1

RUDOLF OTTOS IDEA OF THE HOLY: A POSSIBLE ICONIC CONCEPT

Introduction
This paper is a modest attempt to say something about the divine without disregarding the
exigency of allowing the divine to breathe freely with regards its own existence. It aspires to
elucidate fascinating hallmarks of the One that is wholly other and yet does not shackle in
chain its essential dignity. To achieve this undertaking, this paper will present Rudolf Ottos idea
of the holy as a possible concept that is capable of not only recognizing but of welcoming the
infinite excessiveness of the holy, hence receive it in its essential mystery. But before inquiring
on the holy as mysterium, tremendum, et fascinosum, it will first present Jean-Luc Marions
phenomenological analysis of the icon and the idol since it is from such an analysis that one can
proceed to explain the iconic features implied in Ottos idea of the holy.
The Limits Of Theological Writing
Before even scribbling a single word concerning the divine, one must first have to
grapple with one inevitable difficulty that marks every theological writing. One cannot but admit
the impossibility of ever achieving an authentic and complete discourse concerning the real
nature of the divine for theological writing is always played in distance, which unites as well as
separates the man writing and the Word at hand. 1 While it is humanly possible to make claims
on the nature of the divine, it remains tentative and conditional for the distance that separates
between man and the divine remains infinite. However, though knowledge has its own
irremovable limits, it remains capable of transcribing the experience of its encounter with the

Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas A Carlson (Chicago: University
Press, 1991), 1.

2
divine for within the human sphere, there exists a horizon where beings can accede to the realm
of the holy, even if it means to see it in just a glimpse like a flickering light that immediately
disappears in a wink of an eye. The fleetingness of such a gaze implies a certain limitation on
any divinatory apprehension. Hence, in writing any theological discourse, one must always
provide a room for the freedom of God with regards to his own existence.
Such a limitation implies that there is a need to retrieve mans usual understanding of the
divine. There are many ways to respond to such urgency. I assume theology provides a great
number of ways. However, I must admit that I am not quite well-versed with the ways of the
theologians since I am not one of them. It is for this reason that I choose a path that is more
familiar to my horizon, namely the realm of experience. Jean-Luc

Marions fundamental

analysis of the idol and the icon provides a suitable starting point because such an analysis is
concerned with the original phenomenological experience of man concerning the divine. To go
back to ones basic experience means to return to the root where everything begun. It is in this
sense that the analysis of the idol and the icon becomes pertinent because before one can
formulate any meaningful concept, one must first commence with the primordial human
experience and its immediate interpretation of the radical alterity of the divine. Thus, we begin
with mans initial encounter of the holy.

Encounter with the Divine: A Starting Point of the Idol and the Icon
There are epoch-making moments that one encounter in ones life which bring about a
strong sense of urgency for not only these experiences occur rarely, but that its very nature
surpasses the sphere of human ordinariness. Such experiences cannot but captivate mans
enthusiasm for they have a distinguishing characteristic that elevates man to a certain

3
transcendental level that goes beyond the ordinary. One such particular experience is mans
initial encounter with the divine.
In such an experience, the splendor of the visible seduces mans gaze. He sees a certain
symbolic value, which constitutes the essential dignity of the divine. Such a recognition
presupposes that the visible reveals a certain kind of signaling for the apprehension of a symbol
is only made possible through the visible and meaningful signs which point to it. Thus, one
would have to investigate the sign and its mode of signaling because it may well be the case that
the idol and the icon are distinguishable only inasmuch as they signal in different ways.
The differences in the mode of visibility indicate variations in the apprehension of the
divine itself. Yet the distinction between the idol and the icon does not only depend on the
variations of the mode of signaling of the signa because the manner of seeing [also] decides
what can be seen, or at least, negatively, decides what in any case could not be perceived of the
divine.2 Hence, the icon and the idol are not necessarily classes of particular beings that are
entirely distinct from each other, since the same beings can pass from one rank to another. 3 They
are two manners of being for beings determined by the manner of seeing.
The Idol
The idol can never be said to be a product of ones imagination since it is something that
can be seen. In fact, its apprehension is made possible primarily because of its capacity to be
seen. The idol fascinates and captivates the gaze precisely because everything in it must expose
itself to the gaze, attract, fill, and hold it. However, even if it awakens a sense of awe and wonder

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 8.

4
in the gaze, it still depends on the gaze that it satisfies, since if the gaze did not crave to satisfy
itself in the idol, the idol would have no dignity for it.4
The first intention of the gaze, in exposing itself and letting be carried away by the
splendor of the visible, aims at the divine and it strains itself to see the divine, to see it by taking
into the field of the gazeable. Yet such a gaze will not last to infinity because if it has already
satisfied itself, in a sense that it has seen what it wants to see, it will gaze no more. Hence, the
idol, as a function, mirrors the gazes scope.5
When the gaze ceases to look further, it lets itself be filled by the visible. Instead of
outflanking the visible, of not seeing it and rendering it invisible, the gaze discovers itself as
outflanked, contained, and held back by the visible.6 Since the idol astounds the gaze with its
dazzling splendor, it conceals its own mirror function so much so that it becomes an invisible
mirror in which the gaze does not recognize. As an invisible mirror, it limits the sight of the aim
of the gaze for it admits nothing beyond what the first visible offers. Here then lies the
shortcoming of the gaze because instead of venturing further into the realm of the infinite
excessiveness of the divine, it has contained itself only with what it wants to see. In delivering
the divine to the measure of the human gaze, the idol deprives the divine of its authentic dignity
that goes beyond what the invisible mirror can offer. Thus, in the idolatrous gaze, its not really
the divine in its shining splendor but simply mans fecundated vision of himself.

Ibid.

Ibid., 12.

Marion, 11.

5
Conceptual Idol
The idol is not necessarily confined with what can be seen by the naked eye because the
intellect is also capable of conceiving concepts that can efficiently adumbrate the essential
dignity of the divine. When a specific concept consign the divine to the measure of human
thought, it functions exactly as an idol. Hence, when philosophy purports a concept signifying
the divine, it does not escape the idolatrous gaze because more than the divine, it is thought that
determines, or even perhaps dictates, the essential nature of the divine.

The Icon
The dignity of the icon does not depend on the human gaze because it is not seen but
appears. The icon summons sight in letting the visible be saturated little by little with the
invisible.7 The invisible, in proceeding to the visible, remains invisible not because it is omitted
by the aim of the human gaze but because it is a matter of rendering visible this invisible as such
the unenvisageable.8 The gaze can never settle if it looks at an icon because the realm of the
gazeable goes beyond what the particular human eyes can support.
In the icon, the gaze does not belong to man anymore. It belongs to the icon who gazes
man intentionally.9 And it is through such a gaze that the visibility of the invisible is made
possible because it concerns us, in that it allows its intention to occur visibly. Man no longer has
the reign in determining the scope of the icon for the infinite depth of the face that the icon offers
depends only on itself. It admits no other measure than its own infinite excessiveness.10
7

Ibid., 17

Ibid., 14

Ibid.

10

Ibid., 21.

6
The icon also transforms the human gaze in that it displaces the limits of our visibility to
the measure of its own its glory. 11 The essential in the icon the intention that envisagesreally concerns us because in offering the visibility of its face, it changes us in its glory by
letting this glory to shine on our face as its mirror. The face that the icon unfolds is an invitation
to share in its glory for within such a face radiates a spirit of generosity that ceaselessly
summons the human spirit to experience the splendor and of its infinite excessiveness.

The Icon in the Concept

The icon can proceed conceptually only if in conceiving it, the infinite excessiveness is
recognized and the impossibility of ever fully conceptualizing it is taken into account. 12 The
infinite depth of the face obliges the concept to welcome the infinite distance of the iconic gaze.
Hence, a concept should have a certain openness to the horizon of the icon so much so that it
must renounce comprehending the incomprehensible because the icon goes beyond what the
particular human mind can support.

Rudolf Ottos Idea of the Holy: A Possible Iconic Concept

The whole enterprise of searching for concepts that would aptly describe the icon is a
complex undertaking given that concepts, insofar as they come from the human intellect, always
imply limitations and certain imperfections. Yet the attempt itself is still worth undertaking
because it will at least free us from harboring a constrictive view of the divine. Rudolf Ottos
idea of the holy as that which is mysterium, tremendum, et fascinosum can be a possible iconic

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid., 23.

7
concept. I do believe that a closer analysis of his notion of the holy reveals interesting insights
that describes the infinite excessiveness of the icon.
For within such a conception of the divine, there is a certain space given so that the
divine is given due respect with regards to what it is. It does not rely on the power of reason;
rather, it explores the non-rational which emphasizes the feelings and the passion of the
creatures. His exploration of the non-rational side is really an attempt to open new possibilities
concerning how we approach the problematique of the divine. This emphasis on the non-rational
side does not necessarily imply that the outcome of such an inquiry is unintelligible for
intelligibility is not exclusively confined in the realm of reason. For instance, one cannot
perfectly and rationally explain the experience of authentic love, yet it remains comprehensible
and meaningful.
Before inquiring further on his notion of the holy, there is one very important requirement
that one must take into account. As Otto himself puts it,
The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt experience, as
little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this,
whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther; for it is
not easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who can recollect the
emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion.but cannot recall any
intrinsically religious feelings.13
Such an invitation implies that Ottos inquiry starts not just from any ordinary experience
but from a deeply-felt religious experience. His emphasis on such an experience is made
manifest by his endeavor to classify it under quite an unusual category. He coined the word
numinous as that special term which will stand for the holy minus the moral and rational

13

Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea
of the Divine and its Relation to the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976), 10.

8
factor altogether.14 Accordingly, to be rapt in worship is one thing; to be morally uplifted by the
contemplation of the good deed is another. 15 And it is the emotional content peculiar to the first
which he endeavors to describe.
Such an experience awakens in man a sense of feeling of dependence on something that
is wholly other. To amplify its peculiar character could distinguish it from other feelings of
dependence, Otto proposes to call it creature-consciousness or creature feeling. It is the
emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that
which is supreme above all creatures.16 Creature feeling can never be denounced as something
illusory because it is an authentic feeling-response whose primary reference is external to the
self. It is from this creature feeling that one can proceed to describe the holy as that which is
mysterium, tremendum, et fascinosum.
A believer rapt in deep worship finds the Other as something deeply mysterious. The
word mystery, taken in the ordinary sense, is that something which is alien and
incomprehensible to the intellect. Mysterium, taken in the religion sense, takes a different
complexion of meaning. It is something that is wholly other, which is quite beyond the
ordinary, the intelligible, and the familiar, that it fills the mind with blank wonder and
astonishment.17 The truly mysterious object is something beyond our comprehension and
apprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it
we come upon something inherently wholly other, whose kind and character are

14

Otto, 6.

15

Ibid., 8.

16

Otto, 10.

17

Otto, 26.

9
incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us
chill and numb.18
The mysterium is not only the unfamiliar and the unexplainable, rather, it is Somebody
whose radical alterity lies beyond the sphere of human reality. In it we encounter a totally
different kind of actuality never experienced before by the believer. In front of such a mysterious
object, he cannot but be consumed by a sense of dread. The sense of fear emerges because in
front of the mysterium, the individual recognizes a certain power beyond measure that could
abrogate its fleeting and fragile existence in just a twinkling of an eye. Thus, tremendum comes
into the picture. Tremor- is in itself merely the perfectly familiar and natural emotion of fear. 19
Yet tremendum, taken in the religious sense, is related to a mystical awe defined as that
experience of dread when faced with that which is wholly other. In such an encounter, the
shudder reappears in a form ennobled beyond measure where the soul, held speechless, trembles
inwardly to the farthest fiber of its being. 20 It trembles with utter humility because it recognizes
the immense power, that aweful majesty shown by the holy.
The humility experienced in this sense does not connote something negative. Rather, it
impels man to truly recognize his authentic being in relation to the holy. That amidst his
privileged position in contrast to other living beings, he remains a single drop of water in the
vastness of the ocean if he is to compare himself to this wholly other. A sheer recognition of
ones fragility and unworthiness awakens in ones spirit for the aweful majesty that one
recognizes is beyond any human reckoning. However, even if such overpoweringness engenders

18

Ibid., 28.

19

Otto, 13.

20

Ibid., 17.

10
a feeling of unworthiness, the force that knows not stint nor stay, is something that is urgent,
active, compelling, and alive.21 Its like even if the soul might be consumed by the burning
flames of fire, it still desires to come near and stay with it because there is a kind of a mysterious
charm which allures it. Thus, the divine in itself radiates an element of fascination.
Even if the experience of the holy provokes in man a sense of aweful dread, the divine is
not, however, altogether indifferent to the finite creature to which it manifests itself for within
the element of fascination, the mysterium is experienced in its essential, positive, and specific
character as something that bestows man a beatitude beyond compare, but one whose real nature
he can neither proclaim on speech nor conceive in thought, but may know only by a direct and
living experience.22 The experience of the holy involves an unfathomable bliss that exalts the
soul into an inexplicable jubilation. It entrances, captivates, and transports him with a strange
ravishment, rising enough to the pitch of dizzy intoxication.23
The element of fascination plays a vital role in the experience of the holy because it
provides the necessary connectivity between the finite creature and that which is wholly other.
In it the soul realizes that, though it may simply be dust and ashes, it matters in the sight of the
divine for the beatitude bestowed upon its abysmal emptiness saturates its inquietude with
brimming ecstasy.

The Icon in Ottos Idea of the Holy

21

Otto, 24.

22

Ibid., 33.

23

Otto, 31.

11
In his phenomenological analysis of the icon, Marion believes that the icon can be
conceptually described, provided at least that the concept renounces comprehending the
incomprehensible, to attempt to conceive, hence also to receive it, in its own infinite
excessiveness.24 It recognizes the distance that lies infinitely between the human gaze and the
divine, thus, the impossibility of ever reaching a complete and definite conception concerning
the icon. The only concept that can serve as an intelligible medium for the icon is one that lets
itself be measured by the infinite excessiveness of the invisible that enters into visibility through
infinite depth, hence that itself speaks or promises to speak this infinite depth, where the visible
and the invisible become acquainted.25
I believe that Marions specific criterion for an iconic concept is reflected in Ottos idea
of the holy. The adjectives, mysterium, tremendum, et fascinosum are concepts which in
themselves imply a certain openness to the infinite excessiveness of the icon. A closer analysis
on their meanings reveals that, though they are perfectly intelligible to the human mind, in that
they can be understood by any human being, they refuse to qualify the holy as something that is
definite and complete. In other words, they provide enough space for the icon to be free with
regards to its own existence because, rather than defining the real essence of the divine, they are
more concern in describing the emotional content, or as Otto would term it, the feelingresponse of the creature as it finds itself rapt in worship. They only describe what it means to
experience the holy rather than presenting crystal-clear notions of what the holy is. Thus, from
such tentative descriptions, the infinite excessiveness of the holy is not closed to the human gaze;
rather, it is amplified.

24

Marion, 22.

25

Marion, 22.

12
For instance, the unfathomable mystery that the creature recognizes in the holy speaks of
mans admission that the holy is not something that his gaze can fully envisage because it is
something that goes beyond what his particular mind can support. No matter what painstaking
endeavor he will undertake to encapsulate it in his finite intellect , this will only result to a
fruitless result because the very nature of the holy not only refuse to be encapsulated, but that it
is impossible to do so. Using the allegory of St. Augustine, it is like putting all the water of the
ocean in a small hole. Hence, in the mysterium, one realizes the infinite excessiveness that
supersedes the human gaze. Its origin cannot be defined since it is in itself infinite. The most that
the individual can do is to simply recognize the infinite depth that lies before him for the icon
accords in the visible only a face whose invisibility is given all the more to be envisaged that its
revelation offers an abyss that the eyes of man can never finish probing.
The senses of dread and mystical awe described in the analysis of tremendum also
indicate a reverend respect to the overpoweringness of the holy. The aweful majesty that radiates
in the invisible engenders a sense of religious humility in which the individual realizes that he is
nothing but dust and ashes. From such a humble admission, the individual surrenders to the
holy, or one can say, consigns to the holy the privileged status to make the claim. This does not
necessarily imply a negative submission to the Other as if letting oneself be dictated by the
Other. Rather, it is a free recognition that one cannot really measure the infinite depth with ones
gaze for the icon recognizes no other measure than its own and infinite excessiveness. This
humble admission compels the human gaze not to limit the scope of the holy to its own measure,
hence, giving enough space for the holy to shine in its glory. A radical openness to the
mysterious realm of the icon engulfs the human gaze, which allows the Other to make the

13
claim. Man finally realizes that his recognition of the mysterious is the subtlest form of human
reasonableness.
Yet the radical openness to that which is overpoweringly mysterious is only made
possible because there is something in the wholly other that captivates and allures the soul to
make such a revolutionary act of letting be and letting go. The holy, though it may evoke a sense
of dread in the creature, is not all together indifferent for it also indicates some revelatory signs
that disclose its concern to the creature. And this is seen in the element of fascination.
The element of fascination provides the crucial bridge between the human gaze and the
holy. The potent charm that allures the creature shows that the holy regards us it concerns us,
in that it allows the intention of the invisible to occur. In this element, the holy is experienced in
its essential, positive, and specific character, as something that bestows upon man a beatitude
beyond compare, but one whose real nature he can neither proclaim in speech nor conceive in
thought. The soul realizes that somebody is gazing at him not with any sense of indignation but
with mystifying tenderness. The invisible strangeness of the face that envisages the human gaze
saturates the soul with unfathomable meaning. It invites the soul to let itself be transformed and
consumed by its glory by allowing this glory to shine on its face as its mirror. Hence, the
fascination that captivates the soul is not a mere witnessing of the splendor of the holy. Rather,
within such enchantment lies a hidden invitation to be a living symbol of its glory by allowing
this glory to shine on ones face.

Conclusion
The traces of the icon in the Ottos idea of the holy are not compelling evidence to
declare that, indeed, such idea can best be declared as the exclusive embodiment of the icon. Yet

14
one cannot also deny that it affords a certain minimal compatibility to the criteria specified by
Marion. For as we have seen, Ottos description of the divine welcomes the distance of the
infinite depth. It does not attempt to delimit the infinite excessiveness, hence, not consigning the
divine to the measure of the human gaze. It also recognizes the essential component of the icon
the intention that envisages. For the holy, though excessively infinite that the creature is nothing
but dust and ashes venerating in front of it, still does not fail to make its intention known as
experienced in the beatitude bestowed upon man, a complete happiness beyond compare but one
whose real nature he can neither proclaim in speech nor conceive in thought. Perhaps this is the
reason why St. Thomas Aquinas confessed that the many philosophical works he wrote were
nothing compared to the mystical joy he experienced at the near end of his earthly existence.
The purpose of this paper consists in trying to show that Ottos idea of the holy can be an
iconic concept. Yet, as the title suggests, it is only a possible iconic concept because it could well
may be the case that it might still deprive the icon the freedom to be with regards its own
existence, given its infinite excessiveness and indeterminable nature. However, compared to the
onto-theo-logical God of metaphysics, his idea remains important and illuminating because it
opens the portal of the divine with an honest admission of mans finiteness and the
incomprehensible nature of the divine, and that it does not seek to idolize the divine to meet the
requirements of the intellect. Thus, it ventures on a new possibility where metaphysics did not
seek to investigate further.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary References:

15
Marion, Jean-Luc. God Without Being. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. Chicago:
University Press, 1991.
Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the
Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational. Translated by John W.
Harvey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Secondary Reference:
Marion, Jean-Luc. The Idol and the Distance. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson.
New York: Fordham Univerrsity Press, 2001.

16