Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R. No.

124699
July 31, 2003
FACTS:
The respondents in this case were the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez Sr.,
who purchased an unregistered parcel of land located in Cebu from
FelicianaSantillan (seller). The land was possessed by decedent who had
also paidtaxes thereon. The heirs subsequently inherited the
land. However, asugar company, Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. was able to
obtain title to Lot No. 954, the narrow lot where the railroad tracks
(existent even prior tothe sale to decedent) lay. The lot was likewise
declared for tax purposesunder the name of the company.The heirs filed a
complaint for Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of the lot
claiming that Bomedco was granted by the seller of the lot a railroad right
of way for a period of 30 years which had expiredsometime in 1959 but
that the heirs allowed Bomedco to continue usingthe land because one of
them was then an employee of the company.Bomedco, on the other hand,
claimed that it was the owner and possessor of the registered lot when it
bought the lot from seller in 1929 and that theheirs were already barred
by prescription and laches because of
Bomedcos open and continuous possession of the property for more than
50 years.The trial court rejected the evidence presented by Bomedco (as it
wasonly a Xerox copy of an unsigned deed of Sale) but ruled that
Bomedcohad already acquired ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription because it possessed the property in good faith for
more than10 years. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals which ruled
thatBomedco only acquired an easement of right of way by unopposed
andcontinuous use of the land, but not ownership.
ISSUE:
1) whether Bomedco had indeed acquired ownership of the land through
extraordinary acquisitive prescription?
2) Whether easement was continuous and thus Bomedco had acquired
title over the use of the land?
RATIO/HELD:
1. No. Bomedco only had a right of easement over the land as shown by
tax receipts wherein it declared, for several years, the property to be a
central railroad right of way or sugar railroad right of way when it could
have declared it to be industrial land as it did for the years 1975
and 1985. Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these receipts
showed that all petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of
waygranted to it. X x x A person cannot have an easement on his own
land, since all of the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his
generalright of ownership.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal
immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has torefrain
from doing, or must allow someone to do something on his property, for

the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only when the servient and
dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the
easement an incorporeal interest onthe land but grants no title thereto.
Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the
property belongs to another.
Having held the property by virtue of an easement, Bomedco cannot now
assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an
owner. Neither can it declare that the 30- year period of
extraordinary prescription started from that year.Moreover, the mere
expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners
possession into an adverse one. Mere material
possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and
isinsufficient to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the
intent to possess as an owner.
2. An easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant withoutthe
intervention of any act of man, like the easement of draineage andit is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like
the easement of right of way.
x x x an easement of right of way of railroad tracks
is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train
operated by a person passes over anothers property.
A party is deemed to acquire title over the use of the land if:
a) it hadsubsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the heirs
for thecontinued use of the land under the principles of voluntary
easements,or
b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a
legaleasement of right of way (see orig case for the requirements)The
point is, bomedco did not exercise any of the abovementionedoptions in
order for it to acquire title over the railroad right of way.

BICOL VS OBIAS
FACTS:

I.

Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development Corporation

(BISUDECO) was established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same
year, BISUDECO constructed a road (the disputed road) measuring
approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road
was used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from
its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its sugar
milling operations.[4]
Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. acquired the
assets of BISUDECO. On April 19, 1993, petitioner filed a
Complaint[5]against respondents Edmundo Obias, Perfecto Obias, Victor
Bagasina, Elena Benosa, Melchor Brandes, Rogelio Montero, Pedro
Montero, Claudio Resari, Pilar Galon, Antonio Buison, Prudencio Benosa,
Jr., Victor Bagasina Jr., Maria Villamer, and Roberto Padua, alleging that on
March 27, 1993 and April 3, 1993, respondents unjustifiably barricaded
the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones across
it, preventing petitioners and the other sugar planters vehicles from
passing through the disputed road, thereby causing serious damage and
prejudice to petitioner.[6]
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant
to an agreement with the owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The
agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives
of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their
properties. Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous use
of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the
properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it
when it bought BISUDECOs assets. Petitioner prayed that respondents be
permanently ordered to restrain from barricading the disputed road and
from obstructing its free passage.[7]
RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[19] ordering
respondents to desist from constructing barricades across the road.

the

CA: the owners of the servient estate in the easement of right of

way recognized in this Decision shall retain ownership of the lands affected
by the easement in accordance with Art. 630 of the Civil Code.
declared that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as
such cannot be acquired by prescription. The CA likewise affirmed the
finding of the RTC that petitioner was entitled to a compulsory easement of
right of way upon payment of proper indemnity to respondents.
ISSUE:

I.

On the Existence of an Agreement between BISUDECO

and Respondents WALA!

An easement of right of way was succinctly explained by the CA in

the following manner, to wit:
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is
established either by law (in which case it is a legal
easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement).
In terms of use, easement may either be continuous or
discontinuous. The easement of right of way the
privilege of persons or a particular class of persons
to pass over anothers land, usually through one
particular path or linen is characterized as
a discontinuous easementbecause its use is in
intervals and depends on the act of man. Because of
this character, an easement of a right of way may
only be acquired by virtue of a title.[40]
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case
at bar, viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements,
and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may
be acquired only by virtue of a title.
Based on the foregoing, in order for petitioner to acquire the
disputed road as an easement of right-of-way, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to show its right by title or by an agreement with the owners of
the lands that said road traversed.
While conceding that they have no direct evidence of the alleged
agreement, petitioner posits that they presented circumstantial
evidence
which,
if
taken
collectively,
would
prove
its
existence. Specifically, petitioner cites the following circumstances, to wit:
a.

The
agreement
was
of
public
knowledge.
Allegedly BISUDECO and respondents entered into
an agreement for the construction of the road provided
that the latter, their children or relatives were
employed with BISUDECO.
The road was continuously used by BISUDECO and
the public in general.[43]
[42]

b.

c.
d.
e.

There was no protest or complaint from respondents

for almost a period of two decades.[44]
The portions of the land formerly belonging to
respondents affected by the road were already
segregated and surveyed from the main lots. [45]
The road in dispute is already a barangay road.

The testimonies of the plaintiffs witnesses

failed to satisfactorily establish the plaintiffs
contention
that
there
was
such
an
agreement. Likewise, the list of the Employees of
Defendants relatives, son/daughter employed by the
BISUDECO (Exhibit H) does not in any manner prove
the alleged agreement.[47]
For its part, the CA also ruled that petitioner failed to prove the existence
of the said agreement, to wit:
Like the lower court, we found no conclusive proof to
sufficiently establish the existence of an agreement
between BISUDECO and the defendants-appellants
regarding the construction and the use of the
disputed road. Additionally, the testimonies that the
plaintiffs-appellants presented are mainly hearsay,
as not one among the witnesses had personal
knowledge of the agreement by reason of direct
participation in the agreement or because the
witness was present when the agreement was
concluded by the parties.
II.

On Acquisition by Prescription HINDI DIN PWEDE!

Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals [53] (Bogo-Medellin),

involving the construction of a railroad track to a sugar mill. In BogoMedellin, this Court discussed the discontinuous nature of an easement of
right of way and the rule that the same cannot be acquired by
prescription, to wit:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either
by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person
passes or sets foot on somebody elses land. Like a
road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an
easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if

and when a train operated by a person passes over

another's property.In other words, the very exercise
of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that
the road in dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the
same may be apparent. To reiterate, easements are either
continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are
exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or
physical indications of the existence of such easements. Hence,
even if the road in dispute has been improved and maintained over a
number of years, it will not change its discontinuous nature but simply
make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code
states that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.
III.

Is the road part of barangay road? Yes partial.

The RTC findings of fact thus shows that while certain portions of the
property of Edmundo is a barangay road, the same only pertains to Lots A,
B and C, or a total of 1,497 square meters, which is distinct from the road
in dispute which pertains to different lots (lots E to P) and covers a total
area of 10,774 square meters.
In light of the foregoing, considering that the contents of the 1991
FAAS is disputable, it was incumbent on petitioner to present documents
which would evidence the expropriation of the road in dispute by the local
government as a barangay road. Under the prevailing circumstances, the
documents of the expropriation proceedings would have been the best
evidence available and the absence thereof is certainly damaging to
petitioners cause.

[G.R. No. 130845. November 27, 2000.]

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C.
VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN
and SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Villanueva is the registered owner of a parcel of land previously
owned by spouses Gabriel. When Villanueva bought the land, there was a
small house on the southeastern portion, occupying one meter of the twometer wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the
Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. Unknown to
Villanueva, even before he bought the land, there was already a final and
executory decision enforcing the right to easement where the small house
encroaching the same was ordered demolished by Judge Velasco.
The easement in the case at bar is both voluntary and legal easement. The
settled rule is that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width
of the easement. Hence, petitioner ought to demolish the small house on
the easement obstructing the entry of private respondents' cement mixer
and motor vehicle. And even if the easement was not annotated in the title
of the land and the notice of lis pendens was not recorded with the
Register of Deeds, in legal easement, the servient estate is bound to
provide the dominant estate ingress from and egress to the public
highway. Further, the decision enforcing the right of easement against the
previous owner is conclusive and binding upon the successor-in-interest.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; EASEMENTS; KINDS; LEGAL EASEMENT;
ELUCIDATED. [A] legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted
for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property
right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which
it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The
essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity. has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4)
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. DAESTI

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE NEEDS OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE DETERMINE THE
WIDTH OF THE EASEMENT. [T]he small house occupying one meter of
the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents'
cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of
private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant
estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner
ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the
needs of private respondents' estate.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL EASEMENT BINDING EVEN IF NOT ANNOTATED IN
THE TITLE AND NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS OF CASE ENFORCING THE SAME
NOT RECORDED. Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not bound
by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the
title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce
the easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously
unmeritorious . . . it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient
estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of
private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the public
highway.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS;
DECISION IN A CASE BINDING TO THE PARTIES AND SUCCESSOR-ININTEREST AFTER CASE COMMENCED. Petitioner's last argument that he
was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 and that he had not been
given his day: in court, is also without merit [in view of] Rule 39, Sec. 47,
of the Revised Rules of Court. . . . [A] decision in a case is conclusive and
binding upon the parties to said case and those who are their successor in
interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court. In
this case, private respondents. . . initiated; Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on
May 8,1991, against the original owners. . . . Title in the name of
petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after
he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the
Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner.
For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.
Facts:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land.
-

He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of

said property.
The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina
Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983.

When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its
southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter
wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the
Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract
of Easement of Right of Way.

ISSUE: Whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.

Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had
constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the
two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private
respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991,
Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement, damages and with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses
Gabriel. 4 As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to
enforce the contract of easement.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of
said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is
conclusive on this Court.

On May 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On

August 1991, it issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house
encroaching on the easement. On August 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion
for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus, they filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On March 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld
the RTC's issuances. The decision became final and executory on July
1992. 5
On January 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City issued
an Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the
small house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with
Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition.
-

He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his

property since he was not a party to the civil case.
His Third Party Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition
was denied for lack of merit
The motion for reconsideration as well as the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration were denied

Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of

Appeals, docketed asserting that the existence of the easement of right of
way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case
No. Q-91-8703, hence the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels
in favor of the Espinolas could not be enforced against him.
-

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and
denied the reconsideration

HELD: As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the

instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement,
and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement.

The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter

wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents' cement
mixer and motor vehicle.
One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents.
It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine
the width of the easement.
Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice
obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private
respondents' estate.

Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract

of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a
notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not
recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious.
-

As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the

servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the
dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from
and egress to the public highway.

In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla,

initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, against the original
owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of
petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after
he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the
Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner.
For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Heirs of Joaquin Limense
vs Rita Vda. De Ramos
Ponente: Peralta

Facts:
Lozada was the registered owner of a land in Manila, he subdivided his
property into five and gave the divided lots to his daughters through a
deed of donation on March 9, 1932.
In 1981, Joaquin Limense wanted to build a hollow block fence on his
property but could not because a substantial portion of the respondent's
building encroached upon portion of Limense property.
Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area, respondent
ignored both oral and written demands.
In the RTC, the respondents averred that they are daughters of on of the
Lozada daughters. . After subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio Lozada
donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero
Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to
Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos,
respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has
served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada
since 1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or
fenced by Joaquin Limense without causing damage and prejudice to
respondents.
RTC: dismissed the complaint of Limense ruling that an apparent
easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents. The Court also
finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he
knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley.
Joaquin filed a notice of appeal but during the pendency of the appeal with
the CA, Joaquin died. His heirs then elevated the case to the SC via
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether CA committed a grave abuse amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in holding that respondent's ot has an easement of right of
way.
Held: In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against
respondents was an action for removal of obstruction and damages.
Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have
been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial
proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the nature of a collateral
attack, which is not allowed by law.
] As with the present case, the CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is of
dubious origin, as TCT No. 40043 does not appear to have been disposed
of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper and constitutes an
indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at
present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limenses ownership over Lot No. 12-

C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-owned

Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now registered exclusively in the name of
Joaquin Limense.
Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12C, and his successors-in-interest, may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot
No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by
respondents and residents in the area for a long period of time.
The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter
in width and 17 meters in length; the stairs; and the concrete structures
are all within the 1/3 share allotted to them by their donor Dalmacio
Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that respondents
acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house on Lot No. 12-C.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886,
between petitioners and respondents.
2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila,
for further proceedings without further delay to determine the facts
essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code.

G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009

Heirs of Joaquin Limense
vs Rita Vda. De Ramos
Ponente: Peralta
Facts:
Lozada was the registered owner of a land in Manila, he subdivided
his property into five and gave the divided lots to his daughters
through a deed of donation on March 9, 1932.
In 1981, Joaquin Limense wanted to build a hollow block fence on his
property but could not because a substantial portion of the respondent's
building encroached upon portion of Limense property.
Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area, respondent
ignored both oral and written demands.
In the RTC, the respondents averred that they are daughters of on of
the Lozada daughters. . After subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio
Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina,
married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and
Salud, married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of
Francisco Ramos, respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right of way or common alley of all the
heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since 1932 up to the present. As a common
alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense without
causing damage and prejudice to respondents.
RTC: dismissed the complaint of Limense ruling that an apparent
easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents. The Court
also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the
alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an
alley.
Joaquin filed a notice of appeal but during the pendency of the appeal
with the CA, Joaquin died. His heirs then elevated the case to the SC
via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether CA committed a grave abuse amounting to lack of

jurisdiction in holding that respondent's ot has an easement of right of
way.
Held: In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against
respondents was an action for removal of obstruction and damages.
Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have
been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial
proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the nature of a
collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.
As with the present case, the CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is
of dubious origin, as TCT No. 40043 does not appear to have been
disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper and
constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT
No. 96886, at present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limenses
ownership over Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that
respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now
registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.
Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot
12-C, and his successors-in-interest, may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that
Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by
respondents and residents in the area for a long period of time.
The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1
meter in width and 17 meters in length; the stairs; and the concrete
structures are all within the 1/3 share allotted to them by their donor
Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that
respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house
on Lot No. 12-C.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No.

96886, between petitioners and respondents.
2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Manila, for further proceedings without further delay to determine the
facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code.

PMO v LEGASPI TOWERS

FACTS: Caruff Development Corporation owned several parcels of land
along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Among them were
contiguous lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 120311,
120312, 120313, and 127649 (now TCT No. 200760).
Sometime in December 1975, Caruff obtained a loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to finance the construction of a 21-storey
condominium along Roxas Boulevard.[2] The loan accommodation was
secured by a real estate mortgage over three (3) parcels of land covered
by TCT Nos. 120311, 120312, and 120313, [3] where Caruff planned to
erect the condominium and was then known as the Legaspi Towers 300,
Inc. with power house and sump pumps
However, for Caruffs failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter
foreclosed the mortgage and acquired some of the properties of Caruff at
the sheriffs auction sale.
Thereafter, Proclamation No. 50[5] was issued. It was aimed to
promote privatization for the prompt disposition of the large number of
non-performing assets of the government financial institutions, and certain
government-owned and controlled corporations, which have been found
unnecessary or inappropriate for the government sector to maintain. It
also provided for the creation of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14 and the Deed of Transfer
executed by PNB, the National Government, thru the APT, became the
assignee and transferee of all its rights and titles to and interests in its
receivables with Caruff, including the properties it acquired from the
foreclosure of Caruffs mortgage.
Meanwhile, Caruff filed a case against PNB before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 2, whereby Caruff sought the nullification of PNBs
foreclosure of its properties.[6] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8529512.
A Compromise Agreement was entered into by Caruff, PNB, and
the National Government thru APT. The parties agreed, among other
things, that Caruff would transfer and convey in favor of the National
Government, thru the APT, the lot covered by TCT No. 127649 (now TCT
No. 200760), where it built the generating set and sump pumps. RTC
approved this.
On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for Declaration of the
existence of an easement before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 89-49563. Respondent alleged that the act of Caruff of
constructing the powerhouse and sump pumps on its property constituted
a voluntary easement in favor of the respondent. RTC there was
easement.

CA affirms.
Hence, the present petition assigning the following errors:
ISSUE: WON THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IN
FINDING THAT [THE] PRESENCE OF THE GENERATOR SET
(GENERATING SET) AND SUMP PUMPS CONSTITUES AN
EASEMENT. WALA.
Petitioner argues that the presence of the generator set and sump
pumps does not constitute an easement. They are mere improvements
and/or appurtenances complementing the condominium complex, which
has not attained the character of immovability. They were placed on the
subject property as accessories or improvements for the general use and
comfort of the occupants of the condominium complex.
Petitioner posits that respondent failed to present any evidence to
prove the existence of the necessary requisites for the establishment of an
easement. There is no concrete evidence to show that Caruff had a clear
and unequivocal intention to establish the placing of the generator set and
sump pumps on the subject property as an easement in favor of
respondent.
For its part, respondent argues that it was the intention of Caruff
to have a voluntary easement in the subject property and for it to remain
as such even after the property was subsequently assigned to APT. It was
Caruff who constructed the generating set and sump pumps on its
adjacent property for the use and benefit of the condominium adjoining it.
HELD:

An easement or servitude is a real right constituted on anothers

property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the
same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something
on his property for the benefit of another thing or person. [15] The statutory
basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit
of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that which is
subject thereto, the servient estate.

There are two sources of easements: by law or by the will of the

owners. Article 619 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law
or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal
and the latter voluntary easements.
In the present case, neither type of easement was
constituted over the subject property. When the appurtenances were
constructed on the subject property, the lands where the condominium
was being erected and the subject property where the generating set and
sump pumps were constructed belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article
613 of the Civil Code does not apply, since no true easement was
constituted or existed, because both properties were owned by
Caruff.
Also, Article 624 of the Civil Code is controlling, as it contemplates
a situation where there exists an apparent sign of easement between two
estates established or maintained by the owner of both. The law provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established or maintained

by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of

them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement
may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time
the ownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This
provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing
owned in common by two or more persons.[16]

Nailipat
na
kasi
yung
property
via
compromise
agreement,when the subject property was assigned to the National
Government thru the APT, no easement arose or was voluntarily
created from the transfer of ownership, considering that the
parties, more particularly, Caruff, pledged that it was assigning,
transferring, and conveying the subject property in favor of the
National Government thru the APT free from any and all liens and
encumbrances.