Two Monthly Continuous Dynamic Model Based on Nash

Bargaining Theory for Conict Resolution in Reservoir System

MehranHomayounfar, MehdiZomorodian, ChristopherJ.Martinez, SaiHinLai
Published:December7,2015

http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143198

Abstract
SofarmanyoptimizationmodelsbasedonNashBargainingTheoryassociatedwithreservoiroperationhavebeendeveloped.
Mostofthemhaveaimedtoprovidepracticalandefficientsolutionsforwaterallocationinordertoalleviateconflictsamongwater
users.Thesemodelscanbediscussedfromtwoviewpoints:(i)havingadiscretenatureand(ii)workingonanannualbasis.
Althoughdiscretedynamicgamemodelsprovideappropriatereservoiroperatorpolicies,theirdiscretizationofvariablesincreases
theruntimeandcausesdimensionalityproblems.Inthisstudy,twomonthlybasednondiscreteoptimizationmodelsbasedonthe
NashBargainingSolutionaredevelopedforareservoirsystem.Inthefirstmodel,basedonconstrainedstateformulation,thefirst
andsecondmoments(meanandvariance)ofthestatevariable(waterlevelinthereservoir)iscalculated.Usingmomentequations
astheconstraint,thelongtermutilityofthereservoirmanagerandwaterusersareoptimized.Thesecondmodelisadynamic
approachstructuredbasedoncontinuousstateMarkovdecisionmodels.Thecorrespondingsolutionbasedonthecollocation
methodisstructuredforareservoirsystem.Inthismodel,therewardfunctionisdefinedbasedontheNashBargainingSolution.
Indeed,itisusedtoyieldequilibriumineverypropersubgame,therebysatisfyingtheMarkovperfectequilibrium.Bothapproaches
areapplicableforwaterallocationinaridandsemiaridregions.AcasestudywascarriedoutattheZayandehRudriverbasin
locatedincentralIrantoidentifytheeffectivenessofthepresentedmethods.Theresultsarecomparedwiththeresultsofanannual
formofdynamicgame,aclassicalstochasticdynamicprogrammingmodel(e.g.BayesianStochasticDynamicProgramming
model,BSDP),andadiscretestochasticdynamicgamemodel(PSDNG).Bycomparingtheresultsofalternativemethods,itis
shownthatbothmodelsarecapableoftacklingconflictissuesinwaterallocationinsituationsofwaterscarcityproperly.Also,
comparingtheannualdynamicgamemodels,thepresentedmodelsresultinsuperiorresultsinpractice.Furthermore,unlike
discretedynamicgamemodels,thepresentedmodelscansignificantlyreducetheruntimetherebyavoidingdimensionality
problems.
Citation:HomayounfarM,ZomorodianM,MartinezCJ,LaiSH(2015)TwoMonthlyContinuousDynamicModelBasedon
NashBargainingTheoryforConflictResolutioninReservoirSystem.PLoSONE10(12):e0143198.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0143198
Editor:YongDeng,SouthwestUniversity,CHINA
Received:July3,2015Accepted:November1,2015Published:December7,2015
Copyright:2015Homayounfaretal.ThisisanopenaccessarticledistributedunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommons
AttributionLicense,whichpermitsunrestricteduse,distribution,andreproductioninanymedium,providedtheoriginalauthor
andsourcearecredited
DataAvailability:AllrelevantdataarewithinthepaperanditsSupportingInformationfiles.
Funding:ThefirstauthorisgratefultotheGovernmentofMalaysiaandtheUniversityofMalaya(UM)forfinancialsupportof
thefirstauthorthroughtheBrightSparkFellowshipScheme.Thefundershadnoroleinstudydesign,datacollectionand
analysis,decisiontopublish,orpreparationofthemanuscript.
Competinginterests:Theauthorshavedeclaredthatnocompetinginterestsexist.

Introduction
Inefficiencyofclassicalconflictresolutiontechniques[16]indealingwithconflictingissuesinwaterallocationamongdifferent
usershavedrawnattentiontoutilizinginnovativealternativesforresolvingconflict.AnumberofapproachessuchasNonlinear
Programing[7,8],CompromiseProgramming[911],AnalyticHierarchyProcess[12,13]andFuzzySetAnalysis[1416]have
beenutilizedtodealwithconflictsituations.
Gametheoryasanotherapproachforconflictresolutionhasbeenbroadlyappliedinwaterresourcemanagement[1725].The
applicabilityofGameTheorytowaterresourcesmanagementandconflictresolutionwasreviewedbyCarraroetal.[26]and
Madani[27]throughaseriesofnoncooperativewaterresourcegames.SimilarstudieshavebeenconductedbyParrachinoetal.
[28]andZaraetal.[29],evaluatingtheapplicationofcooperativegametheorytowaterresourcesandenvironmentalissues.In
anotherstudybyMadaniandDinar[30],anumberofcooperativegametheoreticsolutions(i.e.thecore,NashHarsanyi,Shapley,
andnucleolus)areformulatedandappliedthroughanumericalgroundwaterexample.Consideringappliedcooperativesolutions,
theyevaluatehowcommonpoolresourcesuserssharethegainsobtainedfromcooperationefficientlyandfairly.
Inthecontextofgametheory,NashbargainingisatypicalgameintroducedbyNash[31]applicabletomodelconflictsituations.
Subsequently,aNashBargainingSolution(NBS)isasolution(i.e.Paretoefficientsolution)tothisgame.Harsanyi[32]developed
anequilibriumsolutionforannpersonbargainingproblembasedonaninitialNashequilibriumsolutionforthetwoplayercase.
AccordingtoThomson[33],Nashssolutionisgenerallyacceptedasthetypicalframeworkforbargainingproblems.Sofar,many
researchershaveutilizedNBStodealwithconflictsituationsindifferentwaterrelatedproblems.IntheareaofwaterqualityNBS
hasbeenutilizedinanumberofstudies[3436].RegardingoptimalreservoirmanagementalsoNBShasbeenusedforconflict

resolution[3740].Karamouzetal.[3]usedNashproductforformulationoftheobjectivefunctionofareservoirwaterallocation
modelandusedresiliencyandvulnerabilityindicestoevaluatetheperformanceofoptimizationalgorithms.Resultsshowedthe
significanceoftheapplicationofconflictresolutionmodels,suchastheNashtheoryintheregionalscaleespeciallyincomplicated
watersupplysystems.
AnumberofdiscretedynamicmodelsbasedonNashBargainingTheoryhavebeenextendedtoprovideanoriginalwayto
overcomeproblemsbytakingintoaccounttheinteractionbetweendifferentobjectives,behaviorsandpreferencesofwaterusers.
KerachianandKaramouz[35]createdastochasticdynamicmodelforconflictresolutioninreservoirsandriverbasins.The
objectivefunctionwasdefinedbasedontheexpectedvalueoftheNashproduct.Anotherattemptbasedonthesameapproach
wasconductedbyGanjietal.[17,18,41]todevelopadiscretestochasticdynamicmodeltosimulatethecompetitionbetween
waterusersdownstreamofareservoir.Allthesemodelsarepowerfulindealingwithadynamicgameproblembutsufferthe
setbackofhighcomputationaleffortingettingappropriatesolutions[42].Additionally,inthesamecontext,mostoftherecent
continuousapproachesareknownaspowerfultoolsforgeneratingoperatingpolicies.However,manyofthedevelopedmodels
havebeenstructuredannually.Comparedtothemodelswhichworkonamonthlybasis,thiscanleadtoinefficienciesinreservoir
operation.
InthisstudytwocontinuousdynamicoptimizationmodelsaredevelopedusingNashbargainingtheory.Theprincipalaimisto
introducemonthlycontinuousdynamicapproachesapplicabletosinglereservoirsystemsinordertomaximizelongtermutility
associatedwithreservoirmanagementandwaterusers.Duetothecontinuousformofthestatevariable,theseapproacheswillnot
sufferfromthecurseofdimensionality.Alsotheyresultinpracticaloperatingpoliciescomparedtoannualdynamicstructures.The
firstmodelemployingconstrainedstateformulationintroducedpreviouslybyFletcherandPonnambalam,[43],providesan
optimizationapproachforwaterallocationinaridandsemiaridregions.TheobjectivefunctionisstructuredbasedonNBSand
optimizedsubjecttothestatisticalmoments(Thefirstandsecondmoments)ofthestoragestatevariableofareservoirsystem.The
secondmodelisadynamicapproachstructuredbasedoncontinuousstateMarkovdecisionmodels.Weemploythecollocation
methodtosolvethismodel.ThepresentedmodelwasdevelopedbasedonapreviousstudybyHomayounfaretal.[44].The
presentedmodelresultsinmonthlyoperatingpoliciesdistributinglimitedavailablewateramongdifferentusersusingNBS.The
ZayandehRudreservoirsystemincentralIranisselectedtodemonstratethecapabilitiesofthepresentedmodelsincomparison
withtheresultsoftheannualformofthedynamicgamemodel,(i.e.secondpresentedmodel)[42],adiscretestochasticdynamic
game[18],andaBayesianStochasticDynamicProgramming(BSDP)[45]modelofreservoiroperation.
Asanoutlineofthepresentresearch,first,thetheoryofConstrictedstateformulationispresentedandtheobjectivefunctionand
correspondingconstraintsofthedynamicmodel(firstmodel)createdbasedonthistheoryareintroduced.Afterwards,theMarkov
decisionProcessisbrieflypresentedasadynamicsolutiontodealwithconflictinwaterallocationinreservoirsystem.Then,the
theoreticalframeworkofthesecondmodelandcorrespondingsolution(collocationmethod)ispresented.Themodeladjustmentfor
monthlyuseandthemodelstructureassociatedwiththesecondmodelwillbeexplainedasthefinalpartofthemethodology
section.

Methodology
Optimizationmodelforthedynamicofsinglereservoir
TheoryofConstrictedstateformulation.

FletcherandPonnambalam,[43]introducedastochasticoptimizationmodeltoprovideanefficientmanagementinreservoirsystem
operationwithanacceptablelevelofreliability.ThestructureoftheaforementionedmethodwassimilartoStochasticDynamic
Programming.However,thestatevariables(reservoirstorage)werenondiscrete,therebyacontinuousdynamicoptimization
methodwasformed.Statisticalparameters,thefirstandsecondmomentofthestoragevariable(meanandvarianceofthe
reservoirstorage)playimportantrolesincharacterizingtheprobabilitydistributionofthestoragevariable.Usingtheseparameters
asexertedconstraintsinthemodelnotonlyprovidesanexplicitconsiderationtotheboundedstoragevariableinthereservoir
systembutalsothemodelwouldnotinvolveanydiscretizationofthesystemvariables.
RegardingtheprecedingstudyconductedbyFletcherandPonnambalam,[43],thefirstandsecondmomentsofthestoragestage
arecalculatedandtakenintoaccountasconstraintsforanoptimizationproblem.Consideringthecontinuityequationforthe
reservoirsystem,Eq1,andtheindicatorfunction,Eq2,thefirstandsecondmomentsofthestoragestatevariable,Eq3andEq4
respectively,arederived.
(1)

(2)

Wherestandst1representthewaterstoragelevelinreservoirattimetandt1respectively.Rtisthewaterreleasedecision,Itis
thelongtermaverageofmonthlyinflowintoreservoir,smin(t)andsmax(t)are,respectively,minimumandmaximumamountofwater
storageinreservoirandItistherandomcomponentassociatedwiththeinflowattimet.

(3)

(4)

Thesymbolserf()andVar()are,respectively,theerrorfunctionandvarianceandillustratedasfollows:

(5)

(6)

IntheEq3andEq4,E(st)andE(st)2arethefirstmoment(Mean)andsecondmoment(Variance)ofthestoragevariable.Further
detailedexplanationregardingtheextensionofthefirstandsecondmomentequationsandconstrainedstateformulationis
availableinstudiesdonebyFletcherandPonnambalam[43].
ObjectiveFunctionofthecontinuousoptimizationmodel.

Inthismethod,thelongtermvariationofthestatevariableareimposedontheoptimizationmodelthroughconstraintsstatedbyEq
3andEq4.Therefore,theoptimalvalueoflongtermutilitiescorrespondingtowaterusersandreservoirmanagementareachieved
fromtheoptimization.Sincetheobjectivefunctionshouldhaveaconflictresolutionstructure,wedefinedthefunctionbasedonthe
Nashproduct.InordertomaximizethelongtermaverageoftheNashproductfunction,thefirstmomentofNashfunctionis
calculated.(Eq7).

(7)

where,E()istheexpectationofthefunctionandLn()isthenaturallogarithm.AlsoxiandU(xi)arerespectivelyallocatedwaterto
thewateruseriandthecorrespondingutilityfunctions.StandU(st)arethereservoirstorageinstatetandthecorrespondingutility
function.InordertoestimateEq5theninthorderTaylorseriesapproximationisused.
Constraintsonthecontinuousdynamicmodel.

Constraintoftheminimumandmaximumallocatedwatertoeachsector(Eq8)

(8)

wherexiandxi,maxarerespectivelyallocatedwaterandmaximumallocatedwatertoeachsector.
a.Constraintofthemaximumandminimumtotalreleasedwater.

(9)

whereRminandRmaxare,respectively,minimumandmaximumallowedreleasewaterandRisthetotalmonthlyreleasewater.
a.Constraintoftotalavailablewater

(10)

a.Constraintsofthefirstandsecondmomentsrelatedtothefirstandlastmonthsoftheyear.
Theseconstraintsguaranteethatreservoirconditionatthebeginningofeachyearissimilartotheendofthepreviousyear.

(11)

(12)

whereinEq11andEq12,s1ands13are,respectively,reservoirstoragesinthelastmonthandfirstmonthofeverytwo
consecutiveyear.
a.TheEq3andEq4arealsocontributedintoconstraintsaswell.
ContinuousDynamicOptimizationmodelandcorrespondingcollocationsolution

Dynamicviewofconflictinwaterallocationinreservoirsystem.

Problemsdealingwithconflictinwaterconsumptionamongdifferentusersbasedonexpertsviewscanbedefinedasbothstatic
anddynamiccases.Eventhoughapplyingastaticframeforaproblemmakesiteasiertosolve,thedynamicnatureoftheproblem
willbeignored.Inthiscontentandregardingconflictinreservoiroperationandwaterallocation,thesequentialnatureofthe
reservoirmanagementdecisions,togetherwiththeinherentrandomnessofnaturalwaterinflowsexplainthefrequentmodelingof
reservoirmanagementproblemsasMarkovdecisionprocessesandtheiroptimizationbystochasticdynamicprograming.
Whenanallocationproblemalonganinfinitetimehorizonisunderdiscussion,thelifetimeutilityfunctioncanbepresentedbyEq
13.Themaingoalistomaximizetheoverallwaterusersutilities(Us).Inthisequation,vectorsx={xi,i=1,n}andU(xi)denote
allocatedwatertodifferentwaterusersandtheutilitiesproducedbyusingtheallocatedwater,respectively.

(13)

where:tshowsthetimestepofthesystem,StandRtarethereservoirstorageandwaterreleaseattimetandItistheinflow.
Moreover,isthediscountfactorandVt(St)statestheindirectutilityfunction(ValueFunction)attimet.Ontherightside,g(St,It,t)
statesthetransitionequation(Eq14)andtisthefactorbywhichtherandomnessassociatedwithinflowdischargeisimposedand
iscalledexogenousrandomshock(thisparameteristhesameasItbeingalreadydefinedinsection(2.2.1)).AlsoE()denotesthe
expectationofthevaluefunction.
(14)

Eq13isknownastheBellmanequation.Thefirstcomponentinthisequationrepresentstheutilityderivedfromimmediate
consumptionatanygiventimewhereasthesecondcomponentrepresentsthevalueofoptimallifetimeconsumptionstartingone
periodfromstatet.
Inthiscontext,themultiplicativeformofutilityfunctionsofwaterusers(Ux(xti))andreservoiroperator(Us(St)),whichisknownas
theNBS,isconsideredastheintermediateobjectivefunction(Eq15).
(15)

Inthisequation,dxanddsrepresentminimumallocatedwatertowaterusersandminimumwaterlevelinthereservoir,respectively.
Themainaimistomaximizethisproductineverypropersubgameovertheplanninghorizon.
Collocationmethodforcontinuousdynamicmodel.

Thevaluefunctioncanbewrittenasalinearcombinationofasetofmlinearlyindependentbasisfunctions(1,2,3,,j)
associatedwithSt(storageasthestatevariable)andunknownbasiscoefficients(c1,c2,,cj):

(16)

Consideringthecollocationmethod,manyinterpolationschemescanbeemployedtoapproximatethefunctionalequation.Here,
onegeneralandpracticalscheme,namelyChebycheyPolynomialandapproximationisappliedtoapproximatethefunctional
equation[46].
Chebychevapproximationfunction.

ChebychevpolynomialsareassociatedwithafamilyoforthogonalpolynomialsdescribedbyJudd[47].Eq17istonormalizethe
domaintotheinterval[1,1],withtheChebychevpolynomialsdefinedasinEq18:

(17)

where,

(18)

Thelinearcombinationofmnonlinearequationsandmunknowns(Eq15)canbesubstitutedforthevaluefunctioninEq13.This
replacementresultsinEq19:

(19)

TocomputethisoptimizationproblemtheEnvelopeTheoremcanbeapplied[48,49].

MirandaandFackler[46]statedthatthepolicyfunctionisassociatedwiththemeanoftherandomvariableinthepolynomial
optimalcontrolmodel.Accordingly,inordertocomputetheexpectationtermpracticallyinEq10,themeanoftherandomvariable
(t)istakenintoaccountinthestatetransitionfunction.Asaresult,thetransitionequationassociatedwiththestochasticproblem
turnsintotheformusedinthedeterministicmodelandconsequentlycanbesolvedsimilarly.
ThereareanumberofnumericalsolutionmethodstocopewithnonlinearequationproblemssuchasNewtonandquasiNewton
methods[5052].Inthisstudy,wehaveusedtheNewtonmethodtosolvethisproblem.
Modeladjustment:waytointroduceamonthlystructure.

UsingthecollocationmethodtosolveEq19resultsinannualoperatingpoliciesforareservoirsystemanddoesnotevaluate
changesinwaterlevelinreservoirduringtheyear.Incontinuousframeworks,therewardfunctions,Us(xt1,,xtn,Rtt),associated
withdifferentmonthschangeoverthecourseoftheyear.Therefore,thesecondpartoftherighthandside,
,cannotbeusedasanapproximationfortherestoftheyearinitscurrentform.Toovercomethis
issue,thesecondpartoftheEq19ismodifiedanddividedintotwoparts,asshowninEq19

(20)

InEq20,thelefthandsideshowstheoptimalapproximationofvaluefunctionsforthetimeintervalstartingfromstatet+1(M)upto
theendoftheyear.Ontherighthandside,thefirstpartisthevaluefunctionapproximationrelatedtostatet+1whilethesecond
partrepresentsthevaluefunctionapproximationfromstatet+2totheendoftheyear.CombiningEq20andEq19resultsinEq21:

(21)
ModelStructure.

Inordertodescribestructureofthemodel,consideringFig1,wefirstillustratethestepstosolveEq19annually.Then,the
algorithmwithwhichdifferentmonthswillbeconnectedtogetherwillbeexplainedbyFig2.

Fig1.SequentialstepstosolveEq19.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.g001

Fig2.IllustrationofsolvingEq21foreachmonthalongtheyearmovingbackward.

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Fig1providesanillustrationonthesequentialstepstodeterminetheaforementionedvalues(i.e.optimalvaluefunctionand
optimaloperatingpolicy)annually.Themodeliscomprisedofthreeinterconnectedcyclestodeterminetheshareofdifferentwater
users,optimalwaterreleases(xs)andunknowncoefficients(cs)respectively.Forthispurpose,takinginitialunknowncoefficients
intoaccount,theoptimalwaterreleasesarecalculatedandusedinarecursivealgorithmtoupdateunknowncoefficients(cycles1

and2,Fig1).Meanwhile,todeterminetheoptimalwaterreleasesbymeansoftheEnvelopeTheorem,weneedtoknowwater
sharesassociatedwitheveryuser.Therefore,employingNBSthecorrespondingvalues(i.e.allocatedwatersharetoeveryuser)
aredetermined(cycle3,Fig1)andusedtoupdatexsanddeterminingoptimalwaterreleasesineverytrial.
Fig2showsthealgorithmwithwhichdifferentmonthswillbeconnected.Asthefirststep,Eq21issolvedforthelastmonthofthe
year(December)therebydeterminingtheoptimalvaluefunction,Vt(St),andcorrespondingoperatingpolicy,xti*associatedwith
December.Then,movingbackward,thesameparametersarecalculatedforothermonthsoftheyear(Step4,Fig2)takinginto
accountofvaluefunctionapproximationsassociatedwithlatermonthsanddeterminedinprevioussteps.Thisprocedureis
continueduptothepointwhenoptimalwaterallocationpoliciesassociatedwitheachmonthremainconstantfortwosubsequent
iterations.Forexample,allocationpoliciesassociatedwiththethirdmonthofyear(March)calculatedthroughsequentialsteps22
andstep10.Forthispurpose,apredefinedsmallvalueoftoleranceisconsidered(seeTolinFig2).
ApplyingthisapproachmakesitpossibletouseEq19inreservoirsystemoperationonamonthlybasisanddeterminetheoptimal
valuefunction,Vt(St),andcorrespondingoptimaloperatingpolicy,xti*,foreachmonthoftheyear.

ResultsandDiscussion
CaseStudy

Inthisstudy,theZayandehRudriverbasin(Fig3),whichisoneofthemajorriverbasinsinIranwithacatchmentareaof4,200
squarekilometers,isusedasacasestudytoexaminetheproposedconflictresolutionmethod.TheZayandehRudreservoirwith
aneffectivecapacityof1,250millioncubicmeterslocatedattheupstreamoftheriverbasinprovideswaterforapproximatelythree
millionpeoplewholiveinthecityofIsfahanandsurroundingsuburbareas.Inaddition,thereservoirsupplieswaterforthe
domestic,industrialandagriculturalsectorsaswell.Apartfromthat,thereservoirisimportantinprovidingwaterforhydropower,
recreationaluse,andinstreamflow.Thegreatdemandfromvarioussectorsexertspressureontheriverbasinespeciallyduring
summerwhentheriverbasinfailstomeetthedemand.Inaddition,theeffectsofclimatechangehavemadethisproblemeven
worseintherecentdecade.

Fig3.ZayandehRudriverbasinandreservoirlocation.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.g003
AgreatdealofresearchhasbeenconductedontheZayandehRudbasin.ZahraieandHosseini[53],developedanoptimization
modelbasedonageneticalgorithm(GA)consideringvariationsinwaterdemands.Theefficiencyoftheirproposedmodelwas
assessedbyperformingalongtermsimulationoftheZayandehRudreservoir.MadaniandMarino[54],appliedasystemdynamic
frameworktodeveloptheZayandehRudWatershedManagementandSustainabilityModel(ZRWMSM).Homayounfaretal.[44],
developedanannualnondiscretestochasticdynamicgamemodelforreservoiroperationanditscorrespondingsolutionwas
basedonthecollocationmethod.Inthisstudy,thelogarithmsofthe30yearmonthlyinflowstothereservoirweremodeledwiththe
ThomasFieringmodel.Themodelreproducesthemeanandvarianceofflowsineachofthemonthsandthemonthtomonth
correlationoftheflows.Usingthesestatisticalparameters,streamflowsarereproducedforeverymonthalongtheyearandutilized
forreservoiroptimization.Themodelwasstructuredbasedontwowaterusergroups(theagricultureandthemiscellaneousgroup
whichconsistsofindustrial,domesticandenvironmentalsectors),plusthereservoiroperator.
Utilityfunctiondevelopment

Theutilitydataofwaterusersandtheresourcemanager(reservoiroperator)wasobtainedviapreviousresearchconductedby
Ganjietal.[17,18].
Thewaterallocatedtodifferentwaterusersisshownbyxt={xti,I=1,2}Subsequently,Ux(xti)andUs(St)denotetheutilities
associatedwithvarioususersandthereservoiroperator,respectively.Utilityfunctionsarestructuredbasedonquadraticequations.
Table1presentsthecoefficientsofthequadraticequationsofutilityvalues(a*,b*andc*)appliedinEq22forbothusers
(agriculturesectorandothersectors).Eq23alsoshowsthequadraticstatementappliedforthereservoiroperator.Thevalueofa
utilityfunctionreachesthemaximum1(100%)whenthevolumeofallocatedwater(xti)comestothemaximumwaterrequirement.
Conversely,thevalueofutilityhitthelowestlevel(0.0%)whenthevector(xti,i=1,2)reachestheboundariesaspresentedin
Table2.Moreover,thevaluegiventotheoutsideoftheboundariesiszero.

(22)

(23)

Table1.Thecoefficientsofthequadraticequationsofutilityvaluesfordifferentwaterusers.

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Table2.Thegivenallocatedwaterwhichresultsinthemaximumandminimumvaluesoftheutilityfunctionfordifferentusers(MCM).

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ReliabilityIndices

Inthisstudy,reliabilityisthekeydecidingpointtoevaluatetheperformanceofthemodelbasedonthedecisionsbythereservoir
operatorandwaterusers.Thevolumetricreliabilitiesofthereservoirsystemisutilizedtoevaluatethecapabilityandefficiencyof
theproposedmodel.Forwaterallocation,thevolumetricreliabilityofthereservoirsystem,calledtotalreliability,is:

(24)

where,nyearshowsthelengthoftheplanninghorizon.Evaluationoftheshortfallandtheoverflowinthereservoircanbecarried
outbycalculatingthereservoirvolumetricreliabilityindex(Eq25):

(25)
Solvingtheoptimizationmodelbasedonconstrainedstateformulation

Inthispart,asexplainedpreviouslyinthemethodologysection,applyingtheConstrainedStateformulation(introducedby[43])and
basedonNashBargainingTheoryanoptimizationmodelforconflictresolutioninalimitedwatersituationispresented.
Comparingthediscretedynamicoptimizationmodels,theprincipalfeatureofthismodelistoconsiderthestatevariable(water
levelinthereservoir)asacontinuousvariabletherebyavoidingdimensionalityproblemsandlongruntime.Inthismodel,thefirst
andsecondmomentsofthestoragevariable,importanttocharacterizingtheprobabilitydistributionfunctionofthestoragevariable,
aredeterminedandtakenintoaccountasconstraintsforanoptimizationproblem.
Themodelrunfortwowateruserscomprisedofagriculturesectorandothersectorsconsistingofindustrialsector,domesticsector
andenvironmentalsector.Solvingthemodelresultsindeterminingthefirstmomentofthestatevariable(monthlylongterm
averageofwaterstorageinthereservoir),thesecondmomentofthestatevariable(thevarianceofthechangesinthewater
storageinthereservoir),andthemonthlyreleaseofwaterfromthereservoirandthewatershareforeachwateruser(Table3).The
objectivefunctionisrepresentedusingEq7.Themodelconvergedafter389iterationsbytrialanderror.

Table3.Theoptimizedvariablesresultedfromthecontinuousoptimizationmodelbasedonconstrainedstateformulation.

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Inordertoevaluatetheapplicabilityoftheoptimalpolicyassociatedwithwaterrelease(fourthrowintheTable3)a30year
simulationmodelisrunandthereliabilityindicesforthereservoirmanagerandwaterusersarecalculatedsubsequently(Table4).

Table4.Volumetricreliabilitiesofthereservoirsystemresultingfromthesimulationbasedonthepresentedmethod.

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AscanbeseeninTable4,thereliabilityvaluesreducedbyapproximatelyfortypercentoverthefirstfourmonthsoftheyearforthe
agriculturesector.Thiswasduetotheconsiderableincreaseinwaterdemandoverthisperiod.Althoughthereisanaveragewater
demandofnearly250MCMinJuly,aconsiderableportionoftherequiredwaterhasbeenmet.
Solvingthecontinuousdynamicmodelusingcollocationmethod

Regardingthecurvatureofthevaluefunction,theappropriatenumberofcollocationnodes(dimensionsoftheproblem)andthe
basisnodeschemewerechosen.Inthisstudy,variousdimensionsandbasisnodeschemeswereevaluatedtorenderit
computationallyefficient.Ultimately,theChebychevapproximationfunctionwasemployedtoserveasthebasicfunctionwhilethe
appropriatedimensionoftheproblemwasconsideredtobe10termsofcorrespondingbasicfunctions.Asthenextstep,the
collocationequationsweresolvedbyapplyingNewton'ssolutionmethod.ApplyingtheChebychevapproximationfunction,the
programconvergedin372iterations.Oncethecollocationmethodisusedtocopewithdynamicproblems,theresidualfunctionis
employedtoevaluatethequalityoftheapproximation.Theresidualfunctionrepresentsthedifferencebetweentheleftandright
sidesofthisequationatarbitrarystatesSt.Fig4showsthechangesinresidualfunctionovertherangeofthestatevariableforthe
consideredapproximationfunction.Itappearsthattheappliedapproximationfunctionenjoysanacceptablelevelofaccuracy.There
aresomedisturbancesovertheintervalwhichcanbeduetothediscontinuitiesofthederivativesofutilityfunctionsatthosepoints.

Fig4.TheresidualsvariationovertheentireinterpolationintervalofthestatevariablefortheChebychevapproximationfunction.

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Fig5representsthevaluefunctionsofthesolutionprovidedfortheappliedscheme.Fig6illustratesthecorrespondingreservoir
storagesthroughwhichthemaximumlongtermutilityofthewaterusersandreservoiroperatorforeachmonthisobtained.
AccordingtoFig6,itisclearthatoverthesummerseason(fromJunetoAugust)higherstorageisrequiredinthereservoirto
obtainhigherlevelofutility.Consideringthehighlevelofagriculturalactivityduringthistimeofyear,itisrenderedappropriately.

Fig5.Valuefunctionsresultingfromcollocationsolution.

(a),thefirstthreemonths,(b),thesecondthreemonths,(c),thethirdthreemonthsand,(d),thefourththreemonths.
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Fig6.Optimallevelofstoragethatresultsinthemaximumlongtermutilityofthewaterusersandreservoiroperatorineverymonthofthe
year.

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Fig7illustratestheresultingpolicyfunction.Itisobviousthat,aslongastheweatherismovingtowardthewarmanddryseason
(JulytoSeptember),theprovidedoperatingpolicydiagramswouldgoonasteepergradientandconsequently,itislogicalthata
higherlevelofreleaseisobtained.

Fig7.Theoperatingpolicyresultingfromthecollocationsolution,applyingChebychevapproximationfunction.

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Consideringtheoptimalreservoiroperationrule,asimulationmodelbasedonatimeperiodof30yearsiscreatedtoevaluatethe
optimaloperatingruleaswellasthevariationinwaterusers'utilities.Subsequently,thereliabilityindicesforreservoirmanagerand
waterusersarecalculatedandpresentedinTable5.Additionalinformationassociatedwiththesimulationmodelandthe
optimizationmodelincludingsourcecodeareavailablefromauthorsupontherequest.

Table5.TheresultsofsimulationbasedontheoutcomesofcollocationmethodworkingonanannualbasisdonebyHomayounfaretal.[42].

http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.t005
Drawingacomparisonbetweenpresentedmodelsandotherdynamicalternatives

Accordingtotheresults,itseemsthepresentedmodelssuccessfullytakethedynamicsofthereservoirsystemintoaccountand
maximizedlongtermutilityofthesystem.Theyresultedinoptimalreservoiroperatingpoliciesandoptimalwaterallocationinthe
reservoirsystem.Moreover,thestatevariable(waterlevelinthereservoir)isconsideredasacontinuousvariableinthemodels
therebyavoidingthedimensionalityproblem.Thereare,however,differencesbetweenthemintermofthemodelstructure.Inthe
optimizationmodelbasedonconstrainedstateformulation(firstmodel),thelongtermvariationofthestatevariableisimposedin
theoptimizationmodelthroughconstraintsofthemodel.Therefore,theoptimalvalueoflongtermutilitiescorrespondingtowater
usersandreservoirmanagementareachievedfromtheoptimization.While,inthesecondmodelinordertomaximizelongterm
utilityvalueofthesystem,aformoftheBellmanEquationisemployed.
Consideringthevaluesofreliabilitythatresultedfromthe30yearsimulation,itseemsthatbothmodelscansuccessfullydealwith
waterconflictissueswhichmayoccurinreservoirmanagement.Incomparisonwiththereliabilitiesofthewaterusersfromthefirst
model,thereliabilityvaluesinthesecondmodelsuggesthigherperformanceinthemanagementofwaterallocation.Considering
thetotalreservoirstorageindex
alsothesecondmodelproducedmorereliablevaluescomparedtothemodelbasedonthe
constrainedstateformulation.Thehigherperformanceofthesecondmodelinproducingbetterreliabilityindicescanberootedin
utilizingthestructureoftheBellmanEquation.Usingthisdynamicstructuremakesthemodelingsituationclosertothereality.
Incomparisonwiththegamemodelwhichworksonanannualbasis(Table5),thesecondmodelresultsinbettervalues(less
values)ofthetotalreservoirstoragereliabilities(secondrowofTable6).Regardingthewaterusers,thereliabilitiesthatresulted
fromthesecondmodel(fourthrowofTable6)precedetheannualvalue.Itshouldbenotedthatfromthepracticalviewpoint,the
resultsofmodelswhichworkonamonthlybasis,althoughprovidinglowerreliabilitiesinafewcases,aremorerealisticwhen
comparedtoannualmethods.

Table6.Volumetricreliabilitiesofthereservoirsystemresultingfromthesimulationbasedonthepresentedmethod.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.t006
Inaddition,theefficiencyofthepresentedmodelscanbefurthercompared,usingtheinformationonthesystemreliabilityindexof
theBSDPmodel[45],PSDNGmodel[18],andanannualformofdynamicgame[42]inTable7.Accordingtotheresults,in
comparisonwiththeBSDPandPSDNG,thepresentedmodelsresultinlowerreliabilityvalues(Fig8).Also,comparedtothe
discretedynamicgames(i.e.PSDNG),runtimeisconsiderablyreduced.ThediscretenatureofthePSDNGmodelmaybethemain
reasonforthebetterresultsandlongerruntime.ThePSDNGisastochasticconflictresolutionmodel,whichmakespossible
achievementofhigherprecisioninoptimization,usingafinediscretizationofstatevariables.Furthermore,thePSDNGmodeluses
theSimulatedAnnealing(SA)proceduretosearchforthestaticequilibriumpointineachstateofnstagesofthemodel.Afine

discretizationandusingtheSAprocedureincreasestheruntimeandcausesdimensionalityproblems[18].Inaddition,accordingto
theresults,whencomparedwiththeannualdynamicgamemodels,thepresentedmodelsprovidesuperiorresults.Indeed,the
operatingpoliciesresultingfromthesecondmodelaremorepracticalthanthoseoftheannualmodels[42,44].

Fig8.ThevolumetricreliabilityofthereservoirsystemassociatedwithdifferentmodelsforZayandehRudriversystem.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.g008

Table7.Thecomparisonofsystemreliabilityindicesamongpresentedmodels,annualformofdynamicgame,PSDNGandBSDPmodel.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.t007

Conclusion
InthisstudytwomonthlycontinuousdynamicmodelsbasedonNBSweredevelopedtotacklewaterallocationconflictsina
reservoirsystem.Thefirstmodel,utilizingconstrainedstateformulation,computedthefirstandsecondmomentsofthestate
variableandusedthemasconstraintsinmaximizinglongtermutilityofthereservoiroperatorsandwaterusers.Thesecondmodel
wasamonthlycontinuousdynamicgamemodelwhichwassolvedbythecollocationmethod.Applyingthismodel,operating
policiesweregeneratedforeverymonth.Consideringtheoptimalreservoiroperationrule,a30yearsimulationmodelisdeveloped
andcorrespondingreliabilityindicesforreservoirmanagerandwateruserswerecalculated.Accordingtotheresults,itseemsthe
continuousdynamicmodelsolvedbythecollocationmethod(secondmodel)providedsuperiorresultscomparedtothemodel
basedontheconstrainedstateformulation.Thevolumetricreliabilitiesresultedfromthesecondmodelaregreaterthanthe
correspondingvaluesassociatedwiththefirstonealongtheyear.ThiscanbeduetoincorporatingtheBellmanEquationintomodel
structure.Usingthisdynamicstructuremakethemodelingsituationclosertothereality.
Regardingthesolutionmethodofthesecondmodel,thecollocationmethodwasusedtofindapolynomialapproximationtoan
unknownfunctionandgenerateoperatingpoliciesinthereservoirsystem.Meanwhile,theChebychevbasisnodeschemewas
employedasthebasisfunctioninthecollocationmethod.Theresultsshowedthatthecollocationmethodandappliedbasis
functionarequiteappropriateandaccurateinapproximatingthefunctionalequationsandtheirderivatives.
Inordertoevaluatetheefficiencyofthepresentedmodels,thereliabilityvalueswerecomparedwiththeinformationonthesystem
reliabilityindexoftheBSDPmodel,thePSDNGmodelandanannualformofdynamicgame.Inthisregard,thePSDNGandBSDP
modelsresultedinhigherlevelofvolumetricreliabilityindexincomparisonwiththecorrespondingvaluesresultedfromthe
presentedmodels.ThiscanbeduetothediscretenatureoftheBSDPandPSDNG.Inaddition,thePSDNGmodelemploysthe
SimulatedAnnealing(SA)proceduretoachievethestaticequilibriumpointineachstate.Althoughafinediscretizationofstateand
decisionvariableandtheSAcanresultinhigherprecisionintheoptimizationprocess,itoftenincreasesruntimeandcauses
dimensionalityproblems.
Regardingtheresults,theproposedmodelsincreasedtheoverallstoragereliabilitiesofthereservoirsystemcomparedtothe
annualalternative.Inaddition,volumetricreliabilitiesimprovedovertheyear.Also,incomparisonwithannualalternatives,the
operatingrulesresultedfromthepresentedmodelsaremoreusefulinpractice.Intermofapplicabilityofthepresented
approaches,itshowsthatconflictonwaterconsumptioninariverbasinunderareservoirsystemcanbestatedbasedonthe
monthlycontinuousdynamicapproaches.Duetothecontinuousformofthevariable,theseapproacheswillnotsufferfromthe
dimensionalityproblems.Italsomakespossibleconsiderationofuncertaintyininputvalues(inflows)inreservoiroperation.
Incorporatingtheinflowuncertaintymaynotrepresentreality,butitisgettingclosertorealworldconditions.

SupportingInformation
S1Table.Inflowdata.

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.s001
(XLSX)
S2Table.Monthlyvaluefunction.

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.s002
(XLSX)
S3Table.Monthlyoperatingpolicies.

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0143198.s003
(XLSX)

Acknowledgments
TheauthorsaregratefultoBrightSparkUnit,andFacultyofEngineering,UniversityofMalayaforallthefacilitiesprovided.

AuthorContributions
Conceivedanddesignedtheexperiments:MHSHL.Performedtheexperiments:MHMZSHL.Analyzedthedata:MHMZCJM
SHL.Contributedreagents/materials/analysistools:MZMH.Wrotethepaper:MHMZ.

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