NAPOCOR v.

CA
DOCTRINE:
Civil Law Act of God Doctrine Requisites
to exempt the obligor from liability on the
claim of force majeure.In any event, We
reiterate here Our pronouncement in the
latter case that Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs.
Court of Appeals is still good law as far as
the concurrent liability of an obligor in the
case of force majeure is concerned. In the
Nakpil case, We held: To exempt the
obligor from liability under Article 1174 of
the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation
due to an act of God, the following must
concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of
the debtor (b) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable (c) the event
must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner and (d) the debtor must be
free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
Same Same Intervention of a human factor
removed the occurrence from the rules
applicable to acts of God.Accordingly,
petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act
of God or force majeure to escape liability
for the loss or damage sustained by the
private respondents since they, the
petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The
event then was not occasioned exclusively
by an act of God or force majeure a human
factornegligence or imprudencehad
intervened. The effect then of the force
majeure in question may be deemed to have,
even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man. Thus, the whole
occurrence was thereby humanized, as it

were, and removed from the rules applicable

to acts of God.
FACTS:
In the early morning hours of
October 27, 1978, at the height of typhoon
"Kading", a massive flood covered the
towns near Angat Dam, causing several
deaths and the loss and destruction of
properties of the people residing near the
Angat River. Private respondents are
residents of such area. They were awakened
by the sound of rampaging water all around
them. The water came swiftly and strongly
that before they could do anything to save
their belongings, their houses had
submerged, some even swept away by the
strong current.
Private respondents blamed the
sudden rush of water to the reckless and
imprudent opening of all the three (3)
floodgates of the Angat Dam spillway,
without prior warning to the people living
near or within the vicinity of the dam.
Petitioners
denied
private
respondents' allegations and contended that
they have maintained the water in the Angat
Dam at a safe level and that the opening of
the spillways was done gradually and after
all precautionary measures had been taken.
Petitioner NPC further contended that it had
always exercised the diligence of a good
father in the selection of its officials and
employees and in their supervision. It also
claimed that written warnings were earlier
sent to the towns concerned. At the time
typhoon "Kading" hit Bulacan with its
torrential rain, a great volume of flood water
flowed into the dam's reservoir necessitating

the release of the water therein in order to

prevent the dam from collapsing and causing
the loss of lives and tremendous damage to
livestock and properties.
Petitioners further contended that
there was no direct causal relationship
between the alleged damages suffered by the
respondents and the acts and omissions
attributed to the former. That it was the
respondents who assumed the risk of
residing near the Angat River, and even
assuming
that
respondents
suffered
damages, the cause was due to a fortuitous
event and such damages are of the nature
and character of damnum absque injuria,
hence, respondents have no cause of action
against them.
The Trial Court awarded damages,
interest, and attorneys fees. The CA
affirmed such ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the injury caused to
private respondents was due to fortuitous
event?
HELD:
No. Act of God or force majeure, by
definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, events that could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
are inevitable. It is not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. As a general rule, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen or which though foreseen, were
inevitable.

The act of God doctrine strictly

requires that the act must be occasioned
solely by the violence of nature. Human
intervention is to be excluded from creating
or entering into the cause of the mischief.
When the effect is found to be in part the
result of the participation of man, whether
due to his active intervention or neglect or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is then
humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God.

Rainfall was classified only as

moderate and couldnt have caused
flooding.
Despite announcements of the
coming of a powerful typhoon, the
water level was maintained at its
maximum.

When the negligence of a person

concurs with an act of God producing a loss,
such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate cause of the
damage was the act of God. To be exempt he
must be free from any previous negligence
or misconduct by which the loss or damage
may have been occasioned
PAL v. CA (September 15, 1993)
DOCTRINE:
Same Same PAL failed to grasp the
exacting standard required by law. The
occurrence of a fortuitous event did not
terminate PALs contract with its passengers
who must still necessarily have to exercise
extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the
stranded passengers until they have reached
their final destination.The position taken
by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its

failure to grasp the exacting standard

required by law. Undisputably, PALs
diversion of its flight due to inclement
weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless,
such occurrence did not terminate PALs
contract with its passengers. Being in the
business of air carriage and the sole one to
operate in the country, PAL is deemed
equipped to deal with situations as in the
case at bar. What we said in one case once
again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of
carrier and passenger continues until the
latter has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the carriers
premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still
have to 425 exercise extraordinary diligence
in safeguarding the comfort, convenience
and safety of its stranded passengers until
they have reached their final destination. On
this score, PAL grossly failed considering
the then ongoing battle between government
forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City
and the fact that the private respondent was
a stranger to the place. As the appellate
court correctly ruledWhile the failure of
plaintiff in the first instance to reach his
destination at Ozamis City in accordance
with the contract of carriage was due to the
closure of the airport on account of rain and
inclement weather which was radioed to
defendant 15 minutes before landing, it has
not been disputed by defendant airline that
Ozamis City has no allweather airport and
has to cancel its flight to Ozamis City or
bypass it in the event of inclement weather.
Knowing this fact, it becomes the duty of
defendant to provide all means of comfort
and convenience to its passengers when they
would have to be left in a strange place in
case of such bypassing. The steps taken by
defendant airline company towards this end

has not been put in evidence, especially for

those 7 others who were not accommodated
in the return trip to Cebu, only 6 of the 21
having been so accommodated. It appears
that plaintiff had to leave on the next flight 2
days later. If the cause of nonfulfillment of
the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it
has to be the sole and only cause (Art. 1755
C.C., Art. 1733 C.C.). Since part of the
failure to comply with the obligation of
common carrier to deliver its passengers
safely to their destination lay in the
defendants failure to provide comfort and
convenience to its stranded passengers
using extraordinary diligence, the cause of
nonfulfillment is not solely and exclusively
due to fortuitous event, but due to something
which defendant airline could have
prevented, defendant becomes liable to
plaintiff.
FACTS:
On August 2, 1976, he was among
the twenty-one passengers of PAL Flight
447 that took off from Cebu bound to
Ozamiz City. The routing of this flight was
Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato. While on flight and
just about fifteen (15) minutes before
landing at Ozamiz City, the pilot received a
radio message that the airport was close due
to heavy rains and inclement weather and
that he should proceed to Cotabato City
instead. Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the
PAL Station Agent informed the passengers
of their options one of which is to return to
Cebu on Flight 560. However, there were
only six (6) seats available in Flight 560 as
there were already confirmed passengers for
Manila and that the basis of priority would
be the check-in sequence at Cebu. Private

respondent chose to return to Cebu but was

not accommodated because he checked in as
passenger No. 9 on Flight 447. Station
Agent refused private respondent's demand
explaining that the latter's predicament was
not due to PAL's own doing but to a Force
Majeure. He accepted the free ticket to
Iligan City but under protest.

convenience to its stranded passengers using

extraordinary diligence, the cause of nonfulfillment is not solely and exclusively due
to fortuitous event, but due to something
which defendant airline could have
prevented, defendant becomes liable to
plaintiff.

PAL v. CA (July 17, 1997)

ISSUE:
Whether or not force majeure is a
valid defense?

HELD:
The relation of the carrier and
passenger continuous until the latter has
been landed at the port of destination and
has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL
necessarily would still have to exercise
extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the
comfort, convenience and safety of its
stranded passengers until they have reached
their final destination. The appellate court
correctly ruled that the steps taken by
defendant airline company towards this end
has not been put in evidence, especially for
those seven who were not accommodated in
the return trip to Cebu, only 6 or 21 having
been accommodated. It appears that that
plaintiff had to leave on the next flight 2
days later. If the cause of the non-fulfillment
of the contract is due to fortuitous event, it
has to be the sole and only cause. Since part
of the failure to comply with the obligation
of common carrier to deliver its passengers
safely to their destination lay in the
defendant's failure to provide comfort and

DOCTRINE:
Same Same Damages Assuming arguendo
that airline passengers have no vested right
to amenities in case a flight is cancelled due
to force majeure, what makes an airline
liable for damages in the instant case is its
blatant refusal to accord the socalled
amenities equally to all its stranded
passengers who were similarly situated.
Assuming arguendo that the airline
passengers have no vested right to these
amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to
force majeure, what makes petitioner liable
for damages in this particular case and
under the facts obtaining herein is its
blatant refusal to accord the socalled
amenities equally to all its stranded
passengers who were bound for Surigao
City. No compelling or justifying reason was
advanced for such discriminatory and
prejudicial conduct.

FACTS:
On October 23, 1988, private
respondent Pantejo, then City Fiscal of
Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila
and disembarked in Cebu City where he was

supposed to take his connecting flight to

Surigao City However, due to typhoon
Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City
was cancelled.

ISSUE:

To accommodate the needs of its

stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out
cash assistance of P100.00 and, the next day,
P200.00, for their expected stay of two days
in Cebu.

HELD:

Respondent
Pantejo
requested
instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PALs
expense because he did not have cash with
him at that time, but PAL refused.
Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced
to seek and accept the generosity of a
copassenger, an engineer named Andoni
Dumlao, and he shared a room with the
latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to
pay his share of the expenses upon reaching
Surigao.
On October 25, 1988 when the flight
for Surigao was resumed, respondent
Pantejo came to know that the hotel
expenses of his co-passengers, one
Superintendent Ernesto Gonzales and a
certain Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the
Philippine National Bank, were reimbursed
by PAL.
At this point, respondent Pantejo
informed Oscar Jereza, PALs Manager for
Departure Services at Mactan Airport and
who was in charge of cancelled flights, that
he was going to sue the airline for
discriminating against him. It was only then
that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo
P300.00 which, due to the ordeal and
anguish he had undergone, the latter decline.

Whether or not PAL can establish the

defense of force majeure?

Yes. PAL can establish the defense of

force majeure but it is still liable for
damages.
Petitioner theorizes that the hotel
accommodations or cash assistance given in
case a flight is cancelled is in the nature of
an amenity and is merely a privilege that
may be extended at its own discretion, but
never a right that may be demanded by its
passengers. Thus, when respondent Pantejo
was offered cash assistance and he refused
it, petitioner cannot be held liable for
whatever befell respondent Pantejo on that
fateful day, because it was merely exercising
its discretion when it opted to just give cash
assistance to its passengers.
Assuming arguendo that the airline
passengers have no vested right to these
amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to
force majeure, what makes petitioner liable
for damages in this particular case and under
the facts obtaining herein is its blatant
refusal to accord the so-called amenities
equally to all its stranded passengers who
were bound for Surigao City. No compelling
or justifying reason was advanced for such
discriminatory and prejudicial conduct.
More importantly, it has been
sufficiently established that it is petitioner's
standard company policy, whenever a flight
has been cancelled, to extend to its hapless
passengers cash assistance or to provide
them accommodations in hotels with which

it has existing tie-ups. In fact, petitioner's

Mactan Airport Manager for departure
services, Oscar Jereza, admitted that PAL
has an existing arrangement with hotels to
accommodate stranded passengers, and that
the hotel bills of Ernesto Gonzales were
reimbursed obviously pursuant to that
policy.

Cipriano vs. CA
DOCTRINE:
Torts
and
Damages
QuasiDelicts
Negligence Violation of a statutory duty is
negligence per se.We have already held
that violation of a statutory duty is
negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and

fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot

exempt petitioner from liability for loss.
FACTS:
Cipriano is engaged in rust-roofing
of vehicles (Mobilkote) and a restaurant
(Lambat) situated adjointly. On a relevant
date, an employee of Maclin Electronics
brought a Kia Pride to him for such service,
which the latter should have claimed on a
certain time after the service but failed to do
so.
Cipriano then kept the same in the
inner garage to safeguard against theft.
However fire broke out from Ciprianos
adjoined restaurant, which then burned the
premises of Mobilkote, including the Kia
car.

Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held the

owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire
which started in his establishment in view of
his failure to comply with an ordinance
which required the construction of a
firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we stated
that where the very injury which was
intended to be prevented by the ordinance
has happened, noncompliance with the
ordinance was not only an act of negligence,
but also the proximate cause of the death.

Private respondent then sued for

damages which Cipriano denied since there
was delay in the claim of the car. CA upheld
liability by reason of Ciprianos failure to
observe mandate of PD 1572.

Same Same Same Same Same Failure to

comply with a statutory duty to secure
insurance coverage constitutes negligence.
There is thus a statutory duty imposed on
petitioner and it is for his failure to comply
with this duty that he was guilty of
negligence rendering him liable for
damages to private respondent. While the
fire in this case may be considered a

YES. CIPRIANO LIABLE. Violation of a

statutory duty is negligence. His failure to
insure the cars under his service and the
service he renders under the DTI is a
condition precedent for his operations.
Although the fire is a fortuitous event, the
circumstance given as neglect of duty cannot
exempt petitioner from the loss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cipriano could be
held liable for damages despite the fire
being a caso fortuito?
HELD:

Yobido vs. CA
DOCTRINE:
Same Fortuitous Events Words and
Phrases Characteristics of a Fortuitous
Event.In view of the foregoing,
petitioners contention that they should be
exempt from liability because the tire
blowout was no more than a fortuitous event
that could not have been foreseen, must fail.
A fortuitous event is possessed of the
following characteristics: (a) the cause of
the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence,
or the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligations, must be independent of
human will (b) it must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid (c) the occurrence must
be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner and (d) the obligor must be free
from any participation in the aggravation of
the injury resulting to the creditor. As Article
1174 provides, no person shall be
responsible for a fortuitous event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable. In other words,
there must be an entire exclusion of human
agency from the cause of injury or loss.
Same Same Under the circumstances of
the present case, the explosion of the new
tire may not be considered a fortuitous
event. Under the circumstances of this
case, the explosion of the new tire may not
be considered a fortuitous event. There are
human factors involved in the situation. The
fact that the tire was new did not imply that

it was entirely free from manufacturing

defects or that it was properly mounted on
the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire
bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand
name noted for quality, resulting in the
conclusion that it could not explode within
five days use. Be that as it may, it is settled
that an accident caused either by defects in
the automobile or through the negligence of
its driver is not a caso fortuito that would
exempt the carrier from liability for
damages.
FACTS:
Spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and
their minor children named Ardee and
Jasmin, boarded a Yobido Liner bus.
The left front tire of the bus
exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around
three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree.
The incident resulted in the death of
28 year-old Tito Tumboy and physical
injuries to other passengers.
A complaint for breach of contract of
carriage, damages and attorneys fees was
filed by Leny and her children against
Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and
Cresencio Yobido, its driver
TC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit, because it said the tire blowout was a
caso fortuito which is completely an
extraordinary circumstance independent of
the will of the defendants who should be
relieved of whatever liability the plaintiffs
may have suffered by reason of the
explosion pursuant to Article 11746 of the
Civil Code.

CA reversed the decision of the TC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the explosion of a
newly installed tire of a passenger vehicle is
a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier
from liability for the death of a passenger?

HELD:
No. The explosion of a newly
installed tire of a passenger vehicle is not a
fortuitous event that exempts the carrier
from liability for the death of a passenger.
On the Presumption of Negligence:
Based on Art. 1756 of the CC7,
when a passenger is injured or dies while
travelling, the law presumes that the
common carrier is negligent.
This disputable presumption may
only be overcome by evidence that the
carrier had observed extraordinary diligence
as prescribed by Articles 17338, 1755 and
1756 of the Civil Code or that the death or
injury of the passenger was due to a
fortuitous event.

obligations, must be independent of

human will;
It must be impossible to foresee the
event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid;
The occurrence must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and
The obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of
the injury resulting to the creditor.

Under the circumstances of this case,

the explosion of the new tire may not be
considered a fortuitous event. There are
human factors involved in the situation. The
fact that the tire was new did not imply that
it was entirely free from manufacturing
defects or that it was properly mounted on
the vehicle
It is settled that an accident caused
either by defects in the automobile or
through the negligence of its driver is not a
caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier
from liability for damages.

On Caso Fortuito:
Yobidos contention that they should
be exempt from liability because the tire
blowout was no more than a fortuitous event
that could not have been foreseen, must fail.
A fortuitous event is possessed of the
following characteristics:

The cause of the unforeseen and

unexpected occurrence, or the failure
of the debtor to comply with his

Proof of Diligence is Essential:

Moreover, a common carrier may not be
absolved from liability in case of force
majeure or fortuitous event alone. The
common carrier must still prove that it was
not negligent in causing the death or injury
resulting from an accident.
They failed to rebut the testimony of Leny
Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that
she cautioned the driver to slow down.

These contradictory facts must, therefore, be

resolved in favor of liability in view of the
presumption of negligence of the carrier in
the law.
The Yobidos should have shown that
it undertook extraordinary diligence in the
care of its carrier, such as conducting daily
routinary check-ups of the vehicles parts.

Walter Smith Co. v. Cadwallader Gibson

Lumber Co.|

partially demolishing it and throwing the

timber piled thereon into the water. As a
result, plaintiff sued defendant for the partial
destruction of the wharf and for the timber
that was piled thereon.
Trial court held that the defendant
was not liable for the partial collapse of the
plaintiff's wharf, and for the loss of the
timber piled thereon, dismissing the
complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant is liable?

DOCTRINE:
DAMAGES
DAMAGES

RESPONSIBILITY

FOR

CAUSED TO A WHARF BY A STEAMSHIP.

By virtue of the facts stated in the decision
and the doctrines therein cited, H is held:
That, inasmuch as the defendant company,
owner of the steamer Helen C, which caused
the damages, giving rise to the controversy
at the wharf of the plaintiff, had employed a
duly licensed captain, authorized to
navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage,
and inasmuch as the appellee contracted his
services because of his reputation as a
captain, the presumption of liability against
the defendant has been overcome by the
exercise of the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting said captain.
FACTS:
Defendant owns a steamer under the
command of Capt. Lasal. The steamer was
in the course of its maneuvers to moor at
plaintiffs wharf in Olutanga, Zamboanga,
when said steamer struck said wharf,

HELD:
NO, CADWALLADER GIBSON
LUMBER CO. IS NOT LIABLE. The
instant case, dealing, as it does, with an
obligation arising from culpa aquiliana or
negligence, must be decided in accordance
with articles 1902 and 1903 (now 2176 and
2180) of the Civil Code.
It is not true that proof of due
diligence and care in the selection of and
instructions to a servant relieves the master
of liability for the former's acts; on the
contrary, such proof shows that the liability
never existed. As Manresa (vol. VIII, page
68) says, the liability arising from an extracontractual wrong is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission, which, while free
from any wrongful intent, and due to mere
negligence or carelessness, causes damaged
to another. A master who takes all possible
precaution in selecting his servants or
employees,
bearing
in
mind
the
qualifications necessary for the performance
of the duties to be entrusted to them, and
instructs them with equal care, complies

with his duty to all third parties to whom he

is not bound under contract, and incurs no
liability if, by reason of the negligence of
such servants though it be during the
performance of their duties as such, third
parties should suffer damages. It is true that
under article 1903 of the Civil Code, the law
presumes that the master, if regarded as an
establishment, has been negligent in the
selection of, or instruction to, its servants,
but that is a mere juris tantum presumption
and is destroyed by the evidence of due care
and diligence in this respect.
In a previous case (Bahia v. Litonjua
and Leynes), this distinction was clearly
stated.
It said: From this article two
things are apparent: (1) That when an
injury is caused by the negligence of
a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee,
or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that the
presumption is juris tantum and not
juris et de jure, and consequently,
may be rebutted. it follows
necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in selection and supervision he
has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability. This theory
bases the responsibility of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant. This is the

notable peculiarity of the Spanish

law of negligence. It is, of course, in
striking contrast to the American
doctrine that, in relations with
strangers, the negligence of the
servant
is
conclusively
the
negligence of the master.
The evidence shows that Captain
Lasal at the time the plaintiff's wharf
collapse was a duly licensed captain,
authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of
any tonnage, and that the defendant
contracted his services because of his
reputation as a captain. This being so, the
presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the
exercise of the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting Captain Lasal,
in accordance with the doctrines laid down
by this court in the cases cited above, and
the defendant is therefore absolved from all
liability.

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District

FACTS:
Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its
filters in Balara, Quezon City. It charges the
public a certain fee if such wanted to use its
pools.
Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of
petitioners, went to the pools along with his
2 brothers
He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he
told his brothers that he would get
something to drink. His brothers left him
and went to the Deep pool

Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that

one person was swimming to long under
water
Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty
dove into the pool to retrieve Ongs lifeless
body. Applying first aid, the lifeguard tried
to revive the boy.
Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came
to render assistance, followed by sanitary
inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after
being called by phone from the clinic by one
of the security guards, boarded a jeep
carrying with him the resuscitator and a
medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected
the boy with camphorated oil. After the
injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to
fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the
Philippines. Meanwhile, Abao continued
the artificial manual respiration, and when
this failed to revive him, they applied the
resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were
exhausted
Investigation was concluded and the cause
of death is asphyxia by submersion in water
(pagkalunod)
The parents of Ong bring this action for
damages against Metropolitan, alleging
negligence on the selection and supervision
of its employees and if not negligent, they
had the last clear chance to revive Ong.
It is to be noted that Metropolitan had
complete safety measures in place: they had
a male nurse, six lifeguards, ring buoys, toy
roof, towing line, saving kit and a
resuscitator. There is also a sanitary
inspector who is in charge of a clinic
established for the benefit of the patrons.

Defendant has also on display in a

conspicuous place certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools,
one of which prohibits the swimming in the
pool alone or without any attendant.
Although defendant does not maintain a fulltime physician in the swimming pool
compound, it has however a nurse and a
sanitary inspector ready to administer
injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator
if the need should arise
ISSUE:
Whether or not Metropolitan is liable
to the Ongs for its negligence?
Whether or not the last clear chance
doctrine may be invoked in this case?

HELD:
NO, METROPOLITAN IS NOT
NEGLIGENT. Metropolitan has taken all
necessary precautions to avoid danger to the
lives of its patrons. It has been shown that
the swimming pools of appellee are
provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid
medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is
painted with black colors so as to insure
clear visibility. There is on display in a
conspicuous place within the area certain
rules and regulations governing the use of
the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards
who are all trained as they had taken a
course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards
work on schedule prepared by their chief
and arranged in such a way as to have two
guards at a time on duty to look after the

safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse

and a sanitary inspector with a clinic
provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there
are security guards who are available always
in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the
body of minor Ong was retrieved from the
bottom of the pool, the employees of
appellee did everything possible to bring
him back to life. When they found that the
pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector
immediately injected him with camphorated
oil. When the manual artificial respiration
proved ineffective they applied the oxygen
resuscitator until its contents were
exhausted. And while all these efforts were
being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from
the University of the Philippines who
however came late because upon examining
the body found him to be already dead. All
of the foregoing shows that appellee has
done what is humanly possible under the
circumstances to restore life to minor Ong
and for that reason it is unfair to hold it
liable for his death
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE
IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
The record does not show how minor
Ong came into the big swimming pool. The

only thing the record discloses is that minor

Ong informed his elder brothers that he was
going to the locker room to drink a bottle of
coke but that from that time on nobody
knew what happened to him until his lifeless
body was retrieved. The doctrine of last
clear chance simply means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant
where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence
Since it is not known how minor
Ong came into the big swimming pool and it
being apparent that he went there without
any companion in violation of one of the
regulations of appellee as regards the use of
the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard
Abao responded to the call for help as soon
as his attention was called to it and
immediately after retrieving the body all
efforts at the disposal of appellee had been
put into play in order to bring him back to
life, it is clear that there is no room for the
application of the doctrine now invoked by
appellants to impute liability to appellee.