Tank and Petroleum Use Mishaps

The Steel Tank Institute is unable to guarantee the accuracy of any information. Every effort has been
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By learning about the misfortunes of others, it is STI's hope to educate the public by creating a
greater awareness of the hazards with storage and use of petroleum and chemicals. Please refer to the many
industry standards and to the fire and building codes for further guidance on the safe operating practices
with hazardous liquids. Thanks and credit for content are given to Dangerous Goods-Hazmat Group
Network.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/DangerousGoods/
USA, ORE
SEPTEMBER 27 2007.
MECHANIC DIES FROM LACK OF OXYGEN IN TRANSPORT TANK
On February 4, 2004, a 23-year-old tank mechanic died from lack of oxygen after entering a chemical
transport tank prior to a scheduled inspection. OR-FACE received notification of the incident the next day. An ORFACE investigator was invited onsite by the employer. Local fire and emergency medical responders were at the
scene. This report is based on information from the onsite investigation, and reports from Oregon OSHA, law
enforcement, and the medical examiner.
The employer was a longtime Oregon company, based in Portland, specializing in the manufacture and
maintenance of transportation tanks. At the time, the firm had 5 factories and 11 sales branches in several western
states, employing over 550 workers, with about one-third in Oregon. On the day of the incident, at least two
management and three coworkers were present in the vicinity of the tank department where the incident occurred.
The firm had a written confined-space entry policy, which stated, No tank entry is permitted until the tank
passes the Confined Space Pre-entry Atmospheric Check and the reclassification Confined Space Form is
completed. The OSHA investigation found that documentation was not always completed, however, and employee
interviews indicated that atmospheric testing was not always performed. In late 2003, the employer trained a
designated person to perform atmospheric testing on all tanks prior to entry. The individual was transferred 2 weeks
prior to this incident and the duties were not reassigned.
The tank mechanic had worked for the employer since 1999, with duties that included inspecting and
repairing tanks. He completed a 45-minute hazardous materials training course and test certificate in his first year,
and was promoted to journeyman in 2001. Interviews by OSHA and the Medical Examiner indicated that he had
been given positive performance appraisals, had never been known to bypass safety measures, and reportedly had
completed hundreds of tank inspections similar to the one in this incident.
On the day of the incident, the tank mechanic arrived at work at 6:30 a.m., and was told to prepare a
container for dual inspection with an industry shipping inspector. About 7:45 a.m., the foreman helped the mechanic
back the chemical transport truck into a bay of the tank shop. The mechanic was last seen about 45 minutes later,
and was not missed until the industry inspector arrived shortly before 10 a.m.
The tank due for inspection that day was designated for the transport of silicon tetrachloride. Chemical
transport tanks go through two inspections: an annual visual inspection, and a 2.5 year visual and pressure check as
in this case. The visual and pressure check requires work inside the tank to verify structural integrity, and possible
welding.
The tank had been purged with inert nitrogen. A dated memo posted on the outside of the tank by the
owner stated: this container has been washed, and is free of any hazardous materials This container has a
breathable atmosphere only when proper tank entry is followed (fresh air moved through the container and use of
oxygen monitor before entering).

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The tank mechanic had placed a ladder next to the tank, opened the top manhole cover, and lowered a drop
light inside. Without testing the atmosphere, he then entered the tank for an unknown reason and collapsed at the
bottom of the ladder from lack of oxygen. His footprints did not extend beyond the base of the ladder.
When the inspector arrived, a coworker went looking for the tank mechanic and discovered him lying face
down inside the tank. He called for help, then took a deep breath and entered the tank to retrieve the victim, without
testing the atmosphere. The rescuer ran out of breath while trying to lift the victim up to others at the top of the tank,
and was only able to take very shallow breaths. He emerged from the tank unharmed.
Resuscitation efforts failed, and the victim was pronounced dead by emergency responders shortly
afterward. There were no injuries to indicate the victim had fallen into the tank rather than descending on his own.
Fire department personnel tested the atmosphere in the tank and found about 12% oxygen at the bottom of
the tank, 15% in the middle, and 17% at the top, all below the minimum safe level of 19.5% oxygen. The manhole
cover had been open by then for over an hour, and ambient air raised the oxygen level at the top of the tank.
Investigators found the employers atmospheric monitor was missing the necessary strap to reach the bottom of the
tank, indicating that even had the victim tested the atmosphere with available equipment, he would have been at risk
as he descended into the confined vessel.
Recommendation #1: Employers must evaluate confined spaces in the workplace. A permit-required
confined space requires written entry procedures, including posted documentation of test results by an
authorized person.
A confined space is defined as a space with (a) a restricted opening that makes entry and exit difficult, (b)
is large enough for a person to enter completely, and (c) is not designed to be occupied. Such spaces include pits,
wells, vats, ship compartments, silos, pipes, tunnels, tanks, sewers, and so on.
The evaluation of a confined space should involve testing the atmosphere, and also an assessment of
structural security, including the threat of collapse or engulfment, and the isolation of hazardous mechanical or
electrical energy. Occupational safety regulations (29 CFR 1910.146) require a written entry permit for confined
spaces with a potentially hazardous atmosphere or other conditions that could entrap or harm a worker. Employers
must establish written entry procedures for permit-required confined space. The procedures can be summarized in
five basic steps.
Evaluate. An employer must identify hazardous confined spaces in the workplace where workers may
be expected to enter, and post warning signs.
Test. An employer must provide appropriate equipment to test the atmosphere prior to entry. Tests
must be performed by a trained, authorized person. Testing equipment should be periodically checked
against known atmospheres to ensure reliability.
Inform. Hazards identified in test results must be documented in a written entry permit and posted
outside the space. A worker entering a confined space must be trained in entry procedures, and must
be allowed the opportunity to observe testing. Training and participation increases awareness of the
invisible dangers in a confined space.
Control. The employer must implement measures to prevent unauthorized entry. Prior to entry, a safe
atmosphere must be assured, usually involving continuous forced-air ventilation.
Monitor. Atmospheric conditions in a confined space can change rapidly. Testing should be repeated
prior to entry. The area in the confined space where work is performed must be continuously
monitored. A worker inside should always be accompanied by an attendant outside the space to
maintain communication, and implement a rescue plan if necessary. Entry must be authorized by an
entry supervisor.
Recommendation #2: Never enter a confined space without first testing the atmosphere with an appropriate
air-monitoring instrument.
Never trust your senses to determine if the air in a confined space is safe. The level of oxygen cannot be
determined without a calibrated instrument, and many toxic gases and vapors are odorless or overwhelm the sense
of smell.
Prior to entry, always test the air from outside the confined space to detect oxygen levels and toxic or
flammable atmospheres. Even brief exposure to a toxic or oxygen-deficient atmosphere can cause immediate
collapse. In some instances, workers putting their head inside a vat or descending a ladder into a confined space
have lost consciousness.

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All compartments must be tested where workers will be present, including the bottom, middle, and top of
the space workers must pass through. Gases may stratify based on density and OSHA recommends testing depths at
4 ft intervals.
Recommendation #3: Never enter a confined space without appropriate personal protective equipment for
safe entry.
Use appropriate personal protective equipment when working in a confined space. The required equipment
depends on conditions. Examples include physical protection (hardhat, goggles, gloves), respiratory protection (airpurifying or air-supplied respirators), ventilation fans to control atmospheric hazards, and fall protection (safety
harness, lifeline). Equipment that is adequate for some conditions may be insufficient for others. If no air is
available, for example, a filter mask will not help. Prior evaluation and preparation of the work area is critical.
Recommendation #4: A trained attendant must monitor workers in a confined space and be prepared for an
emergency response that does not involve direct entry of the space.
Work in a confined space must always be performed with a minimum of two persons. A trained attendant
must always remain outside the space and stay in communication with the workers inside. In case of emergency, the
function of the attendant is not to personally attempt a rescue, but to summon rescue and emergency services, and
prevent unauthorized persons from attempting a rescue. An attendant may only perform a rescue if relieved by
another attendant, and when provided with necessary training and equipment.
Over half of the workers who die in a confined space are would-be rescuers. The danger to an impulsive
rescuer emphasizes the need for a prearranged plan, training, and proper equipment readily available to implement
an emergency response. Equipment should include an atmospheric monitor, personal protective equipment, and
retrieval devices
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/stateface/or/04or002.html
USA, OH, COLUMBUS
SEPTEMBER 28 2007.
FUEL TANK LEAK TOPS 29,000 GALLONS
Spencer Hunt
A city-owned underground storage tank near Alum Creek leaked more than 29,000 gallons of biodiesel
fuel since late June, officials said this morning.
Last week, Columbus officials estimated as much as 3,000 gallons might have been lost from the tank at a
city garage located at 2100 Alum Creek Drive on the South Side.
The estimate rose after the city's Public Service Department matched invoices of biofuel delivered to the
15,000 gallon tank against the amount that went into city garbage trucks.
Ken Schultz, an assistant manager at the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency's central district office,
said the leak may have begun after June 21. That's when the 15,000 gallon tank was cleaned of regular diesel fuel so
that it could contain lower-polluting biodiesel. Mary Carran Webster, spokeswoman for the Columbus Public
Service Department, said the city is still studying the tank to determine why it leaked. One theory, she said, is the
cleaning removed a thick layer of sludge that kept fuel from leaking through tiny holes or cracks.
No one is sure how much may have leaked to the stream. Schultz said the city pumped more than 1,700
gallons of the fuel from the soil surrounding the tank as of yesterday. The pumping is still going on.
http://www.columbusdispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2007/09/27/leakytank.html
AUSTRALIA, WESTERN AUSTRALIA, PERTH
SEPTEMBER 28 2007.
EXPLOSION OF EMPTY FLAMMABLE CONTAINERS DURING HOT WORK AT DEMOLITION SITE
Incident
While cutting up scrap steel using oxy-propane cutting equipment at a demolition site, a labourer suffered
serious burns to the head, chest and arms when hot material slag and spatter ignited an old 20 litre flammable liquid
drum through a small hole in the side wall.
The drum that exploded was found to have contained epoxy thinners and was still partly filled.

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Causes

Due to lengthy exposure to the elements, the labels and markings on flammable liquid and oil drums at
the site had become illegible over time. Therefore the contents of the drums were unknown in some
cases.
A waste oil contractor emptied the oil from the oil drums but refused to remove the material from the
flammable liquid drums.
Old drums had been moved from a dedicated sign-posted drum storage compound to the demolition
area for disposal. Large-scale hot work was being carried out in the same area.
There was no procedure for drum storage.
No signage was displayed to warn of the danger or restrict access to the area where the drums were
located within the demolition area.
Employees who were trained in hot work procedures failed to realise the danger posed by the partly
filled flammable liquid drums stored in the demolition area and therefore no arrangements were made
for their removal.
Legal requirements
Under Section9(e)(ii) of the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 (MSIA), each employer must make
arrangements for the safe use, handling, processing, storage, transportation and disposal of all substances at the
mine.
The handling and disposal of old drums and containers containing residual material of a flammable or
explosive nature pose a significant threat of injury to employees if not carried out with appropriate precaution.
Under Regulation 4.3 of the Mines Safety and Inspection Regulations 1995 (MSIR), the manager and each
employer must ensure that personnel do not use welding oxy-acetylene cutting equipment or other hot work
equipment where there is a risk of personal injury.
Regulation 7.23 requires each responsible person at a mine to ensure, so far as is practicable, a safe means
of disposal is provided for empty or surplus hazardous substance containers.
Regulation 7.24 further requires each responsible person to ensure that all hazardous substance containers
have an appropriate label attached to the containers at all times.
Recommendations
In light of these requirements, the Registered Manager, principal employer and every employer at each
mine should therefore review and/or establish procedures for the site for the inspection, labelling, storage and safe
disposal of old hazardous substance and flammable containers at the mine. With this in mind, the following
recommendations are made:
A risk assessment or JSA should be conducted prior to commencing welding cutting or other hot work
in areas other than designated workshops or other areas designed and arranged for such activity.
Old hazardous substance and flammable drums and containers need to be segregated from work areas
to avoid accidental ignition or explosion occurring. Segregation distances should be similar to the
distances allocated for full hazardous substance containers where practicable.
Warning signage needs to be displayed in container storage areas with respect to any hazards
associated with the old drums to ensure that no ignition sources or other potential sources of danger
are introduced into the storage areas prior to disposal.
Daily workplace inspections should be undertaken to ensure hazards are identified and appropriately
managed or removed.
All personnel undertaking hot work at a mine should be appropriately trained and informed of the
dangers associated with containers containing vapours or residual amounts of hazardous or flammable
substances.
http://www.docep.wa.gov.au/resourcessafety/Sections/Mining_Safety/pdf_/MS%20GMP/MineSafe%20Magazine/MSH
_Pub_MineSafe0907.pdf
BRAZIL, SAO PAULO
OCTOBER 2 2007.
LIGHTNING CAUSES EXPLOSION AT COMANCHE STORAGE FACILITY
Comanche Clean Energy Corporation ("Comanche") experienced an explosion caused by a massive direct
lightning strike on the reserve tanks at the company's storage facilities last Friday that has resulted in a loss of one
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life as well as of fuel inventory. The fire began at 10:30 a.m. Sao Paulo time after the strike, which was the direct
cause of a dry electrical storm. Firefighters waged a battle against the fire, located 380 kilometers east of Sao Paulo,
amidst challenging weather conditions. One Comanche agricultural employee, who was driving past the tanks at the
time of the strike, tragically lost his life. Two workers remain hospitalized for further observation with non-life
threatening injuries.
The storage facility housed nine million liters, or approximately 37%, of the inventory held by Comanche
and scheduled for sale at a later date. The plant was not being used for fuel production purposes, as it was closed for
reconstruction. Construction was in early stages, and management does not expect the explosion to materially slow
Comanche's reconstruction plans.
A third party hired by the Company's insurer had previously confirmed that the Company had taken all of
the proper fire safety measures at the facility and was in compliance with the insurance covenants and requirements.
The reserves and equipment were fully insured and the company expects to be fully reimbursed for all damages and
loss of fuel, which were also recently audited.
Tom Cauchois, Chairman of Comanche, commented, "Our first concern is the well-being of our
employees. We extend our deepest sympathies and our prayers go out to the family of the worker who perished in
the explosion. We are attending to the families and victims of the fire and are committed to providing them with
support through this tragedy."
About Comanche
Founded in 2006, Comanche is engaged in the production of clean fuels in Brazil for domestic
consumption and for export. The company has acquired two operating ethanol plants, Canitar and Santa Anita, and
one new biodiesel plant, Salvador. It produces ethanol from sugar cane, which management believes to be the most
energy and cost efficient feedstock for the production of ethanol in the world. Comanche produces biodiesel from a
variety of feedstocks, optimizing feedstock acquisitions near-term to minimize cost. Its business focus is to be
vertically integrated into the majority of the company's feedstocks.
Safe Harbor Statement: This press release contains forward-looking statements. Forward-looking
statements are identifiable by words or phrases indicating that Comanche or its management "anticipates",
"believes", "expects", "looks forward", "plans" that a particular occurrence "will" be the result or occur; that an
"opportunity" will be realized, or similarly stated expectations. These forward-looking statements are subject to a
number of factors that could cause actual results to differ materially.
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/news_press_release,188882.shtml
USA, FLA, TAMPA
OCTOBER 3 2007.
$2 MILLION FIRE AT AMALIE
Khusro Khan
A fire at the Amalie Oil Co. bulk oil storage facility in Tampa, Fla., last Wednesday caused no serious
injuries but nearly $2 million in damages.
At about 1 a.m. a fire ignited inside the boiler room and threatened the surrounding structures, said
Tampa Fire Rescue captain Bill Wade. According to a Tampa Fire Rescue report, the facilitys large oil storage
tanks suffered fire damage and many thousand gallons of product were damaged by the heat of the fire. The
lubricant manufacturer stores motor oil, coolants and brake fluids in amounts ranging from 1,500 to 1.2 million
gallons at the site.
An estimated 50 firefighters, rescue squads and one hazardous materials team responded to the fire that
was brought under control in an hour. Thirty employees were inside the facility at the time of the incident, but all
exited the area safely, explained Wade.
Senior Vice President Dennis Madden told Lube Report, The fire was very much contained to two motors
associated with our VM [viscosity modifier] solubilization unit, and some electrical wiring that leads to our building
was damaged, but power was restored within a few hours. No one was injured, and no real or permanent damage
was sustained. Our building is fine. Other than the VM that was in the unit, we didnt lose any oil.
Located at the Port of Tampa on Floridas Gulf of Mexico Coast since 1956, the 450,000 square foot
manufacturing, packaging and shipping facility is Amalie Oils main production site. The facility has over 20
million gallons of bulk blending and storage capacity. The company ships lubricants to all 50 states and to over 70
foreign nations. Amalie Oil maintains satellite offices in Jacksonville, Fla., and Los Angeles.
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All safety procedures were in effect, and thats why damage was minor and not major, said Amalie Oil
Vice President Al Vittorino. Although the fire is still under investigation, Madden said that we feel pretty certain
that we know the cause of the fire, but the Tampa Fire Department has to issue their official report before we can
comment on the cause.
The Sept. 26 blaze is the second fire-related incident in September to strike an oil company. A small
electrical fire triggered a blaze inside a storage warehouse last month at the Warrenton Oil Co. in Truesdale, Mo.,
that burned down the lubricant and fuel distributors corporate offices and warehouse, and injured two firefighters.
http://www.imakenews.com/lng/e_article000920415.cfm?x=bblNV4M,b5bfFfBp
UK, CARDIFF
OCTOBER 5 2007.
BLAZE IN FORMER FUEL SITE'S TANK
Work men dismantling an old petrol station on the outskirts of Cardiff had to call in fire-fighters after two
underground petrol tanks caught fire.
The fire service said some residual fuel was left in the lining of one of the tanks despite procedures to
pump it out being followed correctly. The fuel ignited while the tank was being dismantled during "hot work".
Foam was sprayed over the tank. No-one was injured in the blaze at the site on Llantrisant Road, Llandaff.
The contractors were clearing the site to make way for a supermarket.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/south_east/7027121.stm
CANADA, EDMONTON
OCTOBER 7 2007.
PROPANE PERIL AVERTED - EXPLOSION COULD HAVE LEVELLED CITY BLOCKS
Daniel Macisaac
Quick response by Edmonton firefighters and their hazardous materials team deffused a potentially
catastrophic situation yesterday afternoon - a propane leak at a north-end gas station that, had it exploded, could
have levelled much of the surrounding neighbourhood.
CREATE SHOCKWAVES
"At least a city block - probably several city blocks," said Pump 14 Capt. William Brown.
"If it was to explode, it would definitely create some shockwaves."
Speed was key as firefighters and police quickly blocked off traffic and set up a perimeter around the Coop Gas Bar on the corner of 82 Street and 127 Avenue, north of the Yellowhead Trail, just around noon.
Members of the haz-mat team, wearing masks and oxygen tanks, waded into a propane cloud around a
vertical storage tank containing 3,200 kilos of highly explosive fuel.
"The wind was helping disperse the cloud," Brown said.
"But the problem was we just had to get close and into the cloud - into that explosive area - to shut the
tanks down.
"Any kind of ignition source could have set it off - a portable radio, cigarettes or the flip of a light switch."
The tall propane tank also stands within metres of the Co-op gas pumps. But within minutes the firefighters
found the source of the leak - coming off the valve - backed off the valve and shut everything down.
Mel Anderson, visiting from Yorkton, Sask., was lined up for a car wash when he witnessed the
firefighters in action.
He says it was surprising how coolly they performed.
"I could see the danger with the propane leaking and the chance of an accident," he said.
Brown put the explosive situation down to human error - and perhaps faulty equipment.
"We had an inexperienced attendant filling propane bottles on his first day on the job and trying to put 40
pounds of propane into a 20-pound bottle," Brown said.
Firefighters also examined the storage tank and valve and shut the unit down pending further investigation.
However, within the hour the gas bar had reopened its car wash and resumed pumping gas.
Vijay, the gas-bar manager, declined to give his last name or comment on the incident.
REVIEW
Spokesman Andrew Horton says Alberta Environment and city authorities will be looking at it, too, to
determine if a fine, licence review or other action is warranted.
"If an owner of a station is not properly training employees, we can even work with them on training to
eliminate the risk," he said.
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Brown says there's a definite link between the labour crunch and lack of training - and that he's heard of
similar incidents across the city.
http://www.edmontonsun.com/News/Edmonton/2007/10/07/4557172-sun.html
USA, WASH, TACOMA
OCTOBER 8 2007.
HUGE EXPLOSION ROCKS TACOMA - FOUNDRY FIREBALL SHOOTS HUNDREDS OF FEET INTO
AIR
Hector Castro, Brad Wong and Kathy Mulady
A powerful explosion rocked Tacoma Saturday afternoon, sending four injured workers to the hospital,
shooting a fireball hundreds of feet into the sky, shutting down highways and banning aircraft for a five-mile radius.
The series of events leading to the explosion began as a tanker truck driver was loading propane into one
of two stationary tanks at Atlas Castings & Technology. Two smaller explosions occurred, followed by a massive
one that blew the truck apart, with the axle flying hundreds of feet in the air before landing on a state Route 16
overpass.
"It was burning as it landed on the overpass," Washington State Trooper Jeff Merrill said. "We're lucky it
didn't fall on someone."
The driver of the truck, a man in his 60s, survived but is in critical condition at Harborview Medical
Center. He works for IXL, a trucking company that contracts with Ferrellgas, a propane supplier.
The other three injured men are employees of Atlas. All are in stable condition with non-life-threatening
injuries.
Firefighters remain concerned that the two tanks may yet blow. Saturday night, they continued to pour
water over them, using remote control devices. Even as they do so, a fire is burning in the asphalt below the
containers, fueled by leaking propane.
Deputy Tacoma Fire Chief Jolene Davis said one of the two sationary tanks contained about 11,000
gallons, and the other contained about 9,000 gallons.
The fire is expected to burn through the night.
Residents who had been evacutated were still out of their homes late Saturday.
The explosions were heard as far as two miles away and blew out windows in nearby businesses. A onesquare-mile area was evacuated, and about 13,000 residents were temporarily without power.
The scene immediately after the explosion was chaotic. Employees covered with black soot stumbled
outside, one limping from a knee injury. Initially, some employees could not get to their muster areas and left, but
later a company spokesmen said all 32 employees at the foundry were accounted for.
A Tacoma police sergeant, who arrived on the scene, was moving people out of the way.
"If you really want to help, say some prayers," the officer said.
Washington State Patrol briefly closed Interstate 5 in both directions. State Route 16, which intersects with
I-5 near the plant, remained closed into the evening. Flames shot high over the Nalley Valley business at 3021 S.
Wilkeson St. in the industrial part of Tacoma, south of the Tacoma Dome.
Mesina Bach, who was shopping at a nearby party supply store, said the two smaller explosions drew her
attention. She went outside the store and was watching the trucker, who was near the tank and his truck, when the
last and largest of the three explosions occurred. At that point, she began to run and lost sight of him. Pieces of
metal rained down on her as she ran.
"It was insane," Bach said. "I felt like I was in a James Bond movie."
Atlas maintenance worker Troy Richey was inside the foundry at the time and said there were two minor
explosions -- and then a big one.
Several Atlas employees said explosions are common, occuring when cool liquid contacts molten metal.
An explosion last year was powerful enough to break some windows in the foundry, said Corthay Johnson, who has
worked at the foundry for two years.
The part of the foundry where Saturday's explosion occurred was shut down at the time of the blast
because it operates only four days a week.
The arriving fire crews took a defensive position, setting up unmanned water lines so they could avoid
entering the grounds. Because of the risk of more explosions, firefighters were staying back and planned to let the
fire burn itself out.
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The Tacoma company, founded in 1899, occupies 18 acres and has more than 500,000 square feet of
manufacturing space. The facility produces high-grade steel parts for the U.S. Navy and offshore drilling
operations. It also made some large steel sections for the recently completed Tacoma Narrows Bridge.
Seattle resident Michael Naiman, driving to Portland on Interstate 5 near the Tacoma Mall Boulevard exit,
said he saw the explosion.
"I saw a big red fire ball, then it hiccupped onto itself and turned into a mushroom cloud," he said. "I could
see fire down the embankment."
The explosion was felt for miles away, according to witnesses.
One woman, who has lived in a house overlooking the foundry for 10 years, said explosions are common.
"We're so used to hearing those down there," said Lindy Glamuzina. She came outside her home after the initial
explosions and began videotaping the fire. When the third, larger explosion hit, "it just rocked you back," she said.
A truck hit one nearby resident as he stood in the street; he was taken away by an ambulance.
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/334588_tacomafire07.html
USA, TN, NASHVILLE
OCTOBER 9 2007.
TANKER EXPLODES SENDING OIL INTO NEARBY CREEK
Crews in Donelson spend most the day Monday cleaning up after a tanker truck exploded sending nearly
1,000 gallons of oil onto the pavement and into a nearby creek.
The explosion occurred at the BP gas station on the corner of Lebanon Road and McGavock Pike.
The tanker was collecting waste oil when it burst into flames just after 6 a.m. Monday.
Christine Smith works across street and witnessed the explosion.
She said, This big boom, I mean whoom, and I looked up and I could see a ball of flames and I ran out the
door and the driver, the delivery man was running across the parking lot at the same time We could just see the
guy, he was on fire and he was ripping his shirt off.
There was so much oil, some flowed down the pavement and into a storm drain about 100 feet away.
HAZMAT teams pumped out as much as they could but some of the oil ended up in a stream behind the
gas station.
First Response and Metro Water officials laid down absorbent cloths to soak up some of the oil.
They also created a dam in the middle so the oil could float on top of the water.
By doing so they were able to put a tube through the middle of the dam to sort out the clean water, leaving
most of the oil above the dam.
The cause of the explosion is under investigation.
The driver of the tanker was burned and taken to Vanderbilt University Medical Center.
His condition is unknown.
http://wkrn.com/nashville/news/tanker-explodes-sending-oil-into-nearby-creek/122395.htm
MEXICO, VERACRUZ
OCTOBER 11 2007.
UNPROTECTED, THREE WORKERS DIE IN MEXICO PIPELINE ACCIDENT
Three Pemex workers died when they were exposed to toxic gases while cleaning a pipeline in the
Mexican Gulf state of Veracruz, the state-owned oil giant said. Pemex said the pipeline at which the accident
occurred Monday had been out of service since a leak was detected on Sept. 26. The employees were cleaning the
pipeline when "a gas pocket unexpectedly burst in the pipe ... poisoning the workers," Pemex said. The state-owned
company said the pipeline did not pose "a risk to the population" because it was out of service. The Veracruz state
government said in a statement that the three workers had not been provided with safety equipment and were killed
instantly when they inhaled the gas.
http://www.downstreamtoday.com/News/Articles/200710/Unprotected_Three_Workers_Die_in_Mexico_6440.aspx

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USA, OK, MARSHALL COUNTY
OCTOBER 12 2007.
SALT TANK FIRE IN MARSHALL CO.
A salt water tank fire in Little City had emergency officials on high alert on Thursday.
The tank caught fire at around 11 oclock Thursday morning. A company spokesman said that it caught fire
when workers were painting the water tank next to two other tanks that contain oil.
"We were painting a fiberglass water tank and had a little gas venting off. We think painters were painting
it. We dont know what ignited it. Its under investigation," Cimrex energy production foreman Ben Duff said.
Foam was used to put out the fire. Officials say no one was hurt
http://www.kxii.com/news/headlines/10486547.html#
USA, IA, URBANDALE
OCTOBER 16 2007.
150 GALLONS OF DIESEL FUEL SPILL INTO CREEK
A ruptured fuel tank caused about 150 gallons of diesel fuel to spill into a tributary of Walnut Creek in
Urbandale on Sunday.
The spill originated about 8 a.m. at Pilot Travel Center, 11957 Douglas Ave., after a truck backed over a
scale, rupturing the fuel tank. The fuel entered the creek through a storm water intake.
Booms and pads were used to stop and absorb the fuel in the stream, but the Iowa Department of Natural
Resources said rain caused the fuel to move down the creek rapidly, making most of it unrecoverable.
"It's probably fortunate this happened when we had all the rain because the impacts to the stream could
have been much greater if the creek was low," said Ted Petersen, an environmental specialist for the DNR. "All of
the extra water will help dilute the diesel much quicker."
The creek runs through Living History Farms. The DNR is investigating.
http://desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071015/NEWS/710150336/-1/SPORTS12

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