DIGEST

CHIONG JOC- SOY VS VAO

FACTS:
The testator, Genoveva Rosales, made Chong Joc-soy as her legatee. Her will reads as follows:
"3. Of the third part of the estate, which is at my free disposal, I bequeath to the
Chinaman Chiong Joc-Soy, the sum of 50,000 pesos, Mexican currency, of which amount 20,000
pesos are for the aforesaid Chiong Joc-Soy, and the balance of 30,000 pesos for the expenses of
interment etc. of my late husband Don Nicasio Veloso, . . ."
The rest of her property, which amounted in all to upward of 800,000 pesos, she left to her children. After her
death the will was presented for probate in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu and was duly
proved and allowed and an administrator with the will annexed was appointed, in which to pay the debts and
legacies of the deceased.
The petitioner, Chiong Joc-Soy, the legatee named in the will, filed a petition in the said proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, Genoveva Rosales, asking that the administrator be directed to pay him the
50,000 pesos mentioned in the will. The court granted the petition and ordered the administrator to pay the petitioner
his share.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the legacy contains a condition?
HELD:
NO, the legacy does not contain a condition.
Article 797 of the Civil Code is as follows:
"The statement of the object of the designation or of the legacy or the application to be given to what
has been left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the same, shall not be considered as a
condition, unless it appears that such was his will.
"What has been left in this manner may be immediately claimed and is transmissible to the heirs who
give security for the fulfillment of the orders of the testator and the repayment of what they may
have received, with its fruits and interest, should they fail to comply with this obligation."
From the first paragraph of this article it is apparent that there is a presumption in cases of this kind that the legacy
is not conditional, and unless it clearly appears in the will that it was the intention of the testatrix in this case to
make the legacy conditional, the words used must be considered as not imposing any condition. We think under
all the circumstances of the case that the testatrix did not intend to impose upon the legatee any condition in

making this gift of 30,000 pesos. It is true, as claimed by the heirs, that it is very evident that she intended the
20,000 pesos to be the absolute property of the petitioner and that as to the 30,000 pesos she had a different
intention, but this does not resolve the question presented. That she wished and desired the petitioner to expend
the 30,000 pesos as indicated in the will is apparent, but the question is, did she intent to make her gift
conditional, or did she rely upon her confidence in the petitioner that he would carry out her suggestion without
the necessity of imposing a condition upon him? It appears that the husband of the testatrix was a Chinaman; that
she was a Filipina, and that the legatee was Chinaman. The manner in which persons of Chinese descent spend
money to perpetuate the memory of a deceased person of their race does not appear, nor the amount that they are
accustomed so to expend, nor the time during which it may be expended. All these circumstances were doubtless
known to the testatrix and we believe that knowing them she intentionally selected a person of Chinese birth to
carry out her purposes in these regard. We hold, therefore, that they legacy is not conditional.

PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY VS WEBBER

FACTS:
(A) Mrs. Clara Webber filed an additional opposition to the scheme of partition in so far as it gives her onehalf of the jewelry. She contends that inasmuch as the will gives her one-half of said jewelry, and as its
value has depreciated considerably, being hardly worth P500 at present, it is a serious error and a manifest
lack of equity to appraise its value at P2,995.50, adjudicating to her one-half thereof. She proposes that the
jewelry be sold and the proceeds divided equally between her and the other legatee.
(B) The last opposition is that filed by Frema Fischler, who claims the legal interest upon her legacy of
P10,000. It is argued that since this sum of money has been in the administrator's hands for many years,
this legatee is entitled to the legal interest upon it from the time of the testatrix's death.

ISSUE/S:
(A) Whether or not Mrs. Webbers contention is with merit?
(B) Whether or not the legatee is entitled to the legal interest?

HELD:
(A) Court rules in the NEGATIVE. This contention is not well taken: first, because the will of the testatrix must
be carried out where it provides that one-half of the jewelry itself is to be given to this opponent; and
secondly, because there is no need of selling the jewelry; as for the value, that is reasonable because it was
fixed by the committee of appraisal, and no proper objection was entered in due time. This additional
opposition must be rejected.

(B) NO. There is no merit in this opposition. While it is true that under article 882 of the Civil Code the legacy of
a specific determinate thing vests in the legatee upon the testator's death, as well as any pending fruits or
income, inasmuch as we are here concerned with a generic or a so-called legacy of quantity, article 884 of
the Code must be applied, which provides that interest from the time of the testator's death shall be given
the legatee if the testator's death shall be given the legatee if the testator has expressly so provided. With
reference to the present opponent, it appears that the testatrix has not clearly and expressly provided for the
payment of the interest upon the P10,000 legacy; according to the last-named article it is clear that the
opponent is not entitled to the interest claimed. In Fuentes vs. Canon and Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao the
Supreme Court ruled that generic legacies or legacies of quantity, like the one adjudicated to the opponent,
do not draw legal interest until a demand is made for them: and a legacy cannot be legally demanded before
the scheme of partition is duly approved by the probate court. And in the case cited by counsel for Fred
Frankel, the Supreme Court held that a cash legacy does not earn interest until the person bound to deliver
it in this case the judicial administrator is in default. The administrator in the present case is not in
default, for the scheme of partition not only has not yet been approved, but is actually the subject matter of
many oppositions filed by the legatees and the heir.