Soliven v.

Makaisar
FACTS:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the
then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar
averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would
sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she
would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not
be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD:
No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time,
also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Minucher v Scalzo
FACTS:
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan
and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National
Resistance Movement.
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425,
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized.

The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the
principal witnesses for the prosecution.
In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

ISSUE:
WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity
conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
RULING:
The SC DENIED the petition. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic
mission involve, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations
with the receiving state. Only diplomatic agents, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from
civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled
to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an
Attache, Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their
respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home
government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an
erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction
over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the
courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a
suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the
State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment
against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as
the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded
as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state
is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.
The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States

Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseurbuyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

WHO v Aquino
Facts:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director
of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry from
duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates contain large
quantities of highly dutiable goods beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the
COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects
of Verstuyft.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to
immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions
pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor
General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge
nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic
immunity.
Held:
Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge
of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the
gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the
quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law

officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion.
Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

Liang v People
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an office of protocol from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the
petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in official capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly
be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this
case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically

granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.

Peo v Wong Cheng

FACTS:

appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of
the city.

Lower court dismissed the case

ISSUE:
W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters
HELD:
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
YES.

2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law

French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within territory they were committed.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation
the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs.

mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.

to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

Peo v Lol-lo
FACTS:
2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in the
other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the Islands
of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24
Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on the Dutch
boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro marauder were Lollo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy
All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."
ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found
guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.
YES. Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of
persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine
as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was
taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of
the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.

People v. Tulin GR. No. 111709

FACTS: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested. The warrant had issued on an information with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant.

Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights in being, or having been: (a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist
in the statute books; (b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; (c) denied his
right to bail; and (d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.

On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return which urged that the petitioners' case
does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in
Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated
murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed was rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder or
simple rebellion

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right Ratio: Accused-appellant Hiong ratiocinates
that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Muti

People v. Lacson, GR. No. 149453

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial
practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be applied prospectively and
retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He
asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal
procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted

and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition
of his case. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than
two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondents
right to due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to the accused, can the time-bar rule be applied
retroactively?

HELD: The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed
a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the
Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a
reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused
and notice to the offended parties.

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead
of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than
two years to do so.

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons 37 SCRA 420

FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954
and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on
Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a
ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. In

People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with
murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have
become final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable
in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)

HELD: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied
on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the
accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al.,
has been convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus
is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.

People v. Pimentel GR No. 100210

FACTS: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5,
1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion
to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile
v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of
appeals.

ISSUE: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous
charge under RA 1700.

Ratio: No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to
occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was
not even arraigned yet.

2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession
of firearms.

However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the
accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didnt raise this issue. PD 1866
should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of subversion

HELD: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended.
Release Tujan.

Bernardo v. Balagot GR. No. 86561

Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining GR. No. 149927

FACTS: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been granted
permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan,
succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio
which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the
issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.

License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter,
Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioners license stating that their license had illegally been
issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the
continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was confirmed by the language of
Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of
land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-naBato national park.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.

HELD: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent

nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within
the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex
post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely
restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents license, is
clearly not penal in character.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly
exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of
Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a
legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly
recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

Lacson v. Executive Secretary GR. No. 128092

FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence
Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitionerintervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher,
or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said
requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in
Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides
that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case

Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case
falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.

HELD: Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and
under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of
penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office
if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the
amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth
with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. [US], 386

FACTS: When Morrison died, his will stated that Mr. and Mrs. Bull were to be the beneficiaries. Due to
some problems with the will, the Bulls were denied an inheritance by a Connecticut Probate Court.
Instead, the Court gave the money to a guy named Calder.
The Bulls attempted to appeal the decision more than a year and a half later, but they found that under
State law, the Statute of Limitations for filing an appeal was 18 months, so they lost their chance to
appeal. Undaunted, the Bulls persuaded the Connecticut legislature to change the law, which enabled
them to successfully appeal the case.
On appeal, the Court reversed and gave the inheritance to the Bulls. Calder appealed.
Calder argued that the Connecticut legislation a violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution,
which prohibits ex post facto laws.
Ex post facto means that the act took place before the law changed, and so the act can't be judged by the
new law.
In this case, Calder argued that the principle of ex post facto meant that even if Connecticut changed the
Statute of Limitations, the courts couldn't retroactively apply it to the Bull's case.

HELD: The US Supreme Court found for the Bulls.

US Supreme Court found that the Connecticut legislation was not an ex post facto law.

The Court distinguished criminal rights from private rights, arguing that restrictions against ex post facto
laws were not designed to protect citizens' contract rights.
The Court found that while all ex post facto laws are retrospective, all retrospective laws are not
necessarily ex post facto. Even "vested" property rights are subject to retroactive laws.

Bayot v. Sandiganbayan GR. No. L-61776 to No. 61861

FACTS: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru
falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged
involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education
and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teachers
camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent
obligations of the teachers camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32
cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was
elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused
together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two cases filed against them. On March 16,
1982, Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

ISSUE: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law.

HELD: The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as
among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending
action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of
ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not
be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if
acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex
post facto law.

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position
diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that
any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA
3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage
of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word office
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under
which he was charged.

Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27

FACTS: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest.
Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the
effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates.

RULING: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern and corollarily access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6
Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise
effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their
publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential
issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.

Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one manMarcosare in fact laws of
general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive and
legislative powers. The generality of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without constructive
notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice and is
thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat [US] 76, 95, 5

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos GR. No. 113092

FACTS: Respondent Judge filed a case against petitioner in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or
the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court (criminal case). Petitioner filed a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming
that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied
by the trial court, and petitioners motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits
ensued. Trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest sense so as to
include a religious purpose.

HELD: NO. Decision appealed was reversed and set aside. Petitioner was acquitted. Solicitation for
religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power.
However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within
the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor.

It is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or
equitable considerations.

It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Rimando v. COMELEC GR. No. 176364

LINK: https://issuu.com/homeworkping/docs/212683539-political-law-case-digest_6f8da0df46eda2

People v. Mantalaba GR. No. 186227

FACTS: The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report that Allen Mantalaba, 17 years old at the time, was selling shabu. A buy-bust team was organized,

composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers with two (2) pieces of P100
marked bills. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was said to be in the act of selling
shabu. The appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked
money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the
transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the
appellant as he was leaving the place.

After the operation, the police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant: (1)
one big sachet of shabu; (2) one small sachet of shabu; and (3) two pieces of P100 marked money and a
P50 peso bill. Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against
appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 (COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002).

RTC Butuan (GUILTY)

CA (GUILTY)
SC (GUILTY but modified penalty due to privileged mitigating circumstance of minority)

ISSUE: WON there should have been a suspension of sentence by reason of minority

HELD: YES. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when
the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTCs
Decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its
decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor.

The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with The Child and Youth Welfare Code and
The Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
imprisonment to death.

The appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA
9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, that suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law
limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already
moot and academic.

The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that
should be imposed. A penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the
proper imposable penalty.

People v. Martin Simon GR. No. 93028

FACTS: Accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation
of Section 4, Article II of RA no. 6425 under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at
barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to a laboratory

examination, were found positive for marijuana. On December 4, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting appellant, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case?

HELD: Yes. Drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua to
death. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be
liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.

Ladonga v. People GR. No. 141066

FACTS: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga, petitioner, became the regular customer of
Alfredo Oculam in his pawnshop. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a loan from
him, guaranteed by check of United Coconut Planters Bank, issued by Adronico. On last week of April
1990and during the first week of May 1990 the spouses obtained additional loan guaranteed by UCPD.
And between May and June 1990, the spouses obtained the third loan guaranteed by UCPD. The three
checks bounced upon presentment for the reason that the account was closed. When the spouses failed to
redeem the check, despite repeated demands, Oculam filed a criminal complaint against them. While
admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the
account was closed, the spouses claim that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with
an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature, and, that petitioner is not a
signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, who was not the issuer of the three checks that bounced, could be
held liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

RULING: Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exist when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be
held liable guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have perform an
overt actin pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. It was not proven by direct evidence; petitioner
was merely present at the time of the issuance of the checks. However, this inference cannot be stretched
to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence.

US v. Soliman 36 Phil. 5
FACTS: Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with
several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He testified
falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect
an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not
been procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who
presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt.
Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However,
since judgement was entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the
enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that
the judgement convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not be
sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the
criminal liability of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment
of the Administrative Code.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative code
had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury.
(2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those
imposed by the trial judge.

HELD:
(1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions
of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we
are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues
in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that
in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing
statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching
perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No.
1697.
(2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in Section 3 of Act # 1697.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal
Code should be imposed.