ALEJANDRA BUGARIN VDA. DE SARMIENTO vs.

JOSEFA R. LESACA
FACTS:
Vda. De Sarmiento bought 2 parcels of land to Lesaca for 5,000 on Jan. 18 1949.
The Deed of Sale is in public instrument.
After the sale, de Sarmiento tried to take actual physical possession of the land.
It was prevented by Martin Deloso claiming to be the owner of the property.
De Sarmiento, on Dec. 12, 1949 wrote Lesaca to change the subject with another of the same
kind or to return the purchase price plus the expenses incurred and interest.
Lesaca, through her letter, did not agree with de Sarmiento.
De Sarmiento filed a complaint in CFI in Zambales for the rescission of their contract.
The court declared the deed of sale between de Sarmiento and Lesaca rescided.
Lesaca appealed to CA and the case was certified to SC for it involves purely legal question.
ISSUE:
W/N the sale between de Sarmiento and Lesaca in public instrument is equivalent to delivery
of possession of the land sold.
HELD:

NO.
1498 of the Civil Code of the Phil. States that When the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of
the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
It can be clearly seen therein that the vendor intended to place the vendee in actual
possession of the lands immediately as can be inferred from the stipulation that the vendee "takes
actual possession thereof ... with full rights to dispose, enjoy and make use thereof in such manner
and form as would be most advantageous to herself." The possession referred to in the contract
evidently refers to actual possession and not merely symbolical inferable from the mere execution of
the document.
But Lesaca did not complied with this express commitment. The thing sold shall be deemed
delivered when the vendee is placed in the control and possession thereof, which situation does not
here obtain because from the execution of the sale up to the present the vendee was never able to
take possession of the lands due to the insistent refusal of Martin Deloso to surrender them claiming
ownership thereof.
It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and right of possession. The
thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing
sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through
the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use
of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality the delivery has not been effected.
Wherefore the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant.

MANUEL R. DULAY ENTERPRISES, INC., VIRGILIO E. DULAY AND NEPOMUCENO REDOVAN,

petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDGARDO D. PABALAN, MANUEL A. TORRES, JR.,
MARIA THERESA V. VELOSO AND CASTRENSE C. VELOSO
FACTS:
Manuel R. Dulay Enterprises, Inc, a domestic corporation obtained various loans for the
construction of its hotel project, Dulay Continental Hotel (now Frederick Hotel).

a 16 apartment unit on a situated at FB Harrison St. in Pasay City.

689 sq.m.
By virtue of Board Resolution No. 18, Manuel Dulay sold the subject property to spouses Ma.
Teresa and Castrense Veloso in the amount of 300,000.00 on December 23, 1976.
Effected by Deed of Absolute Sale giving Dulay withing 2 years to repurchase the
property for 200,000.00
The title was not annotated at the back.
On December 24, 1976, Maria Veloso, without the knowledge of Manuel Dulay, mortgaged
the subject property to Manuel A. Torres for a loan of P250,000.00 which was duly annotated.
Veloso failed to pay Torres and the property was sold to Torres as the highest bidder in the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Maria Veloso nor her assignee Manuel Dulay was able to redeem the subject property within
the one year statutory period for redemption, private respondent Torres filed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership.
Torres and Edgardo Pabalan, real estate administrator of Torres, filed an action against
petitioner corporation, Virgilio Dulay and Nepomuceno Redovan, a tenant of Dulay Apartment
Unit No. 8-A for the recovery of possession, sum of money and damages with preliminary
injunction.
They also filed an action against spouses Florentino and Elvira Manalastas, another tenant.
The court ruled in favor of Torres.
On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of CFI.
Hence this petition.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: respondent Torres never acquired ownership over the subject
property since the latter was never in actual possession of the subject property nor was the property
ever delivered to him is also without merit.
ISSUE: W/N Torres never ownership over the subject property.
HELD: YES.
Paragraph 1, Article 1498 of the New Civil Code provides:
When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary do not
appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Under the aforementioned article, the mere execution of the deed of sale in a public document is
equivalent to the delivery of the property. Likewise, this Court had held that:
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such,
he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.

POWER COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

SPOUSES REYNALDO and ANGELITA R. QUIAMBAO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
FACTS:

Petitioner Power Commercial & Industrial Development Corporation on January 31, 1979, it
entered into a contract of sale with the spouses Reynaldo and Angelita R. Quiambao.
The contract involved a 612-sq. m. parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
S-6686 located at the corner of Bagtican and St. Paul Streets, San Antonio Village, Makati
City.
The parties agreed that petitioner would pay private respondents P108,000.00 as down
payment, and the balance of P295,000.00 upon the execution of the deed of transfer of the
title over the property. In full satisfaction thereof, he paid P79,145.77 to Respondent
Philippine National Bank (PNB for brevity).
On June 1, 1979, respondent spouses mortgaged again said land to PNB to guarantee a loan
of P145,000.00
On June 26, 1979, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale With Assumption of
Mortgage to 145,000 mortgage of Sps Quiambao.
Power Commercial failed to assume the mortgage on PNB for not able to pass necessary
docs.
However, when mortgage become due and demandable, even though petitioner failed to
assume the mortgage, paid PNB P41,880.45 on June 24, 1980 and P20,283.14 on December
23, 1980, payments which were to be applied to the outstanding loan.
Power Comm. requested PNB to remove all the people who are currently physically present
and in occupation of said lot.
In response, PNB said that the Quimabao would be responsible for the removal of the people
who were there. Inasmuch as the previous owner has not been able to keep his commitment,
it will be necessary for us to take legal possession of this lot in order to take physical
possession.
Power Commercial filed a case against respondent spouses for rescission and damages and
demanded for the return of the payments it made on the ground that its assumption of
mortgage was never approved.
On May 31, 1983, while this case was pending, the mortgage was foreclosed.
The property was subsequently bought by PNB during the public auction.
RTC Pasig ruled in favor of Power Commercial.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of RTC. - The deed of sale between respondent
spouses and petitioner did not obligate the former to eject the lessees from the land in
question as a condition of the sale, nor was the occupation thereof by said lessees a violation
of the warranty against eviction. Hence, there was no substantial breach to justify the
rescission of said contract or the return of the payments made.

ISSUE:
W/N the sps Quiambao faild to deliver the sold land due to breach of condition.
HELD:

NO.

The provision adverted to by Power Commercial does not impose a condition or an obligation
to eject the lessees from the lot. The deed of sale provides in part:
We hereby also warrant that we are the lawful and absolute owners of the above described property,
free from any lien and/or encumbrance, and we hereby agree and warrant to defend its title and
peaceful possession thereof in favor of the said Power Commercial and Industrial Development
Corporation, its successors and assigns, against any claims whatsoever of any and all third persons;
subject, however, to the provisions hereunder provided.
If the parties intended to impose on respondent spouses the obligation to eject the
tenants from the lot sold, it should have included in the contract a provision. Futhermore,
petitioner was well aware of the presence of the tenants at the time it entered into the sales
transaction. In fact, petitioner actually filed suit to eject the occupants.

Petitioner asserts that the legal fiction of symbolic delivery yielded to the truth that, at the
execution of the deed of sale, transfer of possession of said lot was impossible due to the presence of
occupants on the lot sold.
SC enunciated that Symbolic delivery (Article 1498), as a species of constructive delivery,
effects the transfer of ownership through the execution of a public document. Its efficacy can,
however, be prevented if the vendor does not possess control over the thing sold, in which case this
legal fiction must yield to reality.
The key word is control, not possession, of the land as petitioner would like us to believe.
In order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the
vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that xxx its material delivery could have been
made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The
thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing
sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through
the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use
of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality -- the delivery has not been effected.
Considering that the deed of sale between the parties did not stipulate or infer otherwise,
delivery was effected through the execution of said deed. The lot sold had been placed under the
control of petitioner; thus, the filing of the ejectment suit was subsequently done. It signified that its
new owner intended to obtain for itself and to terminate said occupants actual possession thereof.
Prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required and the execution of the deed of sale is
deemed equivalent to delivery.[24] This deed operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property
sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. Nothing more is required.

ARTEMIO KATIGBAK vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL EVANGELISTA and V. K. LUNDBERG
Artemio Katigbak upon reading an advertisement for the sale of the winch placed by V. K.
Lundberg, owner and operator of the International Tractor and Equipment Co., Ltd., went to
see Lundberg and inspected the equipment.
The price quoted was P12,000.00. Desiring a reduction of the price, Katigbak was referred to
Daniel Evangelista, the owner.
After the meeting, it was agreed that Katigbak was to purchase the winch for P12,000.00,
payable at P5,000.00 upon delivery and the balance of P7,000.00 within 60 days.
The condition of the sale was that the winch would be delivered in good condition. Katigbak
was apprised that the winch needed some repairs, which could be done in the shop of
Lundberg.
It was then stipulated that the amount necessary for the repairs will be advanced by Katigbak
but deductible from the initial payment of P5,000.00.
The repairs were undertaken and the total of P2,029.85 for spare parts was advanced by
Katigbak for the purpose.
For one reason or another, the sale was not consummated and Katigbak sued Evangelista,
Lundberg and the latter's company, for the refund of such amount.
Evangelista, on his part, claimed that while there was an agreement between him and
Katigbak for the purchase and sale of the winch and that Katigbak advanced the payment for
the spare parts, he (Katigbak) refused to comply with his contract to purchase the same; that
as a result of such refusal he (Evangelista) was forced to sell the same to a third person for
only P10,000.00