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Public International Law

Traditional: Body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized
states in their relations to one another.
Restatement (3rd) of Foreign Relations Law of the US: Law which deals with
the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations
inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or
Obligations Erga Omnes
In international law, the concept of erga omnes obligations refers to specifically
determined obligations that states have towards the international community as a
whole. In general legal theory the concept erga omnes (Latin: in relation to
everyone) has origins dating as far back as Roman law and is used to describe
obligations or rights towards all. In municipal law it has the effect towards all in
another, general context.
*Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain)
4 Erga Omnes Obligations: a) the outlawing of acts of aggression; b) the outlawing
of genocide; c) protection from slavery; and d) protection from racial
In this judgment the Court drew a distinction between the erga omnes obligations
that a state has towards the international community as a whole and in whose
protection all states have a legal interest, and the obligations of a state vis--vis
another state.
In municipal law it has the effect towards all in another, general context. For
example, a property right is an erga omnes right while a right based on a contract
is only enforceable towards the contracting party and is inter partes (Latin:
between the parties)
All norms of jus cogens are enforceable erga omnes not all erga omnes obligations
are jus cogens.
Jus Cogens
Latin: compelling law; English: peremptory norm- refers to certain fundamental,
overriding principles of international law, from which no derogation is ever
-A number of universally recognised principles of international law existed which
rendered any conflicting treaty void and that the peremptory effect of such
principles was itself a unanimously recognised customary rule of International Law.
Prerequisites for a norm to be identified as Jus Cogens
1. The norm must be a norm of general international law.
2. The norm must be accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole.
3. The norm must be one from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law of the
same character,
Example of Jus Cogens
(1)Principles of the Charter of the United Nations prohibiting the unlawful use of
force ;

(2) International laws that prohibit the performance of any other act criminal
under international law; and
(3) International laws that oblige States to co-operate in the suppression of
certain acts such as trade in slaves, piracy or genocide
Generally accepted that jus cogens includes:
of genocide,
maritime piracy,
include slavery as well as the slave trade), torture, refoulement and wars of
aggression and territorial aggrandizement.
Ex Aequo et Bono
Latin term which means what is just and fair or according to equity and good
conscience. Something to be decided ex aequo et bono is something that is to be
decided by principles of what is fair and just. A decision-maker who is authorized to
decide ex aequo et bono is not bound by legal rules but may take account of what
is just and fair.

Legal cases are decided on the strict rule of law. For example, a contract will be
enforced by the legal system no matter how unfair it may prove to be. But a case to
be decided ex aequo et bono, overrides the strict rule of law and requires instead a
decision based on what is fair and just under the given circumstances.

It is a term often used in international law when a matter is to be decided according

to principles of equity rather than by points of law. Article 38(2) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice provides that the court may decide cases ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.

In the context of arbitration, it refers to the power of the arbitrators to dispense

with consideration of the law and consider solely what they consider to be fair and
equitable in the case at hand. Article 33 of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law's Arbitration Rules (1976) provides that the arbitral tribunal
should decide as ex aequo et bono only if the parties have expressly authorized the
arbitral tribunal to do so and if the law applicable to the arbitral procedure permits
such arbitration.
Ex aequo et bono (Latin for "according to the right and good" or "from equity and
conscience") is a Latin phrase that is used as a legal term of art. In the context
of arbitration, it refers to the power of arbitrators to dispense with consideration of
the law but consider solely what they consider to be fair and equitable in the case
at hand.
Article 38(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides that
the court may decide cases ex aequo et bono only if the parties agree.[1] In 1984,
the ICJ decided a case using "equitable criteria" in creating a boundary in the Gulf
of Maine for Canada and the US.[2]

Article 33 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's

Arbitration Rules (1976)[3] provides that the arbitrators shall consider only the
applicable law unless the arbitral agreement allows the arbitrators to consider ex
aequo et bono, or amiable compositeur, instead.[4] This rule is also expressed in
many national and subnational arbitration laws such as section 22 of the
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW).
On the other hand, the constituent treaty of the EritreaEthiopia Claims
Commission explicitly forbids the body from interpreting ex aequo et bono.

Topouzis v. Abboud:
"Ex aequo et bono: according to the right and good."
Ex aequo et bono is a term of art in the law of alternative dispute
resolution generally, andarbitration specifically. It refers to an arbitration in
which the arbitrator does not rely on strict legal rules but instead deciding the
matter on justice and fairness, even in defiance of a legal principle: "The parties
(to arbitration) may determine the law, either domestic or foreign, that will govern
the merits of the dispute. They may also authorize the arbitrators to designate the
applicable positive law or, through a directive empowering them to act as amiables
compositeurs, exclude the positive law of the State. Of course, the latter possibility,
which permits the arbitrators to decide ex quo et bono that is, pursuant to
extra-legal standards is not an innovation of the 1986 law. Amiable composition is
part of a very old civilian tradition in arbitration matters.... Arbitrators must
therefore decide pursuant to substantive rules of law unless they have been
exempted from doing so by the parties themselves. It would be interesting to
observe in the years to come whether the exception that is, the appointment of
arbitrators exempted from applying the law will in fact prevail over the principle.
At the moment, it is not clear, since practice varies from one context to another.
The exemption from the strict application of the law probably makes the most sense
in commercial arbitration."

"Parties to international law disputes-both public and commercial ordinarily resolve

disputes ex aequo et bono only as an exception, not as the rule. The vast majority
of decisions are resolved according to the parties' choice of law. Any resort to ex
aequo et bono occurs only if the parties expressly choose it in substitution for, or in
addition to, their choice of law....

"Whereas equity is part of an applicable legal system, notions of equality

associated with ex aequo et bono are deemed to reside in a moral, social, or
political realm that is external to the law."

Israel v Eichmann (1962)

Facts: Adolf Eichmann, was an Austrian by birth who volunteered to work for the
Security Service (SD) in Berlin. He rose through the ranks and eventually occupied

the position of Head of Section (Referant) for Jewish Affairs charged with all
matters related to the implementation of the Final Solution to the Jewish Question.
In this capacity, he oversaw the transport and deportation of Jewish persons, set up
and personally ran an operations centre in Hungary in order to implement the Final
Solution there, organised the transfer of money from evacuated Jews to the State
and was responsible for the administration of the camps at Terezin and BergenBelsen.
He was captured by Israeli Security Forces in Argentina and handed over to the
District Court of Jerusalem to stand trial for war crimes, crimes against humanity
and crimes against the Jewish people. He was convicted of all 15 counts and
sentenced to death by the District Court of Jerusalem. His appeal was rejected by
the Supreme Court of Israel and he was executed by hanging a few minutes before
midnight on 31 May 1962.
Adolf Eichmann is being tried under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment)
Law, which was adopted by the Knesseth on August 1, 1950. Section one of this
Law provides that any person who has "done, during the period of the Nazi regime,
in an enemy country, an act constituting a crime against the Jewish people" or an
"act constituting a crime against humanity" or "an act constituting a war crime" is
liable to the death penalty. All three crimes are more closely defined in section 1
(b). While according to section seven of the Law, the general provisions of the Penal
Code apply to offenses under the Law, section eight expressly excludes the
applicability of sections sixteen to nineteen of the Penal Code, which relate to the
defense of the exercise of judicial function, constraint, necessity, and justification.
Counsel of Eichmann contested the jurisdiction of the court based on international
law now the Punishment Law. According to the counsel: a) that the Israel Law, by
inflicting punishment for acts done outside the boundaries of the state and before
its establishment, against persons who were not Israel citizens, and by a person
who acted in the course of duty on behalf of the foreign country (Acts of State)
conflicts with international law and exceeds the power of the Israel legislators; b)
that the prosecution of the accused in Israel upon his abduction from a foreign
country conflicts with international law and exceeds the jurisdiction of the court.
Core legal questions

Is the Law of 1950 contrary to the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal

law or to the principle of territorial sovereignty?
Does the Law of 1950 conflict with the principle of territorial sovereignty?
Can the Appellant rely on the Act of State doctrine to excuse his criminal

Held: There is no rule of general customary international law, which prohibits the
enactment of retroactive penal legislation. Furthermore, the argument that to
punish an individual for conduct which was not yet criminal at the time of its
commission would be unethical loses its force in face of the odious crimes
committed by the Appellant. The Appellants contention that the Law of 1950 is
therefore contrary to the principle of non-retroactivity and cannot therefore apply to
the Appellant is rejected (para. 8).
There is no rule of general customary international law that the principle of
territorial sovereignty prohibits the enactment of a criminal law applicable to extraterritorial crimes committed by a foreign national. The Appellants second ground of
appeal must also be rejected (para. 9).
These findings are reinforced by positive international law: the crimes for which the
Appellant was convicted were international crimes under international law entailing

individual criminal responsibility at the time that they were committed (para. 11),
and their universal character is such that each State is vested with the power to try
and punish anyone who assisted in their commission (para. 12).
*Jurisdiction to try the case is based on the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Law, a statutory law the provisions of which are unequivocal. The
court gave effect to the law of the Knesset. The law contended conforms to the best
law of nations. The power of the state of Israel to enact the law in question or Israel
rights to punish is based, with respect to the offenses in question, from the point of
international law, on dual foundation: universal character of the crime and specific
character of the crimes.

Ker v. Illinois (December 6, 1886)

This case is brought here by a writ of error to the supreme court of the tate of
Illinois. The plaintiff in error, Frederick M. Ker, was indicted, tried, and convicted in
the criminal court of Cook county, in that state, for larceny. The indictment also
included charges of embezzlement. During the proceedings connected with the trial
the defendant presented a plea in abatement, which, on demurrer, was overruled;
and, the defendant refusing to plead further, a plea of not guilty was entered for
him, according to the statute of that state, by [119 U.S. 436, 438] order of the
court, on which the trial and conviction took place.
The substance of the plea in abatement, which is a very long one, is that the
defendant, being in the city of Lima, in Peru, after the offenses were charged to
have been committed, was in fact kidnaped and brought to this country against his
will. His statement is that, application having been made by the parties who were
injured, Gov. Hamilton, of Illinois, made his requisition, in writing, to the secretary
of state of the United States for a warrant requesting the extradition of the
defendant, by the executive of the republic of Peru, from that country to Cook
county; that on the first day of March, 1883, the president of the United States
issued his warrant, in due form, directed to Henry G. Julian, as messenger, to
receive the defendant from the authorities of Peru, upon a charge of larceny, in
compliance with the treaty between the United States and Peru on that subject;
that the said Julian, having the necessary papers with him, arrived in Lima, but,
without presenting them to any officer of the Peruvian government, or making any
demand on that government for the surrender of Ker, forcibly and with violence
arrested him, placed him on board the United States vessel Essex, in the harbor of
Callao, kept him a close prisoner until the arrival of that vessel at Honolulu, where,
after some detention, he was transferred, in the same forcible manner, on board
another vessel, to-wit, the City of Sydney, in which he was carried a prisoner to San
Francisco, in the state of California. The plea then states, that, before his arrival in
that city, Gov. Hamilton had made a requisition on the governor of California, under
the laws and constitution of the United States, for the delivery up of the defendant
as a fugitive from justice, who had escaped to that state on account of the same
offenses charged in the requisition on Peru and in the indictment in this case. This
requisition arrived, as the plea states, and was presented to the governor of
California, who made his order for the surrender of the defendant to the person

appointed by the governor of Illinois, namely, one Frank Warner, on the twenty-fifth
day of June, 1883. The defendant arrived in the city of San [119 U.S. 436,
439] Francisco on the ninth day of July thereafter, and was immediately placed in
the custody of Warner, under the order of the governor of California, and, still a
prisoner, was transferred by him to Cook county, where the process of the criminal
count was served upon him, and he was held to answer the indictment already
The plea is very full of averments that the defendant protested, and was refused
any opportunity whatever, from the time of his arrest in Lima until he was delivered
over to the authorities of Cook county, of communicating with any person, or
seeking any advice or assistance in regard to procuring his release by legal process
or otherwise; and he alleges that this proceeding is a violation of the provisions of
the treaty between the United States and Peru, negotiated in 1870, which was
finally ratified by the two governments, and proclaimed by the president of the
United States, July 27, 1874. 18 U. S. St. at Large, pt. 3, p. 35.
The judgment of the criminal court of Cook county, Illinois, was carried by writ of
error to the supreme court of that state, and there affirmed, to which judgment the
present writ of error is directed. The assignments of error made here are as follows:
'First, that said supreme court of Illinois erred in aff rming the judgment of said
criminal court of Cook county, sustaining the demurrer to plaintiff in error's plea to
the jurisdiction of said criminal court; second, that said supreme court of Illinois
erred in its judgment aforesaid, in failing to enforce the full faith and credit of the
federal treaty with the republic of Peru, invoked by plaintiff in error in his said plea
to the jurisdiction of said criminal court.
The grounds upon which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked may be said to be
three, though from the briefs and arguments of counsel it is doubtful whether, in
point of fact, more than one is relied upon. It is contended, in several places in the
brief, that the proceedings in the arrest in Peru, and the extradition and delivery to
the authorities of Cook county, were not 'due process of law;' and we may suppose,
although [119 U.S. 436, 440] it is not so alleged, that this reference is to that
clause of article 14 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States
which declares that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
'without due process of law.' The 'due process of law' here guarantied is complied
with when the party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the state court,
has a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when,
in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is lawfully
entitled. We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings previous to the
trial, in regard to which the prisoner could invoke in some manner the provisions of
this clause of the constitution; but, for mere irregularities in the manner in which he
may be brought into custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that
he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular
indictment. He may be arrested for a very heinous offense by persons without any
warrant, or without any previous complaint, and brought before a proper officer;
and this may be, in some sense, said to be 'without due process of law.' But it
would hardly be claimed that, after the case had been investigated and the
defendant held by the proper authorities to answer for the crime, he could plead
that he was first arrested 'without due process of law.' So here, when found within
the jurisdiction of the state of Illinois, and liable to answer for a crime against the

laws of that state, unless there was some positive provision of the constitution or of
the laws of this country violated in bringing him into court, it is not easy to see how
he can say that he is there 'without due process of law,' within the meaning of the
constitutional provision.
So, also, the objection is made that the proceedings between the authorities of the
state of Illinois and those of the the state of California, and was not with the act of
congress on that subject; and especially that, at the time the papers and warrants
were issued from the governors of California and Illinois, the defendant was not
within thestate of California, and was not there a fugitive from justice. This
argument is not much pressed by counsel, and was scarcely noticed in the
supreme [119 U.S. 436, 441] court of Illinois, but the effort here is to connect it
as a part of the continued trespass and violation of law which accompanied the
transfer from Peru to Illinois. It is sufficient to say, in regard to that part of this
case, that, when the governor of one state voluntarily surrenders a fugitive from
the justice of another state to answer for his alleged offenses, it is hardly a proper
subject of inquiry on the trial of the case to examine into the details of the
proceedings by which the demand was made by the one state, and the manner in
which it was responded to by the other. The case does not stand, when a party is in
court and required to plead to an indictment, as it would have stood upon a writ of
habeas corpus in California, or in any of the states through which he was carried in
the progress of his extradition, t test the authority by which he was held; and we
can see, in the mere fact that the papers under which he was taken into custody in
California were prepared and ready for him on his arrival from Peru, no sufficient
reason for an abatement of the indictment against him in Cook county, or why he
should be discharged from custody without, a trial.
But the main proposition insisted on by counsel for plaintiff in error in this court is
that, by virtue of the treaty of extradition with Peru, the defendant acquired by his
residence in that country a right of asylum,-a right to be free from molestation for
the crime committed in Illinois, a positive right in him that he should only be
forcibly removed from Peru to the state of Illinois in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty,-and that this right is one which he can assert in the courts of the
United States in all cases, whether the removal took place under proceedings
sanctioned by the treaty, or under proceedings which were in total disregard of that
treaty, amounting to an unlawful and unauthorized kidnaping. This view of the
subject is presented in various forms, and repeated in various shapes, in the
argument of counsel. The fact that this question was raised in the supreme court of
Illinois may be said to confer jurisdiction on this court, because, in making this
claim, the defendant asserted a right under a treaty of the United States, and,
whether the assertion was [119 U.S. 436, 442] well founded or not, this court has
jurisdiction to decide it; and we proceed to inquire into it.
There is no language in this treaty, or in any other treaty made by this country on
the subject of extradition, of which we are aware, which says in terms that a party
fleeing from the United States to escape punishment for crime becomes thereby
entitled to an asylum in the country to which he has fled. Indeed, the absurdity of
such a proposition would at once prevent the making of a treaty of that kind. It will
not be for a moment contended that the government of Peru could not have
ordered Ker out of the country on his arrival, or at any period of his residence
there. If this could be done, what becomes of his right of asylum?

Nor can it be doubted that the government of Peru could, of its own accord, without
any demand from the United States, have surrendered Ker to an agent of the state
of Illinois, and that such surrender would have been valid within the dominions of
Peru. It is idle, therefore, to claim that, either by express terms or by implication,
there is given to a fugitive from justice in one of these countries any right to remain
and reside in the other; and, if the right of asylum means anything, it must mean
this. The right of the government of Peru voluntarily to give a party in Ker's
condition an asylum in that country is quite a different thing from the right in him
to demand and insist upon security in such an asylum. The treaty, so far as it
regulates the right of asylum at all, is intended to limit this right in the case of one
who is proved to be a criminal fleeing from justice; so that, on proper demand and
proceedings had therein, the government of the country of the asylum shall deliver
him up to the country where the crime was committed. And to this extent, and to
this alone, the treaty does regulate or impose a restriction upon the right of the
government of the country of the asylum to protect the criminal from removal
In the case before us, the plea shows that, although Julian went to Peru with the
necessary papers to procure the extradition of Ker under the treaty, those papers
remained in his pocket, and were never brought to light in Peru; that no steps [119
U.S. 436, 443] were taken under them; and that Julian, in seizing upon the
person of Ker, and carrying him out of the territory of Peru into the United States,
did not act, nor profess to act, under the treaty. In fact, that treaty was not called
into operation, was not relied upon, was not made the pretext of arrest, and the
facts show that it was clear case of kidnaping within the dominions of Peru, without
any pretense of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United
In the case of U. S. v. Rauscher, post, 234, (just decided, and considered with this,)
the effect of extradition proceedings under a treaty was very fully considered; and
it was there held that when a party was duly surrendered, by proper proceedings,
under the treaty of 1842 with Great Britain, he came to this country clothed with
the protection which the nature of such proceedings and the true construction of
the treaty gave him. One of the rights with which he was thus clothed, both in
regard to himself and in good faith to the county which had sent him here, was that
he should be tried for no other offense than the one for which he was delivered
under the extradition proceedings. If Ker had been brought to this country by
proceedings under the treaty of 1870-74 with Peru, it seems probable, from the
statement of the case in the record, that he might have successfully pleaded that
he was extradited for larceny, and convicted by the verdict of a jury of
embezzlement; for the statement in the plea is that the demand made by the
president of the United States, if it had been put in operation, was for an
extradition for larceny, although some forms of embezzlement are mentioned in the
treaty as subjects of extradition. But it is quite a different case when the plaintiff in
error comes to this country in the manner in which he was brought here, clothed
with no rights which a proceeding under the treaty could have given him, and no
duty which this country owes to Peru or to him under the treaty. We think it very
clear, therefore, that, in invoking the jurisdiction of this court upon the ground that
the prisoner was denied a right conferred upon him by a treaty of the United
States, he has failed to establish the existence of any such right.[119 U.S. 436,
444] The question of how far his forcible seizure in another country, and transfer

by violence, force, or fraud to this country, could be made available to resist trial in
the state court for the offense now charged upon him, is one which we do not feel
called upon to decide; for in that transaction we do not see that the constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States guaranty him any protection. There are
authorities of the highest respectability which hold that such forcible abduction is no
sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the
jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offense, and
presents no valid objection to his trial in such court. Among the authorities which
support the proposition are the following: Ex parte Scott, 9 Barn. & C. 446, (1829;)
Lopez & Sattler's Case, 1 Dearsl. & B. Cr. Cas. 525; State v. Smith, 1 Bailey, 283,
(1829;) State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, (1835;) Dow's Case, 18 Pa. St. 37, (1851;)
State v. Ross, 21 Iowa, 467, (1866;) The Richmond v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 102.
However this may be, the decision of that question is as much within the province
of the state court as a question of common law, or of the law of nations, of which
that court is bound to take notice,
It must be remembered that And, though we might or might not differ with the
Illinois court on that subject, it is one in which we have no right to review their
It must be remembered that this view of the subject does not leave the prisoner, or
the government of Peru, without remedy for his unauthorized seizure within its
territory. Even this treaty with that country provides for the extradition of persons
charged with kidnaping, and, on demand from Peru, Julian, the party who is guilty
of it, could be surrendered, and tried in its courts for this violation of its laws. The
party himself would probably not be without redress, for he could sue Julian in an
action of trespass and false imprisonment, and the facts set out in the plea would
without doubt sustain the action. Whether h could recover a sum sufficient to justify
the action would probably depend upon moral aspects of the case, which we cannot
here consider. [119 U.S. 436, 445] We must therefore hold that, so far as any
question in which this court can revise the judgment of the supreme court of the
state of Illinois is presented to us, the judgment must be affirmed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a milestone document in the
history of human rights. Drafted by representatives with different legal and cultural
backgrounds from all regions of the world, the Declaration was proclaimed by the
United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 General Assembly
resolution 217 A as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all
nations. It sets out, for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally
protected and it has been translated into almost 500 languages.
Rights for all members of the human family were first articulated in 1948 in the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Following the
horrific experiences of the Holocaust and World War II, and amid the grinding
poverty of much of the worlds population, many people sought to create a
document that would capture the hopes, aspirations, and protections to which every
person in the world was entitled and ensure that the future of humankind would be

different. See Part V, "Appendices," for the complete text and a simplified version of
the UDHR.
The 30 articles of the Declaration together form a comprehensive statement
covering economic, social, cultural, political, and civil rights. The document is both
universal (it applies to all people everywhere) and indivisible (all rights are equally
important to the full realization of ones humanity). A declaration, however, is not
a treaty and lacks any enforcement provisions. Rather it is a statement of intent, a
set of principles to which United Nations member states commit themselves in an
effort to provide all people a life of human dignity.
Over the past 50 years the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has acquired the
status of customary international law because most states treat it as though it
were law. However, governments have not applied this customary law equally.
Socialist and communist countries of Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia have
emphasized social welfare rights, such as education, jobs, and health care, but
often have limited the political rights of their citizens. The United States has
focused on political and civil rights and has advocated strongly against regimes that
torture, deny religious freedom, or persecute minorities. On the other hand, the US
government rarely recognizes health care, homelessness, environmental pollution,
and other social and economic concerns as human rights issues, especially within
its own borders.

Article 1

Right to Equality

Article 2

Freedom from Discrimination

Article 3

Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security

Article 4

Freedom from Slavery

Article 5

Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment

Article 6

Right to Recognition as a Person before the Law

Article 7

Right to Equality before the Law

Article 8

Right to Remedy by Competent Tribunal

Article 9

Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Exile

Article 10

Right to Fair Public Hearing

Article 11

Right to be Considered Innocent until Proven Guilty

Article 12

Freedom from Interference with Privacy, Family, Home and


Article 13

Right to Free Movement in and out of the Country

Article 14

Right to Asylum in other Countries from Persecution

Article 15

Right to a Nationality and the Freedom to Change It

Article 16

Right to Marriage and Family

Article 17

Right to Own Property

Article 18

Freedom of Belief and Religion

Article 19

Freedom of Opinion and Information

Article 20

Right of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Article 21

Right to Participate in Government and in Free Elections

Article 22

Right to Social Security

Article 23

Right to Desirable Work and to Join Trade Unions

Article 24

Right to Rest and Leisure

Article 25

Right to Adequate Living Standard

Article 26

Right to Education

Article 27

Right to Participate in the Cultural Life of Community

Article 28

Right to a Social Order that Articulates this Document

Article 29

Community Duties Essential to Free and Full Development

Article 30

Freedom from State or Personal Interference in the above Rights

What Are Human Rights?

simply because he or she is a human being.



Human rights are held by all persons equally, universally, and forever.
Human rights are inalienable: you cannot lose these rights any more than you can
cease being a human being.
Human rights are indivisible: you cannot be denied a right because it is "less
important" or "non-essential." Human rights are interdependent: all human rights
are part of a complementary framework. For example, your ability to participate in
your government is directly affected by your right to express yourself, to get an
education, and even to obtain the necessities of life.
Another definition for human rights is those basic standards without which people
cannot live in dignity. To violate someones human rights is to treat that person as
though she or he were not a human being. To advocate human rights is to demand
that the human dignity of all people be respected.
In claiming these human rights, everyone also accepts the responsibility not to
infringe on the rights of others and to support those whose rights are abused or