BOOK I

PERSONS
Title I. - CIVIL PERSONALITY
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired
and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and
do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when
the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
(32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity
to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship.
The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code,
other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not
limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts
of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
CLASSES OF PERSONS AND THEIR DISTINCTIONS
ELEMENTS OF CIVIL CAPACITY
JURIDICAL CAPACITY V. PERSONALITY
JURIDICAL CAPACITY V. CAPACITY TO ACT

1. Presumption of capacity
FIRST DIVISION
CORAZON CATALAN, G.R. No. 159567
LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM,
EULOGIO CATALAN,
MILA CATALAN-MILAN,
ZENAIDA CATALAN, Present:
ALEX CATALAN, DAISY
CATALAN, FLORIDA PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CATALAN and GEMMA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CATALAN, Heirs of the late CORONA,
FELICIANO CATALAN, AZCUNA, and
Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ.

- versus Promulgated:
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA,
LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA,
JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES
CATALAN,
Respondents. July 31, 2007
x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, and damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged
from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the
Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military
service due to his schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which
incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation
with worries, withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech. [1]
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. [2]
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled Absolute Deed of
Donation,[3] wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES
CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley,
Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South
by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan; and on the West
by Roman Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square
meters, more or less.
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu
thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 18080[4] to Mercedes for the 400.50
square meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained
in Felicianos name under Tax Declaration No. 18081. [5]
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special
Proceedings No. 4563[6] before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court
issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian
for the Estate and Fixing Allowance [7] of Feliciano. The following day, the
trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company as Felicianos

guardian.[8] Peoples Bank and Trust Company has been subsequently

renamed, and is presently known as the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and
3 of their property, registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.[9]
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her
children Delia and Jesus Basa.[10] The Deed of Absolute Sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992,
and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents. [11]
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the
aforementioned property registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children
Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14,
1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of
the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan. [12]
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership,[13] as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio,
as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI
averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her,
the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was
therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed
of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute
Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes
Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about
the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long after the
death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration
for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was
amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case
No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by
the complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of
donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the
presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the
presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld.
[14]
It rendered judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1.
Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;
2.
Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful
owners of the land in question which is now declared in their names under
Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);
3.
Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorneys fees
of P10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.[15]

Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals
via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[16]
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in
disposing that plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the insanity or mental
incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when the
property in dispute was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the
1951 donation coupled with compliance with certain solemnities required by
the Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real property under Article 749,
which provides:
xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in
dispute. By virtue of her ownership, the property is completely subjected to
her will in everything not prohibited by law of the concurrence with the
rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3,
appellees Folder of Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes Catalan to
defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be upheld. Nothing
of the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much less
apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As correctly
stated by the RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered
only in 1992, after the death of Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale
void ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute
sale carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document
with respect to its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a
similar vein, jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged before a
notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to
contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision
dated December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:
1.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO
PROVE THE INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE
FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED;
2.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY
FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT S) AND THE REPORT OF A BOARD OF
OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY

REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS S-1 AND S-2) ARE ADMISSIBLE IN

EVIDENCE;
3.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT
SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES
CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA
BASA; AND4.
WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.[18]
Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos competence to donate
property to Mercedes had been rebutted because they presented more
than the requisite preponderance of evidence. First, they presented the
Certificate of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued
on October 20, 1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of
Veteran Affairs. Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano
was judged an incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
and put under the guardianship of BPI. Based on these two pieces of
evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been suffering from a
mental condition since 1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any
contract thereafter, until his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend
that Felicianos marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does
not prove that he was not insane at the time he made the questioned
donation. They further argue that the donations Feliciano executed in favor
of his successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his
competency because these donations were approved and confirmed in the
guardianship proceedings.[19] In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her
children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and fictitious. This is allegedly
borne out by the fact that the document was registered only on February
20, 1992, more that 10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already
died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew that Feliciano was
incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to be innocent
purchasers of the property in question.[20] Lastly, petitioners assert that their
case is not barred by prescription or laches under Article 1391 of the New
Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before
the four year period after Felicianos death on August 14, 1997 had begun.
[21]

The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a
thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. [22] Like any other contract,
an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes
the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of
the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be

spontaneous.[23] The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of

a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. [24]
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors
capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no
doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. [25] However,
the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it;
if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. [26]
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that
the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early
as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by
the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself,
however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be
presumed capable of attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was
brought to the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil
Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, combined hebrephrenia and catatonia
with certain paranoid states and called the condition dementia
praecox. Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins
conception in the early 1900s to include cases with a better outlook and in
1911 renamed the condition schizophrenia. According to medical
references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of
symptoms, with symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease
progresses. The condition improves (remission or residual stage) and
worsens (relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively
normal, while other patients in remission may appear strange because they
speak in a monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have no
emotional feelings and are prone to have ideas of reference. The latter
refers to the idea that random social behaviors are directed against the
sufferers.[27] It has been proven that the administration of the correct
medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring
biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications
reduce delusions, hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or
eliminate chances of relapse.[28] Schizophrenia can result in a dementing
illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimers disease. However, the illness
will wax and wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration of
intellect.[29]
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from
schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently
dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia,
petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the
donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his
mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of
sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof
to the contrary was adduced.[30] Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give
consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent onDecember 22, 1953. [31]

It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at

the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental
competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon
Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in
their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute
contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other
contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have
existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to
continue until the contrary is shown. [32]
Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to
sell the property to whomever she chose.[33] Not a shred of evidence has
been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes sale of the property to her
children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the
Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is
material is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal
and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question
belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and
laches for the first time on appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this
Court to note that even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed of
Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained
binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.
[34]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the

petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[1]

Exhibit S, Original Records, p. 112.

Exhibit 11, Folder of Exhibits for Defendants.
[3]
Exhibit A and 1, rollo, p. 59.
[4]
Exhibit P, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 24.
[5]
Exhibit O, id. at 23.
[6]
Exhibit G, id. at 8.
[7]
Exhibit H, rollo, p. 57.
[8]
Exhibit I, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 10.
[9]
Exhibit N-2, id. at 18.
[10]
Exhibit B, rollo, p. 60.
[11]
Exhibit R and Exhibit 4, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 26.
[12]
Supra note 9.
[13]
Civil Case No. 17666.
[14]
Rollo, p. 44.
[15]
Id. at 3.
[16]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66073.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 40-42.
[18]
Id. at 4.
[2]

[19]

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
[21]
Article 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four
years. This period shall begin: In cases of intimidation, violence or undue
influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.
And when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other
incapacitated persons, from the time the guardianship ceases.
[22]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 725.
[23]
Lim, Jr. v. San, G.R. No. 159723, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 102,
106-107.
[24]
Vitug, Civil Law Annotated, Vol. II, 2003 edition, p. 149, citing Espino v.
Spouses Vicente. G.R. No. 168396, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 330.
See also Article 1330 of the New Civil Code:
ARTICLE 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
[25]
See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
[26]
Miguela Carillo v. Justimiano Jaojoco, 46 Phil 957, 960 (1924), Vitalista,
et al. v. Perez, et al., G.R. No. 164147, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 127.
[27] Kahn, Ada P. and Fawcett, Jan. The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health. New York, 1993, p. 326.
[28]
Id. at 327.
[29]
Samuels, Martin A., ed. Manual of Neurologic Therapeutics With
Essentials of Diagnosis, Third Edition. Boston/Toronto, Little, Brown and
Company, 1986, p. 49.
[30]
Mendozana, et al. v. Ozamiz et al., G.R. No. 143370, February 6, 2002,
376 SCRA 482, citing 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence 295; Norwood v. Norwood,
207 Ga 148, 60 SE2d 449.
[31]
Exhibit H, rollo, p. 57.
[32]
Supra note 30, citing Blochowitz v. Blochowitz, 122 Neb 385, 240 NW
586, 82 ALR 949.
[33]
Article 428 of the New Civil Code. The owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of
the thing in order to recover it.
[34]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a
contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in
court. They are susceptible of ratification.
Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years xxx.
[20]

2. Restrictions on capacity to act

NCC Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and
do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when
the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)
NCC Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit
capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and
trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in
this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to
act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts
of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
NCC Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to
write. (1263a)
a) Minority
Republic Act No. 6809
December 13, 1989
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO
EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE
ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless
otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person
and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all
acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special
cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twentyone.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests,
donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing

references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their

prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989
FC Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may
contract marriage. (54a)
FC Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or
person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited
with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
XXXX
NCC Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to
write. (1263a)
CHAPTER 7
VOIDABLE CONTRACTS
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though
there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a
contract;
Xxxxx
CHAPTER 8
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS (n)
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
xxxx
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
NCC Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted
by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons
who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they
contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue
influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon
these flaws of the contract. (1302a)

NCC Art. 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of
one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any
restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price
received by him. (1304)

CHAPTER 2
CAPACITY TO BUY OR SELL
NCC Art. 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate
themselves, may enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications
contained in the following articles.
Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person
without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor.
Necessaries are those referred to in Article 290. (1457a)
NCC Art. 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or
guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole
thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact the he has not been
benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus
returned.
NCC Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age, who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or
guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in
fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same from
the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith. (1160A)
G.R. No. L-11872
December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis
Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.
Vicente Foz for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs
from the judgment of September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the
Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and
ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and
to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa
Mercado brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis
Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended
by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator

of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they
and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the
children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis
Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal
property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of
Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in
paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had since
then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father
Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year
1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently
succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a
deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of P400, which
amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion
and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its
assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the land in question
belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, onefourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two
sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two
plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per
cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had
received said products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel
therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to
be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land,
to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to
the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the
estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the
products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450
per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned
complaint, denying each and all of the allegations therein contained, and in
special defense alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the complaint,
had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its
owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with
the due authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz
sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an
area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that
subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the
plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as administrator of the property of his
children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of
P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes
of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's)
children, and this amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed
from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600;
but that later, on May 17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of
legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela
Paz, the notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the
answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the
land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their
father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600,

they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration

of P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and
which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned
purchaser. In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint
filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses
and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate
of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by
ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in
litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and
damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts
therein set forth, and in special defense alleged that at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-complaint the plaintiffs
were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years
fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They
therefore asked that they be absolved from the defendant's crosscomplaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court
rendered the judgment aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and
in writing moved for a reopening of the case and a new trial. This motion
was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper bill of
exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and
transmitted to the clerk of this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed
by them on May 17, 1910, on the ground that they were minors when they
executed it, the questions submitted to the decision of this court consist in
determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and
therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the
instrument Exhibit 3; and in case they then were such, whether a person
who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of
legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within legal period, ask
for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of some
defect that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code,
arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of the land sold.
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu
obtained title by composition with the State, to three parcels of land,
adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit,
Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59
centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's
death, his said lands passed by inheritance to his four children named
Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said
decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as
containing forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and
sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to
Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five children,
Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all
surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896
inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land described in the
complaint.

The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent
restitution to them of two-fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of
one-fourth of all the land described in the complaint, and which, they
stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the
defendant excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only an
area such as is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the
plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of
P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation,
or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and
that, on account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was on
the possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because,
during the revolution, the protocols or registers of public documents of the
Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the
widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance
of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the
date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and those of his minor children
Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein
set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made
by his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year,
1901, the widower Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document
Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a
part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had
belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which
now forms a part of the land in question a transaction which Mercado
was obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his
children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having died,
about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together
with their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age
and in possession of the required legal status to contract, executed and
subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in
which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their deceased
mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and
authorization, they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the
sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price, the land
described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit,
Bulacan, of an area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed
bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro
Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the
south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes
Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed
Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the date of its execution they were minors
without legal capacity to contract, and for the further reason that the
deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in
obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of
Apalit (plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that

parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost or burned, the witness
Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which
she testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father
Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that
the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa
Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the
averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration certificate of
said Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears
that in 1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be appear that
Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May
17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was
executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of
age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's
death her brother and sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her
brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu, who took
charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in
interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the
other cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that
the latter was then already 23 years of age; that she did not know why her
uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed
of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death
had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs'
father, it was Luis Espiritu who directed the cultivation of the land in
litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu,
who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time,
she did not know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that
fell to his wife and to his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of
about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted to the aforementioned
Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net
and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land
and of inferior quality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its
yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two sisters' share was 764
cavanes.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified,
was a witness for the defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up
by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of
the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said
document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties,
after it had been read to them and had been translated into the Pampangan
dialect for those of them who did not understand Spanish. On crossexamination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age and
began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a
young maiden, although she had not yet commenced to attend social
gatherings, and that all this took place about the year 1898, for witness said
that he was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.

Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the
properties owned by the latter, testified that Espiritu's land contained an
area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death, was under witness'
administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products
yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about
15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by
reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu's
death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another
portion of the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which
had been left by this deceased, and that he held same until 1901, when he
conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. lawphi1.net
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis
Espiritu, testified that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on
in the house of his deceased father, about the year 1909 or 1910, and used
to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his other
relatives. He denied that his father had at any time administered the
property belonging to the Mercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs,
testified that he mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece
of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown the deed of purchase
and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its contents.
This same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had
between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the
year), in which the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated in
Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could
identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no
instrument whatever was presented to him for identification. The
transaction mentioned must have concerned either the ratification of the
sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the
mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14,
1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the
private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied
having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the purpose of
requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated that she
saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis
Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and while said
document was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the
witnesses thereto whose names appear therein; and that she went to her
said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as well as her brother and
sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever
having been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the
plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the execution of any deed
in behalf of her brother.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially,
that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or
intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit 3,
executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and
the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed
Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous sale which their

mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said purchaser Luis
Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado,
father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of
Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that
the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of P400,
by virtue of the contract made with him, they declare having sold to him
absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and thenceforth
any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just
price of the property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the
contract of sale of the parcel or portion of land that would contain 15
cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of the purchaser
Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract
of pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area of six
cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the
price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as
follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and
the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894,
Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of
seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs' widowed father mortgaged
or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her
brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the
notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs,
recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the totality of the land,
consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold
absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more;
and there is no conclusive proof in the record that this last document was
false and simulated on account of the employment of any violence,
intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the vendors
who executed it.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and
those of previous dates, Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the
relationship between the contracting parties, and also the general custom
that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to
obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in
the amount loaned, without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and
illegal to hold, in view of the facts hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser
Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or simulate the
document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the
capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15
cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901, according to the contract
of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the
total area of 21 cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his
testate or intestate estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land
situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of the title
of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in
consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum

of P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an

area containing 6 cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel
of land, as its ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a
singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes
of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the
payment or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao
Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the
pledged property; but, after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the
creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6
cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter
parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in the
deed Exhibit 3.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements
made therein, is of the nature of a public document and is evidence of the
fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter, even
against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the
plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true
that his wife Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited
from her father, of an area of about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother
Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25,1894
an instrument that disappeared or was burned and likewise
recognizing that the protocols and register books belonging to the Province
of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the request
of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony
recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had
occurred, and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the
exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he had personal knowledge
of said sale, he himself being the husband who authorized said
conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's
interest and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits that might be
produced by said real property.
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as
authentic by one of the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record
shows no evidence whatever that this document is false, and it does not
appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the
plaintiffs' father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it
should be rejected. It was therefore properly admitted as evidence of the
certainty of the facts therein set forth.
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3
consists in that, on the date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that
they signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet attained the age
of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the
record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors,
for no certified copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did
the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that
Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the
document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit

A, notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not

constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and
Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the
date referred to, it cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they
stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it,
and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is
perfectly valid a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of
land of 6 cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs
in security for P600 received by him as a loan from his brother-in-law Luis
Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold
by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the
sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in
fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse
themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to
have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the
6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and
absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not
violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical
rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court
of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the
fact that it was Luis Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal
registration certificate on April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years to be
entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of
May 17th of the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also
allow it to be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that the
cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14, 1914, where in it is
recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age, for both
these facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the
statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial
instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they executed it, they were
already of legal age, and, besides the annotation contained in the
copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages was
introduced.
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this
case, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors
when they executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered
positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a
result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by
the plaintiffs' mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of
the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not occasion any damage or prejudice
to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document Exhibit 2
that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the
land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and
which was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for certain
engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff;
and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father himself,

they received through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed,
which passed into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit
which must have accrued to them from the sums of money received as
loans; and, finally, on the execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3,
the plaintiffs received and divided between themselves the sum of P400,
which sum, added to that P2,000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that
of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter and
father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of P3,000, the amount
paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of
seed, and is the just price of the property, was not impugned, and,
consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and compensatory
for, the true value of said land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment
appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in
accordance with law and the evidence of record, we should, and do hereby,
affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to indicate that the
general statement, in the prevailing opinion to the effect that the making of
false representations as to his age by an infant executing a contract will
preclude him from disaffirming the contract or setting up the defense of
infancy, must be understood as limited to cases wherein, on account of the
minor's representations as to his majority, and because of his near
approach thereto, the other party had good reason to believe, and did in
fact believe the minor capable of contracting.
The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the supreme court of
Spain in the cases cited in the prevailing opinion, is substantially similar to
the doctrine of estoppel as applied in like instances by many of the courts
in the United States.
For the purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert some citations of
authority, Spanish and American, recognizing the limitations upon the
general doctrine to which I am inviting attention at this time; and in this
connection it is worthy of note that the courts of the United States look with
rather less favor than the supreme court of Spain upon the application of
the doctrine, doubtless because the cases wherein it may properly be
applied, are much less likely to occur in a jurisdiction where majority is
reached at the age of 21 than a jurisdiction wherein majority is not
ordinarily attained until the infant reaches the age of 25.
Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6. is, in part, as follows:

If he who is minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he

is over twenty-five years of age, and this assertion is believed by another
person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he
should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should no (3)
afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age
when he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps
the deceived and not the deceivers.
In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by Gregorio Lopez, I find
the following:
(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si appareret ex aspectu
eum esse minorem, tunc adversarius non potest dicere se deceptum; imo
tam ipse, quam minor videntur esse in dolo, quo casu competit minori
restitutio, quia facta doli compensatione, perinde ast ac si nullus fuiset in
dolo, et ideo datur restitutio; et quia scienti dolus non infertur, l. 1. D. de
act. empt. secundum Cyn. Alberic et Salic. in l. 3. C. si minor se major.
dixer. adde Albericum tenentem, quabndo per aspectum a liter constaret, in
authent.sacramenta puberum, col. 3. C. si advers vendit.
(2) Engoosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. Et adverte
nam per istam legem Partitarum, que non distinguit, an adultus, vel pupillus
talem assertionem faciat, videtur comprobari dictum Guillielm. de Cun. de
quo per Paul. de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in princ. D. de jurejur. quod si
pupillus proximus pubertari juret, cum contrahit, se esse puberem, et
postea etiam juret, quod non veniet contra contractum quod habebit locum
dispositio authenticae sacramenta puberum, sicut si esset pubes: et cum
isto dicto transit ibi Paul. de Cast. multum commendans, dicens, se alibi
non legisse; si tamen teneamus illam opinionem, quod etiam pupillus doli
capax obligatur ex juramento, non esset ita miranda dicat, decissio; vide
per Alexand. in dict. 1. qui jurasse, in princ. Item lex ista Partitarum
expresse sentit de adulto, non de pupillo, cum superius dixit, que
paresciere de tal tiempo: Doctores etiam intelligunt de adulto 11. dict. tit. C.
si minor. se major. dixer. et patet ex 11. illius tituli. Quid autem dicemus in
dubio, cum non constat de dolo minoris? Azon. in summa illius tit. in fin.
Cynus tamen, et alli, tenent oppositum, quia dolus non praesumitur, nisi
probetur, 1. quotiens, s., qui dolo, D. de probat. Et hoc etiam vult ista lex
Partitarum, cum dicit, si lo faze engoosamente: et ita tenent Alberic. et
Salicet. in dict. 1. 3. ubi etiam Bart. in fin. Si autem minor sui facilitate
asserat se mojorem, et ita juret, tunc distingue, ut habetur dict. 1. 3 quia aut
juravit verbo tenus, et tunc non restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu
scripturam probet se minorem; et si juravit corporaliter, nullo modo
restituitur, ut ibi; et per quae instrumenta probentur, cum verbo tenus
juravit, vide per Specul. tit. de restit, in integr. s. quis autem, col. 4. vers.
sed cujusmodi erit scriptura, ubi etiam vide per Speculatorem aliquas
notabiles quaestiones in ista materia, in col. 5. videlicet, an praejudicet sibi
minor ex tali juramento in aliis contractibus, et tenet, quod non; et tenet
glossa finalis in 1. de aetate, D. de minor. in fin. gloss. vide ibi per Speculat.
ubi etiam de aliis in ista materia.
In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the 27th of April, 1860,
I find an excellent illustration of the conditions under which that court

applied the doctrine, as appears from the following resolution therein set
forth.
Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the latter pretend to be
twenty-five years of age and, due to the circumstances that they are nearly
of that age, are married, or have administration of their property, or on
account of other special circumstances affecting them, the other parties to
the contract believe them to be of legal age.
With these citations compare the general doctrine in the United States as
set forth in 22 Cyc. (p. 610), supported by numerous citations of authority.
Estoppel to disaffirm (I) In General. The doctrine of estoppel not
being as a general rule applicable to infants, the court will not readily hold
that his acts during infancy have created an estoppel against him to
disaffirm his contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be estopped by the acts
or admissions of other persons.
(II) False representations as to age. According to some authorities the
fact that an infant at the time of entering into a contract falsely represented
to the person with whom he dealt that he had attained the age of majority
does not give any validity to the contract or estop the infant from
disaffirming the same or setting up the defense of infancy against the
enforcement of any rights thereunder; but there is also authority for the
view that such false representations will create an estoppel against the
infant, and under the statutes of some states no contract can be disaffirmed
where, on account of the minor's representations as to his majority, the
other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting.
Where the infant has made no representations whatever as to his age, the
mere fact that the person with whom he dealt believed him to be of age,
even though his belief was warranted by the infant's appearance and the
surrounding circumstances, and the infant knew of such belief, will not
render the contract valid or estop the infant to disaffirm.

G.R. No. 173822

October 13, 2010
SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon,
convicted the petitioners of murder.1 On December 13, 2005, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but
modified the awarded damages.2
The petitioners contest the CAs affirmance of their conviction in this appeal
via petition for review on certiorari.
We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador
Monreal because the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority

at the time of the commission of the crime. We order his immediate release
from prison because he already served his sentence, as hereby modified.
Also, we add to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled
in order to accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor
formally charged the petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with
murder through the following information, to wit:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Boga,
Municipality of Castilla, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill,
armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot one Rogelio Llona y Llave,
a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on
November 7, 1994,4 the trial ensued.
The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major
Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence
Llona (Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia).
Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona
(Llona), her common-law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay
Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone
to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as
they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were
seated in the sala of Desders house, she heard "thundering steps" as if
people were running and then two successive gunshots; that she then saw
Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona; that seeing Atizado
about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, thats enough!; that while
aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the
direction of the clicking sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he
was moving backwards and simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his
gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she
rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to
report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital
where Llona was pronounced dead.5
Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May
18, 1994,6 based on the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R.
Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon.
Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the
back that penetrated his spinal column, liver, and abdomen. 7
Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent P30,000.00 for
the funeral expenses of Llona.8

Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for
the Defense were Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph
Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing.
The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime,
Atizado had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and
Danilo had been in the house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay
Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo
had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of
Llona; and that the petitioners had been implicated only because of their
being employed by their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the
killing of Llona.
As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted
Danilo, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador
Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby
sentences each of the accused to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to reimburse the
heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay
the cost.
Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the
crime charged and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate release
from the provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of other
lawful cause or causes.
Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be
credited in full in the service of their sentence.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court referred the petitioners direct appeal to the CA pursuant
to People v. Mateo.10
On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accusedappellants Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to
suffer the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered
to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P30,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.11
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration, 12 the petitioners now
appeal.
Issue
The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty
of murder beyond reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of
Mirandilla despite her not being a credible witness; that some
circumstances rendered Mirandillas testimony unreliable, namely: (a) she
had failed to identify them as the assailants of Llona, because she had not

actually witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed
that they had been the assailants from the fact that they had worked for
Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c) the autopsy report stated that
Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary to
Mirandillas claim; (d) Mirandillas testimony was contrary to human
experience; and (e) Mirandillas account was inconsistent with that of
Jesalvas.
Ruling
The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the
penalty imposed on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as
civil liability.
I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CAare accorded respect
The RTC and CAs conclusions were based on Mirandillas positive
identification of the petitioners as the malefactors and on her description of
the acts of each of them made during her court testimony on March 6,
1995,13 viz:
q Who were you saying we sat together?
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to
sleep.
q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size
of the sala and the house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting
arrangement of yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg.
Llona was infront of me, I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona
q How about Kdg. Jesalva?
a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the
door in otherwords, the door was at his back.
q Was the door open?
a Yes, sir.
q Was the door immediately found Rather was this the main door of the
house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.
q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
a Yes, sir.
q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have
finished assisting the persons in Bongga about the program, ... after that,
what were you doing then?
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child.
q How about Kgd. Jesalva?
a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness.
q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if
there was any incident that happened?
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there
were successive shots.
q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the
origin or who was responsible for the shots?

a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado.
q Who is this Salvador Atizado?
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.
q Can you be able to identify him?
a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered
Salvador Atizado.)
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona
sliding downward.
q Then after that what happened?
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible stop thats
enough, and I gave assistance to Kgd. Llona.
q Then after that what happened?
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of
the trigger of the gun.
q Then what did you do when you heard that?
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal
but at that time I do not know his name.
q Then what did you see of him?
a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the
cylinder of the gun.
q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can
you see where the gun was pointed at?
a It was pointed towards me.
q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?
a Yes, sir.
q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize
this man?
a Yes, sir.
q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?
a Yes, sir.
q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?
a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the
shoulder of the person, the person tapped by the witness answered to the
name Salvador Monreal.)
q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting
his revolver and he was moving backward, did you see other persons as
his companion, if any?
a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was
already on the process of leaving the place.
q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
a Danilo Atizado
q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?
a Salvador Monreal was the one left.
Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed,
Mirandillas positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her
declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their
sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had
conspired to kill and had done so with treachery.

It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial

judges evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of the witness
testimony is accorded the highest respect because the trial judges unique
opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witness enables him to
determine whether the witness is telling the truth or not. 14 Such evaluation,
when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect the disposition of
the case.15 We thus apply the rule, considering that the petitioners have not
called attention to and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the application of the rule is that
Mirandillas positive declarations on the identities of the assailants
prevailed over the petitioners denials and alibi. 16
Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.17 Yet, the State did not have to prove the petitioners previous agreement
to commit the murder,18 because their conspiracy was deduced from the
mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act. 19 They
had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts
manifesting a community of purpose and design to achieve their evil end.
As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable as co-principals. 20 Thus,
they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in
murder.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:
Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means
of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of
the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which offended party might make. 21 For treachery
to be attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must be
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders. 22 Moreover,

treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of
the attack.23
The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative "sufficiently established
that treachery attended the attack o[n] the victim" because Atizados
shooting the victim at the latters back had been intended to ensure the
execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreals conspiracy to kill the
victim was proved by their presence at the scene of the crime each armed
with a handgun that they had fired except that Monreals handgun did not
fire.24
We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners
mounted their deadly assault with suddenness and without the victim being
aware of its imminence. Neither an altercation between the victim and the
assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the victim provoked the
assault in the slightest. The assailants had designed their assault to be
swift and unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity to
defend himself.25 Such manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a
method of attack that ensured their unhampered execution of the crime.
II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal and of the Civil Damages
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetuato death. There being no modifying
circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the
RPC.26 But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due
to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the
CA did not appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of
the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the
trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age
when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counteraffidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of
age.27 Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he
was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994. 28 Thirdly,
Villafes affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on
the date of the incident.29 Fourthly, as RTCs minutes of hearing dated
March 9, 1999 showed,30 Monreal was 22 years old when he testified on
direct examination on March 9, 1999,31 which meant that he was not over
18 years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla
described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at the time of the
incident.32
The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it
conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006,33 viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall
enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a
child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years
old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the childs birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the

absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the

child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance
of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of
the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to
the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a
summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court
which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the
appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is
pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine
the age of the child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending
hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be
suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age
of the child in conflict with the law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,34 when the offender is over 15 and
under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is
imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the
penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the
range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision
mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in
its medium period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper
indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor, as
the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum period.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his
arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of
Monreals detention should be credited in the service of his sentence,
pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, 35 the revision of the
penalty now warrants his immediate release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as
granted under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of
minor offenders through programs and services, such as delinquency
prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-integration, geared
towards their development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a
convict serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified
under this Act or other applicable laws.

Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the

surviving heirs of Llona.1avvp++il Their solidary civil liability arising from
the commission of the crime stands,36 despite the reduction of Monreals
penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages in order to conform to
prevailing jurisprudence. The CA granted onlyP50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity and moral
damages should each be raised to P75,000.00 to accord with prevailing
case law;37 and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the
attendance of treachery should be further awarded, 38 to accord with the
pronouncement in People v. Catubig,39 to wit:
The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as
it breaches the social order and other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State
concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended
party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender.
In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award
of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.
The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being supported
by the record.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005
promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following
modifications:
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from
six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14
years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum
period;
(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to
immediately release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the
penalty imposed on him, unless he is being held for other lawful causes;
and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs
of Roger L. Llona P75,000.00 as death indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as actual
damages.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal

service. The Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to this Court the
action he has taken on this decision within five days from service.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Original records, pp. 357-364 (Criminal Case No. 94-3653).
2
Rollo, pp. 18-36; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with
Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and Associate Justice Amelita G.
Tolentino, concurring.
3
Original records, pp. 20-23.
4
Id. pp. 55-56.
5
TSN, March 6, 1995, pp. 2-14.
6
TSN, February 22, 1995, p. 8.
7
TSN, February 20, 1995, pp. 2-4.
8
TSN, January 9, 1995; February 22, 1995, p. 22.
9
Supra, note 1, p. 364.
10
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
11
Rollo, p. 36.
12
Id., p. 43.
13
At pp. 5-10.
14
People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 385,
392.
15
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184958, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA
280, 293; People v. Gerasta, G.R. No. 176981, December 24, 2008, 575
SCRA 503, 512.

16

See People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. 151251, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA
529, 531.
17
Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
18
People v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 105992, February 1, 1955, 241 SCRA 28.
19
People v. Factao, G.R. No. 12566, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 38.
20
People v. Peralta, No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 776777; People v. Pablo, G.R. Nos. 120394-97, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA
79.
21
Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.
22
People v. Punzalan, No. L-54562, August 6, 1982, 153 SCRA 1, 2.
23
People v. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 659,
660; People v. Cajurao, G.R. No. 122767, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA
207, 208; People v. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004, 420
SCRA 326, 328.
24
CA Rollo, pp. 163-165.
25
People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 122746, January 29, 1999, 302 SCRA
380, 382.
26
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases
in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:
xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxx
27
Original records, pp. 28-29.
28
TSN, February 22, 1995, p. 8.
29
Original records, p. 30.
30
Id., p. 338.
31
TSN, March 9, 1999, p. 1.
32
TSN, March 28, 1995, pp. 50-51.
33
The law was enacted on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May 20, 2006.
34
Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of
age. When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is
one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of
Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not
exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted
with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always
lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period.

35

Section 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. The child in conflict with the
law shall be credited in the services of his of his/her sentence with the full
time spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act.
36
Sections 6, 38 and 39 of RA No. 9344.
37
People v. Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA
239, 255; People v. Satonero, G.R. No. 186233, October 2, 2009, 602
SCRA 769.
38
Id.
39
G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.

b) Insanity
FC Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxxx
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
Xxxx
NCC Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
xxxxx
Ncc Art. 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid.
Contracts agreed to in a state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are
voidable. (n)
FIRST DIVISION
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 166470
MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZSAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZVILLA ABRILLE[1] and NATIVIDAD Present:
CRUZ-HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
- v e r s u s - BERSAMIN, JJ.

JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,

Respondent.
x---------------------x
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 169217

MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZSAGUN and TERESA C.

HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE,
Petitioners,
-versusJOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,[2]
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 7, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14,
1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez.
Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After
Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C.
San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced
three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C.
Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero,
Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family
(conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She
was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However,
due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she reached
Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of
her estate.[3] Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary
education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus
properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of
administering Lulu's properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993),
Felix and petitioners undertook various projects involving Lulus real

properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulus properties for

an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision. [4] In 1995, Ma.
Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property [5] was
under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney [6] (SPA)
believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her
behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell
the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400.
[7]
Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare
property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates for P58,500
per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin,
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had
been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to
live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was
receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and
smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped
room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had
not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden.
Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians
for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis,
rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several
complications.[8]
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of
Lulus estate from petitioners.[9] However, the demand was ignored.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship [10] in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged
that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate
because she was of weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose
the same.
Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and
her late husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was
allegedly part of their conjugal partnership.
Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of
Lulus competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when
the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan,
to deliver the properties for her to manage.
They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of
the consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not
Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their respective

authorities could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding, such

matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action.
Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou
Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San
Juan family. However, because the sale between Felix and Lulu had taken
place in 1974, questions regarding its legality were already barred by the
statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so
they claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her
genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families.
Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and
maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan
family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family
as they lived a luxurious lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation,
Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was
made to ride a tricycle.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations
which revealed the alarming state of her health. [11] Not only was Lulu
severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,
[12]
she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which
was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined
that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and
fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and selfadminister her medications.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001,[13] the RTC concluded that, due to
her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a
legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu
an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and
property of Lulu on a P1 million bond.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond
was grossly insufficient to secure Lulus P50-million estate against
fraudulent loss or dissipation.[14] The motion, however, was denied.[15]
On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of
the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).[16] The appeal was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 75760.
On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September
25, 2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.[17] It
held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu,
because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed
assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering
the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the
legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none
of them was qualified to be her legal guardian. Because guardianship was

a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly
trusted.
Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470. [18]
Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina
apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her.
Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina
apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police AntiCrime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National
Police.
The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu
somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the
investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER
to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian
had allegedly been maltreating her.[19]
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus[20] in
the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive
in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that
Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. [21]
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was
denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005. [22] Aggrieved, they filed this
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was
consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.
The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an
incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over
her person and property.
Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending
physicians[23] regarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as
they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove
that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should have been
presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental
capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed to live with them since
under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code,[24] legitimate brothers and
sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support each other
fully.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the
courts a quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com,
a psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in
Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also
had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by Boy Negro and

imaginary pets she called Michael and Madonna. [25] The November 21,
2005 medical report[26] stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with
psychosis but claimed significant improvements in her behavior.
We find the petition to be without merit.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may
give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted.[27] Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted
with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior
and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental
stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary.[28] The observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence[29] establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.
[30]
Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu
personally when she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, [31] persons who, though of
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be
placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid
due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not
Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the
evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions
of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for
review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional
circumstances, none of which is present in this case. [32] We thus adopt the
factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate
courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial
guardian of Lulu.[33] We therefore affirm her appointment as such.
Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of
Lulu, and manage her estate as well. [34]
Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was
proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in
order.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto.[35]Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was dutybound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation,
respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ

of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.
[36]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.

Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal
guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds
they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria
Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against
them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria
Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs estate and her unlawful abduction from the
custody of her legal guardian.
Treble costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[1]

Ma. Teresa Hernandez-Villa Abrille in some parts of the records.

The Court of Appeals was impleaded as respondent but was excluded as
party in these cases pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[3]
Order dated July 31, 1968 in SP No. 1127 penned by Judge Andres
Reyes of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch VI. Rollo (G.R.
No. 166470), p. 128.
[4]
Referred to as Marylou Subdivision or Marilou Village Subdivision in
some parts of the records.
[5]
Covered by TCT No. 248784. Rollo (G.R. No. 166470), p. 109.
[6]
Id., pp. 110-111.
[7]
Deed of Sale. Id., pp. 112-115.
[8]
Medical report dated September 18, 1998. Id., pp. 118-121.
[9]
Letter dated September 20, 1998. Id., pp. 116-117.
[10]
Docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 250. Id., pp. 99-102.
[11]
Lulu was examined by cardiologist-internist Perfecto Palafox,
diabetologist-internist Rosa Allyn Sy and general practitioner Eliza Mei
Perez. Surgeon Jacinto Bautista removed a mass from Lulus ear lobe and
skin.
[12]
Lulu was nearly blind due to cataract and suspected to have gallstones
in her kidneys.
[13]
Penned by Judge Jose C. Reyes, Jr. Rollo, pp. 87-98.
[14]
Id., pp. 143-147.
[15]
Order dated April 26, 2002. Id., pp. 154-155.
[16]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.
[17]
Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer R. de los Santos (retired) and
Monina Arevalo-Zearosa of the Special Fourth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Dated December 29, 2004. Rollo (G.R. No. 166470), pp. 61-86.
[18]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[19]
Signed by Police Superintendent Nicolas M. Gregorio. Rollo (G.R. No.
169217), pp. 81-82.
[20]
Id., pp. 58-63.
[2]

[21]

Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by

Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 39-54.
[22]
Id., pp. 56-57.
[23]
Supra note 11.
[24]
FAMILY CODE, Arts. 194, 195 and 196 provide:
Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to
and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the
following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in
the preceding article:
1.
The spouses;
2.
Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full
or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set
forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or
sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or
negligence.
[25]
Report [the Court of Appeals] on the Condition of the Ward, Ma. Lourdes
S.J. Fernandez, Annex A. Rollo (G.R. No. 166470), pp. 248-249.
[26]
Prepared by attending physician Edison C. Galindez, pp. 250-254.
[27]
Section 50, Rule 130, RULES OF COURT, provides:
Section 50. Opinion of an Ordinary Witness. The opinion of a witness for
which proper basis is given shall be received in evidence regarding-(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c ) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impression of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person. (emphasis supplied)
[28]
People v. Bacaling, 447 Phil. 197, 204 (2003). (citations omitted)
[29]
The opinions of Lulu's attending physicians have been verified by the
2001 medical report of Recovery.com which diagnosed Lulu's condition as
unspecified mental retardation with psychoses.
[30]
People v. Bacaling, supra note 28.
[31]
Section 2, Rule 92, RULES OF COURT, provides:
Section 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word
"incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to

read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby
an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
[32]

Goyena v. Ledesma-Gustilo, 443 Phil. 150, 158-160 (2003). (citations

omitted)
[33]
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 93 for the qualifications of a judicial
guardian.
[34]
Section 1, Rule 96, RULES OF COURT, provides:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. -- A guardian appointed shall
have care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of
his estate, or the management of his estate only, as the case may be. The
guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all
the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in
which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship. (emphasis supplied)
[35]
Ilusorio v. Bildner, 387 Phil. 915, 922 (2000).
[36]
See Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 406 Phil. 449 (2001).

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 184757

Present:

- versus -

ANICETO BULAGAO,
Accused-Appellant.

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
October 5, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 which affirmed the Decision [2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 197M-2001 and Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001 dated January 23, 2006.
Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in
separate Informations both dated December 21, 2000. The Informations
read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 197-M-2001
That on or about the 29th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], [3] 14 years old, against the
latters will and consent.[4]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 198-M-2001
That on or about the 17th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], 14 years old, against the
latters will and consent.[5]
Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty on both counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand for the
prosecution. AAA was born on April 13, 1986. According to her lateregistered birth certificate, her parents are BBB (mother) and CCC
(father). AAA, however, testified that BBB and CCC are not her biological
parents, as she was only adopted when she was very young. [6] CCC died in
December 1999.[7]
In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and settled in the house of her
brother DDD (son of BBB and CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue,

Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and
accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao, and her younger sister, then six-yearold FFF (who were also the children of BBB and CCC). [8]
On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a
room which had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt
somebody enter the room.She recognized the accused-appellant as the
intruder, and saw that he was holding a knife. Accused-appellant poked the
knife at AAAs neck, causing her to freeze in fear.Accused-appellant
removed AAAs clothes, and then his own. Both AAA and accused-appellant
were wearing t-shirt and shorts before the undressing. Accused-appellant
kissed her neck and inserted his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this
moment, but accused-appellant did not stop and continued raping AAA for
one hour.[9]
On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located
in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was
sleeping in the second floor of the house, where there are no rooms. AAA
was roused from her sleep when accused-appellant was already
undressing her. Accused-appellant removed his shorts and inserted his
penis into her vagina. AAA tried to resist, but accused-appellant held her
hands. Accused-appellant then touched her breasts and kissed
her. Accused-appellant remained on top of her for half an hour.[10]
AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the rape
incidents. Upon learning of the same, BBB did not believe AAA and
whipped her.[11]
During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to establish the character
and chastity of AAA, asked AAA about an alleged sexual intercourse
between her and the now deceased CCC. AAA affirmed her statement in
her affidavit that CCC took advantage (pinagsamantalahan) of her when he
was still alive. This allegedly happened five times, the first of which was
when she was only seven years old.[12] Answering a query from the court,
AAA testified that she was currently in the custody of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).[13]
The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal officer Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray as its second witness. However, the latters testimony was
dispensed with upon the stipulation of the parties on the fact of examination
of AAA by Dr. Viray on September 5, 2000, and the contents of the
examination report,[14] which includes the finding that AAA was in a nonvirgin state.
When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a
year later, it also presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony
for the prosecution. This time, she testified that the sexual encounters
between her and the accused-appellant were consensual. She fabricated
the charge of rape against the accused-appellant because she was

supposedly angry with him. She also claimed that she was instructed by
the police officer who investigated the incident to say that the accusedappellant used a knife. She also testified that she was raped by her father
CCC when she was seven years old. She was recanting her previous
testimony because she purportedly was no longer angry with accusedappellant.[15]
On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of rape
because she was angry with the accused-appellant for making her do
laundry work for him.However, when asked if she consented and voluntarily
submitted herself to the accused-appellant when she had sexual
intercourse with him, she answered in the negative. She had been released
from the custody of the DSWD and was alone by herself for some time, but
she now lives with the family of accused-appellant. [16]
On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not force
himself upon her. She affirmed that accused-appellant had a little defect in
his mind. On re-cross examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant
was not her sweetheart.[17]
Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical
psychologist. She conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant
on September 12, 2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering
from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. [18]
Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he testified on June 15,
2005, claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted
that they ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual
intercourse. He denied pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape
because she was asking for P300 from him after they kissed. Accusedappellant also testified that there was no legal proceeding for the adoption
of AAA (ampun-ampunan lang).[19]
On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision in Crim. Case
No. 197-M-2001 and 198-M-2001, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, and hereby sentences
him to suffer:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is
likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of P50,000.00;
(b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is
likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of P50,000.00.[20]

The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she
testified for the prosecution, and was returned to the family of the accusedappellant after her original testimony. It was during the time when she was
back in the custody of the accused-appellants family that she recanted her
testimony for the prosecution. According to the RTC, it is clear that she had
no other place to go to as she was completely orphaned and was
dependent on the family of the accused, and it was understandable that
she may have recanted in order to remain in the good graces of the
accused-appellants family.[21]
As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from
mental retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of
accused-appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the
dates of the complained of incidents. There was no showing from the
findings of the psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or
psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. Even assuming
that accused-appellant was of such mental state at the time of the
incidents, the psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the capacity
to discern right from wrong.[22]
On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that
of the RTC, except with a modification on the penalty in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death
penalty. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13, dated 23 January
2006, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed and
damages awarded. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in each of the two (2)
counts of rape. He is further directed to pay private complainant the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, for each count of rape, in addition to the
civil indemnity awarded by the court a quo.[23]
Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal. Both parties
manifested that they are waiving their rights to file a supplemental brief, as
the same would only contain a reiteration of the arguments presented in
their appellants and appellees briefs.[24]
In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant asserted that the
prosecution evidence was insufficient, particularly in view of AAAs
withdrawal of her original testimony.
We have recently held that [c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or
for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily
negate an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked
upon with considerable disfavor by the courts.Moreover, it would be a

dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice,

simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind for
one reason or another.[25] We have, in the past, also declared that the
recantation, even of a lone eyewitness, does not necessarily render the
prosecutions evidence inconclusive.[26]In the often-cited Molina v. People,
[27]
we specified how a recanted testimony should be examined:
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the
original testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where
previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary,
testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony
to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general
rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set
aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the
previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared
and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully
and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change,
discriminatingly analyzed. x x x.[28] (Emphases supplied.)
These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant is
usually the lone eyewitness. Thus, in People v. Sumingwa,[29] where the
rape victim later disavowed her testimony that she was raped by her father,
this Court held:
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most
often depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's
testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and
usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victim's testimony
is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling
examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish
the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,
notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution
witness does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such
recantation may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other
testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the
stand.[30]
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
AAAs accusation and recantation is facilitated by the fact that her
recantation was made in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike in

cases where recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this
case had the opportunity to see the demeanor of AAA not only when she
narrated the sordid details of the alleged rape by her adoptive brother, but
also when she claimed that she made up her previous rape charges out of
anger. As such, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted
accused-appellant even after examining the young witness as she made a
complete turnaround and admitted to perjury. The legal adage that the trial
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds
an entirely new significance in this case where AAA was subjected to
grueling cross examinations, redirect examinations, and re-cross
examinations both as a prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial
court found that the private complainants testimony for the prosecution was
the one that was worthy of belief.
However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, it is clear to this
Court which of the narrations of AAA was sincere and which was
concocted. AAAs testimony for the prosecution, which was taken when she
was in the custody of the DSWD, was clear, candid, and bereft of material
discrepancies. All accused-appellant can harp on in his appellants brief
was AAAs failure to recall the length of the knife used in the assaults, a
minor and insignificant detail not material to the elements of the crime of
rape. She remained steadfast on cross-examination even as defense
counsel tried to discredit her by bringing up her dark past of being sexually
molested by the accused-appellants father when she was seven years
old. This is in stark contrast to her testimony for the defense, where AAA,
now living with accused-appellants family, claimed that she fabricated a
revolting tale of rape simply because accused-appellant made her do
laundry. AAAs recantation even contradicts the testimony of accusedappellant himself. While AAA claims in her retraction that she had
consensual sex with her brother, accused-appellant testified that they
merely kissed and that AAAs purported motive for the rape charges was
monetary.
As furthermore observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
the cross-examination of AAA as a defense witness revealed that it was
taken at a time when AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay with
the family of accused-appellant and upon a reliance on the familys implied
commitment to send accused-appellant to Mindanao:
PROS. JOSON:
Q: Where are you staying at present?
A: In our house, sir.
Q: And your house where you were staying is the house of the parents of
the accused?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you dont have any relatives where you can go and stay except from
that house?
A: None, sir.
Q: Where [are] your parents?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: Are they all dead or still alive?
A: They are deceased, sir.
Q: All?
A: Both are deceased, sir.
Q: Do you mean to say that do you have full blood brother and sister?
A: They all separated, sir.
Q: Do you know where they were living?
A: No, sir.
Q: From the time you were released from the DSWD you are alone by
yourself?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the person[s] who are now taking care of you are giving you shelter
and everyday foods [sic] from the family of the accused, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Ms. Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will be dismissed because you
testify today[, would] you admit for a fact that he [was] also staying in the
house where you are staying now?
A: No, sir.
Q: Where will he stay?
A: In Mindanao, sir.
Q: Because that was one of the promise or commitment of the family of the
accused, is it not?
A: No, sir.
Q: And how did you know he will stay in Mindanao?
A: Because my other Kuya will not allow him to stay in the house, sir.
Q: Because your other Kuya does not like Aniceto Bulagao to do the things
that you have complaint [sic] against him, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what you are isinusumbong is the case today against him, is it not?

A: Yes, sir.[31]
Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial
court that he was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree
with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental
condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape
incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.
[32]
Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accusedappellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a
complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that
the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. [33] Only when
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission
of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.
[34]

As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty

of death for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty
to reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. It
should be noted at this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance
which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still
cause the award of moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased
each from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing jurisprudence. [35]
In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by the
use of a deadly weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when committed with
the use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. This crime was proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001,
which was alleged to have occurred on June 17, 2000. Since no other
qualifying or aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information, the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant used
a knife on June 17, 2000, she said that she hid said knife before June 29,
2000, the date of Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001. [36] As such, the crime that
was proven in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by
any circumstance affecting criminal liability.However, simple rape is also
punishable by reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B.
In both cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed even
without the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the
award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, both for each count of rape. [37] In
addition, we have held that since exemplary damages are corrective in

nature, the same can be awarded, not only in the presence of an

aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.
[38]
This Court believes that the conduct of accused-appellant herein, who
raped her minor adoptive sister twice, falls under this category and is
therefore liable for exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for
each count of rape, in line with existing jurisprudence. [39]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 finding
accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, for each count of rape is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA the
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape, in
addition to the amountsawarded by the Court of Appeals, namely: civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, both for each count of rape;and
2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[1]

Rollo, pp. 2-20; penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo

with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Hakim S. Abdulwahid,
concurring.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 44-54.
[3]
The real names of the victim and her family, with the exception of
accused-appellant, are withheld per Republic Act No. 7610 and Republic
Act No. 9262, as held in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19
September 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[4]
Records, Volume 1, p. 1.
[5]
Id., Volume 2, p. 1.
[6]
TSN, August 7, 2001, p. 3.
[7]
TSN, May 8, 2001, p. 5.
[8]
Id. at 6-7.
[9]
Id. at 7-11; TSN, June 15, 2001, pp. 2-3.
[10]
TSN, June 15, 2001, pp. 3-9.
[11]
Id. at 13-14.
[12]
TSN, August 7, 2001, pp. 3-7.
[13]
TSN, October 15, 2001, p. 5.
[14]
TSN, January 29, 2002, p. 6.
[15]
TSN, March 5, 2003, pp. 3-5.
[16]
Id. at 5-8.

[17]

Id. at 9-10.
TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 2-4.
[19]
TSN, June 15, 2005, p. 5.
[20]
CA rollo, pp. 16-17.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Rollo, p. 19.
[24]
Id. at 27-29, 38-40.
[25]
People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 596,
607-608.
[26]
Baldeo v. People, 466 Phil. 845-857 (2004).
[27]
328 Phil. 445 (1996).
[28]
Id. at 468.
[29]
G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 638.
[30]
Id. at 649-650.
[31]
TSN, March 5, 2003, pp. 5-8.
[32]
People v. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 510, 519.
[33]
People v. Danao, G.R. No. 96832, November 19, 1992, 215 SCRA 795,
801.
[34]
People v. Condino, 421 Phil. 213, 221 (2001).
[35]
People v. Manulit, G.R. No. 192581, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA
426, 439.
[36]
TSN, June 15, 2001, p. 16.
[37]
People v. Manulit, supra note 35.
[38]
People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA
807, 820.
[39]
Id. at 821.
[18]

FIRST DIVISION
NILO OROPESA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 184528

Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

CIRILO OROPESA,
Respondent.
April 25, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure of the Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008, as well as the
Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA. The Court of Appeals issuances affirmed the Order [3] dated
September 27, 2006 and the Order[4] dated November 14, 2006 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc.
Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a
widower), and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent)
Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and
raffled off to Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has
been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10)
years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003,
that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident
after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was
observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of
failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical
condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and
has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him,
particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a
quo set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to
conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted
her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The
Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any
finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social
worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental
Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his

testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the
(respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May
29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal
offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the
petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the
presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered;
(2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3)
To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents)
Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to
Evidence dated July 23, 2006.[5] (Citations omitted.)
The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated
September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide
sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent
to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositors
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED. [6]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in
an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitionermovant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his
personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms
its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.[7]
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his
appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February
29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED.
The assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and
November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED. [8]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by
the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September
16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT
PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES
OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9]
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition
to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the
Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and
reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court
which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by
him showing respondents incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature and purpose of
guardianship in the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is
designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any
assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that
while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates
not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.[11]
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if
the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons
who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or
other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision
reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word
incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of

age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby
an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent should
be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence. [12] We consider that
evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at
bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore,
should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his
Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:
a.
Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been
sickly for over ten (10) years already;
b.
During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes
Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former
colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for
payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had
substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to cover his
medical expenses;
c.
Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to
lack of care and management;
d.
The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid
and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay
the necessary taxes;
e.
Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta
car for the reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but
when the car had been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle
and refused to account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;
f.
Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under
his name and his daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;
g.
There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen
knife to stab himself upon the orders of his girlfriend during one of their
fights;
h.
Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of
groceries and furniture, despite protests from his children. [14]

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners

lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to respondent,
petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence
that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is
incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental
condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document
presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said
document, entitled Report of Neuropsychological Screening, [15] were
quoted by respondent in his Memorandum [16] to illustrate that said report in
fact favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and
participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in
his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his
articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains
that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and
keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in
visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using
tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the
Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest
effective solutions to problem situations. x x x.[17]
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his
proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by
himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and
personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any
expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of
petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to
evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a
formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of
certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his fathers and his
sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing
payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in
any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for
himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned
Report of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition
for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as
evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was

ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding
memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that
supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the
proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that where the
sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
persons state of mental sanity will suffice. [18]
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable
September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that
petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and,
likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondents
physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which
states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional,
and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary,
Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report
which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most
of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and
(3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that
Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly
impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation
of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able. [19] (Citation omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.
[20]
We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional
circumstances;[21] however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It
is also long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such
findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and
are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the
evidence on record.[22] We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower
court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents
demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If

the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he

shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in
an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue.[23] We have also held that a demurrer to evidence
authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. [24]
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the
petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his
evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence
other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a
defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated
September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1]

Rollo, pp. 72-83; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with

Associate Justices Lucenito N. Tagle and Agustin S. Dizon, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 85-86.
[3]
Id. at 457-460.
[4]
Id. at 468-469.
[5]
Id. at 73-75.
[6]
Id. at 460.
[7]
Id. at 469.
[8]
Id. at 82.
[9]
Id. at 667.
[10]
212 Phil. 346 (1984).
[11]
Id. at 352.
[12]
Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, 164 Phil. 55, 70 (1976), citing Yangco v.
Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190 (1915).
[13]
Rollo, pp. 653-682.
[14]
Id. at 659.
[15]
Records, pp. 10-13.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 684-705.
[17]
Records, pp. 11-12.
[18]
Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 and 169217, August
7, 2009, 595 SCRA 464, 473-474.
[19]
Rollo, p. 468.

[20]

Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011,
641 SCRA 148, 155.
[21]
Heirs of Jose Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA
141, 147.
[22]
Maxwell Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 179395,
December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 653, 658.
[23]
Republic v. Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., G.R. No. 164800, July 22, 2009,
593 SCRA 404, 422.
[24]
Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 806,
822.

FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff -Appellee,

- versus -

G.R. No. 188978

Present:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
Acting Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PERLAS-BERNABE,** JJ.
Promulgated:

MARCIAL BAYRANTE Y
BOAQUINA,
June 13, 2012
Accused-Appellant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision [1] dated November 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02778, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina, which affirmed with modification the Joint
Judgment[2] dated February 7, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31 in Criminal Case Nos. P-3286 & P3287. The trial court found appellant Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of Rape as defined
and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.

The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed November 11, 2008
Decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On April 3, 2000, AAA[3] filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pili,
Camarines, two (2) separate complaints against Accused-Appellant Marcial
Bayrante y Boaquina for the crime of Rape. Finding probable cause that
the Accused-Appellant may have committed the crimes charged, the
Presiding Judge of the MTC ordered the filing of the appropriate
Information(s), to which the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor concurred.
Consequently, on September 4, 2002, two (2) separate Informations were
filed before the RTC charging the Accused-Appellant of two (2) counts of
Rape under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353. The Information in Crim. Case No. P-3286, which
was raffled off to Br. 31, reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening of February 19, 2002 at Brgy.
Old San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design using
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with his niece [AAA], a 20[-]year[-]old
mental retardate whose mental age is 9 to 10 years of age, against her will,
to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other Information, which was raffled off to Br. 32 of the RTC and
docketed as Crim. Case No. P-3287, is similarly worded as to date, place,
the elements of the crime charged, and the persons involved, except for the
time of the commission of the crime, which is at about 10:00 oclock in the
evening of February 19, 2002.
As the cases involved the same parties, cause of action, and reliefs sought,
a consolidation thereof was decreed. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant,
duly assisted by counsel during the arraignment, pleaded not guilty to both
charges. After the pre-trial, proceedings on the merits ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution:
AAA testified that at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of February 19, 2002,
the Accused-Appellant brought her to Poblacion, Pili, Camarines Sur,
particularly to a house, which she described to have many rooms. Thereat,
the Accused-Appellant undressed her and himself, laid on top of her, and
inserted his penis inside her vagina, during which she felt pain in her organ.
She resisted the Accused-Appellants ravage acts by kicking him several
times, but was overcome with fear because he had a knife about five (5)
inches long. After an hour or so, or at about 9:00 or 10:00 oclock in the
same evening, the Accused-Appellant again raped her by undressing her
and inserting his penis into her vagina. Again, she felt pain in her vagina.

Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone

about the incident.
AAA also testified, among others, that the Accused-Appellant took her away
from their house in one (1) evening of February 2002 when her parents
were then already asleep. They walked the streets and later rode a Palces
bus in which no other passengers were on board as it was already
nighttime.
BBB, mother of AAA, stated in open court that the Accused-Appellant, who
had been staying in their house, is AAAs uncle because the AccusedAppellant and her husband, CCC, are first cousins. Preliminarily, BBB
testified that AAA, who was born on April 16, 1982, attained an educational
level of Grade 6 only because of her low comprehension and that she
cannot even be relied upon to run errands as she can only follow simple
instructions or tasks if well-explained to her. AAA is unlike any normal child
because she cries and scampers away when there are visitors around; she
has never attended any party, dance events, or any social gathering; and
had poor grades in school.
BBB also testified that the Accused-Appellant disappeared in the evening of
February 14, 2002, together with her daughter, AAA. She and CCC looked
for their whereabouts, but located them only on February 20, 2002, in
Poblacion, Pili, Camarines Sur. When they saw AAA and the AccusedAppellant standing near a market, waiting for a ride going to Manapao,
Minalabac, Camarines Sur, they immediately approached and embraced
AAA and took her away from the latter. Forthwith, they reported the matter
to the Barangay Tanod of the place whereupon the Accused-Appellant was
brought to the police station for questioning.
At home, BBB interviewed her daughter as to where the Accused-Appellant
brought her, to which AAA replied that she was brought to a certain place in
Pili, Camarines Sur, where the Accused-Appellant raped her twice and
threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident. Upon learning
the same, she brought AAA to Dr. Pablo B. Filio, Jr. (Dr. Filio) on the
following day for a physical examination and, thereafter, to Dr. Imelda
Escuadra (Dr. Escuadra) for further check-up.
Dr. Escuadra, a Medical Specialist II at the Bicol Medical Center and in
charge of the Women and Children Protection Unit, particularly in the
psychiatric evaluation and management of patients, is the one who
conducted psychiatric and psychological tests on AAA. Dr. Escuadra
testified that AAA suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She
also diagnosed AAA with mild mental retardation because of her intellectual
quotient (IQ) of only 55, which meant that her mental age is equivalent to
that of nine (9) to ten (10) year old child. Dr. Escuadra elaborated that the
psychiatric tests and psychological tests performed on AAA are different
from each other because the former refers to the examination of the
patients mental capacity while the latter refers to the evaluation of the

patients intelligence quotient. She also averred that AAA was poor in
arithmetic and economics; that it took her some time to answer even simple
questions; that her answers were short and monosyllabic; and that AAA
cooperated during the sessions only when BBB is present. Finally, Dr.
Escuadra testified that AAA disclosed to her the events that transpired
during the rape incident in February 2002.
Dr. Filio, an Assistant City Health Officer in Iriga City who conducted a
physical examination on AAA, testified in fine that he did not find any
laceration on the victims vagina or seminal fluid inside it.
Finally, Carlos Bayrante, an uncle of the Accused-Appellant, corroborated
BBBs testimony that at about 7:00 oclock in the morning of February 20,
2002, they saw AAA and the Accused-Appellant together. He wondered
why the two (2) were together, but he did not bother to ask anyway.
The Version of the Defense:
The Accused-Appellant testified that he and CCC are cousins and that he
stayed in the house of the latter and his [CCCs] family since October 2001
to help in lumber-cutting. He denied forcing AAA into a relationship with him
and added that during his stay with CCCs family, he courted a female
neighbor with whom AAA later quarreled because [AAA] had feelings for
him. He dissuaded her at first, but AAA threatened to commit suicide if they
do not become sweethearts. He even consulted a friend for he entertained
the idea that AAA might actually carry out her threat to commit suicide.
Also, on one occasion, AAA went inside his bedroom and suggested that
they should leave the place since her parents will not approve of their
relationship.
The Accused-Appellant further testified that on or about February 9, 2002,
he and AAA left the house, stopped by at Baao and proceeded to Pili,
Camarines Sur at about 5:00 or 6:00 oclock the following morning. They
first went to his friends house where AAA changed her clothes and, later, to
his uncles house in Minalabac, Camarines Sur, where he left AAA because
he had to go back to Baao to get his own clothes. He returned to his uncles
house in the afternoon of the same day and stayed there with AAA for five
(5) more days. While in Manapao, AAA suggested that they go to the office
of the Barangay Captain to execute an affidavit to the effect that AAAs act
of going with him was voluntary.
The Accused-Appellant further testified that he and AAA went to Old San
Roque when they learned that the latters parents were looking for them.
They checked in at El Alma Hotel in Pili, Camarines Sur, where they spent
the night and checked out of the following morning on February 20, 2002.
In the said morning, however, when they went to the house of his cousin,
William Raon (Raon), to pick up their personal belongings, AAAs parents
were there.

Marilyn Mendoza (Mendoza) testified that she personally knows AAA as

she (Mendoza) was previously introduced to her by the Accused-Appellant.
The next time that she met AAA was sometime on February 12 or 13, 2002
when the Accused-Appellant requested if they could stay at her (Mendoza)
parents house. She, however, refused to entertain them because her
parents will not approve of it. Thus, AAA and the Accused-Appellant stayed
there only for a while.
Raon, a Barangay Tanod in Old San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, testified
that at about 6:30 in the morning of February 19, 2002, he was in front of
the store of his relative in Old San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, when the
Accused-Appellant arrived together with a woman (referring to AAA). He
noticed that when the Accused-Appellant left some things in the store, the
latters right arm was placed on AAAs shoulder. When he saw them again at
about 5:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, in front of the public
market, the Accused-Appellants right arm was lazing on the womans
shoulder while the latter were leaning on the Accused-Appellants shoulder.
At around 7:00 oclock in the morning of even date, BBB and her husband
CCC approached him and sought his help in apprehending the AccusedAppellant on the allegation that the latter raped their daughter. As the
Accused-Appellant was only about ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters away from
him, he called the former and told him to place his hands on his head. He
then conducted a body search, and thereafter, brought him to the police
station in Pili, Camarines Sur, for an investigation. The woman, who was
with the Accused-Appellant at the time, said that she will go with him at the
police station because they love each other.
Barangay Captain Zenaida Regis (Brgy. Capt. Regis) of Barangay
Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, testified that on February 19, 2002,
the Accused-Appellant, together with AAA, came to her office requesting
the preparation of an affidavit to the effect that AAA voluntarily went with the
Accused-Appellant. While interviewing AAA, Brgy. Capt. Regis noticed that
it took some time for AAA to answer the question of whether or not she was
forced to go with the Accused-Appellant. She qualified, however, that AAA
finally answered in the negative.[4] (Citations omitted.)
After due proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. P-3286 and P-3287, the trial
court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of Rape that were charged against him. We quote the dispositive
portion of the trial courts Joint Judgment dated February 7, 2007 here:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered
convicting the accused for TWO (2) Counts of RAPE and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each count. To pay [AAA]
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count, or in
the total amount of P250,000.00.

With cost de oficio.[5]

Unperturbed, appellant elevated his case to the Court of Appeals but the
trial courts ruling was merely affirmed with modification by the appellate
court in its Decision dated November 11, 2008. The appellate court
disallowed the award of exemplary damages for the reason that the same
may be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances exist
and that no such circumstance is present in the case at bar. The dispositive
portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) as
exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.[6]
Thus, appellant interposed this appeal before this Court. He merely
adopted his Appellants Brief with the Court of Appeals and no longer filed a
supplemental brief on the belief that the Appellants Brief had adequately
discussed all matters that are pertinent to his defense. In the present
appeal, he put forth a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WHOSE GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[7]
In his Brief, appellant maintains that AAA was his lover and that she
voluntarily eloped with him as evidenced by the affidavit she signed before
Brgy. Capt. Regis.Furthermore, appellant argues that the prosecution failed
to establish the mental state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that he
raped a woman who is of the legal age but otherwise deprived of reason. In
other words, he asserts that the prosecution was not able to prove that AAA
suffers from mental retardation. For these reasons, appellant urges this
Court to exculpate him from guilt.
We are not persuaded.
The provision of law pertinent in this case is Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, which states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1.
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a.

Through force, threat or intimidation;

b.
When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;

c.
authority;

By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

d.
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
2.
By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is settled in jurisprudence that, under the foregoing provision of law,
carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency is considered rape
because such a person is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. [8] In
a recent case, we had declared that in cases of rape involving a victim
suffering from mental retardation, proof of force or intimidation is not
necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual
congress between the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental
retardation of the victim.[9]
Previously in People v. Dalandas,[10] we described in detail the nature of
mental retardation as well as its different degrees as defined in the modern
and the old intelligence quotient (IQ) scales:
Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early
childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured
by standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily
demands of the individuals own social environment. Commonly, a mental
retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological,
as well as impaired learning capacity.
Although mental retardation is often used interchangeably with mental
deficiency, the latter term is usually reserved for those without recognizable
brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their level
of intellectual function are illustrated, thus:
Mental Retardation
LEVEL DESCRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT
(IQ RANGE)
I Profound Below 20
II Severe 20-35
III Moderate 36-52
IV Mild 53-68

A normal mind is one which in strength and capacity ranks reasonably well
with the average of the great body of men and women who make up
organized human society in general, and are by common consent
recognized as sane and competent to perform the ordinary duties and
assume the ordinary responsibilities of life.
The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of
mental retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0-19, and a maximum
intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old
child; (b) imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function
in adult life equivalent to that of the average seven-year old child;
(c) moron orfeebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum
intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the average twelveyear old child. Psychiatrists and psychologists apply the term borderline
intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89. In People v. Palma, we ruled
that a person is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female
who was suffering from a borderline mental deficiency.[11]
In the case at bar, the undisputed expert testimony of Dr. Imelda Escuadra,
a Medical Specialist II and officer-in-charge of the Women and Children
Protection Unit at theBicol Medical Center who personally conducted the
psychiatric tests on AAA, clearly established that the victim is afflicted with
mild mental retardation. She further testified that AAA was also suffering
from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that AAA possesses an IQ
of 55 with a mental age equivalent to that of a normal 9 to 10-year-old
person.[12]
In an attempt to discredit Dr. Escuadras testimony, appellant argued that
Dr. Escuadra admitted that the psychological test result was only furnished
to her by the psychologist who conducted AAAs psychological exam and
that the said psychologist was not presented in court. [13] We find this
argument unmeritorious. What was clear from Dr. Escuadras testimony was
that her psychiatric evaluation yielded the same diagnosis as the
psychological examination with respect to the victims mental retardation.
[14]
The presentation of the psychologist who conducted the psychological
examination could be dispensed with as the same would have merely been
corroborative.
In any event, notwithstanding the fact that the determination of mental
retardation is deeply rooted in medical psychology, we had previously ruled
that evidence other than a psychometric evaluation can prove mental
retardation or abnormality.[15] Furthermore, we held that mental retardation
can be proved by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as
the testimony of witnesses and even the observation of the trial court.
[16]
We find no error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it likewise
gave weight to the testimony of BBB (AAAs mother) regarding AAAs

difficulties in school due to low comprehension and failure to complete even

simple chores.[17]
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the mental retardation
of the victim was not proven, we likewise uphold the appellate court in
finding that AAAs testimony adequately showed how appellant utilized force
and intimidation to succeed in having carnal knowledge with her. AAA
testified that she initially resisted appellants carnal desire but was
eventually overcome by the latter because he used a knife to threaten
her. At one point in her testimony, AAA could not continue with her narration
of the events that transpired during the alleged rape incidents as she was
overwhelmed by emotion, even weeping on the witness stand.
Consequently, it was necessary for the trial court to call a recess in order to
give AAA the chance to collect herself. These were evident in the following
excerpts from the court transcript:
Pros. Solano:
Q Miss Witness, sometime on February 19, 2002 at about 8:00 oclock in
the evening do you recall where were you?
A I was at Centro Pili, sir.
Q You are referring to Pili, Camarines Sur?
A Yes, sir.
Q Particularly where in Pili, Camarines Sur were you at that time?
A In the house.
Q Why were you in that house located at Pili, Camarines Sur on that
particular date and time?
A I was brought there by Marcial.
Q When you said Marcial you are referring to Marcial the accused in these
two (2) cases?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, have you gone to El Alma Hotel?
Atty. Obias:
No basis, your honor.
Pros. Solano:

Preliminary, your honor.

Court:
Reform.
Pros. Solano:
Q As you were there as you said tell us what happened?
A I was undressed.
Q By whom?
A By Marcial, sir.
Q After you were undressed by Marcial, tell us what happened?
A He got on top of me, sir.
Q After Marcial Bayrante got on top of you as you said tell us what
happened next?
Pros. Solano:
I will withdraw that question.
Pros. Solano:
Q What happened to Marcial Bayrante when you were already undressed,
what did he do, if any?
A He also undressed himself, sir.
Q After Marcial Bayrante undressed himself as you said, what next
happened?
A (At this juncture, the witness is crying.)
Court:
Q Why are you crying?
A Because I remembered what he did to me, your honor.
Q And so tell us what did he do to you, the accused in this case?
A (No answer.)
Court:

Continue.
Pros. Solano:
Q You testified earlier that you were undressed by the accused and he
himself undressed also and so what happened to his penis and your
vagina, if any?
A (No answer.)
Atty. Obias:
Maybe, your honor we can suspend the proceedings.
Court:
To give the private complainant witness to regain composure as she is
crying and cannot answer to the question of the public prosecutor, the
hearing is suspended for ten (10) minutes after which we will resume the
hearing of the same.
Hearing resumed at 10:00 in the morning.
Pros. Solano:
Q Miss witness, you testified that accused undressed you and after he
undressed you he also undressed himself, what happened next, if any?
A He inserted his penis to my vagina.
Q So what did you feel, if any?
A I felt painful.
Q Now, at about 10:00 oclock of the same night, February 19, 2002, where
were you at that time?
A I was still at the house, sir.
Q Tell us what happened, if any?
A Again, I was undressed by accused.
Q After you were undressed again by the accused as you said, what else
happened, if any?
A Again he inserted his penis to my vagina.

Q Again, what did you feel?

A It was painful, sir.
Q If you can estimate the penis of the accused inserted to your vagina on
February 19, 2002 at Pili, Camarines Sur as you can estimate these two (2)
insertion was made by the accused?
A (No answer.)
Q Now, after the accused inserted his penis to your vagina at 8:00 oclock
on February 19, 2002 in that house, what happened as you said was
painful?
A I got pregnant, sir.
Q And what happened to your pregnancy?
A And so I gave birth to a baby girl.
Q Do you know the name?
A Yes sir, Jose.
Court:
Q Where is now the child?
A He died.
Q When did your child died?
A Right after my delivery, your honor.
Court:
Continue.
Pros. Solano:
Q Do you have any death certificate?
A Yes sir, I have. (At this juncture, the witness is producing her birth
certificate.)
Q And so, as far as you can recall miss witness during these two (2)
incidents that the penis of the accused inserted to your vagina, did you not
resist?

A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened to your resistance?
A I was afraid.
Q Why were you afraid?
A Because he had with him a knife.
Q What kind of knife, how long was it?
A (At this juncture, the witness is demonstrating the length of the knife
which is about five (5) inches long including the handle.)
Court:
Q You said that you resisted how did you resist?
A (No answer.)
Q You said that when the accused inserted his penis to your vagina, how
were you resisted?
A I was kicking at him, your honor.
Q Was he hit when you kicked him?
A Yes, your honor.
Q How many times did you kick him?
A Many times, your honor.
xxxx
Court:
Q You said that you were raped, do you recall where was that house where
you were brought by the accused located?
A There at Pili, Camarines Sur.
Q Do you know who owns that house?
A No, your honor.
Q Can you describe that house?
A Plenty of rooms, your honor.

Q Does it has name?

A I was not able to see, your honor.
Q And you said you bore a child that died right after you gave birth tell us
the father of your child?
A (At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man who when asked his
name responded as Marcial Bayrante.)[18]
In People v. Manjares,[19] we reiterated the basic principles that:
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. There
is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by
holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and,
where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on the basis thereof. x x x.
That the victim suffers from a mental abnormality or deficiency would not
detract from the reliability of her testimony. We observed in a similar case
that:
While it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental retardate may be
difficult to determine, still, it can be ascertained by deducing from the
manner she testifies in court as to the surrounding facts of the crime
committed. For as long as her testimony is straightforward, candid and
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, and her
demeanor is consistent with one who has been a victim of rape, bolsters
her credibility with the verity born[e] out of human nature and experience,
thus, must be given full faith and credit.
Moreover, mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally
retarded [person] may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her
testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she
can make them known to the court.[20]
In People v. Arpon,[21] we discussed the jurisprudential principle of affording
great respect and even finality to the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the
credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's

observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often

accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the
witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or
the scant or full realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore,
can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance
and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of
the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and
detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application
where said findings are sustained by the [Court of Appeals]. [22]
We further agree with the Court of Appeals that AAAs emotional outburst
on the witness stand strengthens the trustworthiness of her
testimony. According to jurisprudence, the crying of a victim during her
testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity
borne out of human nature and experience. [23]
In a seemingly desperate effort to secure an acquittal, appellant maintains
that the alleged rape could not have occurred because both he and AAA
were lovers. In other words, he proffers the sweetheart theory as a defense
but his assertion is bereft of substantial proof. The appellate court did not
err in finding that the testimony of the witnesses presented by appellant
utterly failed to satisfactorily prove the alleged romantic relationship.
Witness Marilyn Mendozas testimony revealed that it was only appellant
who claimed that AAA was his sweetheart and that AAA never spoke to her
much less told her that both she and appellant were romantically involved
with each other.[24] Likewise, witness William Raons testimony is afflicted
with the same infirmity. He merely averred that he saw appellants arm on
AAAs shoulder and from that fact assumed that they had a
relationship. Still he admitted in open court that he had no personal
knowledge of the purported love affair between appellant and AAA. [25]
Neither could the purported affidavit signed by AAA before Brgy. Captain
Regis be relied upon by appellant. All that the affidavit stated was that AAA
voluntarily went with [appellant][26] but such statement does not preclude
that any sexual relation between them was not consensual. Moreover,
given AAAs mental state, it was highly doubtful that she understood the
significance of the affidavit that she signed or that she signed it
voluntarily. We note, too, Brgy. Captain Regiss testimony that (a) it was
appellant who insisted on the execution of the affidavit [27] and (b) the reason
AAA was asked to sign the affidavit was so that appellant would have no
responsibility or liability as regards AAA. [28]
We have previously held that:

For the [sweetheart] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed

relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to
adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no
probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a
corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by
tokens of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the
like.[29]
Significantly, this Court has decreed that even if the alleged romantic
relationship were true, this fact does not necessarily negate rape for a man
cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiance and worse, employ
violence upon her on the pretext of love because love is not a license for
lust.[30]
As to the civil liability, we affirm the trial courts award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages for each count of simple rape that
appellant had been proven to have committed. However, we disagree with
the Court of Appeals decision to delete the trial courts award of exemplary
damages in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein
exemplary damages are awarded in order to set a public example and to
protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation, we agree with the trial
court regarding the propriety of the award of exemplary damages but
increased the same from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 11,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02778 is
hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) Appellant Marcial Bayrante is ordered to pay Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages for each count of SIMPLE RAPE, and
(2) Appellant Marcial Bayrante is further ordered to pay the private
offended party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.

**

Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012.

Rollo, pp. 2-22; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with
Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Fernanda Lampas Peralta,
concurring.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 20-29.
[3]
In compliance with the rulings of this Court in People v.
Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA
419) and People v. Ching (G.R. No. 177150, November 22, 2007, 538
SCRA 117), applying provisions of Republic Act No. 7610, Republic Act No.
9262 and the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children (A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC), the Court of Appeals withheld the real names of the
victim and members of her immediate family and replaced them with
initials.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 3-11.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 29.
[6]
Rollo, p. 21.
[7]
CA rollo, p. 50.
[8]
People v. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011.
[9]
Id.
[10]
442 Phil. 688 (2002).
[11]
Id. at 695-696.
[12]
TSN, August 8, 2003.
[13]
CA rollo, p. 60.
[14]
TSN, August 8, 2003, p. 6.
[15]
People v. Almacin, 363 Phil. 18, 28 (1999).
[16]
People v. Dumanon, 401 Phil. 658, 669-670 (2000).
[17]
Rollo, p. 14.
[18]
TSN, March 16, 2004, pp. 6-13.
[19]
G.R. No. 185844, November 23, 2011, citing People v. Felan, G.R. No.
176631, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 449, 452 and People v. Bongat, G.R.
No. 184170, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 496, 505-506.
[20]
People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 188855, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA
672, 685.
[21]
G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011, citing People v. Condes, G.R.
No. 187077, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 312, 322-323.
[22]
Id.
[23]
People v. Atadero, G.R. No. 183455, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 327,
342.
[24]
TSN, June 29, 2006, pp. 16-20.
[25]
TSN, May 6, 2005, pp. 14-16.
[26]
CA rollo, p. 69.
[27]
TSN, August 16, 2005, pp. 9 and 16.
[28]
Id. at 24-25.
[29]
People v. Dahilig, G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011, 651 SCRA 778, 788.
[30]
People v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 176740, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 535,
548.
[31]
See People v. De la Paz, G.R. No. 182412, November 28, 2011; People
v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 185206, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 437, 450.
[1]

G.R. No. 166803

October 11, 2012

CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, Petitioners,

vs.
EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor
EIMAEREACH ROSE DE GARCIA TERINGTERING, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated July H, 2004 and
Resolution2 dated January 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 79966, setting aside the Resolutions dated February 20,
20033 and July 31, 20034 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), which affirmed in toto the Decision5 dated February 12, 2002 of
the Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto
Teringtering (Jacinto), and in behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint
against petitioner Crewlink, Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign principal Gulf
Marine Services for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child,
burial assistance, damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas
employment contract with Crewlink, Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign
principal Gulf Marine Services, the details of which are as follows:
Duration of Contract

: 12 months

Position

: Oiler

Basic Monthly Salary

: US $385.00

Hours of Work

: 48 hrs/wk

Overtime

: US $115.50

Vacation Leave with pay : 1 mo. leave after

12 months
Point of Hire

: Manila, Philippines

xxxx
Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was
subjected to a pre-employment medical examination wherein he was
pronounced as "fit to work." Thus, her husband joined his vessel of
assignment and performed his duties as Oiler.
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry of
Health of the United Arab Emirates wherein it was stated that Jacinto died
on April 9, 2001 due to asphyxia of drowning. Later on, an embalming and
sealing certificate was issued after which the remains of Jacinto was
brought back to the Philippines.
After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners
the payment of death compensation in the amount of US$50,000.00 and
burial expenses in the amount of US$1,000.00, as well as additional death
compensation in the amount of US$7,000.00, for the minor Eimaereach
Rose de Gracia Teringtering but was refused without any valid cause.
Hence, a complaint was filed against the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be
compensable it is enough that he died during the term of his contract and
while still on board. Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a
psychotic disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to his
jumping into the sea and his eventual death. Respondent further asserted
that her husbands death was not deliberate and not of his own will, but
was a result of a mental disorder, thus, compensable.
For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001,
around 8:20 p.m. while at Nasr Oilfield, the late Jacinto Teringtering
suddenly jumped into the sea, but the second engineer was able to recover
him. Because of said incident, one personnel was directed to watch
Jacinto.
However, around 10:30 p.m., while the boat dropped anchor south of Nasr
Oilfield and went on standby, Jacinto jumped off the boat again. Around
11:00 p.m., the A/B watchman reported that Jacinto was recovered but
despite efforts to revive him, he was already dead from drowning.
Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being
claimed, because Jacinto committed suicide. Despite the non-entitlement,
however, Teringtering was even given burial assistance in the amount of
P35,800.00 and P13,273.00 on May 21, 2001. She likewise received the
amount of US$792.51 representing donations from the GMS staff and crew.
Petitioner likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to moral and
exemplary damages, because petitioner had nothing to do with her late
husband's untimely demise as the same was due to his own doing.
As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C.
Morado's report on the incident, which we quote:

At arround 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr Complex w/ 1
passenger. 2018 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding to drop 1
passenger At 2020 hrs. Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering suddenly jump to the sea,
while the boat cast off from Nasr Complex boatlanding. And the second
Engr. Mr. Sudarto jump and recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering the oiler.
2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And that time
informed to GMS personnel about the accident, And we informed to A/B on
duty to watch Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2230 hrs. The A/B watch man
informed that Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering jump again to the sea. And that time
the wind NW 10-14 kts. and strong current. And the second Engr. jump to
the sea with life ring to recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2300 hrs. We
recovered Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering onboard the vessel and apply
Respiration Kiss of life Mouth to Mouth, And proceed to Nasr Complex to
take doctor.
2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board to
check the patient. 2330 hrs. As per Nasr Complex Doctor the patient was
already dead. Then informed to GMS personnel about the accident.
I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with the best
of my knowledge and reserve the right, modify, ratify and/or enlarge this
statement at any time and place, According to the law.6
In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing,
dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is
true that Jacinto Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract of
employment and that he died of asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was
the result of his deliberate or intentional jumping into the sea. Thus, his
death was directly attributable to him.
Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Court of Appeals and sought the nullification of the NLRC Resolution,
dated February 20, 2003, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision dated
February 12, 2002.
On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of
the NLRC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20,
2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Crewlink, Inc.
and Gulf Marine Services are hereby DECLARED jointly and severally
liable and, accordingly, are directed to pay deceased Jacinto Teringtering's
beneficiaries, namely respondent Editha Teringtering and her daughter
Eimaereach Rose de Gracia, the Philippine Currency equivalent to
US$50,000.00, and an additional amount of US$7,000, both at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.

SO ORDERED.7
Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as
petitioner, raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI INCLUDES
CORRECTION OF THE NLRC'S EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
AND FACTUAL FINDINGS BASED THEREON OR CORRECTION
OF ERRORS OF FACTS IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC;
II
WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY FAILING TO
TAKE SUCH MEASURES FOR THE COMFORT AND SAFETY OF
THE DECEASED SEAFARER, AMONG OTHERS, WHICH WERE
ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN THE ASSAILED CA DECISION AND
WHICH ACTUALLY REFERRED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY THE
SHIPMATES OF THE DECEASED, BUT POSITIVELY ATTRIBUTED
TO PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH THE LATTER ARE NOW
BEING HELD LIABLE ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT SOURCE OF OBLIGATION THAT IS PREDICATED ON
QUASI-DELICT OR TORT AS PROVIDED UNDER OUR CIVIL
LAWS AND, THUS, HAS NO REFERENCE TO OUR LABOR CODE;
III
WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A
RESULT OF A DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS OWN LIFE, AN
ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DECEASED, AND NO
OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO RULED BY THE LABOR ARBITER
AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS DEATH NOT COMPENSABLE.
Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering that
the latter's death resulted from his willful act. It argued that the rule that the
employer becomes liable once it is established that the seaman died during
the effectivity of his employment contract is not absolute. The employer
may be exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the seaman's
death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful
act, as in this case.
We find merit in the petition.
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law in the absence of any showing that the factual findings
complained of are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly
erroneous. We are not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in
labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined

to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even
finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave
abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at
arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record. This case is no
different.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an
accident but was deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into
the sea and it was on his second attempt that caused his death. The
accident report of Captain Oscar Morado narrated in detail the
circumstances that led to Jacinto's death. The circumstances of Jacinto's
actions before and at the time of his death were likewise entered in the
Chief Officer's Log Book and were attested to by Captain Morado before
the Philippine Embassy. Even the A/B personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was
tasked to watch over Jacinto after his first attempt of committing suicide,
testified that despite his efforts to prevent Jacinto from jumping again
overboard, Jacinto was determined and even shoved him and jumped
anew which eventually caused his death.
Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the
evidence presented as well as the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is
the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by
substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. More so,
when there is no showing that said findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record.
Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly
inapplicable in this case. For precisely, the issue for resolution here is the
obligation of the employer to its employee should the latter die during the
term of his employment. The relationship between the petitioner and
Jacinto is one based on contract of employment and not one of contract of
carriage.
Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment
Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board
Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC), it is provided that:
xxxx
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman,
provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity,
disability or death is directly attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee
should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of
a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his

heirs for death compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute.
The employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that
the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his
deliberate or willful act.
In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's
death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into
the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that her
husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any
medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The
record does not even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start.
Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the
same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity
is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of
the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind
of another, the state or condition of a persons mind can only be measured
and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is
intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has
rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness
own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist.8 No such evidence was presented to support respondent's
claim.
The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial
evidence from which reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for
can be drawn, the Court is left with no choice but to deny her petition, lest
an injustice be caused to the employer. Otherwise slated, while it is true
that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of
the POEA-SEC must be construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino
seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels,
still the rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and
existing jurisprudence.9
WHEREFORE, the petition Is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, dated July 8, 2004, and its January 17,
2005 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The February 20, 2003 and July 31, 2003 Resolutions of
the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR OFW Case No.
(M) 01-06-1144-00, affirming the February 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
*

Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1299 dated

August 28, 2012.

Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with

Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Danilo B. Pine, concurring;
rollo, pp. 40-47.
2

Id. at 49-50.

CA rollo, pp. 27-37.

Id. at 38-39.

Id. at 21-26.

Id. at 93.

Rollo, p. 46.

People v. Florendo, G.R. No. 136845, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA

132, 139; 459 Phil. 470, 478-479 (2003).
9

Panganiban v. Tara Trading Shipmanagement, Inc. and Shinline

SDN BHD, G.R. No. 187032, October 18, 2010, 633 SCRA 353, 369.

c) Deaf-Mutism
NCC Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
Xxxxxx
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know
how to write. (1263a)
NCC Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must
personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate
two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable
manner, the contents thereof. (n)
NCC Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen
years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and
write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article
805 of this Code. (n)
d) Prodigality

RULE 92
VENUE
Sec. 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." - Under this rule, the
word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,
even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation.
e) Civil Interdiction
RPC Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or temporal special
disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce
the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling
affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments
either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the
extent of such disqualification.
Art. 34. Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the
offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental
authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any
ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of
the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance
inter vivos.
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory
penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

G.R. No. 193237

October 9, 2012

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193536
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
These are two special civil actions for certiorari1 questioning the resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. No.
193237, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul the 10 May 2010
Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010
Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc, which both ordered the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation. In G.R.
No. 193536, Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges the 11 August 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which applied the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code in filling the vacancy in the Office of the
Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte created by the cancellation of
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy.
The Facts
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his
third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that
he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy,
Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced
to prisin mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in
Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not
yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had
already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked
Jalosjos probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino
and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that
Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated
that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification
filed against him on the same grounds.4
The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos criminal record
as follows:

As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of
robbery on January 22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco
Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his coaccused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this
decision to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9,
1973. It was only after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17,
1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of
Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his
Probation Officer, Jalosjos probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on
March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued.
Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator
Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr.,
had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. This Certification
was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the
disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in 2004, docketed as SPA No.
04-235.
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of
the Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod,
former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19,
2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the
terms and conditions of his probation. A portion of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan is quoted hereunder:
The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador
Jalosjos, Jr., unwarranted benefits and advantage because the subject
certification, which was issued by the accused without adequate or official
support, was subsequently utilized by the said probationer as basis of the Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to issue the
Order dated February 5, 2004 in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring
that said probationer has complied with the order of probation and setting aside
its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the warrant or [sic] arrest; and that said
Certification was also used by the said probationer and became the basis for the
Commission on Elections to deny in its Resolution of August 2, 2004 the petition
or [sic] private complainant James Adasa for the disqualification of the
probationer from running for re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City in the National
and Local Elections of 2004.5
The COMELECs Rulings
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardinos petition and
cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the
office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final
judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served."6 The
COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos certificate of compliance of
probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his
sentence. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of
one year, eight months and twenty days of prisin correccional as minimum, to

four years, two months and one day of prisin mayor as maximum. The
COMELEC First Division ruled that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his
disqualification as provided for in Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160."7
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos motion for
reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
With the proper revocation of Jalosjos earlier probation and a clear showing that
he has not yet served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for
Jalosjos to claim that his civil as well as political rights have been violated.
Having been convicted by final judgment,
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His
proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive
the Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality, and to
oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied
for utter lack of merit. Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and ordered to
CEASE and DESIST from occupying and discharging the functions of the Office
of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions of the Local
Government Code on succession apply.
SO ORDERED.8
Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while
Cardino filed his petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.
On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No.
193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated
August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC)
are hereby AFFIRMED.9
Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take
judicial notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved11 to
consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.Jalosjos then filed a
Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from the
position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation
was accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando
E. Yebes."12Jalosjos resignation was made "in deference with the provision of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to his candidacy as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."13
These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos resignation. In resolving
Jalosjos Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardinos Petition in
G.R. No. 193536, we address not only Jalosjos eligibility to run for public office
and the consequences of the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, but also
COMELECs constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws relating to the
conduct of elections.

The Issues
In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that
Jalosjos probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed
a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good
faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same
position from which he is now being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10
May 2010 and 11 August 2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure.
In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the
dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of the
Local Government Code on succession should apply.
This Courts Ruling
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for
any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was
never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a
result of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the
only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.
The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc. The dissenting opinions erroneously limit the remedy
against Jalosjos to disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and apply the rule on succession under the Local Government Code.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run
for public office is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of
candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a
right to run for the public office.14 If a candidate is not actually eligible because he
is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and
he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for
public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a
candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a
person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or
under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced

to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral

turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. x x x
Prisin mayor and temporary disqualification. The duration of the penalties of
prisin mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day
to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the
offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular
elective office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the
exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised

in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the
sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office
formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification.
The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public
office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of
such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisin mayor its accessory penalties. The penalty of prisin mayor
shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of
law,15 the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code,
temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right
to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office." The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as
that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised
Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,"
which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained
the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that
appellees conviction of a crime penalized with prisin mayor which carried the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and

Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he

had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of
imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the
convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised
Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This
accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised
Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should
be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word
"perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the
phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special
disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both
special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their
durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of
said penalty" which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual
or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold
public office perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this
accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article
32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of his perpetual special disqualification." Once the judgment of
conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the
convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality
of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public
office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to
hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of
conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility,

which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in Section
74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that
is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public
office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,17 the false
material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers
from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a
person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of
candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court
explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the
CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate
made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false,
the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate.18(Emphasis supplied)
Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisin mayor, to
which perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a
ground for a petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses
enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers
only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes
under the Revised Penal Code. For ready reference, we quote again Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or
if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including
the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the
offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs when it holds that
Jalosjos conviction for the crime of robbery under the Revised Penal Code is a
ground for "a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not for
cancellation of COC under Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that
offenses punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a
ground for a petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,19 the Court
declared:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and
not administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four
statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized
Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of,
or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is eligible
for the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidates allegiance
to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.20
We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for
mayor? The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was
not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made
a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility
of Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68
and not under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that
the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a ground under Section
78 without, however, saying under what specific provision of law a petition
against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate of candidacy.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material
representation arises from a crime penalized by prisin mayor, a petition under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor
his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple
remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. A void
certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was cancelled
because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate
of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos ineligibility
existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his

certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran
unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections Cardino who received the highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed
winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible22 should be limited to
situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the
time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law
that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally
the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in
the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in
the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or
before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for
that candidate are stray votes.23 If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should
also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very
beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid
certificates of candidacy for the same position.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run
for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of
conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public
office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to
other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the
law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment
on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC
because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."24 The
disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code,
as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement
and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will
result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior
perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as
mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce
and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu
proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED,

and the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10
May 2010 and 11 August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and the
COMELEC En Bane, respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010
elections and thus received the highest number of votes for Mayor. The
COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board of
Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor of Dapitan
City, Zamboanga del Norte.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of
Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government so they can cause
the arrest of, and enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to
his conviction for the crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 40-48; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp. 29-37.
Signed by Presiding Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, and
Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal.
2

Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 49-56; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp. 22-28.
Signed by Chairman Jose A.R. Melo, and Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco,
Elias R. Yusoph, and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal.
3

James A. Adasa v. Dominador Jalosjos, Jr., SPA No. 04-235. The

Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was promulgated on 2
August 2004, while the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc was
promulgated on 16 December 2006. Rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp. 45-46.
4

Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 50-51.

Id. at 46; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), p. 35.

Id. at 47; id. at 36.

Id. at 55-56; id. at 27-28.

Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), p. 360.

10

Id. at 373-393.

11

Rollo (G.R. No. 193536), p. 178.

12

Id. at 215.

13

Id. at 218.

The Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press 2010) defines

the word "eligible" as "having a right to do or obtain something."
14

15

People v. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636 (1935).

16

133 Phil. 770, 773-774 (1968).

17

G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 782.

18

Id. at 792-794.

19

442 Phil. 139, 177-178 (2002).

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey
the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities. I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
20

Bautista v. Commission on Elections, 359 Phil. 1, 16 (1998). See

Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 (1999); Gador v. Commission on
Elections, 184 Phil. 395 (1980).
21

Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 467 (1995); Labo, Jr. v.

Commission on Elections, 257 Phil. 1 (1989).
22

Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736, 24

April 2007, 522 SCRA 23.
23

24

CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(1).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. and Agapito Cardino were rivals in the mayoralty race
in Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Before election day, Cardino filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
against Jalosjos, alleging that the latter made a material misrepresentation in his
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) when he declared that he was eligible for the
position of mayor when, in fact, he was disqualified under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code for having been previously convicted by a final judgment for a
crime (robbery) involving moral turpitude.
In his defense, Jalosjos admitted his previous, conviction but argued that he had
been admitted to probation, which allegedly restored him to all his political rights.
Cardino rebutted Jalosjos' defense, citing a court order revoking the grant of
probation for Jalosjos' failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant
of probation.

On the very day of the election, the COMELEC resolved to grant Cardino's
petition and ordered the cancellation of Jalosjos' CoC. The COMELEC ruled that
the rules on succession would then apply. Both Cardino and Jalosjos came to the
Court for redress.
On February 22, 2011, the Court denied Jalosjos petition, prompting Jalosjos to
move for reconsideration. During the pendency of his motion, Jalosjos
manifested that he had already tendered his resignation from his office and that
the same was duly accepted by the governor of the province of Zamboanga del
Norte.
I dissent from the majoritys (i) position that the present case involves a
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy (CoC) rather than a case of
disqualification and (ii) conclusion that Cardino, the "second placer" in the 2010
elections for the mayoralty post of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, should be
the rightful Mayor. I submit that while Cardino intended to cancel Jalosjos CoC,
his petition alleged acts constituting disqualification as its ground. Thus, the case
should be resolved under the rules of disqualification, not from the point of a
cancellation of a CoC.
I point out in this Dissenting Opinion, as I did in the cases of Mayor Barbara Ruby
C. Talaga v. Commission on Elections, et al.1 and Efren Racel Aratea v.
Commission on Elections, et al.,2 that this case is best resolved through an
analytical approach that starts from a consideration of the nature of a CoC; the
distinctions between eligibility or lack of it and disqualification; the effects of
cancellation and disqualification; and the applicable remedies.
The CoC and the Qualifications for its Filing.
As I discussed in Talaga and Aratea, a basic rule and one that cannot be
repeated often enough is that the CoC is the document that creates the status of
a candidate. In Sinaca v. Mula,3 the Court described the nature of a CoC as
follows
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole
world of the candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement
of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his
candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name
of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office
address for all election purposes being as well stated.
Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions left to Congress the task of providing the
qualifications of local elective officials. Congress undertook this task by enacting
Batas Pambasa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337 (Local Government Code or LGC), B.P.
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code or OEC) and, later, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC 1991).4
Under Section 79 of the OEC, a political aspirant legally becomes a "candidate"
only upon the due filing of his sworn CoC.5 In fact, Section 73 of the OEC makes
the filing of the CoC a condition sine qua non for a person to "be eligible for any
elective public office"6 i.e., to be validly voted for in the elections. Section 76 of
the OEC makes it a "ministerial duty" for a COMELEC official "to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy"7 filed.

COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides what a CoC must contain or state:8
Section 2. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall
be under oath and shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office and constituency stated therein; that he is eligible for said office, his
age, sex, civil status, place and date of birth, his citizenship, whether natural-born
or naturalized; the registered political party to which he belongs; if married, the
full name of the spouse; his legal residence, giving the exact address, the
precinct number, barangay, city or municipality and province where he is
registered voter; his post office address for election purposes; his profession or
occupation or employment; that he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant
to a foreign country; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that
he will obey the laws, legal orders, decrees, resolution, rules and regulations
promulgated and issued by the duly-constituted authorities; that he assumes the
foregoing obligations voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate are true and correct to the best
of his own knowledge. [italics supplied]
From the point of view of the common citizen who wants to run for a local elective
office, the above recital contains all the requirements that he must satisfy; it
contains the basic and essential requirements applicable to all citizens to qualify
for candidacy for a local elective office. These are their formal terms of entry to
local politics. A citizen must not only possess all these requirements; he must
positively represent in his CoC application that he possesses them. Any falsity on
these requirements constitutes a material misrepresentation that can lead to the
cancellation of the CoC. On this point, Section 78 of the OEC provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. [italics, emphases
and underscores ours]
A necessarily related provision is Section 39 of LGC 1991 which states:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years
of age on election day. [italics ours]

Notably, Section 74 of the OEC does not require any negative qualification
except only as expressly required therein. A specific negative requirement refers
to the representation that the would-be candidate is not a permanent resident nor
an immigrant in another country. This requirement, however, is in fact simply part
of the positive requirement of residency in the locality for which the CoC is filed
and, in this sense, is not strictly a negative requirement. Neither does Section 74
require any statement that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground
for disqualification specifically enumerated by law, as disqualification is a matter
that the OEC and LGC 1991 separately deal with, as discussed below.
With the accomplishment of the CoC and its filing, a political aspirant officially
acquires the status of a candidate and, at the very least, the prospect of holding
public office; he, too, formally opens himself up to the complex political
environment and processes. The Court cannot be more emphatic in holding "that
the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the
electoral process."9
Pertinent laws10 provide the specific periods when a CoC may be filed; when a
petition for its cancellation may be brought; and the effect of its filing. These
measures, among others, are in line with the State policy or objective of ensuring
"equal access to opportunities for public service,"11 bearing in mind that the
limitations on the privilege to seek public office are within the plenary power of
Congress to provide.12
The Concept of Disqualification vis-a-vis
Remedy of Cancellation; and Effects of
Disqualification.
To disqualify, in its simplest sense, is (1) to deprive a person of a power, right or
privilege; or (2) to make him or her ineligible for further competition because of
violation of the rules.13 It is in these senses that the term is understood in our
election laws.
Thus, anyone who may qualify or may have qualified under the general rules of
eligibility applicable to all citizens (Section 74 of the OEC) may be deprived of the
right to be a candidate or may lose the right to be a candidate (if he has filed his
CoC) because of a trait or characteristic that applies to him or an act that can be
imputed to him as an individual, separately from the general qualifications that
must exist for a citizen to run for a local public office.
In a disqualification situation, the grounds are the individual traits or conditions of,
or the individual acts of disqualification committed by, a candidate as provided
under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC and Section 40 of LGC 1991, and which
generally have nothing to do with the eligibility requirements for the filing of a
CoC.14
Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC (together with Section 40 of LGC 1991, outlined
below) cover the following as traits, characteristics or acts of disqualification: (i)
corrupting voters or election officials; (ii) committing acts of terrorism to enhance
candidacy; (iii) overspending; (iv) soliciting, receiving or making prohibited
contributions; (v) campaigning outside the campaign period; (vi) removal,
destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda; (vii) committing
prohibited forms of election propaganda; (viii) violating rules and regulations on

election propaganda through mass media; (ix) coercion of subordinates; (x)

threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of
coercion; (xi) unlawful electioneering; (xii) release, disbursement or expenditure
of public funds; (xiii) solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the
day of the election; (xiv) declaration as an insane; and (xv) committing
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Section 40 of LGC 1991, on the other hand, essentially repeats those already in
the OEC under the following disqualifications:
a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded.
Together, these provisions embody the disqualifications that, by statute, can be
imputed against a candidate or a local elected official to deny him of the chance
to run for office or of the chance to serve if he has been elected.
A unique feature of "disqualification" is that under Section 68 of the OEC, it refers
only to a "candidate," not to one who is not yet a candidate. Thus, the grounds for
disqualification do not apply to a would-be candidate who is still at the point of
filing his CoC. This is the reason why no representation is required in the CoC
that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground for disqualification.
The time to hold a person accountable for the grounds for disqualification is after
attaining the status of a candidate, with the filing of the CoC.
To sum up and reiterate the essential differences between the eligibility
requirements and disqualifications, the former are the requirements that apply to,
and must be complied by, all citizens who wish to run for local elective office;
these must be positively asserted in the CoC.
The latter refer to individual traits, conditions or acts applicable to specific
individuals that serve as grounds against one who has qualified as a candidate to
lose this status or privilege; essentially, they have nothing to do with a
candidates CoC.

When the law allows the cancellation of a candidates CoC, the law considers the
cancellation from the point of view of those positive requirements that every
citizen who wishes to run for office must commonly satisfy. Since the elements of
"eligibility" are common, the vice of ineligibility attaches to and affects both the
candidate and his CoC. In contrast, when the law allows the disqualification of a
candidate, the law looks only at the disqualifying trait or condition specific to the
individual; if the "eligibility" requirements have been satisfied, the disqualification
applies only to the person of the candidate, leaving the CoC valid. A previous
conviction of subversion is the best example as it applies not to the citizenry at
large, but only to the convicted individuals; a convict may have a valid CoC upon
satisfying the eligibility requirements under Section 74 of the OEC, but shall
nevertheless be disqualified.
Distinctions among (i) denying due course to or
cancellation of a CoC, (ii) disqualification,
and (iii) quo warranto
The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local elective office and the
disqualifications that may apply to candidates necessarily create distinctions on
the remedies available, on the effects of lack of eligibility and on the application
of disqualification. The remedies available are essentially: the cancellation of a
CoC, disqualification from candidacy or from holding office, and quo warranto,
which are distinct remedies with varying applicability and effects. For ease of
presentation and understanding, their availability, grounds and effects are
topically discussed below.
As to the grounds:
In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC, the ground is essentially
lack of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office;15 the governing provisions are Sections
78 and 69 of the OEC.16
In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the grounds are traits, conditions,
characteristics or acts of disqualification,17 individually applicable to a candidate,
as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC; Section 40 of LGC 1991; and
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. As previously discussed, the grounds for
disqualification are different from, and have nothing to do with, a candidates CoC
although they may result in disqualification from candidacy whose immediate
effect upon finality before the elections is the same as a cancellation. If they are
cited in a petition filed before the elections, they remain as disqualification
grounds and carry effects that are distinctly peculiar to disqualification.
In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office
are ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This is provided
under Section 253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of Court as to
procedures. While quo warranto and cancellation share the same ineligibility
grounds, they differ as to the time these grounds are cited. A cancellation case is
brought before the elections, while a quo warranto is filed after and may still be
filed even if a CoC cancellation case was not filed before elections.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy

and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for
quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds - (1)
ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be
initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. Under
section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office,
and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.18
Note that the question of what would constitute acts of disqualification under
Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC and Section 40 of LGC 1991 is best resolved
by directly referring to the provisions involved. The approach is not as straight
forward in a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC and also to a quo
warranto petition, which similarly covers the ineligibility of a candidate/elected
official. In Salcedo II v. COMELEC,19 we ruled that
In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78,
it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material
matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be
considered as a "material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase
in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of the Code.
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated
by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a
candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have
been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive
political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.
[emphases ours, citation omitted]
Thus, in addition to the failure to satisfy or comply with the eligibility
requirements, a material misrepresentation must be present in a cancellation of
CoC situation. The law apparently does not allow material divergence from the
listed requirements to qualify for candidacy and enforces its edict by requiring
positive representation of compliance under oath. Significantly, where
disqualification is involved, the mere existence of a ground appears sufficient and
a material representation assumes no relevance.
As to the period for filing:
The period to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC depends on
the provision of law invoked. If the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC,
the petition must be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the filing of the
CoC.20 However, if the petition is brought under Section 69 of the same law, the
petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing the CoC.21
On the other hand, the period to file a disqualification case is at any time before
the proclamation of a winning candidate, as provided in COMELEC Resolution

No. 8696,22 while a quo warranto petition must be filed within ten (10) days from
proclamation.23
As to the effects of a successful suit:
A candidate whose CoC was denied due course or cancelled is not considered a
candidate at all. Note that the law fixes the period within which a CoC may be
filed.24 After this period, generally no other person may join the election contest. A
notable exception to this general rule is the rule on substitution. The application
of the exception, however, presupposes a valid CoC. Unavoidably, a "candidate"
whose CoC has been cancelled or denied due course cannot be substituted for
lack of a CoC, to all intents and purposes.25 Similarly, a successful quo warranto
suit results in the ouster of an already elected official from office; substitution, for
obvious reasons, can no longer apply.
On the other hand, a candidate who was simply disqualified is merely prohibited
from continuing as a candidate or from assuming or continuing to assume the
functions of the office; substitution can thus take place under the terms of Section
77 of the OEC.26
As to the effects of a successful suit on the right of the second placer in the
elections:
In any of these three remedies, the doctrine of rejection of the second placer
applies for the simple reason that
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,
the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such circumstances.27
1wphi1

With the disqualification of the winning candidate and the application of the
doctrine of rejection of the second placer, the rules on succession under the law
accordingly apply, as provided under Section 44 of LGC 1991.
As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second highest
number of votes (second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the
elections should the winning candidate be disqualified by final judgment before
the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.28 The same effect
obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in fact and in law and within the realm
of notoriety, of the disqualification, yet they still voted for the disqualified
candidate. In this situation, the electorate that cast the plurality of votes in favor
of the notoriously disqualified candidate is simply deemed to have waived their
right to vote.29
In a CoC cancellation proceeding, the law is silent on the legal effect of a
judgment cancelling the CoC and does not also provide any temporal distinction.
Given, however, the formal initiatory role a CoC plays and the standing it gives to
a political aspirant, the cancellation of the CoC based on a finding of its invalidity
effectively results in a vote for an inexistent "candidate" or for one who is deemed

not to be in the ballot. Although legally a misnomer, the "second placer" should
be proclaimed the winner as the candidate with the highest number of votes for
the contested position. This same consequence should result if the cancellation
case becomes final after elections, as the cancellation signifies non-candidacy
from the very start, i.e., from before the elections.
Application of Above Rulings and Principles to the Case.
While it is apparent from the undisputed facts that Cardino did indeed file a
petition for denial and/or the cancellation of Jalosjos CoC, it is obvious as well,
based on the above discussions, that the ground he cited was not appropriate for
the cancellation of Jalosjos CoC but for his disqualification. Conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude is expressly a ground for disqualification under
Section 12 of the OEC. As a ground, it applies only to Jalosjos; it is not a
standard of eligibility that applies to all citizens who may be minded to run for a
local political position; its non-possession is not a negative qualification that must
be asserted in the CoC. Hence, there can be no doubt that what Cardino filed
was effectively a petition for disqualification. This conclusion, of course, follows
the rule that the nature of a petition is determined not by its title or by its prayers,
but by the acts alleged as basis for the petition.
Unfortunately for Cardino, the position of a second placer is not given preference,
both in law and in jurisprudence with respect to the consequences of election
disputes (except with well-defined exceptional circumstances discussed above),
after election has taken place.30
This approach and its consequential results are premised on the general
principle that the electorate is supreme; it registers its choice during the election
and, after voting, effectively rejects the candidate who comes in as the second
placer. Under the rule that a disqualified candidate can still stand as a candidate
unless his disqualification has been ruled upon with finality before the
elections,31 Jalosjos validly stood as a candidate in the elections of May 2010 and
won, although he was subsequently disqualified. With his disqualification while
already sitting as Mayor, the winning vice-mayor, not . Cardino as a mere
defeated second placer, should rightfully be seated as mayor under Section 44 of
LGC 1991 on the law on succession.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

G.R. Nos. 196804 and 197015.

G.R. No. 195229.

373 Phil. 896, 908 (1999).

Prior to these laws, the applicable laws were the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, R.A. No. 2264 (An Act Amending the Laws Governing Local
4

Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial

Governments); and B.P. Blg. 52 (An Act Governing the Election of Local
Government Officials).
See, however, Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended. Penera v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009, 605
SCRA 574, 581-586, citing Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858,
November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114.
5

Section 73 of the OEC reads:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any

elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within
the period fixed herein.
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election,
withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written
declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office,
he shall not be eligible for any of them.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy
may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and
cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect
whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
have incurred. [italics supplied]
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, however, adds that "any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the aforesaid
campaign period." (italics supplied)
7

See Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, 479 Phil. 677, 689 (2004).

The statutory basis is Section 74 of the OEC which provides:

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of

candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of
birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he
will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly

constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to

a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court
approved proceeding, a certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy
the name by which he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in
any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil
registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or,
in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed
religious pilgrimage:
Provided, That when there are two or more candidates for an office with
the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware of
such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the
incumbent who may continue to use the name and surname stated in his
certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one
nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in
the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest
photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data
and program of government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so
desires.
Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 658 (1999). See also Bautista v.
Commission on Elections, 359 Phil. 1 (1998).
9

Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 and

Section 78 of OEC.
10

11

1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 26.

See Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13,

2004, 427 SCRA 96, 100-103.
12

13

Merriam-Websters 11th Collegiate Dictionary, p. 655.

If at all, only two grounds for disqualification under the Local Government
Code may as well be considered for the cancellation of a CoC, viz.: those
with dual citizenship and permanent residence in a foreign country, or
those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of
the same right after January 1, 1992. It may be argued that these two
disqualifying grounds likewise go into the eligibility requirement of a
candidate, as stated under oath by a candidate in his CoC.
14

Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369,

December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782, 792-794.
15

16

See Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646.

Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC cover these acts: (i) corrupting voters or
election officials; (ii) committing acts of terrorism to enhance candidacy; (iii)
over spending; (iv) soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions;
(v) campaigning outside the campaign period; (vi) removal, destruction or
defacement of lawful election propaganda; (vii) committing prohibited
forms of election propaganda; (viii) violating rules and regulations on
election propaganda through mass media; (ix) coercion of subordinates;
(x) threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms
of coercion; (xi) unlawful electioneering; (xii) release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds; (xiii) solicitation of votes or undertaking any
propaganda on the day of the election; (xiv) declaration as an insane; and
(xv) committing subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which
he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude.
17

Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 387 (1999), citing Aznar v.

Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 703 (1990).
18

19

Supra, at 386-389.

Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986, December 22, 1992,

216 SCRA 760, 765-766.
20

21

Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6646.

22

Section 4(B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 reads:

SEC. 4. Procedure in filing petitions. - For purposes of the preceding

sections, the following procedure shall be observed:
xxxx
B. PETITION TO DISOUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SECTION
68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO
DISOUALIFY FOR LACK OF OUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING
SOME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1. A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Section 68 of the
OEC and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of
qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification may be filed
on any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.
23

Section 253 of the OEC.

24

Section 15 of R.A. No. 9369.

25

Miranda v. Abaya, supra note 9, at 658-660.

Section 77 of the OEC expressly allows substitution of a candidate who

is "disqualified for any cause."
26

Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, September 18,

1995, 248 SCRA 400, 424.
27

Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736, April

24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23, 43-47; Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
28

Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997,

274 SCRA 481, 501.
29

30

See: discussions at pp. 14-15.

31

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J.:
With all due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion.
Subject of this case are two (2) consolidated Petitions for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. In G.R. No. 193237, petitioner Dominador G. Jalosjos,
Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated May 10,
20101 and August 11, 20102 issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), which respectively ordered for the cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
In G.R. No. 193536, petitioner Agapito J. Cardino"(Cardino) likewise assails the
Resolution dated August 11, 2010, particularly the dispositive portion thereof
which contained the directive to apply the provision of the Local Government
Code (LGC) on succession in filling the vacated office of the mayor.
Jalosjos attributes grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC en banc in (1)
ruling that the grant of his probation was revoked, hence, he is disqualified to run
as Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga Del Norte, (2) cancelling his COC without
a finding that he committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his
qualifications, considering that he merely relied in good faith upon a previous
decision of the COMELEC wherein he was declared eligible to run for public
office, and (3) issuing the Resolutions dated May 10, 2010 and August 11, 2010
in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
On February 22, 2011, this Court issued a Resolution3 dismissing G.R. No.
193237, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated

August 11, 2010 of the Commission in (sic) Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076
(DC) are hereby AFFIRMED.4
This Court ruled that Jalosjos could not have qualified to run for any public office
as the grant of his probation was revoked by the RTC, as early as March 19,
1987 and that he could not rely on the Certification dated December 19, 2003
issued by former Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod to
assert his eligibility. We ratiocinated:
It must be remembered that by the time Bacolod submitted his Termination
Report on January 23, 2004, there was no longer a probation to speak of, the
same having been revoked more than 16 years earlier. Under the Probation Law
of 1976, the order of revocation is not appealable. There is no showing that the
RTC ever issued a subsequent order suspending the execution of petitioners
sentence and granting him probation again. In fact, the RTC issued an alias
warrant of arrest on January 17, 2004 pursuant to the March 19, 1987 Order of
revocation.
Thus, the same order revoking the grant of probation was valid and subsisting at
the time that petitioner supposedly completed his probation. Petitioner could not
have validly complied with the conditions of his probation and there would have
been no basis for any probation officer to accept petitioners compliance with a
non-existent probation order.
This, plus the cloud of doubt created by Bacolods conviction for falsification of
the certification relied upon by petitioner, the Court cannot now rely on the
presumption of regularity in the issuance of said certification in order for us to
conclude that petitioner has in fact completed his probation. Considering that
petitioner likewise has not served the sentence of his conviction for the crime of
robbery, he is disqualified to run for and hold his current position as Mayor of
Dapitan City.5 (Citation omitted)
Undeterred, Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 on March 22, 2011,
raising the same issues stated in his petition. Subsequently, he filed a
Manifestation dated May 30, 2012, informing this Court that he had already
tendered his resignation from his position as Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
del Norte and that the same was accepted by the Governor of the province, Atty.
Rolando E. Yebes.
I will deliberate on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Jalosjos in G.R. No.
193237 despite his resignation from office, in conjunction with the merits of G.R.
No. 193536, with which it shares identical factual background.
The allegations in the petition filed
by Cardino in SPA No. 09-076 (DC)
bespeak of its characterization as
one for disqualification.
It is well to remember that G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536 stemmed from the
Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of
Respondent filed by Cardino against Jalosjos, docketed as SPA No. 09-076
(DC). In the said petition, Cardino alleged:

3. Respondent Jalosjos is also of legal age, a resident of Dapitan City, a

registered voter of Precinct No. 0187B, likewise filed his certificate of candidacy
for the same position with the Office of the Comelec, Dapitan City, as that for
which petitioner duly filed a certificate of candidacy, for the May 10, 2010 national
and local elections on December 1, 2009, a certified true copy of said COC is
hereto attached as Annex B;
4. Respondents Jalosjos certificate of candidacy under oath contains material
misrepresentation, when he declared under oath, that respondent Jalosjos is
eligible for the office he seeks to be elected, par. 16, COC for Mayor, considering
that he is not eligible for the position for which he filed a certificate of candidacy
because respondent was convicted by final judgment by the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-Cebu for Robbery, an offense
involving moral turpitude and he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of "one (1)
year, eight (8) Months and Twenty (20) days of prision correctional, as minimum,
to Four (4) years, Two 2 months and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum,"
a certified true (sic) of which decision is hereto attached as Annex C.
5. Respondent Jalosjos failed to serve even a single day of his sentence. The
position requires that a candidate be eligible and/or qualified to aspire for the
position as required under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.7
On the basis of the foregoing allegations, Cardino prayed (1) that Jalosjos be
declared ineligible for the position for which he filed a COC or that his COC be
cancelled or denied due course, (2) that the Board of Election Inspectors of
Dapitan City be directed to exclude all the votes cast in Jalosjos name, (3) that
the City Board of Canvassers be ordered to suspend or hold in abeyance
Jalosjos proclamation as the winning candidate, and (4) that Jalosjos be held
liable for damages.8
Subsequently, the COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution dated May 10,
2010, granting Cardinos petition and cancelling Jalosjos COC. The COMELEC
First Division ratiocinated that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his
disqualification as provided for in Section 40(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160." 9
Jalosjos promptly filed his Motion for Reconsideration but the COMELEC en
banc denied the same in its Resolution dated August 11, 2010. Introductory to
the ratio decidendi of its ruling, the COMELEC en banc stated:
It is long settled that for a material representation to serve as ground for the
cancellation of a candidates certificate of candidacy, it must refer to his
qualifications for elective office. Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government
Code or Republic Act No. 7160 prescribes the qualifications and disqualifications
for elective municipal officials, x x x.10
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc correlated Sections 39 and 40 of the LGC
and proceeded to conclude that since Jalosjos was convicted by final judgment
for the crime of robbery, he is disqualified to run for any elective position or to
hold office.
I fully agree with the COMELECs ruling that Jalosjos cannot run for any public
office by reason of possession of a ground for disqualification. However, the
COMELEC laid the predicate of said conclusion on a muddled discussion of the

nature of the petition filed by Cardino and the effects of a judgment on the same
on the status of candidacy.
Verily, a candidate may be prevented from participating in the electoral race
either because he is ineligible or he suffers from any of the grounds for
disqualification. Ineligibility refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in
Sections 311 and 612 of Article VI, and Sections 213 and 314 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution for senatorial, congressional, presidential and vice-presidential
candidates, or under Section 3915 of the LGC for local elective candidates. On the
other hand, disqualification pertains to the commission of acts which the law
perceives as unbecoming of a local servant, or to a circumstance, status or
condition rendering said candidate unfit for public service. To question the
eligibility of a candidate before the elections, the remedy is to file a petition to
deny due course or cancel the COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC). If, on the other hand, any ground for disqualification exists, resort
can be made to the filing of a petition for disqualification against the candidate
thought to be unqualified for public service under Section 68 of the same Code.
Pertinently, Section 78 of OEC states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
To be clear, it is not the mere ineligibility or lack of qualification which warrants
the filing of a petition to deny due course or cancel the COC but the material
representation of his qualifications. Material misrepresentation as a ground to
deny due course or cancel a COC refers to the falsity of a statement required to
be entered therein, as enumerated in
Section 74 of the OEC,16 which reads:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Succinctly, the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the
OEC refers to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made

a false representation in his COC are grave to prevent the candidate from
running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person
of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon
just any innocuous mistake.17
Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to ones qualification for public office.18
On the other hand, a petition for disqualification may be filed if the candidate
committed any of the acts considered as an election offense stated in Section 68
of the OEC which reads:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
The same petition may be filed on the ground of possession of a status or
condition which makes the candidate incapable of assuming the stern demands
of public service or which places him in serious contradiction with his oath of
office, as enumerated in Section 12 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC:
Section 12 of the OEC
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.
Section 40 of the LGC

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by Cardino in SPA No. 09-076 (DC) is a confusion of the
remedies of petition to deny due course or cancel a COC and petition for
disqualification. It must be remembered that while both remedies aim to prevent
a candidate from participating in the elections, they are separate and distinct
from one another. They are embraced by distinct provisions of law, which provide
for their respective prescriptive periods and particular sets of grounds. Further,
each remedy entails diverging effects on the status of candidacy of the
concerned candidate thus subsuming one remedy within the coverage of the
other is a dangerous feat.
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,19 we had the occasion to ponder on the
substantial differences between the two remedies, thus:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the
CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate
made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false,
the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
wining candidate.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different

remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities.

Private respondents insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the
COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under
Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not
persuade the Court.
xxxx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised
on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under
Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this
Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68
can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains
a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due
course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is
never considered a candidate.20 (Citations omitted)
It is beyond dispute that Jalosjos cannot run for public office because of a prior
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. While he was granted probation,
his failure to comply with the terms and conditions of this privilege resulted to the
revocation of the same on March 19, 1987. It bears reiterating that probation is
not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state, which may be granted to a seemingly deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law
for the offense for which he was convicted.21 As a mere discretionary grant, he
must pay full obedience to the terms and conditions appertaining thereto or run
the risk of the State revoking this privilege. In Soriano v. Court of Appeals,22 this
Court underscored the import of the terms and conditions of probation, to wit:
These conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down
by statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to
impose and the petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying
these conditions may the purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include
promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for the reformation of a
penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence. Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting
probation, pursuant to the Probation Law:
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. A probation order shall take effect upon
its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the
consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the
conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he
shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on
probation.
Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon
the discretion of the trial court. Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions

that may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper
case and under appropriate circumstances.23 (Citations omitted)
On the ground of Jalosjos failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his
probation, the RTC revoked said grant and ordered for the issuance of an alias
warrant of arrest against him. Stripped of the privilege, he becomes an ordinary
convict who is imposed with restraints in the exercise of his civil and political
rights. Specifically, under Section 40(a) of the LGC, he is disqualified to run for
any local elective office. His disqualification cannot be defeated by bare
allegation that he was earlier granted probation as this does not perfunctorily
obliterate the fact of conviction and the corresponding accessory penalties.
Further, in Baclayon v. Hon. Mutia,24 we emphasized that an order placing
defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory
judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant
under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by
a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated.25 With the revocation of
the grant of Jalosjos probation, the temporary suspension of his sentence is
lifted and all the ensuing disqualifications regain full effect.
Remarkably, Cardinos challenge to Jalosjos candidacy was not based squarely
on the fact that there is a final judgment of conviction for robbery against him but
on the ground that he made a material misrepresentation in his COC by declaring
that he is eligible to run for public office when there is an existing circumstance
which renders his candidacy unacceptable. Based on the designation of his
petition in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), Cardino intends to file a petition to cancel the
COC of Jalosjos, an action which is governed by Section 74, in relation with
Section 78 of the OEC. The combined application of these sections requires that
the facts stated in the COC by the would-be candidate be true, as any false
representation of a material fact is a ground for the COCs cancellation or the
withholding of due course.26 Essentially, the details required to be stated in the
COC are the personal circumstances of the candidate, i.e., name/stage name,
age, civil status, citizenship and residency, which serve as basis of his eligibility
to become a candidate taking into consideration the standards set under the law.
The manifest intent of the law in imposing these qualifications is to confine the
right to participate in the elections to local residents who have reached the age
when they can seriously reckon the gravity of the responsibility they wish to take
on and who, at the same time, are heavily acquainted with the actual state and
urgent demands of the community.
A painstaking examination of the petition filed by Cardino with the COMELEC
would reveal that while it is designated as a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a COC, the ground used to support the same actually partake of a
circumstance which is more fittingly used in a petition for disqualification. Section
40(a) of the LGC clearly enumerates a final judgment of conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude as a ground for disqualification. That Cardino employed
the term "material misrepresentation" in his disputations cannot give his petition a
semblance of what is properly a petition to cancel a COC. It bears reiterating that
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC and a petition for
disqualification are two separate and distinct actions which may be filed based on

grounds pertaining to it. Thus, a petition for cancellation of COC cannot be

predicated on a ground which is proper only in a petition for disqualification. The
legislature would not have found it wise to provide for two different remedies to
challenge the candidacy of an aspiring local servant and even provide for an
enumeration of the grounds on which they may be based if they were intended to
address the same predicament. The fact that the mentioned remedies were
covered by separate provisions of law which relate to distinct set of grounds is a
manifestation of the intention to treat them severally.
Considering that the core of Cardinos petition in SPA No. 09-076 (DC) is the
existence of a final judgment of conviction against Jalosjos, this material
allegation is controlling of the characterization of the nature of the petition
regardless of the caption used to introduce the same. Cardinos petition must
therefore be treated and evaluated as a petition for disqualification and not for
cancellation of COC. Well-settled rule is that the caption is not determinative of
the nature of the petition. What characterizes the nature of the action or petition
are the material allegations therein contained, irrespective of whether the
petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for therein.27
In order to conform with existing laws and established jurisprudence, the
Resolution dated February 22, 2011 of this Court in G.R. No. 193237 must
accordingly be modified to reflect the foregoing clarification on the nature of
Cardinos petition in SPA No. 09-076 (DC) and the ensuing consequences of the
judgment on the same.
Turning to G.R. No. 193536, it is Cardinos contention that with the cancellation
of Jalosjos COC, he should succeed to the office of the mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte as he was the only remaining qualified candidate for said
position. He posits that the cancellation of Jalosjos COC retroacted to the date of
its filing and rendered the latter a non-candidate as if he never filed one at all.
Consequently, all the votes cast in his favor are considered stray and his
proclamation as winning candidate did not produce any legal effect.
Further, Cardino imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
for stating in the dispositive portion of its Resolution dated August 11, 2010 that
the provisions on succession in the LGC will apply in filling the post vacated by
Jalosjos. To begin with, he argues that Section 44 of the LGC applies only when
a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the mayor. A permanent vacancy
contemplates a situation whereby the disqualified mayor was duly elected to the
position and lawfully assumed the office before he vacated the same for any
legal cause. It does not embrace cancellation of COC since this eventuality has
the effect of rendering the individual a non-candidate, who cannot be voted for
and much less, be proclaimed winner in the elections.28
Cardinos disputations fail to persuade.
Cardino as a mere second placer
cannot be proclaimed mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Truly, a judgment on a petition to cancel a COC impinges on the very eligibility of
an individual to qualify as a candidate and that its ultimate effect is to render the
person a non-candidate as if he never filed a COC at all. The votes in favor of the

candidate whose COC was cancelled are considered stray even if he happens to
be the one who gathered the majority of the votes. In such case, the candidate
receiving the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed the winner as
he is technically considered the one who received the highest number of votes.
Further, the judgment on a petition to cancel a COC does not distinguish whether
the same attained finality before or after the elections since the consequences
retroact to the date of filing of the COC. Regardless of the point in time when the
cancellation of the COC was adjudged, the effect is nevertheless the same: the
person is stripped of his status as an official candidate.
Cardinos disputations could have been tenable if the petition he filed in SPA No.
09-076 (DC) is a petition to cancel a COC. However, the pertinent allegations of
his petition bespeak of the fact that the same is actually a petition for
disqualification, the effect of which is covered by Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
which repealed Section 72 of the OEC, to wit:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Italics ours)
Unlike a judgment on a petition to cancel a COC, the effects of a judgment on a
petition for disqualification distinguish whether the same attained finality before or
after the elections. If the judgment became final before the elections, the effect is
identical to that of cancellation of a COC.
If, however, the judgment attained finality after the elections, the individual is still
considered an official candidate and may even be proclaimed winner should he
muster the majority votes of the constituency.
In Cayat v. Commission on Elections,29 we cogitated on the import of Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646, to wit:
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is
when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the
situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6.The second is when the
disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in
the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms
Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004,
way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in
Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004
elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only
candidate, second to none.30 (Emphasis supplied)

The instant case falls under the second situation contemplated in Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646. The petition to disqualify Jalosjos was filed on December 6, 2009
and was resolved by the COMELEC on the very day of elections of May 10,
2010. Thus, on the election day, Jalosjos is still considered an official candidate
notwithstanding the issuance of the COMELEC Resolution disqualifying him from
holding public office. The pendency of a disqualification case against him or even
the issuance of judgment of disqualification against him does not forthwith divest
him of the right to participate in the elections as a candidate because the law
requires no less than a final judgment. Thus, the votes cast in his name were
rightfully counted in his favor and, there being no order suspending his
proclamation, the City Board of Canvassers lawfully proclaimed him as the
winning candidate. However, upon the finality of the judgment of disqualification
against him on August 11, 2010, a permanent vacancy was created in the office
of the mayor which must be filled in accordance with Section 44 of the LGC,
which states:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor,
Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. x x x.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room
for interpretation but merely application.31 Accordingly, when Jalosjos was
adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy was created in the office of the
mayor for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the position. As provided by
law, it is the duly-elected vice-mayor of the locality who should succeed to the
vacated office.
Following the foregoing ratiocination, Cardinos contention that he should be
proclaimed mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte lacks legal basis. That
he was the one who received the second highest number of votes does not
entitle him to any right or preference to succeeding the vacated post.
Unmistakably, he did not have the mandate of the voting populace and this must
not be defeated by substituting him, a losing candidate, in place of the
disqualified candidate who received the majority votes. In Benito v. Commission
on Elections,32 we held:
In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their
expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and
elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes dies, or is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. For to

allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite
his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault
on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and
the peoples right to elect officials of their choice.33 (Citations omitted)
Further, in Kare v. Commission on Elections,34 we further deliberated on the
reason behind the doctrine of rejection of the second placer. We enunciated:
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it
would be absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters
choice. Moreover, there are instances in which the votes received by the second
placer may not be considered numerically insignificant. In such situations, if the
equation changes because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate,
voters preferences would nonetheless be so volatile and unpredictable that the
results for qualified candidates would not be self-evident. The absence of the
apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of
votes to candidates other than the second placer. Where an "ineligible" candidate
has garnered either a majority or a plurality of the votes, by no mathematical
formulation can the runner-up in the election be construed to have obtained the
majority or the plurality of votes cast.35 (Citations omitted)
In other words, a second placer cannot bank on a mere supposition that he could
have won the elections had the winning candidate, who was eventually adjudged
disqualified, been excluded in the roster of official candidates. It is erroneous to
assume that the sovereign will could have opted for the candidate who received
the second highest number of votes had they known of the disqualification of the
winning candidate early on. For in such event, they could have cast their votes in
favor of another candidate, not necessarily the one who received the second
highest number of votes.
Finally, Cardino impugns the wisdom of the doctrine of rejection of second placer
which was first enunciated in Topacio v. Paredes36 on the ground that the doctrine
effectively discourages qualified candidates for the same position for which the
disqualified candidate was elected, in initiating a disqualification case because
the prospect of being proclaimed to the position is nil.37
The doctrine of rejection of the second placer was not conceived to suit the
selfish interests of losing candidates or arm them with a weapon to retaliate
against the prevailing candidates. The primordial consideration in adhering to this
doctrine is not simply to protect the interest of the other qualified candidates
joining the electoral race but more than that, to safeguard the will of the people in
whom the sovereignty resides. The doctrine ensures that only the candidate who
has the peoples faith and confidence will be allowed to run the machinery of the
government. It is a guarantee that the popular choice will not be compromised,
even in the occasion that the prevailing candidate is eventually disqualified, by
replacing him with the next-in-rank official who was also elected to office by the
authority of the electorate.
It is of no moment that, as Cardino surmised, the doctrine of rejection of the
second placer dissuades other qualified candidates in filing a disqualification
case against the prevailing candidate for lack of expectation of gain. To justify the
abandonment of the doctrine following Cardinos asseveration is to reduce its
significance and put premium on the interest of the candidate rather than of the

electorate for whose interest the election is being conducted. The doctrine was
for the protection of the public and not for any private individuals advantage.
Thus, the right to file a petition for disqualification is not exclusive to the opposing
candidate but may also be pursued by any citizen of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties, 38 who are
minded to do so.
In ruling therefore that the provisions of the LGC shall apply in determining the
rightful successor to the office of the mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The
application of the provisions of the LGC is the necessary consequence of
Jalosjos' disqualification.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, I respectfully vote to:
(1) DISMISS G.R. No. 193536 for lack of merit.
(2) MODIFY the Resolution dated February 22, 2011 of this Court in G.R.
No. 193237. The Resolutions dated May 10, 2010 and August 11, 2010 of
the COMELEC in SPA No. 09-076 (DC) should be AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. should be declared
disqualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte and the
provisions of the Local Government Code on succession be applied in
filling the vacated office.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

G.R. No. 193237 rollo, pp. 40-48.

Id. at 49-56.

Id. at 355-360.

Id. at 360.

Id. at 359-360.

Id. at 373-393.

Id. at 57-58.

Id. at 59.

Id. at 47.

10

Id. at 53.

Art. VI, Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirtyfive years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the
day of the election.
11

Art. VI, Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
12

Art. VII, Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
13

Art. VII, Sec. 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same
manner as the President. He maybe removed from office in the same
manner as the President. x x x.
14

(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of theSec. 39. Qualifications. sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
15

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of

the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the
sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)
years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.

Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179413, November

28, 2008, 572 SCRA 736, 740.
16

17

Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 389 (1999).

Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011,

644 SCRA 761, 775-776, citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,
supra note 37, at 390, citing Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, Abella v.
Larrazabal, 259 Phil. 992 (1989), Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 318
Phil. 467 (1995), Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 105111,
July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297, Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 327 Phil. 521 1996),
Republic v. De la Rosa, G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 785.
18

19

G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.

20

Id. at 792-796.

Santos v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 642, 652 (1999), citing Francisco v.
CA, 313 Phil. 241, 254(1995).
21

22

363 Phil. 573 (1999).

23

Id. at 583-584.

24

214 Phil. 126 (1984).

Id. at 132, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Paige vs. Smith, 198 A. 812, 813,
815, l30 Pa. Super. 536.
25

Velasco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180051, December 24,

2008, 575 SCRA 590, 602.
26

Guiang v. Co, 479 Phil. 473, 480 (2004), citing Ty v. Court of Appeals,
408 Phil. 792 (2001).
27

28

G.R. No. 193536 rollo, pp. 11-12.

29

G.R. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23.

30

Id. at 45.

31

Sunga v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 310, 327 (1998).

32

235 SCRA 436 (1994).

33

Id. at 441-442.

34

G.R. No. 157526, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 264.

35

Id. at 274-275.

36

23 Phil. 238 (1912).

37

G.R. No. 193536 rollo, pp. 12-15.

38

The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 25, Section 1.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The all-important concern here is the effect of the conviction for robbery by final
judgment of and the probation allegedly granted to Dominador G. Jalosjos,
petitioner in G.R. No. 193237, on his candidacy for the position of Mayor of
Dapitan City; and the determination of the rightful person to assume the
contested elective position upon the ineligibility of Jalosjos.
I easily CONCUR with the insightful opinion delivered for the Majority by our
esteemed colleague, Senior Associate Justice Carpio. As I see it, these
consolidated cases furnish to the Court the appropriate occasion to look again
into the candidacy of a clearly ineligible candidate garnering the majority of the
votes cast in an election and being proclaimed as the winning candidate to the
detriment of the valid candidacy of his rival who has all the qualifications and
suffers none of the disqualifications. The ineligible candidate thereby mocks the
sanctity of the ballot and reduces the electoral exercise into an expensive joke.
G.R. No. 193237 is a special civil action for certiorari brought by Jalosjos to
assail the Resolution dated August 11, 2010,1 whereby the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc affirmed the Resolution dated May 10,
20102issued by the COMELEC First Division in SPC No. 09-076 (DC). Both
Resolutions declared Jalosjos ineligible to run as Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections pursuant
to Section 40(a) of The Local Government Code (LGC), viz:
Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
xxx
Additionally, the COMELEC cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy (CoC) on
the ground of material misrepresentation made therein.
Jalosjos charges the COMELEC En Banc with committing grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that he was disqualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan City

in view of the revocation of his probation; and when it cancelled his CoC without
finding that he had deliberately misrepresented his qualifications to run as Mayor.
G.R. No. 193536 is a special civil action for certiorari commenced by Agapito J.
Cardino, the only other candidate against Jalosjos, in order to set aside the
COMELEC En Bancs Resolution dated August 11, 2010,3 to the extent that the
Resolution directed the application of the rule of succession as provided in the
LGC. Cardino challenges the COMELEC En Bancs application of the rule of
succession under the LGC, contending that he should be considered elected as
Mayor upon the cancellation of Jalosjos CoC because he had been the only
bona fide candidate for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City.4 Cardino insists that
the cancellation of Jalosjos CoC retroacted to the date of its filing, thereby
reducing him into a non-candidate.5
The special civil actions were consolidated on March 29, 2011.6
Antecedents
The antecedents are narrated in the Resolution the Court has promulgated on
February 22, 2011 in G.R. No. 193237, to wit:
On December 6, 2009, private respondent Agapito J. Cardino filed a Petition to
Deny Due Course to and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner before
respondent Comelec. Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for
Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte during the 2010 Elections. Private
respondent alleged that petitioner misrepresented in his CoC that he was eligible
to run for Mayor, when, in fact, he was not, since he had been convicted by final
judgment of robbery, a crime involving moral turpitude, and he has failed to serve
a single day of his sentence.
The final judgment for robbery stems from the following factual antecedents:
On April 30, 1970, the then Circuit Criminal Court (now Regional Trial Court RTC)
of Cebu City convicted petitioner of the crime of robbery and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals (CA). He later abandoned the appeal, which was thus
dismissed on August 9, 1973. Sometime in June 1985, petitioner filed a petition
for probation.
On July 9, 1985, Gregorio F. Bacolod (Bacolod), who was then the Supervising
Probation Officer of the Parole and Probation Office, recommended to the RTC
the grant of petitioner's application for probation. On the same day, the RTC
issued an Order granting the probation for a period of one year subject to the
terms and conditions stated therein.
However, on August 8, 1986, Bacolod filed a Motion for Revocation of the
probation on the ground that petitioner failed to report to him, in violation of the
condition of the probation. Accordingly, the RTC issued an Order dated March 19,
1987, revoking the probation and ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest. A
warrant of arrest was issued but remained unserved.

More than 16 years later, or on December 19, 2003, petitioner secured a

Certification from the Central Office of the Parole and Probation Administration
(PPA), which was signed by Bacolod, now Administrator of the PPA, attesting that
petitioner had fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation.
At this time, the prosecution also decided to stir the case. It filed a motion for the
issuance of an alias warrant of arrest. The RTC granted the motion on January
16, 2004 and issued an Order for the Issuance of an Alias Warrant of Arrest
against petitioner.
On January 23, 2004, Bacolod submitted to the RTC a Termination Report stating
that petitioner had fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and, hence,
his case should be deemed terminated. On the same day, petitioner filed an
Urgent Motion to Reconsider its January 16, 2004 Order and to Lift the Warrant
of Arrest.
On January 29, 2004, James A. Adasa (Adasa), petitioner's opponent for the
mayoralty position during the 2004 Elections, filed a Petition for Disqualification
against petitioner, based on Section 40(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, on the ground that the latter has been
convicted of robbery and failed to serve his sentence. Adasa later amended his
petition to include Section 40(e) of the same law, claiming that petitioner is also a
"fugitive from justice."
Meanwhile, acting on petitioner's urgent motion, the RTC issued an Order dated
February 5, 2004, declaring that petitioner had duly complied with the order of
probation, setting aside its January 16, 2004 Order, and recalling the warrant of
arrest.
Thus, in resolving Adasa's petition, the Comelec Investigating Officer cited the
February 5, 2004 RTC Order and recommended that petitioner be declared
qualified to run for Mayor. In the Resolution dated August 2, 2004, the ComelecSecond Division adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Officer and
denied the petition for disqualification. It held that petitioner has amply proven
that he had complied with the requirements of his probation as shown by the
Certification from the PPA dated December 19, 2003, which was the basis of the
February 5, 2004 RTC Order.
Adasa filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Comelec En Banc denied on
December 13, 2006.
Adasa then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
176285). In a Resolution dated June 3, 2008, the Court dismissed the petition for
being moot and academic, the three-year term of office having expired.
In a related incident, Bacolod, who issued the Certification dated December 19,
2003 to petitioner, was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
and falsification of public document under the Revised Penal Code for issuing
said Certification. On September 29, 2008, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision finding Bacolod guilty as charged. It held that the Certification he issued
was definitely false because petitioner did not actually fulfill the conditions of his
probation as shown in the RTC Order dated March 19, 1987, which states that

the probation was being revoked. Hence, at the time the Certification was issued,
there was no longer a probation order to be fulfilled by petitioner.
On May 10, 2010, the elections were held, and petitioner won as Mayor of
Dapitan City.
On the same day, the Comelec-First Division issued a resolution granting the
Petition to Deny Due Course and cancelling petitioner's CoC.The Comelec noted
that the dismissal of Adasa's petition for disqualification hinged on the
presumption of regularity in the issuance of the PPA Certification dated
December 19, 2003, declaring that petitioner had complied with the requirements
of his probation. It opined that, with the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting
Bacolod, it would now appear that the December 19, 2003 Certification was
fraudulently issued and that petitioner had not actually served his sentence; thus,
the ruling on Adasas petition is "left with no leg to stand on."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The Comelec En Banc denied the motion in
a resolution dated August 11, 2010. The Comelec ordered him to cease and
desist from occupying and discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of
Dapitan City.7
Through the Resolution promulgated on February 22, 2011,8 the Court dismissed
G.R. No. 193237, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated
August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC)
are hereby AFFIRMED.
On March 22, 2011, Jalosjos moved for the reconsideration of the February 22,
2011 Resolution,9 raising the same issues he had averred in his petition.
On June 1, 2012, however, Jalosjos filed a manifestation dated May 30, 2012,
informing the Court that he had meanwhile tendered his resignation as Mayor of
Dapitan City effective April 30, 2012; that his resignation had been accepted by
Governor Rolando E. Yebes of
Zamboanga del Norte; and that Vice Mayor Patri Bajamunde-Chan had taken her
oath of office as the new Mayor of Dapitan City.
Disposition
I vote to affirm the disqualification of Jalosjos as a candidate for Mayor of Dapitan
City; and to sustain the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling his
CoC.
I agree with the Majority that the rule of succession provided by the LGC does
not apply to determine who should now sit as Mayor of Dapitan City. Thus, I hold
that Cardino, the only other candidate with a valid CoC for Mayor of Dapitan City
in the May 10, 2010 elections, had the legal right to assume the position of City
Mayor.
Let me specify the reasons for this humble concurrence.

1.
Cardinos petition in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC)
was a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
The COMELEC En Banc correctly held that the petition of Cardino in SPA Case
No. 09-076 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,10 the Court pointed out that there are
two remedies available to challenge the qualifications of a candidate, namely:
(1) Before the election, pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, to
wit:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
and
(2) After the election, pursuant to Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
The Court has explained that the only difference between the two remedies is
that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in
the CoC, and the proceedings must be initiated prior to the elections, while under
Section 253, a petition for quo warranto may be brought within ten days after the
proclamation of the election results on either of two grounds, to wit: (a)
ineligibility; or (b) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. A candidate is
ineligible under Section 253 if he is disqualified to be elected to office; and he is
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.11
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections:12
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the
CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate
made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional

and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the

candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false,
the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate.13
Clearly, the only instance where a petition assailing the qualifications of a
candidate for elective office can be filed prior to the elections is when the petition
is filed under Section 78.14
A Section 78 petition is not to be confused with a Section 12 or Section 68
petition. The two are different remedies, are based on different grounds, and can
result in different eventualities.15 A person who is disqualified under either Section
1216 or Section 6817 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose
CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered a
candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC.18
To ascertain whether Cardinos petition against Jaloslos was a petition under
Section 78, on one hand, or under Section 12 or Section 68, on the other hand, it
is necessary to look at its averments and relief prayed for, viz:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino citizen, married, able to read and write,
a registered voter of Precinct No. 0019A, and is and has been a resident of
Dapitan City, continuously since birth up to the present;
2. Petitioner duly filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of City
Mayor of Dapitan for the election on May 10, 2010, with the Office of the
Commission on Election, Dapitan City, on December 1, 2009, which
accepted and acknowledged the same, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex A;
3. Respondent is also of legal age, a resident of Dapitan City, a registered
voter of Precinct No. 0187B, likewise filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same position with the Office of the Comelec, Dapitan City, as that for
which petitioner duly filed a certificate of candidacy, for the May 10, 2010
national and local elections on December 1, 2009, a certified true copy of
said COC is hereto attached as Annex B;
4. Respondents certificate of candidacy under oath contains material
misrepresentation, when he declared under oath, that respondent is
eligible for the office he seeks to be elected, par. 16, COC for Mayor,
considering that he is not eligible for the position for which he filed a
certificate of candidacy because respondent was convicted by final
judgment by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CCCXIV-140-Cebu for Robbery, an offense involving moral turpitude and he
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of "one (1) year, eight (8) Months and
Twenty (20) Days of prision correctional, as minimum, to Four (4) years,
Two (2) months and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, a certified
true copy of which decision is hereto attached as Annex C;

5. Respondent failed to serve even a single day of his sentence. The

position requires that a candidate be eligible and/or qualified to aspire for
the position as required under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code;
6. This petition is being filed within the reglementary period of within five
days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission:
1. Declaring respondent, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. ineligible for the position for
which he filed certificate of candidacy and to deny due course to such filing and
to cancel the certificate of candidacy Annex B; x x x19(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing make it evident that Cardinos petition contained the essential
allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Jalosjos made a false
representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material
matter that would affect the substantive right of Jalosjos to run in the elections for
which he filed his CoC; and (c) Jalosjos made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or to
deliberately attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise
render him ineligible.20
Worthy of noting is that the specific reliefs prayed for by the petition, supra, were
not only for the declaration that Jalosjos was "ineligible for the position for which
he filed certificate of candidacy" but also for denying "due course to such filing
and to cancel the certificate of candidacy." Thereby, Cardinos petition attacked
both Jalosjos qualifications to run as Mayor of Dapitan City and the validity of
Jalosjos CoC based on the latters assertion of his eligibility despite knowledge
of his conviction and despite his failure to serve his sentence. The petition was
properly considered to be in all respects as a petition to deny due course to or
cancel Jalosjos CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2.
Jalosjos materially misrepresented his eligibility as a
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City; hence, the
COMELEC properly cancelled his CoC
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code involves a finding not only that a person lacked the
qualifications but also that he made a material representation that was false.21 In
Mitra v. Commission on Elections,22 the
Court added that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications
for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot
be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where
the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate
results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows

from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate

who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot
serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.23
A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC that is short of
the requirements should not be granted.
Based on the antecedents narrated herein, I consider to be warranted the
COMELEC En Bancs conclusion to the effect that, firstly, his conviction for
robbery absolutely disqualified Jalosjos from running as Mayor of Dapitan City,
and, secondly, Jalosjos deliberately misrepresented his eligibility when he filed
his CoC.
First of all, the records show that the erstwhile Circuit Criminal Court in Cebu City
had convicted Jalosjos of the felony of robbery on April 30, 1970 and had
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one year, eight months and
20 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, two months and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum. Although he had appealed, his appeal was
turned down on August 9, 1973. In June 1985, or more than 15 years after his
conviction by the Circuit Criminal Court, he filed a petition for probation.
Pursuant to Section 40(a) of the LGC,24 his having been sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one year or more of imprisonment rendered Jalosjos ineligible to run for Mayor of
Dapitan City. There is no quibbling about the felony of robbery being an offense
involving moral turpitude. As the Court has already settled, "embezzlement,
forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a
general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving
moral turpitude."25
Anent moral turpitude for purposes of the election laws, the Court has stated in
Teves v. Commission on Elections:26
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
xxx
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, the Court clarified that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that
"as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the
general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that
it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act
itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not,
however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality
lies in their being positively prohibited."27

It is relevant to mention at this juncture that the ineligibility of a candidate based

on his conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is also
dealt with in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which specifically states:

Section 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years
from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Section 12, Jalosjos remained ineligible to run for a public office
considering that he had not been granted plenary pardon for his criminal offense.
The expiration of the five-year period defined in Section 12 counted from his
service of sentence did not affect the ineligibility, it being indubitable that he had
not even served his sentence at all.
It is relevant to clarify, moreover, that the five-year period defined in Section 12 is
deemed superseded by the LGC, whose Section 40(a) expressly sets two years
after serving sentence as the period of disqualification in relation to local elective
positions. To reconcile the incompatibility between Section 12 and Section 40(a),
the Court has discoursed in Magno v. Commission on Elections:28
It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on
December 3, 1985 while the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on
January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable
conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more
recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have
knowledge of the older law and intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing
clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code states that:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed
Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a
subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former
enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
In David vs. COMELEC, we declared that RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that
specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and
definitively provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions.

It is applicable to them only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of

disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of all
public officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the
disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special
law which ought to prevail.
The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for
local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The
reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest
intent. (Bold emphases supplied)29
Regardless of whether the period applicable was five years or two years,
Jalosjos was still ineligible to run for any public office in any election by virtue of
his having been sentenced to suffer prision mayor. That sentence perpetually
disqualified him from running for any elective office considering that he had not
been meanwhile granted any plenary pardon by the Chief Executive.
Indeed, in accordance with the express provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty of prision mayor imposed on Jalosjos for the robbery conviction
carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The effects of the
accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification included the deprivation
during the term of the sentence of the right to vote in any election for any popular
elective office or to be elected to such office.30 The effects of the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage was to
deprive the convict perpetually of the right to vote in any popular election for any
public office or to be elected to such office; he was further prohibited from holding
any public office perpetually.31 These accessory penalties would remain even
though the convict would be pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
pardon expressly remitted the accessory penalties.32
Secondly, Jalosjos had no legal and factual bases to insist that he became
eligible to run as Mayor of Dapitan City because he had been declared under the
RTC order dated February 5, 2004 to have duly complied with the order of his
probation. His insistence has no merit whatsoever.
Probation, by its legal definition, is only "a disposition under which a defendant,
after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the
court and to the supervision of a probation officer."33 The grant of probation
cannot by itself remove a persons disqualification to be a candidate or to hold
any office due to its not being included among the grounds for the removal of the
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, supra. Although
the original text of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of
1976) stated that: xxx an application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the
appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The
filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.

the amendment of Presidential Decree No. 968 by Presidential Decree No.

199034 has made more explicit that probation only suspends the execution of the
sentence under certain conditions set by the trial court, viz:
Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment
or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The
filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
For sure, probation or its grant has not been intended to relieve the convict of all
the consequences of the sentence imposed on his crime involving moral
turpitude. Upon his final discharge as a probationer, the convict is restored only
to "all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction." This
consequence is according to the second paragraph of
Section 16 of the Probation Law of 1976, which states: "The final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as
to the offense for which probation was granted." There is no question that civil
rights are distinct and different from political rights, like the right of suffrage or the
right to run for a public office.
Even assuming that Jalosjos had been validly granted probation despite his
having appealed his conviction (considering that the amendment stating that an
appeal barred the application for probation took effect only on October 5, 1985
but his application for probation was earlier made in June 1985), his
disqualification pursuant to Section 40(a) of the LGC would have still attached
simply because the legal effect of a validly-granted probation was only to
suspend the execution of sentence,35 not to obliterate the consequences of the
sentence on his political rights.
In reality, Jalosjos could not even legitimately and sincerely rely on his supposed
final discharge from probation. He was fully aware that he did not at all satisfy the
conditions of his probation,36 contrary to what Section 10 and Section 16 of the
Probation Law definitely required, to wit:
Section 10. Conditions of Probation. Every probation order issued by the court
shall contain conditions requiring that the probationer shall:
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his
supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within seventytwo hours from receipt of said order; .

(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and
place as specified by said officer. x x x
Section 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and upon
consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court
may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed
terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspend as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of
such order.
The records indicate that the RTC revoked the order of probation on March 19,
1987 upon a motion filed by one Gregorio Bacolod, the Supervising Probation
Officer who had recommended the approval of the application for probation. The
revocation was premised on Jalosjos failure to report to Bacolod in violation of
the conditions of his probation. Following the revocation, the RTC issued a
warrant for the arrest of Jalosjos, but the warrant has remained unserved until
this date. With the revocation of his probation and in the absence of an order of
final discharge, Jalosjos was still legally bound to serve the sentence for robbery.
I point out for emphasis that the February 5, 2004 order of the RTC declaring that
Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation deserved no consideration
for the following reasons, namely: (a) the certification attesting that Jalosjos had
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation was secured by and issued to
him only on December 19, 2003, more than 16 years from the issuance of the
RTC order revoking his probation; (b) the certification was issued by Bacolod, the
same Supervising Probation Officer who had moved for the revocation of the
probation; and (c) the Sandiganbayan later on found the certification to have
been falsified by Bacolod considering that at the time of its issuance there was
no longer a probation order to be fulfilled by Jalosjos.37
And, thirdly, Jalosjos argues that he acted in good faith in representing in his
CoC that he was qualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan City,38 having relied on the
previous ruling of the COMELEC adjudging him eligible to run and to be elected
as Mayor of Dapitan City;39 and that it cannot then be said that he deliberately
attempted to mislead or to deceive the electorate as to his eligibility.
The argument is devoid of merit.
The COMELEC Resolution dated August 2, 2004, on which Jalosjos has
anchored his claim of good faith, was rendered on the basis of the RTC order
dated February 5, 2004 that had declared Jalosjos to have sufficiently complied
with the conditions of his probation based on the certification dated December
19, 2003. As earlier emphasized, however, the issuance of the certification dated
December 19, 2003 that became the basis for the RTC order dated February 5,
2004 proved to be highly irregular, and culminated in the Sandiganbayan
convicting Bacolod of falsification in relation to his issuance of the certification.

Clearly, Jalosjos reliance on the COMELEC Resolution dated August 2, 2004

was definitely not in good faith, but was contrary to every juridical conception of
good faith, which, according to Heirs of the Late Joaquin Limense v. Vda. De
Ramos,40 is
xxx an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition; and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal good faith is a concept of his
own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of
good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.41
In contrast, Jalosjos had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the finality
of his conviction and the revocation of his probation. He never denied and cannot
now dispute his failure to comply with the conditions of his probation, for he fully
knew that he had never duly reported to Bacolod during the period of his
probation. The following findings rendered by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision
dated September 29, 2008 convicting Bacolod of falsification of a public
document and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 sustained the fact that Jalosjos
had been unable to fulfil the terms of his probation:
xxx The subject Certification of the accused [Bacolod] attesting that "as per
records" Mr. Jalosjos "has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and
his case is deemed terminated," is nevertheless false because the PPA Central
Office had no records of an order of final discharge issued by the court to support
the facts narrated in the subject certification that Mr. Jalosjos has fulfilled the
terms and conditions of his probation and that his case is deemed terminated.
Besides, the accused failed to submit any oral or documentary evidence to
establish that at the time he issued the subject Certification on December 19,
2003, Mr. Jalosjos has already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation.
His belated submission on January 23, 2004 of a termination report dated
January 12, 2004 does not cure or remedy the falsity of the facts narrated in the
subject certification. Rather, it strengthens the theory of the prosecution that at
the time the accused issued the subject Certification on December 19, 2003,
probationer Jalosjos had not yet fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation
because, if it were so, his submission of the said termination report would no
longer be necessary. Since the PPA Central Office had no record of a court order
of final discharge of the probationer from probation, then he should have been
truthful and certified to that effect.42
Nor could Jalosjos even feign a lack of awareness of the issuance of the warrant
for his arrest following the revocation of his probation by the RTC on March 19,
1987. This is because he filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift
Warrant of Arrest in the RTC upon obtaining the falsified certification issued by
Bacolod.43 The absurdity of his claim of good faith was well-known even to him
because of his possession at the time he filed his CoC of all the information
material to his conviction and invalid probation. Being presumed to know the law,
he knew that his conviction for robbery and his failure to serve his sentence
rendered him ineligible to run as Mayor of Dapitan City. As a result, his

affirmation of his eligibility in his CoC was truly nothing but an act tainted with
bad faith.
3.
Jalosjos did not file a valid CoC for the May 10,
2010 elections; not being an official candidate,
votes cast in his favor are considered stray
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement
for any person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is
clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.
In turn, Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a
CoC, viz:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
A CoC, according to Sinaca v. Mula,44 "is in the nature of a formal manifestation
to the whole world of the candidates political creed or lack of political creed. It is
a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he
announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the
office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any,
and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated."
Accordingly, a persons declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
declaration that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume,
followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render
the declarant an official candidate.
In Bautista v. Commission on Elections,45 the Court stated that a cancelled CoC
does not give rise to a valid candidacy. A person without a valid CoC cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed
any CoC cannot at all be a candidate.46

Hence, the cancellation of Jalosjos CoC rendered him a non-candidate in the

May 10, 2010 elections.
But, even without the cancellation of his CoC, Jalosjos undeniably possessed a
disqualification to run as Mayor of Dapitan City. The fact of his ineligibility was by
itself adequate to invalidate his CoC without the necessity of its express
cancellation or denial of due course by the COMELEC. Under no circumstance
could he have filed a valid CoC. The accessory penalties that inhered to his
penalty of prision mayor perpetually disqualified him from the right of suffrage as
well as the right to be voted for in any election for public office. The
disqualification was by operation of a mandatory penal law. For him to be allowed
to ignore the perpetual disqualification would be to sanction his lawlessness, and
would permit him to make a mockery of the electoral process that has been so
vital to our democracy. He was not entitled to be voted for, leaving all the votes
cast for him stray and legally non-existent.
In contrast, Cardino, the only remaining candidate, was duly elected and should
legally assume the position of Mayor of Dapitan City. According to the Court in
Santos v. Commission on Elections:47
Anent petitioners contention that his disqualification does not ipso facto warrant
the proclamation of private respondent, We find the same untenable and without
legal basis since votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of
invalid non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all
in the eyes of the law. Section 155 of the Election Code provides
"Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified shall be
considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot."
(Italics supplied)
Considering that all the votes garnered by the petitioner are stray votes and
therefore should not be counted, We find no error, much less any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Comelec, in proclaiming private respondent Ricardo
J. Rufino the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, he having obtained the highest
number of votes as appearing and certified in the canvass of votes submitted by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers petitioner having been legally disqualified.
Such a proclamation finds legal support from the case of Ticzon vs. Comelec 103
SCRA 671, wherein disqualified candidate Ticzon likewise questioned the legality
of the Resolution of the Comelec which not only disqualified him but further
proclaimed Dizon, the only candidate left for the disputed position, and this Court
upheld the proclamation of Cesar Dizon as Mayor of San Pablo City.48
Although the doctrine of the sovereign will has prevailed several times in the past
to prevent the nullification of an election victory of a disqualified candidate, or of
one whose CoC was cancelled, the Court should not now be thwarted from
enforcing the law in its letter and spirit by any desire to respect the will of the
people expressed in an election. The objective of prescribing disqualifications in
the election laws as well as in the penal laws is obviously to prevent the
convicted criminals and the undeserving from running and being voted for.
Unless the Court leads the way to see to the implementation of the
unquestionable national policy behind the prescription of disqualifications, there
would inevitably come the time when many communities of the country would be
electing convicts and misfits. When that time should come, the public trust would

be trivialized and the public office degraded. This is now the appropriate
occasion, therefore, to apply the law in all its majesty in order to enforce its clear
letter and underlying spirit. Thereby, we will prevent the electoral exercise from
being subjected to mockery and from being rendered a travesty.
In closing, I consider to be appropriate and fitting the Courts following
pronouncement in Velasco v. Commission on Elections:49
x x x We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be
considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be
disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidates certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election
laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC.
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune
our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified
reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance
for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively
negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
information to make an informed choice about a candidates eligibility and fitness
for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is
Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local
government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section
74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may
likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel
or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a
candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk
falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure
any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal command,
framed by a Congress representing the national will, is rendered inutile because
the people of a given locality has decided to vote a candidate into office despite
his or her lack of the qualifications Congress has determined to be necessary.
In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim that he
is registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a final
judgment. Equally important is that he has made a material misrepresentation
under oath in his COC regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must
pay the ultimate price - the nullification of his election victory. He may also harve
to account in a criminal court for making a false statement under oath, but this is
a matter for the proper authorities to decide upon.
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past
by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve
material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC

mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after

the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement
involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material
COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election
and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people
of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on
material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the
electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we
cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of
upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of
law. 50
ACCORDINGLY, I JOIN the Majority in granting the petition in G.R. No. 193536;
in dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 193237 for lack of merit; and in affirming the
COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated February 22, 2011 subject to the
modification that Agapito J. Cardino be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga during the May 10, 2010 national and local elections,
and thus entitled to assume the office of Mayor of Dapitan City.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 49-56.

Id. at 40-48.

Id. at 49-56.

Rollo, G.R. No. 193536, p. 9.

Id.

Id. at 177.

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 355-358.

Id. at 355-360.

Id. at. 373-391.

10

G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447.

11

Id. at 457.

12

G.R. No. 179695 & 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.

13

Id., pp. 792-794; emphases are part of the original text.

Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011,

644 SCRA 761, 777.
14

15

Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12, p. 794.

Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which
he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and
to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
16

This disqualification to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed

removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified.
Section 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest
in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or
if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
17

Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12, at pp. 794-796, to

wit:
18

x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on

Section 12 or 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On
the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only
be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as
if he/she never filed a CoC.
19

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 58-59.

See Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12; Salcedo II v.

Commission on Elections, supra, note 10.
20

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false.
21

The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
22

G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.

23

Id. at 769.

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified

from running for any elective local position:
24

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence; (b)
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
xxx
Republic v. Marcos, G.R. Nos. 130371 & 130855, August 4, 2009, 595
SCRA 43, 63; see also De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, A.C. No. 439, April 12,
1961, 1 SCRA 954, 956.
25

26

G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009, 587 SCRA 1.

27

Id. at 12-13.

28

G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 495.

29

Id. at 500-501.

Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code gives the effects of the accessory
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, to wit:
30

Article 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute

disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the
offender may have held even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office
or to be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the
exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised
in paragraphs 2 and
3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office
formerly held.
31

Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code expressly declares:

Article 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special

disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage
shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence,
according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his disqualification.
32

Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Article 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision
mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that
of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the
offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
33

Section 3(a), Presidential Decree No. 968.

34

Approved on October 5, 1985.

35

Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968, states:

Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree,

the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and
upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the execution of
said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
36

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 159-160.

On that basis, the Sandiganbayan convicted Bacolod of two crimes, one,

for a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and, two, for
falsification of public document under the Revised Penal Code.
37

38

Id. at 28.

39

Id. at 27-28.

40

G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009, 604 SCRA 599.

41

Id. at 612; emphasis is supplied.

42

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 159-160.

43

Id. at 153.

44

G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 276.

45

G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 480, 493.

46

Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617, 624.

47

G.R. No. L-58512, July 23, 1985, 137 SCRA 740.

48

Id. at 749.

49

G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590.

50

Id. at 614-615.

f) Family Relations
FC Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. (217a)
FC Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise
under
the
Civil
Code. (222a)
FC Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage. (133a)
NCC Art. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each
other, except:
(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements; or

(2) When there has been a judicial separation or property under

Article 191. (1458a)
NCC Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be
valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)
NCC SUBSECTION 1. - Relationship
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of
generations. Each generation forms a degree. (915)
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct
or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come
from a common ancestor.(916a)
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from
him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917)
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are
generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the
child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the
grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be
made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three

from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first
cousin, and so forth. (918a)
Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who
have the same father and the same mother.
Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the
same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the
same father.(920a)

g) Alienage
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and cralaw
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain
their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed,
under the law, to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national

interest and shall be dealt with by law.
h) Absence
Title XIV. - ABSENCE
CHAPTER 1
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CASE OF ABSENCE
Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his
whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to
administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested
party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in
all that may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances
the power conferred by the absentee has expired. (181a)
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having
been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard
the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify the powers,
obligations and remuneration of his representative, regulating them,
according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning
guardians. (182)
Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present
shall be preferred when there is no legal separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any
competent person may be appointed by the court. (183a)
CHAPTER 2
DECLARATION OF ABSENCE
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the
absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case
the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his
property, his absence may be declared. (184)
Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic
copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;

(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some
right subordinated to the condition of his death. (185)
Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until
six months after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. (186a)
CHAPTER 3
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE ABSENTEE
Art. 387. An administrator of the absentee's property shall be
appointed in accordance with Article 383. (187a)
Art. 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the
husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's
property, or that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial
authority. (188a)
Art. 389. The administration shall cease in any of the following cases:
(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an
agent;
(2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or
intestate heirs appear;
(3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper document
that he has acquired the absentee's property by purchase or
other title.
In these cases the administrator shall cease in the performance of his
office, and the property shall be at the disposal of those who may
have
a
right
thereto. (190)
CHAPTER 4
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening
his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n)
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an

aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and
has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years. (n)
Art. 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence
is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in which it
may be found, and the price of any property that may have been
alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim
either fruits or rents. (194)

CHAPTER 5
EFFECT OF ABSENCE UPON THE
CONTINGENT RIGHTS OF THE ABSENTEE
Art. 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to a person whose
existence is not recognized must prove that he was living at the time
his existence was necessary in order to acquire said right. (195)
Art. 394. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article,
upon the opening of a succession to which an absentee is called, his
share shall accrue to his co-heirs, unless he has heirs, assigns, or a
representative. They shall all, as the case may be, make an inventory
of the property. (196a)
Art. 395. The provisions of the preceding article are understood to be
without prejudice to the action of petition for inheritance or other
rights which are vested in the absentee, his representatives or
successors in interest. These rights shall not be extinguished save by
lapse of time fixed for prescription. In the record that is made in the
Registry of the real estate which accrues to the coheirs, the
circumstance of its being subject to the provisions of this article shall
be stated.(197)
Art. 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance shall
appropriate the fruits received in good faith so long as the absentee
does not appear, or while his representatives or successors in
interest do not bring the proper actions. (198)

THIRD DIVISION
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 158907

Present:

- versus -

EMILIO PURUGGANAN, JR. AND

RAUL LOCSIN,
Respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA,* JJ.
Promulgated:
February 12, 2007

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision,[1] dated 30 June 2003, promulgated by the
Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated
26 July 1995, dismissing the petitioners suit.
The parties presented conflicting accounts of the facts.

EDUARDO B. OLAGUERS VERSION

Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer alleges that he was the owner of 60,000
shares of stock of Businessday Corporation (Businessday) with a total
par value of P600,000.00, with Certificates of Stock No. 005, No. 028, No.
034, No. 070, and No. 100.[2] At the time he was employed with the
corporation as Executive Vice-President of Businessday, and President
of Businessday Information
Systems
and
Services
and
of Businessday Marketing
Corporation,
petitioner,
together
with
respondent Raul Locsin (Locsin) and Enrique Joaquin (Joaquin), was
active in the political opposition against the Marcos dictatorship.
[3]
Anticipating the possibility that petitioner would be arrested and detained

by the Marcos military, Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an

unwritten agreement that, in the event that petitioner was arrested, they
would support the petitioners family by the continued payment of his salary.
[4]
Petitioner also executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), on 26 May
1979, appointing as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofileafor
the purpose of selling or transferring petitioners shares of stock
with Businessday. During the trial, petitioner testified that he agreed to
execute the SPA in order to cancel his shares of stock, even before they
are sold, for the purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder
of Businessday, in the event of a military crackdown against the
opposition.[5]The parties acknowledged the SPA before respondent
Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary
of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public forQuezon City.[6]
On 24 December 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military by
virtue of an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order and detained for allegedly
committing
arson. During
the
petitioners
detention,
respondent Locsin ordered fellow respondent Purugganan to cancel the
petitioners shares in the books of the corporation and to transfer them to
respondentLocsins name.[7]
As part of his scheme to defraud the petitioner, respondent Locsin sent
Rebecca Fernando, an employee of Businessday, to Camp Crame where
the petitioner was detained, to pretend to borrow Certificate of Stock No.
100 for the purpose of using it as additional collateral
for Businessdays then outstanding loan with the National Investment and
Development Corporation. When Fernando returned the borrowed stock
certificate, the word cancelled was already written therein. When the
petitioner became upset, Fernando explained that this was merely a
mistake committed by respondent Locsins secretary.[8]
During the trial, petitioner also agreed to stipulate that from 1980 to
1982, Businessday made
regular
deposits,
each
amounting
to P10,000.00, to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company accounts of
Manuel and Genaro Pantig, petitioners in-laws. The deposits were made
on every 15th and 30th of the month.[9] Petitioner alleged that these funds
consisted of his monthly salary, which Businessday agreed to continue
paying after his arrest for the financial support of his family.[10] After
receiving a total of P600,000.00, the payments stopped. Thereafter,
respondent Locsin and Fernando went to ask petitioner to endorse and
deliver the rest of his stock certificates to respondent Locsin, but petitioner
refused. [11]
On 16 January 1986, petitioner was finally released from detention. He
then discovered that he was no longer registered as stockholder
of Businessday in its corporate books. He also learned that Purugganan,
as the Corporate Secretary of Businessday, had already recorded the
transfer of shares in favor of respondent Locsin, while petitioner was
detained.When petitioner demanded that respondents restore to him full

ownership of his shares of stock, they refused to do so. On 29 July 1986,

petitioner filed a Complaint before the trial court against
respondents Purugganan and Locsin to declare as illegal the sale of the
shares of stock, to restore to the petitioner full ownership of the shares, and
payment of damages.[12]
RESPONDENT RAUL LOCSINS VERSION
In his version of the facts, respondent Locsin contended that petitioner
approached him and requested him to sell, and, if necessary, buy
petitioners shares of stock in Businessday, to assure support for
petitioners family in the event that something should happen to him,
particularly if he was jailed, exiled or forced to go underground. [13] At the
time petitioner was employed with Businessday, respondent Locsin was
unaware that petitioner was part of a group, Light-a-Fire Movement, which
actively sought the overthrow of the Marcos government through an armed
struggle.[14] He denied that he made any arrangements to continue paying
the petitioners salary in the event of the latters imprisonment. [15]
When petitioner was detained, respondent Locsin tried to sell petitioners
shares, but nobody wanted to buy them. Petitioners reputation as an
oppositionist resulted in the poor financial condition of Businessday and
discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock. [16] In view of petitioners
previous instructions, respondent Locsin decided to buy the shares
himself. Although the capital deficiency suffered by Businessday caused
the book value of the shares to plummet below par value,
respondent Locsin, nevertheless, bought the shares at par value.
[17]
However, he had to borrow from Businessday the funds he used in
purchasing the shares from petitioner, and had to pay the petitioner in
installments of P10,000.00 every 15th and 30th of each month.[18]
The trial court in its Decision, dated 26 July 1995, dismissed the Complaint
filed by the petitioner. It ruled that the sale of shares between petitioner and
respondent Locsin was valid. The trial court concluded that petitioner had
intended to sell the shares of stock to anyone, including
respondent Locsin, in order to provide for the needs of his family should he
be jailed or forced to go underground; and that the SPA drafted by the
petitioner empowered respondent Locsin, and two other agents, to sell the
shares for such price and under such terms and conditions that the agents
may deem proper. It further found that petitioner consented to have
respondent Locsin buy the shares himself. It also ruled that petitioner,
through his wife, received from respondent Locsin the amount
of P600,000.00 as payment for the shares of stock. [19] The dispositive part
of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the [herein petitioner] to prove by
preponderance of evidence, his causes of action and of the facts alleged in
his complaint, the instant suit is hereby ordered DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

[Herein respondents] counterclaims, however, are hereby DISMISSED,

likewise, for dearth of substantial evidentiary support. [20]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court that
there was a perfected contract of sale. [21] It further ruled that granting that
there was no perfected contract of sale, petitioner, nevertheless, ratified the
sale to respondent Locsin by his receipt of the purchase price, and his
failure to raise any protest over the said sale. [22] The Court of Appeals
refused to credit the petitioners allegation that the money his wife received
constituted his salary from Businessday since the amount he received as
his salary,P24,000.00 per month, did not correspond to the amount he
received during his detention, P20,000.00 per month (deposits
of P10,000.00 on every 15th and 30th of each month in the accounts of the
petitioners in-laws). On the other hand, the total amount
received, P600,000.00, corresponds to the aggregate par value of
petitioners shares in Businessday.Moreover, the financial condition
of Businessday prevented it from granting any form of financial assistance
in favor of the petitioner, who was placed in an indefinite leave of absence,
and, therefore, not entitled to any salary. [23]
The Court of Appeals also ruled that although the manner of the
cancellation of the petitioners certificates of stock and the subsequent
issuance of the new certificate of stock in favor of respondent Locsin was
irregular, this irregularity will not relieve petitioner of the consequences of a
consummated sale.[24]
Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court
disallowing respondent Locsins claims for moral and exemplary damages
due to lack of supporting evidence.[25]
Hence, the present petition, where the following issues were raised:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS A
PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND MR.
LOCSIN OVER THE SHARES;
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
CONSENTED TO THE ALLEGED SALE OF THE SHARES TO MR.
LOCSIN;
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AMOUNTS
RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS IN LAWS WERE NOT PETITIONERS

SALARY FROM THE CORPORATION BUT INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS

FOR THE SHARES;
IV.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MR. LOCSIN WAS
THE PARTY TO THE ALLEGED SALE OF THE SHARES AND NOT THE
CORPORATION; AND
V.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ALLEGED SALE OF THE SHARES WAS VALID ALTHOUGH THE
CANCELLATION OF THE SHARES WAS IRREGULAR.[26]
The petition is without merit.
The first issue that the petitioner raised is that there was no valid sale since
respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA[27] issued in his,
Joaquin and Holifenasfavor. He alleged that the authority of the aforenamed agents to sell the shares of stock was limited to the following
conditions: (1) in the event of the petitioners absence and incapacity; and
(2) for the limited purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the
satisfaction of petitioners subsisting obligations with the companies
adverted to in the SPA.[28]
Petitioner sought to impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the
definition of the word absence to a condition wherein a person disappears
from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an
agent to administer his property,[29] citing Article 381 of the Civil Code, the
entire provision hereunder quoted:
ART 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts
being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the
judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the
power conferred by the absentee has expired.
Petitioner also puts forward that the word incapacity would be limited to
mean minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction.[30]He cites Article 38 of the Civil Code, in support of
this definition, which is hereunder quoted:

ART. 38 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,

prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and
do not exempt the incapacitated person, from certain obligations, as when
the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Petitioner, thus, claims that his arrest and subsequent detention are not
among the instances covered by the terms absence or incapacity, as
provided under the SPA he executed in favor of respondent Locsin.
Petitioners arguments are unpersuasive. It is a general rule that a power of
attorney must be strictly construed; the instrument will be held to grant only
those powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor
deviate from the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and
should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the
power. If the language will permit, the construction that should be adopted
is that which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the
appointment.Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant to each
other should be reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in
accordance with its general intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore,
the instrument should always be deemed to give such powers as essential
or usual in effectuating the express powers. [31]
In the present case, limiting the definitions of absence to that provided
under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of incapacity under Article 38 of the
same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd,
if not impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the necessarily
stringent standards that would justify the appointment of a representative
by a judge. Among the standards the said article enumerates is that no
agent has been appointed to administer the property. In the present case,
petitioner himself had already authorized agents to do specific acts of
administration and thus, no longer necessitated the appointment of one by
the court. Likewise, limiting the construction of incapacity to minority,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction, as provided under Article 38, would render the SPA
ineffective.Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code provides that the death, civil
interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent
extinguishes the agency. It would be equally incongruous, if not outright
impossible, for the petitioner to require himself to qualify as a minor, an
imbecile, a deaf-mute, or a prodigal before the SPA becomes operative. In
such cases, not only would he be prevented from appointing an agent, he
himself would be unable to administer his property.
On the other hand, defining the terms absence and incapacity by their
everyday usage makes for a reasonable construction, that is, the state of
not being present and the inability to act, given the context that the SPA
authorizes the agents to attend stockholders meetings and vote in behalf of
petitioner, to sell the shares of stock, and other related acts. This

construction covers the situation wherein petitioner was arrested and

detained. This much is admitted by petitioner in his testimony.[32]
Petitioners contention that the shares may only be sold for the sole purpose
of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioners
subsisting obligations to the company is far-fetched. The construction,
which will carry out the purpose, is that which should be applied. Petitioner
had not submitted evidence that he was in debt withBusinessday at the
time he had executed the SPA. Nor could he have considered incurring any
debts since he admitted that, at the time of its execution, he was concerned
about his possible arrest, death and disappearance. The language of the
SPA clearly enumerates, as among those acts that the agents were
authorized to do, the act of applying the proceeds of the sale of the shares
to any obligations petitioner might have against the Businessday group of
companies. This interpretation is supported by the use of the word and in
enumerating the authorized acts, instead of phrases such as only for, for
the purpose of, in order to or any similar terms to indicate that the petitioner
intended that the SPA be used only for a limited purpose, that of paying any
liabilities with the Businessday group of companies.
Secondly, petitioner argued that the records failed to show that he gave his
consent to the sale of the shares to respondent Locsin for the price
of P600,000.00. This argument is unsustainable. Petitioner received from
respondent Locsin, through his wife and in-laws, the installment payments
for a total of P600,000.00 from 1980 to 1982, without any protest or
complaint. It was only four years after 1982 when petitioner demanded the
return of the shares. The petitioners claim that he did not instruct
respondent Locsin to deposit the money to the bank accounts of his inlaws fails to prove that petitioner did not give his consent to the sale since
respondent Locsin was authorized, under the SPA, to negotiate the terms
and conditions of the sale including the manner of payment. Moreover, had
respondent Locsin given the proceeds directly to the petitioner, as the
latter suggested in this petition, the proceeds were likely to have been
included among petitioners properties which were confiscated by the
military. Instead, respondent Locsindeposited the money in the bank
accounts of petitioners in-laws, and consequently, assured that the
petitioners wife received these amounts. Article 1882 of the Civil Code
provides that the limits of an agents authority shall not be considered
exceeded should it have been performed in a manner more advantageous
to the principal than that specified by him.
In addition, petitioner made two inconsistent statements when he alleged
that (1) respondent Locsin had not asked the petitioner to endorse and
deliver the shares of stock, and (2) when Rebecca Fernando asked the
petitioner to endorse and deliver the certificates of stock, but petitioner
refused and even became upset.[33] In either case, both statements only
prove that petitioner refused to honor his part as seller of the shares, even
after receiving payments from the buyer. Had the petitioner not known of or
given his consent to the sale, he would have given back the payments as

soon as Fernando asked him to endorse and deliver the certificates of

stock, an incident which unequivocally confirmed that the funds he
received, through his wife and his in-laws, were intended as payment for
his shares of stocks. Instead, petitioner held on to the proceeds of the sale
after it had been made clear to him that respondent Locsin had considered
the P600,000.00 as payment for the shares, and asked petitioner, through
Fernando, to endorse and deliver the stock certificates for cancellation.
As regards the third issue, petitioners allegation that the installment
payments he was adjudged to have received for the shares were actually
salaries which Businessday promised to pay him during his detention is
unsupported and implausible. Petitioner received P20,000.00 per month
through his in-laws; this amount does not correspond to his monthly salary
at P24,000.00.[34] Nor does the amount received correspond to the amount
which Businessday was supposed to be obliged to pay petitioner, which
was only P45,000.00 toP60,000.00 per annum.[35] Secondly, the petitioners
wife did not receive funds from respondent Locsin or Businessday for the
entire duration of petitioners detention. Instead, when the total amount
received by the petitioner reached the aggregate amount of his shares at
par value -- P600,000.00 -- the payments stopped. Petitioner even testified
that when respondent Locsin denied knowing the petitioner soon after his
arrest, he believed respondent Locsins commitment to pay his salaries
during his detention to be nothing more than lip-service. [36]
Granting that petitioner was able to prove his allegations, such an act of
gratuity, on the part of Businessday in favor of petitioner, would be
void. An arrangement whereby petitioner will receive salaries for work he
will not perform, which is not a demandable debt since petitioner was on an
extended leave of absence, constitutes a donation under Article 726 [37] of
the Civil Code. Under Article 748 of the Civil Code, if the value of the
personal property donated exceeds P5,000.00, the donation and the
acceptance shall have to be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation will
be void. In the present case, petitioner admitted in his testimony [38] that
such arrangement was not made in writing and, hence, is void.
The fact that some of the deposit slips and communications made to
petitioners wife contain the phrase household expenses does not disprove
the sale of the shares. The money was being deposited to the bank
accounts of the petitioners in-laws, and not to the account of the petitioner
or his wife, precisely because some of his property had already been
confiscated by the military. Had they used the phrase sale of shares, it
would have defeated the purpose of not using their own bank accounts,
which was to conceal from the military any transaction involving the
petitioners property.
Petitioner raised as his fourth issue that granting that there
sale, Businessday, and not respondent Locsin, was the party
transaction. The curious facts that the payments were received
15th and 30th of each month and that the payor named in the

was a
to the
on the
checks

was Businessday,
were
adequately
explained
by
respondent Locsin.Respondent Locsin had obtained cash advances from
the company, paid to him on the 15 th and 30th of the month, so that he can
pay
petitioner
for
the
shares. To support
his
claim,
he
presented Businessdays financial records and the testimony of
Leo Atienza, the Companys Accounting Manager. When asked why the
term shares of stock was used for the entries, instead of cash
advances, Atienza explained that the term shares of stock was more
specific rather than the broader phrase cash advances. [39] More to the
point, had the entries been for shares of stock, the issuance of shares
should have been reflected in the stock and transfer books
of Businessday, which the petitioner presented as evidence.Instead the
stock
and
transfer
books
reveal
that
the
increase
in
respondent Locsins shares was a result of the cancellation and transfer of
petitioners shares in favor of respondentLocsin.
Petitioner alleges that the purported sale between himself and
respondent Locsin of the disputed shares of stock is void since it
contravenes Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which provides that:
ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxxx
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;
x x x.
It is, indeed, a familiar and universally recognized doctrine that a person
who undertakes to act as agent for another cannot be permitted to deal in
the agency matter on his own account and for his own benefit without the
consent of his principal, freely given, with full knowledge of every detail
known to the agent which might affect the transaction. [40]The prohibition
against agents purchasing property in their hands for sale or management
is, however, clearly, not absolute. It does not apply where the principal
consents to the sale of the property in the hands of the agent or
administrator.[41]
In the present case, the parties have conflicting allegations. While
respondent Locsin averred that petitioner had permitted him to purchase
petitioners shares, petitioner vehemently denies having known of the
transaction. However, records show that petitioners position is less credible
than that taken by respondent Locsin given petitioners contemporaneous
and subsequent acts.[42] In 1980, when Fernando returned a stock
certificate she borrowed from the petitioner, it was marked
cancelled. Although the petitioner alleged that he was furious when he saw
the word cancelled, he had not demanded the issuance of a new certificate
in his name. Instead of having been put on his guard, petitioner remained

silent over this obvious red flag and continued receiving, through his wife,
payments which totalled to the aggregate amount of the shares of stock
valued at par. When the payments stopped, no demand was made by
either petitioner or his wife for further payments.
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner knew of the transaction,
agreed to the purchase price of P600,000.00 for the shares of stock, and
had in fact facilitated the implementation of the terms of the payment by
providing respondent Locsin, through petitioners wife, with the information
on the bank accounts of his in-laws. Petitioners wife and his son even
provided receipts for the payments that were made to them by
respondent Locsin,[43] a practice that bespeaks of an onerous transaction
and not an act of gratuity.
Lastly, petitioner claims that the cancellation of the shares and the
subsequent transfer thereof were fraudulent, and, therefore, illegal. In the
present case, the shares were transferred in the name of the buyer,
respondent Locsin, without the petitioner delivering to the buyer his
certificates of stock. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that:
Sec.63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. xxx Shares of stock so
issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the
certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or
other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however,
shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded
in the books of the corporation showing the names of the parties to the
transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or
certificates and the number of shares transferred. (Emphasis provided.)
The aforequoted provision furnishes the procedure for the transfer of
shares the delivery of the endorsed certificates, in order to prevent the
fraudulent transfer of shares of stock.However, this rule cannot be applied
in the present case without causing the injustice sought to be avoided. As
had been amply demonstrated, there was a valid sale of stocks.Petitioners
failure to deliver the shares to their rightful buyer is a breach of his duty as
a seller, which he cannot use to unjustly profit himself by denying the
validity of such sale.Thus, while the manner of the cancellation of
petitioners certificates of stock and the issuance of the new certificates in
favor of respondent Locsin was highly irregular, we must, nonetheless,
declare the validity of the sale between the parties. Neither does this
irregularity prove that the transfer was fraudulent. In his testimony,
petitioner admitted that they had intended to conceal his being a
stockholder of Businessday.[44] The cancellation of his name from the
stock and transfer book, even before the shares were actually sold, had
been done with his consent. As earlier explained, even the subsequent sale
of the shares in favor of Locsin had been done with his consent.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This
Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated

on 30 June 2003, affirming the validity of the sale of the shares of stock in
favor of respondent Locsin. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

On leave.
Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Assuncion and Lucas
P. Bersamin, concurring; rollo, pp. 70-86.
[2]
Id. at 71.
[3]
Id. at 18-19.
[4]
Id. at 19.
[5]
Records, Volume 1, pp. 217-218.
[6]
Rollo, p. 19.
[7]
Id. at 20
[8]
Id. at 20-21.
[9]
Records, Volume II, pp. 519-520.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[11]
Id. at 23.
[12]
Id. at 23-24.
[13]
Id. at 925-926.
[14]
Id. at 927-928.
[15]
Id. at 928.
[16]
Id. at 929-930.
[17]
Id. at 930-931.
[18]
Id. at 933.
[19]
CA rollo, pp. 818-822.
[20]
Records, Vol. II, p. 822.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 76-79.
[22]
Id. at 80.
[23]
Id. at 81-82.
[24]
Id. at 83-84.
[25]
Id. at 85.
[26]
Id. at 29-30.
[27]
Id. at 199-200. The Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioner on 26 May 1979 reads:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT I, EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, of legal age, xxx, have named, appointed and constituted, and by these
presents, do hereby name, constitute and appoint Messers. RAUL L. LOCSIN, ENRIQUE M. JOAQUIN, and
HECTOR HOFILEA, all of legal age and with business address c/o Businessday Corporation, 113 West
Avenue, Quezon City, jointly and individually, to be my true and lawful attorneys-in-fact, for me and in my name,
place and stead, in the event of my absence or incapacity, to do or perform any or all of the following acts and
things, to wit:
1. For me and in my stead to attend and vote my stock at any stockholders meeting of the Businessday Group of
Companies, consisting of the Businessday Corporation, Businessday Information Systems & Services, Inc.,
and BusinessdayMarketing Corporation, of all of which I am a stockholder, and to take such action as may be in my
interest as fully as I could do if personally present, and for this purpose to sign and execute any proxies or other
instruments in my name or on my behalf, appointing my said attorneys, or any one of them, or any other person
as my proxy or proxies;
2. To sell, assign, transfer, endorse and deliver, for such price or prices, and under such terms and conditions, as my
said attorneys-in-fact may deem proper, any and all shares of stock now held or which may hereafter be held by me
in the aforesaid companies; to receive payment or payments from the buyer; buyers thereof; to make, execute and
deliver receipts for such payments; and to apply the net proceeds of any such sale, assignment and transfer to the
liquidation of and satisfaction for any and all obligations that I may have with the said companies.
[28]
Rollo, p. 31.
[29]
Id.
[30]
Id. at 31-32.
[1]

[31]
[32]

3 Am. Jur. 2d, 536-537.

Records, Volume I, p. 188.

Q: In other words Mr. Witness, it is not correct to conclude that when you executed that special power of attorney,
you contemplated your possible arrest at that time?
A: Arrest, death and disappearance.
[33]
Rollo, pp. 34, 1929.
[34]
Records, Volume I, p. 196. Petitioner confirmed the Court of Appeals factual finding that he received a monthly
salary of P24,000.00 when he testified receiving an equivalent amount estimated at P250,000.00 to P300,000.00 per
annum.

[35]

Id. at 194-195.
Id. at 240.
[37]
ART. 726. When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the latters merits or of the services
rendered by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon
the donee a burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is also a donation.
[38]
Records, Volume I, p. 243.
[39]
Records, TSN Duplicate, p. 2087.
[36]

[40]

3 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 727-728.

[41]

Distajo v. Court of Appeals, 393 Phil. 426, 433 (2000); Pelayo v. Perez, G.R. No. 141323, 8 June 2005, 459
SCRA 475, 487-488.
[42]
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that:
ART. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
[43]
[44]

TSN, 28 January 1992, pp. 2208-2209.

Records, Volume I, pp. 217-218.

i) Insolvency and Trusteeship

Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards
whom they represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the
value of the things which are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter
suffer the lesion stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in
any other manner collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been
entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of
the litigants or of competent judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to
rescission. (1291a)
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at
a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation
of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be
under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under
administration;

(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any
subdivision thereof, or of any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been
intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and
government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a)
NCC Art. 2236. The debtor is liable with all his property, present and
future, for the fulfillment of his obligations, subject to the exemptions
provided by law. (1911a)

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
LEONARDO S. UMALE, [deceased]
represented
by
CLARISSA
VICTORIA, JOHN LEO, GEORGE
LEONARD,
KRISTINE,
MARGUERITA
ISABEL,
AND
MICHELLE ANGELIQUE, ALL
SURNAMED UMALE,
Petitioners,
- versus -

G.R. No. 181126

Present:
VELASCO, JR.,
Acting Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

ASB REALTY CORPORATION,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 15, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Being placed under corporate rehabilitation and having a receiver appointed to carry out
the rehabilitation plan do not ipso facto deprive a corporation and its corporate officers of
the power to recover its unlawfully detained property.
Petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the October 15, 2007
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91096, as well as its January
2, 2008 Resolution.[3] The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 28, 2005 of the trial court is affirmed in
toto.
SO ORDERED.[4]

Factual Antecedents
This case involves a parcel of land identified as Lot 7, Block 5, Amethyst Street, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City which was originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation
(Amethyst Pearl), a company that is, in turn, wholly-owned by respondent ASB Realty
Corporation (ASB Realty).
In 1996, Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject
premises in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst
Pearls outstanding capital stock from ASB Realty.[5] Thus, ASB Realty became the owner
of the subject premises and obtained in its name Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT105797,[6] which was registered in 1997 with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
Sometime in 2003, ASB Realty commenced an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) of Pasig City for unlawful detainer [7] of the subject premises against petitioner
Leonardo S. Umale (Umale). ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease
contract[8] with Umale for the period June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000. Their agreement was
for Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent
of P60,720.00 to ASB Realty.

Upon the contracts expiration on May 31, 2000, Umale continued occupying the
premises and paying rentals albeit at an increased monthly rent of P100,000.00. The last
rental payment made by Umale to ASB Realty was for the June 2001 to May 2002
period, as evidenced by the Official Receipt No. 56511[9] dated November 19, 2001.

On June 23, 2003, ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and
Demand to Vacate and Pay.[10] ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease
effective midnight of June 30, 2003; that Umale should vacate the premises, and pay to
ASB Realty the rental arrears amounting to P1.3 million by July 15, 2003. Umale failed
to comply with ASB Realtys demands and continued in possession of the subject
premises, even constructing commercial establishments thereon.
Umale admitted occupying the property since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease contract
but vehemently denied that ASB Realty was his lessor. He was adamant that his lessor
was the original owner, Amethyst Pearl. Since there was no contract between himself and
ASB Realty, the latter had no cause of action to file the unlawful detainer complaint
against him.
In asserting his right to remain on the property based on the oral lease contract with
Amethyst Pearl, Umale interposed that the lease period agreed upon was for a long
period of time.[11] He then allegedly paid P1.2 million in 1999 as one year advance rentals
to Amethyst Pearl.[12]
Umale further claimed that when his oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended in
May 2000, they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. They agreed that Umale did not
have to pay rentals until the sale over the subject property had been perfected between
them.[13] Despite such agreement with Amethyst Pearl regarding the waiver of rent
payments, Umale maintained that he continued paying the annual rent of P1.2
million. He was thus surprised when he received the Notice of Termination of Lease
from ASB Realty.[14]
Umale also challenged ASB Realtys personality to recover the subject premises
considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly
appointed. Under Section 14(s), Rule 4 of the Administrative Memorandum No. 00-810SC, otherwise known as the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation

(Interim Rules), it is the rehabilitation receiver that has the power to take possession,
control and custody of the debtors assets. Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the
subject premises, it is its duly-appointed receiver that should sue to recover possession of
the same.[15]
ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for Umale to have entered into a Contract of
Lease with Amethyst Pearl in 1999 because Amethyst Pearl had been liquidated in
1996. ASB Realty insisted that, as evidenced by the written lease contract, Umale
contracted with ASB Realty, not with Amethyst Pearl. As further proof thereof, ASB
Realty cited the official receipt evidencing the rent payments made by Umale to ASB
Realty.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
In its August 20, 2004 Decision,[16] the MTC dismissed ASB Realtys complaint against
Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB Realty had no cause to seek Umales ouster
from the subject property because it was not Umales lessor. The trial court noted an
inconsistency in the written lease contract that was presented by ASB Realty as basis for
its complaint. Its whereas clauses cited ASB Realty, with Eden C. Lin as its
representative, as Umales lessor; but its signatory page contained Eden C. Lins name
under the heading Amethyst Pearl. The MTC then concluded from such inconsistency
that Amethyst Pearl was the real lessor, who can seek Umales ejectment from the subject
property.[17]
Likewise, the MTC agreed with Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could file suit
to recover ASB Realtys property.[18] Having been placed under receivership, ASB Realty
had no more personality to file the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
ASB Realty appealed the adverse MTC Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
[19]

which then reversed[20] the MTC ruling.

The RTC held that the MTC erred in dismissing ASB Realtys complaint for lack of cause
of action. It found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it was indeed ASB

Realty that entered into a lease contract with Umale, hence, the proper party who can
assert the corresponding right to seek Umales ouster from the leased premises for
violations of the lease terms. In addition to the written lease contract, the official receipt
evidencing Umales rental payments for the period June 2001 to May 2002 to ASB Realty
adequately established that Umale was aware that his lessor, the one entitled to receive
his rent payments, was ASB Realty, not Amethyst Pearl.
ASB Realtys positive assertions, supported as they are by credible evidence, are more
compelling than Umales bare negative assertions. The RTC found Umales version of the
facts incredible. It was implausible that a businessman such as Umale would enter into
several transactions with his alleged lessor a lease contract, payment of lease rentals,
acceptance of an offer to sell from his alleged lessor, and an agreement to waive
rentals sans a sliver of evidence.
With the lease contract between Umale and ASB Realty duly established and Umales
failure to pay the monthly rentals since June 2002 despite due demands from ASB
Realty, the latter had the right to terminate the lease contract and seek his eviction from
the leased premises. Thus, when the contract expired on June 30, 2003 (as stated in the
Notice of Termination of Lease), Umale lost his right to remain on the premises and his
continued refusal to vacate the same constituted sufficient cause of action for his
ejectment.[21]
With respect to ASB Realtys personality to file the unlawful detainer suit, the RTC ruled
that ASB Realty retained all its corporate powers, including the power to sue, despite the
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Citing the Interim Rules, the RTC noted that the
rehabilitation receiver was not granted therein the power to file complaints on behalf of
the corporation.[22]
Moreover, the retention of its corporate powers by the corporation under rehabilitation
will advance the objective of corporate rehabilitation, which is to conserve and
administer the assets of the corporation in the hope that it may eventually be able to go
from financial distress to solvency. The suit filed by ASB Realty to recover its property
and back rentals from Umale could only benefit ASB Realty.[23]
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set
aside. Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant
ordering defendant-appellee and all persons claiming rights under him:
1) To immediately vacate the subject leased premises located at Lot 7, Block 5, Amethyst
St., Pearl Drive, Ortigas Center, Pasig City and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffappellant;
2) To pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P1,300,000.00 representing rentals in arrears
from June 2002 to June 2003;
3) To pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of P100,000.00 a month starting from July 2003
and every month thereafter until they finally vacate the subject premises as reasonable
compensation for the continued use and occupancy of the same;
4) To pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees;
and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[24]

Umale filed a Motion for Reconsideration [25] while ASB Realty moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution pursuant to Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.[26]
In its July 26, 2005 Order, the RTC denied reconsideration of its Decision and granted
ASB Realtys Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution.[27]
Umale then filed his appeal[28] with the CA insisting that the parties did not enter into a
lease contract.[29] Assuming that there was a lease, it was at most an implied lease. Hence
its period depended on the rent payments. Since Umale paid rent annually, ASB Realty
had to respect his lease for the entire year. It cannot terminate the lease at the end of the
month, as it did in its Notice of Termination of Lease.[30] Lastly, Umale insisted that it was
the rehabilitation receiver, not ASB Realty, that was the real party-in-interest.[31]
Pending the resolution thereof, Umale died and was substituted by his
widow and legal heirs, per CA Resolution dated August 14, 2006.[32]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.[33]

According to the appellate court, ASB Realty fully discharged its burden to prove the
existence of a lease contract between ASB Realty and Umale, [34] as well as the grounds
for eviction.[35]The veracity of the terms of the lease contract presented by ASB Realty
was further bolstered, instead of demolished, by Umales admission that he paid monthly
rents in accordance therewith.[36]
The CA found no merit in Umales claim that in light of Article 1687 of the Civil Code
the lease should be extended until the end of the year. The said provision stated that in
cases where the lease period was not fixed by the parties, the lease period depended on
the payment periods. In the case at bar, the rent payments were made on a monthly basis,
not annually; thus, Umales failure to pay the monthly rent gave ASB Realty the
corresponding right to terminate the lease at the end of the month.[37]
The CA then upheld ASB Realtys, as well as its corporate officers, personality to recover
an unlawfully withheld corporate property. As expressly stated in Section 14 of Rule 4 of
the Interim Rules, the rehabilitation receiver does not take over the functions of the
corporate officers.[38]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[39] which was denied in the
assailed January 2, 2008 Resolution.[40]
Issues
The petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:[41]
1. Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file
suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the
corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation?
2. Whether a contract of lease exists between ASB Realty and Umale; and
3. Whether Umale is entitled to avail of the lease periods provided in Article 1687 of the
Civil Code.
Our Ruling

Petitioners ask for the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer on the ground that
it was not brought by the real party-in-interest. [42] Petitioners maintain that the
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver for ASB Realty deprived its corporate officers of
the power to recover corporate property and transferred such power to the rehabilitation
receiver. Section 6, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court states that a receiver has the power to
bring actions in his own name and to collect debts due to the corporation. Under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A and the Interim Rules, the rehabilitation receiver has
the power to take custody and control of the assets of the corporation. Since the receiver
for ASB Realty did not file the complaint for unlawful detainer, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject property.[43]
Petitioners cite Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[44] Yam v. Court of
Appeals,[45] and Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. The Manila Banking
Corporation,[46] as authorities for the rule that the appointment of a receiver suspends the
authority of the corporation and its officers over its property and effects. [47]
ASB Realty counters that there is no provision in PD 902-A, the Interim Rules, or in
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court that divests corporate officers of their power to sue upon
the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.[48] In fact, Section 14 , Rule 4 of the Interim
Rules expressly limits the receivers power by providing that the rehabilitation receiver
does not take over the management and control of the corporation but shall closely
oversee and monitor the operations of the debtor.[49] Further, the SEC Rules of Procedure
on Corporate Recovery (SEC Rules), the rules applicable to the instant case, do not
include among the receivers powers the exclusive right to file suits for the corporation.[50]
The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers.
There is no denying that ASB Realty, as the owner of the leased premises, is the real
party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer suit.[51] Real party-in-interest is defined as the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.[52]
What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated to file
this suit to recover a corporate property because ASB Realty has a duly-appointed
rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file
the instant suit.

Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of law.
[53]

As a creature of law, the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out,

expressly or impliedly, in the law. Among the general powers granted by law to a
corporation is the power to sue in its own name. [54] This power is granted to a dulyorganized corporation, unlessspecifically revoked by another law. The question
becomes: Do the laws on corporate rehabilitation particularly PD 902-A, as amended,
[55]

and its corresponding rules of procedure forfeit the power to sue from the corporate

officers and Board of Directors?

Corporate rehabilitation is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a position of
successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is
economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than
if it is immediately liquidated.[56] It was first introduced in the Philippine legal system
through PD 902-A, as amended.[57] The intention of the law is to effect a feasible and
viable rehabilitation by preserving a floundering business as agoing concern, because the
assets of a business are often more valuable when so maintained than they would be
when liquidated.[58] This concept of preserving the corporations business as a going
concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-inplace. This means that the debtor corporation (the corporation undergoing rehabilitation),
through its Board of Directors and corporate officers, remains in control of its business
and properties, subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation receiver.
[59]

The concept of debtor-in-possession, is carried out more particularly in the SEC Rules,

the rule that is relevant to the instant case.[60] It states therein that the interim rehabilitation
receiver of the debtor corporation does not take over the control and management of the
debtor corporation.[61] Likewise, the rehabilitation receiver that will replace the interim
receiver is tasked only to monitor the successful implementation of the rehabilitation
plan.[62] There is nothing in the concept of corporate rehabilitation that would ipso
facto deprive[63] the Board of Directors and corporate officers of a debtor corporation,
such as ASB Realty, of control such that it can no longer enforce its right to recover its
property from an errant lessee.
To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor corporation.
The rules enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions [64] (most of which
involve some kind of disposition or encumbrance of the corporations assets) during the

pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings but none of which touch on the debtor
corporations right to sue. The implication therefore is that our concept of rehabilitation
does not restrict this particular power, save for the caveat that all its actions are monitored
closely by the receiver, who can seek an annulment of any prohibited or anomalous
transaction or agreement entered into by the officers of the debtor corporation.
Petitioners insist that the rehabilitation receiver has the power to bring and defend actions
in his own name as this power is provided in Section 6 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, PD 902-A, as amended, provides that the receiver shall have the powers
enumerated under Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. But Rule 59 is a rule of general
application. It applies to different kinds of receivers rehabilitation receivers, receivers of
entities under management, ordinary receivers, receivers in liquidation and for different
kinds of situations. While the SEC has the discretion[65] to authorize the rehabilitation
receiver, as the case may warrant, to exercise the powers in Rule 59, the SECs exercise of
such discretion cannot simply be assumed. There is no allegation whatsoever in this case
that the SEC gave ASB Realtys rehabilitation receiver the exclusive right to sue.
Petitioners cite Villanueva,[66] Yam,[67] and Abacus Real Estate[68] as authorities for their
theory that the corporate officers of a corporation under rehabilitation is incapacitated to
act. InVillanueva,[69] the Court nullified the sale contract entered into by the Philippine
Veterans Bank on the ground that the banks insolvency restricted its capacity to act. Yam,
[70]

on the other hand, nullified the compromise agreement that Manphil Investment

Corporation entered into while it was under receivership by the Central Bank. In Abacus
Real Estate,[71] it was held that Manila Banks president had no authority to execute an
option to purchase contract while the bank was under liquidation.
These jurisprudence are inapplicable to the case at bar because they involve
banking and financial institutions that are governed by different laws. [72] In the cited
cases, the applicable banking law was Section 29 [73] of the Central Bank Act.[74] In stark
contrast to rehabilitation where the corporation retains control and management of its
affairs, Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, as amended, expressly forbids the bank or the
quasi-bank from doing business in the Philippines.
Moreover, the nullified transactions in the cited cases involve dispositions of assets and
claims, which are prohibited transactions even for corporate rehabilitation [75] because
these may be prejudicial to creditors and contrary to the rehabilitation plan. The instant

case, however, involves the recovery of assets and collection of receivables, for which
there is no prohibition in PD 902-A.
While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue
to recover its property and the back rentals from Umale, the necessity of keeping the
receiver apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court. Tasked to
closely monitor the assets of ASB Realty, the rehabilitation receiver has to be notified of
the developments in the case, so that these assets would be managed in accordance with
the approved rehabilitation plan.
Coming to the second issue, petitioners maintain that ASB Realty has no
cause of action against them because it is not their lessor. They insist that Umale entered
into a verbal lease agreement with Amethyst Pearl only. As proof of this verbal
agreement, petitioners cite their possession of the premises, and construction of buildings
thereon, sans protest from Amethyst Pearl or ASB Realty.[76]
Petitioners concede that they may have raised questions of fact but insist nevertheless on
their review as the appellate courts ruling is allegedly grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, and conjectures and its conclusions regarding the termination of the lease
contract are manifestly absurd, mistaken, and impossible.[77]
Petitioners arguments have no merit. Ineluctably, the errors they raised involve factual
findings,[78] the review of which is not within the purview of the Courts functions under
Rule 45, particularly when there is adequate evidentiary support on record.
While petitioners assail the authenticity of the written lease contract by pointing out the
inconsistency in the name of the lessor in two separate pages, they fail to account for
Umales actions which are consistent with the terms of the contract the payment of lease
rentals to ASB Realty (instead of his alleged lessor Amethyst Pearl) for a 12-month
period. These matters cannot simply be brushed off as sheer happenstance especially
when weighed against Umales incredible version of the facts that he entered into a verbal
lease contract with Amethyst Pearl; that the term of the lease is for a very long period of
time; that Amethyst Pearl offered to sell the leased premises and Umale had accepted the
offer, with both parties not demanding any written documentation of the transaction and
without any mention of the purchase price; and that finally, Amethyst Pearl agreed that
Umale need not pay rentals until the perfection of the sale. The Court is of the same mind

as the appellate court that it is simply inconceivable that a businessman, such as

petitioners predecessor-in-interest, would enter into commercial transactions with and
pay substantial rentals to a corporation nary a single documentation.
Petitioners then try to turn the table on ASB Realty with their third argument. They say
that under Article 1687 of the New Civil Code, the period for rent payments determines
the lease period. Judging by the official receipt presented by ASB Realty, which covers
the 12-month period from June 2001 to May 2002, the lease period should be annual
because of the annual rent payments. [79] Petitioners then conclude that ASB Realty
violated Article 1687 of the New Civil Code when it terminated the lease on June 30,
2003, at the beginning of the new period. They then implore the Court to extend the lease
to the end of the annual period, meaning until May 2004, in accordance with the annual
rent payments.[80]
In arguing for an extension of lease under Article 1687, petitioners lost sight of the
restriction provided in Article 1675 of the Civil Code. It states that a lessee that commits
any of the grounds for ejectment cited in Article 1673, including non-payment of lease
rentals and devoting the leased premises to uses other than those stipulated, cannot avail
of the periods established in Article 1687.[81]
Moreover, the extension in Article 1687 is granted only as a matter of equity. The law
simply recognizes that there are instances when it would be unfair to abruptly end the
lease contract causing the eviction of the lessee. It is only for these clearly unjust
situations that Article 1687 grants the court the discretion to
extend the lease.[82]
The particular circumstances of the instant case however, do not inspire granting
equitable relief. Petitioners have not paid, much less offered to pay, the rent for 14
months and even had the temerity to disregard the pay-and-vacate notice served on
them. An extension will only benefit the wrongdoer and punish the long-suffering
property owner.[83]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 15, 2007 Decision and January
2, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91096 are
hereby AFFIRMED. ASB Realty Corporation is ordered to FURNISH a copy of the
Decision on its incumbent Rehabilitation Receiver and to INFORM the Court of its
compliance therewith within 10 days.

SO ORDERED.

In lieu of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per Special Order No. 1000 dated June 8, 2011.
Rollo, pp. 32-58.
[2]
Id. at 60-75; penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Normandie B. Pizarro.
[3]
Id. at 77.
[4]
CA Decision, p. 16; id. at 75.
[5]
Id. at 167-168.
[6]
Id. at 124-129.
[7]
The original complaint was filed on September 3, 2003 (CA rollo, pp. 83-86) but was amended on October 1,
2003 (Id. at 89-92). The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 10427 and raffled off to Branch 70 of the
MTC Pasig.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 175-179.
[9]
Id. at 181.
[10]
Id. at 180.
[11]
Defendants Position Paper, p. 3; CA rollo, p. 148.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 4-5; id. at 149-150.
[14]
Id. at 5; id. at 150.
[15]
Id. at 13-14; id. at 158-159.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 226-241; penned by Presiding Judge Jose P. Morallos.
[17]
MTC Decision, p. 14; rollo, p. 239.
[18]
Id. at 13-14; id. at 238-239.
[19]
The appeal was docketed as SCA No. 2724 and raffled off to Branch 161 of the RTC Pasig.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 307-319; penned by Pairing Judge Amelia A. Fabros.
[21]
RTC Decision, pp. 9-11; rollo, pp. 315-317.
[22]
Id. at 8-9; id. at 314-315.
[23]
Id. at 8; id. at 314.
[24]
Id. at 12-13; id. at 318-319.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 320-340.
[26]
Id. at 341-344.
[27]
Id. at 353-357.
[28]
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 91096. CA rollo, pp. 2-41.
[29]
Petition for Review, pp. 25-30; id. at 26-31.
[30]
Id. at 31-33; id. at 32-34.
[31]
Id. at 12-16; id. at 13-17.
[32]
Rollo, pp. 589-590.
[33]
CA Decision, p. 16; CA rollo, p. 666.
[34]
Id. at 11; id. at 661.
[35]
Id. at 13; id. at 663.
[36]
Id. at 11; id. at 661.
[37]
Id. at 11-13; id. at 661-663.
[38]
Id. at 7-10; id. at 657-660.
[39]
CA rollo, pp. 667-678.
[40]
Id. at 708.
[41]
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 11; rollo, p. 651.
[42]
Id. at 12; id. at 652.
[43]
Id. at 12-13; id. at 652-653.
[44]
314 Phil. 297 (1995).
[45]
362 Phil. 344 (1999).
[46]
495 Phil. 86 (2005).
[47]
Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 13-15; rollo, pp. 653-655.
[48]
Respondents Memorandum, p. 9; id. at 673.
[49]
Id. at 7; id. at 671.
[50]
Id. at 6; id. at 670.
[51]
Consumido v. Ros, G.R. No. 166875, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 696, 702.
[52]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Section 2.
[53]
CORPORATION CODE, Section 2.
[54]
CORPORATION CODE, Section 36(1).
[55]
On July 18, 2010, a new law on rehabilitation was enacted Republic Act No. 10142 or the Financial
Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act (FRIA) of 2010. Section 146 thereof states that the new law governs
rehabilitation petitions filed afterFRIA has taken effect.
[1]

[56]

2009 RULES OF PROCEDURE ON CORPORATE REHABILITATION, Rule 2, Section 1.

Reorganization of the Securities and Exchange Commission with Additional Powers and Placing the Said Agency
Under the Administrative Supervision of the Office of the President.
[58]
China Banking Corporation v. ASB Holdings, G.R. No. 172192, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 247, 260.
[59]
Catindig, NOTES ON SELECTED COMMERCIAL LAWS, 161 (2003).
[60]
While The Securities Regulation Code (Republic Act No. 8799), transferred SECs jurisdiction over corporate
rehabilitation proceedings to the regular courts, it retained within SECs jurisdiction all pending rehabilitation
cases as of June 30, 2000 until finally disposed. ASB Realtys petition for rehabilitation was filed on May 2,
2000 and remained pending as of June 30, 2000, such that it remained within the SEC jurisdiction.
[61]
SEC RULES OF PROCEDURE ON CORPORATE RECOVERY, Section 4-12.
[62]
SEC RULES OF PROCEDURE ON CORPORATE RECOVERY, Section 4-25.
[63]
All of this is not to say that a corporation under rehabilitation cannot be deprived of control and management at
all. To be sure, in warranted cases, the SEC is authorized to place the corporation under a management
committee that would replace its corporate management and board of directors and assume their powers over
the corporation (Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, Section 6(d); SEC Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Recovery, Rule V, Sections 5-1 and 5-3).This instance however is not the case before us. There is no
allegation whatsoever that ASB Realty had been placed under a management committee.
[64]
According to Section 2-12 of the SEC Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, the following acts are
prohibited and, if done, may be nullified by the SEC:
1. any sale, encumbrance, transfer, or disposition of the debtors property outside the normal course of business in
which the corporation is engaged (Section 4-4 (c), SEC Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery); and
2. any payments of the debtor corporations outstanding liabilities (Section 4-4(d), SEC Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Recovery).
[65]
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 902-A, as amended, Section 6(m); SEC RULES OF PROCEDURE ON
CORPORATE RECOVERY, Section 4-25 (f).
[66]
Supra note 44.
[67]
Supra note 45.
[68]
Supra note 46.
[69]
Supra note 44 at 309-311.
[70]
Supra note 45 at 351.
[71]
Supra note 46 at 97-98.
[72]
The prevailing law is Republic Act No. 8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000. Section 69 thereof (in relation
to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653, entitled The New Central Bank Act) continues to forbid banks or nonbank financial corporations from doing business upon a finding of insolvency.
[73]
Sec. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall
be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts,
and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines x x x
The Monetary Board shall thereupon determine within sixty days whether the institution may be reorganized or
otherwise placed in such a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors
and creditors and the general public and shall prescribe the conditions under which such resumption of business
shall take place as well as the time for fulfillment of such conditions. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
[74]
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 265, as amended.
[75]
SEC RULES OF PROCEDURE ON CORPORATE RECOVERY, Section 4-4.
[76]
Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 17-20; rollo, pp. 657-660.
[77]
Id. at 7-8; id. at 647-648.
[78]
U-bix Corporation v. Milliken & Company, G.R. No. 173318, September 23, 2008, 566 SCRA 284, 288; Solar
Harvest Inc. v. Davao Corrugated Carton Corporation, G.R. No. 176868, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 448, 457.
[79]
Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 661-662.
[80]
Id. at 22; id. at 662.
[81]
LL and Company Development & Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Huang Chao Chun, 428 Phil. 665, 674-675
(2002).
[82]
Id.
[83]
Lo Chua v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 877, 893 (2001); Guiang v. Samano, G.R. No. 50501, April 22, 1991, 196
SCRA 114, 120.
[57]

j) Gender
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,

and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.
NCC Art. 403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article,
a daughter above twenty-one but below twenty-three years of age
cannot leave the parental home without the consent of the father or
mother in whose company she lives, except to become a wife, or
when she exercises a profession or calling, or when the father or
mother has contracted a subsequent marriage. (321a)
RULE 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties.
Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by
law.