MANONGSONG VS.

ESTIMO
FACTS:
Allegedly, Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina
Navarro, which is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had
six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez
Manongsong (Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and
Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually sold to them by Justina
Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed of sale dated
October 11, 1957. Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a
Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and award to them of an
area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC ruled that
the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the
property conveyed had a conjugal character and that Agatona Guevarra as her
compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of
the estate under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at
all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force
and effect against Agatona Guevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged
sale of the property by Justina.
RULING:
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a
public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution.
There is no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in the
Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As
opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for
valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the
disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but
merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the
equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.
The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void
ab initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article
160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired
the Property during her marriage.

MAQUILAN VS. MAQUILAN

FACTS:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a
blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their
once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private
respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus,
prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and
the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime
charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered
into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT.
This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
property. The Petition was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for
her to share in the conjugal property?
HELD:
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil
interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as
to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage
his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with
Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from

the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery
does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the
person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter
vivos.

MATTHEWS VS. TAYLOR

FACTS:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject,
married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17- year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989,
while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294
square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly
financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds,
constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a
vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required
permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of
Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their
Boracay property.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property
for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was
signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter
took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.
ISSUES:
The marital consent of respondent Benjamin Taylor is not required in the
agreement of lease dated 20 july 1992. Granting arguendo that his
consent is required, benjamin taylor is deemed to have given his consent
when he affixed his signature in the agreement of lease as witness in the

light of the ruling of the supreme court in the case of spouses pelayo vs.
Melki perez, g.r. no. 141323, june 8, 2005.
The parcel of land subject of the agreement of lease is the exclusive property
of jocelyn c. Taylor, a filipino citizen, in the light of cheesman vs. Iac, g.r.
no. 74833, january 21, 1991.
The courts a quo erroneously applied article 96 of the family code of the
philippines which is a provision referring to the absolute community of
property. The property regime governing the property relations of
benjamin taylor and joselyn taylor is the conjugal partnership of gains
because they were married on 30 june 1988 which is prior to the effectivity
of the family code. Article 96 of the family code of the philippines finds no
application in this case.
The honorable court of appeals ignored the presumption of regularity in the
execution of notarial documents.
The honorable court of appeals failed to pass upon the counterclaim of
petitioner despite the fact that it was not contested and despite the
presentation of evidence establishing said claim.
HELD:
We find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease
between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering
that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said
property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain
Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into
such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor;
no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be
made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of
the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question
the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared
conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right
over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and
the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was

Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner
cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its
validity. With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the
other issues raised by the petitioner.

DE LEON VS. DE LEON

FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for
the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968,
Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On
June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon
full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the
name of Bonifacio, single. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his
sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the
written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo,
and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner
of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his
exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC.
They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio
and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was
the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the
marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
HELD:
Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of

Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after
he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was
made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect,
the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.

IMANI VS. METROPOLITAN BANK

FACTS:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metrobank, with Cesar P. Dazo,
Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and
Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay
Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but
not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of
P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by
promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the
payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon
CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against
CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. RTC ruled in favor
of Metrobank. Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which
was granted on December 7, 1999. A writ of execution was issued against
CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covering a lot
registered in the name of petitioner. Petitioner argued that the subject property
belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the
liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on
execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the
levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor
of Metrobank.
ISSUE:
W/N or not the property in question is conjugal.
RULING:
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.

Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioners assertion. As aptly
ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina
Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired
during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing.

MUNOZ VS. RAMIREZ

FACTS:
Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to the
GSIS to secure a housing loan (200k). Thereafter, they used the money loaned
to construct a residential house on said lot. It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the
spouses a 600k loan, which the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS. The balance
of the loan (400k) will be delivered by MUNOS upon surrender of the title over
the property and an affidavit of waiver of rights (over the property) to be executed
by the husband. While the spouses were able to turn over the title, no affidavit
was signed by the husband. Consequently, MUNOZ refused to give the 400k
balance of the loan and since the spouses could no longer return the 200k (which
was already paid to GSIS), MUNOZ kept the title over the property and
subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in his own name. The spouses
then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the property in favor
of MUNOZ. The RTC ruled that the property was the wifes exclusive paraphernal
property (since she inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is valid
even without the husbands consent. The CA reversed and ruled that while the
property was originally exclusive paraphernal property of the wife, it
became conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a housing loan
that was paid through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void. ISSUE (1): Is the
property paraphernal or conjugal?
RULING: PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule, all property acquired during the
marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In this case,
clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has sufficiently
rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Consequently, the residential
lot is the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of
FC). It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on
Calimlim-Canullas. True, respondents were married during the effectivity of the
CC and thus its provisions should govern their property relations. With the
enactment of the FC however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership
of gains superseded those of the CC. Thus, it is the FC that governs the present
case and not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which supersedes Article
158 of the CC), when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in
the value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement,

the entire property shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to

reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement. In
this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it
is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably
more than the contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the property remained the
exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time she contracted with
MUNOZ; the written consent of the husband was not necessary. ISSUE (2):
Was the transaction a sale or equitable mortgage?
RULING: EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. Under Article 1602 of the CC, a contract is
presumed an equitable mortgage when: (a) price of sale with right to repurchase
is unusually inadequate; (b) vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise; (c) upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase, another
instrument extending the period of redemption is executed; (d) purchase retains
for himself a part of the purchase price; (e) vendor binds himself to pay the taxes
on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case it may be fairly inferred that the real
intention of the parties is for the transaction to secure the payment of a debt. In
this case, considering that (a) the spouses remained in possession of the
property (albeit as lessees thereof); (b) MUNOZ retained a portion of the
purchase price (200k); (c) it was the spouses who paid real property taxes on
the property; and, (d) it was the wife who secure the payment of the
principal debt with the subject property the parties clearly intended an
equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.

PANA VS. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE SR.

FACTS:
Efren Pana (Efren), herein petitioner, his wife Melecia, and another person, were
charged with murder before the RTC of Surigao City. On July 9, 1997, the RTC
rendered its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but finding Melecia and
another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.
The RTC also ordered those found guilty to pay civil indemnity and damages to
the heirs of the victim.On appeal to the Supreme Court, it affirmed the
conviction of both accused but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With
respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of civil
indemnity and damages with modification.Upon motion for execution by the
heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.Hence, Efren
and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that
the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA

dismissed the petition.Thus, Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his
marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains,
given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that
they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.On the other hand, the heirs
argued that the regime of absolute community of property governs the marriage
of Efren and Melecia since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its
provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, and
that the property relation between the couple was changed when the Family
Code took effect in 1988.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be
levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the
murder case?
HELD:
Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification.
CIVIL LAW: conjugal partnership of gains (CPG); fines and pecuniary
indemnities chargeable to CPG
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets
are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in
specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend
to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property
relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting
only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot
be modified except prior to marriage. Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership
of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were
married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that
marriage. Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only
where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and
liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally
separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c)
judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse
abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to
the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the
spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists

in the case of Efren and Melecia.

What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142
of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate
property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. This
means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of
ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically
change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil
Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took
effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate
properties.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on Melecia
may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. Article 121
allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of
the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that
such indemnities may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered. No
prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since
Article 122 states that at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such
offending spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes
above-mentioned.
CA affirmed with modification. The RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first
ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of
spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed
by final judgment on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been
covered.

ALMELOR VS. RTC

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad
(Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and
Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician,
respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the
RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in
the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this

was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a
harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuels
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to
the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged that her
husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She
also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And
she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr.
Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point,
Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical
psychologist, was presented to prove Leonidas claim. She testified that she
conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on
Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She
concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is
marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be
incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility against him
was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the
ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void
due to fraud by reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage,
not homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to
substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed
this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the
public perception of Manuels sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it
against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there
was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven
that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonidas consent had
been vitiated by such.