On Liberty - John Stuart Mill

Summary Notes
In blue, quotes from the text.

Chapter 1 - Introductory
In chapter 1 of On liberty, Mill tackles the following ideas:
1. that the book is not about liberty of the will as understood by the
philosophy of Necessity but about social liberty.
2. that the struggle between liberty and authority is a very ancient
one and has divided mankind since Greece and Rome.
3. the what was meant by liberty then, was liberty against the
oppression and tyranny of the state.
4. That dealing with despotism went through 2 states: 1) that of
securing concepts and recognition of political liberties and rights and 2)
the establishment of constitutional checks to control the power of the
authority. That the latter was less successful.
5. That after a while, it was recognized that instead of mitigating the
power of a state which was always seen as antagonistic to the peoples
interest, it would be better that the power actually reflects the same
interests, that the rulers identified with the people, ideas that would lead
to the birth of modern democratic ideals.
6. that this ideal of democracy was not perfect and that axiomatic
concepts like self government and power of the people over
themselves dont reflect the actual state of things because the people
who exercise the power are not the same as those over which the power
is exercised and that it is not the government of each by himself but
each by all the rest.
7. that one of the major adverse effects of democracy now well
recognized is the tyranny of the majority. Mill believes this tyranny
to be an even stronger form of oppression than political tyranny because
it leaves few means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the
details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. and so is needed protection
against the tyranny of the prevailing opinions which prevents the
formation of individuality not in harmony with its ways.

8. Mills then introduces the need to place a limit on the influence of

social control and that a lot remains to be done in terms of practical
implementation and rules of conduct, .
9. Mill believes most people dont think much about the rules
according to which they ought to live and instead rely on the customs
put in place, as something that is self evident. However Mill admonishes
customs and the thinking of one that everybody ought to live the same
way as he, that he possesses the right standard of judgement. Mills says
that ones judgement, when not supported by evidence, is but ones own
opinion. That men would not understand other ways of conduct than the
one given to them by some religious creed. That in a state of oppressors
and oppressed, it is the morality of the oppressors that dominates the
general conduct, which only encourages a principle of servility for the
preferences of the ruling masters.
10.
People who disagreed with this authority have dealt with it by
inquiring into what are good conducts and then endeavoring to convince
others into favoring the view they had adopted as heretical. Mill thinks
instead they should make common cause in defense of freedom.
11.
that the first ground over which the break with tradition
happened was over religious liberties and over the moral right of
freedom of consciousness as an indefeasible right.
12.
Mill says there is no recognized principle over which to judge
the propriety or impropriety of government interference, with regards to
control of individual behavior. He therefore gives the one which is the
object of the essay, one very simple principle, as entitled to govern
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of
compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the
form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That
principle is, that the sole end for which making are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He further
says, Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign
13.
Mill believes that this applies to all men or women who have
reached the level of maturity in a modern society, not in a barbarian
society (where for example, despotism is a better type of government in
improving the state of the people). Compulsion is not the right method
anymore when people are now able to learn and guide themselves by
persuasion and conviction.

14.
Mill also says his principle is not based on an idea of abstract
rights that are not based on utility (such as apriori rights or natural
rights). That his principles utility is seen as benefiting the progressive
development of human being. So only if one does harm to another, there
is prima facie case for punishing him.
15.
He make a distinction between doing something wrong and
preventing a wrong from happening, in the latter case, to be dealt with
more cautiously. There are often times good reason not to hold someone
accountable and not involving government because, the individual is
more likely to know better than the government what to do or because
forcing him to do something might actually incur another worse harm.
16.
Mill discuss the domain of human liberty, a sphere of
action in which society has only an indirect interest. He says it is
comprises of 3 parts: 1) the inward domain of consciousness; demanding
liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of
thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all
subjects; practical or speculative, scientific moral or theology. The liberty
of expressing and publishing opinions. 2) The liberty of tastes and
pursuit, of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing
as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without
impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not
harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse,
or wrong. 3) the liberty within the same limits of combination among
individuals, freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to
other: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age and not
force or deceived
17.
Mill continues by saying that even though this doctrine seems
a truism, it is the opposite that has been in practice for a long time,
where philosophers and societies advocated the control of every part of
private conduct. Even today Mill sees the same assault on liberty in
modern theories such as Comtes religion of Humanity which he accuses
of being despotic to the individual to a level never before contemplated.
18.
Mill finishes the chapter by warning that the increase in
power, particularly of the masses as is happening with the adoption of
democracy, will only increase the pressure of society over individuals
liberty, and that a strong barrier of moral conviction must be raised
against the mischief that we must expect in the present circumstances.

Chapter 2 - On the Liberty of Thought and

Discussion
TBD

Chapter 3 - Of Individuality as One of the

Elements of Well Being
In chapter 3, Mill defends individuality as one of the elements of well being
1. Acting according to ones will is as fundamental as saying what one
thinks, as long as one does not make himself a nuisance to others.
2. Mill argues for different experiments in livings because no one is
holder of the full truth, mankind is imperfect and have different opinions.
He thus values varieties of character letting the choice of the best of
them be proven practically. It is desirable, in short, that in things which
do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself.
3. The challenge in maintaining this principle Mill says is the
indifference that people have for others lives. People dont really value
the free development of individuality, or individual spontaneity.
4. Mill thus quotes the German Wilhelm Von Humboldt, a strong
proponent of liberty and individuality (from his book, The sphere of
Duties of Government), an inspiration for Mills doctrine of freedom,
which he quotes: The end of man, or that which is prescribed by the
eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague
and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development
of his powers to a complete and consistent whole; that, therefore, the
object towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his
efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their
fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and
development. That for this there are two requisites, freedom and
variety of situations and that from the union of these arise individual
vigor and manifold diversity which combine themselves in originality.
5. Mill doesnt argue that all that people do is imitate each other, or
should not add their own judgement into the good habits they have
learned. neither to live as if no one has ever lived before, as if one could
not learn from anyone elses experience. What Mill stresses is that
having reached maturity, it is the privilege and proper condition of a
human being to use and interpret experience in his own way

6. That customs are made for customary circumstances that might

not be fit to one at his point of time and that one would be better off
making his own choice rather that following the customs because: the
human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental
activity and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a
choice
7. Mill is very critical of those people who let the world do the
choosing for them, who only use they ape-like faculty of imitation. His
whole worth as a human being is much enriched. One would not want to
live the life of an automaton.
8. After focusing on exercising our own understanding, Mill asks
whether the same should be done of our desires and impulses. He
believes that people look down on people who have them as peril and
snare. But desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human
being as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulse are only perilous
when not properly balanced; when one set of times and inclinations is
developed into strength, which others, which ought to co-exist with
them, remain weak and inactive
9. Mill believe strong impulse and vigor to be a good thing and that
they are no natural relation to weak conscience, only more of the raw
material of human nature and so can be used as much for good than
evil. He says It is through the cultivation of these [love of virtue and
sternest control] that society both does its duty and protects its
interest. Mill is a proponent of character, shaped by ones desire and
impulses and so encourages them.
10.
Mill looks back at the old times where impulses were hard to
control, that law and discipline asserted a power over the whole man
and claimed control of all his life in order to control his character. Mill
laments that today, people dont ask them what is good for them, what is
highest and best to grow as. They merely ask what is good for my
position, what will make me money, what is preferential for my superior.
Even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing
thought of, peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned
equally with crimes
11.
Mill then attacks this state of affair as being one encouraged
by the calvinist theory, where the worst that man can do is to have selfwill. a culture of obedience and of duty which crushes any human
capacity. He asks whether this is not opposite to religious doctrine which,
stating that a God is Good and made us with those faculties, would make
us then work hard to eliminate their effect. According to Mill, pagan selfassertion is one of the elements of human worth as well as christian selfdenial.

12.
Mill still thinks he needs to go further to convince those who
dont think self development is important, that if they encourage it, it is
still good for them. For it promotes originality which then allows
discovery of new truths and falsehoods. That the human nature has a
tendency to degenerate into the mechanical unless there were a series
of people working originally and preventing beliefs and practices to
become mere traditions. Genius can only breathe freely in an
atmosphere of freedom. He also laments that people dont take the idea
of originality serious enough. Originality is the one thing which
unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of
13.
In his discussion of character, Mill is invective about English
views. He is very negative about how public opinion views odd behavior.
He says the general average of mankind are not only moderate in
intellect, but also moderate in inclinations: they have no taste or wish
strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they
consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with
the wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down
upon.
14.
he talks about the despotism of custom, which proscribes
singularity, but it does not preclude change, provided all change
together.
15.
It is the fate of nations to become stagnate when they dont
encourage originality. Mills points to china, where fine tradition has kept
the people in well being but however, for the past thousand of years
have not improved much. Europe he thinks has so far escaped the fate of
the chinese because of the plurality of paths that nations have taken but
this might not last for a long time, as a work by Tocqueville is showing
less and less difference with the older generation. Mill reminds us about
Humboldt 2 necessary conditions for human development: freedom and
diversity variety of situation
16.
Mill ends the chapter with the alarming effect of the
globalization and industrialization have on promoting conformity. He says
All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to
raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education
promotes it, because education brings people under common influences,
and give them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments.
Improvement in the means of communication promotes it, by bringing
the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keeping up a
rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The
increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diffusing more
widely the advantages of easy circumstances, and opening all objects of
ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire

of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all

classes.
17.
To Mill, the most important of all the changes is the
ascendancy of public opinion in the State.that the idea of resisting the
will of the public disappears more and more from the minds of practical
politicians., all these are creating a mass influence hostile to
Individuality. Mill asks that people act now to make sure it is safeguarded
because mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when
they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.

Chapter 4 - Of the Limits to the Authority of

Society over the Individual
In Chapter 4 of On Liberty, Mill tackles the limits to the authority of society
over the individual:
1. Mill is concerned about where societys control begins and how
much of individual life should be assigned to individuality vs society.
2. That society is not based on a social contract but that nevertheless
one should give back from what one takes advantages from, and that
the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be
bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest
3. that this conducts consist of 1) not injuring the interests of one
another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal
provision, or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights,
and 2) in each persons bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable
principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society
or its members from injury and molestation
4. Mills thus add that behavior that is not bounded by a duty to
society or steps over someone elses right, can be justly punished by
opinion but not by law.
5. Mill doesnt mean to say that people should only interact with each
other if there is self interest. He does encourage mutual disinterest when
it is for promoting the mutual good but doesnt think force or coercion
should be used.
6. Self regarding values should only be inculcated by education (such
as temperance, prudence, courage and industry. Other-regarding virtues
are generosity, conscientiousness, honesty, veracity and justice)
7. Mill actually wants people to help improve each others. He says:
human being owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the
worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter.

They should be forever stimulating each other to increased exercises of

their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims
towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects
and contemplations
8. Ultimately however, each man has infinitely more knowledge about
what makes him better. The interference of society in his judgement
would be grounded on general assumptions altogether wrong and even if
right, might be misapplied to individual cases.
9. Mill provides some hints as what can be done to help people with
their conduct: considerations to aid his judgement, exhortations to
strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him , by
others, but he himself is the final judge
10.
For Mill, there is an ideal perfection of human nature,
embodied by self-regarding qualities, and the men do use them to regard
others according to that scale, because it arouses admiration in one. This
lowness or depravity of taste, Mill says, which though it cannot justify
doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and
properly a subject of dictate, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt.
11.
Mill thus justifies social reprobation because it will eventually
benefit that individual. Though doing no wrong to anyone, a person may
so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a
being of inferior order: and since this judgement and feeling are a fact
which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it
beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he
exposes himself. Mill would just wish that something else that politeness
would be used to deliver the message, without being unmannerly or
presuming.
12.
Regarding such person Mill says, we are not bound to seek his
society, we have a right to avoid him, we have a right to caution others
against him. We may give others a preference over him in optional good
offices (except those which tend to his improvement). In all these cases,
Mill argues that one should expect to be lowered in the expectation of
others when their behavior is characterized by rashness, obstinacy, self
conceit, all hurtful to other people.
13.
Some other acts that Mill think can be punished are act
injurious to others, encroachment on their rights, infliction on them of
any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or duplicity
in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them;
even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury, these are fit
object for moral reprobation and in grave cases, of moral retribution and
punishment. Not only the acts, but also the dispositions that lead to
these acts are fit subjects of disapprobation: cruelty of disposition,

malice and ill-nature, that most anti-social and odious of all passions,
envy; dissimulation and insincerity, irascibility on insufficient cause, and
resentment disproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering
over others; the desire to engross more than ones share of advantages,
the price which derives gratification from the abasement of others; the
egotism which thinks self and its concerns more important than
everything else and decides all doubtful questions in its own favor.
These are moral vices and constitute a bad and odious moral
character.
14.
Mill then takes on the opposing side that argues that the
distinction between ones life that only concerns oneself and that which
concerns other is non existent. These people, Mill says, argue that it is
not possible for people to be indifferent to others behavior, that people
are not so isolated, that anything they do hurtful enough to themselves
will be also felt by others, at least their closest connections. If one hurts
himself, he affects his dependents, may even become a burden. So they
justify that if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to
others, he is nevertheless injurious by, his example, and ought to be
compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or
knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead. Those people Mill
says, argue that society should take care of all even those manifestly
unfit for it. Society should police vices and conducts that have
established themselves as better than others from the beginning of the
world until now.
15.
Mill himself does concede that the mischief which a person
does to himself may seriously affect both through their sympathies and
their interests, those nearly connected with him and in minor degree
society at large. However, what has to be punished is not the
extravagance of the behavior, but the breach of duty. He stresses that for
those cases, ones behavior leading to some failure can be a subject of
moral reprobation but not be considered as the cause of failure. To
illustrate this point, he says no person ought to be punished simply for
being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being
drunk on duty
16.
Mill restates his point: With regard to the merely contingent,
or as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to
society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public,
nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except
himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for
the sake of the greater good of human freedom
17.
Mill in his defense, argues that society should not claim a
power to punish grown ups when it had all the time it needed to

encourage a new generation of kids to be morally good. Their fault lie in

that society itself, as he says, is so lamentably deficient in goodness
and wisdom, but it only has itself to blame, if it lets considerable
number of its children grow up without the ability to be rationalized with.
Society will also fail to act on those who have strong character. Finally,
bad example is bad because it leads to bad things for that individual.
Society therefore in that individual has an example to show that it is in
the right and should not therefore act to remove it, but let by its display,
be its own lessons taught.
18.
The most important of all arguments that Mill raised to
interfering with ones individuality is the misplacement and wrongness of
the interference. The real goal is shutting down opinions and behavior
which society doesnt agree merely because they are different. public
opinion means, at the best, some peoples opinion of what is good or bad
for other people; which very often it does not even mean that; the public,
with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or
convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only
their own preference. In its interferences with personal conduct it is
seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling
differently from itself. Mill believe 9/10th of moralist to be using this
standard of judgement that teach that things are right because they are
right; because we feel them to be so
19.
In the next section, Mill go through examples of moral
policing: religious opinions between christians and mohammedans,
married clergy in southern europe, the efforts of temperance to control
music, dancing, public games and other diversions. Sabbatarian
legislation, actions against mormonism because of their sanction of
polygamy. In all these, the case is made of an intrusion in the liberty of
others which society or others have no business in doing.
20.
These examples seems to suggest a view of the world
centered around social rights that can be invaded by others, where social
right is that which can be affected by anything that other people can do
and also the expectation that everyone else should do the same as one.
For Mill, there is no violation of liberty which that principle would not
justify because it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever,
except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever
disclosing them.

Chapter 5 - Applications
In Chapter 5 of Liberty, Mill discusses his principle of liberty in the context of
some applications. These applications are not consequence of the principle

itself but rather used to illustrate what the principle would entail. I offer not
so much applications, as specimens of applications; which may serve to bring
into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the maxims.
1. He first reminds us of the two principles, the first being that an
individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these
concern the interests of no person but himself. The second, that for
such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of other, the individual is
accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal
punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite
for its protection.
2. Mill urges us to recognize the fact that not because one action can
affect the interests of other that interference is alone justified.
Particularly in the field of trade, there is much competition which
involves such interests and necessarily involves the suffering of losing
against others. He says however these often are due to bad social
institutions, they are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some
would be unavoidable under any institution.
3. Mill makes a distinction between the Doctrine of Free Trade and
the principle of liberty. The doctrine of free trade, is one that has
recognized that government interference in social trade, either by fixing
prices or regulating the process of manufacturing doesnt lead to the
best outcomes. It is now recognized, though not till after a long
struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities
are most effectually provided for by the leaving the producers and sellers
perfectly free, under the sole check of, equal freedom to the buyers for
supplying themselves elsewhere
4. Mill clearly states that this doctrine doesnt in most case involves
the principle of individual liberty, and so is not concerned by the limits of
the doctrine. What amount of public control is admissible for the
prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary precautions, or
arrangements to protect working people employed in dangerous
occupations, should be enforced on employers, such questions involve
considerations of liberty only in so far as leaving people to themselves is
always better, ceteris paribus (other things equal), than controlling them:
but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends is in principle
undeniable.

5. Mill cites the Main Law (one of the first statutory

implementations of the developing temperance movement in the United
States) as a law that is essentially a question of liberty, because the
object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a
commodity, and that the infringement is objectionable not as operating
on producers or sellers, but on the buyers.
6. Mill then goes through a few other examples of such restrictions
such as the sale of poison, the prevention of crime or of accident and
provides some alternate ways to reduce the side effects. He believes that
the preventive function of government is far more liable to be abused,
to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function. One should not
however shriek from preventing a crime when there is certainty it would
happen. If the function of poisons is to always be used to do harm, than
it is justified to prohibit their manufacture and sale. For cases where
someone puts himself in harm without knowing it (such as about walking
a bridge over a river which officers know is unsafe), it is also justified to
intervene without an infringement of liberty. Liberty consists in doing
what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. In cases
where the danger is not certain, it ought to be the person to judge for
himself what that danger would interference would be justified is only
warning of it. Mill says one way to increase awareness of the danger in
the example of the poison, is to provide labelling. Forcing everyone to
get a certificate in order to buy this item would be much too expensive.
7. Mill also discusses the method of contracts called pre-appointed
evidence as named by Bentham as a good example of preventing evil
without infringement worth taking into account upon the liberty of those
people. Precaution of a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of
articles adopted to be instruments of crime. The seller might be required
to enter in a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and
address of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity sold so as to
make it quite difficult to do something bad without being detected.
8. Mill also mentions drunkenness which he says is not a fit subject for
legislative interference, except if it is known to be leading a person into a
state of violence (for example in the case of recidivists). The making
himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to
others, is a crime against others. So again, idleness, except in a person
receiving support from the public or except when it constitutes a breach

of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal

punishment.
9. He also mentions violation of good manners as one within the
category of offenses against others and may rightly be prohibited. This
includes offenses against decency, but Mill doesnt define the limit or the
scope of such offenses.
10.
Mill also asks: what the agent is free to do, ought other
persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate?. He finds that
whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do But
there are some limits, especially when the counselor has a pecuniary
interest: the question is doubtful only when the instigator derives a
personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for
subsistence or pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the State
consider to be an evil. Other examples, he says should be tolerated are
fornication and gambling. but should a person be free to be a pimp or to
keep a gambling house? The case is one of those which lie on the exact
boundary line between two principles.
11.
There are argument on both side he says. On the side of
toleration, how can we we have a double standard of making something
admissible yet not when it becomes an occupation. Our principle ought
to be consistent and people should be as free to persuade as to
dissuade. On the other side, it should be recognized that however the
state may not be allowed to authoritatively decide to punish, it may still
think the activity to be a disputable question. That it should be wrong on
their part to want to dissuade solicitations which are not impartial, who
have a direct personal interest on the opposite side of what the state
considers right. the same argument would argue that though the
statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly indefensible - though all
persons should be free to gamble by their own subscription, and open
only to the members and their visitors - yet public gambling houses
should not be permitted. Mill doesnt eventually take a side, noting
however that prohibition does tend to go one in secrecy and unregulated.
These arguments also apply to items that can be bought: every article
which is bought and sold may be used in excess, and the sellers have a
pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess but that doesnt justify
the Main Law, in that, one cannot ban the dealers because they are an
indispensable part of providing the goods for their legitimate use.

12.
Another aspect is whether the state should be allowed to
restrict the agents to geographical areas or quantities of goods, making
it harder to get them by limiting the purchasing points. To tax stimulants
for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained, is a
measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition, and would
be justifiable only if that were justifiable. Every increase of cost is a
prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augment
price. Should stimulants be special subjects of taxation? at first it would
not seem so but it is well remembered, said Mill, that taxation for fiscal
purposes is absolutely inevitable and some products more than
other will be targeted. It is therefore best to tax those products which, if
used in greater quantity provide greater damage. Taxation therefore, of
stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of
revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it yields)
is not only admissible, but to be approved of
13.
Mill thinks any intervention which is done in a paternal
mindset is wrong, particularly on the ground that they infringe on the
opportunity to control oneself and develop ones moral capacities. It is
only because the institutions of this country are a mass of
inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice, which
belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal, government,
while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise of
the amount of control necessary to render the restrain of any real
efficacy as a moral education
14.
Mill addresses the concern of those engagements between
individual and in what cases the state would be allowed to interfere. Any
engagement which seeks to remove the liberty by making one a slave of
another are null and void. The reason for not interfering, unless for the
sake of others, with a persons voluntary acts, is consideration of liberty.
By selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty and its future use.
the principle of freedom cannot require that he should not be free
15.
Mill does think however, that people who bind each other with
what only concerns themselves should also be able to release
themselves from the engagement. He cites Wilhelm von Humboldt,
from his essay on government, That engagements which involve
personal relations or services should never be legally binding beyond a
limited duration of time; and that the most important of these

engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity that its objects are

frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are in harmony with it,
should require nothing more than the declared will of either party to
dissolve it. Mill however think more needs to be known about the
premise that leads one to end the engagement. Because with such
engagement, so much is done by either party to plan for the future and
rely on this promise, to build expectations and calculations about ones
life, there are a new series of moral obligations that then arises
which even though can be overruled, cannot be ignored. This would be
the same if any third party, or children come out from this union. He
disagree with Humboldt that these matters should make no difference in
the legal freedom of the parties to release themselves from the
engagement, they necessarily make a great difference in the moral
freedom. A person is bound to take all these circumstances into account
before resolving on a step which may affect such important interests of
others; and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests, he is
morally responsible for the wrong.
16.
Mill then talks about the misplacement of the sentiment of
liberty. In many cases, liberty is withheld where it ought to be granted or
granted where it ought to be withheld. He deals with one case in
particular where he thinks the sentiment of liberty is misplaced. It
regards the case where one is acting on the behalf of another under
the pretext that their affairs are his own. The state, while it respects the
liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a
vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to
possess over others. One area where this is completely disregarded is
over the despotic power of husbands over their wives, who should be
getting the same rights and protection of the law as any man.
17.
This is also true regarding how father treat their children, who
are thought to be part of them which makes the misapplication of the
principle even more urgent. For children, in the case of education, Mill
wonders, is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should
require and compel parents to provide the education, up to a certain
standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? State ought to
have the power to force parents to comply with such obligation. They
ought to give any new children all the chance she deserves and which
enables her to perform well in life. While this is unanimously declared to

be the fathers duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear,
of obliging him to perform it. it is still unrecognized that to bring up a
child in this world without a fair prospect of being able to develop itself is
a moral crime.
18.
Even though Mill is for universal education, he doesnt think
the state should be the sole provider because of the difficulties of
agreeing on what to teach and how to teach it. The objections which are
urged with reason against state education do not apply to the
enforcement of education by the state but to the states taking upon
itself to direct that education, which is a totally different thing. Mill reiterates the importance of individuality of character, diversity of opinions
and modes of conduct which should be encouraged by a diversity of
education. That is why he doesnt want people to be molded to look like
each other, which is what a state education would do, and which
eventually tend to represent the predominant power in the government.
There should be many competing experiments, perhaps the state being
one of them, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to
keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence.
19.
How should this education be certified? Only through public
examination and beginning at an early age, says Mill. Help may be given
if fathers dont have sufficient money to give the ability to read to their
children. A certain minimum amount of knowledge should be required for
certification but beyond that minimum there should be voluntary
examination on all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain
standard of proficiency might claim a certificate. Mill doesnt think you
should be tested for opinions. The knowledge required for passing an
examination should, even in the higher classes of examinations, be
confined to facts and positive science exclusively. The examination
on religion, politics or other disputed topics should not be about the truth
or falsehood of opinions but on matters of facts, that for example, such
opinion is held by such and such person.
20.
Mill believes that all attempts by the state to bias the
conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects are evil; but it may very
properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the
knowledge requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth
attending to. Also, All professions should be available for certifications
and government shouldnt exclude anyone from one of any professions.

21.
It is important to emphasize that Mill is quite against bringing
to life more babies in a state of overpopulation, whose parents cannot
afford to provide them a good education, and knowing that this increases
the number of low wage labors and would have the effect of reducing the
reward of ones labor because of the added competition. He is in favor of
some of the laws in other European countries which forbid marriage if the
couple cannot demonstrate enough means of supporting a family. Such
laws are interferences of the state to prohibit a mischievous act - an act
injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, and social
stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal
punishment.
22.
Mills finishes this chapter questioning the validity of acts
performed by the states to help people rather than restrict them. He
gives 3 objections to such governmental interference. 1) The thing to be
done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government.
2) It is desirable that things be done by individual instead of
governmental officers, even if not done well, because they are a mean
to their own mental education - a mode of strengthening their active
faculties, exercising their judgement, and giving them a familiar
knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. 3) the
great evil of adding unnecessarily to the governments power.
23.
The 2nd reason is about the development of citizenry. It is in
the interest of the country to train its people to be citizens, to give them
practical education that takes them out of the narrow circle of personal
and family selfishness and accustoming them to the comprehension of
joint interests - the management of joint concerns - habituating them to
act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims
which unite instead of isolating them from one another. This further
allows at local levels the development of individuality and diversity of
modes of action, which allows creativity to come forth. The governments
business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the
experiments of others; instead of tolerating no experiments but its own
24.
Regarding the 3rd reason, Mill fears that an increase of
governmental powers would lead to a decrease in the active powers of
the people, and a reliance of others to do the job. If everything became
the job of the government, such as roads, railways, banks, insurance,
joint-stocks, universities, charities, municipal board etc.. then there

would be no freedom in such a country. The evil would be greater, the

more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was
constructed - the more skillful the arrangements the arrangements for
obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it.
25.
Mill discuss the proposal that the most intelligent and
instructed people should be hired for civil service. Those who are against
this proposal, hold that the state cannot pay high enough to attract such
people from the private sector. Mill however is uneasy about such a
proposal, that even if that could be done, a small minority would then
hold much of the bureaucracy to which the rest of the community would
look for to dictate them what to do. Ambition would be to be admitted to
this group. Also, it would be very hard for the people to check against
their representatives. Under this regime, not only is the outside public
ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticize or check the
mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of
despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise
to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be
effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. That is the
state of things in Russia where the Czar cannot govern without or against
the will of the bureaucrat.
26.
Mill contrast this with countries with freedom such as France
and America where people have enough skills to transact things on their
own. What the french are in military affairs, the Americans are in every
kind of civil business; let them be left without a government, every body
of americans is able to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other
public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence, order and
decision. This is what every free people ought to be: and a people
capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by
any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the
reins of the central administration.
27.
Mill believes no absolute rule can be laid down with regards to
the art of government: to secure as much of advantages of centralized
power and intelligence as can be had without turning into governmental
channels too great a proportion of the general activity is one of the most
difficult and complicated questions in the art of government. To him
however, one principle conveyed the standard of overcoming the
difficulties: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with

efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and

diffusion of it from the centre.
28.
Mill envisions in every local department, a central
superintendence who would gather a variety of information and
experience in all localities and would share them with other places. He
gives an example of how this organization is better done and compares it
with the Poor Law board, which was created for the administration of the
poor Law of 1834.
29.
Mill finishes by reiterating when the mischief with the state
begins, when instead of calling forth the activity and powers of
individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs. A worth
of the state is in its people and if a state only favors docile individuals
who cannot do anything more than administrative things, it will soon find
out that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and
that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything,
will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order
that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish