Aggravating CRIMREV Cases

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review
G.R. No. 135784
December 15, 2000
RICARDO FORTUNA Y GRAGASIN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Perhaps no other profession in the country has gone through incessant
maligning by the public in general than its own police force. Much has been
heard about the notoriety of this profession for excessive use and illegal
discharge of power. The present case is yet another excuse for such
vilification.
On 21 July 1992 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, while Diosdada
Montecillo and her brother Mario Montecillo were standing at the corner of
Mabini and Harrison Streets waiting for a ride home, a mobile patrol car of
the Western Police District with three (3) policemen on board stopped in
front of them. The policeman seated on the right at the front seat alighted
and without a word frisked Mario. He took Marios belt, pointed to a
supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word
"evidence."1 Then he motioned to Mario to board the car. The terrified Mario
obeyed and seated himself at the back together with another policeman.
Diosdada instinctively followed suit and sat beside Mario.
They cruised towards Roxas Boulevard. The driver then asked Mario why he
was carrying a "deadly weapon," to which Mario answered, "for self-defense
since he was a polio victim." 2 The driver and another policeman who were
both seated in front grilled Mario. They frightened him by telling him that
for carrying a deadly weapon outside his residence he would be brought to
the Bicutan police station where he would be interrogated by the police,
mauled by other prisoners and heckled by the press. As they
approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile car pulled over and the two (2)
policemen in front told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a
"deadly weapon" was P12,000.00. At this point, the driver asked how much
money they had. Without answering, Mario gave his P1,000.00 to Diosdada
who placed the money inside her wallet.
Diosdada was then made to alight from the car. She was followed by the
driver and was told to go behind the vehicle. There, the driver forced her to
take out her wallet and rummaged through its contents. He counted her
money. She had P5,000.00 in her wallet. The driver took P1,500.00 and left
her P3,500.00. He instructed her to tell his companions that all she had
was P3,500.00. While going back to the car the driver demanded from her
any piece of jewelry that could be pawned. Ruefully, she removed her
wristwatch and offered it to him. The driver declined saying, "Never
mind,"3 and proceeded to board the car. Diosdada, still fearing for the
safety of her brother, followed and sat beside him in the car.
Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the front
passenger seat to place all her money on the console box near the
gearshift. The car then proceeded to Harrison Plaza where the Montecillos
were told to disembark. From there, their dreadful experience over, they
went home to Imus, Cavite.
The following day Diosdada recounted her harrowing story to her employer
Manuel Felix who readily accompanied her and her brother Mario to the
office of General Diokno where they lodged their complaint. Gen. Diokno
directed one of his men, a certain Lt. Ronas, to assist the complainants in
looking for the erring policemen. They boarded the police patrol car and
scoured the Mabini area for the culprits. They did not find them.
When they returned to the police station, a line-up of policemen was
immediately assembled. Diosdada readily recognized one of them as the
policeman who was seated beside them in the back of the car. She
trembled at the sight of him. She then rushed to Lt. Ronas and told him that
she saw the policeman who sat beside them in the car. He was identified by
Lt. Ronas as PO2 Ricardo Fortuna. A few minutes later, Gen. Diokno
summoned the complainants. As they approached the General, they at
once saw PO2 Eduardo Garcia whom they recognized as the policeman who
frisked Mario. The following day, they met the last of their tormentors, the
driver of the mobile car who played heavily on their nerves - PO3 Ramon
Pablo.
The three (3) policemen were accordingly charged with robbery. After trial,
they were found guilty of having conspired in committing the crime with
intimidation of persons. They were each sentenced to a prison term of six
(6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, to restitute in
favor of private complainants Diosdada Montecillo and Mario Montecillo the
sum of P5,000.00, and to indemnify them in the amount of P20,000.00 for
moral damages and P15,000.00 for attorneys fees.4
The accused separately appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 March
1997 the appellate court affirmed the lower court's verdict.5 Accusedappellant Ricardo Fortuna moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied. Hence, this petition by Fortuna alone under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. He contends that the appellate court erred in holding that private
complainants gave the money to the accused under duress, the same being
negated by the prosecutions evidence, and in affirming the decision of the
court below. He argued that the evidence presented by the prosecution did
not support the theory of conspiracy as against him.6
The issues raised by accused-appellant, as correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, are purely factual. We have consistently stressed that in a
petition for review on certiorari this Court does not sit as an arbiter of facts.
As such, it is not our function to re-examine every appreciation of facts
made by the trial and appellate courts unless the evidence on record does
not support their findings or the judgment is based on a misappreciation of
facts.7The ascertainment of what actually happened in a controverted

situation is the function of the lower courts. If we are to re-examine every
factual finding made by them, we would not only be prolonging the judicial
process but would also be imposing upon the heavily clogged dockets of
this Court.
We do not see any infirmity in the present case justifying a departure from
this well-settled rule. On the contrary, we are convinced that the trial and
appellate courts did not err in holding that accused-appellant Fortuna
conspired with the accused Pablo and Garcia in intimidating private
complainants to give them their money.
We are convinced that there was indeed sufficient intimidation applied on
the offended parties as the acts performed by the three (3) accused,
coupled with the circumstances under which they were executed,
engendered fear in the minds of their victims and hindered the free
exercise of their will. The three (3) accused succeeded in coercing them to
choose between two (2) alternatives, to wit: to part with their money or
suffer the burden and humiliation of being taken to the police station.
To our mind, the success of the accused in taking their victims' money was
premised on threats of prosecution and arrest. This intense infusion of fear
was intimidation, plain and simple.
Accused-appellant further argues that assuming arguendo that the element
of intimidation did exist, the lower court erred in holding that he conspired
with his companions in perpetrating the offense charged.
This indeed is easy to assert, for conspiracy is something which exists only
in the minds of the conspirators, which can easily be denied. However,
conspiracy may be detected and deduced from the circumstances of the
case which when pieced together will indubitably indicate that they form
part of a common design to commit a felony; and, to establish conspiracy,
it is not essential that there be actual proof evincing that all of the
conspirators took a direct part in every act, it being sufficient that they
acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.8
In the present case, accused-appellant would want to impress upon this
Court that his silence inside the car during Marios interrogation confirmed
his claim that he did not participate in the offense.
conspirators.9 Hence, all of the three (3) accused in the present case should
be held guilty of robbery with intimidation against persons.
We however observe that the courts below failed to appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of "abuse of public position."10 The mere fact that
the three (3) accused were all police officers at the time of the robbery
placed them in a position to perpetrate the offense. If they were not police
officers they could not have terrified the Montecillos into boarding the
mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over their money. Precisely it
was on account of their authority that the Montecillos believed that Mario
had in fact committed a crime and would be brought to the police station
for investigation unless they gave them what they demanded.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed should be modified. Under Art. 294, par.
(5), of The Revised Penal Code, the penalty for simple robbery is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
In view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, the
penalty should be imposed in its maximum period11 while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto
mayormaximum to prision correccional medium in any of its periods the
range of which is four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of
the trial court finding accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna guilty of robbery
and ordering him to pay complaining witnesses Diosdada Montecillo and
Mario Montecillo P5,000.00 representing the money taken from
them, P20,000.00 for moral damages and P15,000.00 for attorney's fees, is
AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna is
SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of two (2) years four (4)
months and twenty (20) days of the medium period ofarresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8)
years two (2) months and ten (10) days of the maximum period of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, as maximum.
Costs against accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna.
SO ORDERED.
We do not agree. As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all

means the commission of an offense. As such, he should not have kept his
silence but, instead, should have protected the Montecillos from his
mulcting colleagues. This accused-appellant failed to do. His silence then
could only be viewed as a form of moral support which he zealously lent to
his co-conspirators.1wphi1
In one case, we ruled that in conspiracy all those who in one way or another
helped and cooperated in the consummation of a felony were co-

One (1) Alba wristwatch 1,500.00
TOTAL P16,000.00
G.R. No. 133872 May 5, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEXANDER TAO y CABALLERO, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN,J.:
The appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery
with rape because the asportation was conceived and carried out as an
afterthought and only after the rape has been consummated. Dwelling
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case because
the rape was committed in the ground floor of a two-story structure, the
lower floor being used as a video rental store and not as a private place of
abode or residence.
The Case
This is an automatic review of the Decision 1 dated April 23, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127, in Criminal Case No. C53066, finding Accused-Appellant Alexander Tao y Caballero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with rape and imposing upon him the supreme
penalty of death. The case arose out of an Information, 2 dated November
10, 1997, signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador C. Quimpo, accusing
the appellant of robbery with rape allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 1997 in Kalookan City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to gain and by means fo force and
intimidation employed upon the person of one AMY DE GUZMAN Y
MAQUINANA, did there and then wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
rob and carry away the following articles, to wit:
Cash money P5,000.00
Three (3) bracelets 3,500.00
Two (2) rings 5,000.00
One (1) pair of earrings 2,000.00
with the total amount of P16,000.00 belonging to one ANA MARINAY Y

SICYAN; that in the course of said robbery, said accused, with the use of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said AMY DE GUZMAN
Y MAQUINANA, against the latter's will and without her consent and with
the use of a bladed weapon.
During his arraignment on November 26, 1997, appellant, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 3 After trial on the
merits, the lower court promulgated the herein assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
W H E R E F O R E the prosecution having established beyond an iota of
doubt the guilt of Accused ALEXANDER TAO Y CABALLERO of the crime of
Robbery with Rape, and considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling without any mitigating circumstances to offset the
same, this Court hereby sentences the Accused to suffer the maximum
penalty of D E A T H with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to
indemnify Victim AMY DE GUZMAN the amount of P50,000.00 and pay her
actual damages of P2,687.65 and to restore to the victim her gold ring of
undetermined amount as well as moral and exemplary damages in the total
sum of P100,000.00; and to pay the costs.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general sums the evidence for the prosecution in this wise: 4
On November 6, 1997, at around 7:30 p.m., Amy de Guzman (Amy) was
tending a Video Rental Shop owned by her employer and cousin, Ana
Marinay (Ana) located at 153 Loreto Street, Morning Breeze [S]ubdivision,
Caloocan City (Tsn., January 8, 1998, p. 3). Thereupon, accused-appellant
Alexander Tao, a relative of Ana's husband Gerry Marinay (Gerry), arrived
at said shop (ibid., p. 4). Alexander Tao then asked Amy about the time
when Gerry would be coming home, to which she replied, 10:00 p.m. (id.).
He then asked about the time when Ana would be coming home and Amy
replied that she did not know (id.).
Thereafter, but still on the same date, Alexander Tao kept on going in and
out of the Video Shop, and on the last time that he went inside said shop,
he jumped over the counter of the shop to where Amy was and seized the
latter by placing one of his arms around Amy['s] neck, while his other hand
held a knife which he poked at her neck (id., pp. 4-5).

Terrified by the attack, Amy started shouting for help but Alexander Tao
increased the volume of a karaoke which was on at the time to drown
Amy's cries for help (id., p. 5).
Alexander Tao then dragged Amy to the kitchen of the shop where, at
knife point, he ordered the latter to undress and he thereafter started
raping her (id., pp. 5-6).
However, while Alexander Tao was raping Amy, somebody knocked at the
door of the shop prompting the former to stop what he was doing and
ordered Amy to put on her clothes (id., pp. 6-7).
Alexander Tao then directed Amy to go upstairs to the second floor of the
shop to change clothes as he will be taking her with him (id., p. 7). But
suddenly thereafter, Tao pulled her down and punched her in the stomach
thrice causing her to lose her balance (id.). Tao then started cursing her
and again placed himself on top of her while poking a knife at her neck
(id.). Amy then pleaded with Tao to just take anything inside the shop and
to spare her life, to which Tao replied "no, I will not leave you here alive."
(id.).
But after a while and upon Amy's pleading, Tao put down his knife and
while he was kissing Amy, the latter got hold of the knife which she
surreptitiously concealed under the stairs (id.).
Therafter, Tao became violent again and banged Amy's head on the wall
causing the latter to lose consciousness (id., p. 9). When she regained
consciousness she found herself and Tao inside the toilet of the shop and
the latter again banged her head, this time on the toilet bowl, several times
causing Amy to again lose consciousness (id., pp. 8-10).
Thereafter, Tao went upstairs and looted the place of valuables belonging
to Amy's employer, Ana. Amy, herself lost her ring, bracelet and wristwatch
during the incident in question (id., p. 10).
At about 9:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day, Amy's employer Ana arrived
and found the shop in disarray with the "karaoke" in full volume (Tsn., 13,
1998, pp. 2-4). After turning off the "karaoke["], Ana proceeded to the toilet
where she found Amy bathed in blood (ibid., p. 4).
Ana immediately sought the help of Barangay officials of the place and Amy
was brought to the "MCU" Hospital where she was initially treated of her
injuries (id., p. 5). Amy was, later on, transferred to Jose P. Reyes Memorial
Medical Center (JPRMMC) where she was confined for four (4) days.
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant's version of the incident is as follows:
. . . [O]n November 6, 1997, at around 7:40 p.m., he went to the house of

his cousin Gerry Bautista Marinay at 113 Loreto St., Morning Breeze
Subdivision, Kalookan City and upon arrival thereat he found therein Amy
de Guzman alone which she greeted him because she knew that the
accused was a frequent visitor thereof. Upon learning from her that Gerry
was not around, accused proceeded to the kitchen to drink water and after
he bought cigarettes at the nearby store, he returned to the shop and
seated himself infront of Amy de Guzman's counter. After the lapse of five
minutes he got bored and went out again to wait for the arrival of GERRY.
After finishing his cigarette he returned to Amy and talked with her and
learned that ANA was at her newly opened restaurant. After a while, the
thought of stealing his cousin's valuables struck his mind owing to his dire
need of cash/money. Thus, he approached Amy and held her hands and
asked her to come with him because he badly needed money, to lead him
to where his cousin was keeping his money and valuables. As to Amy's
surprise [sic], she shouted and to stop her, the accused covered her mouth
with his right hand but Amy put up a struggle and in the process they both
fell down and rolled on the floor. Thence, the accused was able to subdue
Amy and forcibly took her in the upstairs where he did the ransacking of the
drawers while holding the private complainant's hand. However, she was
able to free herself from his hold and ran downstairs to the kitchen where
she tried to get hold [of] a knife but he was able to wrest with her. As the
accused was rattled, he pushed Amy inside the comfort room and shoved
her head against the tiles to mum her. He took Amy's bag wherein he
placed his loot consisting of 2 wrist watches, including Amy's Alba watch, a
bracelet, clothes and hair blower as well as jewelry box containing five
rings which he placed in his pocket, then he proceeded to his brother's
house in Taytay. Upon arrival of the police and his cousin thereat he
returned the jewelry box to the latter but the same was not presented in
court, that no other jewelry was taken by him from the place except those
already specified, muchless has he taken any cash money from his cousin
Gerry Marinay, that he has a wife staying in Iloilo and he has a girlfriend
here in Manila, that he never raped the private complainant Amy de
Guzman and neither [had he] courted her prior to the incident. (TSN., March
3, 1998, pp. 2-9) (TSN., March 4, 1998, pp. 2-6)"
Ruling of the Trial Court
Assessing the testimony of the private complainant, the trial judge
observed: 6
Verily this Court finds the forthright account of the incident by the private
complainant whose small and slender physique was certainly no match to
the tall well-built body of an ex-convict, to be candid, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank which remained consistent and unwavering despite
the rigid cross-examinations of the defense counsel wherein she narrated in
detail the sexual assault with the use of a knife perpetrated by the accused
against her.

Parenthetically this Court has observed the deportment of the private
complainant at the witness stand and certainly she did not appear to have
the callousness and shrewdness of a woman capable of imputing a heinous
crime against the [a]ccused if the same is not true. Besides, the defense
has not shown any evil motive or ill will on the part of the private
complainant for testifying the way she did in this case.
The Court's Ruling
The lower court accepted the judicial admission of the accused that he
stole valuables belonging to private complainant and her employer, and
then proceeded to determine "whether or not the prosecution evidence has
sufficiently established the rape angle of the case."
First Issue:
In fine, the [a]ccused having already admitted the robbery charge coupled
with the fact that the prosecution has established with clear and convincing
evidence [a]ccused's culpability for sexually assaulting the pri[v]ate
complainant leaves no room for doubt of the guilt of the accused for the
complex crime of robbery with (aggravated) rape[.]
Furthermore, the trial court appreciated dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance because the incident took place supposedly at the residence
of private complainant's employer, "which doubles as a video rental
shop." 7 Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA
7659, it imposed the maximum penalty provided under Article 294 of the
same Code as amended, which is death.
Thus, this automatic review by this Court.
Issues
In his Brief,
Appellant Tao assigns only two errors or issues. These are:
I
The lower court erred in not taking into consideration the testimonies of Dr.
Godofredo Balderosa and Dr. Maria Redencion Bukid-Abella which negate
the rape [charge] imputed against the accused.
II
The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with rape despite the prosecution's
insufficiency of evidence.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case open for review and the
appellate court may correct such errors it may find in the appealed
judgment, even if they have not been specifically assigned. 10 Hence, this
Court likewise reviewed (a) the propriety of appellant's conviction of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape and (b) the trial court's
appreciation of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. These two items
will be discussed as the third and fourth issues.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that (a)
appellant is guilty of two separate crimes rape and robbery, (b) dwelling
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, and (c) the proper
penalty for rape is reclusion perpetua, not death.
Evaluation of the Examining

Doctors' Testimonies
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to give due credence to the
testimonies of Dr. Godofredo Balderosa and Dr. Ma. Redencion Bukid-Abella,
who both examined and treated Amy de Guzman's physical injuries
immediately after the incident. Both doctors similarly stated that the victim
complained to them of physical assault and attempted rape only, not of
consummated rape. 11 Additionally, the findings of NBI Medico-Legal Officer
Aurea Villena were allegedly inconclusive as to whether there was sexual
intercourse between the appellant and the victim. 12 Their testimonies
supposedly bolster appellant's innocence of the rape charge.
Otherwise stated, appellant claims that the failure of Amy de Guzman to
immediately disclose the rape to her examining physicians could only mean
that she was not in fact sexually assaulted.
In many criminal cases, especially of rape, this Court has acknowledged
that the vacillation of the victim in reporting the crime to the authorities is
not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge. Neither does it always
cast doubt on the credibility on the complaining witness. 1 The initial
reluctance of a young, inexperienced lass to admit having been ravished is
normal and natural.14 The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipina's inbred
modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which
blemish her honor and virtue. 15 She cannot be expected to readily reveal
the fact of her sexual violation to total strangers.
It is thus perfectly understandable and consistent with common experience
that Amy initially tried to downplay the assault upon her chastity by telling
the doctors that there was no consummation of the act. The following day,
however, she was finally able to gather the courage to reveal the entire
truth to her cousin-employer, Ana Marinay. 16 She also executed a Sworn
Statement 17 before PO3 Jaime Basa, detailing how she had been raped and
beaten by appellant. Four days later, she acceded to undergo a medico
legal examination of her genital organ, which was conducted by Dra. Aurea
Villena of the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, where she was confined.
Time-honored is the doctrine that no young and decent woman would
publicly admit that she was ravished and her virtue defiled, unless such
was true, for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor. 18 No

woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an
open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to
have the culprit apprehended and punished. 19 Thus, absent any credible
imputation of ill motive on the part of the private complainant to falsely
accuse the appellant of a heinous crime, her candid and consistent
testimony should be given full faith and credit. 20 It is a basic rule, founded
on reason and experience, that when a victim testifies that she has been
raped, she effectively says all that is necessary to show that rape was
indeed committed. 21
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of

the following instances: (1) force or intimidation is used, (2) the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (3) she is under twelve
years of age. 28 We find the necessary elements of rape duly established by
Private Complainant Amy de Guzman when she candidly testified thus: 29
In the case at bar, we find no reason to deviate from these doctrines. Amy
de Guzman's straightforward and convincing testimony, which will be
detailed later, bears no badge of material inconsistency which would bring
doubt to its veracity. She stood firm on her tale throughout her court
appearance. The trial judge observed her "to be candid, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank . . . [and she] remained consistent and unwavering
despite the rigid cross-examinations of the defense counsel . . ." 22
q What else transpired thereafter?
Besides, no ill motive was imputed on her. Appellant offers us no plausible

explanation why Amy de Guzman cried rape against him. We believe she
did so in order to bring out the truth and to obtain justice.
a "Natakot po."
Appellant's contention that the absence of genital and other injuries on

Amy's body proves his innocence is unacceptable. Time and again, we have
ruled that hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. 2 The victim need
not sustain genital injuries, for even the slightest penetration of the labia
by the male organ is equivalent to consummated rape. 24
a Then after turning louder the volume of the karaoke to down my voice, he
took me to the kitchen.
Besides, the examining physician satisfactorily explained the absence of

lacerations on private complainant's genitalia: 25
. . . during the examination I found out that [the victim's] hymen is that of
elastic type and so it is disten[s]ible and it could accommodate the penis
without producing any genital injuries.
a Then Alexander Tao kept coming in and out of the video rental shop and
last time he went in, he slammed the door and jumped over the counter
where I was and strangled me while his other hand is holding a knife, the
knife was poked at the right side of my neck.
a And he took the knife from the right hand and held it with his left hand
and turned the volume of the karaoke louder so that my voice will not be
heard since I was shouting.
q When the accused poked the knife, what did you feel?
q What happen[ed] next Ms. Witness?
COURT:
q How [were] you taken to the kitchen?
"Paano ka dinala sa kusina?"
a Sakal-sakal po niya ako.
xxx xxx xxx
She elucidated that "[l]aceration only occur[s] on non-elastic hymen

because non-elastic hymen cannot accommodate the size of the penis
without producing injury but hers is that of the elastic type, like rubber
band that could stretch and turn back into its proper size." 26
a . . . and once in the kitchen he made me lay my back against the stairs
and told me to take[ ]off my pants. Due to fright I did as told and the knife
was then poked at my stomach.
Second Issue:
q You said you removed . . . your pants, where [sic] you wearing your panty
at that time?
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Time-tested is the guiding principle that when a victim cries rape, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime was inflicted on her;
and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof. 27 We have no reason in the instant case
to deviate from this settled jurisprudence.
a Yes, Sir. I was wearing one.

q What happened to that panty?
a He told me to take off my pants, in doing so I took off completely together
with my panty.

q Then, what happened next?
a [Y]es sir.
a And once [I laid] down on the floor, he tried . . . to make me

spread[-]eagle my legs and in that process he knelt between my legs then
took off his pants.
q [W]hat are these valuables?
q And after that, what happen[ed] next after accused removed his
pants . . .?
a I remember the jewelry box containing jewelry, clothes and other

valuables [sic] things sir.35
xxx xxx xxx
a Then after taking off his pants, he lay atop me and I felt he was forcing
his penis in and [while] in that process the knife was still poked at my left
neck.
q [W]here did you get that jewelry box containing rings?
q When he inserted his penis into your private parts, what did you feel?
q [A]fter having taken all these jewelries and clothes you placed them all in
a blue bag and left the place?
a Pain. (Masakit po).

q After inserting his penis into your private parts, what did he do?
a He kept on pumping.
As noted earlier, the trial judge, who was able to observe firsthand the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, perceived Amy to
be candid, straightforward, spontaneous and frank. Said witness was also
found to have been consistent and unwavering despite the rigid crossexamination of the defense counsel. We note from the transcript of
stenographic notes that the judge herself had posed additional clarificatory
questions upon Amy. 30 Throughout her testimony, she indeed remained
consistent as well as convincing.
Of long-standing is the rule that findings of trial courts, especially on the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and accorded the
highest respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain facts of substance
and value were overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter the
conviction of the appellant. 31 Trial judges are in a better position to assess
the behavior of witnesses and to detect whether they are telling the truth
or not because they could directly observe them in court. 32 The reviewing
magistrate, on the other hand, has only the cold and impersonal records of
the proceedings to rely upon.
With respect to the robbery, its elements are: (1) the subject is personal
property belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking of that property,
(3) the taking is with the intent to gain, and (4) there is violence against or
intimidation of any person or use of force upon things. 3 There is no
question on the unlawful taking of valuables belonging to Amy and her
employer, Ana Marinay. Appellant openly admitted in court the unlawful
asportation, thus:
q [W]ere you able to get some valuables from the room of [the]
Bautista 34 couple?
a [I]nside the locker or aparador sir.
a [T]he jewelry box was placed inside my pocket. I did not place in the blue
bag sir.
q [Y]ou mentioned five rings, Alba wrist watch owned by rape victim [A]my
de [G]uzman, you also mentioned other jewelries, what other jewelries
aside from the jewelry that you took in the house of the couple Gerry [and
Ana] Bautista?
[A]tty. [C]risostomo
[O]bjection he did not mention other jewelries. He specified one bracelet
and one wrist watch.
Court
[W]itness may answer.
Witness
a [T]here were sir.
Fiscal
q [W]hat are they?
Witness
a [C]lothes and a hair blower because I was in a hurry.
36
During his arrest, the following stolen valuables were found in his bag:
P5,000 cash, two bracelets, two rings and a pair of earrings, which Ana
Marinay identified as belonging to her; and one wristwatch and a bracelet
belonging to Amy de Guzman. 37 Unrebutted is the presumption that a

person in possession of stolen personal effects is considered the author of
the crime.
independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate

complaints or informations.
Third Issue:
In the case at bar, we find the Information filed against appellant to have
sufficiently alleged all the elements necessary to convict him of the two
separate crimes of rape and robbery. Needless to state, appellant failed,
before his arraignment, to move for the quashal of the Information which
appeared to charge more than one offense. He has thereby waived any
objection and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as those
charged in the Information and proven during the trial. 40
Crime(s) Committed
We do not, however, agree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape. This felony contemplates a
situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to
gain, personal property belonging to another; and rape is committed on the
occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. 38
Such factual circumstance does not obtain here. As related by Private
Complainant Amy de Guzman, accused-appellant suddenly jumped over the
counter, strangled her, poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled her
towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and gained carnal
knowledge of her against her will and consent. Thereafter, he ordered her
to proceed upstairs to get some clothes, so he could bring her out, saying
he was not leaving her alive. At this point, appellant conceived the idea of
robbery because, before they could reach the upper floor, he suddenly
pulled Amy down and started mauling her until she lost consciousness;
then he freely ransacked the place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly
banging her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl, he took her
bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then proceeded upstairs where he took as
well the jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's
employer.
Under these circumstances, appellant cannot be convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape. However, since it was clearly proven
beyond reasonable doubt that he raped Amy de Guzman and thereafter
robbed her and Ana Marinay of valuables totaling P16,000, he committed
two separate offenses rape with the use of a deadly weapon and simple
robbery with force and intimidation against persons.
Appellant may well be convicted of the separate offenses of rape and
robbery notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged in the
Information is only "Robbery with Rape." In a similar case, People
v. Barrientos, 39 this Court held:
. . . Controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. Neither is it the technical name given to
the offense by the prosecutor, more than the allegations made by him, that
should predominate in determining the true character of the crime. There
should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or more crimes
erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later proven to be
Fourth Issue:
Dwelling as an
Aggravating Circumstance
Dwelling aggravates a felony when the crime was committed in the
residence of the offended party and the latter has not given any
provocation. 41 It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human
abode. 42 As one commentator puts it, one's dwelling place is a sanctuary
worthy of respect; thus, one who slanders another in the latter's house is
more severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere. 4 According
to Cuello Calon, the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows
worse perversity and produces graver alarm. 44
In the case at bar, the building where the two offenses were committed was
not entirely for dwelling purposes. The evidence shows that it consisted of
two floors: the ground floor, which was being operated as a video rental
shop, and the upper floor, which was used as a residence. It was in the
video rental shop where the rape was committed. True, the victim was
dragged to the kitchen and toilet but these two sections were adjacent to
and formed parts of the store. Being a commercial shop that caters to the
public, the video rental outlet was open to the public. As such, it is not
attributed the sanctity of privacy that jurisprudence accords to residential
abodes. Hence, dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the crime of rape.
Proper Penalties
Under Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
"[w]henever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon . . . the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death." Under Article
63 of the same Code, reclusion perpetua is the appropriate penalty
imposable upon accused-appellant for the crime of rape, inasmuch as no
aggravating circumstance was proven. Pursuant to current jurisprudence,
the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon the finding
of the fact of rape. 45 Moral damages may additionally be awarded to the
victim in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need of

pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 46 In rape cases, it is recognized that
the victim's moral injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from
the odiousness of the crime to warrant the grant of moral
damages. 47 In the instant case, we deem it appropriate to grant Amy de
Guzman P30,000 as moral damages. However, since no aggravating
circumstance attended the rape, no exemplary damages may be
awarded. 48
For the crime of robbery committed under the circumstances of this case,
the Code provides the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period. 49 Further, the appellant is also
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the actual
damages incurred by Amy de Guzman in connection with her physical
injuries, the lower court awarded P2,687.65, based on receipts submitted
by her. A recomputation of the receipts, however, reveals a total of only
P2,487.65. We, therefore, reduce the award accordingly. The trial court also
ordered appellant "to restore to the victim her gold ring of undetermined
amount," which was supposedly unrecovered. Upon an examination of the
records, we note that the Information alleges the robbery of the following
items: P5,000 cash, three (3) bracelets, two rings, one pair of earrings and
one (1) Alba wristwatch. Except for the cash money, which has already
been returned to Ana Marinay by the police, the other items were offered as
evidence 50 and submitted to the custody of the trial court. Upon
Motion 51 of Ana Marinay and Amy de Guzman, the release to them of these
items was ordered by this Court via a Resolution issued on December 7,
1999. The stolen items are therefore all accounted for. Thus, we find no
sufficient basis for the trial court's order for the appellant to return a "gold
ring of undetermined amount."
In robbery and other common crimes, the grant of moral damages is not
automatic, unlike in rape cases. The rule that a claim for moral damages
must be supported by proof still stands. It must be anchored on proof
showing that the claimant experienced moral suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation or similar injury. 52 The private complainants, however,
did not present any evidence of their moral sufferings as a result of the
robbery. Thus, there is no basis for the grant of moral damages in
connection with the robbery.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-Appellant
Alexander Tao y Caballero is found guilty of two separate offenses: rape
and robbery. For the crime of rape, appellant is hereby SENTENCED
to reclusion perpetua and to pay Private Complainant Amy de Guzman
P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P30,000 as moral damages. For the
crime of robbery, appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay De Guzman P2,487.65
as actual damages.
G.R. No. 170470

September 26, 2006
People vs. Edna Malngan Mayo
The Case
For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.

01139 promulgated on 2 September 2005, affirming with modification
the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in
Criminal Case No. 01-188424 promulgated on 13 October 2003, finding
appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo (Edna) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of
six (6) people, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of death.
The Facts
As summarized[3] by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts are as

follows:
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in

the area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named
Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when Remigio
Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a
housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different
directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna
Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which
was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by
the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street,
but upon her arrival there, she changed her mind and asked that she be
brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying
for her fare.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos

group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the
housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the
fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from
the Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.

When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he
received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod,
that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the
housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman
(the same housemaid) who was acting strangely and suspiciously on
Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other
tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was later
identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively
identified the woman as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street,
Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods
apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At
the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and
whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accused-appellant
EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a
disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant EDNAs bag.
Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman
Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the
Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire because she had
not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home
to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going
home.
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators

headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire
Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then
detained.
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her
sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA
at the latters detention cell why she did the burning of her employers
house and accused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire
because when she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of
her employer Roberto Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at
her: Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis,
pagdating mo maputi ka na (TSN, January 22, 2002, p.6) (Go ahead, when
you arrive your color would be fair already. Ride a broomstick, when you
arrive your color would be fair already.) And when Mercedita Mendoza
asked accused-appellant EDNA how she burned the house, accusedappellant EDNA told her: Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko
ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng
bahay (TSN, January 22, 2002, p. 7.) (I crumpled newspapers, lighted them
with a disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the
house.)
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network,

accused-appellant EDNA while under detention (sic) was heard by SFO4
(sic) Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the
manner how she accomplished it. SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan was able to
hear the same confession, this time at his home, while watching the
television program True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN
Network.
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto Separa, Sr. and
other adjoining houses and the death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia
Separa together with their four (4) children, namely: Michael, Daphne,
Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.
On 9 January 2001, an Information[4] was filed before the RTC of Manila,

Branch 41, charging accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-188424.
The accusatory portion of said Information provides:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey
residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden
materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting
crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house
knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly
populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and
the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential
houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said
fire, the following, namely,
1.
Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2.
Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3.
Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4.
Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5.
Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6.
Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
10
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death
immediately thereafter.[5]
Pros. Rebagay:
When was that?
When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de

oficio, pleaded[6] Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.[7]
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely,

SPO4[8] Danilo Talusan, Rolando Gruta, Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita
Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that accused-appellant
Edna committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide.
A: On January 2 she was interviewed by the media, sir. The one who took
the coverage was Carmelita Valdez of Channel 2, ABS-CBN. They have a
footage that Edna admitted before them, sir.
Q: And where were you when Edna Malngan made that statement or
admission to Carmelita Valdez of ABS-CBN?
A: I was at our office, sir.

SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that he was one of those
who responded to the fire that occurred on 2 January 2001 and which
started at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. He stated that the fire
killed Roberto Separa, Sr. and all the other members of his family, namely
his wife, Virginia, and his children, Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto,
Jr.; the fire also destroyed their abode as well as six neighboring houses.He
likewise testified that he twice heard accused-appellant once while the
latter was being interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN,
and the other time when it was shown on channel 2 on television during the
airing of the television program entitled True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas
confess to having committed the crime charged, to wit:
Q: Was there any other occasion wherein the accused made another
confession relative to the admission of the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When was that?

Pros. Rebagay:
Based on your investigation, was there any occasion when the accused
Edna Malngan admitted to the burning of the house of the Separa Family?
A: Last Friday, sir. It was shown in True Crime of Gus Abelgas. She was
interviewed at the City Jail and she admitted that she was the one who
authored the crime, sir.
xxxx
Pros. Rebagay:
And where were you when that admission to Gus Abelgas was made?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
A: I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.
11

Double hearsay na yon.
Q: What was that admission that you heard personally, when you were
present, when the accused made the confession to Carmelita Valdez?
Pros. Rebagay:
A: Naglukot po siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter at inilagay niya sa
ibabaw ng mesa yung mga diyaryo at sinunog niya.
No, Your Honor, the witness was present, Your Honor, when that confession
was made by the accused to Carmelita Valdez. [9]
xxxx
Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay tanods in the
area, testified:
Q: Aside from that statement, was there any other statement made by the
accused Edna Malngan?
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. Witness, what is your profession?
A: Yes, sir. Kaya po niya nagawa yon galit po siya sa kanyang amo na
si Virginia, hindi siya pinasuweldo at gusto na po niyang umuwi na (sic)
ayaw siyang payagan. Nagsalita pa po sa kanya na, Sumakay ka na lang sa
walis. Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na. (sic) Yon po ang
sinabi ng kanyang amo.
Atty. Masweng:
A: Sidecar driver, sir.
Q: On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do you recall where

were (sic) you?
That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your Honor.

A: I was at the corner of Moderna Street, sir.
Court:
Sabi ni Valdes, ha?
Pros. Rebagay:
Pros. Rebagay:
And while you were at the corner of Moderna St., what happened if any, Mr.
Witness?
Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez, Your Honor.

A: I saw Edna coming out from the door of the house of Roberto Separa, sir.
Court:
Q: Do you know the number of the house of the Separa Family?
12
A: 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Court:
Why?
xxxx
Witness:
Q: And you said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa
Family. How far is that house from the place where you were waiting at the
corner of Moderna and Paulino Streets?
Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab.
Pros. Rebagay:
A: About three meters from Moderna and Paulino Streets where my pedicab
was placed. My distance was about three meters, sir.
xxxx
How about the Separa family? Why do you know them?
A: They were the employers of Edna, sir.
Q: And how did you know that the house where Edna came out is that of
the house of the Separa Family?
Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family.
What happened when you saw Edna coming out from the house of the
Separa Family?
A: Mismong nakita po ng dalawang mata ko na doon siya galing sa bahay

ng Separa Family.
A: Wala pa pong ano yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
Q: How long have you known the Separa Family, if you know them?
Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out from
the house of the Separa family?
A: About two years, sir.
A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.
Q: How about this Edna, the one you just pointed (to) awhile ago? Do you
know her prior to January 2, 2001?
xxxx
A: Yes, sir. I knew(sic) her for two years.
Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
13
A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
A: When we arrived there, she alighted and pay (sic) P5.00, sir.
Q: Where?
Q And then what transpired after she alighted from your pedicab?
A: To Nipa Street, sir.
Witness:
I went home and I looked for another passenger, sir.
Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?

Pros. Rebagay:
A: Yes, sir.
After that, what happened when you were on you way to your house to look
for passengers?
xxxx
A Nakita ko na nga po na pagdating ko sa Moderna, naglalagablab na apoy.
Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you
go (sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?
Q: From what place was that fire coming out?
A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po.
A: From the house of Roberto Separa Family, sir.
Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
xxxx
A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan

Street, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
After you noticed that there was a fire from the house of Roberto Separa
Family, what did you do if any?
xxxx
Q: What happened after that?
A: Siyempre po, isang Barangay Tanod po ako, nagresponde na po kami sa

sunog. Binuksan na po ng Chairman naming yung tangke, binomba na po
naming yung apoy ng tubig.
14

Q: Now, where were you when this incident happened?
Q: After that incident, Mr. Witness, have you seen Edna Again (sic).
A: No, sir.
A: Kasi ugali ko na po tuwing umagang-umaga po ako na pupunta sa

barangay Hall mga siguro 6:00 or 5:00 o clock, me sumigaw ng sunog
nirespondehannamin iyong sunog eh me dala kaming fire.
Pros. Rebagay:
Court:
And after that incident, did you come to know if Edna was apprehended or
not?
You just answer the question. Where were you when this incident
happened?
xxxx
Witness:
I was at the Barangay Hall, Your Honor.
A: I was called by our Barangay Chairman in order to identify Edna, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
x x x x[10]
And you said that there was a fire that occurred, what did you do?
Witness:
Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where the fire occurred,
stated:
Iyon nga nagresponde kami doon sa sunog eh nakita ko iyong sunog

mukha talagang arson dahil napakalaki kaagad, meron pong mga tipong
Iyong namatay po contractor po iyon eh kaya siguro napakaraming kalat
ng mga pintura, mga container, kaya hindi po namin naapula kaagad iyong
apoy, nasunog ultimo iyong fire tank namin sa lakas, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
Pros. Rebagay:
On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a fire that occurred somewhere
in your area of jurisdiction, particularly Moderna Street?
Now, will you please tell us where this fire occurred?
A: Yes, sir.
A: At the house of the six victims, sir.
15

Q: Whose house is that?
Q: What happened when you reached that place?
A: The house of the victims, sir.
A: Siya po ang nahuli ko doon, sir.
xxxx
Court:
Witness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.
Pros. Rebagay:
You said that you responded to the place, what transpired after you
responded to the place?
Pros. Rebagay:
And what happened?
A: Iyon nga po ang nagsabi may lumabas na isang babae po noon sa bahay
na nagmamadali habang may sunog, me isang barangay tanod po akong
nagsabi may humahangos na isang babae na may dalang bag papunta po
roon palabas ng sasakyan, sir.
A: I brought her to the barangay hall, sir.
Q: And what happened at the barangay hall?

Q: And so what happened?
A: Siyempre hindi naman ako nagtanong kung sino ngayon may dumating
galing na sa bahay naming, may tumawag, tumawag po si Konsehala
Alfonso na may isang babae na hindi mapakali doon sa Calle Pedro Alfonso,
ke konsehal na baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito ganoon nirespondehan ko
po, sir.
A: Inembestigahan ko, kinuha naming iyong bag niya, me lighter siya eh.
Inamin niya po sa amin na kaya niya sinunog hindi siya pinasasahod ng
more or less isang taon na eh. Ngayon sabi ko bakit eh gusto ko ng umuwi
ng probinsya ang sabi sa akin ng amo ko sumakay na lang daw po ako ng
walis tingting para makauwi, sir.
Atty. Herman:
Q: Where did you respond?
We would like to object, Your Honor on the ground that that is hearsay.
A: At Balasan, sir, but its not the area of my jurisdiction.
Pros. Rebagay:
xxxx
That is not a hearsay statement, Your Honor, straight from the mouth of the
accused.
16

Atty. Herman:
Q: Where were you residing at?
Its not under the exemption under the Rules of Court, Your Honor. He is
testifying according to what he has heard.
A: At No. 170 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Court:
Thats part of the narration. Whether it is true or not, thats another matter.
Let it remain.
Q: Why did you transfer your residence? Awhile ago you testified that you
are now residing at 147 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila?
A: Because our house was burned, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are telling you this?
Q: More or less, how much did the loss incurred on the burning of your
house (sic)?
A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre
may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan
para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh
anim na tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao kinokontrol siya
madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na
iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap
awatin. Gustong-gusto siyang kunin ng mga taong-bayan, nagalit dahil ang
daming bahay hong nasunog.[11]
A: More or less, P100,000.00, sir
Q: Do you know the accused in this case Edna Malngan?
A: Yes, sir.
For her part, Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of the Separa Family
and whose house was one of those destroyed by the fire, recounted:
Q: Why do you know her?
Pros. Rebagay:
A: She is the house helper of the family who were (sic) burned, sir.
Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do you recall where were you residing
then?
Q: What family?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Cifara (sic) family, sir.
17

Q: Who in particular do you know among Cifara (sic) family?
A: The woman, sir.
Q: What is the name?
Q: How long do you know Edna Malngan as house helper of the Cifara (sic)
family?
A: I cannot estimate but she stayed there for three to four years, sir.
Q: Do you know who caused the burning of the house of the Cifara (sic)
family?
A: Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic), sir.

Witness:
Q: Are you related to Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?
Edna Malngan, sir.
A: My husband, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
Why do you know that it was Edna Malngan who burned the house of the
Cifara (sic) family?
Q: What is the relationship of your husband to the late Virginia Mendoza

Cifara (sic)?
A: When the fire incident happened, sir, on January 3, we went to San
Lazaro Fire Station and I saw Edna Malngan detained there, sir.
A: They were first cousins, sir.
Q: How far is your house from the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
Q: And so what is your basis in pointing to Edna Malngan as the culprit or

the one who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A: Magkadikit lang po. Pader lang ang pagitan.
A: I talked to her when we went there at that day, sir.
Q: You said that Edna Malngan was working with the Cifara (sic) family.
What is the work of Edna Malngan?
Q: What transpired then?
A: I talked to her and I told her, Edna, bakit mo naman ginawa yung ganun?
A: Nangangamuhan po. House helper, sir.
18

Q: And what was the answer of Edna?
A: She answered, Kasi pag nagpapaalam ako sa kanyang umuwi ng

probinsya, nagpapaalam po siyang umuwi ng probinsya ang sinasabi daw
po sa kanya ni Baby Cifara (sic) na, (sic)Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo
maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis pagdating mo maputi ka na.
defined and penalized by law; (b) that circumstantial evidence was

insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (c) that the
testimonies given by the witnesses of the prosecution were hearsay, thus,
inadmissible in evidence against her.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition to accusedappellants Demurrer to Evidence.
Pros. Rebagay:
What is the basis there that she was the one who burned the house of the
Cifara (sic) family?
A: I also asked her, Paano mo ginawa yung sunog? She told me, Naglukot
ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis
niya sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay. (sic)[12]
Lastly, the prosecution presented Rodolfo Movilla, owner of the house

situated beside that of the Separa family. He testified that his house was
also gutted by the fire that killed the Separa family and that he tried to help
said victims but to no avail.
On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC

promulgated its Judgment[18] wherein it proceeded to resolve the subject
case based on the evidence of the prosecution. The RTC considered
accused-appellant to have waived her right to present evidence, having
filed theDemurrer to Evidence without leave of court.
In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide, the RTC ruled that:
The first argument of the accused that she is charged with an act not
defined and penalized by law is without merit. x x x the caption which
charges the accused with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide is
merely descriptive of the charge of Arson that resulted to Multiple
Homicide. The fact is that the accused is charged with Arson which resulted
to Multiple Homicide (death of victims) and that charge is embodied and
stated in the body of the information. What is controlling is the allegation in
the body of the Information and not the title or caption thereof. x x x.
The prosecution presented other documentary evidence[13] and thereafter

rested its case.
xxxx
When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory evidence,
instead of doing so, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Admit Demurrer to
Evidence[14] and the corresponding Demurrer to Evidence[15] with the former
expressly stating that said Demurrer to Evidence was being filed
x x xwithout express leave of court x x x.[16]
The second and third arguments will be discussed jointly as they are
interrelated with each other. x x x.
xxxx
In her Demurrer to Evidence, accused-appellant asserts that the
prosecutions evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the following reasons:[17] (a) that she is charged with crime not
19

[W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the accused in the act of
burning the house or actually starting the subject fire, the following
circumstances that show that the accused intentionally caused or was
responsible for the subject fire have been duly established:
confessions/admissions, especially the one given to her neighbor Mercedita

Mendoza and the media, albeit uncounselled and made while she was
already under the custody of authorities, it is believed, are not violative of
her right under the Constitution.
1. that immediately before the burning of the house, the accused hurriedly
and with head turning in different directions (palinga-linga) went out of the
said house and rode a pedicab apparently not knowing where to go x x x;
The decretal part of the RTCs Judgment reads:
2. that immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a woman in
Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay
Chairman and his tanods went there, found the accused and apprehended
her and brought her to the barangay hall as shown by the testimony of
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
3. that when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay

officials and when her bag was opened, the same contained a disposable
lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the Barangay Chairman.
[T]he timing of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately

before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same
demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at
the same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of
the lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show her
guilt as charged.
If there is any doubt of her guilt that remains with the circumstantial
evidence against her, the same is removed or obliterated with the
confessions/admissions of the commission of the offense and the manner
thereof that she made to the prosecution witnesses Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and to the media, respectively.
xxxx
[H]er confessions/admissions are positive acknowledgment of guilt of the

crime and appear to have been voluntarily and intelligently given. These
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby denied and judgment is

hereby rendered finding the accused EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson
resulting to the death of six (6) people and sentencing her to suffer the
mandatory penalty of death, and ordering her to pay the heirs of the
victims Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa and children Michael,
Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr., the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos for each victim and the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as temperate damages for their burned
house or a total of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos and to
Rodolfo Movilla the amount of One Hundred [Thousand] (P100,000.00)
Pesos.
Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly
elevated to this Court for automatic review. Conformably with our
decision inPeople v. Efren Mateo y Garcia,[19] however, we referred the case
and its records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the

decision of the RTC, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed October 13, 2003

Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, finding accusedappellant Edna Malngan y Mayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arson
with multiple homicide and sentencing her to suffer the DEATH PENALTY is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that she is further ordered to pay
P50,000.00 as moral damages and another P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each of the victims who perished in the fire, to be paid to their
heirs. She is ordered to pay Rodolfo Movilla, one whose house was also
burned, the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damage.
20
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal

Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004,
which became effective on October 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals, after
rendering judgment, hereby refrains from making an entry of judgment and
forthwith certifies the case and elevates the entire record of this case to the
Supreme Court for review.[20]
It is the contention of accused-appellant that the evidence presented by the

prosecution is not sufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt
as the perpetrator of the crime charged. In support of said exculpatory
proposition, she assigns the following errors[21]:
results therefrom Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659,[22] and Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1613[23], quoted hereunder, to wit:
Revised Penal Code:
ART. 320. Destructive Arson. x x x x

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.[Emphasis supplied.]
I.
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
THE ACCUSED; and
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the occasion

of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AND GIVING CREDENCE TO

THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND UNCOUNSELLED ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY
GIVEN BY THE ACCUSED TO THE WITNESSES BARANGAY CHAIRMAN
REMIGIO BERNARDO, MERCEDITA MENDOZA AND THE MEDIA.
THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH (MULTIPLE)

HOMICIDE.
The Information in this case erroneously charged accused-appellant with

a complex crime, i.e., Arson with Multiple Homicide. Presently, there are
two (2) laws that govern the crime of arson where death
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the
provisions of PD No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one
penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or
otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison d'tre is that arson is
itself the end and death is simply the consequence. [24]
Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or will have to
be a separate crime altogether, the joint discussion [25] of the late Mr. Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino and Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, on the
subject of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is highly instructive:
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular
person who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the
21

house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be
purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without
a design to take life.[26] In other words, if the main object of the offender is
to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is
the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the
crime of arson.[27]
xxxx
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would
not be a qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the
separate offenses of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson. [28]
Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to

determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder
or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the
building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson,
the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on
the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be
in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish
such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is,
likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then
there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder
and arson.
Where then does this case fall under?
knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly

populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and
the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential
houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said
fire, the following, namely,
1.
Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2.
Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3.
Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4.
Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5.
Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6.
Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death
immediately thereafter.[29] [Emphasis supplied.]
accused-appellant is being charged with the crime of arson. It it is clear

from the foregoing that her intent was merely to destroy her employers
house through the use of fire.
We now go to the issues raised. Under the first assignment of error, in

asserting the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant argues that the
prosecution was only able to adduce circumstantial evidence hardly enough
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She ratiocinates that the
following circumstances:
From a reading of the body of the Information:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey
residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden
materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting
crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house
1.
That immediately before the burning of the house , the accused
hurriedly and with head turning in different directions (palinga-linga) went
out of the said house and rode a pedicab apparently not knowing where to
go for she first requested to be brought to Nipa St. but upon reaching there
requested again to be brought to Balasan St. as shown by the testimony of
prosecution witness Rolando Gruta;
22
2.
That immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a
woman in Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive (balisa), the
Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there, found the accused and
apprehended her and brought her to the barangay hall as shown by the
testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out from
the house of the Separa family?
A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.

3. That when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay
officials and when her bag was opened, the same contained a disposable
lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the Barangay Chairman. [30]
fall short of proving that she had any involvement in setting her employers
house on fire, much less show guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given that it
is a fact that housemaids are the first persons in the house to wake up early
to perform routine chores for their employers,[31] one of which is preparing
and cooking the morning meal for the members of the household; and
necessity requires her to go out early to look for open stores or even
nearby marketplaces to buy things that will complete the early meal for the
day.[32] She then concludes that it was normal for her to have been seen
going out of her employers house in a hurry at that time of the day and to
look at all directions to insure that the house is secure and that there are no
other persons in the vicinity.[33]
xxxx
Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
Q: Where?
A: To Nipa Street, sir.

We are far from persuaded.
Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?
True, by the nature of their jobs, housemaids are required to start the day
early; however, contrary to said assertion, the actuations and the
demeanor of accused-appellant on that fateful early morning as observed
firsthand by Rolando Gruta, one of the witnesses of the prosecution, belie
her claim of normalcy, to wit:
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family.
What happened when you saw Edna coming out from the house of the
Separa Family?
A: Wala pa pong ano yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you
go (sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?
A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po.
23
Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan

Street, sir.
there is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that they are
suborned witnesses. The records of the RTC even show
that Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman, kept accused-appellant
from being mauled by the angry crowd outside of the barangay hall:
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are (sic) telling you this?
xxxx
We quote with approval the pronouncement of the RTC in discrediting

accused-appellants aforementioned rationale:
[O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to leave the house in

such a disturbed, nervous and agitated manner, demeanor and condition.
The timing of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately
before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same
demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at
the same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of
the lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show her
guilt as charged.[34]
All the witnesses are in accord that accused-appellants agitated

appearance was out of the ordinary. Remarkably, she has never denied this
observation.
We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity to
observe them directly. The credibility given by trial courts to prosecution
witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can
rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe them, particularly their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination
by counsels. Here, Remigio Bernardo,
Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested witnesses and
A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre
may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan
para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh
anim na tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao kinokontrol siya
madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na
iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap awatin.
Gusting-gusto siyang kunin ng mga taong-bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming
bahay hong nasunog.[35]
Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why the witnesses
presented would openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to
send an innocent person to jail all the while knowing that the real
malefactor remains at large. Such proposition defies logic. And where the
defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their testimonies are true
and thus entitled to full faith and credence.[36]
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant actually

starting the fire that burned several houses and killed the Separa family,
her guilt may still be established through circumstantial evidence provided
that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [37]
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of

facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. [38]It is
founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be
proved.[39] In order to bring about a conviction, the circumstantial evidence
24

presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others,
as the guilty person.[40]
In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,

taken together, exemplify a case where conviction can be upheld on the
basis of circumstantial evidence. First, prosecution witness Rolando Gruta,
the driver of the pedicab that accused-appellant rode on, testified that he
knew for a fact that she worked as a housemaid of the victims, and that he
positively identified her as the person hurriedly leaving the house of the
victims on 2 January 2001 at 4:45 a.m., and acting in a nervous
manner. That while riding on the pedicab, accused-appellant was unsure of
her intended destination. Upon reaching the place where he originally
picked up accused-appellant only a few minutes after dropping her off,
Rolando Gruta saw theSeparas house being gutted by a blazing
fire. Second, Remigio Bernardo testified that he and his tanods, including
Rolando Gruta, were the ones who picked up accused-appellant Edna
at Balasan Street (where Rolando Gruta dropped her off) after receiving a
call that there was a woman acting strangely at said street and who
appeared to have nowhere to go. Third, SPO4 Danilo Talusan overheard
accused-appellant admit to Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of Channel 2 (ABSCBN) that said accused-appellant started the fire, plus the fact that he was
able see the telecast of Gus Abelgas show where accused-appellant, while
being interviewed, confessed to the crime as well. The foregoing
testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony ofMercedita Mendoza validating
the fact that accused-appellant confessed to having started the fire which
killed the Separa family as well as burned seven houses including that of
the victims, convincingly form an unbroken chain, which leads to the
unassailable conclusion pinpointing accused-appellant as the person behind
the crime of simple arson.
In her second assigned error, accused-appellant questions the admissibility

of her uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to prosecution witnesses,
namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to the media. Accusedappellant Edna contends that being uncounselled extrajudicial confession,
her admissions to having committed the crime charged should have been
excluded in evidence against her for being violative of Article III, Section
12(1) of the Constitution.
With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused-appellant is of

the position that the remaining proof of her alleged guilt, consisting in the
main of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
We partly disagree.
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or

Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of

custodial investigation when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect.[41] Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has
merely been invited for questioning.[42]
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial

confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:
Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of prosecution witnesses
Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita Mendoza for being hearsay and in the
nature of an uncounselled admission.
(1)
it must be voluntary;
25

(2)
it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel;
(3)
appropriately, accused-appellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession to

said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.[43]
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this

particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution.
When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning
of2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the
fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of
RobertoSepara, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accusedappellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made
in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted
without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the
Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are
inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of
her constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellants confession to

Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not
automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to
having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when
accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of
Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas house. The
testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is,
unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and
is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the
Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between
the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another private individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution
witness MerceditaMendoza undoubtedly are.[44] Here, there is no evidence
on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so
Accused-appellant likewise assails the admission of the testimony of

SPO4 Danilo Talusan. Contending that [w]hen SPO4 Danilo Talusantestified
in court, his story is more of events, which are not within his personal
knowledge but based from accounts of witnesses who derived information
allegedly from the accused or some other persons x x x. In other words, she
objects to the testimony for being merely hearsay. With this imputation of
inadmissibility, we agree with what the Court of Appeals had to say:
Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is hearsay because he was

not present when Gus Abelgas interviewed accused-appellant EDNA, it may
nevertheless be admitted in evidence as an independently relevant
statement to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the
fact that the statement was made [People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July
20, 1999, 310 SCRA 621 citing People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August
14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]. In People vs. Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 132635 &
143872-75, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court ruled
that:
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of

their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is
relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. [45]
As regards the confession given by accused-appellant to the media, we

need not discuss it further for the reporters were never presented to testify
in court.
As a final attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant asserts that since the

identities of the burned bodies were never conclusively established, she
cannot be responsible for their deaths.
26

Such assertion is bereft of merit.
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that
intent to kill them particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. As
we have clarified earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge of
arson, simple or destructive. The prosecution need only prove, that the
burning was intentional and that what was intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling. Again, in the case of People v. Soriano,[46] we
explained that:
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be

inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one
intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one
has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to
produce further evidence of his wrongful intent.[47]
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty

of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson:
1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree
No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of
the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused, [48] to
wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,

contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft,
factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons.[[49]] The
classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is selfevident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this
dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the
lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only
destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater
retribution to authors of thisheinous crime. The exceptionally severe
punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme
danger to human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these
structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact
that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and
the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the
social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis
supplied.]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The
Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This
decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and
classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings,
government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus
stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.[[50]]
Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high
incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction, protect the
national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability
of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This
separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the
severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed,
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
[Emphasis supplied.]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the

degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts
committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended)
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. [51] On the other hand,
acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a
lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a
lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications than
Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.][52]
27
Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the crime
as stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident
that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson for
having deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of
ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited
house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence
thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some
seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case
of People v. Soriano.[53] The accused in the latter case caused the burning of
a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five
(5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of
destructive arson under paragraph 1[54] of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr.
Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613,

which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for
other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant
are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or
dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second
Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather
than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3,
Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of
ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws
shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of
the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited
house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar. [55]
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged

with having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of
Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7)
adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial,
she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple

arson. Such is the case notwithstanding the error in the designation of the
offense in the information, the information remains effective insofar as it
states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein. [56] What is controlling
is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged
or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. [57]
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5
of PD No. 1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for
simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the

occasion of arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the

Information, the imposable penalty on accused-appellant
is reclusionperpetua.
Apropos the civil liabilities of accused-appellant, current

jurisprudence[58] dictate that the civil indemnity due from accused-appellant
isP50,000.00 for the death of each of the victims. [59] However, the monetary
awards for moral and exemplary damages given by the Court of Appeals,
both in the amount of P50,000.00, due the heirs of the victims, have to
be deleted for lack of material basis. Similarly, the Court of Appeals award
of exemplary damages to Rodolfo Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00 for
the destruction of his house, also has to be deleted, but in this instance for
being improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this Court in the
absence of proof of mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of
the victims.[60] Concerning the award of exemplary damages, the reason for
the deletion being that no aggravating circumstance had been alleged and
proved by the prosecution in the case at bar. [61]
To summarize, accused-appellants alternative plea that she be acquitted of

the crime must be rejected. With the evidence on record, we find no cogent
28

reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. It is
indubitable that accused-appellant is the author of the crime of simple
arson. All the circumstantial evidence presented before the RTC, viewed in
its entirety, is as convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negates
accused-appellants innocence, and when considered concurrently with
her admission given to Mercedita Mendoza, the formers guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is twice as evident. Hence, her conviction is effectively
justified. More so, as it is propitious to note that in stark contrast to the
factual circumstances presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant
neither mustered a denial nor an alibi except for the proposition that her
guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2

September 2005, in CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is
concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of damages to be
awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of each of
the victims P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
[G.R. No. 139542. June 21, 2001]

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. INOCENCIO

GONZALEZ, JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the improvident
use of a firearm did not exacerbate a simple altercation over traffic. This is
one of them.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot
to death in the course of her husbands altercation with the accusedappellant and his son along the Garden of Remembrance within the Loyola
Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found the accused guilty of the
complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and
accordingly sentenced him to death. This case is before us on automatic
review.
The details of what actually transpired in the few seconds immediately
preceding the shooting are controverted by both parties but the events
leading to this tragedy are not disputed.
29

In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the families of
the private complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-appellant
Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial
Park. The appellant was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and
three housemaids, while the private complainant was driving a maroon
Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old son,
Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the
intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant
Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the complainant Noel Andres
was headed straight along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost
collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant
continued driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind the
appellants vehicle for some time and cut him off when he found the
opportunity to do so.[1] Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked
on the appellants car window.[2] This is as far as their versions of the
incident coincide.
The prosecutions version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the
appellant to be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he,
Andres, is with his family and to this Gonzalez allegedly replied, Accidents
are accidents, whats your problem. Andres stated that he saw the appellant
turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when he was
blocked by the appellants son who said, Anong problema mo sa erpat
ko. Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded
his vehicle, sat at the drivers seat, closed the door, and partially opened
the car window just wide enough to talk back to appellants son,
Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said Binaril kami. He turned to his
wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned
around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also
wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino were shouting at each
other so that he did not hear the shot. Andres then got out of his vehicle to
warn the appellant not to flee. He then took the wounded members of his
family to the exit where there was an ambulance standing by. The three
were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later transferred to
the Quezon City Medical Center.
The defenses version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellants path
by positioning his FX obliquely along the appellants lane from the latters
left side. Andres then got out of his vehicle, stood beside the appellants car
window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant, Putang ina mo, ang tandatanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo.[3] The
appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly replied, Pasensiya ka na hindi
kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang. The appellant Gonzalez and
another witness for the defense, Quidic, testified that Noel Andres went
back to his vehicle to move it in such a way that it is straight in front of the
appellants car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again and continued
shouting and cursing at the appellant.[4] Dino, the appellants son, who rode
in another vehicle decided to go back when he did not see his fathers car
behind him. When Dino arrived at the scene he confronted Andres and the
two had an altercation. Both Dino and the appellant stated that Andres
remained outside his vehicle during the altercation with Dino. When Andres
suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot
where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get his gun from the glove
compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car
ready to shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put
down his hand holding the gun.This is when the appellants daughter Trisha
who was riding in Dinos car arrived at the scene, walked past Dino and
Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father and in the
process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand
and with Trishas substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant
lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. The accused stated that he
did not know he shot somebody until the private complainants sister-in-law,
Francar Valdez, got out of the vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The
defense claims that the appellant did not try to flee and even told the
complainants sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder,
Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against herein
accused-appellant:
That on or about the 31st day of October 1998, in the city of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal violence by means of
treachery and abuse of superior strength upon the person of Noel Andres y
Tomas, by then and there shooting him with a Glock cal. 9mm pistol but
instead hitting one Feliber Andres y Ordoo, on the left back portion of her
head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wound which directly
caused her death, as well as hitting John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin
Valdez y Ordoo physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused their
death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced
the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason of some cause or causes, independent of their will, that is, the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to John Kenneth Andres y
Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y Ordoo to their damage and prejudice as well as to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Feliber Andres y Ordoo.
On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel Andres did not
die instantaneously. She lived to give birth to a baby girl[5] by caesarian
section and died the following morning on November 1, 1998. The Autopsy
Report[6] states:
FINDINGS: Fairly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, with post
mortem lividity. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are
cyanotic. Surgical incisions were noted at left tempero-parietal
region.Surgical incisions is also noted at the abdominal region secondary to
a caesarian section.
30

HEAD: (1) gunshot wound, point of entry, left fronto-temporal region,
measuring 1 by 0.9 cm, 9 cm from the anterior midline, with a uniform
abraided collar measuring 0.2 cm., directed posteriorwards, slightly
downwards, and medialwards, fracturing the frontal, and left temporal
bones, lacerating the left cerebral hemisphere, with a deformed slug
fragment embedded and recovered at the posterior lobe of the left cerebral
hemisphere. (2) hematoma, left orbital region, measuring 4.5 by 2 cm, 4
cm from the anterior midline. There are subdural and subarachnoidal
hemorrages. Stomach contains 1 glassful of partially digested food particles
mostly rice and meaty material.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head.
Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic fragments on
their faces. They were discharged from the hospital six days later or on
November 6, 1998.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding that the
shooting was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
held the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder for the death of
Feliber Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries
sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez and sentenced the appellant
to the maximum of the imposable penalty which is death. The trial court
held:
Beforehand, the Court takes note of the judicial admissions on the verbal
declarations of the accused that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the
case; that he owns the black Gluck 9 mm. automatic pistol; that the said
gun will never fire even if he drops it; that only one bullet was fired from his
gun; and that the victim Feliber Andres is already dead. With this exegesis
and the declarations in open court of the eyewitness of both the
prosecution and some of the defense, there is no real dispute on the
antecedent facts showing that the accused fired on Noel Andres but instead
hit and caused the fatal injuries to the victims John Kenneth Andres, Kevin
Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death of the latter. The
court takes further judicial admissions of the accused made in their
memorandum demonstrating the existence of five (5) sequences of events
leading to the death of Feliber Andres and the wounding of John Kenneth
Andres and Kevin Valdez which are as follows: First is when Noel Andres
overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his path; Second is
when Noel Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted Inocencio; Third
is when Noel had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the accused;
Forth is when, Inocencio seeing his son having confrontation with Noel, got
his gun to protect Dino; and Fifth is when Inocencio had a struggle with his
daughter. Trisha Gonzalez, who tried to reach for the gun and as a result of
which Inocencio lost his balance and as he was falling backward to his side,
his right arm holding the gun hit the rear window of the Tamaraw FX van
and the gun accidentally went off hitting the victim, who were all then
inside the van.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol
used in this case which is capable of unquestionable demonstration or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Practically,
the stages before an automatic firearm would be capable of firing are as
follows: 1) the loading of a bullet into the chamber of the gun; 2) the
cocking of the hammer, if uncocked; 3) the releasing of the safety pin; 4)
the pressing of the trigger to unleash the hammer so that the firing pin will
hit the cartridge to propel the bullet out to hit the target. Realistically, it
demonstrates that a gun will not fire even if the bullet is loaded in its
chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if cocked if the safety pin is
engaged; or even if the safety pin is disengaged if the trigger will not be
pressed. However, even if the gun is fired if it is not aimed and leveled to
the target, the purpose of firing it shall not be achieved. Contrarily, once a
gun is drawn against a person, the means methods and forms employed for
its execution is already conceived. And once it is tended directly and
specifically to insure its execution, it consequently produces the conscious
and deliberate intention. Finally if all the acts of execution had been
effectively done without risk on the part of the offender arising from any
defense coming from the offended party, treachery results. In brief, there is
treachery when the offender commits any crime against persons,
employing means, methods and forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from any defense which the offended party might make (People vs. Mesa
276 SCRA 407; People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr. G. R. No. 112445, March 7,
1996). To appreciate treachery two (2) conditions must be present, to wit:
1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2) the means of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted. (People vs. Azugue, 268 SCRA
711; People vs. Pea, G. R. No. 116022, July 1, 1998, p. 1)
In the case at bar and guided with the above-quoted doctrinal cases,
logically, the accused is positive of the crime charged against him. When he
alighted with a drawn gun to protect his son and released all the safety
measures of his gun as he fired and missed at Noel who was then unarmed,
but instead hit Kevin Valdez, John Kenneth Andres and Feliber Andres which
resulted to the death of the latter, demonstrate that the accused has
executed the two (2) conditions to generate treachery enough to qualify the
crime committed to murder.
XXXX XXXXX XXXX
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio
Gonzalez, Jr., y Esquivel is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted
Murder penalized under Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer
the maximum penalty of Death by lethal injection.
The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:
31

1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Feliber Andres;
b) the amount of P3,363,663.60 as indemnity for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased Feliber Andres;
c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;
d) the amount of P271,800.56 for the hospitalization expenses incurred for
the injuries sustained by the deceased Feliber Andres and the amount of
P23,622.58 representing the expenses for the untimely delivery of the child
Ma. Clarisse Andres;
e) the amount of P51,566.00 representing the hospitalization expenses for
the injuries sustained by the victim John Kenneth Andres;
f) the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages suffered for the untimely
death of his wife Feliber Andres and for the injuries caused to his son John
Kenneth Andres;
g) the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees and a fee of
P2,000.00 per appearance; and
h) the costs of the suit.
2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:
a) the amount of P73,824.75 as actual damages for the injuries sustained
by the victim Kevin Valdez; and
b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court committed reversible error when it found that treachery
was present.
2. The trial court committed reversible error when it presumed that there
was treachery by taking judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol
involved in this case.
3. The trial court committed reversible error when it violated the
constitutional right of the accused-appellant to due process when it took
judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol involved in this case
without notice.
4. The trial court committed reversible error when it found AccusedAppellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder
with Double Frustrated Murder.
5. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act, incomplete defense of relative, and
voluntary surrender.
6. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to find that the
shooting incident was accidental.
7. The trial court committed reversible error when it gave credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Elmer Ramos and Moises Castro.
8. The trial court committed reversible error when it disregarded the basic
principle that the accused is presumed innocent and his guilt must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
9. The trial court committed reversible error when it ordered AccusedAppellant to pay for the civil liabilities.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered
exempting him from criminal and civil liabilities. Appellant declared that he
had no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his wife nor the
children. He lost his balance when his daughter Trisha approached and
pushed him backwards to stop him from joining Dino and Noel Andres but
the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it accidentally
fired. The single bullet fired hit the last window on the left side of the
Tamaraw FX. The appellant claims that he did not see the passengers inside
the vehicle at the time of the shooting.This is corroborated by the
testimony of two witnesses for the prosecution who testified that the
windows of Andres vehicle are heavily tinted so that a person outside the
vehicle would not be able to see if there are people inside. It is also argued
that had the appellant intended to shoot Noel Andres he could have simply
done so by shooting at him directly. The defense asserts that the evidence
for the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of treachery and
without the attendance of the said qualifying circumstance the crime
committed is homicide, not murder.
The appellant also points out that the trial court made the factual finding
that the shooting happened in a matter of seconds and that it was
preceded by a heated argument between the parties. Such being the case,
it is argued that the shooting could not have been attended by
treachery. There was no time for the appellant to consciously and
deliberately employ the mode of attack against Noel Andres, nor against
any one of the actual victims, to insure its execution and at the same time
to eliminate any form of retaliation from the alleged intended victim. And
yet, the trial court, contrary to the evidence on record, held that the loading
32

of the bullet into the chamber of the gun, the cocking of the hammer, the
release of the safety pin and the pulling of the trigger by the appellant of
his automatic pistol constitute conscious and deliberate effort to employ
the gun as a means of committing the crime and resultantly, qualified its
commission by treachery. Such a finding presupposes that the appellant
loaded the gun to shoot Noel Andres only that very moment when his son
Dino and Noel Andres were arguing. This conclusion has no basis on
record. The appellant testified that his gun was loaded before he left the
house and two witnesses for prosecution stated in court that a few seconds
after Noel Andres and Dino started shouting at each other, the appellant
got out of his car and shot at the last window on the left side of the
complainants vehicle. Further, the appellant assigns as error the procedure
adopted by the trial court in taking judicial notice that the gun used by the
appellant is an automatic pistol and as such, it will not fire unless aimed at
the intended target. The procedure taken by the trial court is contrary to
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.[7] The trial court should have
given both parties the opportunity to present evidence, expert evidence, if
necessary, to inform the court on the subject matter. The appellant argues
that the factual finding borne by such erroneous procedure is equally
erroneous. The gun used by the appellant is a semi-automatic and not an
automatic pistol which means that the pistol used has no external safety
pin to be released and that the hammer need not be cocked. The pulling of
the trigger, intentional or not, will fire the gun. The use of a semi-automatic
pistol does not necessarily imply treachery.
Appellant also argues that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Castro
and Ramos were improperly given credence by the trial court. The
appellant contends that a reading of their testimonies would show that
their narration of the incident is rather absurd and would show that they did
not witness the actual shooting. Defense witnesses, Gonzalez and his
daughter, Trisha, on the other hand, testified that Castro and Ramos arrived
at the scene only after the shooting.
As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it is argued that
considering that there was no intent to kill and that they stayed in the
hospital only for six days, the crime committed is physical injuries. It is
argued that the trial court erred in awarding damages. The bunch of
receipts allegedly representing the medical expenses incurred for the
injuries sustained by the victims was erroneously admitted in evidence,
without first requiring the prosecution to establish the authenticity of the
receipts. The appellant also points out that the award for loss of earning
capacity has no basis as the deceased was unemployed at the time of the
incident.
Finally, the appellant assigns as error the trial courts rejection of the
mitigating circumstances pleaded by the defense which allegedly attended
the commission of the crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and
voluntary surrender. The appellant asserts that these mitigating
circumstances were duly proven during the trial and are supported by the
evidence on record. The private complainant Noel Andres testified that he

saw the appellant getting red in anger after they, Andres and the appellant,
had a heated argument immediately prior to the shooting. These admitted
circumstances show that the appellant was not in his proper state of mind
at the time of the shooting. First, he was angered by Andres abusive
language and later he got out of his car with a loaded gun to protect his son
from a perceived danger. The appellant clams that his willingness to help
the injured and his voluntary surrender to the police should likewise be
considered as mitigating circumstances in the imposition of penalties.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the crime was not
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and hence the crime
committed by the appellant for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide, not
murder. The appellee takes into consideration that the shooting was
preceded by a heated argument and that the supposed victim was placed
on guard that attack was imminent. It also appears that the shooting was
done impulsively. There is no evidence that the appellant deliberately
employed the means of attack to insure execution of the crime and at the
same time eliminate the risk of retaliation from the private
complainant. The appellee also agrees with the appellant that the trial
court erred in equating the use of an automatic pistol with treachery. The
trial court made the factual finding that the appellants automatic pistol
would not fire unless aimed and the trigger is deliberately pulled and hence
treachery attended the shooting. The appellee submits that if we follow the
reasoning of the trial court it would appear that the appellant intended to
shoot at the complainants vehicle only as the shot was fired at the last
window on the left side of the FX away from where Andres was allegedly
seated. The fact that the gun was drawn and fired does not mean that the
mode of attack was consciously and deliberately employed.
However, with respect to the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, the
appellee disagrees with the contention that the appellant is liable only for
slight physical injuries. The injuries sustained by both children are head
injuries and could have caused their death if not for the immediate medical
attention given them. The number of days spent in the hospital is not
determinative of the severity of the wounds.Their nature and location
should instead be considered. The appellant cannot escape liability for
frustrated homicide for the injuries of the two children on the ground that
he fired a single shot at the vehicle of Noel Andres. He is liable for all the
consequences of his unlawful act even if the crime committed is different
from that intended.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee asserts that
none can be considered in favor of the appellant. There is evidence on
record that the appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police and it
appears from the testimonies of witnesses that he entertained the
possibility of flight but his car was stuck in traffic along the exit of the
memorial park. His pretense of incomplete defense of a relative is belied by
his own admission that when he saw that Noel Andres did not have a gun
he lowered his hand holding the gun. There was allegedly no threat on the
33

life of his son at the time of the shooting, no uncontrollable fear nor
irresistible force that would mitigate the commission of the offense.
The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the pecuniary awards granted by
the trial court. The appellee alleges that it is not denied by the appellant
that Feliber Andres was a 38 year old registered nurse at the time of the
shooting. Although she was then unemployed on account of her pregnancy,
she still had earning capacity and the trial court properly applied the salary
of a government nurse under the salary standardization scheme in the
computation of damages for the loss of earning capacity. The receipts
presented in evidence by the prosecution to establish hospitalization and
other medical expenses incurred by the private complainants by reason of
the injuries suffered by the victims were duly authenticated by the
prosecution witnesses and there is no dispute that they are exact copies of
the original receipts presented in court. The objections raised by the
appellant in this regard were duly met by the evidence presented by the
private complainants.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant fired a
single shot and in the process committed four offenses the appellant should
be held liable for the complex crime of homicide for the death of Feliber
Andres, double frustrated homicide against Kevin and Kenneth and
attempted homicide against Noel Andres. Under the rules on complex
crimes the penalty for the gravest offense, i.e.,reclusion temporal for
homicide, should be imposed in its maximum period.
The appeal has merit.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as
the deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of
a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two elements
must concur: 1) the employment of means of execution that would insure
the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and
leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the
means employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
[8]
The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the
victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was
made or the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render
the attack as treacherous.[9] This is of particular significance in a case of an
instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an
advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and
was rendered defenseless.[10] The means employed for the commission of
the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously
or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the
crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from
the intended victim.[11] Accordingly, it has been consistently held by this
court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the
spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are
generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused

to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack. [12] Thus, the sudden
attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victims
provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the
accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting the
accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim
were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned
of reprisal.[13] For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must
have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and
without provocation on the part of the latter.[14]
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the attack
succeeds against its intended victim or injures another or whether the
crime committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as long as it is
shown that the attack is attended by treachery, the said qualifying
circumstance may still be considered by the court.[15] Thus, the determining
factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is attended by
treachery is not the resulting crime committed but the mode of attack
employed in its execution.[16]
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must
be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime
itself. [17]
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting
was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the
death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance
encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided
at an intersection inside the memorial park. Unfortunately, heated
exchange of remarks that followed the near collision was fanned by a short
temper, which in the case of the appellant, was augmented by the
improvident use of a firearm.
From a reading of the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses, it
would appear that Noel Andres, who had his pregnant wife and child with
him, among others, on board the Tamaraw FX provoked the
altercation. After the near collision of his vehicle with that of the appellant,
he tailed behind the latters car towards the exit until he had the chance to
cut him off to scold him for his failure to observe traffic rules.[18] Andres
stated in court that he calmly told the appellant to be careful with his
driving and denied that he was angry when he alighted from his vehicle to
confront the appellant.[19] His statement is belied by the witnesses, two
prosecution witnesses included, who uniformly testified that Andres
quarreled with or shouted and cursed at the appellant for the latters
recklessness at the intersection.[20] The appellant narrated in court that
Andres repeatedly shouted at him, Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na
gago ka pa.[21] Andres hostile behavior towards the appellant is evident
from his statement in court that he noticed the appellant turning red in
34

anger.[22] It is highly improbable for Gonzalez to have turned red in anger
had Andres been polite, as he claims he was, in scolding Gonzalez.Andres
could have simply communicated to the appellant his disgust for the latters
bad driving when he overtook the appellants car near the scene of the
shooting but instead he chose to block the appellants path, insult and
virtually provoke the appellant to retaliate.
Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez infuriation he
immediately walked towards his vehicle, because according to him the
altercation was over. On his way to his FX he met another man, whom he
later found out to be the appellants son, Dino. It appears that the
altercation was far from over because again Andres had a shouting match
this time with Dino.[23] In a matter of seconds, the appellant alighted from
his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres
vehicle at an angle away from Noel Andres. The single bullet fired hit
Feliber Andres on the forehead near the temporal region above the left eye
and the two children with metallic fragments of the bullet on their faces,
one at the cheek and the other below his left eye.
The prosecution did not present evidence as to the exact seating
arrangement of the victims inside the vehicle; suffice it to say, that an
examination of the pictures of the vehicle [24] one of which shows a mass of
blood stains on the left side (towards the drivers seat) of the white seat
cover below the head rest[25], would show that the deceased Feliber must
have been seated at the front passengers seat and the children at the
middle row behind the drivers seat.[26] Another picture shows a bullet hole
on the last window on the left side of the vehicle [27] and another shows that
the front windshield appears undamaged.[28] A ballistics expert appeared in
court for the prosecution and testified that the bullet fired at the FX came
from the appellants gun, which fact was admitted by the defense. The
prosecution did not inquire from the ballistics expert regarding the
trajectory of the bullet or the approximate distance of the appellant from
the FX when he fired his gun to establish whether or not the appellant
aimed for Noel or Feliber or simply fired indiscriminately at the latters
vehicle.[29]
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber Andres was
attended by treachery as she was inside the FX witnessing her husbands
altercation, first, with the appellant then with the appellants son, totally
defenseless from the shot that came suddenly from her left side. Public
outrage over the death of Feliber was heightened by the fact that she was
then pregnant with her second child and her death left a new born baby girl
and a two year old boy motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a conclusive finding
of treachery and any doubt must be resolved, like the fact of the
commission of an offense, in favor of the accused. The pictures indicate
that Gonzalez fired at the FX at an angle away from Noel Andres and that
Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in particular. It is not disputed that the
appellants car was directly behind the complainants FX and that Gonzalez
who was then seated at the drivers seat alighted from his car, took a few
steps then fired at the left side of the FX. Whether Noel Andres was seated
at the drivers seat inside his vehicle when Gonzalez fired at the FX, as the
prosecution asserts, or was standing by the door of the drivers seat outside
his vehicle, as the defense submits, it is clear that the shot was fired away
from Noel Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her temple above the left eye
indicating that she was facing left towards her husband when the shot was
fired.[30] The direct hit on Felibers head shows that the angle of the shot was
indeed away from Noel Andres. Even the eyewitness for the prosecution
testified that had the appellant intended to kill Noel Andres he could have
shot directly at him, considering that Noel Andres was just a few steps
away from him[31] and that Noel Andres was visible from the outside
because his window was partially open.[32] The pictures show that the bullet
hole was on the third window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX [33] belying
any attempt to shoot Noel Andres. Two prosecution witnesses Ramos and
Castro unequivocally declared that nothing or no one prevented Gonzalez
from shooting directly at Noel Andres and that Gonzalez could have simply
done so if he wanted to. But after alighting from his car, Gonzalez took a
few steps and shot at the left side window of the FX.[34]
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by
itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the
appellant deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain
advantage over him when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence
before us reveals that the position of the appellants car was not of his own
doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his
path.
We note further, that the appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel
Andres even after the latter cut off the appellants path. Andres stated in
court that the appellant did not alight from his car nor opened his window
until he, Andres, tapped on it.[35] For his part Gonzalez categorically stated
in court that he did not point his gun nor threatened Andres during their
short spat.[36] Gonzalez, although he had his gun in his car, did not react to
Andres cursing until the latter was having an altercation with the appellants
son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son was in imminent
danger.[37]Whether he overreacted or he shot at Andres vehicle out of rage
over Andres aggressive behavior, one thing appears clear to us, that the
shooting was not done in cold blood. It is undisputed that the windows of
the FX are heavily or darkly tinted so that a person outside would not see if
anybody was inside.[38] The pictures of the FX[39] on record confirm the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses that the other
passengers of the FX were not visible from the outside. Gonzalez admitted
in court that Noel Andres mentioned that he has passengers with him while
he was shouting and cursing at Gonzalez but there is no indication that
Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers when he fired the
shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a conclusion
that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue
advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive
35

evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime
committed is homicide.[40]
The trial courts finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking of the
hammer and finally the pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate effort
on the part of appellant to use the gun as a means of a treacherous attack
is patently erroneous. A single and continuous attack cannot be divided into
stages to make it appear that treachery was involved. [41] The entire incident
happened in a matter of minutes, as testified to by witnesses, and as noted
by the trial court.[42] It was error to our mind for the trial court to divide the
assault in stages to arrive at the conclusion that the mode of attack was
consciously employed by the appellant. Contrary to the finding of the trial
court that the appellant prepared the gun before getting out of his car, the
appellant testified that he loaded his gun before he left the house and that
it was ready to fire when he alighted his car. There was no time for him to
reflect on the mode of attack since he just picked up his gun and alighted
from his car and shot at the FX a few seconds after Dino and Noel Andres
started shouting at each other.[43] We note further that the trial court
pointed out that from the fact that the appellant prepared his gun to shoot,
this was an indication of the deliberate employment of the gun as a means
to kill; i.e. that the use of an automatic pistol shows that the shooting was
attended by treachery.
We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is determinative of
treachery, unless it is shown, and it is not herein shown, that the appellant
deliberately used the gun to insure the commission of the crime and to
render the unarmed victim defenseless. As discussed above, the encounter
between the appellant and the Andresses was a chance encounter and the
appellants gun was in the glove compartment of his car even before he left
his house. The shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive
decision made by the appellant preceded by a heated altercation at the
instance of the private complainant.Jurisprudence teaches us that under
the circumstances, treachery is not obtaining. In the case of People vs.
Valles,[44] the accused, a security guard, fired his Armalite and mortally
wounded the victim when the latter approached the accused four times
insisting on entering the workplace wearing improper uniform, then cursed
and insulted and challenged the accused to a fight. We held that the
shooting was not attended by treachery as the shooting was preceded by a
heated altercation at the instance of the victim. It is to be noted that the
kind of weapon used against an unarmed victim was not taken into
consideration in determining the attendance of treachery; it is the mode of
attack employed by the accused under the particular circumstances of a
case that determines its attendance in the commission of a crime. We find
that the prosecution has not discharged its burden to show that the
shooting was attended by treachery and we are convinced that the crime
committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime
committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill
determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide
and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused which are
undoubtedly intended to kill the victim.[45] In a case wherein the accused
did not know that a person was hiding behind a table who was hit by a
stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring treatment for three days,
the crime committed is slight physical injuries.[46] In case of doubt as to the
homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convicted of the lesser
offense of physical injuries.[47] We have earlier pointed out that the intent to
kill is absent in this case. It was also found that one small metallic fragment
was extracted from Kenneth below his left eye while another fragment was
extracted from Kevin immediately below the level of his skin before the
cheek bone.[48] An examination of the testimonies of the attending
physicians, showed that the wounds sustained by the two children from the
metallic fragments are not in themselves fatal but may cause death if left
untreated. One of the attending physician testified in court that the
fragments themselves will not cause complication, it is the entry of the
fragment or the open wound that is susceptible to infection.[49] Two small
fragments were no longer extracted from the face of Kevin Valdez, as the
doctor deemed it to be without danger of complication.[50] We note that the
various sizes of the metallic fragments were not established, at least to
give an indication of the severity of the wounds sustained. Both children
were discharged after six days of treatment and there is no showing that
they required subsequent treatment or that they were immobilized for a
greater number of days by reason of the injuries sustained. Considering the
nature and location of their injuries and the number of days required for
their treatment, we find that the crime committed for the injuries sustained
by the children are two counts of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of
the Revised Penal Code which imposes a penalty of arresto menor or
imprisonment for 1 to 30 days for injuries sustained that has incapacitated
the victim for one to nine days or required medical attendance for the same
period. For evident lack of criminal intent to kill the complainant, Noel
Andres, as above stated, the information for attempted homicide must fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and
obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved
and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of
prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary
surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant drove away towards
the gate of the memorial park while he was questioning him after the
shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked his path the
appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.[51]
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not
obtaining. For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be
shown that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and
obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime was
committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the
unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accuseds mind; and that
(3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from
a spirit of lawlessness or revenge.[52] Noel Andres act of shouting at the
36

appellants son, who was then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to
produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed by the accused. Besides,
the appellants son, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a
case wherein the appellants son appeared helpless and oppressed that the
appellant lost his reason and shot at the FX of Noel Andres. The same holds
true for the appellants claim of provocation on the part of Noel
Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the
wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the
crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the
circumstances of the case.[53] The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres
towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it
is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainants vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing
and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful
aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit.This mitigating circumstance is
obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed
by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The
intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is
manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the
injury sustained by the victim.[54] The appellants use of a gun, although not
deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably
placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The
use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, the appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as
minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries
committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is
hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a
single act constitutes two or more grave and less grave felonies or when an
offense is a necessary means of committing another; in such a case, the
penalty for the most serious offense shall be imposed in its maximum
period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 25 defines grave
felonies as those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
afflictive penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less grave
felonies are those to which the law attaches a penalty which in its
maximum period falls under correctional penalties; and light felonies are
those punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos. Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the appellant
of firing a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two
counts of slight physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the imposition
of penalties for complex crimes, which requires two or more grave and/or
less grave felonies, will not apply.
The pecuniary award granted by the trial court for actual damages was duly
established by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as supported
by the original receipts for hospitalization and other medical expenses
presented in evidence by the prosecution. The award for loss of earning
capacity is likewise sustained for the reason that while Feliber Andres was
pregnant and was unemployed at the time of death, it is not disputed that
she was a registered nurse and had earning capacity. Noel Andres also
testified that he and his wife had plans to go back to Saudi Arabia to work
after Feliber had given birth to their second baby. While there is no
evidence as to Felibers actual income at the time of her death, in view of
her temporary separation from work because of her pregnancy, we do not
consider it reversible error for the trial court to peg her earning capacity to
that of the salary of a government nurse under the salary standardization
law, as a fair estimate or reasonable assessment of her earning capacity at
the time of her death. It would be grossly inequitous to deny her spouse
and her minor children damages for the support that they would have
received, considering clear evidence on record that she did have earning
capacity at the time of her death.
The awards for moral damages for the death of Feliber Andres and for the
injuries sustained by the two children, which under the circumstances are
reasonable, are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The
appellant is hereby found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres
and is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each
count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and
Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto
menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby sustained.
SO ORDERED.
37

vs.
ALBERTO S. ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO
CARTALLA, JR., accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No. 111232H, for Murder, the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet", GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery as
charged in the Information, and there being no mitigating or any
aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 entitled "An
Act to Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes" and Art. 63,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet"
shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C.
CARTALLA, JR., as accessories, having also been established beyond any
reasonable doubt, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.
Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet" is likewise hereby ordered to
pay, unto the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, the following sums:
a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
b. P226,298.36, as actual damages;
c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost by reason of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles death;
d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for the three (3)
children of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, and another P500,000.00 for the widow, Ma.
Odyssa "Suzette" Tecarro-Tuadles, as moral damages;
e. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
G.R. No. 128900
July 14, 2000
f. Costs.
38

In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet", accused
JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR., shall be liable to
pay, jointly and severally, one-third (1/3) of the above-adjudicated sums or
the amount of P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F with
Serial Number BER-041965-Z, including its black magazine and five (5) live
bullets, which are presently under the custody of the Court, be confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the Government and turned over to the Firearms
and Explosives Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO S.
ANTONIO @ "Ambet" from the San Juan Municipal Jail to the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.1
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an
amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly
confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other.
The victim, Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles, a former professional basketball player,
succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the
eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta
pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto "Ambet" S.
Antonio, a one-time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB).
It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially
acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted when
they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC), located
along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities such
as a dining room, music bar and gameroom. Often, the two would meet
with other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the
second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or "pusoy dos",
ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of
thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996.
Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC,
had agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their third night
in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around
midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for
sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play "pusoy dos", a game for
two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only
when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at
around 9:00 oclock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the
loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the
defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged
and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or
cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very
close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the
nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the
testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to
how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the
testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument
was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios winnings. In the middle of a
heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed
Antonios gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed
that he reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for possession of the
gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the
floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the
trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his
only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted the testimony of the
prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have seen the
actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who
were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the scene when Tuadles had
already been shot and was lying on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an
ambulance or check if he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute in
these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security guards,
prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to his home
in Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they proceeded to
the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member of the
San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios residence for several
hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls and summoned his
lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by
SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the two security guards
and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited for the
police investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events
and executed his statement at the police station, a statement which he
would repudiate three (3) days later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the
crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1
Honorio Cartalla, Jr. The Information alleged that:
On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Antonio, armed with a gun,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and
with treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
of Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles, by then and there suddenly, unexpectedly,
39

deliberately and without provocation, shooting Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles on
his forehead, right between the eyes, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death;
The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder,
either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his public
functions and position as a public officer, by harboring or assisting the
accused Antonio, by then and there failing to arrest and surrender
immediately the said accused Antonio to the authorities and by giving false
information which tended to deceive the investigating authorities; and
The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of
murder either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with
abuse of his public functions and position as a public officer, by concealing
or destroying the effects or instruments of the body of the crime, in order to
prevent its discovery, by then and there removing the laser sight of the gun
used in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to take steps to preserve the
evidence at the scene of the crime, and purposely failing to call on the
crime laboratory service of the proper agencies for appropriate action.
Contrary to law.2
Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea of "Not
Guilty." Accused Antonio and SPO4 Nieto both refused to enter a plea, and
the trial court entered a plea of "not guilty" for both of them.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF
APPELLANT ALBERTO "AMBET" ANTONIO.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM ARNULFO "ARNIE" TUADLES IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDED THE COMMISION OF THE IMPUTED ACT, AND IN NOT
APPRECIATING THIS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF P7,200,000.00 AS
COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY REASON OF ARNIE TUADLES DEATH,
DESPITE INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH AWARD.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE MORAL
DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF ARNIE TUADLES.
After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as charged,
imposing on them the appropriate penalties and ordering them to pay to
the heirs of Tuadles various amounts as and for indemnity and damages,
set forth in the dispositive portion quoted above. All three accused filed
separate appeals assailing the trial courts findings and disposition.
VIII
Appellant Antonio assails the trial courts judgment on the following

assigned errors:
Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial courts decision, arguing
that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY

OF JOSE "JIMMY" BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH
HIS INITIAL DECLARATIONS BUT ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED
STATEMENT, AND WHICH TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH SERIOUS
INCONSISTENCIES, INCREDIBILITIES, AND OMISSIONS ON SUBSTANTIAL
MATTERS.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS AN

ACCESSORY
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO "AMBET"

ANTONIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER.3
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED ANTONIO WAS MURDER 4
Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the following
grounds:
40

I
THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN CONVICTING
SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD IS SO REPLETE WITH EVIDENCES
THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM AS SUCH.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT SHOWN
FAIRNESS IN NOT CONSIDERING FULLY THE GOOD FAITH, DILIGENCE AND
HARD WORK EXERTED BY SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE
INVESTIGATED THE CASE ON HAND TILL THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE
SPECIMEN OR PIECES OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME TO THE PNPCLS, CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN
DISREGARDING THE SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE POLICE SERVICE OF
SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. SHOWN WITH DEDICATION AND LOYALTY
THERETO SUSTAINING MORE HIS INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED
HEREIN.5
Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we shall deal
first with the issues raised in his appeal, foremost of which is the credibility
of the prosecutions sole eyewitness, SG Jose Jimmy Bobis. Appellant
Antonio challenges SG Bobis worth and credibility as an eyewitness on two
(2) grounds.
First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan authorities
averred that he did not see the actual shooting since he was still ascending
the stairs leading to the second floor where the crime took place when he
heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second statement taken at the Eastern
Police District (EPD) and in his testimony before the trial court, SG Bobis
negated his earlier statement, this time averring that he had indeed seen
appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind, and with neither warning nor
provocation, aim the gun at the head of Tuadles and shoot the latter
pointblank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis testimony, according to
appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said witness unreliability,
incredibility, and unworthiness. He also points out the contradictions and
inconsistencies between SG Bobis first and second statements and court
testimony.
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis reasons for giving the San
Juan Police investigators false information in his first statement, saying that
nobody threatened SG Bobis if he testified against appellant Antonio. On
the other hand, appellant Antonio suggests that it was Colonel Lucas
Managuelod of the EPD who coerced SG Bobis to change his statement and
testimony so that the murder charge against appellant Antonio would be

strengthened.
There is no question that SG Bobis second statement and court testimony,
on the one hand, contradicted what he previously narrated in his first
statement, on the other hand. The question therefore is: Which is more
credible and of more value to the courts in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused?
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex
parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature,
they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court,
the testimony commands greater weight.6 Moreover, inconsistencies
between the declaration of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in
open court do not necessarily discredit said witness.7 Thus, the trial court
followed precedents in giving more credence to SG Bobis testimony given
in open court despite his having executed an earlier statement which was
inconsistent with his testimony.
Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG Bobis
explained the reasons why he was moved to give false information in his
first statement. He had testified that moments after he saw appellant
Antonio shoot Tuadles, the appellant warned him: "Ikaw, wag kang
tumistigo, ha."8 Later, he and the other security guard, SG Olac, were
allegedly coerced to go to the appellants house in Quezon City. He also
testified that while they were there, appellant Antonio and his lawyer
instructed him (Bobis), should the police investigator ask him who shot
Tuadles, to say that what happened was only an accident.9
At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis to say
that they were both outside the club when the trouble started, saying:
"kailangan ipalabas natin na nasa labas tayo ng club."10 Bobis stated that
he was confused and afraid, and, therefore, told the police investigator,
appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2, 1996, that he did not see appellant
Antonio shoot Tuadles because he was still ascending the stairs when the
gun went off.
Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions at that
time, but also remorse and confusion. As found by the trial court:
He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of
conduct of private security guards when he did not make a formal report to
his superior about the shooting incident of November 2, 1996 at the Club
but countered that this was because accused Antonio had taken him to the
latters house. This being so, neither was he able to put said accused
Antonio under arrest.
Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active
service who was with them at the time and who should have done so, had
41

also failed to arrest accused Antonio, more so with him and SG Olac who
are just ordinary security guards. ("Dahil po maam, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis na
po ang kasama namin, hindi niya po nagawa na arestuhin si Mr. Ambet
Antonio mas lalo po kami na ordinary guard lang po.")
True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the time.
Nevertheless, because accused Antonio looked: "parang galit pa sila sa
amin" he can not, as in fact he did not, insist that instead of going to the
house of accused Antonio, he will effect the arrest. 11
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and seeing
Tuadles widow crying on television, he gathered enough resolve and
courage to finally tell the truth to the police authorities at the EPD. When
he testified in open court, SG Bobis did not waver in his declaration that he
witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly pull his gun from behind and shoot
Tuadles three (3) feet away.
Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict

with each other, SG Bobis had fully explained to the satisfaction of the
Court. His lowly station in life had been taken advantage of by accused
Antonio and Nieto. These two (2) had thought that they had succeeded in
completely prevailing upon SG Bobis. For did not SG Bobis tell their lies?
Still, the conscience of a good man had won over.
SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and straightforward
answers to the gruelling questions propounded on him and had stuck to his
truth.
The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses
demeanor on the stand. While SG Bobis was steadfast with his words,
accused Antonio and Nieto were evidently recalling from a script. The other
prosecution witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo M. Solano were, like SG Bobis,
untainted in their testimonies.14
Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and
the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in
writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to
him concerning them. (Underscoring ours).
Thus, this Court has uniformly held that:
Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of
a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he
was then given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached.12
We find no reason to discredit the trial courts finding that the reasons
given by SG Bobis sufficiently explained the conflicting declarations he
made in his two (2) sworn statements and in his court testimony. Therefore,
he cannot be impeached as an eyewitness. This Court also recognizes that
the initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal
case and their aversion to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear
of reprisal is not uncommon, and this fact has been judicially declared not
to adversely affect the credibility of witnesses.13
Apart from the issue of SG Bobis having given an earlier contradictory
statement, his direct testimony and answers under cross-examination
appear clear and convincing. We agree with the trial court when it held:
But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible.
Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we respect the

findings of the trial court on the issue of the credibility of SG Bobis as an
eyewitness, especially considering that the trial court was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself and
observed his deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.15
In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule that:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the
trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some
facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. 16
And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that:
It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the
culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the
trial court are entitled to and given the highest degree of respect. 17
Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that:
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate
42

magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness in the light of his
demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified, and is thereby placed in a
more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. 18
There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis was
given full faith and credit. SG Bobis, a mere security guard, realized he was
no match to appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto. The former, a wealthy
businessman, is known as an intimate friend of people in power. Appellant
Antonio admitted in court that he surrendered himself and his gun to Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada, who was his good friend. Hours later, he went to see then
Vice President Joseph Estrada in Tagaytay City so he (Antonio) could tell his
friend, the Vice President, what happened in his own words.19
Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San Juan Police
Force who was close to appellant Antonio. Considering SG Bobis lowly
station in life, as compared to that of the said appellants, it is
understandable that his initial reaction to the shocking events would be one
of intimidation, if not fear. SG Bobis believed then, and no one can fault him
for thinking so, that going against the instructions and dictates of appellant
Antonio and SPO4 Nieto would make life very difficult for him, knowing they
were well-connected to the powers that be. This perceived threat, whether
real or imagined, compelled him to take the easy way out and just repeat
what appellants told him to say.
There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid his
enemies, but he can never run away from himself. SG Bobis may have
momentarily avoided incurring the wrath of the appellants by acceding to
their dictates, but he could not escape the proddings of his conscience. He
realized he had to right a wrong, and this he did with selflessness and at
great risk to himself.
Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part of SG
Bobis except the statement that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the
EPD who told him how to testify. Thus, his positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath without convincing
evidence to the contrary deserve full faith and credence.20
Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid culpability by
claiming that the shooting of Tuadles was caused by mere accident without
his fault or intention of causing it, or that he acted in self-defense.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an accused
admits having killed the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal
liability, he assumes the burden of proof to establish his plea of self-defense
by clear, credible and convincing evidence.21 To successfully interpose selfdefense, appellant Antonio must clearly and convincingly prove: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the person
defending himself must not have provoked the victim into committing the
act of aggression.22
Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the events

that took place, we shall discuss the points raised by appellant Antonio only
for the purpose of determining whether the requisites of self-defense were
attendant as claimed. In his testimony appellant Antonio alleged that
Tuadles committed an act of aggression when he (Tuadles) grabbed the gun
which was on top of a sidetable. Appellant Antonio then concluded that
Tuadles had the sole intention of using the gun against him (Antonio), so he
grappled with Tuadles to prevent the latter from shooting him. His bare
testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does not convince us that Tuadles would,
so to speak, beat him to the draw. The testimony of Bobis shows that
Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant Antonios loud invectives, and it
would be hard to imagine Tuadles as the aggressor under such a situation.
And even if Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could very well have been that
Tuadles intended to keep the gun away from appellant Antonio to prevent
the latter from using it against him considering the state of mind and the
foul mood appellant Antonio was in. This would be a more believable
scenario since even appellant Antonio admitted that he was suffused with
anger, his temper short due to three (3) consecutive sleepless nights.
Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun at him.
There is no evidence, apart from appellant Antonios uncorroborated
testimony, that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him. Hence, there is no
convincing proof that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles.
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual,
sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.23 The burden of proving unlawful
aggression lay on appellant Antonio, but he has not presented
incontrovertible proof that would stand careful scrutiny before any court.
Lacking this requirement, appellant Antonios claim of self-defense cannot
be appreciated. He cannot even claim it as an extenuating circumstance. 24
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke Tuadles, if
indeed the latter had grabbed the gun from the table. Antonio himself
admitted that he was shouting and cursing Tuadles while in a furious rage.
Such a threatening stance could be interpreted as a provocation which
could have prompted Tuadles to get the gun so that appellant Antonio, in
his anger, would not be able to use it against Tuadles. If ever there was
provocation, it was certainly coming from appellant Antonio, not from
Tuadles.
In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of Tuadles was
an accident. He further argues that Tuadles was killed while he, Antonio,
was performing a lawful act with due care, and without fault or intention of
causing it. Having ruled that appellant Antonio failed to prove his claim of
self-defense, (i.e., there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles
and provocation coming from Antonio himself), there is no basis for us to
argue with appellant Antonio that he was performing a lawful act when he
shot Tuadles.25
43

We note that appellant Antonios version of how the shooting took place
leaves much room for conjecture. It is true that there is no fixed dictum on
the reaction of a person under the circumstances of a sudden death he may
have caused. He could react in a variety of ways, some of them even
irrational. However, we respect the trial courts findings. The trial court
upheld the prosecutions version thus sustaining the theory that if Antonio
indeed shot Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected of him
would be to immediately see to it that Tuadles be brought to a hospital or
get medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead, appellant
Antonio left Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend, lying dead on
the floor for several hours. If indeed he and Tuadles both had their hands on
the gun and there was no telling who actually pulled the trigger, we agree
that appellant Antonio should have seen to it that no one else would touch
the gun barehanded to preserve the fingerprints on it. Instead, he gave the
gun to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern for preserving the fingerprints on
the gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio also handed the gun to Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece of evidence that could have
proven his claim of self-defense or accident was unfortunately lost due to
his lack of presence and due care.
Appellant Antonios ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear from the
records. First, he denies that he pulled the trigger because it was Tuadles
who was holding the gun. Then he says that he cannot recall who fired the
gun so it could have very well been either him or Tuadles who did it. Next,
he admits firing the gun, but he did it in self-defense. Only, he could not
indubitably prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles.
Failing there, he again admitted shooting Tuadles, but that it was an
accident. Again, he failed to prove that he was in the process of performing
a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.
When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an accident to
escape criminal liability, he admits having caused the death of the victim.
And when he fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
positiveness of that justifying circumstance, having admitted the killing,
conviction of the accused is inescapable. 26 Appellant Antonio had to rely on
the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence for, even if the latter were weak, his invoking self-defense is
already an open admission of responsibility for the killing. 27 As it was,
appellant Antonios testimony is not only uncorroborated by independent
and competent evidence, but also doubtful by itself28 for being ambivalent
and self-serving.29
Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant Antonio
claims the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this score,
we find merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order that
voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his case. First,
he had not been actually arrested;Second, he surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and Third, his surrender was voluntary. It is of no
moment that appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender to the
authorities, but did so only after the lapse of about six (6) hours. In the case
of People v. Bautista,30 the voluntary surrender of the accused to a police

authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime was considered
attenuating. There is no dispute that appellant Antonio voluntarily
surrendered to the mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested,
hence the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
considered in appellant Antonios favor.31
Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation on the part of Tuadles. To avail of this mitigating circumstance,
it must be shown that the provocation originated from the offended
party.32However, apart from his own testimony, appellant Antonio has not
proven by convincing evidence that he was provoked by Tuadles. He
claimed that Tuadles provoked him when the latter refused or could not pay
his winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a mitigating provocation for appellant
Antonio to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt cannot, and never will, be a reason
to shoot the debtor dead. Besides, appellant Antonio had no other proof
that he won and that the argument arose from Tuadles refusal to pay. His
bare testimony is, at best, self-serving. Accordingly, appellant Antonio is not
entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation.33
There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the case which
the trial court overlooked and disregarded.
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the trial court
when it relied on the testimony of SG Bobis. However, we have carefully
examined said testimony, the records of this petition, and the justifications
of the trial court upon which it based its decision.
There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion "that accused Antonio
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself." 34 It ruled
that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain
the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was a
sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page decision,
typed single space, the trial court devoted only a few sentences to the
issue of treachery.
There was no treachery in this case.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There
must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a
specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a
spur of the moment crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
44

"Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where
accused made no preparation or employed no means, method and form of
execution tending directly and specially to insure the commission of a crime
and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may take." 35
"A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the
aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to
perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself."36
"A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia
where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode
of attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk
to himself, as where the appellant followed the victims when the latter
refused appellant's invitation to have some more alcoholic drinks." 37
"The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of
alevosia if the mode adopted by the accused does not positively tend to
prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment
of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the
defense that might be offered."38
"The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to
attack was arrived at on the spur of the moment." 39
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the means,
methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the
offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the
offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that
such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously adopted
by the offender.40 Such deliberate or conscious choice was held nonexistent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment. 41
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the
killing a murder because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of
this Court.42 Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of
attack has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an
established principle that the quantum of evidence to prove a person's
being guilty of a crime is also required to prove treachery. The same degree
of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion
may also be reached respecting the attendance of treachery, whether as
qualifying or aggravating, in a criminal case.43 There is no such proof in this
case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and Tuadles
spent several hours having fun playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned
ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to appellant Antonio his alleged
winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing
face to face three (3) feet away from each other, a fact attested to by the
defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio even

called out: "Sarge! Sarge! Sarge!" Just before the shooting, Bobis heard
Antonio saying: "Putang ina ka kasi." The argument precluded the presence
of treachery. If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill
Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a Sergeant or any eyewitness for
that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,44 where we held
that there was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal
altercation. More recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
"There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such
as when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was
standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not
have been unforseen."45 (Underscoring Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no
treachery.1wphi1 In People v. Chua,46 we reiterated our consistent view
that:
"While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was
preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that
indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard."
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned
and could have anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the
sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation
between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution
and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed
with treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in
the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which
neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because
treachery requires that the mode of attack must have been thought of by
the offender and must have sprung from an unforeseen occurrence. 47
In People v. Nitcha,48 we held that:
"To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made
some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the
execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not
treacherous." (Underscoring ours)
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull
his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with
treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In
treachery, on the other hand, the means employed is adopted consciously
and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-
45

control, cannot consciously employ a particular means, method or form of
attack in the execution of the crime.49 Thus, the killing of Tuadles by
appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and favorably
considered by the trial court to elevate the killing to murder, was not
proven by convincing evidence50 is advocated by the Solicitor General in
the Appellee's Brief. He agreed with Appellant Antonio's contention on the
matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to agree with
this particular submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles engaged in
"pusoy dos". In the beginning, they were heard laughing and kidding each
other (nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan). Later, the banter turned into
verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient violence.
Hence, Tuadles could have braced himself with the aggression of Antonio.
There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal altercation or
spat between the victim and the assailant such that the victim must have
been forewarned of the impending danger. In this case, Bobis testified that
he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing each other before Antonio raised his
hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The proximate distance of three
feet between Tuadles and Antonio immediately before the fatal shooting
allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity to defend himself. 51
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.
Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that should
be imposed on appellant Antonio should be reduced to reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being one (1)
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty to be imposed
shall be the minimum period ofreclusion temporal, that is, from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty to
be imposed shall be the penalty next lower which is prision mayor in any of
its periods.52 Therefore, appellant Alberto Antonio is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and moral
damages to the heirs of Tuadles, arguing that said award was unsupported
by adequate evidence. In arriving at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as
compensatory damages, the trial court relied completely on the testimony
of the victim's widow, Suzette Tuadles, who stated that at the time of his
death, Tuadles was earning P50,000.00 a month from his construction
business. Applying the formula laid down by this Court in the cases of Villa
Rey Transit v. CA,53 and People v. Quilaton,54the trial court arrived at the
amount of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning

capacity. Appellant Antonio argues that the trial court cannot just rely on
the sole testimony of Suzette Tuadles, otherwise, it would be basing its
computation on mere speculation, conjecture, or guess work.
In People v. Silvestre55 and People v. Verde,56 we held that the absence of
documentary evidence to support the prosecution's claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said
damages. There, we awarded damages for loss of earning capacity
computed on the basis of the testimonies of the victim's wives. This was
reiterated in People v. Dizon,57 where we held that:
"As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. In People vs. Verde (G. R.
No. 119077, February 10, 1999), the non-presentation of documentary
evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity did
not prevent this Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the
victim's wife as to the earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was
then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver,
sufficed to establish the basis for such an award. x x x As in People vs.
Verde, the Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence."
(Underscoring ours)
In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages should
be calculated as follows:
Net earning
capacity (x)
= life expectancy
gross annual income - living

expenses
(50% of gross annual
income)
[P600,000.00 - 300,000.00]
2(80-40)
x
=
3
26.67 x
P300,000.00
= P8,001,000.00
Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss, the Court shall take into account the circumstances
obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its discretion. 58 We
46

agree with appellant Antonio that the trial court's award of moral damages
was excessive. While there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of
what would be a fair amount of moral damages, each case must be
governed by its own peculiar circumstances.59 And though moral damages
are incapable of pecuniary estimation to compensate the claimants for
actual injury, they are not designed to enrich the complainants at the
expense of the accused.60
Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole support of his
family and they will also be deprived of his love and companionship. No
amount of money could ever compensate for their loss. While the award of
moral damages may help ease the emotional and psychological trauma
that they continue to suffer, this Court has not granted so large an amount
as moral damages. Accordingly, we find that the amount of P3,000,000.00
granted by the trial court in this case is excessive, and the same is
therefore reduced to P500,000.00. Moreover, there being no aggravating
circumstances attendant in this case, the award of exemplary damages
should also be deleted.61
We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito M. Nieto. He
argues that the trial court erred in convicting him as an accessory. The trial
court's grounds for finding him guilty are: (1) he failed to arrest appellant
Antonio; and (2) he gave false information tending to deceive the
investigating authorities.62
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has
knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its
commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its
commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying
the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to
prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. 63
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two
(2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors,
conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must
have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by
the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant SPO4
Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his public function when he
failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and to conduct a
speedy investigation of the crime committed.
The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's culpability is
concerned, shows that in the middle of the argument between appellant
Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by shouting, "Sarge!
Sarge!" Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the latter went upstairs.
Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot Tuadles, and then ordered

Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the table, which Nieto did.
Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told guards Bobis and
Ernesto Olac to go with them, and they all boarded Antonio's Mercedes
Benz van, including Nieto. They arrived at Antonio's residence in
Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning. There,
they had coffee while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon after, a
certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked to the two security guards, while
Nieto was present. Nieto then told Bobis that in his statement, he should
say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis and Nieto, were seated outside the
entrance of the Club when the incident took place. At 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited outside
until members of the San Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada
and Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. After the
police investigated the scene, they proceeded to the police station. There,
Nieto reiterated his instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were
outside the club. While Bobis gave his statement to the police, Nieto
remained in front of him and dictated to him what he should answer to the
questions of the police investigator.64
The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant
Nieto's actuations immediately after the commission of the crime
demonstrate his liability as an accessory. Being a police officer in the active
service, he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the latter
committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself witnessed.
Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to do. Instead,
he rode with the offender to the latter's house where they stayed for more
than five (5) hours. In the early case of U. S. v. Yacat, et al., it was held:65
It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local president
of the town of Cabiao at the time the crime was committed, has incurred
criminal liability. Abusing his public office, he refused to prosecute the
crime of homicide and those guilty thereof, and thus made it possible for
them to escape, as the defendant Pedro Lising did in fact. This fact is
sufficiently demonstrated in the records, and he has been unable to explain
his conduct in refusing to make an investigation of this serious occurrence,
of which complaint was made to him, and consequently he should suffer a
penalty two degrees inferior to that designated by paragraph 2 of article
405 of the Code, by virtue of article 68 thereof.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before the
shooting, appellant Antonio called him and he immediately went upstairs.
He saw that appellant shot Tuadles. Despite this knowledge, he failed to
arrest appellant and, instead, left the crime scene together with the latter.
To this extent, he assisted appellant Antonio in his escape.66
Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto provided
false information to deceive the investigating authorities. He instructed
Bobis to answer falsely to the questions of the investigating officer, in order
47

to make it appear that there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and thus
make it more difficult for the police to solve the crime.
Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as an
accessory to the crime, and he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
prescribed by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we impose on
appellant Nieto the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years ofprison correccional, as maximum.
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s appeal. After
carefully reviewing the facts and issues raised therein, we find that the trial
court erred in finding said appellant guilty as an accessory.
Continue.
A The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said that this
policeman is very hardworking, even the investigation is not with him
anymore, but still, he's working and I answered him, whatever, whatever
they will charge to me, maybe it's just their job and so, I will also do my job.
Because as far as I know, I will not be implicated because I have not done
anything, I have not done the charges that they filed against me, I was
surprised when I was given a confirmation that I was an accessory that is
why my youngest child even told me "kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?" and I told
him that it's not true. For me, I have not done anything like that.
Atty. Fernandez
The trial court's sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. was
his failure to produce the laser sight of the gun as evidence during the trial.
However, such omission does not amount to concealing or destroying the
body of the crime or effects or instruments thereof to prevent its discovery.
The laser sight had been surrendered to the police authorities so there was
no more need for discovery. Its loss thereafter does not make appellant
SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At most, as custodian thereof, he may be
made answerable administratively.
In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional. He further
stated:
Q Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against you as
alleged in the information that you tried to conceal or destroy the effects or
body of the crime to prevent its discovery?
A It's not true, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on the
body of the crime and as far as I know, I did all my job as investigator and I
worked for it up to the wee hours of the morning up to the next morning, I
still did it and I gathered evidence and I submitted it to the Crime
Laboratory and even when at the time, I have been hearing that I will not
be the one who will investigate, they got it from me without proper notice,
that they will take over the investigation, I still did my job, and on the fifth, I
was asked by Prosecutor Llorente to retrieve the slug and what I did was
even the investigation is not with me, I still did it, I still went to the IBC and
I still worked hard, I even remember
Atty. Flaminiano
We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this moment.
COURT
That's all for the witness, your Honor.

COURT
The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory because
according to one of the witnesses, the gun together with the laser sight was
handled to you and when that gun reached Crame, the laser sight was no
longer there, answer me, what happened?
A The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by Inspector
Cabrera, the laser sight was there, I immediately made the transmittal for
the laboratory and I described what is there, together with the laser and
after that, I placed it in a brown envelope, I placed it in my drawer. On the
second day, I was really busy on that day because I was the only one. I was
asking for assistance because I would go out, I will investigate and then I
just found out when I was about to submit the laser to the laboratory, I
gave the envelope together with the transmittal and when it was being
received, he checked it and he said "Sgt. Where is the laser sight?" and I
said "it's there, attached." And he said "please look at it."
COURT
Who told you that?
A The person who received, your Honor.
COURT
But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser?
A Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I was
planning to go back right away but I just said, "okay, I will just cross it" out
and I did not erase because I want that I will not hide anything. It has
happened because maybe somebody is interested or I might have left in
my drawer. Because I will not hide it. That's why I did not sno-pake it and I
48

just crossed it out so it can be read together with my initial and when I
came back, I asked them who touched my things.
COURT
What answer did you get?
A There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was talking. 67
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did not
intentionally conceal or destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution failed
to prove that he did so with intent to derail the prosecution of the principal
accused. On the other hand, while the laser sight was an accessory device
attached to the gun, it was not essential to the commission, investigation
and prosecution of the crime. The gun itself, which was the instrument of
the crime, was surrendered to the authorities and presented as evidence in
court. The failure of appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. to present the laser sight as
part of the evidence did not in any way affect the outcome of the trial,
much less prevent the discovery of the crime. Furthermore, there is no
showing that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. profited by the non-presentation of
the laser sight.
Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised Penal Code
and jurisprudence, appellant Cartalla, Jr.'s omission does not make him
liable as an accessory to the crime committed by appellant Antonio. Even
the Solicitor General submits that there are no grounds to convict appellant
Cartalla, to wit:
At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or
its corpus delicti had been discovered. Hence, the loss of the laser sight
could not have prevented the discovery of the crime. The essential
instrument of the crime, namely, a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model 92F with
serial number BER-041965-7 and black magazine had been preserved and
presented as evidence.
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as

maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is likewise found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime of HOMICIDE,
and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnulfo
B. Tuadles the following sums:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;
(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(5) Costs.
For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime, he is ACQUITTED and
absolved of all liability, both criminal or civil.
In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ "Ambet", appellant
Juanito Nieto y Nemer shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the aboveadjudicated sums or the amount of P4,388,649.18 unto the said heirs of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation of

the laser sight as this was not proved by the prosecution. Either way,
concealing or profiting, there is no convicting motive for Cartalla to have so
committed. More so, as Cartalla was the investigating officer on the case.
It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not
make him an accessory to the crime committed by Antonio, although he
may be administratively liable for the loss of a part of the evidence for the
prosecution in this case.68
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in
Criminal Case No. 111232-H is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Alberto
"Ambet" Antonio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to
49

head, thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly caused the death of
the said Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607
reads:
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995

vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino
and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the
killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the
shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When
Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the
Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to
MURDER. 1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent
to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and
shoot with the said handgun Roland John Chapman who war hit in the
chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of
said Roland John Chapman.
Contrary to law. 2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with
intent to kill and evident premeditation, and by means of treachery, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head,
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the
death of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent
of his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his death.
Contrary to law. 4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against
accused, bail was set at twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail
was recommended for the murder of Roland John Chapman. A petition for
bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his
arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution
manifested that it would present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify
on the killing of Chapman and on the circumstances resulting to the
wounding of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending that day
was hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder
charge for the killing of Chapman only. He opined that Leino's testimony on
the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of Leino and
Hultman would be irrelevant. 5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be
wasted if the testimony of Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman
considering that the crimes for which accused were charged involved only
one continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be allowed to testify
on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the inconvenience of recalling
him later to prove the two (2) frustrated murder charges. 6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution
wanted to present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait
until after the arraignment of accused on August 14, 1991. The defense
pointed out that if accused did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution
50

would still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it
could present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail
until after arraignment of accused on the condition that there shall be trial
on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. The
defense counsel acceded. 8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The
prosecution then started to adduce evidence relative to all three (3) cases.
No objection was made by the defense. 9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino
invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at
his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m. and
ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where
students of International School hang out. 10 After an hour, they transferred
to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of
July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of Maureen,
then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla
Street, Dasmarias Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they
entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street,
about a block away from her house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to
walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too much noise in
going back to her house. She did not want her parents to know that she
was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman
stayed in the car and listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street.
When they reached the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a lightcolored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the
road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: "Who
are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused only wanted to check
their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his plastic wallet, and
handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. 14 Accused did
not bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed
it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind
Leino and inquired what was going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk
and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?" Accused pushed
Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman
felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you
shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside
Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: "Do
you want a trouble?" Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The
shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she
became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted:
"Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen,
warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the
sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood
2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could not run far without being shot
by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to
the side of accused's car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen
circled around accused's car, trying to put some distance between them.
The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught
Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside
Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and
directly in front of them stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned
his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit
on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him.
He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his
car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three
(3) people looking on and standing outside their houses along Caballero
Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a private security guard
hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357 Caballero Street,
Dasmarias Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of
Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany
Street, Dasmarias Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private security
guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero
Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of
their employer, while driver Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to
return to his own house. These three (3) eyewitnesses heard the first
gunshot while at their respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see
what was happening, while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence
of their employer's house and looked out to Caballero Street. Each saw a
man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino) sitting on the
sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and a woman
(Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot Leino and Hultman and flee aboard
his Lancer car. However, because of Florece's distance from the scene of
the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the
51

control numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the gateway car
as a box-type Lancer, its color somewhat white ("medyo
maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the getaway car
and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver metallic
gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face. They had a
good look at him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters away from the
gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20) meters away from
the scene of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the corner of Caballero
and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took place was adequately
illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house
and went near the scene of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece
along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by and Mangubat requested
him to report the shooting incident to the security officers of Dasmarias
Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and narrated to his
employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime
scene while Florece noted the incident in his logbook (Exhibit "B"). He also
jotted down the license plate control number of the gunman's car as 566. 31
The security guards of Dasmarias Village came after a few minutes. They
rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES
BALDADO of the Makati police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ,
investigated the incident. 33 Their initial investigation disclosed that the
gunman's car was a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number
566. They checked the list of vehicles registered with the village
Homeowners' Association and were able to track down two (2) Lancer cars
bearing plate control number 566. One was registered in the name of JOSE
MONTAO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmarias Village, with plate number
PKX 566, and another was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of
1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI,
was also tasked by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to
investigate the shooting. Ranin's team immediately proceeded to the house
of Jose Montao 35 where they found ahead of them the Makati police and
operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to verify from
Mrs. Montao whether the white Lancer car registered in the name of Mr.
Montao and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's car. Mrs.
Montao denied and declared they had already sold the car to Saldaa
Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben Conti, a
comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon City. Mrs.
Montao called up her husband and informed him about the investigation.
She also called up Conti and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36
Jose Montao came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car.
Ranin brought them to the NBI office for investigation, together with Lancer
car. At the NBI Ranin inquired from Montao the whereabouts of his car on
July 12 and 13, 1991. Montao informed him that the car was at the
residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao,
Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991,
Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaa Enterprises. Conti confirmed
this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2) NBI
agents who made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request,
Montao left his car at the NBI parking lot pending identification by possible
witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot
investigation and neighborhood inquiry of the shooting incident. They
interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their office the
next day for further investigation. 38 They also interviewed Agripino
Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and even denied
having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they returned to
Cadenas' post at Dasmarias Village that night and served him a subpoena,
inviting him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the next day. 39 The
NBI agents also talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing
at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, near the scene of the crime.
Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car was not white but light
gray. A foreign national, Asliami was afraid and refused to give a statement
about the incident. The agents exerted every effort to convince Asliami to
cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked a
representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate. They
failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as
summoned. Florece readily executed a sworn statement. 41 Cadenas,
however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his knowledge of the
incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI agents
informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding information
from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas confided to Ranin
his fear to get involved in the case. He was apprehensive that the gunman
would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI
protection, Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He
described the gunman's car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW
566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where Montao's white Lancer
car was parked to identify the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if
Montao's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its color was
different. Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the parking lot and
to point the color that most resembled the color of the gunman's car. He
pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he
pointed to was not white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied
in the affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to his office and showed him ten (10)
pictures of different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-10) taken from the NBI
files. One of the pictures belonged to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
52

Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture (Exhibit "CC-7"),
and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote his name and the date at
the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the NBI then took down
Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court
to apply for a search warrant. After a searching examination of the
witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search warrant (Exhibit "RR"),
authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray, 1983
Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number PDW 566.
Ranin and his agents drove to accused's house at #1339 Caballero Street,
Dasmarias Village, to implement the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of
accused, of their search warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they
had orders from Director Lim to invite accused to the NBI office for
investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the
house at that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and called up
someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and
secured accused's car. After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin
asked her for the car keys but she told him that the keys were with
accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with accused
on the phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to the NBI for
investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he would report to the NBI later
that day. The agents then towed the car of accused to the NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI
office and waited for accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3) Makati
policemen, after an hour. He informed them that he just came from the
Makati police station where he was also investigated. He told Lim that he
was given a statement to the Makati police and was brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for paraffin test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts
of his Lancer car at the time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car
was involved in an accident a few weeks back and was no longer
functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's house at Dasmarias
Village since then. Due to the lateness of the evening, the group decided to
continue the investigation the following day. 49
gunman from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to accused.

merely stared at Cadenas. 53
52
Accused
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2)
other agents brought accused to Forbes Park for further identification by
the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just been discharged from the
hospital the day before. Since Leino's parents were worried about his
safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the gunman
in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house
and escorted him and his father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along
Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino was brought out of the
house and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was parked
about five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car with Leino was
his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was instructed
to look at the men who would be coming out of the house and identify the
gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the
unoccupied house, into the street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of
them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak at that time
due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of
paper a request for one of the men in the lineup to remove his sunglasses.
Leino handed this written request to his father. The men in the lineup were
herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes, they again
stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino
identified accused as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred
the cases of murder and double frustrated murder against accused to the
Department of Justice for appropriate action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis
Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was
concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat.
Baldado went to see security guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the
residence of his employer in Dasmarias Village. Baldado interviewed
Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police station where his statement
(Exhibit "D") was taken. 58
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim
pressed accused on what really happened at Dasmarias Village. Accused
said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused that he would be
confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into silence. 50
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched
Mangubat from his house and brought him to the Makati police station. At
the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would be coming and
see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the
stairs at the second floor of the station. 59
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested
to join the lineup composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas
was called from an adjoining room 51 and Ranin asked him to identify the
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He
ascended the stairs, passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's
office at the second floor. While accused was going up the stairs, Pat.
53

Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat
initially declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to see the man
again to be sure. He also confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and
afraid for accused was accompanied by a police Major. When accused came
out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if
accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in
response. 60 Accused, together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded
a Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post at
Dasmarias Village by other Makati
policemen. 61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house
and asked him again if accused was really the gunman. Once more,
Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat that he
would no longer ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado) earlier
prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI
agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat if he could recognize the gunman.
Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown twelve (12) pictures
(Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different men and was asked to identify the gun
gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that of accused,
and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat's statement was taken. He
was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a personal
identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the
presence of the media. At that time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and
Malvar, were at the office of then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco protesting
to the submission of accused to identification. They pointed out that since
the cases against accused had already been filed in court and they have
secured a court order for the transfer of accused to the Makati municipal
jail, any identification of accused should be made in the courtroom. Asst.
Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their ongoing investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but
requested that identification be made without the presence of the media.
Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused is not identified n
the lineup, the media coverage would favor accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at
Lim's office and remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG
office the men composing the lineup and he asked them to go near
accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed to
accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its
investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter, located
at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial line, directed backwards and
downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and central and lateral incisors,
both sides, to the buccal cavity then lacerating the tongue with fragments
of the bullet lodged in the right palatine, tongue and tonsillar region.
SKULL
CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign body
(bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar border on the right. No
remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the right
palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with associated soft tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx
67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino.
After entering Leino's head, it fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth.
Some of the bullet fragments pierced his palette and tongue. Brain
scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on the
covering of the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence of the
gunshot wound because of the fractured upper jaw and the loss of the front
teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper portion of his tongue.
Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him difficulty in
speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman.
He opined that the muzzle of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must
have been at a higher level than the victim's head. He concluded that the
gun must have been pointed above Leino's head considering the acuteness
and downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
54

Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center,
operated on MAUREEN HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw
Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was bloodied all over. Maureen
had a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above the eyebrow. Brain
tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the left side of the forehead
where the bullet entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She
was also given a CT scan. The examination revealed that she suffered
injuries on the skull and brain. There were several splintered bullets in her
brain and the major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged
beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a
team who operated on her brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head,
remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the splintered bullets
embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain
and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed
undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After the surgery, Maureen's vital
signs continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was
wheeled to the ICU for further observation.
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of
Maureen's nostrils due to the unpatched undersurface covering of her
brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A second surgery
was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain covering. He used
the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering of
the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious. The trickle of brain
tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen developed infection as
a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen developed brain
abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to
remove brain abscess and all possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis
explained that Maureen was shot at the left side of the forehead. The bullet
entry was at 1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon entering the forehead, the
bullet fragmented into pieces and went from the left to the right side of the
temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet eventually settled
behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital
parts of the body, the brain. When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they
discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet hit her head, it caused
hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the second covering
of the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling
underneath the forehead brought about by edema in the area. Scanning
also showed that Maureen's right jaw was affected by the fragmented
bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the

internal bleeding and remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments
and dead tissues. The main bullet was recovered behind Maureen's right
jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of the bullet. Hence, it
was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen
survived, she would have led a vegetating life and she would have needed
assistance in the execution of normal and ordinary routines. 78 She would
have been completely blind on the left eye and there was possibility she
would have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses would have
been modified and the same would have affected her motor functions.
There was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of
confinement in the hospital, she ceased to be a breathing soul on October
17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused claimed that on said date and time, he was not anywhere near the
scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then in his house at #53 San
Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991
and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning. Accused
avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his presence in his house that
fateful day. 80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the
Dasmarias shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. He
denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas and Vicente
Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi
Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car
ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in an accident
in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the shooting, his Lancer
car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in Dasmarias
Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused, however, conceded
that although the car was not in good running condition, it could still be
used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at
around 5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and
Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about the ownership of the Lancer car
parked in his mother's house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati
police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted himself to a paraffin
test. He was accompanied by the Makati police to the Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame and was tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. 83 After the
test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany him to the NBI for he
had earlier committed to his mother that he would present himself to
Director Lim. 84
55

He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished
Lim with the statement he earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim
detained him at the NBI against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the
Manila Hotel for breakfast. When they returned to the NBI, he was asked to
proceed to Lim's office. On his way, he saw a lineup formed inside Lim's
office. The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and placed him in the
number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to identify him
was already in the room. As soon as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas
identified him as the gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes
Park. The NBI agents brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi
Leino who allegedly identified him as the gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated
at the office of Ranin for he refused to join another lineup. Despite his
protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the identification and
ordered a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was
identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was not
assisted by counsel at any stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May 1989 to February 1991, he
had been using his father's Lancer car bearing plate number PDW 566 in
going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a
bicycle driver and two (2) trucks parked at the side of the road. The
accident resulted in the death of the bicycle driver and damage to his
father's car, 90 especially on its body. The timing of the engine became a
little off and the car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at Reliable
Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon city. After a month, he brought the
car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmarias
Village, Makati. He personally started the car's engine and drove it to
Makati from the shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to their house
in Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs and they preferred to
have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed that from
that time on, he was prohibited by his father from using the car because of
his careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and since he was busy in
school, no further repair on said car had been made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders
Hultman, adoptive father of deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He
capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may have been an
overprotective father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness
allegedly overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy.
Huwag, Daddy." The defense presented Anders Hultman as a hostile
witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian

Hultman were married in the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2)
children by her previous marriage, one of whom was Maureen. He legally
adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3)
children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the
initial stage of the investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading
to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." Anders explained that
Maureen could not have uttered those words for Maureen never spoke
Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but
instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first
salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate with friends. At the time
of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up at
around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their
house and informed them about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to
accused at the Makati municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on
accused in jail and discovered that accused was not in his cell. The jail
guards even covered up accused's whereabouts. His complaint was
investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention, headed
by Congressman Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F.
BALDADO and SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned
from Mr. Jose Montao that he sold his white Lancer car, with plate number
PKX 566, to Saldaa Lending Investors in February 1991. This car was
assigned to Ben Conti, Operations Manager of said company and was in the
residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other witnesses he
interviewed confirmed that Montao's white Lancer car was not in the
vicinity of Montao's residence at the time of the incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente
Mangubat. Mangubat saw the gunman and the get-away car but could not
give the central letters of the car's license plate. Fernandez went to one of
the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked the
maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call, the maid told
him that he saw the gunman and heard one of the victims say: "Daddy,
don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get the maid's name but the
latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court nor asked the
court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement of the
maid included in the Progress Report (Exhibit "13") prepared by the Makati
police investigators. 97
56

SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and
Baldado fetched the latter at Dasmarias Village for identification of the
gunman at the Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby.
After a few minutes, accused and company arrived. When accused passed
by them, they instructed Mangubat to look around and see if he could
identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused. Mangubat told
Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece
(Exhibit "MM"). It was signed by Florece in his presence. In said statement,
Florece described the gunman's car as "medyo puti" (somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified
on the paraffin test she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands of
accused. 100 As per Chemistry Report No. C 274-91, 101 the test yielded a
negative result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report,
she noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test more than seventytwo (72) hours after the shooting incident. She explained that 72 hours is
the reasonable period within which nitrate residues may not be removed by
ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person who has fired
a gun.102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the
stand for the defense. He testified that in the course of handling the cases,
he was able to confer with Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at the Security
agency where Cadenas was employed. Ponferrada informed him that
Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the NBI and was
compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to testify.
Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did not compel the attendance
of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the
irregularities committed in the off-court identification of their client. When
asked what he did to remedy this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he
objected to the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he
filed a petition for review raising this issue with the Department of Justice
upon the filing of the cases therewith, he said he did not. He offered the
excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused at
that time. He also declared that although they knew that arraignment
would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the
investigation and preliminary investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed
accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the
progress in the investigation of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper
reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin
Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza of
Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's Journal and Elena
Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of defense evidence consists of

newspaper clippings and the testimonies of the news reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two
(2) news reports as having been partly written by him. One was a news
item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS"
(Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Manila
Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is usually the product of
collaborative work among several reporters. They follow the practice of
pooling news reports where several reporters are tasked to cover one
subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different reports they file
and summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in
evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the
investigation of the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25,
and three members of a family Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters,
Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.
Exhibit "1-B"
Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when
Hultman, a 10th grader at the International School in Makati was escorted
home by Chapman after going to a disco.
Exhibit "1-C"
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman.
Exhibit "l-D"
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried to
escape.
Exhibit "1-E"
Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive"
matter that might involve influential people. 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of
the news items marked as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them from
57

previous news reports of other newspapers. He admitted that the only
portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director
Velasco was Exhibit "I-E."
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a"

and "3-c". He just reiterated previous reports in other newspapers. They
were based on speculations.
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the
Manila Times, entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN
SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit "2." Certain portions thereof, which
were not written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense and offered in
evidence, viz:
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON
HELD FOR DASMA SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when the
witness showed up and said that the gunman was on board a silver-metallic
Lancer.
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital

region, claims, however, that another security guard, Vic Mangubat, had
testified before the police that another man, not Teehankee, had fired at
Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on
Teehankee's hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory
indicated that he may not have fired the gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2)
newspaper clippings which were partly written by him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, was entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit
"3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3", thus:
Exhibit "4-B"
Exhibit "4-C"
The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car
and was talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several
times. 110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination,
Marfil admitted that the news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were
written based on information available at that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled:
"TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July
18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She testified that she wrote a portion thereof,
marked as Exhibit "5-c", and the sources of her information were several
Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c" reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee was
arrested at his house.
Exhibit "3-a"
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called "Daddy"
shortly before Chapman's shooting.
Exhibit "3-b"
But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a
dancer before she was adopted by her foster parent.
Exhibit "3-c"
Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street inside
the village after the shooting and was believed to have proceeded toward
Forbes Park using the Palm street gate.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control
number 566 who had not been questioned, voluntarily went to police
headquarters upon invitation of Makati police chief Superintendent Remy
Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted
effort of the investigators to implicate accused as the lone gunman; (b) that
there were other suspects aside from accused and that someone whom
Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c) that the initial
police investigation showed that the gunman's car was a white Lancer with
plate no. 566; and, (d) that after the NBI took over the investigation, the
white Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray Lancer of accused
and thereafter, he became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions
she wrote in the news item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared
58

on the October 24, 1991 issue of People's Journal (Exhibit "6"). She
identified the source of her information as Mr. Anders Hultman himself.
114
portion of said article (Exhibit "7-c") and the source of his information was
Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "7-c"
Exhibit "6-a"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate
number "566." The witnesses cannot tell the plate's control letters. 121
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman
said the day after his 17-year old daughter was cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991
issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND
WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The portions of said news item
which he wrote were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman

family's request for permission to visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of
their choice."
Exhibit "8-a"
Exhibit "6-c"
At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked

not to be identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has
taken over the case from the CIS.
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the
curtain," Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take the curtain down
and jail authorities will pull him out." 116
Exhibit "8-c"
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item
marked as Exhibit "6". Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was
quoted as telling Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-Hultman,
Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to a secret but very
influential multi-sectoral group monitoring graft and corruption and other
crimes in high levels of government and society. 118
He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described as
"resembling Teehankee but looks much younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as
Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the early morning of July 13.
The witness, however, failed to identify Teehankee as the gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP
CHAPMAN SLAY CASE", which appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire news
account, 124 portions of which were marked by the defense in evidence,
thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given
to him by BIR insiders for the latter refused to be identified. 119
The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise witness"
picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind
and consuming personal rage and bias of Anders Hultman against accused;
and (b) the unwarranted pressure, prejudice and prejudgment by some
congressional leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to
interview Mangubat himself. 125
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified the

news account which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer,
entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a
Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si Bobby
(Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla
Exhibit "9-b"
59

niyang ituturo, said a red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did not
want to be identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article,
entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the July 14,
1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof
were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's Mercedez Benz with a
diplomat's plate number when a white Lancer with plate number PKX-566
blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a
communications specialist. He said the shooting could be the result of an
altercation on the street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news
account he wrote which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin,
entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news
item were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of
Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmarias Village at past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who
was killed in front of his friends on his way home from a party. The armed
men, on board a white Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's
Mercedes Benz car inside the village before the shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered Chapman
to alight from the car. They shot Chapman several times in the body, while
his companions identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olanileino, were
seriously wounded when the gunmen sprayed the car with bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later the
names of the detained suspects after their initial investigation. 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit
"23"), which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was
introduced by the defense in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's car
on Mahogany St. in the subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two
companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn, to get out of
their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate
No. PDW 566. They added that they saw the same car in the garage of the
Teehankee family. 129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a) stories
was the NBI and they were based on information available to the NBI at
that time 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its
rebuttal witness. Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify accused
when he saw the latter at the Makati police station. Her reiterated that the
next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went to his place of work in
Dasmarias Village and asked him if he was sure about the identity of the
gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. Baldado then said him he would
no longer require him to sign the statement he prepared for him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI,
was also presented as a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified that
extensive washing of hands or excessive perspiration can eliminate
gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands. Continued washing
with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate residue
embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the hand can register
the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a
suspect within 72 hours from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during
which time, any possible trace of nitrate may still be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of
the paraffin test. She related that she once attended a training in Baguio
City where they tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin test. In said training,
two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his hands.
They then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using diphylamine
reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she opined, the result of a
paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative evidence and
evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
60

The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for
the presentation by the defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a day
before the scheduled hearing, the defense filed a Constancia 135manifesting
that it shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the same being
unneccesary. The defense, however, declared that this is without prejudice
to the presentation of its evidence in the trial proper should the same be
necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear.
The prosecution moved in open court that the main cases and the petition
for bail be submitted for decision in view of the absence of defense
counsels who had manifested that they would no longer present their surrebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties were given ten
(10) days from receipt of the Order within which to submit their
simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the defense
objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a
motion asking for additional time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time,
both parties submitted their respective Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes charged. 138The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the fatal shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing
said accused to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion perpetua, and to pay the
heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00),
Philippine Currency, plus moderate or temperate and exemplary damages
in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine
Currency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the fatal shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three
Centavos (P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages;
Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of
earning capacity of the said deceased; and One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages;
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision

mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay the said offended party the sum of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One Hundred
Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum equivalent
in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of earning
capacity of said offended party; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
(4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all the offended
parties the sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency,
as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr.
He filed a Motion for New Trial, 139alleging for the first time that the trial
court erred in considering as submitted for decision not only the petition for
bail but also the case on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to
adduce further evidence was violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal.
140
He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS THE
ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS
MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE
THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF CHAPMAN
AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY
TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF THREE
MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
61

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS
AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE
ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3)
eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. He vigorously
assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone
surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in
Forbes Park was highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers
before he identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino
to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch
must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter
assumed jurisdiction over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The
shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could
not have been fixed only on the gunman's face. His senses were also dulled
by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by
the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness
identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the
success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is
significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of
identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some
authors even describe eyewitness evidence as "inherently suspect." 141 The
causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a
crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event
actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event.
Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately.
Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these
three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve
information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and

suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied) 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with
the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up
for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates
the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts
have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of
and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length
of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged
irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor
was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's identification
of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that
this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. 144 The
need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from
his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to
the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to
have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and
with high security risk. 145 Leino's fear for his safety was not irrational. He
and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive,
supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief
of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is
no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by
witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in
hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the
victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and
TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the
records show that on July 15, 1991, while Leino was still in the hospital, he
was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the investigators. He
identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures. He, however,
categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not
seen any picture of appellant or read any report relative to the shooting
incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot
identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court
identification by Leino.
62

We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by
Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post.
Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident
happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify
against appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was
unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels. He
never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked how sure he
was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied:
"I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody else." 148
security force and the Makati police conducted an on-the-spot investigation

on the day of the incident, neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in
the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed Cadenas and
asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied: "Nakita ko pero patay na."
He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he supposedly
witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He
went to the NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991,
that he gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada,
his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to

reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his
hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino's extensive
injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he
identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak.
He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. 149 There is also no
rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness
whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by
appellant on the case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is
misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not solely on the basis of
delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the finding that the
prosecution evidence was, at best, circumstancial and "suspiciosly short in
important details," there being no investigation whatsoever conducted by
the police.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to

the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the
trial. He related that he feared for his and his family's safety. His fear was
not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated
by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential family. It was
only after consistent prodding and assurance of protection from NBI officials
that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities. 153 The Court has taken
judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the
solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of
these all too real risks, the court has not considered the initial reluctance of
fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an
indicium of credibility. 154 It will not depart from this ruling.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch
prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. There is
nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS
to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is not
evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for
Leino to have remembered appellant's face when the incident happened
within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short time for
Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows that
precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their
eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a
high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. 151 We have ruled that the
natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant
create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for
Leino to impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims and appellant
were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino
identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that
Cadenas did not witness the crime. He stresses that when the Dasmarias
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out
by the records. Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain
Ponferrada, information about his torture. The allegation is an out and out
hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand. Cadenas
himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of torture is also
belied by the fact that Cadenas' entire family was allowed to stay with him
at the NBI headquarters and likewise extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing
the testimony of defense witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police.
Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as the
gunman the first time he was brought to the Makati police station.
Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he positively
identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati police station. He averred
that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to his place
of work in Dasmarias and asked him again whether appellant was the
gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said
he would no longer ask him to sign a statement (Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier
prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously prepared by Baldado,
Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom he saw at the
Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give more weight to the
testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to suspect that
Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to Pat.
Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati
police, including some of its jail officials, gave appellant favored treatment
while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a
congressional investigation.
63

II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial
court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement
in previous shooting incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that
evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing
at another time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to
compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the
bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution
eyewitnesses described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court found
it to be silver mettalic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been the
gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that he
overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please,
don't shoot me and don't kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also
contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime told Makati
police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: "Daddy don't shoot.
Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmarias Village to the
NBI office which proved that the same was not in good running condition.
Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was
negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since
one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having
overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE
MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a white Lancer
car, also bearing license plate number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge
violated the rule on res inter alios actawhen he considered his involvement
in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule
known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's error
as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice
and therefore, almost automatically required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer
rule has long been laid to rest for even English appellate courts now
disregard an error in the admission of evidence "unless in its opinion, some
substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been
occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this approach especially after the
enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate
court to "give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the
court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 160 We have likewise
followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence
improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging quality and its
impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of

the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not
the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in
convicting appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was convicted mainly
because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun
with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however,
cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the
evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not
in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI
towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it was parked to the NBI
office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said
car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was
then in the possession of appellant. Clearly, the car was towed not because
it was not in running condition. Even appellant's evidence show that said
car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove
it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarias Village, in
Makati, where it was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses'
description of the color of the gunman's car. Leino described the car as
light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white ("medyo
puti"); 163Mangubat declared the car was white; 164 and Cadenas testified it
was silver metallic gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no more
than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to
colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the
speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the
break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do
not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the
adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration.
Appellant cites a newspaper item 166 where Maureen was allegedly
overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The
evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not
have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not
have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak
Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not
"Daddy." 167Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in
the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this
possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the
gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
64

Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was
negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin
test has ". . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can
definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the
hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have
handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans,
and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also recognized
several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates
on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after
firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of
a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In the case at
bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that
excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or
vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise
opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two
(72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable result
for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by
washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the paraffin test conducted
on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant
was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already
lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.
III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as
he contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an
impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for highranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case
(as no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then Department of
Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of the hearings and,
President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman while she
was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to
protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which
attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims there were placards
displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the courtroom
clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In
another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger sign" by several young
people while he was leaving the courtroom on his way back to his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high
profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right
of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field . . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism."173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavelto-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated
the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and
other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of
our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a
fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the
world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against
the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them
all in better perspective when he observed: "When a gentleman of high
social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under
the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports
based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to
their own ignorance and stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so
altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools
and miscreants?" 174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the
trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et
a1., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a
fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change
even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to
prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do
not disclose that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a
carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or
65

improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the
case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the attention
of the court to the visible display of a placard inside the courtroom. Acting
on the manifestation, the trial judge immediately directed that the placard
be hidden. Only then did he order the start of the arraignment of
accused.176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the
media after they had enough opportunity to take pictures. The court
granted defense's request, noting that the courtroom was also too
crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued between
the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience clapped their
hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court and moved for the exclusion of the public. Assistant Prosecutor VillaIgnacio objected on the ground that the public was not unruly. The trial
judge noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by the Supreme
Court regarding media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating
defense counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy
by spectators inside the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a
carnival. He also manifested that he personally saw that when accused was
being brought back to his cell from the courtroom, a group of young people
were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full view of policemen. Forthwith,
the trial judge declared that he could not be dissuaded by public
sentiments. He noted that the clapping of hands by the public was just a
reaction at the spur of the moment. He then admonished the audience not
to repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the coverage
of the trial by the press. The defense alleged that the media coverage will
constitute mistrial and deny accused's constitutional right to due process. It
invoked the provision in the Rules of Court which allows the accused to
exclude everybody in the courtroom, except the organic personnel. The
prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public can be ordered
only in prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases.
He added that the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of public
offenses. He quoted the U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell180 where it was
held: "A responsible press is always regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration especially in the criminal field. The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in the
courtrooms public property." The trial judge then ruled that the media
should be given a chance to cover the proceedings before the trial proper
but, thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures during the trial.
They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were ordered to
desist from taking live coverage of the proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial judge
gave the media two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no more. Trial
then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the media
two (2) minutes to take pictures before the trial proper. Afterwards, the
reporters were duly admonished to remain silent, to quietly observe the
proceedings and just take down notes. 183
6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon session, the
judge admonished the media people present in the courtroom to stop
taking pictures. 184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the
press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented
in court no less than seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied heavily on
selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense's
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to
the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on
his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge
voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case at bar to assuage
appellant's suspicion of bias and partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of
the trial judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we directed the
trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration of
justice. 186 We found nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any
suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present
in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was
not shown that the gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular
means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. Appellant asserts
that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the
crimes at bar with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the
shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on
the street since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa It,
however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of
Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events
leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant
suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman
who were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who they
66

were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman
appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on. Chapman then
stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was
wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from
inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. "Why did
you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him
with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record
to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of
attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to
himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the moment.
Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time
between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken.
The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous
impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We
have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim
would not, by itself, constitute treachery. 187Hence, absent any qualifying
circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide for the
shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we
hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The
evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant
ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and
wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her,
Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between
them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to
sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for
mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant
purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position
before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the
killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which
appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution
of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly
appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of
Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant
posits that the awards of moral and exemplary damages and for loss of
earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino
were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's award of attorney's
fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of victims
Hultman and Chapman the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced to pay
the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
indemnity for death and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as moderate or temperate and exemplary damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was sentenced to
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased; and, One Million
Pesos as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to pay:
Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury; One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and EightyFour Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in Philippine pesos of
U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent in
Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity of Jussi
Leino; and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the offended
parties the sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three million pesos) for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation.
188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail
the matter of damages recoverable in case of death arising from a felony,
thus:
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations
arising therefrom are governed by penal laws, ". . . subject to the provisions
of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title
on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating
damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (Art.
100, Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves
death, includes indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.)
and said consequential damages in turn include ". . . those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since
these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain
provisions of the Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
67

complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206
which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by
the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions
of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the descendant's
inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years,
the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been
increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil.
426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of People v.Pantoja, G.R. No. L18793, promulgated October 11, 1968 190, and it must be stressed that this
amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated
even without proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages
being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of
each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability
when the crime has been committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the offended party." (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages
cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity
for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is cases wherein
exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) ". . . damages to be adjudicated
may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) "but the party suffering the loss or
injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize
the damages resulting from the act or omission in question." (Art. 2203)
"Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in

the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses
of litigation, the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages
have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or . . . when there is a separate civil
action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the
deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense P12,000.00
(now P50,000.00), without the need of any evidence or proof of damages,
and even though there may have been mitigating circumstances attending
the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount
to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the deceased
related to his actual income at the time of death and his probable life
expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court as
a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said time
on account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the
deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the
recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not
more than five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the
court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more
aggravating circumstances, an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the
court, the same to be considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, the actual amount
thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has
been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity
of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable separately from
and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00)
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these
damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened according to
the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above,
for obvious reasons. 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN
CHAPMAN in light of the law and the case law.
68

Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
pesos as moderate or temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of
Roland John Chapman was baseless.
xxx xxx xxx
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped
together the awards for moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), without specifying the
particular amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different
kind. We shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her
natural father. During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders
Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence, we find that the award
of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be

given as temperate or moderate damages for the records do not show any
basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be given as exemplary damages.
The killing of Chapman was not attended by either evident premeditation or
treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be considered as one for moral
damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. 192 It states:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall be
at least (fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In addition:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed
by appellant, we increase the amount of moral damages to One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN
NAVARRO HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be
awarded to her mother, Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He
contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil Code, Anders Hultman as
adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said award. Only the parents
by nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect
at the time of Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is
entitled to the award made by the trial court. Article 190 of the Family Code
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
descendants of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the
other half, by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate;
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is
unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply
justified by the circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen recovered
between life and death for ninety-seven (97) days. Her family experienced
the peaks and valleys of unspeakable suffering. During that time, she
underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was never stable
and remained critical. It was always touch and go with death. She could not
be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to be perpetually by her side
at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings had
to be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her family's
business took a downspin. Soon, her family's assets were depleted, then
wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23) doctors attended to her and their
bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely on the
goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving contributions from
other people to defray the medical expenses and hospital bills. 193 Maureen
never regained consciousness until her demise on October 17, 1991, at the
tender age of seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances, we thus find
the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be
reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the
circumstances of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in
addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages
may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the
future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts
to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its
imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an
offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of
Maureen Hultman, a girl in the prime of her youth. Hultman and her
companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood, for no apparent
reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his victims and
their families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the imposition of
exemplary damages against appellant to deter others from taking the lives
of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover, since the killing of
Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the
new Civil Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00)
69

pesos as exemplary damages against appellant for the death of Maureen
Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive
injuries as a result of the shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He
would need a bone transplant operation to restore it. His tongue was also
injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste buds were also
affected. When he was discharged from the hospital, he had difficulty in
speaking and had to be fed through a tube running down his nose. He lost
eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off and the raw nerves
were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries and
suffering. More devastating was the emotional strain that distressed Leino.
His parents were in Europe for a vacation at the time of the shooting. Only
a neighbor attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2) days for his
father to come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in
peace at night. The traumatic event woke him up in the middle of the night.
Black memories of the incident kept coming back to
mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family.
Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had
to relocate his entire family to Europe where he felt they would be
safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we find that an award of One
Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral
damages is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with
treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant
is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to Leino of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS
OF EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the
victim, at the time of injury or death, is gainfully employed. Compensation
of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to
earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 199 we awarded to
the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of his earning capacity
although he was still a medical student at the time of injury. However, the
award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a fourth year medical
student at a reputable school; his scholastic record, which was presented at
the trial, justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish his
course and pass the board in due time; and a doctor, presented as witness
for the appellee, testified as to the amount of income Cariaga would have
earned had he finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in
Philippine pesos, of Forty capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant
that this amount is highly speculative and should be denied considering

that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the International School,
Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military and has just
arrived in Manila in February 1991 to pursue his ambition to become a pilot.
At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991, he has just enrolled at the
Manila Aero Club to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on his
first year, first semester, in said school and was practically, a mere high
school graduate. Under the foregoing circumstances, we find the records
wanting with substantial evidence to justify a reasonable assumption that
Leino would have been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club and
ultimately become a professional pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN
HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court
incorrectly used the monthly salary of a secretary working in Sweden,
computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a month, as per the
estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it appear
that, at the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills needed for a
secretarial job or that she intended to take a secretarial course in
preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself testified that
there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she continued her
studies, what professional career would she (sic) like to pursue considering
her interests and inclinations?
WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our projection is
that, certainly she would have been an artist in the creative side. She would
have become an actress or a movie producer or probably she would have
been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in Sweden,
how much would she have much earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month.
200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million

(P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maureen far loss of earning capacity
as a probable secretary in Sweden.
70

In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high
school, Maureen took up a short personality development course at the
John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the John Roberts Powers at
the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just received her
first salary, for which reason she went out with her friends to celebrate on
that fateful day. However, neither the nature of her work nor her salary in
said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to compute the award for
Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum
wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17, 1991),i.e., one
hundred eighteen pesos (P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and
necessary expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net income per
annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the formula
repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 age of victim at time of
death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have been
received by the heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning as
capacity of deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four
Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's
heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled that the award of damages
for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased,
and not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the
amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is
exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the
ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to
pay the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos each as attorney's
fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal cases were
consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some hearings having
both morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost one and a
half years. More than forty (40) witnesses testified during the hearings.
Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68)
documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related
to the trial of the cases came up to this Court for review at least twice
during the pendency of the trial. 206 Given these circumstances and the
evident effort exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the
trial court's award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on
the cases, where no less than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by
the parties, 207 were merely hearings on the petition for bail concerning the
murder charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the
merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the termination of
the hearing, he still had the right to adduce evidence at the trial proper. He
claims he was denied due process when the trial court considered all the
cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present
its surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first
hearing of the cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was
appellant's petition for bail for the murder of Chapman. It will be
remembered that, initially, there was only one murder charge against
appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course of
the proceedings on October 17, 1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution
was appellant's petition for bail. The prosecution sought to present the
surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate
delay and inconvenience since all three (3) charges involved one continuing
incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony of Leino
insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges (with respect to the
wounding of Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He argued that since the
pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of
Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail
were recommended was irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would
present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after
accused's arraingment on August 14, 1991. 208 The prosecution agreed on
the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time,
hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented
Jussi Leino as its first witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection
was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the
hearings conducted by the trial court were limited to the petition for
bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary evidence
relative to the shooting incident, including evidence in support of the claim
for damages. These witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the
defense counsels. The defense never objected that evidence on damages
would be unnecessary if its intention was really to limit presentation of
evidence to appellant's petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial court
issued an Order 211directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after
which "the main case as well as the petition for bail are respectively
submitted for Decision and Resolution." After receipt of this Order, the
defense counsel filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file the
defense Memorandum. In both Motions, the defense did not object to the
71

trial court's Order submitting for decision the main case and the petition for
bail. Neither did it move for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the
court that it still had witnesses to present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez,
filed a Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum praying for accused's
acquittal. This is inconsistent with the defense's position that the hearing
conducted was only on the petition for bail. If the defense insist that what
was submitted for decision was only his petition for bail, he would have
only prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial
court, the defense did not interpose any objection to the intended
promulgation. In fact, the defense attended the promulgation of the
Decision and manifested that they were ready therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail
were heard simultaneously and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover,
appellant's right to present additional evidence was not abridged by the
trial court. On the contrary, the records disclose that the trial court afforded
the defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the defense
almost one and a half years to submit its evidence. The defense presented
more than twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary evidence. It was
only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he filed
a motion for new
trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he
alleged that the joint decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the
petition for bail, was irregular for he was not given a chance to present
further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for new
trial, 213 appellant did not even identify his alleged additional witnesses and
the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it shown that he could not have
produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable diligence. Appellant's
motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on his cases. His motion was
properly denied by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision
of the trial court, dated December 22, 1992, thus:
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of
Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day ofreclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the
said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of
the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83)
as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Fourty-Two Pesos and
Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said
deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two
Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified
by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following
amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as
indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred
Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million (P2,000,000.00)
pesos as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3)
offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of
Three Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.
72

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Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

G.R. No. 135784

December 15, 2000

RICARDO FORTUNA Y GRAGASIN, petitioner,

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

We do not agree. As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

G.R. No. 133872 May 5, 2000

with the total amount of P16,000.00 belonging to one ANA MARINAY Y

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

. . . [O]n November 6, 1997, at around 7:40 p.m., he went to the house of

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

The Court's Ruling

Appellant Tao assigns only two errors or issues. These are:

Evaluation of the Examining

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of

q What else transpired thereafter?

Besides, no ill motive was imputed on her. Appellant offers us no plausible

Appellant's contention that the absence of genital and other injuries on

Besides, the examining physician satisfactorily explained the absence of

q What happen[ed] next Ms. Witness?

She elucidated that "[l]aceration only occur[s] on non-elastic hymen

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

a Yes, Sir. I was wearing one.

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

a And once [I laid] down on the floor, he tried . . . to make me

q [W]hat are these valuables?

a I remember the jewelry box containing jewelry, clothes and other

q [W]here did you get that jewelry box containing rings?

a Pain. (Masakit po).

a [I]nside the locker or aparador sir.

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

G.R. No. 170470

For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.

As summarized[3] by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts are as

From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in

Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators

When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network,

On 9 January 2001, an Information[4] was filed before the RTC of Manila,

Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age

Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age

Michael Separa, 24 years of age

Daphne Separa, 18 years of age

Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age

Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely,

A: I was at our office, sir.

Q: When was that?

A: I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

A: Sidecar driver, sir.

Q: On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do you recall where

That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your Honor.

Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez, Your Honor.

Aggravating Circumstances Cases Criminal Law Review

A: 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.

Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab.