Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53766 October 30, 1981
MARIA C. RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Judge JESUS R. DE VEGA of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
Malolos Branch II and the MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY Bulacan, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of a municipality's hiring of private counsel to file a suit in its behalf.
The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, through the law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia (now Cruz
Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday), sued in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan Marciano Domingo,
Leonila Guzman, Maria C. Ramos and Consorcio Cruz for the recovery of its 74-hectare fishpond
(Civil Case No. 5095-M).
In paragraph 19 of the complaint it was alleged that the municipality had obligated itself to pay Cruz
Durian & Academia as attorney's fees not less than twenty percent of the amount to be recovered by
the plaintiff (p. 44, Rollo).
The provincial fiscal of Bulacan and the municipal attorney of Hagonoy entered their appearance as
counsel for the municipality with the manifestation that its private counsel would be under the control
and supervision of those officials. Notwithstanding that appearance, Domingo and Maria C. Ramos
(lessee and sublessee of the fishpond) moved to disqualify the Cruz law firm from serving as
counsel of the municipality.
The trial court denied the motion. It found that Angel Cruz, the head of the law firm, volunteered to
act as counsel for the municipality because he desired to serve his native town.
Ramos and Domingo assailed that order by means of certiorari in the Court of Appeals which in a
decision dated February 15, 1979 sustained the trial court (Ramos vs. Judge Jesus R. de Vega, et
al., CA-G.R. No. SP-7728-R). Ramos brought the case to this Court.
We hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the Cruz law firm to act as
counsel for the municipality in collaboration with the fiscal and the municipal attorney.
That ruling constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it is manifestly a transgression of section
1683 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof

original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal
district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or
municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a
province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
The legislative intent to prohibit a municipality from employing private counsel in its lawsuits is
further implemented by section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264, which provides
that the municipal attorney, as the head of the legal division or office of a municipality, "shall act as
legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be
assigned to him by the council" The municipal attorney is paid out of municipal funds (Sec. 4,
Republic Act No. 5185, Decentralization Act of 1967). He can represent the municipality even without
the fiscal's collaboration (Calleja vs. Court of Appeals, L-22501, July 31,1967,20 SCRA 895).
The questioned-ruling of the two courts also contravenes settled jurisprudence. Applying section
1683, it was held that the municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only
to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it (De Guia vs. Auditor General; L29824, March 29, 197 2, 44 SCRA 169. See Reyes vs. Cornista, 92 Phil. 838, Municipality of
Bocaue vs. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173; Enriquez vs. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932).
Evidently, the lawmaker in requiring that the municipality should be represented in its court cases by
a government lawyer like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal intended that the
municipality should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The lawmaker also
assumed that the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer
handles its litigations.
It is to be expected that the municipal attorney and the fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the
municipality's interests and that, as civil service employees, they could be held accountable for any
misconduct or dereliction of duty.
The Court of Appeals perceived nothing illegal in allowing the Cruz Law Office to represent the
municipality of Hagonoy because lawyer Cruz offered his legal services gratis. Petitioner Ramos in
her second motion for reconsideration called the Court's attention to paragraph 19 of the complaint
wherein the Cruz law firm alleged that the municipality had contracted to pay its lawyer a 20%
contingent fee.
The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated December 6, 1979 said that there was no cogent reason
to reconsider, its decision but at the same time it gave the Cruz law firm fifteen days from notice
within which "to amend the answer (should be complaint) in the trail court by "deleting therefrom the
claim for attorney's fees" and to report such amendment to the Court of Appeals; otherwise, it would
"motu proprio reconsider its decision".
Obviously, the Appellate Court wanted the complaint to conform to its erroneous factual finding that
the Cruz law firm was serving as counsel without compensation. It did not notice that its resolution

was ambivalent because while it denied the second motion for reconsideration, in the same breath it
threatened to "reconsider its decision" if the complaint was not amended.
Following that directive, the Cruz law firm filed in the trial court an amended complaint dated
December 31, 1979 containing the allegation in paragraph 19 thereof that the municipality was
forced to retain the Cruz law firm "as additional counsel under the control and supervision of
plaintiff's principal attorneys and/or the Provincial Fiscal without any obligation to pay attorney's
fees". The prayer for the payment of attorney's fees in the original complaint was eliminated in the
amended complaint.
Ramos contended in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals that the trial court could not admit the
amended complaint because it was immobilized by the restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals did not resolve that contention.
On May 7, 1980, Ramos filed in this Court her petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
wherein she prayed that the Court of Appeals be directed to resolve the issue raised in her second
motion for reconsideration and that the amended complaint should not be taken into consideration
because it was improperly admitted by the trial court.
Although the Court of Appeals was furnished on May 7, 1980 with a copy of that petition, it,
nevertheless, issued a resolution dated May 22, 1981 requiring the Cruz law firm to inform it of "the
further development on the matter" (p. 113, Rollo).
This Court treated Ramos' petition as an appeal from the Appellate Court's decision. Ramos was
confused as to when she would appeal from that decision because, as noted earlier, while the
Appellate Court denied her second motion for reconsideration, the denial was not final since it was
accompanied by the warning that it would "reconsider its decision" if the complaint was not amended
to eliminate the claim of the Cruz law firm for attorney's fees. Hence, the alleged tardiness of the
petition was excusable.
The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with a private law firm
does not legalize the latter's representation of the municipality of Hagonoy in Civil Case No. 5095-M.
While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous arrangement is not allowed in
civil cases wherein a municipality is the plaintiff.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, as complemented by section 3 of the Local
Autonomy Law is clear in providing that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can
represent a municipality in its lawsuits. That provision is mandatory.
The law being clear and unmistakable, there is no room for interpretation or for engrafting upon it
exceptions or qualifications not contemplated therein. As observed by Justice Moreland:
Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them
the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly
harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so
difficult for the public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a given

matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals

with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here
and inserting them there, making them fit personal Ideas of what the legislature
ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings
which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring
until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a
given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its
'interpretation and construction (Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil.
183,188).
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them. They are the very last functions
which a court should exercise. The majority of the laws need no interpretation or
construction. They require only application, and if there were more application and
less construction, there would be more stability in the law, and more people would
know what the law is. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504, 513).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. We hereby declare
that the appearance in the aforementioned case of Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday as counsel
for the municipality of Hagonoy is contrary to law. The municipality should be represented by its
municipal attorney and by the provincial fiscal of Bulacan. The restraining order is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:

I concur on the strictly technical grounds stated in the main opinion. I feel, however, that a
municipality or province should be face to seek the help of competent counsel, if it feels, its case is
of such importance that the services of the fiscal and the municipal attorney would be inadequate
and the assistance of the private counsel is offeredgratis. Anyway, the Cruz Law Office can very well
help the government lawyers without having to make any formal appearance. Withal, perhaps
permission by the Minister of Justice may solve the situation of the municipality.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur on the strictly technical grounds stated in the main opinion. I feel, however, that a
municipality or province should be face to seek the help of competent counsel, if it feels, its case is
of such importance that the services of the fiscal and the municipal attorney would be inadequate
and the assistance of the private counsel is offeredgratis. Anyway, the Cruz Law Office can very well
help the government lawyers without having to make any formal appearance. Withal, perhaps
permission by the Minister of Justice may solve the situation of the municipality.

G.R. No. L-12817

April 29, 1960

JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing
government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities,
municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks and
Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19 September 1955 the
President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing, among others, for the
transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties,
machinery, equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds
and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces,
cities, municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the

municipal council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the
desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the
provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor
transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board
requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council
whether he would handle and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and
test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality,
(Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No.
1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be
brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and
constitutionality of the Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and
passed Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or
proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the
services of a special counsel, and appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses of
litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the
petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action against the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of
Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving Resolution No. 201 of the municipal
council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting
his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional
services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal, if any, to the
appellate courts; that his professional fee shall be P1,500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the
filing of the complaint, P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First
Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become final or, should the judgment be appealed,
after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court; and that the
municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in
the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of
counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex
G). On the same date, 28 June 1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas (civil No. 542, Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the
petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956
(Annex H). On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July
1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of
P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee.
Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer
forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for
pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial
attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the
Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute
in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to
engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the refund to the
petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957
the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he
filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the

Rules of Court Annex N). On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this
Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. When the council is desirous of
securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or
attributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such question in writing and submit the
same to the provincial fiscal for decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. The
provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers,
including district health officers, and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities
and municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so requested, submit his
opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body
pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation.
The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district
thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme
Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof
are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and
counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in
any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality,
the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is
disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case
involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; 1and when in the case
involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act
No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the
case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council
in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part
of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not
constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification.3 And unlike a practising lawyer
who has the right to decline employment,4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on
grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others,
"that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position
upon which he is about to enter. . . ."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the

municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial
fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court,
pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the
municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive
supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J)
and direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and
absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is
untenable. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94,
series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913,
5917, provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government
Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97
Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows:
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from
requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without
authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for
payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.