G.R. No.

174369

June 20, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ZAFRA MARAORAO y MACABALANG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the March 1, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 35, convicting appellant Zafra Maraorao y
Macabalang of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Appellant was charged under an Information3 dated January 4, 2001 filed before the RTC of Manila as follows:
That on or about November 30, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being
authorized by law to possess or use regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing ONE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT ZERO EIGHT ONE (1,280.081) grams of white crystalline
substance known as "shabu" containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.
On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged against
him.4 Trial on the merits ensued.
For the prosecution, PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, they received reliable information
at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that an undetermined amount of shabu will be
delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000,
at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2 Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit went to
the Islamic Center. While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each other.
Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to apprehend
him.5
Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the pavement. He was about to run when
PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The man was later identified as appellant
Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the contents of the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag
containing white crystalline substance, which they suspected to be shabu. At the police station, the investigator
marked the plastic sachet "ZM-1" in the presence of the police officers.6
The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory chemical analysis. When
examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the 1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance
gave a positive result to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her findings are
contained in Chemistry Report No. D-1121-00.7

In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he was going to the place
of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a letter from his mother. He went there early because he
had to report for work at the Port Area in Manila at 8:00 a.m. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag
asked him about a house number which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed
his bag down and asked him again. When they turned around, they saw four men in civilian attire walking
briskly. He only found out that they were police officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the
man ran away, the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware of
what was inside the bag.8
Appellant further narrated that the police arrested him and asked who the owner of the bag was. He replied
that it did not belong to him but to the man who ran away. They made him board a bus-type vehicle and
brought him to the police station in Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was referred to a desk sergeant. The desk
sergeant asked him whether the bag was recovered from him, and he replied that he had no knowledge about
that bag. He was not assisted by counsel during the investigation. He was also incarcerated in a small cell for
about ten days before he was brought to Manila City Jail. At the Office of the City Prosecutor, he met his lawyer
for the first time.9
On September 25, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused ZAFRA MARAORAO y MACABALANG guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of possession of 1,280.081 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride without
license or prescription, penalized under Section 16 in relation to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing said accused to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00, plus the
costs.
In the service of his sentence, the full time during which the accused has been under preventive imprisonment
should be credited in his favor provided that he had agreed voluntarily in writing to abide with the same
disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoner. Otherwise, he should be credited with four-fifths (4/5) only of
the time he had been under preventive imprisonment.
Exhibit B, which consists of 1,280.081 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, is confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the Government. Within ten (10) days following the promulgation of this judgment, the Branch Clerk
of this Court, is ordered to turn over, under proper receipt, the regulated drug involved in this case to the
Dangerous Drugs Custodian, National Bureau of Investigation, as appointed by the Dangerous Drugs Board,
for appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.10
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.11 The entire records of the case were elevated to this Court.
Pursuant to our Decision in People v. Mateo,12 however, the case was transferred to the CA for appropriate
action and disposition.
At the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE FABRICATED AND
COACHED TESTIMONY OF THE STAR PROSECUTION WITNESS.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED'S DEFENSE OF
DENIAL.13
On March 1, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 25
September 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Crim. Case No. 01-188945 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.14
In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that there was no showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied a fact or circumstance of weight and substance which would have affected the
case. It gave credence to the testimony of PO3 Vigilla and found appellant's defense of denial inherently weak.
Furthermore, the CA held that appellant was lawfully searched as a consequence of his valid warrantless
arrest.
Hence, this present recourse.
In his Supplemental Brief,15 appellant stresses that PO3 Vigilla testified that when they first saw appellant, he
was talking with a certain person. It was appellants companion who scampered away upon seeing the police.
PO3 Vigilla further testified that appellant tried to flee but they were able to arrest him before he could do so.
Appellant argues that his alleged attempt to flee does not constitute a crime that should have prompted the
police to arrest him. Since his arrest was illegal, he contends that the subsequent search made by the police
was likewise illegal, and the shabu supposedly recovered from him is inadmissible in evidence.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have
reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case.16
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review. This Court is clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a
just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping
with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt.17
Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, or the shabu in this case, the
prosecution evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the appellant was in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession was
not authorized by law; and (3) the appellant freely and consciously possessed the drug.18 In this case, the fact
of possession by appellant of the bag containing the shabu was not established in the first place.

A careful perusal of the testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a glaring discrepancy which both the trial and the
appellate courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit,19 arresting officers PO3 Vigilla, PO2 Abella, PO1 dela Cruz
and SPO1 Gamit stated that they spotted two unidentified persons standing and seemingly conversing a few
meters ahead of them. "However, when one of them noticed our presence, he hastily r[a]n away heading
towards the Muslim Center leaving behind the other person and a maroon colored bag with Adidas marking in
the pavement." In other words, the maroon bag was left behind by the man who ran away. But at the trial, PO3
Vigilla testified during direct examination that they spotted two persons talking to each other, and upon noticing
them, "one of them scampered away and was chased by my companions while the other one dropped a bag,
sir."20Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by the one who did not run away. Later, in
another part of his testimony, he again changed this material fact. When he was asked by Prosecutor Senados
as to who between the two persons they saw talking to each other ran away, PO3 Vigilla categorically
answered, "[t]he one who is holding a bag, sir."21 Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about
the credibility of the prosecutions principal witness and casts reasonable doubt as to appellants guilt for it
renders questionable whether he in fact held the bag with intention to possess it and its contents.
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime
charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.22 While a lone witness testimony is sufficient to
convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must be clear, consistent, and crediblequalities we
cannot ascribe to this case. Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must
both come from a credible witness and be credible in itself tested by human experience, observation,
common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years.23 Clearly from the foregoing,
the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed in possession
ofshabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out
by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the
offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of
the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.24 In this case, the prosecutions evidence
failed to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment.1wphi1 Where there is reasonable doubt,
the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution
presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven
with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored,
and exoneration granted as a matter of right.25
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 1, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01600 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang is hereby ACQUITTED of the
offense charged.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the
latter is being lawfully held for other cause/s; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons
for his confinement, within five (5) days from notice.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137599

October 8, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GILBERT BAULITE and LIBERATO BAULITE, accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
Appeal seeking to reverse the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, at Kidapawan City, Branch 17
finding accused Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and
sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Delia Jacobo Lano in the sum of
P50,000.00, with costs.
On December 1, 1993, Eddie Arguelles, a farmer, passed by a river on his way to Old Bunawan, Tulunan,
Cotabato. In the river, he saw two men Gilbert and Liberato Baulite washing their bloodied hands. Eddie
continued on his way after seeing them. Upon reaching the road, he hear a boy shouting that somebody was
found dead.
Jonathan Cando, a civilian volunteer, was on horseback crossing a river on his way to Bunawan. He heard a
woman crying "indi" "indi". He checked his left, and approximately six (6) meters away, he saw a person
mounting somebody, as if choking the one mounted. He went to the barangay captain and related what he
heard and saw. The barangay captain, however, dismissed the incident, speculating that the two were "only
sweethearts."
Around 3 to 4 in the afternoon of the same day, a boy found the body of Delia Jacobo Lano, Delia was a public
school teacher at Old Bunawan, Datu Paglas and a resident of Maybula, Tulunan, Cotabato. An examination of
her body revealed that Delia suffered a three-inch-deep punctured wound between her eyes, a smashed face
(left side) and a bruised neck (upper portion). Vaginal smear test also found her positive for (dead)

spermatozoa. However, there were no indications that Delia's genitalia sustained any laceration. The medical
examiner opined that Delia had probably delivered several children. The examination was conducted
approximately five (5) to six (6) hours after Delia died.
On December 7, 1993, 2nd assistant provincial prosecutor of Cotabato Alfonso B. Dizon, Jr., filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, at Kidapawan an information for rape with homicide against Gilbert Baulite and
Liberato Baulite, the two men caught wshing their bloodied hands by the river. The information reads:
"That on or about December 1, 1993. At Barangay New Bunawan, Municipality of Tulunan, Province of
Cotabato, Philippines, the above named accused, with lewd design, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of
force and intimidation succeeded in having sexual intercourse with one DELIA JAGOBO LANO against
her will, and thereafter said accused, with intent to kill with personal violence, strangulated the victim
with the use of a hand as shoen by finger nails marking which caused hematoma of the upper portion of
the neck and likewise with the use of a sharp object, inflicted punctured wound (sic) located just above
and between the eyes, three (3) inched deep, directed and posteriorly and superiorly and multiple
fracture of the bone of the left face with hematoma of both eyes, which injuries is (sic) the direct and
proximate cause of death of said DELIA JOCOBO LANO."2
On June 23, 1994, the trial court arraigned the accused. They each pleaded not guilty.3
After due trial, on November 25, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty of rape
with homicide, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
"Prescinding from the foregoing facts and considerations, the Court finds accused Gilbert Baulite and
Liberato Baulite guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime charged, accused Liberato Baulite and
Gilbert Baulite are hereby sentenced each to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Consonant with
the recent jurisprudence, both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Delia Jacobo Lano
the sum of P50,000.00
"With costs de oficio.1wphi1.nt
IT IS SO ORDERED.4
On December 29, 1998, the accused filed a notice of appeal.5
The issues in the appeal are: (1) Was the guilt of the accused-appellants proved beyond reasonable doubt? (2)
Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict the accused-appellants?
The Trial court convicted the accused on the basis of the following circumstantial evidence, namely:
a) A witness saw accused-appellants Gilbert and Liberato Baulite washing their bloodied hands;
b) A boy was heard shouting that somebody was found dead;
c) A witness hear a woman shouting "indi" "indi" who was being choked and later the dead body of
Delia Lano was found.6

An autopsy revealed that the body of Delia Lano sustained a three-inch-deep punctured wound between the
eyes and a smashed face.7
Accused-appellants explained that the blood in their hands was that of a chicken that they had dressed
recently.8
Witness Jonathan Cando heard a woman shouting "indi", "indi", then saw a person mounting somebody as if
choking the person mounted. However, in the absence of an eye-witness identifying the person choking,
accused-appellants would not necessarily be incriminated in the crime. Subsequent examination of the body of
Delia Lano revealed that she was choked, as evidenced by the finger markings or hematoma on the upper
portion of her neck. The fact that the upper portion of the neck was the one severely injured is physical
evidence consistent with the scenario that one in a mounting position applied pressure or choking in the upper
portion of the neck of person "mounted." The prosecution, unfortunately, failed to positively identify the person
"mounting and choking" the victim.9
In light of the prosecution's evidence, we are not convinced that the guilt of the accused has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. "The rule is clear. The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution, on its part, must rely on the strength of its own evidence and must not simply depend
on the weakness of the defense. The slightest possibility of an innocent man being convicted for an offense he
has never committed, let alone when no less than the capital punishment is imposed, would be far more
dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for a crime he may have perpetrated."10 "On the whole
then, the scanty evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. It does not
pass the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to rebut the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees the accused. It isapropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt."11
Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there must be an even greater need to apply the rule that the
prosecution depends not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of its own evidence. Conviction
must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilty of the accused. "For circumstantial evidence to
convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is more than one circumstance: (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. On the latter, decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence
presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person."12
The Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the accused.13 We agree.
We find the circumstantial evidence adduced not sufficient to support a finding that both accused-appellants
were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. To begin with, witness Jonathan Cando was no
able to identify either the woman victim or the person choking the victim.14
We cannot conclude with certainly that the blood in the hands of the accused-appellant was the blood of the
victim, and that the person choking her was one of the accused-appellants. Speculations and probabilities
cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.15 In a
criminal case, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account.16

In our criminal justice, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.17 Where there is reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the accused, he must be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted since the
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can only be overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.18
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused-appellant, they must be acquitted.
"Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof that produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the
constitutional duty of the court to acquit them.19
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite
are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in Criminal Case 2834 of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato,
Kidapawan, on reasonable doubt.1wphi1.nt
Costs de oficio.
The Director, Bureau of Corrections is ordered to release the accused-appellants immediately unless held for
another cause. He shall inform the Court of such release or the reason for non-release within ten (10) days
from notice.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91283 January 17, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO ALCANTARA y GACAD, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is the plight of a poor man with only a third-grade education. He was illegally arrested, 1 arbitrarily
detained, 2tortured into confessing his guilt, convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Insisting that his guilt was not established with moral certainty, he appeals his
conviction to this Court. We find merit in his cause.

On September 7, 1988, appellant was arraigned under an Information, dated August 10, 1988, charging
him and four others with the crime of "Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide." 3 Appellant pleaded not guilty. The other accused remained at large.
Trial ensued. The prosecution evidence showed that Dr. Remedios Patricio owned a ten-wheeler truck
with Plate Number NFS 230 which was used in her hauling business. Her brother-in-law, Venancio
Patricio, worked for her as a truck driver. In the morning of July 19, 1988, Venancio, accompanied by
helper Larry Salvador, drove the truck to the Coca-cola plant in Antipolo. There, it was loaded with six
hundred (600) cases of softdrinks (Coke 500) for delivery to the Coca-Cola sales office in Makati. 4
They were about to leave the Antipolo plant at ten o'clock that night when appellant approached Salvador
to hitch for a ride. After ascertaining that Salvador knew appellant, Venancio accommodated appellant's
request. Appellant had four (4) companions. As Venancio drove, appellant and Salvador engaged in
animated conversation. Salvador did not introduce appellant to Venancio. 5
Near the Meralco building at Ortigas Avenue, appellant poked a gun and grabbed the steering wheel from
Venancio. 6 Venancio and Salvador were tied up by appellant's companions, and were made to lie on the
back seat of the truck. Appellant drove the ten-wheeler to the North Diversion Road where they stopped.
Venancio and Salvador were brought down from the vehicle. Appellant talked to two (2) of his companions
who thereafter stabbed Venancio and Salvador. Appellant's group drove away, leaving Venancio and
Salvador bleeding to death. 7
With his last ounce of strength, Venancio managed to free himself and struggled towards the road. There
he was stopped by CDCP patrolmen who brought the two (2) victims to the MCU Hospital. Salvador, who
suffered two (2) stab wounds, 8 was dead upon arrival. Venancio was luckier, and survived to tell his tale. 9
The hijacked ten-wheeler was found abandoned along the southern lane of the North Diversion Road,
between the Malinta and Valenzuela exits. Members of the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group arrived on
the scene at around 2:30 a.m. of July 20, 1988 found the truck's 600 case cargo intact. Two (2) members
of the group proceeded to the MCU hospital, but desisted from getting any information from Venancio who
was then undergoing emergency treatment. 10
On July 25, 1988, operatives of Precinct 10 of the Western Police District arrested appellant in the vicinity
of Otis Street in Pandacan, Manila. A few days later, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway
Patrol Group. CHPG Sgt. Alberto Awanan brought the appellant to the MCU hospital and was presented to
Venancio for identification. 11 According to Sgt. Awanan, Venancio nearly fainted and exclaimed, "Iyan,
iyan ang umagaw ng manibela ko," 12 upon seeing appellant. The act of Venancio pointing to appellant as
the culprit was photographed. 13
After the confrontation, appellant was brought to the CHPG Headquarters at Camp Crame. He wilted
under interrogation and confessed his participation in the crime. This is evidenced by the two (2)
statements, both dated July 29, 1988, duly signed by him. 14
Dr. Patricio testified she spent P28,377.00 for the hospitalization of Venancio and P25,897.90 for the
hospital and funeral expenses of Salvador. Dr. Alberto Reyes, medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified on
the autopsy he conducted on the body of Salvador. On the other hand, Dr. Henry Falcotelo, resident
phycisian of the MCU Hospital, testified on the stab wound sustained by Venancio.

On August 15, 1988, 15 "Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide" charge was filed against
appellant with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, and the case was raffled off to Branch 156. 16
Appellant's defense consisted mainly of denial and alibi. He testified that on the morning of July 19, 1988,
he went to the Coca-cola plant in Otis Street, Pandacan, Manila, in search of work as a driver. He stayed
put even after he was told that there was no work available. He wanted to find out from truckers returning
from the Coca-cola plant in Antipolo whether drivers were needed there. 17 Until July 21, 1988, he
remained in the vicinity of Otis Street, especially around the area where the delivery trucks of the plant are
parked. 18 During his three-day stay in the area , he mingled with other drivers and truck helpers, and slept
either in parked trucks or on a branches of nearby camachile tree. 19On the afternoon of the third day,
though still without work, he decided to go home to
Cavite. 20
On July 25, 1988, he returned to Pandacan, this time with the intention of applying to Concepcion
Trucking located across Otis street from the Coca-cola plant. 21 He arrived at nine o'clock in the morning.
While eating at the plant, he was arrested by members of the Western Police District and brought to its
Precinct 10. He denied any knowledge of the "hit" on the Coca-cola delivery truck. He remained in the
custody of the police for two days and two nights. On the third day of his detention, he was turned over to
the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. 22
Appellant was the brought to the MCU hospital. He was made to confront Venancio whom he saw for the
first time. CHPG Sgt. Awanan asked Venancio twice if appellant was among those who hijacked the truck
he was driving. On both times, Venancio did not respond. 23
Undaunted, Sgt. Awanan, called to a photographer present, forced appellant to stand about a foot from
Venancio, and told the latter to just point at the suspect. "Basta ituro mo lang," Sgt. Awanan directed.
Venancio obeyed, and pictures of him pointing to the suspect were taken. 24
From the hospital, appellant was brought to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at
Camp Crame. Without being apprised of his rights nor provided with counsel, he was interrogated and
urged to confess his guilt. He balked. At ten o'clock that night, hours after questioning began, appellant's
interrogators started boxing him and kicking him. He was also hit on the back with a chair, and
electrocuted. Still, he refused to admit to the crime. 25
In the midst of his ordeal, appellant heard someone say, "Tubigan na iyan." He was then blindfolded and
brought to another room where he was made to lie down. Water was slowly and continuously poured on
his face, over his mouth. As time passed by, appellant like he was dying. 26
Appellant could no longer bear the pain caused by the water treatment. Finally, he confessed to being one
of the hijackers. His torture ended. He was led to another room, where he was handcuffed and left until
the following day, July 29, 1988. Later, he was made to sign prepared statements containing his full
confession. 27
At the close of trial, accused was found guilty and sentenced as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused ALFREDO ALCANTARA y
GACAD guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "robbery with homicide" under

Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetuawith all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of Larry
M. Salvador in the amount of P30,000.00, to pay Venancio Patricio the sum of P20,000.00
as moral damages, to pay Mrs. Remedios Patricio the sum of P54,275.21 by way of
reimbursement of the hospitalization expenses of Venancio Patricio and burial and other
expenses for Larry M. Salvador and the additional sum of P15,000.00 for the repair of her
truck, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In the service of the sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his
preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court held:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Venancio Patricio's categorical declarations that it was accused who grabbed from him
the steering wheel of the truck and urged his two (2) companions to stab him and his helper
companion resulting in the death of the latter and thereafter, took the truck, are entitled to
far more credence then the accused's denial and uncorroborated defense of alibi.
It cannot gainsaid that alibi is a weak defense. In the face of Venancio Patricio's positive
identification of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime, the alibi dwindles into
nothingness. . . . True enough, Venancio Patricio failed to pinpoint the accused when he first
testified in Court but it was due to the fright and the blurredness of vision which the said
witness was suffering at that time. However, when he regained his emotional composure,
he readily identified the accused when asked by the prosecuting fiscal during the
continuation of his testimony. Besides, accused was previously identified by the same
witness when the former was presented to him while in the hospital. Furthermore, the same
witness was familiar with the accused having previously seen him at the Manila Coca-cola
plant in Otis and ridden the truck he was driving.
The same conclusion is reached even if the Court disregards the in-custody confession of
the accused for being patently violative of the mandate of the Constitution. The confession
was extracted as result of torture, intimidation, force, threats violence and coercion upon the
person of the accused and without the assistance of counsel. However, accused's
conviction is not solely based on said forced confession but on the strength of the remaining
evidence of the prosecution which is more than sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt.
Accused acted in concert with his cohorts in perpetrating the crime of robbery with homicide
and frustrated homicide. For evidence of conspiracy to be clear and convincing, it is not
essential that there be eyewitnesses testifying to the actual conversation, agreements and
acts of the accused as they conspired together to commit the offense. . . . Conspiracy can
also be established from the various circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense . . . or from a number of facts done in pursuance of a common unlawful
purpose. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

As all the elements of robbery, namely, intent to gain, unlawful taking of personal property to
another and violence against or intimidation of any person (Article 293, Revised Penal
Code) have been duly approved in the instant case, the crime committed is robbery
complexed with homicide the death of Larry Salvador) and frustrated homicide (committed
against Venancio Patricio, who sustained a stab wound at the third intercoastal space of the
ribs and which stab wound serious enough to have produced death were it not for the
prompt and skillful medical treatment extended him.) However, in line with the
pronouncement of the High Court in People vs. Alvares, et al., G.R. No. 70446, promulgated
on January 31, 1989, the frustrated homicide committed against Venancio Patricio as well
as the killing of Larry M. Salvador should be merged in the composite, integrated whole,
that is robbery with homicide, it being evident that the killing and the frustrated homicide
were perpetrated with the sole end in view of eliminating opposition to the robbery or
suppressing the evidence or both. . . . 28
It is this conviction that is the subject of the present appeal.
We find reasonable doubt in appellant's guilt. We reverse.
In the case of People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59, 63 (1971), this Court held, viz.:
. . . (T)he starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. That is a right safeguarded . . . appellants. Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate
that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their
behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most
careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently or
whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is
thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must satisfied that on the defendant could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that
it amounted to crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
A thorough reading of the records of the case shows that the people's evidence fails to meet the quantum
required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Thus, regardless of the weakness of
appellant's defense of denial and uncorroborated alibi, he is entitled to an acquittal.
First, we do not agree to the trial court that appellant was positively identified as the perpetrator of the
crime at bench. Indeed, in his direct testimony on November 21, 1988, Venancio failed to identify the
appellant in open court, and actually pointed to another person as the suspect, viz.:

Q: What is your occupation, Mr. Witness?

A: A driver, sir.
Q: Who is the owner of the vehicle that you are driving?
A: Dra. Remedios Patricio, sir.
Q: Since when had you been driving the vehicle of Dra. Patricio?
A: Since 1985, sir.
Q: When you said 1985, are you telling the Court until now you are a driver?
A: Until the time when we were hijacked. But as of now, I could not drive
anymore.
Q: Will you please tell the Court the description of the truck of the vehicle you
were driving for Dra. Patricio till the time you said you were hijacked?
A: Plate No. NFS 230, sir.
Q: Will you please tell the Court how big is the truck?
A: The body is 32 feet, sir.
Q: What was it used for?
A: For hauling Coca-Cola, sir.
Q: Where did you get Coca-Cola?
A: From Antipolo plant in Sumulong highway, sir.
Q: Do you remember where you were on the night of July 19, 1988?
A: We were in Antipolo and we hauled Coca-Cola, sir.
Q: Were you able to haul Coca-Cola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else happened after you hauled Coca-Cola?
A: We were supposed to deliver the Coca-Cola to Makati sales office in
Makati.
Q: Were you able to deliver that Coca-Cola bottles to Makati?

A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because something happened, sir.
Q: What happened?
A: We were hijacked, sir.
Q: You said you were hijacked. What do you mean?
A: They poked something on us and they grabbed the manibela, sir.
COURT:
How many poked something on you?
A: Two, Your Honor.
FISCAL:
Who were these people who poked a gun on you?
A: I only know one of them, sir.
Q: Who is that person you know?
A: Alcantara, sir.
Q: If he is inside the Court room, will you please stand up and look around
and point to him if he is here?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as Michael Balugo, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Are you feeling okay this morning, Mr. witness?
A: I am nervous, Your Honor.
COURT:
You will be cross-examined later on. The Court is giving you another chance
to look around the courtroom since you testified that certain Alcantara poked

something on you. This Court is operating on rules of evidence. You may take
a second look inside this courtroom and see if Alcantara is inside the
courtroom this morning. You will have to tell the truth. If the Court finds out
that you are not telling the truth, you will be held for contempt.
FISCAL:
The witness as I look is hiding something, Your Honor.
COURT:
You cannot hide something in a capital offense like this. You owe it to yourself
and the country as well.
ATTY. VALERO:
I have not entered my appearance in this case, but Dra. Patricio would like to
manifest that the witness just recovered from an illness and he may not be
well enough, Your Honor. He is nervous and afraid. If the Court would grant a
continuance in this case so that he can regain his composure.
COURT:
Granted. Let the hearing be continued for another date.

29

During the next hearing on December 7, 1988, Venancio correctly identified appellant in an open court.
Even then, Venancio's credibility has been seriously damaged. There was no reason for him to err. By his
own admission, 30 appellant was familiar to him. He claimed that he had frequently seen appellant around
Coca-Cola Antipolo plant during the three-year period prior to the hijacking. He had even given appellant a
free ride on his truck from Antipolo to Pandacan on one occasion. Before the hearing of November 21,
1988, he was also allegedly able to identify appellant as the person who grabbed the steering wheel of his
truck when it was hijacked. The identification took place at the MCU hospital on July 26, 1988 where
Venancio was then confined. The pretext that Venancio was not feeling during the hearing of November
21, 1988 is not convincing. It is not supported by any evidence except the say so of Venancio and his
counsel.
Nor was it correct for the trial court to give too much weight to Venancio's alleged previous identification of
appellant at the MCU hospital. The testimony of Sgt. Awanan in this regard leaves much to be desired. To
begin with, the credibility of the law enforcers who make a mockery of the constitutional rights of an
accused during an investigation is highly suspect. Those who out of court violate without any compunction
constitutional rights which we hold sacrosanct are prone to prevaricate in court similarly without any
qualm. Their prevarications are also intended to save their own skin. Indeed, in the case at bench, the
testimony of Sgt. Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio. But even if the identification did take place,
still its fairness is highly suspect. Appellant testified as a follows:
xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many days have you been detained at Precinct 10 before you were
brought to MCU Hospital, sir.
A: Two days and two nights, sir.
Q: And from Precinct 10, what was the place to where you were brought?
A: At MCU Hospital, sir.
Q: What happened at MCU Hospital?
A: Before bringing into a room, we were stopped by one of the escorts in an
alley.
Q: The room, in the room that you were brought, what did you find there,
please describe the room?
A: What I saw was a male person who seems to be patient, sir.
Q: What happened there inside the room with that patient?
A: He was asked by Sgt. Awanan if I was one of those who "tumira sa kanila".
Q: Who was being asked by Sgt. Awanan?
A: The male person, sir.
Q: Are you referring to the patient?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did the patient answer Sgt. Awanan?
A: He did not answer, sir.
Q: What happened next when the patient did not answer?
A: I heard the woman near him asking for a photographer or to call for a
photographer.
Q: Was there any photographer who came?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did the photographer do?
A: When the photographer arrived, he was asked again by Sgt. Awanan if I
was one of the companions of those persons who "tumira sa kanya."

Q: After Sgt. Awanan asked the person the second time, what did you notice if
any that transpired next?
A: The patient did not say anything.
Q: For how long, or how many length of time did the patient continue to do
nothing?
A: Perhaps for about 20 seconds, sir.
Q: In doing nothing for about twenty seconds, what happened next, if any?
A: What Sgt. Awanan said is that "Basta ituro mo na lang."
Q: Hearing that from Sgt. Awanan, what happened next?
A: I was asked by them to go near the patient and from there, I was pointed to
and the pictures were taken, sir.
Q: How near, how much distance did you get near the patient?
A: More or less one arm length, sir.
Q: Was there anyone beside you when you were pointed out?
A: None, sir.
Q: Approximately how much distance is the next person aside from the
patient which is nearest to you when you were pointed to by the patient?
A: More or less about two arms length, sir.
Q: When you were brought inside the room at the MCU Hospital, who were
coming with you aside from your escorts, if any?
A: What I only knew was Sgt. Awanan and his two other companions, sir.
Q: Did you remember if there was any who were joining you as among the
target of endeavor to pinpoint a person, was there any other person aside
from you who was made to pinpoint, if any?
A: No more, sir.
Q: What else if anything else happened aside from the pinpointing to you
inside the room of MCU Hospital?

A: That's all, sir, after I was being photographed, I was brought to Camp
Crame, sir. 31
Despite the damaging character of appellant's charge, the prosecution failed to present any witness to
rebut it. Yet according to Sgt. Awanan, the identification was made "in the presence of the CAPCOM, the
policeman and myself." 32 Due process demands that identification procedure of criminal suspects must be
free from impermissible suggestions. As appropriately held in US vs. Wade, 33 "the influence of improper
suggestion upon identifying witness probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other
single factor."
Secondly, this court observes basic contradictions between the testimony of Venancio and his affidavit
taken by the Constabulary. Particularly irreconcilable is the number of hijackers who snatched the subject
truck. In his testimony, Venancio only identified appellant, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
(Atty. Fernandez):
In what place of the truck did the accused ride in your truck?
A: In Antipolo plant, Sumulong highway, sir.
Q: What time?
A: 10:00 o'clock in the evening, sir.
Q: Did the accused approach you for riding in your car?
A: He approached my helper, sir.
Q: Where were you?
A: Behind the steering wheel, sir.
Q: Where was your helper?
A: In front, at the right side of the vehicle, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said the accused approached your helper?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: I asked him if he knew the accused.

Q: What was the answer of your helper?

A: He answered yes and that is the reason why I allowed him to ride.

34

In glaring contrast to Venancio's testimony before the trial court, stands his affidavit dated July 27, 1988
(Exh. "C"), wherein he made the following unequivocal narration:
Ako po ay nagmamaneho ng isang trak na "Ten Wheeler" na pag-aari ng aking hipag na
may plakang NFS 230 at may lulan kaming "Soft drinks na COKE". Noong gabi ng July 19,
1988 mga bandang alas diyes (10:00 P.M.) galing ako sa planta ng Coca-Cola sa may
Sumulong Highway, Antipolo, Rizal at minamaneho ko ang trak na may kargang 600 ng
kahon ng Coke 500. Kasama ko ang aking helper na si LARRY SALVADOR. Mula sa
nasabing planta may limang (5) lalaki na nakiusap na makisakay at sinabing bababa daw
sila sa may EDSA crossing. Palibhasa'y matagal ko nang nakikita yong mga limang lalaki
roon sa planta na nag-iistambay paminsan-minsan ay pinayagan ko silang makisakay.
Habang ako ay nagmamaneho katabi ang tatlong lalaki sa harap kasama ang aking helper
samantalang tatlo ang nasa likod na upuan "Backseat". Pagkagaling namin doon sa planta
daang Sumulong, kumaliwa ako ng Tuazon Avenue at kumanan ng Marcos Highway at
kumaliwa uli sa Rodriguez Avenue, patungong EDSA at nang bago kami makarating sa
MERALCO, bigla na lamang ako tinutukan ng Beinte Nueve (FAN KNIFE) sa may leeg at
sinabing Makisama na lamang ako. Yung aking helper naman ay tinutukan din ng balisong.
Yung lalaking aking nasa kanan ang umagaw ng manibela at habang tumatakbo ang
sasakyan, ako ay tinalian ng mga basahan sa bibig, ang aking dalawang kamay sa likod at
aking paa hanggang sa pinahiga sa likuran ng upuan sa "Backseat". Ang aking helper ay
ganon din, tinalian sa bunganga, kamay at paa at pinahiga sa harap. sinabi sa aking noon
lalaking umagaw ng manibela na "Makisama na lamang ako" para hindi ako masaktan.
Sumagot naman akong kunin na lamang nila ang gusto nila huwag lang kaming sasaktan.
Tuloy-tuloy ang takbo ng trak habang kami ng helper ko ay nakatali at nakahiga. Narinig ko
lamang sa isa kanila na nagsabing ipasok na lang natin sa Diversion Road. Mula doon sa
toll gate ng Diversion Road, tatlong beses kaming huminto. Noong una, narinig kong may
nagsabi na Huwag nating ibaba dito may mga bahay. Umusad uli kami hanggang sa isang
banda na madilim sa may diversion road ay binuhat kami at ibinaba sa trak at itinali sa may
bakuran na alambre. Habang nakatali kami, naguusap yong limang lalaki sa ibabang
gawing pintuan ng trak habang umaandar ang makina ng trak. Sinabi noong nagmamaneho
ng trak na bali siya ang naguutos lahat ng ginagawa nila ay, sige iwanan na natin yang
dalawa at bago sila umalis, dalawang lumapit sa amin at inundayan na ako ng saksak sa
kaliwang dibdib. Samantalang yong isang kasama ay sinaksak din yong helper kong si
Larry Salvador nang dalawang beses. Isa sa harap at isa sa likod. Nakalogmok si
SALVADOR, at ako naman ay nagpupumilit na alisin ang pakatali namin sa bakod. Nakaalis
na ang trak lulan noon limang lalaki at nakahulagpos din ako sa pagkakatali, bagamat ako
ay sugatan hanggang naglulukso-lukso ako sa tabi ng highway upang tumawag ng saklolo.
Mabuti na lamang at may dumating ng Mobile ng expressway at sinabi kong kami-hinoldap
at pingsasaksak at dinala nga kami rito sa hospital. Hindi ko alam ang sumunod na
pangyayari.

There are other discrepancies between Venancio's testimony and his affidavit before the CHPG. In his
affidavit, he also claimed that their stabbing was preceded by a conference by appellant and
his four companions and that he saw his helper stabbed twice. In contrast, he testified in court viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
(Court)
Q: Are you sure now that the person you pointed to earlier is the very person
who grabbed the steering wheel from you?
A: Yes. Your Honor.
Q: What else did the accused, the person whom you pointed to earlier, do to
you as far as you can remember now?
A: After grabbing the steering wheel, his companions tied us and we were
asked to lie down inside the truck, Your Honor.
Q: Specifically, do you know the participation of the accused herein aside
from grabbing the steering wheel from you?
A: When we reached North Expressway, we were asked to go down the
vehicle and the two of us, we were asked to alight from the vehicle and we
were tied to the fence of the expressway. Before stabbing us, he talked with
the two who stabbed us, Your Honor.
Q: You said you are referring to whom?
A: To Alfredo Alcantara. He was the one who talked with his two other
companions, Your Honor.
Q: And thereafter, what happened?
A: After they have talked with each other , they stabbed us, Your Honor.
Q: Who stabbed you?
A: His two companions, Your Honor.
Fiscal Bayani:
After stabbing you, what did Alcantara and his two other companions do?
A: After we were stabbed, they boarded the vehicle and they left the place,
sir.

xxx xxx xxx

(Fiscal Bayani):
Do you know how many stab wounds this Larry Salvador received when you
were both stabbed by these people including the accused in this case?
A: I saw only one, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)
These discrepancies cannot be overlooked considering their quantity and quality.
It has been stated often enough that conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution, and not
the weakness of the defense. 35 The obligation is upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused, and not the accused to show his innocence. When, as in the case at bench, the evidence
fro the prosecution is not enough to sustain conviction, it must be rejected, and the accuse-appellant
absolved and released at once. 36
The Court takes this opportunity to bewail the blatant violation of the constitutional rights of appellant as
an accused. Appellant belongs to the economically deprived in our society. He is nearly illiterate. Our
Constitution and our laws strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay desideratum that those
who have less in life should have more in law. The policeman and Constabulary Highway Patrol Group
officers who apprehended and investigated appellant showed little respect for our rule of law. The records
show that they illegally arrested appellant, arbitrarily detained, physically abused and coerced him to
confess to a crime penalized by nothing less than reclusion perpetua. Too often, our law enforcers, in
haste to solve crimes, strip people accused of serious offenses of the sanctity of their constitutional rights.
It is again time pound on these law enforcers with the crania of cavern men that the guarantees of the
rights of an accused in the Constitution are not mere saccharine statements but the bedrock of our liberty.
If we allow a meltdown of these guarantees, our democracy will be a delusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is GRANTED. The conviction of ALFREDO GACAD ALCANTARA by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156, dated November 17, 1989 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,

vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and
broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the
Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of
the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of
the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of
the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and
that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the
pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio
coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his
experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert
commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a
decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be served
through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.1wphi1.nt
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds
no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television
of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members,1 the Court denies the motion
for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, 2 has resolved to
order the audio-visual recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.lawphil.net
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording
of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes.
Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its
decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant
to law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and
the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The
trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not
be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be
included in the documentary except annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are
depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan
or its Division as the case may be.

There are several reasons for such televised recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is
under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada
cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their
government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The
recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite
do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of appellate
courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or
becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be
checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the
proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their
roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be allayed. The possibility that parallel
trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just
determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular
tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be assumed, is the
concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the
tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By
delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served by audio-visual recordings
without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty.
Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day
Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy
has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character."6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is made of
the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such
documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes clbres was
made was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An
educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting
arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the case was
concluded -- concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.

No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which the
truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through
presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their
responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And
yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with
the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I would be prepared to
welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an
agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a desperate
need.7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its
recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts,
especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for
public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is
hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial
shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should
not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may
be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have
rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of
court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed,
the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch
10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (now Provincial
Prosecutor) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in behalf of the People of the Philippines, assailing the judgment of
respondent Judge Ernesto M. Mendoza in Crim. Case No. 4264 acquitting accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion,
private respondent herein, of the crime of robbery with force upon things notwithstanding his plea of guilt.
Petitioner prays that respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his judgment exonerating Magalop and, instead,
to impose upon him the proper penalty for the offense to which he pleaded guilty.
The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home
Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked. After an on-the-spot investigation, the police found
themselves at a loss as to the identity of the culprit or culprits. The value of the missing articles was estimated
at P15,298.15.
Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force upon things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y
Salvacion, Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky. All three (3) were represented by
District Citizens Attorney Isidro L. Caracol. At the arraignment on 23 June 1987, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while
Fernandez pleaded "not guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not mentally well."
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court a quo conducted trial. The prosecution presented Pat.
Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as well as a clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The
prosecution likewise offered in evidence colored pictures of the ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers
colored blue, a pair of long-nose pliers colored red, and a coping saw. The last three items were said to have
been recovered by the police.
The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the case was submitted for decision.
On 8 October 1987, respondent Judge acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded
guilty to the charge. The two-paged, single-spaced judgment is quoted hereunder for careful scrutiny and
better appreciation. Thus

This is a case where three accused were allegedly responsible for forcibly taking things from the
storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries.
It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of
Home Industries at Maramag, Bukidnon, on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as shown by the
testimonies of the policemen and by the keepers of the storeroom. After on the spot
investigation, the policemen were at a loss to identify the person or persons responsible thereof.
Except for the accused Juan Magalop who pleaded guilty, the identity of the perpetrators
remained a problem. Accused Ricarte Dahilan is mentally deranged; hence the trial was
separate for accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop.
As shown by the evidence of the prosecution, some of the stolen things were in the possession
of a certain Babie Tan, consisting of two pliers and a saw, and these were all allegedly sold to
said Babie Tan who refused to testify on the matter.
The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the three accused were responsible for
stealing these three articles or tools.
Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty, it was not shown who (how?) they conspired and helped
each other in the commission of the crime charged. To the Court, the plea of Juan Magalop was
not intelligently done. In the course of the proceedings, it was not established how Juan
Magalop and Petronilo Fernandez participated in the looting. No evidence was introduced to
show that the accused sold the stolen things to Babie Tan, which the prosecution could have
proved to show that the possessors of the stolen things could have been identified as the thief
or thieves; hence, the prosecution utterly failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
doubt (emphasis supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop are hereby
ACQUITTED. With respect to Ricarte Dahilan, let this case be held in abeyance until he is
mentally well. 1
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us contending that the decision of 8
October 1987 and the order of 4 November 1987 denying reconsideration are "purely capricious and arbitrary,
made for no proper reason at all and rendered without legal authority whatsoever, thereby amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion, and curtailed the power of the state to punish criminals." 2
Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop, who was assisted by counsel, had voluntarily, spontaneously and
intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with force upon things. Thus, the trial court had no alternative
but to pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty.
Parenthetically, petitioner interposed no objection to the acquittal of accused Fernandez.
It may be stressed that the petition is defective since it was filed by the Provincial Fiscal and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not by the Solicitor General. We have already ruled in a number
of cases that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines
once such actions are brought before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 3 As a matter of fact, in his
Manifestation filed with this Court on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General steered away from the case, explaining

that the petition was filed directly by the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, "without coursing it through
the OSG," as a consequence of which it should be the fiscal who should submit the required pleadings.
Nonetheless, even if we overlook this procedural lapse and treat the case on the merits, the petition should,
just the same, be dismissed.
Petitioner would have this Court set aside the acquittal of Magalop, insisting that with his voluntary plea of guilt,
the trial court had no other recourse but to pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge
and understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information as well as the consequences
of his plea. 4 It is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right
to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by
law under the circumstances. 5Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when the
accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine
the penalty to be imposed. 6
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in
holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the
evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded
guilty to the charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the plea may
be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made.
Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case of the prosecution against the three (3) accused was
virtually non-existent as the asported articles were found in the possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet,
quite inexplicably, the prosecution did not summon him to the witness stand. Babie Tan could have positively
identified those who sold him the stolen articles if called to testify. Or, he could very well have been the
perpetrator of the crime himself. In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into possession of
stolen effects, the possessor is presumed to be the author of the crime of robbery. 7
Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits introduced during the trial could breathe life into the
moribund state of the case for the prosecution. While the loss of articles in the storeroom of the BNSHI was
established, there was nothing, independent of the acknowledgment of guilt, which could link accused Magalop
to the robbery. As the trial court succinctly put it, "the plea of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done."
Admittedly, the procedure followed by respondent judge was not the normal course, as the better procedure
would have been that set forth in People v. Padernal, 8 where the court sustained the exoneration of the
accused notwithstanding his plea of guilt. In that case, in view of the exculpatory testimony of the accused who
had earlier pleaded guilty to the charge of homicide, the trial court correctly considered the plea as withdrawn
and, in its place, ordered a plea of not guilty entered. This was not done by respondent judge. For even after
finding that the plea of Magalop was not intelligently made, Judge Mendoza proceeded to pass judgment
without requiring Magalop to plead anew to the charge. Applying the principle laid down in the Padernal case, it
can fairly be concluded that there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal
hence said acquittal was a nullity.
Be that as it may, however, in the interest of substantial justice, we cannot allow such procedural error to
prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In
fairness to Magalop, outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him

presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which accused Magalop
could have been implicated. It is for this fundamental reason that, even pro hac vice, his acquittal must be
sustained. Interdum even it ut exceptio quae prima facie justa videtur, tamen inique noceat. It may sometime
happen that a plea which on its face seem just, nevertheless is injurious and inequitable. It is so in this
instance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the acquittal of the
accused-respondent JUAN MAGALOP Y SALVACION is sustained.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz J., Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the advice
of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than
conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man did not commit. As
the ponenciaobserves, "outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him
presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have
been implicated."
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack of zeal
in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof,
to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The defense counsel in this
case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the
right to submit evidence in his behalf.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the advice
of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than
conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man did not commit. As

the ponenciaobserves, "outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him
presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have
been implicated."
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack of zeal
in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof,
to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The defense counsel in this
case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the
right to submit evidence in his behalf.

G.R. No. 135438-39

April 5, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONIFACIO DURANGO y CARCEDO, accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, for automatic review, is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, in
Criminal Case No. 18897-MN and Criminal Case No. 18898-MN, jointly tried, which has found herein accusedappellant Bonifacio Durango y Carcedo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on two counts.
The complaints charging accused-appellant with the crime of rape, allegedly twice committed on the same
victim, read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 18897-MN
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1997, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being a father of
Noniebeth Durango y Ferolino, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have sexual intercourse with NONIEBETH DURANGO Y
FEROLINO, a minor of 12 years of age against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 18898-MN

That on or about the 21st day of September, 1996, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being a father
of Noniebeth Durango y Ferolino, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have sexual intercourse with NONIEBETH DURANGO Y
FEROLINO, a minor of 12 years of age against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
During the arraignment on 22 January 1998, the public prosecutor moved for a joint trial of the two cases.
Accused Bonifacio Durango, with the assistance of counsel and after having been informed, in a language and
dialect known to him, of the nature and cause of the indictment, voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty to the
criminal complaints. On 14 May 1998, after the prosecution had barely started with the presentation at the
witness stand of private complainant, the defense counsel manifested to the court that the accused wanted to
withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and to substitute it with a plea of guilty to the crimes charged. On the
basis of the manifestation, accused was re-arraigned, and this time accused pleaded guilty. The trial court
thereupon proceeded to hear the testimony of private complainant.
On 11 August 1998, after the prosecution had concluded its presentation, the trial court rendered the now
questioned decision, the pertinent portions of which read
As established by the testimony of Noniebeth Durango, the first charge of rape was committed on the
night of September 21, 1996 while she was already sleeping inside their house located at 214
Hernandez Street, Catmon, Malabon Metro Manila. She was with her seven (7) years old sister Zeny
but then the latter was also sound asleep on the floor. Her father at that instant went beside her and
forced her to undress. In fact, it was the accused who removed her clothings, after which, stripped
himself of his apparels before allowing his penis to touch the private part of Noniebeth. On the following
night, the accused finally penetrated his daughter. Noniebeth felt his penis inside her genital during
which moment the accused threatened her not to tell her mother about the incident otherwise they
would be killed. That initial sexual coupling was repeated for several times while the mother of
Noniebeth was still working in Taiwan.1wphi1.nt
The second charge of rape was committed August 21, 1997. This time it happened at around 10:00
a.m. and the mother of Noniebeth was around after returning home in July, 1997. Noniebeth was in her
room and her mother was then cooking. The accused went inside and begun to violate her daughter
under practically the same circumstances as the first. But this time the threat did not work because
Noniebeth by now had gained enough courage to inform her mother about the ordeal she went through
in the hands of the accused. Finding it to be an easy way in order to get out of their house, Noniebeth
and her mother went to Mindanao to visit her sick grandmother. And upon their return, Noniebeth was
examined by a doctor in Manila. 2
The trial court then adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 18897-MN, the Court finds accused Bonifacio Durango y Carcedo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH;
2. In Criminal Case No. 18898-MN, the Court finds accused Bonifacio Durango y Carcedo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH.
Likewise, the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify Noniebeth Durango in the amount of P50,000.00,
the additional sums of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost of
the suit in each of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED. 3
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant submitted a lone assignment of error, to wit:
The Court a quo manifestly erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite his
improvident plea of guilty. 4
The imposition of the death penalty tasks anew this Court to closely review the judgment of conviction not only
whether or not an accused did commit the Crime imputed against him but also whether or not his constitutional
rights have been duly protected before and during his trial.
Initially, the accused entered a plea of "not guilty." Just as Noniebeth was called to the witness stand, the
defense manifested its intention to substitute the plea of "not guilty" to one of "guilty."
When an accused enters such a plea of "guilty," the trial court is mandated to see to it that the exacting
standards laid down by the rules therefor are strictly observed. Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, in part,
provides:
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where
the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list
of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both
arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of record shall not affect the validity
of the proceedings.
(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be
entered for him.
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

This Court, in the recent case of People vs. Tizon, 5 has expressed the rationale behind the rule and it is, at
bottom
. . . that no accused is wrongly convicted or erroneously sentenced. It constantly behooves the courts to
proceed with utmost care in each and every case before them but perhaps nothing can be more
demanding of judges in that respect than when the punishment is in its severest form death a
penalty that, once carried out, is irreversible and irreparable. It cannot be said that when a person
pleads guilty to a crime there is no chance at all that he could, in fact, be innocent. Statistics (See
People vs. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 421, citing People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, and 14 Am. Jur.,
Criminal Law, Section 251, p. 951) can easily dispel that notion.
The records of the case at bar would disclose that the trial court issued a curt joint order, dated 14 May 1998,
to the following effect; viz:
JOINT

ORDER

At the hearing today, defense counsel manifested that the accused is intending to withdraw his former plea of
not guilty and substitute the same with that of guilty to the offenses charged, to which manifestation the Trial
Prosecutor interposed no objection.
Accordingly, the accused withdrew his former plea and was re-arraigned in these two (2) complaints in the
language and dialect known to him. With the assistance of his counsel from the PAO, the accused voluntarily
entered a plea of guilty in these two (2) complaints.
Considering that the charges are capital offenses, the Trial Prosecutor was directed to present the
complainant, whose testimony was terminated. Thereafter, Trial Prosecutor formally offered his evidence.
WHEREFORE, these cases are now submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
Malabon, Metro Manila, May 14, 1998.
(SGD) BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO
Judge6
The order was preceded by a brief and abbreviated exchange of remarks between the defense counsel and
the trial judge hereunder fully quoted; viz:
ATTY. DE LAS ALAS
For the accused Your Honor
FISCAL ALIPOSA
For the people Your Honor, we are ready to present the victim, Noniebeth Durango, whose testimony is
being offered to establish the allegations in the Informations and particularly to the fact that she is the
victim Your Honor.

COURT
Duly noted. Swear in the witness.
ON THE WITNESS STAND: NONIEBETH DURANGO, 12 years of age, single, a student, and residing
at No. 214 Hernandez Street, Catmon, Malabon, Metro Manila, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law, testified:
FISCAL ALIPOSA
Considering the nature of the offense Your Honor, may we request that the public be excluded except
the accused and the mother of the victim.
COURT
Yes, exclude the public except the accused and the mother of the victim.
ATTY. DE LAS ALAS
If your Honor please, a while ago the accused intimated to me that he intends to withdraw his former
plea not guilty and substitute the same with that of guilty to these two cases Your Honor.
COURT
Mr. Durango, according to your counsel you are intending to withdraw your former plea of not guilty in
these 2 cases and substitute the same with that of guilty, do you confirm that?
ACCUSED
Yes Your Honor.
ATTY. DE LAS ALAS
In view of this development Your Honor, the accused is now withdrawing his former plea of not guilty to
be substituted with guilty Your Honor.
COURT
Alright, re-arraign the accused. (Accordingly, the accused was re-arraigned in these 2 complaints in the
language and dialect known to him. With the assistance of his counsel from the PAO, the accused
pleaded guilty in these two complaints.)
Even though the accused has already pleaded guilty to the offenses charged, I will require you to
continue presenting your evidence Fiscal.7
The records would show that thenceforth defense counsel spoke not one word. Nor would it appear that the
trial court gave defense counsel or the accused any chance to talk for when the prosecutor ended his direct
examination of Noniebeth, the latter was thereupon simply excused and the court forthwith declared the case
submitted for decision. Thus

FISCAL ALIPOSA
No further question Your Honor.
COURT
You are excused.
FISCAL ALIPOSA.
We are now ready to formally offer the following exhibits:
Exhibits "A," "A-1," the medico-legal report, to establish the fact of examination on victim Noniebeth
Durango;
Exhibits "B" and "B-1," sworn statement of the victim, as part of the testimony of the witness;
Exhibit "C," request for examination;
Exhibit "C-1," stamp mark of the PNP Crime Laboratory, to establish the fact that the police intervened
to have the victim examined?
Exhibit "D" preliminary interview made by the doctor showing that the victim was sexually molested;
Exhibit "E," consent for examination upon the request of the mother of the victim;
Exhibit "F," birth certificate of the victim showing that she is a minor below 12 years of age at the time of
the incident;
Exhibit "G," complaint in Crim. Case No. 18897-MN
Exhibit "G-1," signatures of the victim and her mother;
Exhibit "H," complaint in Crim. Case No. 18898-MN and
Exhibit "H-1," signatures of the victim and her mother, as part of the testimony of the witness.
COURT
Alright, these cases are now submitted for decision. 8
The improvident plea, followed by an abbreviated proceeding, with practically no role at all played by the
defense, is just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit
a human life. It may be opportune to invite attention to the disquisition of the Court in People vs.
Bermas, 9 thus:
. . . The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means
that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is
amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance
by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.
Of most troublous concern is the fact that the accused has not been apprised at all of the consequences of the
plea, let alone specifically warned that, given his plea of guilt, the death sentence decreed under Republic Act
7659 would nevertheless have to be imposed, contrary to what he might have entertained or been advised. It is
essential that a searching inquiry is conducted after the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, and it must
focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea and (2) a complete comprehension of the legal effects of the plea so
that the plea of guilt can be truly said as being based on a free and informed judgment. So indispensable is this
requirement that a plea of guilt to a capital offense can be held null and void where the trial court has
inadequately discharged the duty of conducting the prescribed "searching inquiry." 10 The trial court should also
be convinced that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
or physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters, and this it can do either by eliciting from the
accused himself the manner in which he has been brought into the custody of the law and whether he had the
assistance of competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations or by ascertaining from
him the conditions of his detention and interrogation during the investigation. Likewise, a series of questions
directed at defense counsel on whether or not counsel has conferred with the accused and has completely
explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilt are well-taken steps along those lines. 11
Similarly, just as in People vs. Estomaca, 12 which has ruled that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an
invalid arraignment, there is here no showing that appellant or his counsel de oficio has been furnished with a
copy of each complaint with the list of witnesses against him.
All things considered, the Court is left with little recourse except to remand the case to the court a quo for
further and appropriate proceedings conformably with the opinion heretofore expressed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 18897-MN and No. 18898-MN convicting accused-appellant
Bonifacio Durango y Carcedo of two crimes of rape and imposing upon him the penalty of death is SET ASIDE.
Said cases are REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.