MARIA VIRGINIA V.

REMO vs HONORABLE SECRETARY OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 169202
MARCH 5, 2010

FACTS:

The case is about a petition for review of the decision of the Office of the
President dated May 27, 2005 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA- G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Office of the President and in turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs denying the petitioners request to revert to the use of her
maiden name in the issuance of a renewed passport.

The petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipina whose

passport was expiring on October 27, 2000. The following entries appear in her
passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name and
Remo as her middle name. Petitioner who at that time her marriage still
subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of
Foreign Affairs in Chicago, Illinois.On August 28, 2000, the DFA, through
Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota denied the request to revert the use of her
maiden name, thus stating; that the Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the
conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is,
only in cases of annulment, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case
does not meet any of these conditions. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000. The
Office of the President also dismissed the appeal on July 27, 2004.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner, who originally used her husbands

surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in
the replacement passport.

HELD:

The court denied the petition due to unjustified changes in ones name
and identity in a passport. Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists,
she should not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.
Otherwise stated, a married womans reversion to the use of her maiden name
must be based only on the severance of the marriage

PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.

LLORENTE
G.R. No. 124371 NOVEMBER 23, 2000

FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest.
Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State.
After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to
which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous
relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married
Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo
on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3
children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate.
The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified
declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence,
this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to

remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD:
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case,
the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are
valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce
obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determine the
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by
our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since
he was a foreigner.

PEOPLE vs. GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981 JANUARY 15 2004.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. The information for parricide against appellant,
however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through
the use of a lead pipe not by a gun. Appellant invoked self defense and defense
of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating

circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death
and the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant herein can validly invoke the battered
woman syndrome as constituting self defense.
RULING:
The Court ruled negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted
with the battered woman syndrome. A battered woman has been defined as a
woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without concern for her rights. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.
The defense fell short proving three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly
characterizing their relationship. No doubt there were acute battering incidents
but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the
past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide,
however the penalty is reduced to siz years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some
other lawful cause.

ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON

and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-23482 AUGUST 30, 1968

FACTS:
Feb 14, 1953 when they got married. Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen
(respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila March 12, 1963 Carmen
filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Before it pushed through though they
reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso
and the youngest would stay with Carmen. This was affirmed by the CFI. May
7, 1963, respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her
in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her
younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well
who are all below 7 years old.CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating
to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the
execution of said judgment is void too.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD:
Yes, should have but was filed out of time. NCC Art 363 - "No mother
shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court
finds compelling reasons for such measure." Older children at that time were 5
and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void since no
compelling reasons were stated otherwise. However the children are now 11
and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live
with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) already
1968. Court may also award custody to who they deem fit through evidence.
Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and
intellectual development.
However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the
agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses
and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction.
(art 190/191 of NCC) Corroborated by already 5-year separation