GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON v.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 166606, November 29, 2005
DOCTRINE:
The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: 1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; 2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; 3) when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.
FACTS:
Subsequent investigations determined that petitioners Philippine National Police (PNP) Director for
Comptrollership Guillermo Domondon, and Sr. Superintendent Van Luspo, together with other PNP officers,
conspired with one another in approving without budgetary basis, the release of P5,000,000 and P15,000,000,
for the procurement of CCIE for the use of PNP personnel of the CRECOM, causing to be issued checks with
an aggregate amount of P20,000,000 for payment of ghost purchases of the aforesaid CCIE items.
On May 4, 1994, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners Domondon and
Luspo, and the other PNP officers, with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Their arraignment was reset for several times, hence, petitioners filed on December 3, 2003 a motion to
dismiss claiming that the failure to arraign them within the period set under Republic Act (RA) No. 8493 or the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 have resulted in denial of their rights to speedy trial.
On September 13, 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to dismiss and on January 11, 2005,
dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to
dismiss.
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
While the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 sets the time limit for the arraignment and trial of a case, these however do
not preclude justifiable postponements and delay when so warranted by the situation. Section 2 of SC Circular
38-98 provides that the period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes
justifying suspension of arraignment, shall be excluded.
Thus in People v. Tee, we held that the right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: 1) the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; 2) when unjustified postponements are asked
for and secured; 3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried.

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the
constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, the Court emphasized that:
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as
length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice
to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.
In justifying the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, the Sandiganbayan reasoned that although the
scheduled arraignments were postponed several times, they were however postponed for valid reasons. The
respondent court cited a number of justifiable causes of postponements, thus:
One of the postponements was due to the request of one of the accused to reset the arraignment since the
counsel of record is not available on the scheduled date. To proceed with the arraignment despite the noted
absence of one of the counsels would result in inequity on one of the accused-movants co-defendants.
Another postponement, as pointed out by the accused-movants, was the time given by the Court to allow the
prosecutor to file an opposition to Brizuelas Bill of Particulars. The comment made by accused-movants is
discriminatory and unjust. They claim that the delay caused by the filing of a motion for bill of particulars by a
co-accused should not be attributable to them as they did not join the same, and consequently such is a
violation of their right to speedy trial. They have forgotten that they themselves had caused a long delay in this
case by filing a motion for reinvestigation and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Honorable
Supreme Court, which is, if such reasoning is to be followed, to the detriment of the other accused in this
case.
We find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the respondent court. A careful examination
of the records would show that the postponements were caused by numerous pending motions or petitions.
The delays caused by the filing and resolution of these motions and petitions cannot be categorized as
vexatious, capricious or oppressive. Hence, the dismissal of petitioners motion to dismiss must be upheld.

PEREZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008
DOCTRINE:
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the
fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents capacity to represent himself, and no
duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.38
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are

conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
FACTS:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of Perez, who was then the acting municipal
treasurer of Bohol. Perez was absent on the first scheduled audit and he was apprised of the on-going audit.
The following day, the audit team counted the cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence which
amounted to P21,331.79. The findings was embodied in the Report of Cash Examination Perez was supposed
to have on hand P94,116.36, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.
Perez was required to produce the amount of P72,784.57. Perez verbally explained that part of the money was
used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for
his medicine.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer P25,000. This was followed
by remittances of P35,000.00, P2,000.00 and P2,784.00.
An administrative case was filed against Perez. Petitioner again remitted the amount of P8,000.00 fully
restituting his shortage in the amount of P72,784.57. Later, Perez was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
malversation of public funds which found that said fund was appropriated and converted by the said accused
to his own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforementioned
amount.
Perez entered a plea of "not guilty." Pre-trial was initially set but the Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial
and allowed the prosecution to present its witness. The defense presented evidence through petitioner Zenon
R. Perez himself, denying the contents of his first Answer15 to the administrative case filed against him by the
audit team. He claimed it was prepared without the assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation
and submission, he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with diabetes mellitus.
He then revoked his Answer dated February 22, 1989 and filed his second Answer dated March 2, 1989.17 In
the latter, he vehemently denied that he incurred a cash shortage P72,784.57.
On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of conviction. On January 13, 2004,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration23 which was denied with finality.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not have been given probative weight because it
was executed without the assistance of counsel.
RULING:
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in an
administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not
indispensable in administrative proceedings.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is

a right afforded a suspect or accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be
invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.37
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the
fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents capacity to represent himself, and no
duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.38
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.39
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be
represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due
process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his
side.

OMBUDSMAN vs. JURADO

GR No. 154155 August 6, 2008
DOCTRINE:
Speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case; (ii) The
Balancing test is used to determine of what constitutes a violation of the right of speedy disposition of cases;
and (iii) There is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises Co., filed before the Bureau of Customs for the operation of a Customs
Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-Manufacturing Warehouse. As part of the evaluation of Magleis application, CBW
Supervisor Baliwag conducted an inspection of Magleis compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag
submitted a report recommending approval of the application. Respondent Jurado, who was then the Chief of
the Warehouse Inspection Division, adopted the recommendation of Baliwag. Then he indorsed the papers of
Maglei to the Chief Mendoza of the Miscellaneous Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse Division (MMBWD).
June 25, 1992, Maglei was finally granted the authority to establish and operate CBW No. M-1467 located at
129 J. Bautista, Caloocan City. By virtue of such authority, Maglei imported various textile materials which
were then transferred to the said warehouse. The textiles were to be manufactured into car covers for
exportation.
Subsequently, on July 8 and 22, 1992, MMBWD Senior Storekeeper Account Officer Dizon was tasked by
MMBWD Chief Mendoza to check and verify the status of Magleis CBW. Dizon reported that the subject CBW

was existing and operating.

However, upon further verification by the Bureau of Customs, it was discovered that the purported CBW of
Maglei did not exist at the alleged site in Caloocan City. Rather, what was reported located at the site was a
School of the Divine Mercy. Only a small signboard bearing the name Maglei Enterprises Company was
posted inconspicuously in the corner of the lot. Further investigation revealed that Magleis shipment of textile
materials disappeared, without proof of the materials being exported or the corresponding taxes being paid.
Aug. 11 1992, Bureau of Customs initiated a complaint against Dizon, Cuyos and Medina for prosecution
under the Tariff and Customs Code. After receiving a copy of the resolution, the Ombudsman conducted the
investigation on the complaint.
On February 13, 1996, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) recommended that the Resolution of the Bureau of Customs be reversed and forwarded
to case to Fact Finding Bureau (FFB) for further fact-finding investigation.
September 29, 1997, FFB submitted its report and recommended That criminal charges for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 and Section 3081 of the Tariff and Customs Code be filed against the certain officials
including respondent Jurado
October 17, 1997, the OMB approved the above recommendation.
August 2, 1999, the OMB dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents and violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code filed against
respondent. On the other hand, on August 16, 1999, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the OMB
rendered judgment finding respondent Jurado administratively liable, penalizing him with suspension for six (6)
months without pay. Respondents motion for reconsideration of his suspension was likewise denied by the
Ombudsman.
On Appeal, he CA reversed and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the OMB. In ruling in favor
ofJurado, the appellate court ratiocinated: it is quite clear that it took the Ombudsman almost six (6) years to
decide that a case be filed against Petitioner. Under such circumstances, We cannot fault Jurado for invoking
violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case. More importantly, We do not agree that Jurado, under
attendant facts and circumstances can be held liable for negligence. First of all, Jurado as, Deputy
Commissioner for Assessment and Operation, did not have the duty to make inspection on the alleged
warehouse. Such duty belongs to other personnel/officers. Secondly, A careful reading of said 1st Indorsement
undoubtedly shows that Petitioner invited attention to the inspectors (Supervisor Baliwag) qualified
recommendation. After Petitioner made the indorsement, he no longer had any participation nor was he under
obligation or duty to make a re-inspection.
ISSUES:
1.WON Jurados right to speedy trial was violated
2.WON Jurado was negligent in the performance of his duty

RULING:
1.No violation of respondents right to speedy disposition of cases.
It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, it is a
flexible concept. Due regard must be given to the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. The right to
a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
The original complaint filed by the Bureau of Customs, Jurado was not included as one of the parties charged
with violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. With respect to respondent, there were no vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays because he was not made to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the report
and findings of the FFB.
Simply put, prior to the report and recommendation by the FFB that Jurado be criminally and administratively
charged, respondent was neither investigated nor charged. That respondent was charged only in 1997 while
the subject incident occurred in 1992, is not necessarily a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of his
case. The record is clear that prior to 1997, respondent had no case to speak of he was not made the subject
of any complaint or made to undergo any investigation.
The Balancing Test
In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid
down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
The time it took the Ombudsman to complete the investigation can hardly be considered an unreasonable and
arbitrary delay as to deprive respondent of his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of his case. Further,
there is nothing in the records to show that said period was characterized by delay which was vexatious,
capricious or oppressive. There was no inordinate delay amounting to a violation of respondents constitutional
rights. The assertion of respondent that there was a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of cases
against him must necessarily fail.
2. Jurado administratively liable for neglect of duty
The dismissal of criminal charges will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint
based on the same set of facts. The quantum of evidence in order to sustain a conviction for a criminal case is
different from the proof needed to find one administratively liable. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
provides that for criminal cases, conviction is warranted only when the guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is defined as moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
On the other hand, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable as provided
by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Verily, respondent can still be held
administratively liable despite the dismissal of the criminal charges against him.

Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a task expected of him, signifying
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. By merely acquiescing to the report and
recommendation of his subordinate without verifying its accuracy, respondent was negligent in overseeing that
the duties and responsibilities of the WID were performed with utmost responsibility. Respondent was likewise
negligent when he failed, as supervisor, to initiate, institute, or recommend investigation and disciplinary
proceedings against his subordinate Baliwag after the anomaly was discovered. Clearly, respondent failed to
exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence which the circumstances warrant.
Wherefore, the appealed Decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Ombudsman in
OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 finding respondent guilty of neglect of duty is REINSTATED.

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS,

[G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014]
DOCTRINE:
Rights of the Accused Speedy Trial Rule 115 (h)
In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view
of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.
FACTS:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by private complainant Elizabeth Uy in Criminal
Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of BP 22 was filed against petitioner William Co,
which were raffled to the MeTC Branch 49 of Caloocan City.
In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open
court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On July 2, 2004, Uy,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases that was granted on October 14, 2004 and
denied Cos motion for reconsideration.
On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the
revival of the criminal cases. It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005. Cos motion for
reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005. Co then filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096 which was also
dismissed on February 13, 2006; and there being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became
final and executory on March 20, 2006.

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled
after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006. Uy opposed
the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in
G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006
granting Cos motion. When the court subsequently denied Uys motion for reconsideration on November 16,
2006, Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, RTC acted
favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16,
2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. Co then filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner on the ground of denial of his right
to speedy trial constitutes final dismissal of these cases.
RULING:
No.
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77
and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied.
He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was
already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493
(Speedy Trial Act of 1998) and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
mandating that the entire trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is
deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction
over the same based on a mere motion because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.
Co failed to show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the
trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on
the part of the prosecution.
This Court has emphasized: "speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept."
Wherein, in determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a)
duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay.
Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday
life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular

regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
"While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy
administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right
of the accused to speedy trial."
The Supreme Court denies the petition.
Additional Notes
Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998):
Time Limit for Trial. In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules
on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment,
or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or
judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for
continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of
trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule22
of the Rules of Court.
Rule 119, section 2: Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.
Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be
postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on
a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case
shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise
authorized by the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws
or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
IBANEZ vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190798, January 27, 2016
DOCTRINES:
The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal prosecution. As such, right to counsel is
one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused. A deprivation of the right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in

arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field. Simply put, an accused without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing
which is tantamount to a grave denial of due process.
Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine.
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in
proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However,
the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of crossexamination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain
in the record.
FACTS:
This case is an appeal on the decision of the CA affirming with modifications the decision of the RTC which convicted petitioners of
the crime of frustrated homicide.
For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the petitioners together with their co-accused, Boyet Ibaez
(Boyet) and David Ibaez (David), were charged with the crime of frustrated homicide. After posting their bail bond at P24,000.00
each, Ronald, Bobot and Emilio were released on bail. Arraignment of Ronald and Bobot was held on May 9, 2002. Emilio was, in
turn, arraigned on December 10, 2002. All the petitioners entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. After termination of pretrial on April 23, 2003, trial on the merits immediately.
During the arraignment, Ronald and Bobot were assisted by Atty. Bibiano Colasito, who was selected as their counsel de oficio only
for that occasion. At his arraignment, Emilio appeared with the assistance of Atty. Antonio Manzano (Atty. Manzano), who was then
appointed by the trial court as counsel de oficio for all the accused. In the pre-trial conference that followed, Atty. Manzano appeared
for the petitioners. Atty. Manzano was informed that the trial for the presentation of prosecution evidence was set on June 18, 2003.
Both Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit completed their respective testimonies during the June 18, 2003 hearing. However, Atty. Manzano failed
to appear at the said hearing despite prior notice. Likewise, Ronald, one of the petitioners, absented himself from the same hearing. As
a result, the RTC issued an order for the waiver the Atty. Manzano's right to cross-examine the witnesses, the arrest of Ronald and
enjoining the NBI and PNP to answer why warrants of arrest against Boyet and David remain unimplemented.
Thereafter, Atty. Manzano withdrew as petitioners' counsel de oficio. The trial court then appointed Atty. Gregorio Caneda, Jr. (Atty.
Caneda) as the new counsel de oficio of the petitioners. On the same date, Atty. Caneda conducted the cross-examination of Ruth and
even expressed his desire to continue with the cross-examination of said witness on the next scheduled hearing. In the hearing of
September 17, 2003, Atty. Caneda appeared for the petitioners but Bobot and Emilio did not show up. This prompted the trial court to
issue the corresponding warrants for their arrest and the bonds posted by them for their provisional liberty were ordered confiscated in
favor of the government. Despite the continued absence of his clients, Atty. Caneda religiously attended the succeeding hearings. On
November 5, 2003, upon his request, the trial court relieved Atty. Caneda of his designation as counsel de oficio for the petitioners.
Per the trial court's Order23 dated February 10, 2004, Atty. Ma. Teresita C. Pantua (Atty. Pantua), of the Public Attorney's Office, was
designated as the petitioners' counsel de oficio. However, Atty. Pantua's designation was recalled upon her manifestation that she had
previously assisted Rodolfo in initiating the present case. In her stead, the trial court appointed the petitioners' current counsel de
oficio, Atty. Juan Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan).
Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing the petitioners. With his help, all three petitioners finally appeared before the trial
court on May 5, 2005. Atty. Sindingan handled the cross-examination of another prosecution witness, Salvacion, as well as the
presentation of evidence for the defense.
After both parties had rested their case, they were required to submit their respective memoranda in thirty (30) days. Atty. Sindingan
submitted the Memorandum for the petitioners while no memorandum was ever filed by the prosecution. Thereafter, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over the declarations of the defense.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but this was denied in an Order25 dated October 11, 2007.
Undaunted, the petitioners elevated their case to the CA. They faulted the trial court for totally disregarding their claim that Rodolfo
was the aggressor and for not recognizing that Bobot was merely acting in self-defense when Rodolfo was stabbed. The petitioners
also asserted that they were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel.

The CA's Ruling

The CA agreed with the trial court's judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed. The appellate court sentenced the
petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. The CA also found it proper to award P15,000,00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as moral
damages to Rodolfo. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the CA's decision. Still, their motion was denied in the Resolution26
of December 28, 2009.
Petitioner's Contention
The right invoiced by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution which states that:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, x x x.
Guided by the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to counsel and pursuant to its rule-making authority, the Court, in
promulgating the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted the following provisions:
Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
xxxx
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the
judgment, x x x
xxxx
Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de oficio for the accused in the absence of
private representation. It provides:
SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. - Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to
counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of
his choice, the court must assign a counsel de officio to defend him.
SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. - The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that
may arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability,
can competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any
person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal prosecution. As such, right to counsel is
one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused. A deprivation of the right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in
arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field. Simply put, an accused without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing
which is tantamount to a grave denial of due process.
On the basis of this ratiocination and as a last ditch effort to be exculpated, the petitioners insisted that they were denied of their right
to counsel when their counsel de oficio failed to appear on the June 18, 2003 trial court hearing during which Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit
gave their testimonies. As a consequence, the petitioners argued that they were divested of the opportunity to cross-examine the said
two prosecution witnesses.
Respondent's Contention
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, disputed the petitioners' claim that they were deprived of their constitutional
right to counsel. In their May 5, 2010 Comment on the instant petition, the OSG pointed out that since the beginning of the
proceedings in the trial court until the filing of the present petition before this Court, three (3) counsel de oficio were appointed and
represented the petitioners and to which designation the latter did not raise any protest. The OSG opined that the trial court judge
made sure that the petitioners were adequately assisted by a counsel de oficio when they failed to engage the services of a lawyer of
their own choice. Thus, the OSG recommended the dismissal of the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.
RULING:
The Court held that there was no denial of right to counsel as evinced by the fact that the petitioners were not only assisted by a
counsel de oficio during arraignment and pre-trial but more so, their counsel de oficio actively participated in the proceedings before
the trial court including the direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. As aptly found by the CA, the petitioners were duly
represented by a counsel de oficio all throughout the proceedings except for one hearing when their court appointed lawyer was
absent and Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented their testimonies.35 As previously stated, it was during said hearing when the trial court
declared that the cross-examination of the said two prosecution witnesses was deemed waived.
Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine. The case of Savory Luncheonette v.
Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the meaning and substance of right to cross-examine as an integral
component of due process with a colatilla that the same right may be expressly or impliedly waived, to quote:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in
proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However,
the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of crossexamination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain
in the record.
Such is the scenario in the present case where the reason why Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit were not subjected to cross-examination was not
because the petitioners were not given opportunity to do so. Noticeably, the petitioners' counsel de oficio omitted to mention that in
the June 18, 2003 hearing, Ronald, one of the accused, did not show up despite prior notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for his
provisional liberty was ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Ironically, Ronald comes to this Court asserting the very right
he seemingly waived and abandoned for not attending the scheduled hearing without justifiable cause. Moreover, neither did the
petitioners interpose any objection to the presentation of testimony of the prosecution witnesses during the June 18, 2003 hearing nor
did their counsel de oficio subsequently seek a reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.
Further, the trial court judge, when he issued the June 18, 2003 Order, was merely exercising a judicial prerogative. No proof was
presented by the defense showing that the exercise of such discretion was either despotic or arbitrary.
Going by the records, there is no indication that any of the counsel de oficio had been negligent in protecting the petitioners' interests.
As a matter of fact, the counsel de oficio kept on attending the trial court hearings in representation of the petitioners despite the
latter's unjustified absences.
In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the absence of the counsel de oficio in one of the hearings of this case amounts to a denial of
right to counsel. Nor does such absence warrant the nullification of the entire trial court proceedings and the eventual invalidation of
its ruling. In People v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that a particular counsel de oficio did not or could not consistently appear
in all the hearings of the case, is effectively a denial of the right to counsel, especially so where, as in the instant case, there is no
showing that the several appointed counsel de oficio in any way neglected to perform their duties to the appellant and to the trial court
and that the defense had suffered in any substantial sense therefrom.

TIN vs. PEOPLE

GR No. 126480 August 10, 2001
Doctrine
EQUIPOISE RULE. Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds
application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner
must be declared innocent and set free.

FACTS
At the trial, private complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago testified that she and Aurora Jose went to Madys
Pawnshop owned by petitioner to pawn some pieces of jewelry. She initially asked for P250,000.00 but
petitioner offered only P220,000.00. A list of the jewelries was typewritten by a helper of the petitioner. This list
was signed by petitioner as evidence of her receipt of the said jewelries. On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago
went to the pawnshop to redeem her jewelry. She brought with her the amount of P450,000.00 to settle her
loan. However, petitioner told her that the jewelries were already sold. This prompted Dr. Santiago to consult
her lawyer, who wrote to Maria Tin asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to redeem the pieces of jewelry. On March
2, 1984, petitioner replied through her counsel, confirming that Dr. Santiago has an unsettled obligation of
P220,000.00 and demanding payment. The letter also stated that no jewelries were received as collateral for
the loan. Petitioner testified that the real parties to the loan were Dr. Santiago and her daughter-in-law, Mia
Chan. She merely introduced them to one another and it was Mia Chan who signed the acknowledgment
receipt and who actually received the pieces of jewelry. On May 5, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty of ESTAFA. Petitioner appealed with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial
courts decision. Her Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
W/NOT petitioner may be held liable for estafa.
RULING
NO. A conviction in this case for estafa depends on three facts: (1) that accused was the one who
extended the loan; (2) that accused was the one who received the pieces of jewelry as collateral for the
loan she extended; and (3) that the loan was for an indefinite term. A careful review of the records,
however, reveals that:
First. It was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to consider in evidence the letter which a certain
Aurora Jose sent to Fiscal Jumino. Aurora Jose was never presented to testify on the veracity of said
letter, much less its contents. A private certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same
was never presented as a witness. The same is true of letters. They are hearsay evidence.
Second. The signature appearing in the receipt, apparently differs from the specimen signatures
provided by petitioner Maria Tin in open court. But it has striking and obvious similarities to Mia Chans
specimen signatures. The differences and similarities are so obvious to the eye. They could not be
casually disregarded. When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the
other to be the writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted
in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute. The court may, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison.
For, the handwriting of a person is characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the
genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question for
the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by experts. In the present case, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving that the signature in Exhibit A was the petitioners, not Mia
Chans. This the prosecution did not do.
Third. Petitioner did not deny that she received payments and made demands for payment from private
complainant. They do not show, however, that she was the one who extended the loan and accepted
the jewelries. Note that even Mia Chan received certain payments from Dr. Santiago, a certain Viring

also received payment from Dr. Santiago. These instances only prove that a person who received
payments from another is not necessarily the person who extended the loan.
Fourth. Exhibit M-2[25] which the Court of Appeals considered proof that petitioner was in possession
of the jewelry, deserves serious scrutiny. Said exhibit was not properly identified or introduced as
evidence at the trial. It was marked as an exhibit upon mere manifestation of counsel. It was not
touched upon during the testimony of the private complainant nor listed in the list of exhibits for the
prosecution, hence deemed inadmissible in evidence.
Fifth. Mia Chans admission, that she was the one who extended the loan and received the jewelries,
deserves weighty consideration and could not be ignored. That admission is one against self-interest,
amounting to an incriminatory statement, which the witness could not have volunteered if not the truth.
Further, since it was private complainant who asserted that the loan was for an indefinite term under
the so-called white-paper system of the pawnshop, she had the burden of proving that fact as true. In
this she failed, and her failure undermines the case for the prosecution.
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the evidence
on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having
the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime
charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared innocent and set free.
PEOPLE VS VICENTE LUGNASIN and DEVINCIO GUERRERO
G.R. No. 208404, February 24, 2016
DOCTRINE:
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation since neither one
executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.
FACTS:
(OCTOBER 15, 1999) DOJ filed an information against Vicente, Devincio, Tito, Excelso, Elemer, Rogelio and 5
other unidentified individuals for the crime of kidnapping under Art. 267 of the RPC of the person of Nicassius
Cordero for the purpose of extorting money for his safe release from detention and was released in the
evening of April 24, 1999 along the SLEX.
When arraigned both accused-appellants Vicente (November 5, 2001) and Devincio (March 6, 2002) pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. Both made no stipulation during their respective pre-trial conferences except
for their identities and the jurisdiction of the court.
9 other accused remained at large
RTC ruling:
In convicting the accused-appellants, the RTC found Cordero to be a careful, truthful and candid witness,

whose story was supported by the evidence submitted. It added that this was in contrast to the accusedappellants bare denial of their participation in the kidnapping. The RTC also pointed out that Cordero was able
to identify both accused-appellants as he saw their faces before he was blindfolded.
CA ruling:
Affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty; from death penalty to reclusion Perpetua without the
possibility of parole.
Addressing accused-appellant Devincios claim that his rights under RA 7438, entitled an act defining certain
rights of person arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting,
Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof were violated, the CA
pointed out that he neither offered any evidence nor executed an extrajudicial confession or admission for such
allegation.
ISSUE:
WON their rights under 7438 were violated
RULING:
As the CA has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio raised none of these issues anytime
during the course of his trial. These issues were raised for the first time on appeal before the CA. we affirm the
ruling of the CA and quote Miclat, Jr. v. People on this Courts treatment of an accuseds belated allegation of
the illegality of his warrantless arrest:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving
a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity
of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest if an accused is not sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
As regards accused-appellant Devincios argument that his rights under RA 7438 were violated, we likewise
uphold the following ruling of the CA:
With respect to appellant Devincios argument that his rights under RA 7438 were violated while he was under
custodial investigation, aside from his bare-faced clai, he has offered no evidence to sustain such claim; and
appellant Devincio (or appellant Vicente, for that matter) has not executed an extrajudicial confession or
admission for, as stated in people vs. buluran and Valenzuela:
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation since neither one

executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records show that appellant Cielito Buluran
opted to remain silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.

SPOUSES TELAN vs. CA

G.R. No. 95026, October 4, 1991
DOCTRINE:
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and
executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel. There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The
preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro transferred his residence to the other side of the national highway on a lot owned by Luciano
Sia where he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a month. PEDRO set up business enterprises such as a
vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins, the herein private respondents Roberto Telan
and Spouses Vicente and virginia Telan followed suit by setting up their own eatery within the same lot.
On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his spouse ANGELINA received a Notice to Vacate. Apparently VICENTE
and VIRGINIA had executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared by
PEDRO and ANGELINA.
On June 7, 1984, the DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a suit at the Regional Trial
Court of Ilagan, Isabela to evict PEDRO TELAN's family from the lot. The case was dismissed. Meanwhile, on
September 22, 1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to secure a Certificate of Title in his name over the
contested lot which made them file a complaint denominated as Accion Publiciana against petitioners.
At this point, PEDRO and ANGELINA hired the services of Atty. Antonio Paguiran to defend them in the suit.
On October 27, 1988, the lower court awarded the possession of the property in question to ROBERTO and
Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN. PEDRO and ANGELINA informed Atty. Paguiran that they wanted
to appeal the case, but since Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA asked another
person to sign for them.
Having no counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked "Atty. Palma" to handle their case. he
cosented and the petitioners paid his "lawyer's fees."
In the meantime, on August 5, 1988, PEDRO TELAN broke his hip while he was getting off from a passenger
jeepney. All the while, from September 5, 1988 up to October 2, 1988, PEDRO was confined a the PGH.

Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which considered the appeal
interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for failure ... to file an appeal brief within the
reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came to know about it on May 1990,
when somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at Ilagan informed PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the
facts. "Atty. Palma" could no longer be found. PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of
Attorneys with the Bar Confidant's Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal Case No. 389-90 for
Estafa against "Atty. Palma." 15 By now PEDRO had realized that "Atty. Palma" was a fake.
On September 12, 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ of Demolition for the
enforcement of the decision. The Petition for Review on certiorari before this Court was filed on October 18,
1990 by the spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN with an Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to
counsel and hence a lack of due process.
RULING:
YES.
We hold that they had not been accorded due process of law because they lost their to appeal when deprived
of the right to counsel. The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially
so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and
executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The preeminent
right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing
unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has
established a modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation,
it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client
company.
A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation even by the attorney's
mistake or negligence in procedural technique. But how can there be negligence by the counsel in the case at
bar when the "lawyer", "Atty. Palma," turned out to be fake? The Affidavit of the petitioner PEDRO TELAN, the
sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar Confidant's Office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the submitted records of Criminal Case No. 389-90 more than sufficiently establish the existence of an Ernesto

Palma who misrepresented himself as a lawyer.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA
G.R. No. 191752; June 10, 2013
DOCTRINE:
1) Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought
face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
2) To be admissible, the EJ confession must satisfy the following requirements:
"(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of
the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
FACTS:
On July 23, 2004, Ibanez allegedly robbed the Weapons System Corporation (WSC), tied the hands of Zaldy Gabao, an employee of
WSC and killed Rex Dorimon, the companys gunsmith.
The NBI received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of
one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team
and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he
had been sent by Cachuela and Ibaez to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they
were conducting an entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave
the names of the other persons involved in the crime.
The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Cachuela and Ibaez on two separate occasions. The NBI officers recovered firearms
from both Cachuela and Ibaez.
At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC
and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
The prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy. The
accused all pleaded not guilty on arraignment.Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died. The RTC found the
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Excepted from the conviction was
Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. The appellants filed an appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed the
decision of RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N the out of court identification made by Zaldy and the extrajudicial confession made by Nabilgas are admissible in evidence
HELD:
1) As to the out-of-court identification
Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and subsequently died there during the
trial. As explained in the case of People vs Algarme:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought
face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty

demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the persons involved in the
robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who
were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the lineup was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy
before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy
regarding the appearance of the appellants.
The SC held that, Linos failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders unreliable
Zaldys out-of-court identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and
reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an independent
in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Linos testimony.
2) As to the extrajudicial confession
The SC held that Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. To be admissible, the EJ confession must satisfy the
following requirements:
"(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of
the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
Further, Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he executed the alleged written confession. "A
custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
The SC ruled that Nabilgas confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of
Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas the NBI
itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas open declaration to the agencys investigators that he already had a lawyer in the
person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas
at the time his client made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she
was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records
to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and
the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.
In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written
confession was made.
At any rate, Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule.
This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered
as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that
the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first
proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the
declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the
extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be
presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due
to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.

PEOPLE vs BALOLOY
(GR No. 140740, 12 April 2002)
DOCTRINES:
1.
The constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
suspect orally admits having committed the crime.

2.

Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime
before he is placed under investigation.
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.

3.

Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences are based on proven facts; and (3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.
FACTS:
JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN in a spontaneous answer, freely and
voluntarily given in an ordinary manner.
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of 3 August 1996, the
dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho was found. The one who caused its discovery was
accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching
frogs in a nearby creek. The Trial court found JUANITO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide.
Hence, in this automatic review, he seeks that his alleged confession be disregarded for having been obtained
in violation of his constitutional rights, and that his conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside.
JUANITO maintains that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution when it admitted
in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to
him, the two failed to inform him of his constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from
him the incriminatory information. While these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show that he
effectively waived his rights through a written waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that
his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
JUANITO asserts that the prosecution miserably failed to establish with moral certainty his guilt. He points to
the contradicting testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution concerning the retrieved rope owned by him.
Consequently, with the inadmissibility of his alleged extrajudicial confession and the apparent contradiction
surrounding the prosecutions evidence against him, the trial court should have acquitted him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court gravely erred in admitting the alleged confession of the accused-

appellant to witnesses Brgy. Captain Luzviminda Ceniza and Judge Dicon as evidence against the
accused.
2. On account of the inadmissibility of the accuseds alleged confession, the court gravely erred in
convicting the accused based on mere circumstantial evidence.
RULING:
1. It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions
or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation.
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant
case, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN in a spontaneous answer, freely and
voluntarily given in an ordinary manner.
However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were
violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of
his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by,
the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started.
Judge Dicons claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary
investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time JUANITO was already under the
custody of the police authorities. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or
by his submission to the person making the arrest.
At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made without
the advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated as
a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through the testimonies of the persons who
heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.
2. JUANITOs defense of alibi is futile because of his own admission that he was at the scene of the crime.
Alibi is a defense that places an accused at the relevant time of a crime in a place other than the scene
involved and so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party. Likewise, a
denial that is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is a negative and self-serving evidence,
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters.
Minor inconsistencies and honest lapses strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses, as they
erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed. What matters is that the testimonies of
witnesses agree on the essential fact that JUANITO was the owner of the black rope and the perpetrator of the
crime.
Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur: (1)

there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences are based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of
all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN MORIAL, LEONARDO MORIAL alias
CARDING and NONELITO ABION* alias NOLY, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 129295, August 15, 2001
DOCTRINE:
When the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the presence of counsel it did not cure its
constitutional defects. As the accused was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.
FACTS:
On January 6, 1996, around 6:30 pm at Benjamin Morial's house in Barangay Cagnituan, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, Gabriel Guilao saw Nonelito Abion slapped Paula Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was stabbed by Edwin
Morial with a small, sharp, pointed weapon. Leonardo Morial stood outside the house. Gabriel also saw Paula
Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas (3 years old), run towards his grandmother's garden, and later heard the
crushing sound of a stone against flesh. The three accused stayed in the house for about 10 minutes after the
killing the victims. Thereafter, they departed and headed towards the nearby houses.
Benjamin Morial, Paula's common-law husband, who was in Barangay Maria Clara when the incident took
place, arrived at Barangay Cagnituan the next day. Benjamin called out Paula's name when he was a few
meters from the house. When there was no answer he raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom.
He found the clothes all topsy-turvy and the box where he and Paula hid their money was turned upside down.
Benjamin saw Paula lying on the floor with a cut in her neck. He shouted for help. Responding to his cries,
Benjamin's neighbors, including barangay kagawads, rushed to his house. He asked his neighbors to help
search for Albert, who was found shortly some 50 meters from the house. Albert laid flat on the ground with
two stones near his head. Benjamin requested someone to report the incident to the police.
Gabriel Guilao hurried to Benjamin's house. He revealed to Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and that
the three accused were the perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone about what he knew for
fear that they would all be killed since the Abions were "saturated in their place." Gabriel heeded Benjamin's
advice. The police arrived and investigated. After examining the victims' wounds, the police officers, along with
Morial, proceeded to the bedroom. Morial informed the officers that P11,000.00 was missing from the
moneybox. Other than the cash, nothing else was missing. Outside the house, Benjamin disclosed to the
officers his three suspects, the accused in this case. He advised them, however, to bring only Leonardo and
Edwin Morial into custody and not to include Abion, who had many relatives in Cagnituan because he knew
that the Abions were "most feared".
The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito Abion and invited the two to the police
station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. Edwin and Leonardo were allegedly
tortured. Edwin was advised to tell the truth so he would not be killed. Nevertheless, he refused to admit his
alleged participation in the killings. Someone then struck his left hand with a pistol. His hand swelled. A

policeman in uniform boxed and gaged him. Leonardo was also boxed and gaged. When a policeman
attempted to box him again, Leonardo finally admitted that Nonelito Abion and Edwin Morial were responsible
for the death of Paula Bandibas. Leonardo's interrogation lasted one and a half to two hours. Leonardo's
statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that they were going to contact a lawyer
to assist him during the investigation. Leonardo Morial told SPO4 Fernandez that he had no money to pay for
the services of counsel. SPO4 Fernandez informed him that there are many lawyers in their municipality and
named some of them. Leonardo said he did not know any of the lawyers mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez thus
volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented. SPO4 Fernandez then
contacted Atty. Tobias Aguilar.
On January 9, 1996, Atty. Aguilar arrived. After being introduced to Leonardo, Atty. Aguilar had a short
conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions that may be propounded by
the police investigator and warned him that the statements that he may give might be used in evidence against
him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions voluntarily. According to Atty. Aguilar, Leonardo was
bent on revealing what really happened. Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted the investigation in Cebuano.
Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material points," Atty. Aguilar
asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very important engagement. The investigator agreed
to the lawyer's request. Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions
in his absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession had been prepared, the accused
and the document containing the confession should be brought to his office for "further examination." Atty.
Aguilar was in the police station for less than thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation. At about 1:30 or
2:00 p.m., Leonardo and his policeman escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused
whether he was maltreated while he was away and examined the suspect's body for contusions or abrasions.
Leonardo told him that he was not harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the document to
determine whether its contents conformed to the answers given by the accused in his presence. He
propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the document. Atty. Aguilar asked him whether he
understood its contents and whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the positive and signed the
document in the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort.
The three accused were charged with robery with homicide. Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not
guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial court rendered a decision convicting all the three accused for the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion to suffer the supreme penalty of
death by lethal injection; and Edwin Morial, due to his minority, to suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether Leonardo Morilas extra-judicial confession was valid since his counsel was not present during the
custodial investigation
RULING:
Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession is invalid since he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel
during the custodial investigation. An accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that
when the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that Leonardo and his

companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that
he left only after the latter had admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's respective
participation in the crime. For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from
its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination indeed, "in every phase of the investigation."
An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." Furthermore, Section 2(a) of RA 7438 requires that
"[a]ny person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." The
last paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted." The right of Leonardo Morial to counsel was therefore completely negated
by the precipitate departure of Atty. Tobias before the termination of the custodial investigation. If it were true
that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing that he had to abandon a client undergoing custodial
investigation, he could have terminated the same to be continued only until as soon as his schedule permitted,
advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his
client whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's absence. The records also disclose that
Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the custodial investigation
started. Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by his "coming and
going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure before the termination of the
proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added
the modifier "competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and effective"
counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial
investigation that the Constitution abhors and which this Court condemns. His casual attitude subverted the
very purpose for this vital right.

PEOPLE vs. AYSON

G.R. No. 85215
DOCTRINE:
A person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has
the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but
after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being
interrogated by the police:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

the continuing right to remain silent

and to counsel,
and to be informed thereof,
not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will;
and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected;

2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT [Or during preliminary investigation before a Judge] [Sec. 1, Rule

115, Rules of Court]

a)
b)
c)
d)

to refuse to be a witness;
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
WHILE TESTIFYING*, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some
crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

* he may testify but if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness."
FACTS:
Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of Philippine Airlines (PAL), misappropriated the proceeds of his collection.
Ramos made a statement, in a handwritten note (Exhibit A), to the PAL Management that he is willing to settle
the irregularities in his collection. Thereafter, information was filed against Ramos charging him with Estafa.
Ramos lawyers objected to the presentation of Exhibit A because the alleged admission was taken without
Ramos being represented by his lawyers, which was in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Judge
Ayson granted the objection and refused to admit Exhibit A. Thus, this petition for certiorari against respondent
Judge.
ISSUE:
1. W.O.N. the right against self-incrimination was violated
2. W.O.N the rights of persons in custodial investigation were violated.
3. W.O.N the rights of the accused in custodial investigation apply to persons under preliminary
investigation or already charged in court.
RULING:
1. No. Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides "No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to
answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to
incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. The right against self-incrimination is not selfexecuting or automatically operational. It must be claimed. It follows that the right may be waived,
expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
2. No. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides any person under investigation[custodial
investigation/interrogation] for the commission of an offense"-1)

he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right,

2)

nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be

used against him; and

3)

any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. )

The rights above exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused
persons. Custodial interrogation/[investigation] is meant "any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."
In this case, Ramos was not under custodial investigation
3. No, because he is no longer under custodial investigation. However, right against self-incrimination still
apply. Under the [Sec.1, Rule 115] Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled
among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be crossexamined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner
prejudice or be used against him.
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself'
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is
the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other
process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a
co-accused, or even for himself.
However, he may testify but if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness."
He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he
will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with
which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which
he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against selfincrimination

VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS

44 Phil 62 (1920)
DOCTRINE:
The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The

corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
FACTS:
In a criminal case pending before the CFI of Manila, EMETERIA VILLAFLOR andFLORENTINO
SOUINGCO are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro
Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court
ordered the defendant Villaflor, petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the
ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to selfincrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be imprisoned in Bilibid
Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.
The sole legal issue arising from the facts is whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be
examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and
that portion of the Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States,
providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the
representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial
judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court
has held on an identical question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON compelling a woman to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant violates her right
against self-incrimination.
RULING:
No. Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elementals and
ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to
purge the community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal
procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided not to protect the guilty but to
protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its
endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend
to establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her
guilt might only result in inducing her to tell a falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts can for any
substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in
order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of the Constitution
every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely
abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person,
particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific
Railway Co. vs.Botsfordsaid, "To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit

to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and
yet, as well suggested by the same court, even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is
the interest which the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the
modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental evasion, questions which are
put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the
duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a
disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to
one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with
the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again we lay down the rule
that
the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its
corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will
be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed,
no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the
same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the
person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood
as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is
hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against, the petitioner.

PEOPLE vs. NICANDRO

G.R. No. L-59378, February 11, 1986
DOCTRINE:
It is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating
officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a
person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.
FACTS:
Upon receiving complaints from concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of prohibited drugs by one alias

Nel, officers of the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police Station 5 placed Commodore Pension House at Ermita under
surveillance. After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the informant acting
as the buyer of marijuana was organized. The informant bought marijuana from Nelia Nicandro using the
marked bills and after the transaction the police immediately nabbed Nicandro. The police frisked Nicandro
and found the marked bills and marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper.
She was charged violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (1), (m), and (o) Article I, of
Republic Act 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act). The prosecution relied principally on Pat. Joves, who
testified that he saw the accused sell marijuana cigarettes to the unnamed police informant, which allegedly
the accused verbally admitted when she was under custodial investigation. Pat. Joves declared that he
informed the accused her constitutional rights upon commencing with the investigation.
After trial, the trial court convicted the accused as aforesaid and imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and a fine of P20,000.00.
ISSUES:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ALL
POLICE OF OFFICERS WHICH ARE HEARSAY.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WHICH WERE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION PETITION OF ACCUSED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
RULING:
Numerous factors combine to make the appeal meritorious.
In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied partly on her alleged oral admission declaraciones custodial
investigation, as testified to by Pat. Joves. This reliance is assailed as violative of Section 20 of Article IV of the
Constitution which reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to
counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be
sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article
IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he
must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do,
and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People VS.
Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.)
In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the
person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the
degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other
relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more
lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered

According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional rights when she was under custodial
investigation. What specific rights he mentioned to appellant, he did not say. Neither did he state the manner in
which the appellant was advised of her constitutional rights so as to make her understand them. This is
particularly significant in the instant case because appellant is illiterate and cannot be expected to be able to
grasp the significance of her right to silence and to counsel upon merely hearing an abstract statement thereof.
As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the
investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession
made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.
OTHER CASES CITED: Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the
accused during custodial investigation was inadmissible, although he had been apprised of his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel, for the reason that the prosecution failed to show that those rights were
explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently
understood" by the accuse.
Similarly, in People vs. Caguioa, the Court sustained the rejection by the trial court of the extrajudicial
admission made by the accused during custodial investigation, there being no showing by the prosecution that
there was sufficient compliance with the constitutional duty to inform the accused of his rights to silence and to
counsel, without which there could be no intelligent waiver of said rights. In said case, the accused a native
of Samar was interrogated in Tagalog. The prosecution did not show that the accused's acquaintance with
Tagalog was such that he could fully understand the questions posed to him.

BELTRAN vs. SAMSON

GR No. 32025, 53 Phil 570
DOCTRINE:
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is
a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by
the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but
such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons.
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered

him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. (Yan lang talaga ang
facts)
ISSUE:
Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes
evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
RULING:
Yes. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession.
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence
which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.

HERRERA VS. ALBA

GR No. 148220 - June 15, 2005
DOCTRINE:
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself."
The privilege of right against self-incrimination applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence
taken under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987)
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his
or her own defenses.
Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother Armi Alba,
filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7
August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To
support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D., a DNA analysis expert. In
her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an
accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further
argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity
testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February
2000 Order. He asserted that "under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional."
On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned
Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial courts
evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does
not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally,
the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity
testing.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution dated 23 May 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
RULING:
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against
self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to
testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with
approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary
to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege
applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA
513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to
submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from
the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145);
morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the
judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the
court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil.
62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial compulsion."

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his
or her own defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of
modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law,
rules, and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June
2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.
SO ORDERED.

LUMANLAW vs. PERALTA JR

G.R. No. 164953, February 13, 2006

DOCTRINES:
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges
against them.33 The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral
part of due process.34 Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial.

[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lumanlaw was charged with illegal possession of a dangerous drug in November 2002. He was
detained in the Manila City Jail by virtue of a Commitment Order. From the time of his arrest in 2002 up to the
filing of the instant Petition in 2004, his arraignment was postponed a total of 14 times for various reasons,
such as the absence of petitioners counsel, the trial judges unavailability, and the jail wardens failure to bring
him to court.
These postponements resulted in his detention for almost two years, without the benefit of an arraignment.
Thus, he filed two Motions to Dismiss the Information against him, on the ground that his right to speedy trial
had been violated. Both Motions were denied by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65, arguing that respondents failure to act expeditiously on
his arraignment violated his right to speedy trial and justified the dismissal of the charge against him.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a violation of the right to speedy trial.

RULING:
The right of the accused to speedy trial was deemed violated because, for almost two years, the trial court had
unreasonably failed to conduct the arraignment of petitioner.
The 30-day period for an arraignment provided in the Speedy Trial Act is not absolute. Judicial proceedings do
not exist in a vacuum, but have to contend with the realities of everyday life. Rather than merely making
mathematical calculations of periods that have elapsed between stages, one should consider if the delays
were vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified.
This Court reviewed the reasons for the postponements in the case and found that the violation of petitioners
right to speedy trial was manifest, given the length and the unreasonableness of a majority of the delays. It
saw in the fourteen postponements a lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the
arraignment as soon as the court calendar allowed.
An arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of the courts business and does not normally entail legal
gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to accused persons the charges leveled against them, ensuring their
understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute judge can
conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused is presented before the court. For this reason alone, the high
tribunal was astonished that the lower court could not complete this simple but fundamental stage in the
proceedings. The absence of petitioners counsel de parte during arraignment was not a valid reason to
postpone it. It would have been more prudent for the judge to have appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes
of arraignment only. This course of action became more compelling in the instant case when the accused
himself requested the appointment. Thus, the decision of respondent to deny the request was unreasonable,
without legal basis, and generally attributable to his inflexibility as regards contingencies.
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay was the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring petitioner to
court. Although the deferment of the arraignment until the accused was presented was justified, the problem
could have easily been averted by efficient court management. As an administrator, respondent judge should
have supervised his clerk of court to ensure a timely service of the produce orders on the wardens of the
Manila City Jail. Judges who set the pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication can prompt their
personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties.
The Court held that, under the given circumstances, respondent failed to assert his authority actively, so as to
expedite the proceedings. He allowed the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail wardens to dictate
the pace of the proceedings. As further aggravation, he did not exert any effort to expedite the arraignment
even after petitioner had filed two urgent Motions to Dismiss.
Judges should be more deliberate in their actions and make full use of their authority to expedite proceedings.
Delays in the disposition of cases erode the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lower its
standards, and bring it into disrepute.

ABADIA vs. CA
G.R. No. 105597, September 23, 1994
DOCTRINE:
Right to speedy trial; The right to speedy disposition of cases extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the
periods before, during and after the trial.
FACTS:
On April 27, 1990, private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested in connection with the December 1989 coup
attempt. He was detained for 9 months in the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati.
On January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against Lt. Col. Malajacan by the office of the Judge Advocate General alleging
violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th Articles of War (AW) for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman, respectively.
On March 7, 1991, a petition for habeas corpus was filed by Lt. Col. Malajacan with the CA which was dismissed by the same
court on the ground that pre-trial investigation for the charges against the respondent was already ongoing before a Pre-Trial and
Investigation (PTI) Panel of the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO).
3 months after these charges were filed, PTI Panel came out with a Resolution dated May 27, 1991 finding no evidence of direct
participation by Lt. Col. Malajacan in the December 1989 coup. It recommended that the latter be charged with violation of Art.
136 of RPC (Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Rebellion or Insurrection) and the 96th AW in relation to 94th thereof.
Consequently, all existing charges against him were dismissed and a new charge was filed with the General Court Martial (GCM)
No. 8 for violation of 96th AW for having allegedly been involved in a series of conferences with other military officers for
purposes of overthrowing the government, carrying with it the penalty of dismissal from service.
The Quezon City Prosecutor eventually came out with a resolution dated February 4, 1992 dismissing the charges.
Upon Lt. Col. Malajacans arraignment on April 22, 1992, he entered a special motion to dismiss the case on grounds of
prescription under Art. 38 of AW. He contended that the offense was supposed to have been committed between August and
November 1989, more than 2 years before his arraignment.
GCM decided in favor of Lt. Col. Malajacan and dropped the last remaining charge.
On May 27, 1992, he filed a second petition for habeas corpus before CA assailing his continued detention despite the dismissal of
all the charges against him.
On May 29, 1992, CA ordered petitioners Lt. General Lisandro Abadia, AFP Chief of Staff, Maj. General Arturo Enrile and
Commanding General of Phil. Army to produce the person of Lt. Col. Malajacan.
On June 11, 1992, petitioner Lt. Gen. Abadia filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of ROC to annul and set aside
CAs decision.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the case because the law itself provides no time frame for the proper
military officers to review the Court Martials dismissal.
2. WON the right to speedy trial extends to the military.
RULING:
1. NO. Petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules relating to review of cases dismissed by military tribunals in
violating the right of the accused to a speedy trial and in justifying his continued confinement.
The procedural gap in the rules cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain substantive rights have been or are being denied in
the meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of the 2nd paragraph of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which mandates
the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch of the government. Moreover, the absence of of rules and regulations mandating a reasonable period within which the
appropriate appellate military authority should act in a case subject to mandatory review is no excuse for denial of a substantive right.
The Bill of Rights provisions were crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations
which tend to nullify those rights.
2.

YES. Section 16, Art. III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases before all judicial, quasijudicial and administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods
before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to speedy
trial.

PEOPLE vs. SANCHEZ

G.R. No. 121039-15, October 18, 2001
DOCTRINE:
1) Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
2) In Martelino et al. vs. Alejandro et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In
the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial
publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to
prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
FACTS:
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our January 25, 1999 decision, penned by Justice Antonio
M. Martinez, affirming in the judgment of finding accused-appellants Mayor Antonio Sanchez, George
Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Pepito Kawit guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and additionally, ordering each of them to pay the
amount of (P700,000.00) to the heirs of the two victims as additional indemnity. While accusedappellants Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their
respective motions for reconsideration, it was only on December 6, 1999 that the OSG filed its
Comment thereto. And since Justice Martinez had retired earlier on February 2, 1999, in accordance
with A.M. No. 99-8-09 promulgated by the Court on February 15, 2000, the motions for reconsideration
filed by accused-appellants was assigned by raffle only on September 18, 2001 to herein ponente for

study and preparation of the appropriate action.

In his motion for reconsideration, Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and
conviction by publicity and that the principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan
presented by the prosecution are lacking in credibility. He likewise contends that the testimony of his
13-year old daughter vis--vis his whereabouts on the night of the felony should have been given full
faith and credit as against the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan. Lastly, Mayor Sanchez seeks the
reconsideration of the amount of the gargantuan damages awarded on the ground that the same have

no factual and legal bases.

Accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit, in their motion for reconsideration,
maintain that prosecution witnesses Centeno and Malabanan have been sufficiently impeached by
prior inconsistent statements allegedly pertaining to material and crucial points of the events at issue.
Not only that, they assert that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the
prosecutions version of events.

ISSUE:
WON 1) There was trial by publicity; 2) the witnesses presented were credible
RULING:
1) No, citing the case of People vs. Teehankee, Jr., It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case
at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances
an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of
appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated
the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
Furthermore, citing the case of Martelino et al. vs. Alejandro et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity,
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity.
2) It is hornbook doctrine in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate courts will respect these findings
considering that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. ((People vs. Mendoza)