Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
SWU LLB3
August 8, 2016
TORTS and DAMAGES
the part of the petitioner does not prevent the court from ruling that an
implied or constructive trust was created nonetheless. A constructive trust,
otherwise known as a trust ex maleficio, a trust ex delicto, a trust de son
tort, an involuntary trust, or an implied trust, is a trust by operation of law
which arises contrary to intention and in in vitum, against one who, by
fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by
commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice,
concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity
and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to
property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy.
It is raised by equity to satisfy the demands of justice. However, a
constructive trust does not arise on every moral wrong in acquiring or
holding property or on every abuse of confidence in business or other
affairs; ordinarily such a trust arises and will be declared only on wrongful
acquisitions or retentions of property of which equity, in accordance with its
fundamental principles and the traditional exercise of its jurisdiction or in
accordance with statutory provision, takes cognizance. It has been broadly
ruled that a breach of confidence, although in business or social relations,
rendering an acquisition or retention of property by one person
unconscionable against another, raises a constructive trust.*There was a
breach of trust by the officers. SC annulled the sale of the apartment and
ordered Arlegui to execute deed of conveyance to Genguyon spouses
Facts
A taxicab figured in a head-on collision with a carretela. The carretela
overturned, causing death to one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy. A
criminal case was instituted by the parents of the deceased against
Fontanilla, the driver of the taxicab, wherein the former reserved the
right to institute a separate civil action for damages. The driver of the
taxicab was convicted. Subsequently, the parents instituted the present civil
action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.
Barredo contends that his liability rests only on the provision of the penal
code and hence, since no civil action has been filed against Fontanilla, he
too cannot be held civilly responsible.
Issue:
Can plaintiffs bring a separate civil action against the employer of
the taxicab driver making him primarily and directly responsible under Art.
1903 of the Civil Code?
Held:
YES. A Quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the civil responsibility
arising from criminal liability. Under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, an
employer is primarily and directlyresponsible for the negligent acts of his
employee.There are two remedies available for the parents to choose:The
first is under Article 100 of the Penal Code wherein the employer is only
subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the crime committed by his
employees. If the parents choose this remedy, the complainant must first
exhaust the properties of the employee, before the employers properties
could be made answerable.
The other action is under Article 1903 of the Civil code (quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana) wherein the negligent employer is held primarily liable, subject to
the defense thathe exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and engagement of his employees.
In this case, the parents chose the second type of action since it is more
practical to file for damages against the employer, who is more solvent than
his employee.
Elcano vs. Hill
77 SCRA 98 (May 26, 1977)
Facts:
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the
time of the occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a minor and, under laws
effective at the time, also legally married. Reginald is still living and
receives subsistence from his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on
the ground that his acts were not criminal because of lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake.
Issues:
(1) Does the prior acquittal of Reginald bar the present civil action for
damages? (2) Is Atty. Marvin Hill vicariously liable?
Held:
1. No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case does not extinguish
his liability arising from quasi-delict. For one, the quantum of proof required
in the criminal case differs from that required in a civil suit. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required
unlike in civil cases, preponderance of evidence is sufficient. The concept of
culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation
of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Art 2177 of the New Civil
Code provides that Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also
criminally charged, to recover damages on both scores. And assuming
awards made in the two cases vary, he would be entitled only to the bigger
award of the two. In other words, the extinction of civil liability refers
exclusively to the civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. The civil liability arising from quasi-delict is not extinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the accused is acquitted.2. While it is
true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation by marriage of
the minor, such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although
married, was living with his father and still dependent from the latter. ART
2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. The minor may be emancipated, but that does not
mean that he is no longer under the responsibility of his parents.
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married,
was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in question.Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.However, inasmuch as Reginald is now of age (at the time the case
reached the Supreme Court), it is a matter of equity that the liability of Atty.
Hill should be declared merelysubsidiary to that of his son.
Cinco vs. Canonoy
90 SCRA 369 (May 31, 1979)
Facts:
On Feb 25, 1970, Cinco filed a complaint for recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot
arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for
private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit invoking Rule 111, Section3(b) of the
Rules of Court, which provides:(b) After a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Issue
: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action.
Held:
Yes, the civil suit for damages brought by the petitioner is based on quasidelict predicated on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Thus, the civil
case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penalcode. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The separate and
independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. The civil
action referred to in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted,
is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasidelict.
Private Respondent Marilou Gonzales filed an action for damages against
Gashem Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.
Gonzales is 22 years old, single, Filipina, a pretty lass of go
Mendoza v. Arrieta
G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979
Facts:
A t h re e w a y v e h i c u l a r a c c i d e n t o c c u rre d i n v o l v i n g a c a r o w n e d
a n d d r i v e n b y p e t i t i o n e r E d g a rd o M e n d o z a , a p r i v a t e j e e p o w n e
d a n d d r i v e n b y re s p o n d e n t Ro d o l f o Salazar, and a gravel and
sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by
Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate
Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property
were fi led against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of
Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability,
civil and criminal, in view of its fi ndings that the collision between
Salazars jeep and petitioners car was the result of the former having
been
bumped
from
behind
by
the
t r u c k d r i v e n b y M o n t o y a . N e i t h e r w a s p e t i t i o n e r a w a rd e d d a m a
g e s a s h e w a s n o t a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against
jeep-owner-driver
Salazar.
After
the termination
of the
criminal cases, petitioner fi led a civil case
against respondents
Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the
collision involvingtheir vehicles.
Issue:
Whether
or not the
lower court in dismissing petitioners
complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against private respondents
Held:
Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge
wrongfully sustained Timbols allegations that the civil suit is barred
by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him, wherein
no
reservation
to
file
a
separate
civil
case
was
made
b y p e t i t i o n e r a n d w h e re t h e l a t t e r a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e t
r i a l a n d t r i e d t o p ro v e
damages
against
Salazar
only.
For
petitioner's
cause
of
action
against
Timbol
in
the
civil
c a s e i s b a s e d o n q u a s i - d e l i c t . Re s p o n d e n t J u d g e c o m m i t t e d
re v e r s i b l e e rro r w h e n h e dismissed the civil suit against the truckowner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of
the Civil Code provides that, When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the actor omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter. Timbols submission that
p e t i t i o n e r ' s f a i l u re t o m a ke a re s e r v a t i o n i n t h e
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less
has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or
acquittal of the accused. Petitioners have two options from where they
could recover damages fromthat arising out of the criminal act, and that
under quasi-delict. Petitioners opted to recover damages under quasi-delict,
which in effect operated as their abandonment of their claim to damages
under the pending criminal case. Therefore, petitioners may still recover
damages from their civil action against the defendants.
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
38 Phil 768 (October 14, 1918)
Facts:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located
upon the line of thedefendant railroad company. Everyday, he comes by
train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he works and
he uses a pass, supplied by the company, which entitles him toride the
trains free of charge.
One day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came
in contact with a sack of watermelons causing his feet to slip making him
fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from the platform and was
drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from thetrain the car
moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.Cangco was
drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that
the injuries he had received were very serious. He was brought at once to
hospital in thecity of Manila where an examination was made and his arm
was amputated.He instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila to recover damages from the defendant company. His
action is founded upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting
from thetrains. The trial judge concluded that, although negligence
was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of
melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passingto and from the
cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering.
Judgment was accordinglyentered in favor of the defendant company, and
the plaintiff appealed.
Issues:
Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground that
the breach was due to the negligence of their servant.2. Whether Cango is
negligent when he alight from the moving train.
Held:
No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that
the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and
that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of
the servant. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad
company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in
the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as
he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective
legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows
that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned
unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of
liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. It is
important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant
is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the
damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing
essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the
technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and
not to culpa contractual.(2) No it is not negligence per se for a traveler to
alight from a slowly moving train. As pertinent to the question of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed
upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground.
The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform,
constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a
stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was
possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same
dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover
from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation
between the parties is contractual in nature. The lower court held that
plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict,
their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. From this
decision, the plaintiff appealed directly to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not is entitled to damages.
DECISION: The SC held that the existence of a contract between the parties
does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor. However, considering the facts
and circumstances in the case at bar, that the wrong done to the plaintiff
was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he
and his subordinate employee had committed, the SC only awarded nominal
damages. In addition, since damages has already been awarded under
quasi-delict, Singson cannot recover other damages based on the contract,
otherwise, it would be against the rule prohibiting double recovery.
ARANETA V DE JOYA 57 SCRA 59
Facts:
Respondent De Joya, general manager, proposed
t o t h e b o a r d o f A c e Advsertising Corp., to send Ricardo Taylor to
the US to take up special studies in t e l e v i s i o n . T h e B o a rd d i d n o t a c t
u p o n t h e p ro p o s a l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , s e n t Ta y l o r t o t h e U S .
Respondent assured Antonio Araneta, a
c o m p a n y d i r e c t o r , t h a t e x p e n s e s w i l l be handled by other
parties which later was confirmed through a memorandum. While abroad, Taylor
continued to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his salaries appeared in
vouchers prepared upon orders of, and approved by, the respondent. Petitioner Luis
Araneta, signed three of the vouchers, others signed by either respondent or
Vicente Araneta, the company treasurer. All told, Ace Advertising disbursed
P5,043.20 on account of
Taylors travel and studies. Then a year after, Ace Advertising filed a complaint before
t h e C F I a g a i n s t re s p o n d e n t f o r t h e re c o v e r y o f t h e t o t a l s u m d i
s b u r s e d t o Ta y l o r a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e t r i p w a s m a d e
w i t h o u t i t s k n o w l e d g e , a u t h o r i t y or ratification.The
respondent in his answer denied the charge and claimed that the trip was
nonetheless ratified by the companys board and at any event he had the discretion
as general manager to authorize the trip which was for the companys
benefit. A third party complaint was file by respondent against, Vicente and Luis and
Taylor. Respondent provedthat some of the checks to cover the expenses of Taylor
were signed by Vicente andL u i s . I n t h e i r d e f e n s e ,
L u i s a n d V i c e n t e c l a i m e d t h a t t h e y
s i g n e d t h e checks in good faith as they were
a p p r o v e d b y r e s p o n d e n t . T h e C F I r e n d e r e d judgement
ordering the respondent to pay Ace for the amount disbursed with interest
at a legal rate until full payment and dismissed the third party complaint.
Respondent appealed to CA. CA affirmed the decision of trial court with regard to its
decision in favor of Ace but reversed the dismissal of the 3rd
party complaint. CA found as a fact that Taylors trip had neither
b e e n a u t h o r i z e d n o r r a t i fi e d b y A c e . I t h e l d
that Luis and Vicente were also privy
t o t h e authorized disbursement of corporate monies with the
respondent. That when they approved signed the checks, they have given their
stamp of approval. As it is established that corporate funds were disbursed
unauthorized, the case is of a simple quasi-delict committed by them against the
corporation. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of quasidelict, notwithstanding that he was occupying
a contractual position at Ace? Otherwise stated,
whether or not quasi-delict (tort) may
be committed a party in a contract?
Held:
Yes. The existence of a contract between the parties constitutes no bar to the
commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages. His guilt is m a n i f e s t o n a c c o u n t
of, in spite of his being a vicepresident and director of Ace,p e t i t i o n e r r e m a i n e d
passive, through out the period of
Taylors trip and to the payment of the latters salary. As such he neglected to
perform his duties properlyto the damage of the firm of which he was an officer.
other arrangements with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to
these defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the
injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for
the week beginning the 26thof May. It appears from the testimony in this
case, conclusively, that Cuddy willfully violated his contract, he being the
owner of the picture, with Gilchrist because the defendants had offered him
more for the same period. Mr. Espejo at the trial on the permanent
injunction on the 26th of May admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the
owner of the film. He was trying to get it through his agents Pathe Brothers
in Manila. He is the agent of the same concern in Iloilo. There is in evidence
in this case on the trial today as well as on the 26th of May, letters showing
that the Pathe Brothers in Manila advised this man on two different
occasions not to contend for this film Zigomar because the rental price
was prohibitive and assured him also that he could not get the film for
about six weeks. The last of these letters was written on the 26th of April,
which showed conclusively that he knew they had to get this film from
Cuddy and from this letter that the agent in Manila could not get it, but he
made Cuddy an offer
Cuddy accepted it because he was paying about
three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist for. Therefore, in
the opinion of this court, the defendants failed signally to show the
injunction against the defendant was wrongfully procured.
Issue: whether or not there is an interference of contract.
Ruling:
From the above-quoted findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a resident of
Manila, was the owner of the"Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the owner of
a cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in accordance with the terms of the
contract entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former leased to the
latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater for the
week beginning May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully violate his contract
in order that he might accept the appellant's offer of P350 for the film for
the same period. Did the appellants know that they were inducing Cuddy to
violate his contract with a third party when they induced him to accept the
P350? Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film.
He received a letter from his agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him
that he could not get the film for about six weeks. The arrangement
between Cuddy and the appellants for the exhibition of the film by the latter
on the 26th of May were perfected after April 26, so that the six weeks
would include and extend beyond May 26. The appellants must necessarily
have known at the time they made their offer to Cuddy that the latter had
booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April 26. Therefore, the
inevitable conclusion is that the appellants knowingly induced Cuddy to
violate his contract with another person. But there is no specific finding that
the appellants knew the identity of the other party. So we must assume that
they did not know that Gilchrist was the person who had contracted for the
film. The right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with Cuddy for
the lease of the film must be fully recognized and admitted by all. That
Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach ofthat contract,
there can be no doubt. Were the appellants likewise liable for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the
time the identity of one of the contracting parties? The appellants claim that
they had a right to do what they did. The ground upon which the appellants
base this contention is, that there was no valid and binding contract
between Cuddy and Gilchrist and that, therefore, they had a right to
compete with Gilchrist for the lease of thef ilm, the right to compete being a
justification for their acts. If there had been no contract between Cuddy and
Gilchrist this defense would be tenable, but the mere right to compete could
not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away the
appellee's contractual rights. In the case at bar the only motive for the
interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants
was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There
was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the
legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. It is,
therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable to
Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from
such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time
the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.The liability of the
appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as
they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract
with Gilchrist. So that if theaction of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it
would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article
1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes
damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to
repair the damage do done.
BUSTAMANTE V CA 193 SCRA 603
FACTS:
April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel
and sand truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda
passenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza,
Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck
sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the wall from
the driver's seat to the last rear seat. Several passengers of the bus were
thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:
1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and
father of Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed
Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria
Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion
Bersamina
The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or
operated as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado
Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were
approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the
highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus
driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that
the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due
to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted
from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus,
which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or
pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of
the highway
RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in
failing to avoid the collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand
tractor was the proximate cause of the collision making him solely liable
HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.
The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own
acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person is entitled to recovery.
owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving
the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
148 SCA 353 (L-652095) (1987)
Facts:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. private
respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving his way home from a cocktailsand-dinner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the
evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving
his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna
and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and
was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his
allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from
his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner
Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of
General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was
parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of incoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any socalled "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by
petitioner Armando Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures. Dionisio commenced an action for
damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that
the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in
which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that
the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor,
without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenixalso sought to
establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of
the dump truck driver.
Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is the negligence of the
driver or the negligence of Dionisio.'.
HELD: it was the negligence of the truck driver. The legal and proximate
cause of the injuries of Dionisio was the wrongful or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. , The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was
a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. The
truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was
rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump
truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created
an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident,
was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. Respondent
Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
PANTRANCO V BAESA 179 SCRA 384
FACTS:
Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other
people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in
Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses
While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20
kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila,
encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
with it.
As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar
Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar
Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from
quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the
accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who
had the chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence
HELD: NO.
Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to
defeat claim for damages.
For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the
person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care,
have been aware of it.
There is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger
When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on
his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on
his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus
to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite
direction.
Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds
before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
Last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.
failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages
that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to
himself. Had, would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own
injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the
event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence
BERNAL V HOUSE
54 PHIL 327 January 30, 1930
FACTS
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban,
Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. After the procession, they,
accompanied by two other persons,
passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed
to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. While in
front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,Ltd., an automobile
appeared on which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the
street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming
from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.House. When the mother and her
companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot
water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the
child died that same night. It was certified that the cause of death was
"Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were
"Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen. The
defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the
street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that
the cause of death was other than the hot water; and
that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and
negligence. The trial judge, however, after examination of the
evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the
case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. He nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE
WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs
HELD: NO
The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting
hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the
lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it. The mother
and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There
was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in
advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water.
- The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil
Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and
her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability
under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an
'act of God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor, (b) the event must
be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a
fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor
of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which
results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. The principle
embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and
all human agencies are, to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175). Disposition
Petition dismissed.
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS
OF DOMINGA ONG
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening
of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted (a lighted
matchstick was thrown by a stranger near the opening, causing the fire).
The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses. Their owners,
among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and
Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its
agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was
attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence
and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with
respect to the supervision of their employees. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of
appellees
HELD: the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees
are held liable solidarily to appellants,
Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine in
the instant case on the grounds that as to (its) applicability in the
Philippines, there seems to he nothing definite, and that while the rules do
not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, in the case at bar, however,
we find no practical use for such doctrine.
The question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine has
actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine
Power and Development Co
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force
here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and
spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees,
but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring
houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants,
namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the
flames from leaping over it.. Defendants negligence, therefore, was not
only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread
thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the
second amended complaint that the fire was caused through the acts of a
stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant,
passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match
in the premises. No evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the
allegation to be true certainly any unfavorable inference from the
admission may be taken against Boquiren it does not extenuate his
negligence. A decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous
to those of the present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here.
It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a
degree of protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate with
a danger involved we think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to
torts that if the effects of the actors negligent conduct actively and
continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the
active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third
persons innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor from liability. Stated in
another way, The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not
sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such
negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause
in the resulting injury.
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner, vs.ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al.,
respondent
FACTS:
The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a
two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the cor ner of Quezon
Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo,Manila was owned and
operated by Teague.The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total
area of about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of
round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function with my
many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear
right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.
Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points
to the driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof
of care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo
truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire
of the said truck.
ISSUES
WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent. WON the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur
applies in this case
HELD
NO. Negligence defined .Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of
care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing
evidence. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device
consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the
truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still
bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such
accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
DEL PRADO VS. MANILA ELECTRIC, 52 Phil. 900
Facts:
Ignacio del Prados right foot was caught and crushed by car no. 74 and had
to be amputated the following day. He was running across the street to
catch the car but before his position had become secure, and even before
his raised right foot had reached the platform, the motorman applied the
power and the car gave a slight lurch forward. Plaintiffs footslipped and his
hand was jerked loose from the hand post and he fell to the ground.
Issue: WON there was breach of legal duty
Held: Yes. Although motorman was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on,
it was his duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the
plaintiffs peril while he was attempting to board the car.
Premature acceleration of car was breach of this duty.
Duty of carrier extends to persons boarding the cars as well as alighting
there from.
Plaintiff s negligence in attempting o board moving car was not the
proximate cause of the injury. Direct and proximate cause was
the premature acceleration
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
16 Phil 8 (March 22, 1910)
Facts:
Defendant Manila Electric left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used
for blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its power
plant. Fifteen year old David Taylor is a son of a mechanical engineer. Two
years before the incident David spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on
an inter island transports. Later he took up work in his father's office,
learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. It appears that
he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature
both mentally and physically than most boys his age. David, along with
Manuel, a 12 year old, entered the premises of the defendant without
permission. While playing, the boys saw the fulminating caps, picked some
pieces and brought them home. In the presence of Jessie, a 9 year old girl,
The two boys made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the
ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. Next,
they tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of
the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other
boy applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed causing
injuries to the boys and to Jesse. This action was brought by the plaintiff,
through his father, to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.
Issue:
Whether or not the company was liable for the injury sustained by plaintiff.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the negligence of
the defendant of leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury. When the immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own acts, he cannot recover damages
for the injury. The immediate cause of the explosion, which resulted in
plaintiffs injury, was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the
cap. True, David Taylor may not have known and probably did not know the
precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of
the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred, but he well knew that a more or less dangerous
explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly,
and knowingly produced the explosion We are satisfied that the plaintiff in
this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents
of the cap; that his age and his experience qualified him to understand the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have
avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the
injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident
which inflicted the injury.
LOPEZ V PAN AMERICAN WOLRD AIRWAYS, 16 scra 431
Facts:
Then Senate Pro Tempore Lopez booked 1 st class tickets from Tokyo to
San Francisco. He was traveling with wife, daughter and son-in-law.On May
24, 1960, they arrived in Tokyo only to discover that they no longer had 1 st
class accommodations. They took flight under protest cause Senator had
scheduled meeting and wife had check-up at Mayo clinic. Damages was
claimed for breach of contract in bad faith.
Issue: WON they can recover moral damages
HELD: Yes, bad faith existed. Moral damages are recoverable in breach of
contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Badges of
Bad Faith Employee Herranz cancelled reservation of Lopez together
with that of the Rufi nos
only the Rufi nos cancelled. Despite knowledge that reservations have
been cancelled, when Lopez party called in to confirm, they assured them of
1st class accommodations. Such willful non-disclosure of the cancellation or
pretense that the reservations of the plaintiffs stood is the factor to which is
attributable the breach of the resulting contract. It is humiliating to be
compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be