MAMBA v.

GARCIA
Facts:
On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866
(illegal possession of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the
Cagayan Provincial Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge Dominador
L. Garcia of the Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan.
Respondent set the preliminary investigation, but the same was subsequently
postponed and reset as respondent was not present, although the complaining officers
appeared in court.
Later, the preliminary investigation was again reset. On the day before the new
date of preliminaryinvestigation, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the NBI
that at the first scheduled preliminary investigation, the arresting officer demanded
P30,000.00 from him in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against him.
According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and respondent judge. As
Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the amount was reduced toP6,000.00.
Based on Bulataos report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent
judge.
Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will
receive the money. After handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of
respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting outside
respondent's court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two police
officers after recovering marked bills in their possession.
After the matter was referred by this Court to the Executive Judge for
investigation, the latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of evidence for the
respondent. The records show that hearings were set on different dates, but respondent
did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was deemedto have waived the right
to present evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence only his counteraffidavit was considered, in which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who asked
permission to talk to the two police officers.
Issue:
Whether the investigating judges reliance on the taped conversation is proper?
Held:
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between
Bulatao and the two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations
without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in
evidence in any proceeding.

In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in
accordance with the evidence. We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not
just of improper conduct but of serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is such conduct
which affects a public officer's performance of his duties as such officer and not only
that which affects his character as a private individual.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 699, G.R. No. 107383,
February 20, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta went to the clinic of her husband, private respondent Dr.
Alfredo Martin. In the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins secretary, she
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in the clinic and took 157 documents consisting
of private correspondence between Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents
were seized for use as evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her Martin. Martin filed an
action for recovery of the documents and for damages against Zulueta. The RTC,
decided in favor of Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties
described and ordering Zulueta to return the properties to Martin and pay him nominal
and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, Zulueta and
her attorneys were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987
Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision
in the constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art. III,1987 Constitution)

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of

marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court).
Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) PETITION DENIED. (Zulueta vs Court of
Appeals, 253 SCRA 699, GR No. 107383, February 20, 1996)

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

[GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]
FACTS:
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of
Cebu against Leonardo Laconico after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand
was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so
as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was
subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty.
Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent,
complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act
(RA 4200).
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of
RA 4200 such that its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an
unlawful interception of communication between two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone
or dictagraph, or other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. this section
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or
parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and
their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone
conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It
just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in

favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an
extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute
must be construed as not including an extension telephone.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended
to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or
representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence
for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the
telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in order to be punishable
must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar
nature.

Alfon V Republic
FACTS:
Etrella Alfon filed a petition praying to change her name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva where to Estrella Alfon. She was born with the name Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte which was shown in her birth records and baptismal
certificate. But the petitioner used the name Estrella Alfon ever since she was a child.
Apparently she was enrolled and graduated from grades school to college under the
name Estrella S. Alfon and all of her friends call her by this name.
Upon hearing at the lower court, the court decided to allow the petitioner to
change her first name but not her last name because it was not proper and
reasonable. So the petitioner elevated the case.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the petitioner presented a substantial evidence showing that
since her childhood, she borne the name Estrada Alfon. Although her birth records and
baptismal certificate show otherwise. Therefore it is justifiable to grant fully her petition
which is not whimsical but on the contrary based on sold and reasonable ground which
is to avoid confusion.

Ching vs Goyanko
506 SCRA 735
Facts:
Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During the marriage, they
acquire a certain property in Cebu. In 1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the
property in favor of his common-law-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his

children with Epifania discovered the sale. They thus filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against Ching, praying
for the nullification of the deed of sale and of the TCT and the issuance of a new one in
favor of their father Goyanko.
Issue:
Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his common-law wife valid?
Held:
No. The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common
law relationships.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause,
object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause,
produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to
each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during
marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between
spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal
partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of
undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of
marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple
living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his commonlaw-wife, it was null and void. (Ching vs Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10,
2006 citing Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, G.R. No. L-57499, June 22, 1984)

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got
married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months
later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by
reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a

claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her

in1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as
it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering
Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies
to a common-law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the
spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as
the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the
law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not
necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a
widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the
other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Melchor vs. COA

MARIO R. MELCHOR, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 95398
August 16, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Mario R. Melchor entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond
Construction for the construction of Phase I of the home Technology Building of

Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Alangalang, Leyte, for the price of P488, 000.
Pablo Narido, chief accountant of the school, issued a certificate of availability of funds
to cover the construction cost. Narido, however, failed to sign as a Witness to the
contract, contrarily to the requirement of Section I of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 968.
While the construction of Phase I was under way, the contractor, in a letter dated
November 8, 1983 addressed to Melchor, sought an additional charge of P73,000
equivalent to 15% of the stipulated amount due to an increase in the cost of labor and
construction materials. The petitioner then sent a letter asking for the approval of the
Regional Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) on the
contractor's additional charge which the latter later approved.
The contractor requested series of extensions for the completion of the
construction which the petitioner granted. However, the contractor later gave up the
project mainly to save itself from further losses due to, among other things, increased
cost of construction materials and labor.
The Commission on Audit Regional Director, Cesar A. Damole, disallowed the
payment of P515,305.60 in post-audit on the ground that the contract was null and void
for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid
for the construction of a public school building on the ground that the infrastructure
contract is null and void for want of one signature?
RULING:
The Court finds that the contract executed by the petitioner and Cebu Diamond
Construction is enforceable and, therefore, the petitioner should not be made to
personally pay for the building already constructed.
In the case before us, the chief accountant issued a certificate of availability of
funds but failed to sign the contract as witness. But since Section 86 states that the
certificate shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract,
then the failure of the chief accountant to affix his signature to the contract was
somehow made up by his own certification which is the basic and more important
validating document. We agree with the petitioner's view that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract.