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Econ1101 tutorial chapter 8

Econ1101 tutorial chapter 8

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Question 1

(This question demonstrates where the prisoners dilemma got its name!)

Suppose there are two burglars, Bill and Bob, who are captured by the police

leaving a house carrying stolen possessions. The police can prove that the two

are guilty of trespassing but do not have enough evidence to convict them of

burglary unless someone confesses. The police separate Bill and Bob and

promise each one that if he testifies that the other committed the crime of

burglary, they will drop the charge of trespassing.

Suppose that the penalty for trespassing is 1 year in jail, and the penalty for

burglary is 4 years in jail. (Note that if one testifies and the other does not,

the second will be convicted of both trespassing and burglary.)

A. Draw a table showing the strategies and payoffs for both burglars.

B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? Explain how you found it.

Hint

Question 2

Hattie and Mattie are the first two residents of Frankland Island to own cars.

Before them, everyone else walked. One day, they meet, heading in opposite

directions on the same road. The following table summarizes their choices and

outcomes.

How many Nash equilibria can you find? If more than one, which one do you

think is the most likely outcome?

Hint

Question 3

Suppose that there are two petrol stations in a suburb, Franks Fuel and Petes

Petrol. Suppose that both purchase petrol on the wholesale market for $1/litre

and have no other costs. The demand schedule for petrol is

A. If Franks and Petes work together to maximize total profits and split them

evenly, what price will they charge? How much profit will each make?

B. Now, suppose that Franks decides to cut its price by $0.10. How much

profit will each make? What if Petes also cuts its price at the same time?

C. Draw a table showing how the profits of each petrol station depend on its

own price and the price of the other one. (You can restrict your answer to the

two prices you have already considered.)

D. Based on this, which price is likely to be charged by the petrol stations?

Question 4

Vance Harmstrong and Umberto Dumbledore are cyclists who will compete in

a race for a prize of $1,000,000. They are evenly matched and will tie under

normal circumstances. However, each can cheat by taking a drug that will

make them faster but damage their long-term health. Suppose that each

values being healthy at $400,000 and that they will split the prize if they tie.

A. Draw a table showing the strategies and payoffs for both cyclists.

B. Find the Nash equilibrium for their game.

C. Suppose instead that Umberto values being healthy at $600,000. How will

the equilibrium change? In addition, suppose that Umberto can earn $100,000

as a sales representative if he does not spend his time training for the race.

Will he choose to enter the race?

D. In the original case, suppose that race sponsors can spend $200,000

(which they will take out of the prize money) to drug test both cyclists, and

they decide that if the winner cheats, no one will win the prize money. How

will this affect the payoffs of the cyclists in a Nash equilibrium.

Question 5

Suppose that there are two farmers, Earl and Pearl, who graze their milk cows

on the common pasture of their village. Each farmer can purchase up to two

cows, and the more cows that are on the pasture, the less grass there will be

per cow, meaning each cow will produce less milk. Suppose that cows cost

$500 each and milk sells for $2 per litre. The following table summarizes the

production of each cow given the number in the pasture.

What is profit of each farmer in the Nash equilibrium? What would be the

efficient number of cows?

Hint

Question 6

Two students, April and May, have been given the choice to work on a difficult

assignment together or a simple one separately. The difficult assignment is

worth 100 marks for each student, and each simple assignment is worth 70

marks. Each student will get a perfect mark (70) on the simple assignment if

she works on that one. If both work on the difficult assignment, they will get a

perfect mark (100), but if only one works on it, she will get a 0 because it will

be incomplete.

Unfortunately, the students cannot communicate until the moment before

they hand in their assignments. So, their payoffs are summarized by the

following table

Find the Nash equilibria. Which one do you think is the most likely outcome?

Question 7

Consider question #3 again. Suppose that Frank and Pete (the owners of the

petrol stations) realize that they make the same decision every day, and they

always seem to end up cutting their prices to compete with one another. Pete

proposes solution. They both should agree to charge $1.50 every day, and if

either cuts his own price, the other will also cut his price for the next 30 days.

After 30 days of cutting prices, they will start over.

Is this strategy credible (meaning both will be willing to stick to it later)? Is it

likely to result in higher profits for Frank and Pete?

Question 8

Consider the strategy of a soccer Player attempting a penalty kick and a

Goalie trying to keep him from scoring. The Player has two options, kick to the

left and kick to right, and the Goalie also has two options defend to the

(Players) left or defend to the right. If the Goalie defends the same direction

as the Player kicks the ball, he prevents a score. Otherwise, the Player scores.

The following table summarises the strategies and payoffs of the Player and

Goalie. It assumes that the Goalie views allowing a goal as the loss of a point.

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