Research Report 1395

I
O

Training Effectiveness Analysis:

M60 Machinegun and
Squad Automatic Weapon
Thomas J. Thompson
Army Research Institute
and
Kenneth L. Evans and Harry A. LucKer
Mellonics Systems Development Division
Litton Systems, Inc.
ARI Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia
Training Research Laboratory

"DTIC

ELrECTE
JUL2 41988

0, S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

February 1985

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U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

L. NEALE COSBY
EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Colonel, IN

Techni4al Director

Commander

Research accomplished under contract

for the Deparcment of the Army
Litton Mellonics
Technicul review by
Pamela H. Terry
Robert 11. Sulzen

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The findings In this report are not to be construed as en official
Department of the Army position. unless so designated by other authorized
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ARI Research Report 1395

4.

TITLE (and Subtitle)

Hinal Report
Jan 83 - June 84

TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS: M60

MACHINEGUN AND SQUAD AUTOMATIC WEAPON

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

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SThomas
L. Evans
J. Thompson (ARI), Kenneth
and ha-cry fucker (Litton Mellonics)
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February 1985

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SUPIPLtMENARY NOTES5

Bl

30. Il ditwlt

how Rwoi)

Technical quality of this research munitored by Seward Smith.

KEY WOROS (CowfJtu.

It.

#i*. *ro

s"

itmoow se.*

rrd Ittnfl1O OY btoch numbwt

"2 bamiliarization firing, 'k-Standardized targets.

\Qualification firing,
Squad auitomatic-VeOPo1n
Burst firej
Machinegun training,
Qualification standards,
Suppressive fir ej1
Institutional training,
Zeroing procedures
AMT" ACT (twa

VI,

v M~

~*t

Of ftcooar

-d

%\fliedrachinegun training.,
jnit machinegun trailning,

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".Research was initiated to address needed changes in institutional general

A review of historical literature suggested that
purpose machinegun training.
adequate program Components were available which, when tested, provided perMany of the program components can
formance feedback and skill reinforcement.
be applied, with modifications, to programs of instruction for the new squad
This .capon is addressed as a prospective entity stice field
autoultic weapon.
Retesting had not been conducted previously by traiting program developers.
ported performance meastires are derived from materiel development (Continued)

DO

1473

fuoo

'wor

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De'. ZL"0e0d4

ARI Research Report 1395

20.

(Continued)

sources and the data are used to compare the SAW with the current general
The SAW, while procured as an automatic rifle for
purpose M60 machinegun.
U.S. Army squad use, is used as a light machinegun by the armies of other
Side by side tests of the M60 and the SAW are planned as part of
nations.
future research efforts.

,ccession For14TI6 GRA&I

DTIC TAB

1Unannounced

[]

Justificatio

By
Distribution/

Availability Codes
Special

ADist

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iJI

UNCI.ASS I FI ED

aCUQv CLttaEC&?aO.

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Research Report 1395

Training Effectiveness Analysis:

M60 Machinegun and
Squad Automatic Weapon
Thomas J. Thompson
Army Research Institute
and
Kenneth L. Evans and Harry A. Lucker
Mellonics Systems Development Division
Litton Systems, Inc.
Submitted by
Seward Smith, Chief
AR! Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia
Approved as technically adequate
and submitted for publication by
Donald F. Haggard, Acting Director
Training Research Laboratory

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
S. I Eiseinhowc Avnue. Alexedrai,, Virginia 22333
Office. Det, v Chief of Statf for Personnel
Department of %he Army

February 1985

Army Prolect Number

2Q263743A794

Educetion ond Tralning

AopeOvcd lot vubhC roaola;41

III

disletbullon unhlait0d.

ARI Research Reports and Technical Reports are intended for sponsors of
R&D tasks and for other research and military agencies. Any findings ready
for implementation at the time of publication are presented in the last part
of the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military
agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

iv

TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS:

M460 MACHINEGUN AND SQUAD AUTOMATIC WEAPON
FOREWORD

The research conducted with general purpose machinegun training and use
has been a part of the Fort Benning Field Unit's training effectiveness
analysis of individual and crew served weapons programs.
The efforts in this
area are vital and evolutionary in that implementation of training programs
for the new squad automatic weapon, the M249 SAW, are under development as the
weapon system enters the U.S. Army's inventory.
It is an important part of
the research effort to have a foundation of knowledge and experience for
this expected program development phase.

This report summarizes the background research conducted with current

460 machinegun training, illustrates continued problem areas in the training
of new machinegunners, and with the limited test results available anticipates
some of the training issues that will be critical to squad automatic weapon
implementation.
The focus of applied machinegun training research is changing rapidly
to meet the needs of the proponent and sponsor.
There remains a clear need
to continue developing improvements for general purpose machinegun training in
concert with the availability of trained cadre.
A more pressing issue presently
for researchers, trainers, and new users is the development of programs to
bring the squad automatic weapon into the Army both efficiently and effectively.
This is the present direction of our continued research,

*,

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Technical Director

TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS:

M60 MACRINEGUN AND SQUAD AUTOMATIC WEAPON
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:
To identify needed corrective measures to enhance general purpose
(7.62mm, M60) machinegun training during initial entry training and unit
In addition, test and implement program improvements
refresher training.
In anticipation of the fielding of the squad automatic weapon
where possible.
(SAW), develop a working knowledge of the weapon's training requirements and
performance capabilities.

Procedure:
An historical review of literature relative to machinegun training and
employment from the period of early weapon development (1915) through current
This review provided a background along with field
practices was undertaken.
visits to observe U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and opportunistically, German
Federal Republic training. As a result, interventions based on well founded
fundamentals of marksmanship were applied to the Infantry One Station Unit
Training machinegun familiarization program.
A review of SAW test results and weapon characteristics was made and
used to compare its training requirements and performance capabilities with
The intent has been to provide a strong knowledge
the 7.62mm, H60 machinegun.
base to aid in the rapid development of training program components once a
production SAW and its ammunition are available for testing.

Findings:
Army has suffered a marked decline in
Limited training resources and time, and
few qualified instructors have kept initial entry machinegun training to a
A brief intervention,
level of familiarization rather than full qualification.
designed to illustrate the application of marksmanship fundamentals, resulted
in performance improvements on the firing line. Generally, there is a need
for a qualification program with adequate time to develop trained machinegunners. Unit training programs, in many cases, are presently in no better
condition than those found in initial entry training.
Hachinegun training in the U.S.

"emphaals over the last few decade#.

The SAW will perform adequately to its design specifications and will
Training must be
fill
the role of automatic weapon in the rifle squad.
developed quickly to meet the needs of the U.S. Army as it receives the first
It is premature to consider expanding the role of the SAW to include
SAWs.
replacing general purpose machinegun missions and responsibilities with the
SAW.

vii

Utilization of Findings:
The U.S. Army Infantry School, as proponent for the development of
general purpose machinegun and SAW training programs, will use the findings of
The
this report directly in improving training and employment strategies.
training.
SAW
total effort supports more rapid program development for

vii!

CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION .* . . . . . .. *. . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Background . . . . . . . . . ........................
. . . . ....
Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Objectives
. . . . . ..
Method . . . . . . .
LITERATURE REVIEW

...............
..................

..

.. .

2
3

...............

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......

OBSERVATION OF CURRENT TRAINING PRACTICES

Institutional Training ...........

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

.....................

.I...11

Infantry Officer Basic Course .

. ...
..
..
.
Infantry Officer Advanced Course
. . . . . . .
..
.............
Noncommissioned Officer Course
. . . . . . . .................
Infantry One Station Unit Training
.
.. . . . . . .
. .
Unit Training . . ...............
...................
. . . .
Qualification and Sustainment Training . .
.
. .............
Division Schools . . . . .
.
.
.
. .
......................
Maintenance and Malfunctions ............
...
..
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System .
. .
. . . .
Training in Other Services. . . . . . . . ..................
..
U.S. Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....
......
U.S. Marine Corps . . . . . . . . . . . ......................
Training in Allied Forces ....................
West German Army . . . . . . . . . . .
..
. .
.......
British Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.

.
.
.

One
. .
. .
. .

Station Unit Training Hachinegun

.. . .
. .. .
0.. *.. ..
0..
. .
0..
. . .
. . . .
.. . . . . . . .. . ..
# . . . . . .0
. . . . . . .. .. . . . .
. . . . . . .

..............

...

.......................

Background
. ....................
....................
. .
.
Weapons Performance Coarisons . r .. .
...................
Accuracy ................
...........................
...
Burst Size ................
..........................
....
Suppression . ...............
..
...
...
........................
Firing Performance . . . . . . . . . . .......................
Operator Tasks .......... ........................
Training Development
......................
Implementation ..........
. . . .......................
.
Evaluation and Training Issues . .........
...............
.

ix

26
26
28
29

Discussion
. . . . . . . .
. . . . ...
. . ........................
Recommendations and Utilicatlon . . . . .........
.
Unit Machinegun Training Research Needs .....
.......
. .
.
SQUAD AUTOMATIC WEAPON

11
13
14
14
17
17
19
19
21
22
22

24

ANALYSIS OF TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS ...................

Modified Infantry
Program . . . *.
Method . . . .
Results . *. .

11

29
30
32
34
36
36
37
37
38
39
39
39
41
44
44
44
45

CONTENTS Continued
CONCLUSION

A"D RECOMMENDATIONS

. . . . . . .

M60 Machinegun Training ............

SAW Training

. . . . . . . . . .
.

APPENDIX A.
B.

. .

. .

o.
.

. .

. . . . . . . . .. .

460 MKCHINEGUN PERFORMANCE TEST.

Page
49

.................

......................

. .

REFERENCES .............

.....

. ...

..

25m SCALED LANDSCAPE SUPPRESSIVE FIRE TARGET

. ..

49
50
51

A-1

B-i

LIST OF TABLES
Table

1.

Summary of U.S. Army Machinegun Training Programs From

Table

2.

Distribution of M60 Machinegun Tasks in 1981 USAIS and

1958 to 1962

. ..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

. ..

1979 Infautry OSUT Programs...............

12

Table

3.

IOBC Qualification Results with the M60 Kachineguu

Table

4.

A Summary of the Infantry OSUT M60 Hachinegun

Familiarization Program (1979)
. . . . . ........

15

A Sumtary of the 1160 Machinegun Leadership Course of

the Division School Program at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

23

Table

5.

Table

6.

U.S. Air Force M60 Hachinegun Training Program

Table

7.

USHC Infantry Training School 1460 Kachinegun POI

for Infantrymen .....................
..............

Table

Table

0.

9.

.....

A Sumary of the British Annual Hachinegun

Qualification Course of Fire . ........

28

.............

32

...

33

Table 10.

Results of the Non-Firing Proficiency Test

Table 11.

Results of the Nachinegun Knowledge Questionraire

...

Table 12.

Infantry OSUT 17-Hoor M60 Kachinegun Program

Table 13.

A Comparison of M60 Kachinegun and SAW Characteristics

Table 14.

Assault Fire Accuracy with the M60 Hachinegun ......

13

27

A Sumiary of Infantry OSUT Firing Perfortante Data

35
...

37
.
...

40
43

CONTENTS Continued
Page
LIST OF TABLES Continued
Table 15.

A Performance Comparison of the M60 Machinegun and

. . . . .
SAW Using Bipod Mounted Weapons .......

..

..

..

..

..

...

46

..

Table 16.

SAW Training Tasks

Table 17.

Maximum Ordinate of Trajectory to a Range of 300 Meters

44

48

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.

Landscape target

Figure 2.

Target formations used in collecting firing

. . . . . . . .
performance data . . . . . .

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

....................

Suppression effectiveness of three weapons using a

random fire distribution of short bursts in foursecond intervals . .....
.............
A ballistic comparison of M193 and X855/856
aunition
..
..
..
....
.
.
..

xi

...

31

42
47

Introduction

Background
The machinegun has served as a critical weapon for infantrymen since its
development and subsequent proliferation during World War I.
Design improvements have been made over the decades to meet specific mission needs for
machineguns in battle. The application of automatic small arms fire goes
well beyond infantry use, but the scope of the present inquiries has been
limited to doctrine and training associated with infantry employment of
Machinegun training in the U.S. Army presently suffers from
machineguns.
resource austerity, making it critical to identify the most efficient and
effective training procedures possible. Litton Mellonics, under contract to
the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI),
has addressed these issues along with ARI scientists, as part of the training
effectiveness analyses undertaken by the ARI Fort Benning Field Unit for the
U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS).
The need to investigate the state of U.S. Army machinegun training and
use was noted, in summary, by MG David E. Grange, Jr. (1981) while he served

as Commandant of the USAIS, and therefore as the Chief of Infantry. MG Grange

remarked that emphasis over the past 15 years has shifted from the training
and employment of machineguns to the more critical training and employment of
anti-tank guided missiles. In so doing, the solutions to the problems of
close combat, which rely in great part on effective machinegun employment,
have been ignored. Infantry combat divisions, with as many as 1300 M60
and .50 caliber machineguns, must be trained to use these vital resources in
weaponry both efficiently and effectively. The current concerns with fighting
in built-up areas, mountainous areas, forests, and with patrols or raids
behind enemy lines clearly indicate that the roles of the machinegun and its
training remain critical to today's Army (Grange, 1981).
Purpose
The primary purpose of this research was to place in context the current
state of machinegun training in the U.S. Army and to recommend revisions in
Initially, the work effort focused
areas where it fails to meet Army needs.
on the 7.62mm M60 machinegun, which has broadly served U.S. Army infantrymen
and has remained the basic weapon taught during Initial Entry Training
(lET) machinegun familiarization.
M60 machinegun research and development
activities centered on the need to identify and implement improved training
proceduires within the constraints of available resources.
n second purpose of this research involved preparation for training and
deployrent with the Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW).
Since the SAW is to be
fielded in the near F'ture, training program developments that march the
uniqnt charactcristics of Lhe weapon were required.
Further, a review of the
performance capabilities of the SAW was needed from the viewpoint of its
anticipated role in combat.

Objectives
The specific objectives of this research effort are accompanied by brief
descriptions of the activities conducted to either meet or address them for
The&e activities are tiescribed in greater detail in the
future resolution.
following sections of this report.
Objective 1. Review and evaluate methods of machinegun employment
and weapon effectiveness (with training implications to be considered).
o

Review historical military doctrine and training literature which

has pertinence to the development of the machinegun training methodologies currently in use.

Analyze doctrine and current employment procedures for appropriateness

to the training m~asion as it is defined.

o

Review engineering and operational tests for weapon capabilities.

Ob4ectlve 2. Investigate current M60 machinegun training programs and

their effectiveness.
o

'.tdut observations of machinegun training and determine how well it

meets standards.

"o Develop an improved machinegun training package consistent with

current time and ammunition allocations.

"o Conduct field validation of the improved machinegun training within

present time and ammunition allocations.
Objective 3.

Investigate machinegun training in the field.

Visit units to determine the effectiveness of sustainment training as

it is couducted.

Determine appropriate interventions to meet training shortcomings.

Objective 4.
Identify training issues und related problems inherent
to the SAW (FY 83).
o

Review test data for the SAW.

Conduct firing tests usiig available SAWs.

Identify comton, as well as unique, training tasks which relate SAW to

either machinegen or automatic rifle training.

Method
In order to pursue these objectives, machinegun training in the Infantry

One Station Unit Training (OSUT) mode of IET was observed and compared to
historic U.S. Army training, to current U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)

training, and

to selected allied training programs in order to determine its relative

adequacy. Engineering and service tests of the M60 were also reviewed to
better understand the M60's capabilities and optimum size of burst. In
addition, a review was conducted of available literature, including current
training tasks outlined in Soldiers Manuals (Field Manual 7-11B 1/2, 1976;
Field Manual 21-2, 1982) and published programs (Field Manual 23-67, 1964)
that serve as resource materials to both institutional and unit trainers.
A series of observations was made of training conducted at the USAIS.

An

analysis of training tasks, by program, was developed from doctrine and frota
the results of field observations. Early in the programmed research, an
on-site visit was made to the USMC Infantry Training School, Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, to compare the training procedures and philosophies of Infantry
OSITT (U.S. Army) and Infantry Training School (USMC) machinegun training.
Field experimentation with training programs included modification of
OSUT familiarization training with the M60 machinegun, observation and modification of sustainment training with a unit undergoing annual qualification
training, and controlled firing experiments using available M60s. In the case
of the OSUT experimentation, the results led to procedural changes that
were implemented almost immediately and have since become the core of the
current familiarization program of instruction (POI).
Finally, an investigation of SAW performance capabilities was undertaken to prepare trainers for
its introduction and to determine if the weapon could meet the standards set
for its employment.
Literature Review
Much of the early effort in the area of rifle marksmanship, summarized
by Smith, Osborne, Thompson, and Morey (1980), has application to the fundamentals of machinegun marksmanship. The knowledge that was gained from this
related work and from efforts in the area of unit rifle marksmanship training
(Evans, Thompson, & Smith, 1980) helped establish a strong base for further
research in machinegun training problems. Historical data on machinegun
training in the U.S. Army were examined in order to develop a perspective for
training practices. This was considered to be relevant because use of the
machinegun Is neither new, nor have there been large advances in employment
theory or technology. The ballistics of the M60 machinegun are quite similar
to the ballistics of comparable machineguns employed during both World War I
and II.
The methods used for sighting these weapons are comparable as well.
The machineguz

was considered a premier weapon in the era of World War I

and received appropriate training time to prepare firers to use it effectively.

The POI for infantry machineguns included 88 hours of training in 191Y (Hatcher,
Wilhelm, 6 Malony, 1917).
Machinegun training time during IET ranged between

60 and 70 hours in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The M60 began to replace
the .30 caliber Browning machinegun (M1919A6) at this time (Army Subject
Scbedule 21-35, 1961; Army Subject Schedule 23-35, 1962). Repetitive practice
and fundamentals training were considered imperative in producing qtalified
gunners in past programs. Fundamentals and preliminary marksmanship training
were stressed and have remained evident in the doctrine available today (Field
Manual 23-67, 1964), but today's abbreviated lET familiarization program no
longer produces completely qualified gunners. The current institutional
training philosophy, based in part on limited resources, is that machinegunners
will become qualified after their assignment to units. However, limited
observations of unit machinegun teams in the field suggest that adequate
training is generally not being conducted. Time constraints and resource
limitations are realities in the field Just as they are in the institutional
setting. Under the current requirements of Army Regulation 350-4 (1973),
.Iedicated machinegunners must either qualify or familiarize annually. The
absence of emphasis on a clear standard for required qualification allows a
commander in the field the opportunity to focus the unit training program on
what are considered to be the most important areas. These may not include
machinegun marksmanship training, unless so directed from higher headquarters.
Earlier era training consistently placed greater emphasis on preliminary
-n.mrksmanship instruction. The intent of this training was not only to teach
the correct fundawentals, but also to drill the soldiers so that they developed
and int, :naLized fixed aabits before golng to range firing for live fire
practice. The sound p-,nciple of skill acquisition has been common knowledge
In a previous generation of
in the tral.ning literature (Bliodeau, 1966).
training literature, the philosophy expressed was: "marksmen arr made during
preparatory training," ine further, that "no man is allowed to fire on the
range until he has receiveu thorough training in preparatory marksmanship"
(Field Manual 23-45, 1943).
Past emphasis on cre drill and pre-range firing training was maintained
in the 1955 "ianial for Browning '.30 ai.d .50 caliber) machineguns (Field
Manual 23-55), where the preparatory exercise included:
1. sighting anJ aiming exercises,
-

2.

position exercises,

3.

sight setting and laying exercises, and

4.

manipulation (of sight and traversing & elevation mechan'Uti)

exercises.

In particular, the sighting and aiming execcises would appeor comprehensive compared to current practices. There were a total of four soparate
eaxercises involved:
1. Use of a sighting bar - used to show the alignment of front and rear
sights with the target.
2.

Laying the machinegun sighcs on the target - checked each time by a

qualified coach,
4

3.

Triangulation exercise - sighting against a paper target being marked

at the point of aim, by another student directed by the gunner doing
the sighting.

4.

Demonstration and explanation of the effects of weapon cant - demonstration of the lateral displacement in point of round impact for
fire using canted sights.

Prior to firing live rounds, each man was required to pass an examination
covering all aspects of proficiency in preparatory training. Proficiency
testing before actual range firing has been a part of machinegun training
since its inception (Army War College, 1917; Heavey, 1936).
It was considered
important to maintain this history of non-firing proficiency testing with the
development of training programs for the M60 machinegun (Special Text 23-56-1,
1957; Infantry Instructor's Conference Report, 1959).
The purpose of this
testing was to insure that gunners understcod and could employ techniques of
loading, clearing malfunctions, and using the traversing and elevation (T&E)
mechanism. Some of this training was subsequently incorporated into crew
drill instruction and mechanical training.
The course of fire traditionally began at close range using paper targets
(500 inches or 12.7 meters). This provided close range, observable feedback
on performance. Errors could be readily detected since the strike of the
bullets could be easily seen. In addition, targets were inspected frequently
and without delay. It was considered essential to develop skill and prove
marksmanship ability at close range before progressing to firing at longer
ranges.
Firing at long range targets commenced with single shot firing and the
firing of groups of single shots. This procedure was nsed to zero the sights
of the machinegun and to demonstrate to the trainee that, Just like the
rifle, the machinegun required the proper use of sights and the performance of
the integrated act of shooting to obtain consistent results. Initial firing
in bursts was then conducted and shot groups were measured to determine
uniformity of weapon holding. Exercises in fire distribution were then
conducted, using the T&E mechanism for traverse and search fire. Finally,
when proficiency was proven, reduced time limits were imposed to develop
target engagement speed.
Field fire was conducted on various target arrays of silhouette targets
between 300 and 700 yards from the firer, under the direct supervision of
knowledgeable instructors. Each shot or burst fired was observed by an
instructor, and coaching was provided when it was necessary. The assistant
gunner helped not only In ammunition preparation and feeding to the gun, but
assisted the gunner in sensing the impact of bursts in the target area as
well. Teamwork begun during earlier crew drill was further developed during
field fire instruction. As part of all range firing, michinegun sights were
blackened to reduce glare. This practice is seldom seen today outside of
competitive circles.
Historically, machineguns were predominantly employed on tripods in
training and in battle. The tripod was employed both during the attack, from
an overwatch position, and in the defense. The tripod provides stability to
5

the weapon, and permits the firing of large quantities of ammunition without
creating excessive fatigue in the gunner.
Tripod use also permits precise
target engagement, even during the hours of darkness, using sighting data
recorded on a detailed range card. The T&E mechanism is manipulated to bring
the sights on target and the readings on the T&E are recorded.
This process
was practiced during crew drill
and range firing training to the point that
gunners could adjust the holding pressure on the machinegun to account for the
looseness which is common in the T&E mechanism.
This type of training is
still
expressed in U.S. Army doctrine (Field Manual 23-67, 1964), though POI
changes have reduced mechanical training hours and crew drill.
These reductions were partly an effort to streamline training, with the intent that
crew drill and T&E manipulation would be taught in conjunction with other

skills (Infantry Instructor's Conference Report, 1959).

Machinegun training tasks have changed somewhat with time as a result of
differences in accepted employment techniques.
In the era of World War I, for
example, machinegun companies and even battalions were employed.
Special
training was required for officers assigned to these units because indirect
fire was a common role for the employment of machineguns at that time.
Training called for indirect target engagements to a distance of 2,000 yards.
Tripod use on machineguns permitted effective use of the machinegun in an
indirect fire role (Merkatz, 1915; Musham, 1921; Indirect Fire-Machinegun,
1923; Heavey, 1936; Hutchison, 1938; Marshall, 1951).
When machinegun crews
were organized into companies in wars before the Korean Conflict, the indirect
fire mission for the machinegun was considered important.
After the U.S. Army
experience in Korea, this mission and the training with which it was associated
lost its place in the POIs.
The nature of the terrain in Korea and the
beginnings of fluid engagement may have caused a shift away from an emphasis
on indirect fire employment for the machinegun (Marshall, 1951).
Currently,
this mission is no longer taught.

The results of tests conducted in 1956 by the Continental Army Command

(CONARC) indicated that a 7.62mm M60 prototype was a superior weapon to the
then standard .30 caliber Browning (M1919A6).
The U.S. Army tested the 7.62mm
machinegun in order to meet the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
objective of standardizing its rifle and machinegun ammunition.
The prototype
M60 proved to be superior to the M1919A6 in simplicity, portability, reliability, barrel life, and fire delivery (CONARC, 1956).
Although both the
H1919A6 and the prototype M60 provided comparable accuracy to ranges of 1000
yards, the M60 and its tripod mount were found to be less durable under rough
handling conditions than the M1919A6.
Yet, the 7.62mm machinegun was more
accurate than its predecessor beyond 1000 yards.
The recommendations of this
testing program were that the 7.62mm (NATO) general purpose machinegun be
adopted by the U.S. Army and classified as the standard type, while changing
the classification of the M1919AI and M1919A6 .30 caliber machineguns to
limited standard type (CONARC, 1956).
The 7.62mm (NATO) machinegun was to be
transitioned into the inventory in exchange for the .30 caliber mathineguns in
"use. Acceptance of the 7.62mm machinegun, which was to become th'e H60, meant
that associated changes in training programs would be necessary as well.
The post-Korean.

pre-Vietnam era of tachinegun training development had a

documented series of changes as a result of the transltion from the M1919A6 to

6

Table I summarizes the Army Subject Schedules which

the M60 machinegun.
outlined the appropriate training periods and hours for basic machinegun
training during that era.
Preceeding these developments, the USAIS had
produced information about the M60 in order to augment standard training and
to introduce the M60 and its modes of fire (Special Text 23-56-1, 1957).

Table 1
Summary of U.S. Army Machinegun Training Programs

From 1958 to 1962

Program

Date

Army Subject
Schedule 21-35:
M1919A6 machinegun

1958

Army Subject
Schedule 21-35,
M1919A6 machinegun

Army Subject
Schedule 23-35:
M1919A6 or H60
machinegun

1961

1962

Qualification
Hours

Familiarization
Hours

Mechanical training

Crew drill

Marksmanship

36

10

Techniques of fire

23

70

16

Major Objectives

M1919A6 (H60)
4 (4)

Mechanical training

Crew drill

2 (0)

Marksmanship

32

10 (4)

Techniques of fire

20

0 (0)

62

16 (8)

Mechanical training

Marksmanship

20

12

Techniques of fire

24

Record fi-e transition

Record fire

60

16

It was assumed that gunners were trained with the H1919A6 prior to M60
familiarization.
7

The concepts of training machinegun marksmanship and techniques of fire did

not differ substantially from traditional methods.
A report of work done to advance M60 machinegun training programs was
presented after the 1959 Infantry Instructors' Conference (Infantry Instructors'
Conference Report, 1959).
This report outlined a training program describing
the unique qualities of the M60, and most importantly, presented the training
philosophy which was developing at the time.
It is most important to also
note the general influence on marksmanship training, both rifle as well as
machinegun, that Trainfire was having (McFann, Hammes, & Taylor, 1955).
The
orientation of training was moving toward combat realism, which equated to
random appearances of pop-up targets, and away from the manicured expanses of
the known distance (KD) ranges which had served marksmen for decades.
The
original intent of the Trainfire program was to augment fundamental marksmanship training with subsequent combat target training and not to supplant it
(Smith et al., 1980).
During the transition from the M1919A6 machinegun to the M60 machinegun
(see Table 1), there was a measureable shift in training program emphasis and
a reduction in the number of hours spent in basic machinegun training. The
comments presented at the Infantry Instructors" Conference (1959) reflected
the thinking of the time. A 66-hour program for the M60 was proposed at the
conference based on the expressed need to:
1.

focus on effective combat target engagement,

2.

move away from the artificial aspects of the 12.7-meter range (500
inches),

3.

address the allocation of time and ammunition to techniques of fire

that would build teamwork, and to

4.

train to the characteristics of the M60 and remove obsolete skills.

The proposed program was compared with the standard 70-hour program used with
the M1919A6 (Army Subject Schedule 21-35, 1958).
Specifically, one hour was
proposed for orientation, followed by four hours of mechanical training.
Because this mechanical training was to be general in nature, rather than
detailed, it would save five hours from the standard POI.
Six hours of bipod
firing were to follow, incorporating crew drill training on a 12.7-meter
range.
Eight hours of transition range firing were to follow, using the bipod
mount to engage pop-up targets from 300 to 900 meters.
The firing phase of
the next block of instruction was to be six hours, with a shift to the tripod
mode on a 12.7-meter range.
The purpose of the firing in this block was to
detect errors quickly in the application of basic marksmanship fundamentals
and in T&E manipulation.
A landscape target was developed to support subsequent techniques of fire training which later became part of the new
FM 23-67, in 1964 (see Figure 1). It was intended to eliminite some of the
unrealistic aspects of short range firing; the KD-type targets were not to be
used.
Two hours of tripod crew training were built into the program to teach
the skills of getting the weapon into and out of action in this mounting mode.
Further, this block served as a basis for the techniques of fire training.
8

Figure 1.

Landscape target developed from early proposals, accepted in fm

23-67, 1964 (Infantry Instructors' Conference Report, 1959).

The proposed techniques of fire program was increased two hours beyond
the standard training; however, it represented a deletion of defilade and
overhead fire training. This permitted a shift in emphasis to "direct
lay"
firing at targets observed by the gunner.
The advent of the M60 also meant
that firing techniques included assault fire, or firing holding the gun
under
the arm while moving, firing from the shoulder or hip while standing, and
additional crew training.
Concurrent training of non-firing tasks also became
an accepted training technique and it served to shorten the length of the
programs.
According to established practices, qualification firing in the 1950s
measured only marksmanship skills and it preceded training in the techniques
of fire.
Fourteen hours of testing were proposed, including four hours of
practical (non-firing) proficiency testing, six hours of bipod firing on
a
transition range, and four hours of tripod firing on a 12.7-meter range
using
the landscape target (Figure 1). The soldier would have to demonstrate
proficiency in all areas of gunnery according to the proposed program (Infantry
Instructors Conference Report, 1959).
In philosophy, this approach to
qualification testing represented a return to the very early days of machinegun
marksmanship training (Hatcher et al., 1917).
Although the proposed program was not adopted in total, an examination
of
subsequent training programs reveal the influence of its philosophy (see
Table
1). For instance, Army Subject Schedules 21-35 (1961) and 23-35 (1962)
show a
transition from time spent on mechanical training and crew drill to techniques
9

of fire 4nd qualification testing. In Army Subject Schedule 23-35 (1962),

record fire transition was a separate eight-hour period of instruction, when
in actuality it could have been classified as an extension of techniques of
fire training. Additionally important to note was the trend toward fewer
training hours in the relatively brief period from 1958 to 1962.
Detailed information presented in Field Manual 23-67 (1964) addressed M60
machinegun employment and training doctrine. It continued to support non-firing,
as well as firing, proficiency. Immediate action drills to correct malfunctions
continued to be important and part of qualification firing was to be conducted
on a 10-meter range.
It was found that the battlesight zero of the M60
machinegun, which was established at 500 meters, also provided an interception
of the trajectory curve of the 7.62mm (NATO) round with the line of sight
at 10 meters, rather than 12.7 meters. The manual and its associated training
programs supported the basic training of soldiers during the U.S. involvement
in the Republic of Vietnam. This period saw a reduction in the total number
of hours devoted to both rifle and M60 machinegun training. While the effort
to place a greater emphasis on combat oriented firing was not meant to replace
traditional marksmanship training procedures, it nevertheless accomplished
this end (Smith et al., 1980).
The need to train great numbers of soldiers
quickly, with limited resources and instructors at the training centers,
obviously cuntributed to problems which developed.
Historically, there has been a reduction in the time spent training
machinegun crews, as well as a reduction in the emphasis placed on infantry
machineguns missions. Current training guidelines still call for the maintenance of proficiency (though its meaning may have changed), preparatory
marksmanship training before range firing, and annual qualification within
unit mission constraints (Army Regulation 350-4, 1973; Training Circular 25-3,
1981). The present machinegun training effectiveness analysis has been
directed largely at improving the training and subsequent skill sustainment of
infantry machinegun crews whose primary unit mission is preparedness for
battle. Training Circular 25-3 (1981) provides guidelines for levels of
training the U.S. Army currently considers appropriate for sustainment and
qualification.
In summary, machinegun training was considered important from its
inception through the early 19609, as reflected in the number of training
hours involved.
In practice, it is possible that even less time was actually
spent in the late 1960s and early 1970s than might be suggested from the
program outlines of that time. The reduction in IET machinegun training hours
reflected in the change from Army Subject Schedule 23-35 (1962) to the Infantry
OSUT POI (1981) is drastic. Less than 25% of the training time for machinegqns
remained after this change. Observations and reports of machinegun experience
in the Republic of Vietnam suggested that there was evidence of skill degredation in combat which paralleled reductions in training time (Barraclough,
1966).
The seriousness of these reductions in training and proficiency
development has been noted in the hope that emphasis can be returned to the
importance of training proficient machinegunners (Grnnge, 1981).

10

Observation of Current Training Practices

Institutional Training
An examination of training programs for the M60 machinegun began at
Fort Benning, Georgia, with an oveview of USAIS and Infantry OSUT POIs. In
addition to the Infantry OSUT POI (1979), the following USAIS courses were
included in the examination:

1. Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC)

2.

Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC)

3.

Officer Candidate School (OCS)

4.

Primary Noncommissioned Officer Course (PNCOC)

5.

Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC)

6.

Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC)

Reserve Component (RC)

IOBC, IOAC, and OCS courses were also reviewed.

Of

these training programs, only IOBC students were receiving sufficient training
Table 2 presents a listing
to permit them to qualify with the M60 machinegun.
of Soldier's Manual tasks (Field Manual 7-11B: 1/2, 1976; Field Manual 21-2,
1982) common to various USAIS and Infantry OSUT POle. A limited amount
of time devoted to machinegun training is expected in senior courses for
officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), since they should already
hava a professional familiarization with the basic weapons in an infantry
company.
Any machinegun training during these courses would focus on employObservation of
ment and maintenance management concerns relevant to leaders.
senior leader courses supported this expectation, with limited range time and
more emphasis on maintenance and how to train soldiers when leaders returned
to their units.
The two days of training (16 hours) given
Infantry Officer Basic Course.
This training
to IOBC students were observed through actual participation.
covered all the skill level one M60 machinegun tasks (see Table 2) and included
Observations of another IOBC
the opportunity to qualify with the machinegun.
class, as well as participation in training, revealed that 16 hours is a
rather brief period of time for an individual to become proficient with a new
weapon.
The training time was used efficiently by the company cadre presenting
The fundamentals of marksmanship and basic machinegun
the instruction.
exercises outlined In Field Manual 23-67 (1964) served as the core of the
program.
Tactical employment techniques were not included in mechanical and
live fire training as they were to be presented in other field training and
Training with the H60 had three purposes:
classroom tactical exercises.
introduction to the primary automatic weapon that each lieutenant would have
in a rifle platoon, exposure to the training techniques and range activities
which would be a part of annual unit qualification, and opportunity for
Two classes of IOBC students, a total of 249
qualification with the weapon.
11

Table 2

in

Distribution of M60 Machinegun Tasks

1981 USAIS and 1979 Infantry OSUT Programs

SOLDIER'S MANUAL TASKS

(task number)
Perform operator maintenance on M60 and
ammunition (071-11B-3005)

((RC)

I
x ix

Fire the M60 for

I I

familiarization

xix

I
xi

x
i ~

position (071-11B-3004)

(071-11B-3003)
Field zero

an M60

"

(071-11B-3006)

on H60 (071-11B-2310)

i
I.....!
I

xI

xi

lxi

x I

(071-IIB-2311)

12

I
I

I
-

T
I

I x I x
I
I

-- I

III

-II - I

I
xl

I .......

I x
I

I x
I

.I

'

1I ..
I

!6

I
I

xxI

-'"-'I

I .

xI

I x
I

I
I

xl

I
I

II

x Ixl x

Zero AN/PVS-2 toM60x

I
I

I1 I I"

Qualify vith 10o

Nount/Dismount AN/PVS-2

I.

an M60 (071-312-3007) .
Zero an M60 on
me-er range (071-11B-3009)

Prepare a range card for

I
x

I
x

I
I

I
x

I
I

I
x

I
x

Use aiming and firing

stakes for the M60

xl

xx

Construct an 6O0

I
ixi

(071-312-3002)

I1

i(RC)l

I
I
I
I

Operate the M60 (load,

fire, reduce stoppage,
unload, and clear)
(071-312-3001)

OCS lOCS IPNCOCIBNCOCIANCOCFOSUT

i(RC)i
I
I
I._"

IIOBCIIOBCIIOACIIO.AkCI

xI

I ... ..

x I
_I

men, were observed.

Instruction was consistently good and the results of
qualification were impressive (see Table 3).
Firing exercises allowed one

practice trial before each timed exercise for record.

This seriously limited

Table 3
IOBC Qualificaton Results
with the M60 Machinegun

Number of
Classification

.4

Percentage of

students

students

Expert

77

31

First class

61

25

Second class

95

38

Unqualified

16

Note:

N - 249.
Five lieutenants were retested and achieved second class
qualification, which meant only 11 students failed to qualify (4%).

practice opportunities, as did little

or no training in the manipulation of
the T&E mechanism.
However, IOBC training did provide a realistic perspective
of what reasonably can be taught in a short period of time to leaders, in
order to give them a clear understanding of the capabilities of a critical
weapon that they will have to employ in combat.
Infantry Officer Advanced Course. Training received by ZOAC students was
oriented toward maintenance and inspection concerns of company commanders.
Exposure to the M60 was combined with .50 caliber Browning machinegun (M2)
training.
Much of the mechanical and non-firing performance training was
presented to small groups rotating amon8 stations.
This format permitted
questions, practice, and emphasis on any area of particular interest to the
students.
In this setting students were observed to recall experiences
they had had with troop units where machinegun-related probleas existed.
Knowledgeable instructors from the Weapons, Gunnery, and Maintenance Department
(WGIM)
of the USAIS conducted the training and were able to respond effectively
to student questions.

IOAC machinegun training included a demonstration of firing techniques

from a maoving and stationary M113 personnel carrier having mounted M2 and M60
machineguns.
Student participation during this period included techniques of
aerial target engagement.
After a bleacher presentation and demonstration

13

outlining small arms defense against air attack (Training Circular 23-44,
1975), students volunteered to engage a radio controlled model aircraft
having a six foot wingspan.
Machineguns (M60 and M2) and MI6AI rifles were
This enjoyable exercise was intended
used in an attempt to down the aircraft.
to illustrate a unit training technique, rather than a serious attempt to use
captains as anti-aircraft gunners. After approximately 10 minutes of blazing
Three grazing hits
fire, the aircraft was landed and inspected for damage.
had been sustained, illustrating to students that sustained practice is a
necessary element to unit anti-aircraft training.
Although IOAC machinegun training was brief (less than one day), it was
appropriately oriented toward training and materiel management concerns.
Training material wn.s available for designing a unit training program geared
toward particular unit needs and circumstances.

,*
',

4,

Noncommissioned Officer Courses.

The primary, basic, and advanced
NCO courses taught at the USAIS primarily address tasks at or above skill
level two.
These tasks relate more to supervisory, maintenance, and tactical
employment considerations than to the training of a skill level one machineHowever, skill level one tasks which have bearing on employment and
gunner.
maintenance were reviewed during these courses (see Table 2).
Since several
different USAIS courses were observed over a short period of time, comparisons
between courses are interesting.
The exceptional case was machinegun training
presented to IOBC classes, in which all tasks supporting qualification were
taught.
Other courses spent very little,
if any, time addressing the marksCourses meant to prepare
manship training requirements of a machinegunner.
NCOs to lead, train, and employ soldiers in battle did not build instructor
Due to the limitations of machinegun instruction
skills in basic weaponry.
about marksmanship
in lET, it is possible that current NCOs know little
fundamentals.
Further, they may be placed at a disadvantage when assignments
involve either rifle or machinegun training. This criticism reflects similar
experiences noted in basic rifle marksmanship research (Thompson, Smith,
"Morey, & Osborne, 1980). Since Army Regulatloo 350-4 (1973) does not require
qualification with the M60 machinegun, it has not been identified as a
critical task.
Any skills NCOs have with 1M60 or M2 nachineguns have been
generally those gleaned from a brief Infantry OSUT familiarization training
program.
Training in an institutional setting has been limited to familiarOnly if an NCO had been
ization and it is not a full qu~lification program.
assigned to serve with a unit in the duty position of a machinegunner would he
Observation of USAIS NO0 courses,
have had a chance to qualify with the weapon.
Infantry OSUT and unit training suggests there is limited proficiency among
NCOs In machinegun marksmanship and training.
Infantry One Station Unit Trainin?. The Infantry OSUT 160 and R2
machinegun familiarization (Infantry osur POI, 1979) program was observed in
1981 at Fort Benning, Georgia.
This PO0 included 14 hours of training (see
Table 4).
All OSUT periods were observed repeatedly, during which academic
Instruction in classrooms and bleachers, dry fire manipulation of the machinegun and T&E ",*chanism, and livo fire training using transition range silhouette
targets were conducted.
2

The practice of M2 machinegun familiarization firing was discontinued in

1983 as a resource conservation measure.
14

The examiniation of Infantry 3SU" machiinegun familiarization training

disclosed that establicrd fundamentals of machinegun marksmanship were not
being taught.
In fact, L.Pe P01 did not stipulate that they were to be taught.
Live fire training was not meeting satisfactory standards for effective
training, as it appeared to be merely an opportunity to fire a couple of
hundred rounds of ammunition through a machinegun in the general direction of
some distant targets.
This condemning statement is not meant to say that
instructors cared little
about the quality of training and their professional
activities. Part of the problem faced by the researchers was the belief on
the part of the instructors that they were in fact doing a good job teaching
familiarization with the M60 and M2 machineguns.
Since they were themselves
products of a poor marksmanship program in an era of change, when rifle and

Table 4
A Summary of the Infantry OSUT M60 Machinegun
Familiarization Program (1979)

Peric

Decription

Maintenance,

Hours

loading, unloading,

Rounds

clearing,

reducing a stoppage

Transition firing and concurrent training

156

120

40

14

316

on crew drill dnd t.a T&E mechanism

Techniques of fire with a bipod mount,

preparation of range cards,

and establishment

of targec Q.ca for predetermined

fire

Predetermined fire at night

Totals

15

.4

machinegun training was not based on sound fundamentals, they did not realize
what was missing.
They had been taught neither the basic skills of marksmanship, nor the concepts which instructors must grasp in order to teach others.
Much of their instruction was based on repeating prepared elements of established tasks with assnciated conditions and standards.
The ranges and target arrays used for initial firing were inappropriate
for beginning shooters.
The soldiers being trained attempted to apply what
had been recently learned in basic rifle marksmanship to a new weapon with a
different sighting system. The problem of engaging distant targets (400-800
meters) with initial bucsts was exacerbated by very limited time on the firing
line and vague instructions prior to firing. Coachin 0 and feedback on performance was limited as well. The first
targets engaged with an M60 machinegun
werie single E-type silhouettes (roughly 39" x 19") on pop-up mechanisms
Before the transition firing
designed to fall when hit. Many did not.
exercise, soldiers were not given sighting instructions, guns were not zeroed,
and assistant gunners were not directed to aid in the sensing of round impacts.
Because of this, the majority of gunners never hit a target and many were not
visibly close.
Targets were distant and difficult to see.
Further, a fourminute time limit was used for the transition exercise, based or the doctrinal
qualification standard for the transition range (Field Manual 23-67, 1964).
Howevez, this course of fire was intended to be usid only after more easic
machinegun marksmanship training.
It was never interled to be used for
initial lVve fire training.
Finally, the performance standard for this period
of instruction did not state a minimal level of required accuracy.
Training in bipod mounted machinegun firing techniques called for traversing and elevating the nachinegun by shifting elbow placement on the
ground, in order to disperse fire across the width and depth of three target
arrays with 100 rounds of ammunition. The potential training in this period
was reduced because initial burst accuracy was not emphasized, guns were not
zeroed, and sights were not adjusted for range.
Gunners were instructed to
adjust from their initial bursts; yet, their assistant gunners were not taught
to help them sense the impact of each burst to establish an adjustment point.
Thus, feedback to the gunner was minimal.
Fire adjustment was not based
on sight manipulation, not even for major corrections.
Rather, it was based
entirely on shifting the position of the gunner's elbows. Proper sight
picture and the use of successive aiming points within a target area to engage
linear targets were not taught before this period.
The use of the tripod mounted M60 machinegun and the T&E mechanism were
Introduced in a concurrent training period located approximately 150 meters
from the firing line. The configuration of the range complex forced this
proximity, though the class was not hindered greatly by noise.
As it was
presented, the information related to T&E manipulation was correct and was
apparently understood.
On a subsequent informal performance test, randomly
selected soldiers were able to set the T&E properly (see page 48).
The fourth period of instruction, predetermined fire with the M60
machinegun, was preceded by a one-hour class on range card preparation.
A practical application of this training involved the acquisition and recording
of target engagement data on tripod mounted machineguns during daylight hours.
16

This data was subsequently used to engage targets at night.

The only indication that targets, wrecked vehicles, were hit was an occasional ricocheted
tracer round.
There was no way to evaluate the effective areas of predetermined fire data settings because of darkness.
After firing 40 rounds at a
previously selected target, little
was known about performance.
It was
obvious that improved performance feedback is needed before gunners can know

the effects of their fire and make appropriate adjustments, if necessary.

Throughout training an excessive number of weapon malfunctions caused
delays in firing. Discussion with other training departments using M60s

revealed that this problem was fairly widespread.

Observation of maintenance

procedures and discussion with maintenance personnel indicated that the

problem is primarily due to "worn vat" guro. Since this issue goes beyond the
scope of training, it is presented in greater detail in a later section of
this report (see page 29).
Due to the aforementioned weaknesses identified in the Infantry OSUT
machinegun POI (1979), immediate research and development activities were
begun.
Intervention procedures designed to improve the effectiveness of
Infantry OSUT machinegun training are outlined in the Analysis of Training
Effectiveness section of this report (see page 44).

Unit Training
Qualification and Sustainment Training.
Over a period of two years,
the sustainment and qualification training procedures of selected U.S. Army
Forces Command (FORSCOM) units were observed and discussed with FORSCOM
personnel, either as part of the machinegun training effectiveness analysis or
as part of research primarily directed in other areas.
In general, there has
been minimal consistency apparent in the training procedures for annual
qualification or sustainment.
A number of problems have usually occurred, the
most frequent being:
1.

A junior officer is assigned to handle all qualification activities,

without having the necessary knowledge and experience to effectively
coordinate all the resources required.

2.

Soldiers assigned to machinegun crews are frequently detailed to

other tasks.

3.

Effective coordination of ranges, weapons, crews,

support personnel,

and ammunition seldom occurs simultaneously.

4.

Sometimes ranges are inorerable and targets are unavailable.

5.

Training procedures presented in Field Manual 23-67 (1964)

either new or unfamiliar to many units.

are

Opportunities to observe and assist units conducting qualification or

sustainment training have revealed officers, NCOs, and soldiers trying to do
their best.
FORSCOM is most interested in correcting some of the training

17

rvwvN

WN

management problems that units and their commanders face in the field. In
particular, they have conducted an investigation into the state of training in
the field, using the M60 machinegun program as a representative illustration
They found that six factors have contributed to
of training in general.
training problems in FORSCOM:
1.

Commanders have too much to do in too little

2.

Units suffer from turbulence caused by personnel changes (crew weapons

in

3.

time.

particular).

Ammunition constraints limit training opportunities and types of

training that can be conducted.

4.

There are shortages of experienced NCOs.

5.

Crew weapons often have no designated operators.

6.

Excessive demands are made on the squad leader as the primary trainer.

FORSCOM has taken steps to address these problems. At Fort Ord, California,
the Marksmanship Training Unit Detachment was asked to help train machinegunners
for annual qualification. As a result, a five-hour block of refresher and
skill development instruction was prepared.
Squad leader training is also
being examined.
A need to give the squad leader additional training to act as
the primary squad trainer has been identified. In particular, FORSCOM is
addressing the issue of whether institutional NCO training programs are
meeting their needs.
Perhaps there may be better ways to train these supervisors and leaders.
Ia 1983 the Range Modernization Division of FORSCOM was reorganized as
the Training Support Division. This organizational change was meant, in part,
to address training issues recognized as problematic to all commanders charged
with maintaining unit readiness.
Commanders are faced with difficult decisions in their attempt to utilize limited resources in the most efficient
manner.
For example, a mechanized gunnery exercise including unit-wide
tactical activities may be viewed by many commanders as a better use of
training ammunition than traditional range firing involving only machinegunners.
Given the number of ranges which need upgrading (Training Circular
25-2, 1980), unit commanders appear to do a creditable job of training with
limited resources.
Some program objectives recently identified by the
Training Support Division of FORSCOM include:
1.

Remove the ambiguity from Army Regulation 350-4 by making FORSCOM

qualification and familiarization policy clear.

2.

Standardize instruction and provide clear examples of correct performance. Do not simply rely on a set of tasks, conditions, and
standards without illustration.

3.

Work on methodology to incorporate institutionally developed tasks

into unit training to enhance the sustainment of skills.
18

4.

Overcome the effects of leadership turbulence with more "how to"

examples for training.

Division Schools. An intermediate solution to some unit training problems

involves non-traditional schools at post or division level. The Division
School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is a notable example. Portions of the
two-week M60 machinegun leadership course, taught by contract civilians, were
observed in 1983 (see Table 5).
Central Texas College currently has respon-

sibility for the school, and its staff is composed of retired military
instructors with subject matter expertise. Instruction has been based on
Field Manual 23-67 (1964) and related training schedules. Classes are held
for groups of 16 to 20 NCOs and a 992 passing rate is claimed. Though a less
extensive program focusing directly on range activities would be appropriate
for machinegun crews, this course gives the NCO a background to teach and
manage training in a way that may be transferable to other instructional
subjects.

Maintenance and Malfunctions

Observation of both M60 familiarization training in Infantry OSUT and
unit training in FORSCOM revealed a large percentage of M60 machineguns out of
action for parts failure or excessively high malfunction rates.
Because these
factors slow training, Infantry OSUT instructors requisition not only the
weapons needed for training, but additional ones to replace those projected to
have malfunctions and breakage during the course of a training week. Observation and interviews with weapons pool personnel, charged with the care
and maintenance of machineguns, indicated that all prescribed maintenance
inspections were performed during the disassembly, cleaning, and assembly of
the weapons.
Many of the inspections, however, involve little
more than
visual checks and rough gauging.
Broken parts or noted abnormalities can lead
Unfortunately,
to a more detailed inspection to determine serviceability.
there are not enough people assigned to the weapons pool to completely inspect
the machineguns to military specifications, clean, and keep weapons availability equal with the demands of the training system. Yet, it can be stated
that maintenance personnel perform admirably under austere circumstances which
parallel those of the trainers.
Events at the 1982 U.S. Army Rifle, Pistol and Rachinegun Championship
Matches at Fort Benning, Georgia illustrated the severity of M60 machinegun
maintenance problems.
In particular, the individual and team M60 light
machinegun matches included regional championship competitors from the Active
Army, U.S. Army Reserves, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard.
Participants brought their own weapons; however, a few were provided by Fort
Benning in case of breakage.
Four M60 machineguns were made available from
the post's pool of training weapons at the request of the Commander of the
U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit.
Because only the best weapons were needed for
the matches, all four machineguns were inspected in accordance with the
directives of Supply Bulletin 9-50 (1963) and Military Specification
MIL-M-45013C (1964).
As a result, all were found to be technically unserviceable.
Deficiencies for each machinegun ranged in numbers from 10 to 16,
with at least 4 each considered to be critical and possibly dangerous.
These
19

Table 5
A Summary of the M60 Machinegun Leadership Course
of the Division School Program at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Period

Hours

Introduction to the M60 machinegun and mechanical training

Examination

5.5
.5

Maintenance management

9.5
.5

Examination
Organizational maintenance

4.0

Examination

.5

Crew training and employment

8.0

Examination

.5

Map reading, land navigation, range cards, and techniques of fire

10.0

Examination

1.0

Techniques of fire with limited visibility

4.0

Tactical employment

4.0

Range safety

1.0

Firing (tables I-VII,

Field Manual 23-67,

1964)

18.03

Tactical exercises without troops

7.0

Plan a training program for the M60 machinegun to include

forecasting ammunition, requesting training areas, and
application of safety measures

4.0
78.0

These firing tables require 1062 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition per gunner.

20

inspections were extremely detailed and were beyond the level of those made by
the machinegunner, although they are supposed to be made ty maintenance
personnel.
The amount of time necessary to conduct such inspections, according
to the most experienced machinegun maintenance expert available, was rep-ortedly
unavailable to personnel in the normal maintenance cycle. There is little
information to suggest that this situation will change in the near future.
A
problem noted by maintenance personnel at Fcrt Benning and other FORSCOM
installations is that M60 machineguns in the inventory are becoming worn and
aged.
It should soon be apparent that either new guns must be built or a
replacement for the general purpose machinegun must be selected in the not too
distant future.

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) training has been
primarily associated with field, or tactical environment, training to provide
force on force engagement opportunities.
This training system provides
engagement feedback which is not possible using only blank ammunition, or no
ammunition at all. MILES combined with the use of blank ammunition causes the
M60 machinegunner, rifleman, or even tank crew member, to perform many of the
same operations necessary when firing service ammunition.
The laser equipment
provides some performance feedback to the gunner and to the target, thcugh it
has not been successfully demonstrated that MILES can be used as an accurate
substitute for marksmanship training.
Refinements in MILES equipment design
and testing may eventually reveal that a more direct marksmanship training
transfer is possible.
Such product and training improvements may incorporate
MILES into the traditional skill training arena to a greater degree, while
enhancing its tactical advantages.
Presently, units using MILES must understand the system similarities and differences with regard to live fire training
using service ammunition.
In a tactical setting, the use of blank ammunition
helps duplicate the battle conditions of noise and firing signatures.
Considering blank ammunition as part of MILES, the following identified similarities exist between the system and the use of service ammunition:
1. The weapon (M60)

must be zeroed.

2.

Aimed fire is

3.

Both the bipod and tripod mounts may be used with the M60.

4.

Loading, unloading, clearing,

or routinely expected.

5.

Weapons cleaning and lubrication requirements exist.

6.

Procedures
unchanged.

7.

Grazing fire can be employed under some conditions.

8.

Night vision sighting and employment are possible.

necessary for effective engagement.

and reducing stoppages may be practiced

for predetermined fire and preparation of range cards are

21

ku

'"a

Differences which exist between the use of service ammunition and MILES
equipment must be understood when considering the purpose of particular types
of training. Regarding M60 machinegun training, the following differences
between MILES and live fire training have been identified:

1. MILES does not replicate the trajectory of service ammunition, nor

does it require range estimation and related sight adjustment
procedures.
2.

The effects of lateral wind on the flight of a bullet, which require

aiming adjustments, do not exist when MILES is used.

3.

Since MILES is a line-of-sight, speed-of-light system, lead is not

necessary for engaging moving targets with the present equipment.

4.

Observation and adjustment of fire, unless the target dispenses smoke

when hit, is not possible.

5.

MILES does not penetrate brush aud other forms of concealment material,
sometimes including smoke. The effectiveness of grazing fire using
MILES equipment could be underestimated.

In summary, MILES does offer improvements in tactical training, by

providing the gunner opportunities to practice some of the basic tasks associated with the use of the M60 machinegun. Yet, it is important to understand
the advantages and disadvantages of MILES technology when considering its
utilization in training.
Training in Other Services
U.S. Air Force. Information concerning small arms training in the U.S.
Air Force was received from U.S. Air Force Tactical Airwarfare Center personnel
during discussion of a project to test the effectiveness of M16AI rifle and
M60 machinegun firing while wearing chemical defense equipment.
Air Force
personnel, particularly those assigned as weapons specialists in the areas of
reconnaissance and base security, are given M60 machinegun training based on
instruction outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 23-67 (1964).
This field
manual serves as a basic reference for marksmanship, mechanical training, and
techniques of fire. As a result of the chemical defense equipment testing,
additional training in this area was added (Lockleg, 1981). A summary of the
U.S. Air Force M60 machinegun training program is outlined in Table 6.
Although the conduct of this training was not observed, it was noted that the
number of airmen reportedly trained is very small in comparison to the number
of machinegunners trained in the U.S. Army. Further, Air Force marksmanship
instructors are designated as a separate Military Occupational Specialty
(MOS), unlike Army marksmanship instructors.

22

|-

i.

Table 6
U.S. Air Force M60 Machinegun Training Program

Firing table (Field Manual 23-67,

Rounds of
ammunition
per gunner

1964)

168

II

- four times (bipod 10 meter)

practice and record
practice and record with protective mask/gloves
- once (tripod 10 meters)

III

- twice (tripod 10 meters)

156

108

practice
practice with protective mask/gloves
IV

- twice (tripod 10 meters)

record
record with protective mask/gloves

216

- four times (bipod transition range)

practice and record with assistant gunner,
record with protective mask/gloves, assistant
gunner record, single gunner

552

VI

- twice (bipod and tripod)

record with bipod
record with tripod

400

VII

- twice
assault firing, modified

400

VIII - predetermined fire

modified day and night firing

440
Total

Note:

Gunners who
times in an
1981, is to
to be fired

2440

fail to qualify may refire each table a maximum of two

attempt to qualify.
This training program, proposedin
be conducted at a U.S. Air Force Training Center.
It is
biennially by each gunner.

23

Results of the U.S. Air Force chemical defense equipment tests indicated
that familiarization firing with the equipment appeared to be sufficient for

nonspecialist personnel. Further, it appeared possible to qualify at combat

ranges while wearing the equipment. Finally, individual coaching was found to
improve the performance of those firers who did not initially qualify (Lockleg,
1981).
U.S. Marine Corps. In 1981 a visit was made to observe and participate
in M60 Machinegun training at the USMC Infantry Training School at Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina. Unlike U.S. Army machinegun training programs, the
USMC Infantry Training School conducts an M60 machinegun course designed to
produce gunners with a separately designated MOS. The course could be considered part of advanced individual training, since the marines being trained
have finished their basic course. Course duration is four weeks, with 18
training days and a total of 212 hours of instruction. Specifically, the M60
machinegun course devotes 73 hours to range firing, while the remaining hours
are devoted to related subjects such as organization, tactics, and physical
During machinegun training each marine fires at least 1308 rounds
training.
0o ammunition.
Machinegun training mirrors the general USMC philosophy that
the machinegun is a crew-served weapon.
It is neither considered, nor trained
as, an individual weapon.
The USMC concept of machinegun employment impacts on the training
procedures used.
For example, the M60 is primarily used with a tripod and
T&E mechanism in both offensive and defensive operations.
During movement the
leader of each four-man machinegun team carries the tripod, the gunner carries
the gun, and two bearers carry ammunition.
There are two teams in a machinegun squad.
A squad leader usually selects both the firing locations and
general fields of fire for the teams.
Each team leader acts as an assistant
to his gunner, by feeding ammunition and directing fire. Team leaders position
their tripod, set specific limits to fields of fire, and make sensing corrections for their gunner to apply.
In making sensing corrections, the team
leader observes the location of bullet impact and directs the gunner to make
appropriate firing adjustments when needed.
In contrast to USMC machinegun
employment, U.S. Army employment calls for the assistant gunner to aid in
sensing, though the gunner is ultimately responsible for directing the
weapon's fire.
Because the typical class in the USMC machinegun course has between

30 and 50 students, a great deal of individual attention and coaching can be

provided to each marine. An instructor on the firing line has responsibility
for a pair of two-man gun crews, with only one of his two crews firing at a
time. Instructors are all graduates of the machinegun course and they are
required to qualify before being allowed to instruct. Reportedly, they also
must serve as assistant instructors for a few months before becoming principal
instructors.
A gunner's proficiency examination is administered prior to live firing.
Subjects on this performance-oriented examination include: organization of
the weapons platoon, malfunctions and corrective actions, care and cleaning
techniques, ammunition considerations, and the use of machinegun mounting
systems.
In other words, each marine must pass a non-firing proficiency
examination before firing his first shot.
24

Machinegun training then emphasizes marksmanship fundamentals on a

500-inch (12.7-meter) range.
Initial shot groups are established using
single shot firing. This requires loading rounds individually and practicing
operational procedures.
Weapons are zeroed this way under the supervision of
an assistant instructor.
Further, crew leaders are tasked to provide direction
to the gunner, developing subsequent teamwork that continues throughout
training.
All initial zero firing (84 rounds) is conducted on tripod mounted
weapons controlled with TOE mechanisms.
SpeciThe next stage of marksmanship training involves field firing.
fically, 400 rounds are fired in the tripod mode at 55-gallon barrels and
vehicular targets positioned 300 to 600 meters downrange.
Although less
feedba4k on hit performance is available, the purpose of this exercise is to
The exercise is
transition the crew to field target observation techniques.
Additionally,
meant to develop alertness in sensing the impact of rounds.
instructors coach the crews to insure that accuracy is achieved and that a
critique of performance is provided.
Training then returns to a 500-inch range to introduce traverse and
search techniques with the T&E mechanism.
A total of 162 rounds are allotted
for this exercise, which is considered to be part of M60 machinegun qualification.
As in earlier training, crew leaders assist the gunner by observing
and adjusting fire.
Also considered a part of qualification is a second field fire exercise
using the tripod mount.
This 200-round exercise emphasizes fire distribution
at targets between 200 and 600 meters. Assault fire training is then conducted,
during which 250 rounds are fired at targets between 100 and 200 meters.
A standing unsupported firing position is used in assault fire.
Machinegun training concludes with predetermined fire and range card
preparation.
Alter range cards are prepared, ranges to targets are confirmed
by firing 12 single rounds of tracer ammunition during daylight.
At night,
each marine then fires a belt of 200 rounds of mixed ball and tracer ammunition (4:1 ratio) at the predetermined targets.
Illumination is provided by
60mm mortar parachute flares, which are considered critical in permitting
target hits to be sensed.
Table 7 presents a summary of the USMC M60 machinegun training program.
The USMC machinegun training program is highly similar to the traditional
U.S. Army approach of the 1950s.
It emphasizes quality instructors, ample
training and practice time, and reinforcement of marksmanship fundamentals.
The USMC is developing a training management system similar to the U.S. Army
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and Skill Qualification Testing (SQT)
systems.
In fact, current U.S. Army basic H60 machinegun training tasks for
the Light Weapons Infantryman are being used as the basis for USMC training.
In summary, the high quality of the U.S. Marine Corps' machinegun instruction is clearly based on the following factors:
1.

highly skilled and motivated instructors,

25

6V

2.

sufficient training resources,

3.

proven training procedures reinforced by practice, and

4.

training geared to a specific MO0S.

Training in Allied Forces

West German Army. Machinegun training in the West German Army is conducted within units. Since a large part of the West German Army is mechanized,
some training time is devoted to gunnery with vehicular mounted machineguns.
In the infantry platoon, 7.62mm (NATO) general purpose machineguns are
employed primarily as individual weapons in the bipod, direct fire mode at
targets within 600 meters. Greater range is certainly possible (Schiezen mit
Handwaffen, 1972).
Machinegun training can vary depending on differing unit missions and
time constraints. However, emphasis is generally placed on the successful
completion of a series of exercises outlined in the small arms training manual
published by the German Infantry School at Hammelburg. During a visit to the
German Infantry School, small arms training philosophy was discussed with
their professional cadre who instruct 4 infantry leaders, both officers and
NCOs, to conduct unit level training.
Junior officers are the primary
instructors for their rifle platoons. Before leaving the German Infantry
School, they must be proficient instructors with all small arms assigned to
the platoon.
Machinegun training progresses from 25-meter to 300-meter range firing,
always using targets that provide accurate performance feedback. A gunner
never proceeds to a new exercise without first demonstrating proficiency on
the previous exercise. Initial firing is conducted on a 25-meter range, using
single shots to develop tight shot groups before firing bursts of four rounds.
Instructors reported that these short bursts develop trigger control. Training
proceeds to a series of 25-meter landscape targets and 25-meter night firing.
These 25-meter exercises enable a critique of performance to be made without
difficulty.
Silhouette targets at 100, 200, and 300 meters are then engaged
in a variety of exercises, which include firing with the protective mask.
Refresher training occurs at least quarterly, reflecting the importance
of small arms training in the West German Infantry. Soldiers are subject to
additional range firing tests without prior notification, during which they
may be required to fire not only their machinegun, but other small arms
weapons as well. It is interesting to note that West German training does not
include the concept of weapons qualification; rather, weapons proficiency is
expected to be demonstrated continually.

4 observation of machinegun training and discussion with German Infantry

School cadre were a fortunate by-product of a visit to observe Military
Operations on Urban Terrain (KOUT) training in October 1982.
26

Table 7
USMC Infantry Training School
M60 Machinegun POI for Infantrymen

Subject

Introduction, organization,
training

Hours

and mechanical

18.00

Gunner's proficiency examination

6.00

Crew drill

3.25

Basic bipod and tripod marksmanship

19.50

Zeroing
Field fire
Traverse and search techniques

646
(84)
(400)
(162)

Techniques of fire and tactical employment

15.00

Distribution of fire
Assault fire

450
(200)
(250)

Predetermined fire and range card preparation

Daylight confirmation of target ranges
Predetermined night firing
Totals

Note-:

Rounds of
ammuni tion
per gunner

11.25

212

(12)
(200)

73.00

1308

Qualification is determined by both firing and non-firing proficiency,

including performance in the following areas: gunner-s proficiency
examination, traverse and search techniques, and distribution of
fire.

27

British Army.
British 7.62mm (NATO) machinegun training includes an
annual qualification course of fire requiring a team of two men, the gunner
and the assistant gunner, to participate in a series of eight firing exercises
During qualification the assistant
(United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 1975).
A summary of the
gunner is permitted to aid the gunner in fire direction.
In order to
course of fire for annual qualification is presented in Table 8.
achieve a passing score, a gunner is expected to score 70Z of his rounds as
To qualify as a marksman, he must achieve hits
hits on exercises 2 through 8.
with 852 of his shots.
Most noteworthy in the qualification program are the
moderate ranges used for most target engagements, the limited amount of
ammunition expended, and the high percentage of hits required against point
targets.
Prior to qualification testing, however, extensive initial training
and reinforcement practice is conduwted.

Table 8
A Summary of the British Annual Machinegun
Qualification Course of Fire
4

Exercise

Firing
position

Target
range (m)

Exposures

Exposure
time (seconds)

Rounds
fired

foxhole

200

30

20

foxhole

300

unlimited

20

prone

400

30

20

assault

400

45

20

300

45

20

prone

300

20

prone

500

20

prone

600

20

assault

500

20
Total

Note:

180

Qualification scoriog is determined by performance on exercises 2

through 8.
A double silhouette target is used in exercise 1, while
triple silhouette targets are used in exercises 2 through 8.
28

Analysis of Training Effectiveness

Twt. issues are addressed in the analysis of machinegun training effec-

tivenesi. First, following observation of the 14-hour Infantry OSUT M60

machinegun familiarization program (Table 4), a number of modifications were
suggested and implemented almost immediately.

An evaluation of the training

effectiveness of the modified program was then performed. A second training

effectiveness issue concerns the relationship between IET machinegun progrems
and unit machinegun training.
It is recommended that an analysis be performed
of required unit training missions to insure that automatic weapons tasks in

these missions appropriately reflect both unit training resources and skill
levels acquired from lET.

Modified Infantry One Station Unit Training Machinegun Program

Following prior observation of the 14-hour Infantry OSUT M60 familiari-zation program (1979), recommended modifications to the program were implemented and subsequently evaluated.
Unfortunately, the modifications considered
for implementation were limited to those that could be made within existing
training resources.
Specifically, the development cf a modified training
program was limited by the following resource constraints:
1.

Time constraints prohibited more than cursory instructor training.

2.

Additional instructors were not available.

3.

Additional training time could not be allocated.

4.

The schedule of training could not be altered.

5.

Additional ammunition was unavailable.

6.

Weapons were limited to those available from the local weapons pool.

7.

Firing ranges could not be drastically altered.

These constraints made a full-scale intervention impractical.

For example,
the firing ranges available for training and the inexperience of the instructor
cadre prevented the development of a 10-meter grot:ping and zaeoing exercise
which, according to convencional machinegun training practices, could be
expected to significantly improve performance.
Thus, a rnsearch plan with limited objectives was developed to evaluate
the effectiteness of modifications to the 14-hour familiarization POI (Infantry
OSUT POI, 1979).
This appeared to be an appropriate approach to solving the
immediate problem with familiarization, since Infantry OSUT eventually was to
include M60 machinegun qualification standards duri!-g an expanded 28-hour POI
(Infantry OSUT POI, 1981).
The expansion proposed was to speculative to begin
components tcsting.
Soldiers randomly selected from the existing 14-hour
familiarization POX were to serve as baseline cases.
Following baseline data

29

collection, soldiers selected randomly from the modified training program

would provide experimental performance data. Four major modifications, which
were not part of the 14-hour POI, were initiated based on observation of other
current training programs, historical programs, and established fundamentals
of machinegun marksmanship:
1.

Marksmanship fundamentals - An introductory bleacher presentation was

developed that included instruction in proper holding, grip, and
firing positions; illustrations of proper sight alignment and picture;
improved mil-angle instruction for understanding the sight adjustments process; field zeroing information for the M60 machinegun; and
a demonstration of fire adjustment techniques.

2.

Assistant Gunner Duties - The assistant gunner was instructed

to aid the gunner in sensing round impact and adjusting subsequent
Trainers were instructed to check
fire to correct for errors.

assistant gunners in the performance of these tasks.

3.

Pre-zeroed machineguns - Instructors fired and zeroed all M60 machineguns before soldiers arrived, in order to establish an approximate
500-meter battlesight zero. Time was not available in the POI to
include individual zeroing.

4.

Instructor duties - Trainers were instructed to act not only as

safety personnel on the firing line, but as coaches to assist the

gunner and assistant gunner in accurate fire adjustment.

In particular,

trainers were instructed to enforce appropriate sight adjustments and

the use of marksmanship fundamentals during firing.

Method. Three training effectiveness measures were used in the present
evaluation. First, firing performance data were collected from 30 scoreable
E-type silhouette targets constructed in one firing lane of a machinegun
transition firing range at Fort Benning, Georgia. Of these 30 targets, 10
were arranged in a linear formation at 300 meters, 10 were arranged in a
linear with depth format on at 450 meters, and ten were arranged in a deep
formation at 600 meters.
Figure 2 illustrates the target formations used
in collecting firing performance data.
Firing data were collected from a
random sample of 22 soldiers in a baseline control company of 127 soldiers and
from a random sample of 23 soldiers in an experimental company of 105 soldiers.
Each soldier fired 100 rounds of ammunition at the targets.
After all soldiers
in each group had fired, targets were visually inspected for the number of
hits obtoined.
Unfortunately, this restricted data collection procedure did
not permit individual performance scores to be obtained.

After baseline data collection, all 600-meter targets were moved to 700
meters, because foliage growth partially obscured the targets at 600 meters.
As a result, experimental group data are based on targets at 300, 450, and 700
meters.

30

ia
a
I

600(700)

ii

450

i bII t

3100

Range in Meters

Figure 2.

Firing Line

Target formations used in collecting firing performance data.

Second, the same 22 baseline group soldiers and 23 experimental group

soldiers were given a brief non-firing proficiency test. This test included
setting the T&E mechanism on a tripod mounted M60 machinegun and clearing the
machinegun according to a procedural checklist developed from information
outlined in FM 23-67 (1964).
Although no time limit was set for the performance of either task, both tasks required the soldier to perform from
memory.
Because the information needed to successfully accomplish each
task was presented in both the existing and modified POIs, no difference
in non-firing proficiency test performance was expected between baseline
and experimental groups.
Third, a machinegun knowledge questionnaire was administered to all 127
soldiers in the baseline company and all 105 soldiers in the experimental
company. The questionnaire was developed from information presented during
both the existing and modified POIs; however, this information was presented
in somewhat greater depth during the modified POI.
In contrast to the existing
POI, graphic training aids were introduced in the modified POI to enhance
instruction in the areas of sight picture and sight adjustment. Of the 127
31

soldiers in the baseline company, 109 completed the questionnaire (85.83%).

Of the 105 soldiers in the experimental group, 87 completed the questionnaire
(82.86%).
Data were collected during and after the third period of the Infantry
Firing performance data were collected from baseline and
OSUT POI (Table 4).
experimental group soldiers while the remainder of their respective companies
After each
participated in the period's regularly scheduled firing exercise.
baseline and experimental group soldier had fired, they were given the nonfiring proficiency test before leaving the firing line. After the conclusion
of the third period, machinegun knowledge questionnaires were administered to
each company.
Results.

Firing performance data are summarized in Table 9.

target hits ir the experimental group (X

Mean

12.43) were found to be greater

Further, it appeared
7.95).
than mean target hits in the baseline group (X
that this performance difference was largely attributable to the number of
Mean hits at 700 meters
hits obtained at the most distant target formation.
2

in the experimental group (X

6.35) exceeded mean hits at 600 meters in

the

baseline group (X - 2.64).

Table 9
A Summary of Infantry OSUT Firing Performance Data

Test
group

Average hits
per soldier

Target hits
per group

Target
range (m)

300

48

2.18

450

69

3.13

600

58

2.64

175

7.95

300

78

3.39

450

62

2.69

700

146

6.35

286

12.43

Baseline
(N - 22)

Experimental
23)
(N

32

NIX

Results of the non-firing proficiency test are summarized in Table 10,

while the checklist used to score performance on this measure is presented
in Appendix A. As expected, little
difference in performance was found
However, the overall
between baseline and experimental group soldiers.
performance of the experimental group slightly exceeded that of the baseline

group. Of the 22 soldiers in the baseline group, 9 correctly performed

both test items (40.91%).
Of the 23 experimental group soldiers, 11 correctly
performed both items (47.83%).
.

Table 10
Results of the Non-Firing Proficiency Test

Test
item
1.

Set T&E to read

Group

Number of
soldiers

Number
passing

Percentage
passing

Baseline

22

13

59.09%

Experimental

23

15

65.22%

Baseline

22

13

59.09Z

Experimental

23

14

60.87%

Right 100,

Elevation +50/15
2. Clear the M60
machinegun in
9 steps

Note:

Of those who failed the first test item, 2 baseline soldiers and 3
experimental soldiers were not present for training in the period
during which this information was presented.

Results of the machinegun knowledge questionnaire are summarized in Table

11, while correct answers to each questionnaire item are presented in Appendix
A. Two findings are worthy of note.
First, items 3 and 6 appeared to be
most difficult for soldiers in both groups, although a somewhat greater
Second,
percentage of soldiers in the experimental group responded correctly.
the greatest performance difference between groups was found on item 7, which
dealt with sight picture.
Over 93% of soldiers in the experimental group
correctly identified the sight picture for the M60 machinegun, while only 64%
of soldiers in the baseline group did so.
Baseline group performance was
unexpectedly higher than experimental group performance in several areas,
particularly items 5 and 8.

33

Discussion.
There are several factors that could have contributed to the
Since the greatest performance
observed differences in firing performance.
difference was found at the most distant target range, perhaps the deep target
Because the deep
formation used at this distance was a contributing factor.
formation is the only one of the three formations used that enables multiple
hits to be obtained with single rounds (see Figure 2), it is possible that the
However, the experiperformance of the experimental group was exaggerated.
mental group did fire at the deep formation from a greater range (700m) than
the baseline group (600m).
It

is

also possible that characteristics of the modified training program

accounted for the observed firing performance differences between experimental

and baseline groups. Unfortunately, the limited research design used in the
evaluation permitted only a global comparison of the existing and modified
training programs to be made. Nevertheless, the following four characteristics
of the modified program were thought to be the most influential in explaining

the higher firing performance of the experimental group:

1. Machineguns were pre-zeroed at a known distance of 500 meters.
2.

Assistant gunners were observed to have actively aided gunners in

sensing and adjusting fire.

3.

More appropriate holding and firing techniques for use with the bipod
were introduced.

4.

Instruction in

the area of aiming was given greater emphasis.

Only a research design with greater experimental control would enable the
Further, it
relative contributions of these four factors to be estimated.
should be noted that instruction provided to the baseline group was not
Since trainers were aware of
entirely typical of earlier machinegun training.
proposed program modifications prior to baseline data collection, it is
In fact,
possible that they made individual efforts to improve instruction.
assistant instructors on the firing line appeared to offer more responsive
assistance to gunners in the baseline company than they had in previous
observations of training.
Because the non-firing proficiency test examined training provided in
both the existing and modified programs, the similar performance of the
Yet, 59% of
baseline and experimental groups on this measure was expected.
the baseline group and 52% of the experimental group failed at least one of
the two test items.
These results clearly indicate that sufficient practice
and reinforcement time to master clearing and T&E procedures is not available
in a 14-hour familiarization program.
Results of the machinegun knowledge questionnaire highlight those areas
For
of training in which soldier comprehension was lacking (see Table 11).
example, most soldiers were unable to explain the the concept of a mil or to
H1owever, the introname the eight major components of an M60 machinegun.
duction of graphic training aids in the modified program appeared to have
contributed to the experimental company's better comprehension of sight
34

k,

Net-,%ex

Table 11
Results of the Machinegun Knowledge Questionnaire

Baseline (N - 109)
Number
Percentage
Correct
Correct

Item

1.

How many mils are there

Experimental (N - 87)
Number
Percentage
Correct
Correct

82

75.23%

60

68.97%

105

96.33%

81

93.10%

between each small line

on the traversing bar?
2.

Which edge of the

traversing bar slide
is used to set gun
direction on the bar

scale?
3.

What does "mil" mean?

3.67%

9.20%

4.

How many rounds do we

104

95.41%

83

95.40%

77

70.64%

47

54.02%

4.59%

17

19.54%

fire in a burst?
5.

If
is

the traversing slide

left of 0, we read

scale:

6.

left or right?

Nsme the 8 Cajor M60

components.

7.

Identify the sight

picture for the M60.

70

64.22%

81

93.10%

8.

Which picture shows the

correct hand pressure to
apply to the bipod gun?

75

68.81%

46

52.87%

0f the 8 mijor M60 components,

42 soldiers in the baseline group (38.53%)

and 74 soldiers in the experimental group (85.06%)

more compoaents.

35

correctly named 4 or

picture (item 7).

Although comprehension differences between companies
were not expected on most questionnaire items, baseline company performance
noticeably exceeded experimental company performance on two items (items 5
and 8).
This may have been partially influenced by the fact that the administration of questionnaires to the experimental company was hurried, due to the
requirements of their training schedule.

In summary, the results of the three measures of training effectiveness

used in the present evaluation would appear to suggest that the performance of
soldiers in the experimental group slightly exceeded the performance of
soldiers in the baseline group.
While the magnitude and practical significance of this performance difference are debatable, implementation of the
modified training program would appear desirable because no additional
resources would be required.
Recommendations and Utilization.

In an ARI letter reporting training

effectiveness analysis results to the USAIS, it was recommended that the

modified 14-hour M60 POI be implemented within Infantry OSUT. It was also
recommended that initial firing be conducted on a 10-meter firing range, where
corrective feedback on performance can be obtained. These recommendations
were accepted by the USAIS, and 10-meter firing points were later constructed
on an existing machinegun range. However, it was recognized by ARI and USAIS
personnel that the modified program would only serve until the availability of
greater resources allowed a more extensive program to be implemented.
A 28-hour POI that included M60 machinegun qualification was implemented
in May of 1982 (Infantry OSUT POI, 1981).
In comparison to the modified
14-hour POI, it required 42 additional instructors and 336 additional rounds
of ammunition per soldier. Unfortunately, the greater resource expenditures
in the 28-hour POI could not be maintained and the program was discontinued
after approximately three months of operation.
Replacing the 28-hour quali-

fication prozram was a 17-hour familiarization program. The familiarization

program is similar to the modified 14-hour POI, although it does include a
recommended initial firing exercise at 10 meters. A summary of this 17-hour
program is presented in Table 12.
Plans once again exist to implement a M60 machinegun qualification
program within the Infantry OSUT POI in

fiscal year 1984 at Fort Benning,

Georgia. The USAIS anticipates that sufficient additional ammunition and

instructor personnel will be available at that time to support an expanded
training program.

Once such a program has been implemented and firmly

established, it is recommended that a more elaborate training effectiveness

investigation then be conducted to evaluate the program's contribution to
soldier performance.
Unit Machinegun Training Research Needs
It appears that the current relationship between IET and unit machinegun
training programs needs further classification. Specifically, it is recommended that an examination be made of the degree to which lET machinegun
36

Table 12
Infantry OSUT 17-Hour M60 Machinegun Program

Rounds of
Hours

Subject

ammunition

Mechanical training and maintenance

3.0

Tripod and T&E manipulation

1.5

Range card and predetermined fire preparation

2.0

Preparatory marksmanship training

2.0

Firing exercise on a 10-meter range

4.5

108

Bipod firing exercise on a transition range

4.0

138

17.0

246

Totals

Note:

Firing exercises are based on firing tables in Field Manual 23-67

(1964).
Concurrent training is provided in the areas of maintenance,
firing positions, range card preparation, and .50 caliber (M2) machinegun orientation.

training prepares soldiers to perform those machinegun tasks listed in Field

Manual 21-2 (1982) and those in Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs)

for Infantry battalions.

Such an examination should also consider the role

of the SAW.
While the SAW is expected to be employed by squad automatic
riflemen, its capabilities could allow it to augment the role of platoon

and company machineguns.

While the present report does not address doctrinal

issues pertaining to the role of various automatic weapons in Infantry ARTEP

missions, future efforts must do so to insure that units train and employ

automatic weapons fire most effectively.

,

Squad Automatic Weapon

Background
Presently, the U.S. Army is moving quickly to field the SAW to replace
the M16A1 rifles carried by the two members of the infantry rifle squad
designated as automatic riflemen. The SAW project began in 1971 with a
37

xwv~v

.xfn1X,

materiel need document accepted later by the Department of the Army in 1973
(Niewenhous, 1982).
Developmental testing of candidate weapons began in 1974
In
at the U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground asid continued through the 1970s.
May of 1980, the XM249 in 5.56mm was selected as the SAW.
At the same time,
the Belgian SS109 ball and Li10 tracer cartridges (later designated XM855/XM856)
were selected for use in the weapon instead of the standard M193/M196 ball
and tracer combination.
This decision was based on acceptance of these
cartridges as standard second caliber by XATO small arms trials in 1978 and
1979 (Niewenhous, 1982).
In short, the U.S. Army is expected to have a weapon
to support the squad with automatic fire in 1984. Additional applications for
the SAW are under consideration as well.
In some cases, the SAW might reasonably be expected to serve as a replacement for the M60 machinegun. Many of
the potential employment possibilities for the SAW are currently being investigated by tactics and doctrine developers and are beyond the scope of this
report. Consideration .o replace the M60 with the SAW in some applications is
partly based on three factors:
1.

Implementation of the SAW could provide compatibility of ammunition

(5.56mm) for weapons within the squad, while enhancing firepower.

2.

The SAW can perform many of the same missions currently given to the
M60 general purpose machinegun.

3.

A large number of M60 machineguns are becoming old and worn and
must be replaced soon.

The first
factor, ammunition compatibility, assumes acceptance of the
M16A2 as the standard rifle using XM855/XM856 ammunition.
It is difficult
to clearly determine the answers to questions which might be raised from
the second factor until sufficient SAWs are available to test them against the
M60 general purpose machinegun under tactical conditions.
The last factor is
supported primarily from observations made and from the results of discussions
with FORSCOM units, Infantry OSUT instructors, and weapons inspectors.
Nevertheless, training programs must be developed to train soldiers with the

SAW as effective automatic riflemen.

performance capabilities,

in

Further, a comparison of M60 and SAW

light of mission requirements for these weapons,

may contribute to decisions regarding appropriate places for substitution.

Weapon Performance Comparisons
Developmental and operational testing provides some data that can be

useful in preparing realistic training objectives which meet the capabilities

of both the weapons and the soldiers being trained. Since there is some
question regarding the extent of future SAW employment, particularly with
regard to opportunities to substitute it for the M60 machinegun, it may
be appropriate to use the M60 as a basis for comparison (Devan, 1983).
Reports of previous testing are available to aid in determining comparative
performance under controlled conditions.
At the present time there is only
limited test data available concerning the performance capabilities of the
selected SAW (XM249).
In large part, SAW data reported herein have come from

38

4.

11

Developaental Test II (Niewenhous,

1982) and from brief opportunities to fire

the SAW at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Areas where additional test firing would be
helpful in developing training program components are noted.
Both the M60 and the SAW fire from the open bolt position.
Table 13
provides a comparison of other general characteristics of the two weapons.

Using a 200round box magazine, the SAW can be reloaded in 12 seconds.

Testing needs to be conducted to determine the comparative loading time for
both weapons when linked ammunition belts are used. It should be noted that
SAW test personnel had approximately 150 practice trials before these test
times were established (Niewenhous, 1982). Training standards for hot barrel
changing and magazine changing need not be set to match these test results.
Testing with initial entry soldiers, given limited practice, might enable more
realistic standards to be established.
Accuracy.

A large amount of SAW firing performance data remains to be

collected under field firing conditions with the Uipod mount. The SAW meets
established standard deviation limitations for diapersion at 600 meters using
a proof barrel (Niewenhoas, 1982). When used by skilled gunners, the M60 has
proven accuracy to ranges in cxcet~s of one kilomEter. Additional field
performance measures for bipod and tripod mounted SAWS and H60s are needed tcompare the two weapons iind to d'-elop training program compunents.
Opportunities to test fire SAWs have provided some of the necessary firing

data to support POI preparation (Lucker, 1982).

During 1982 and 1983, two

demonstration SAWs were available for limited firing at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Using skilled machinegun firers, data were collected unecr largely informal
testing conditions.

Due to their tentative nature,

these data have not been

reported in the body of the present report. However, a plan has been developed
to test fire a sample of production quality SAWs in 1983 and 1984. Additional
information concerning the comparative accuracy of the H60 and SAW is
in a later section of this report (see Table 15).

presented

Burst Size.
One of the factors measured in an extensive small arms
suppression study was burst size (Combat Developments Experimentation Command,
1976),
It was found that burst size had little
affect on suppression, but
intervals between bursts did.
Other studies and tests have been conducted to
determine the optimum burst size of both automatic rifles and general purpose
machineguns.
In a service test conducted by the U.S. Army Itnfantry Board,
optimum burst sizes differed somewhat between machinegun and automatic rifles
(Roberts et al., 1965).
Burst sizes in excess of three rounds were relatively
ineffective, even with bipod mounts, using automatic rifles (5.56mm to 7.62mm)
and carbines.
Further, it was found that H60 machinegun bursts of six rounds
provided optimum effectiveness.
Though there was not a significant difference
in hit capability between machinegun burst of three and six rounds, the
highest combination of hit capability, hit probability, and percentage of
actual hits was obtained with six-round bursts (Roberts et al., 1965).
Larger
bursts, 10 or 15 rounds, did not provide corresponding increases in target
coverage.
Suppression.
Suppressive fire training methods have been developed and
included in Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (ARM) training for light weapons

infantrymen (Evans & Osborne, 1983; Evans & Schendel, 1982).

A scaled

39

~N

Table 13
A Comparison of M60 Machinegun and SAW Characteristics

Item

SAW

M60 Machinegun
24.01 lbs. (10.94 kg)

15.7 lbs. ( 7.12 kg)

22.2 lbs. (10.07 kg)
with 200 round magazine

Rate of Fire:
Sustained Fire
Cyclic

100 rounds per minute7

550 rounds per minute

85 rounds per Atinute

850-900 rounds per minute
1100 rounds per minute possible

Caliber

7.62mm

5.56mm

Sight Radius
(distance
between
sights)

21.3 in.

Test Gun Average

Trigger Pull

11.33 lbs. (5.14 kg)

11.91 lbs. (5.4 kg)

Overall Length

43.5 in. (110.5 cm)

40435 in.

Weight (without
tripod)

(54.1 cm)

7 This

19.29 in.

(49.0 cm)

(103 cm)

is the cyclic rate of fire reported in Field Manual 23-67 (1964).

A tested rate 600 rounds per minute has also been reported (Keele, 1966).

40

landscape target (Appendix B) is used on a 25-meter range to suppress hidden

This type of
targets with rapid semi-automatic rifle fire (Appendix B).
training could also be developed for the SAW.
To be effective, suppressive fire must be accurate; that is, it is not
indiscriminate firing in the general direction of a selected target. A study
of small arms suppression, conducted by the U.S. Army Combat Developments
Experimentation Command (CDEC, 1976), defined suppression as the temporary
degradation in the quality of performance of an individual due to avoidance of
in the
Though a SAW was not tested, an M16AI riflr
a perceived threat.
Major
automatic mode represented suppressive fire by a light caliber weapon.
findings of the CDEC (1976) investigation included the following:
1.

The M2 (.50 caliber) machinegun was 1jund to be more suppressive than

the M60 (7.62mm) machinegun, which in turn was found to be more
suppressive than the MH6Al rifle (5.56mm).

2.

or no effect on suppressive
The number of rounds per burst had little
Suppressive fire
quality, but the intervals between bursts did.
to be most
appeared
intervals
at
short
bursts
delivered in small
efficient.

3.

The degree of suppression could be aoproximated by a natural logarithm

Wdeapon type, rate of fire, and class of fire
of the miss distance.
were contributing factors to the slhap of the logarithmic curves.

4.

Random disrribution of fire in a target area was more effective than

systematic patterned fire.

5.

Closer range fire was more suppressive than fire delivered from
greater distance.

The suggested approach to suppressive fire delivery based on results of

this experlmentattPni involves an initial heavy volume of fire and a lower
Figure 3 presaents
subsequent volume delivered in an unpredictable pattern.
overall predicted suppression performance curves under comparable conditions
h-ase retults may nave implitations for SAW suppression
('.EC, 1976).
To maximize
effects sOnce the SAW, like the M16AI rifle, Is a 5.56mm weapon.
suppression, accurncy and firing techniques should be critical training
These data sggest that eploying the SAW as a general purpose
considerations.
machinegun may require greater 4ccuracy at equivalett ranges to reduce mist
However, SAW research in the area of
distance and gain maximum suppression.
suppression is needed.
Firing Performance.
There appear to be three primary methods of SAW
First, the SAW can be fired from bipod supported positiona.
employment.
Second. the SAh can be fired from tripod supported fixed positions. using a
However, this metthod of employment is not expected to be used.
T&E mechanism.
Finally, the SAU can be fired from unsupported positions in an assault mode.
Upforrvnately, assault fire has not been a part of machinegun training in a
autmber of years.

41

Test results of M60 machinegun

Board service test are presented in
data are not available for the SAW,
better performance since the 5.56mm

firing from assault positions.

assault fire during a U.S. Army Infantry

Similar
Table 14 (Roberts et al., 1965).
though it is reasonable to expect equal or
weapon produces less recoil in burst

A further advantage of the SAW is that it can

100

90

80

S70
60

50 S40
SM60

S30

20 M16
10 -

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Miss Distance (meters)

Figure 3.

Suppression efftctiveness of three weapons using a random fire

distribution of short bursts in four-second intervals.

42

be fired either right or left handed.

While the results presented in Table 14
do not represent the most accurate fire available from either the M60 machinegun or the SAW, assault firing should be included in a SAW training program.
The SAW has been informally test fired in the assault mode; however, an
investigation under controlled conditions has yet to be performed.
Firing data are available for both the M60 and SAW when mounted in a
rigid test stand.
Under such conditions, established production acceptance
standards (Military Specification MIL-M-45013C, 1964) require that M60
machineguns place nine rounds :f a 10-round burst withiu a three-inch (7.62
cm) circle at 1000 inches (25.4 m).
In an engineering endurance test of SAW
barrels, Niewenhous (1982) found that the mean extreme spread for rounds fired
through new barrels was 39.46 centimeters at 100 meters.
The mean extreme
spread for worn barrels (X - 12,800 rounds per barrel) was 76.34 centimeters
at 100 meters.
In contrast, M60 production acceptance standards permit a
spread of 10.8 inches (27.44 cm) at 100 yards (91.44 m).
With regard to bipod mounted weapons, firing data have been obtained
for both the SAW (Niewenhous, 1982) and M60 machinegun (Wilson, 1966).
These
data, a summary of which is presented in Table 15, are based on bursts of ten
rounds each fired by experienced shooters. At all ranges tested, the M60
machinegun appeared to have greater relative accuracy than the SAW.
However,
it should be noted that SAW firing performance tests with weapons and ammunition of production quality have yet to be performed.

Table 14
Assault Fire Accuracy with the M60 Machingun

Firing position

Shoulder

Underarm

Hip

Burst size
in rounds

Extreme spread in inches

50 meters
100 meters

99.7

131.9

108.3

156.7

.91.5

142.9

93.R

161.0

76.0

135.6

76.6

149.4

43

Table 15
A Performance Comparison of the M60 Machingun and SAW
Using Bipod Mounted Weapons

Range (m)

M60 machinegun
Extreme
Mean
spread (cm)
radius (cm)

SAW8
Extreme
spread (cm)

Mean
radius (cm)

300

120.40

32.77

158.43

56.87

600

232.21

62.21

381.51

134.93

800

353.79

102.66

361.17

125.61

SAW firing was conducted using SS1O9 ammunition from Lot 0O-FNB-81.

The performance of production ammunition may differ.

Operator Tasks.
Many of the standards developed for SAW operator tasks
are based on similar standards established for the M60 machinegun (Niewenhous,
1982).
For example, a bipod mounted M60 requires 10.2 seconds for a hot
barrel change if a gunner is wearing an asbestos glove and 8.5 seconds without
the glove (Roberts et al., 1965).
During a SAW developmental test, a standard
of 5.0 seconds for a barrel change without a glove was initially established.
Test soldiers were .ubsequently able to meet this standard after considerable
practice (Niewenhous, 1982).
Further, it appears that the SAW can be supported
by U.S. Army logistics and maintenance networks, as well as by individual
gunners, at a level equivalent to that of the M60 machinegun (Keele, 1966;
Niewenhous, 1982; Wilson, 1966).
The complexity of SAW operator maintenance tasks is expected to be less than or equal to that of the M60 machinegun tasks (Niewenhous, 1982).

Training Development
Implementation.
The SAW individual and collective training plan currently
under consideration by the SAW proponent, the USAIS, proposes institutional
44

familiarization training for infantrymen with qualification being conducted in

the unit (United States Army Infantry School, 1983).
Other personnel are expected to receive only familiarization training in
order to have the ability to place the SAW into operation and to apply basic
marksmanship skills.
Training tasks have not been defined completely, nor
A
have associated standards and conditions of performance been established.
preliminary, but relatively comprehensive, USAIS SAW training task list
is
presented in Table 16.
Evaluation and Training Issues.
The list
of training tasks presented in
or validation of
establishment
require
the
Table 16 indicates that many
Field firing tests to establish
appropriate standards and training conditions.
performance standards for initial entry soldiers have not been conducted by
the USAIS because production weapons have not been available.
It is anticipated that weapons will be available and test firing will begin in 1983.
Ammunition (XM855/XM856) to be used in the SAW and in the M16A2 rifle may not
However, performance tests
be available in useful quantities at the same time.

indicate that the use of M193 ball ammunition will not substantially alter SAW
firing performance out to ranges of 600 meters (Lucker, 1982; Niewenhous, 1982).
Figure 4 illustrates that the ballistic difference between M193 and
XM855/856 ammunition does not exceed one mil of elevation until rounds reach
600 meters.
One mil, or milliradian, is the angular measurement equivalent to
one meter, or the height of an E-type silhouette target at 1000 meters.
The
impact dispersion of the bipod mounted SAW should allow comparable training to
be conducted with either M193 or XM855/856 ammunition to ranges of 600 meters.
Table 17 presents trajectory data for the three rounds expected to be used
during SAW training in the near future.
To date, MI6AI rifle marksmanship
training has not focused on engaging targets beyond 300 meters. One purpose
in acquiring the SAW is to extend both the range and volume of accurate fire
that can be delivered by squads in combat.
Even if the maximum range for
squad targets is extended, the comparability of M193 and '0(855/856 ammunition

should permit consistency in training procedures to be maintained to at least

600 meters.
Past research has shown that the development of an appropriate zeroing
procedure for the SAW must be a primary topic of future research (Smith,
Thompson, Evans, Osborne, Maxey, & Morey, 1980).
Based upon trajectory data
obtained from such research, a battlesight zeroing distance should be established which maximizes hit probability for high priority targets throughout
the expected range of employment.
In order to maximize hit probability, the

zero trajectory curve should closely follow the weapon's line of sight for the
greatest possible distance.
Once a battlesight zeroing distance and its
associated trajectory curve have been selected, a procedure must be developed

to obtain an approximate zero at a reduced range (e.g.,

45

.4 - ,
I

.i

i i

i i i

~.I ~

i i ,

i i

10 or 25 meters).

Table 16
SAW Training Tasks
Status of standards
and conditions

Training task

Training environment

Perform operator maintenance on SAW and ammunition

Established and use

will validate

Institution/unit

Load, reduce stoppage,

and clear SAW

Established and use

will validate

Institution/unit

Prepare a range card 9

Identical to M60

Unit, if at all

machinegun

appropriate

Zero the SAW at 10 meters

To be established

Institution/unit

Qualify with the SAW

To be established

Unit

Field zero the SAW

Research will validate

proposed standards

Institution/unit

Zero the AN/PVS-4 to the

SAW at 25 meters

To be established

Unit

Place into operation the

AN/PVS-4 and SAW

To be established

Institution/unit

Mount/dismount an
AN/PVS-4 to the SAW

Established, but
included in other tasks

InstLitution/unit

Lay the SAW using field

expedients

Established and
complete

Institution/unit

Fire the SAW for

familiarization

Established and use

will validate

Institution/unit

Perform assault fire

techniques

To be established

Institution/unit

Fire the SAW while wearing

protective gear

To be established

Unit

9 Since

the SAW is not expected to be employed in the tripod mode, preparation

of a sector sketch should be taught in lieu of preparation of a range card.

46

~~~~~~

11 11tNll

l ii

100

908070-

M193

60o50

M855

4JM856

>

440

30
20
10

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

Range in meters

Figure 4.

A ballistic comparison of M193 and XM855/XM856 ammunition.

47

..........

Table 17
0
Maximum Ordinate of Trajectory to a Range of 300 Meters1

Range

Maximum ordinate
Projectile type

(millimeters)

(meters)

Velocity
(meters per second)

M193

195

169.5

743.3

XM855

189

159.7

763.3

XM856

207

159.7

727.4

10 Reprinted

from Niewenhous (1982,

p. 68).

Previous testing revealed that the barrel of the MI6A1 rifle could be
easily distorted by varying pressure applied forward of the receiver (Osborne,
Morey, & Smith, 1980). When compared with normal firings from sandbag support,
use of a hasty sling caused bullets to strike lower and use of a bipod caused
higher shote. In fact, the difference in bullet strike between these sources
of barrel stress was as much as two to four feet at 300 meters. Developmental
testing has indicated that similar differences may be expected with the SAW in
the bipod mode of employment (Niewenhous, 1982). Training development efforts
must address this potential problem and attempt to provide solutions for both
instructors and gunners.
Experience with the M60 machinegun, which has two barrels designed to be
exchanged during the employment of the weapon to maintain a relatively cool
barrel, has shown that changing a barrel can change the zero of the weapon by
as many as 15 clicks (4 mils) of elevation and 4 clicks (1 mil) of windage
(Roberts et al., 1965).
Zero changes are also expected with the SAW, because
the front sight is part of the barrel assembly in both the M60 and SAW.
The
USMC currently plans to employ the SAW with a second barrel available for
changing.
There is some doubt presently, though established policy has been
difficult to determine, that the U.S. Army will employ the SAW with two
barrels.
If it does, the zero of the weapon can be expected to differ with a
barrel change.
If the SAW is employed as a light or general purpose machinegun
in the future, this consideration might prove critical to the effectiveness of
predetermined or suppressive fire under conditions of limited visibility.
The squad automatic weapon is intended to replace the two M16Al rifles in
a squad used by automatic riflemen. These rifles are not crew-served weapons,
nor is the SAW expected to be used as a crew-served weapon.
No plans exist
48

"AY

for procuring tripods and T&E mechanisms for the SAW so it could be employed
Early testing of the SAW has indicated that gunners
as a light machinegun.
have difficulty sensing the impact of rounds, particularly at ranges less than
300 meters.
This is due to a relatively flat trajectory and to the difficulty
Other difficulties
of sensing the impact of 5.56mm bullets at any range.
include the sensing of tracer rounds, both day and night, at shorter ranges

It was discovered during informal field testing of

(Niewenhous, 1980).
bipod mounted SAWs that personnel relatively close to the gunner, however,
Current
could sense bullet impact and the trajectory of tracer rounds.
M60 machinegun doctrine and training emphasizes the use of an assistant

gunner, who is adjacent to the M60 machinegun to help the gunner sense the
The SAW gunner may have
impact of fire and make appropriate adjustments.
to rely on adjacent riflemen for feedback, or learn to identify impact
indications in the target area more effectively.

Conclusion and Recommendations

A number of statements can be made about M60 machinegun and proposed

SAW training in general.
First, the lack of adequate training resources will
Yet, a goal should be to
decrease the effectiveness of any training program.
use available time and ammunition in a way that realizes the greatest possible
For example, sound training can be conducted with limited
training benefit.
ammunition by emphasizing preparatory marksmanship training, controlled
semi-automatic firing, and accurate burst firing. Firing an unlimited number
of rounds in an environment with limited performance feedback is a recipe for
ineffective training.
The least critical element in acquiring machinegun
skills is experiencing extensive automatic fire.
Second, improved instructor training is perhaps the greatest need in
current weapons training programs.
Because the U.S. Army does not provide
instructors with a formal training program, they are forced to learn instructional skills on the job. A comparison of U.S. Army and USMC weapons
instructors leads one to the conclusion that on-the-job training is not an
Although an instieffective method to produce highly qualified trainers.
tutional program for trainers is ideal, perhaps the development of written,
and audiovisual materials could improve current weapons instructor training
somewhat.

M60 Machinegun Training

Maintenance of M60 machineguns has been problematic and should be
When soldiers experience an
Many machineguns are simply old.
improved.
excessive number of weapon malfunctions, it becomes difficult for them to
gain confidence in their equipment.
Operator serviceability checks must be
conducted correctly, followed by the removal of unserviceable weapons from the
inventory.
Considering the aged condition of many M60 machineguns and the
introduction of the SAW, it is tempting to conclude that old M60s simply
However, this was never the intent of the
could be replaced with new SAWs.
SAW development program and it is not recommended, unless specific mission
requirements previously met with the M60 can also be met with the SAW.
49

Perhaps a preferable alternative would be to evaluate the lightweight

version of the M60 as a candidate for replacing unserviceable standard M6Os.

Developed originally for the U.S. Navy, the lightweight M60 is approximately
4.5 pounds lighter than the standard M60 and it

can be fired with either hand.

Further, it appears to be a potential product improvement that should be

investigated completely before accepting the substitution of the SAW for the
M60.
With regard to M60 machinegun training, a comprehensive OSUT program
including qualification is obviously preferable to a program of familiarization.
It is erroneous to believe that infantry units can conduct effective machinegun
qualification programs, given the fact that it has not been possible at the

initial entry level in recent years. Machinegun qualification denotes that a

soldier has met minimum standards set for the performance of individual
machinegun skills. Unit training should logically address collective skills,
as well as the maintenance of individual skills. If individual skills cannot
be acquired at the initial entry level, the unit training mission will be
difficult indeed. Thus, it is imperative that a comprehensive M60 qualification program be made a part of Infantry OSUT as soon as possible.
SAW Training
Significant work remains to be accomplished in developing an effective
SAW training program, for either familiarization in basic training or quali-

fication in Infantry OSUT. Complete program development and validation will

require time, though early indications reveal that the SAW can be used on
available rifle and machinegun ranges with little modification. Program
elements which still require testing and clarification include:
1. techniques and standards for assault fire
2.

bipod employment procedures at ranges beyond 500 meters

3.

an appropriate method of zeroing

4.

performance limitations resulting from difficulty in sensing bullet

impact

5.

qualification course of fire and standards

6.

effectiveness of suppression

Some SAW implementation issues have been resolved. First, SAW operator
maintenance training will be highly similar to M60 machinegun operator maintenance training.
Although
the SAW as easy to assemble
the SAW development program
existing M193 ammunition in

the two weapons are different, the need to make

and disassemble as the M60 was addressed early in
(Niewenhous, 1980).
Second, the performance of
the SAW is roughly equivalent to the new XM855/856

ammunition out to 600 meters.

A

Thus, comparable training can be performed with

either type of ammunition to this range.

However, XM855/856 is not equivalent
to M193 ammunition in the Ml6Al rifle and such use should be avoided.

50

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53

4'

............

na.

.~

'~

*-*

*..

...

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'I
.,

4i

.,a

APPENDIX A
M60 MACHINEGUN PERFORMANCE TEST

This portion of the special questionnaire will be completed by a qualified

instructor while the student performs the assigned tasks.

1.

The instructor will say the following to the student who has been provided
a tripod mounted M60 machinegun.
The T & E and traversing slide should be
set at 0 / 0 to begin this portion of the test.
"Set the traversing bar slide and the T & E mechanism to read:
Right 100,

Did he do it

2.

Elevation +50 / 15"

correctly?

(circle one)

Yes

No

The instructor should check the number of steps performed correctly in

this exercise and STOP when the student performs one out of sequence, or
improperly.
"Clear the M60 machinegun."
(1)

Places the safety on FIRE.

(2)

Cock& the machinegun.

(3)

Places the safety on SAYE.

(4)

Raises the cover and inapects the tray for any ammunition or
links.

(5)

Raisks the tray and inspects the chamber and receiver to insure
that ao round iR pto'snt.

(6)_

Clo.-es and locks Lhe cover,

(7)

Places the safety on FIRSE

(8)

Pulls the cocking handle to the re4r, then pulls the trigger and
manually cases the bolt forward with the cocking handle.

(9)

Places the safety on SAFE.

A-1

*,,,"

,,-% .1... ..

),'*

*****.*,

M60 MACHiNEGUN QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questions are designed to help us improve training by

finding out what you know about the M60 machinegun.
You were given much more
instruction than we are asking about here.
While this questionnaire is short,
it is important that you do your best to answer the questions so that training
improvements can be made.
Read the questions carefully, or listen to the
instructors when you should, and answer them as best you can.

1.

How many mils are there between each SMALL line on the traversing bar?
1

(circle one)

2.

3.

10

Which edge of the traversing bar slide is

used to set gun direction on

the bar scale?

right

(circle one)

What does "mil" mean to you?

left

(explain briefly)

(milliradian) angle of

measurement from the weapon which eqaals one meter at 1000 meters.

4.

How many rounds do we fire in a burst?

5.

If

the traversing slide is

the scale as

right

6-9

on the left side of the 0 on the bar, we read

(circle one)

GENERAL DISASSMHBLY

left

right

Look at the picture.

Write the name of cachi

major group or a-ssembly
after the- number that
identifies it.

-. Bautfr

3.Bolt assembly.

~~ a

_operatingrod
&
group.

r.

an

4.Trgaertiehang adr
Wo:l.,-f

=-

,...6

Sl....

ver tray 4 hner

~ ~8.ecelver.

A-3

*J

grou.Tp.u.

.....

ip

11

aiming
point

Identify the correct sight picture for the M60 machinegun.

__...._correct
....

..

..

..

hand

pressure

using bipod

Which picture shows the correct hand pressure a gunner should apply when firing
a bipod supported M60 machinegun?

D
A-4

APPENDIX B

25 Meter Scaled Landscape Suppression Fire Target*

5MSALED LANDSCAPE.

JPPRESSWV

FVIE TARGET

*The actual size of this target is approximately 3 feet high by 6 feet long.

071686