NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M.

DAYRIT
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989

FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for
violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness
(P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of result of our continuous
surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified sources
that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions arent licensed to
possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders
of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives
and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of
Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers
Search warrant was a general warrant
Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege
under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the
complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in
connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under
oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
Probable Cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection which the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.

This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the

complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase
illegal possession of firearms etc. Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other
words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the
invalidation of this case.
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner v.
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent

Facts:Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila,
and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been
illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by
the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case
for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg.,
Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the
premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance
company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm.
After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3)
tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules
providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside,
and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken
thereunder. Without costs.

Alvarez vs. CFI

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain
Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging
usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the information was based on
his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the
warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized
different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc.
Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez
moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned
to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to
retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez
elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the
Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in
whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the
issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable.

Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that
there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based
upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an
oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act

faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his
attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury
could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath
was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers
are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to
the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The
Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be
presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable
cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of
other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not
personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicants knowledge of the facts is
mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus
the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts

PAPA v. MAGO
G.R. No. L-27360/February 28, 1968/EN BANC
Petitioners:
Ricardo G. Papa (Chief of Police of Manila), Juan Ponce Enrile (Commissioner of Customs), Pedro Pacis (Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila), Martin Alagao (Patrolman, head of counter-intelligence of the Manila Police Department)
Respondents:
Remedios Mago
Hilarion Jarencio (Presiding Judge of Br. 23, CFI of Manila)
J. Zaldivar
November 4, 1966 having received information the day before that a certain shipment of misdeclared and undervalued
personal effects would be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila, Alagao and a duly deputized agent of the
Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance of two trucks allegedly carrying the goods. When the trucks left the customs
zone, elements of the counter-intelligence unit intercepted them in Ermita. The trucks and the nine bales of goods they
carried were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation those claiming ownership showed the
policemen a Statement of Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501 issued by the Bureau of Customs
in the name of one Bienvenido Naguit.
Mago filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition for Mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, alleging that
she was the owner of the goods seized, which were purchased from Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga. She
hired the trucks owned by Lanopa (who filed with her) to bring the goods to her residence in Sampaloc, Manila. She
complained that the goods were seized without a warrant, and that they were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of
the Tariff and Customs Code even if they were misdeclared and undervalued because she had bought them without
knowing they had been imported illegally. They asked that the police not open the bales, the goods be returned, and for
moral and exemplary damages.
November 10, 1966 Judge issued an order restraining the police from opening the nine bales in question, but by then
some had already been opened. Five days later Mago filed an amended petition including as party defendants Pedro Pacis
and Martin Alagao.

December 23, 1966 Mago filed a motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory ordered by the court of
the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be released upon her posting of the
appropriate bond. The petitioners in the instant case filed their opposition, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over
the case and thus no jurisdiction to order the release (case under jurisdiction of CTA), and as the goods were not declared
they were subject to forfeiture.
March 7, 1967 assailed Order issued by Jarencio, authorized release under bond of goods seized and held by petitioners
in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code. The bond of P40,000.00 was filed five days later. On
the same day, Papa filed on his own behalf a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Manila Police Department
had been directed by the Collector of Customs to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the courts action on the MR, petitioners filed the present action.
Arguments of Petitioners (that seem important)
(1) CFI had no jurisdiction over the case
(2) Mago had no cause of action in the civil case filed with the CFI due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies
before invoking judicial intervention
Arguments of Respondents
(1) It was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496
and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure,
and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs
(2) Petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and
said goods had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs
IMPORANT ISSUE (theres another involving illegal search and seizure): WON the judge acted with jurisdiction in
issuing the Order releasing the goods in question
HELD: NO. Petition granted, case filed by Mago dismissed.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, to
(1) assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties,
accruing under the tariff and customs laws
(2) prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and
(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.
The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry". As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal
permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges
must be in full.
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General
wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case
amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties,
taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had
been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance"
itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory, shows that the quantity of the goods was
underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. (e.g. 40 pieces of ladies sweaters assessed
in the Statement when there actually 42 dozen; 100 watch bands were assessed but 2,209 dozen, etc.)
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section
2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The Court had held before (and did again in this
case) that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, and
that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau of
Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on
November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief,
Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, the Bureau of Customs had regained

jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector
of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other
charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods
in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time
the petition for mandamus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the
warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings
had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The Court reiterated its ruling in De Joya v. Lantin: The owner of seized goods may set up defenses before the
Commissioner of Customs during the proceedings following seizure. From his decision appeal may be made to the Court
of Tax Appeals. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect
render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax
Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure
and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such
law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is
a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance
should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control,
even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually
seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the
exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have
jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure
and detention on January 12, 1967. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the
Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967
releasing said goods.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ vs.COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search
warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions).
Firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the
quashal of the search warrant and the validity of which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but
anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court.
ISSUE: W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its
territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial
jurisdiction
HELD: A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our
jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public
necessity.
A judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that
a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already
been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal provision,
statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover, in
our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the
warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but
is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled.
The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and
the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal
case:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for
purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling

circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court,
without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court.
All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal
of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the
same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion
to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum
shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate
higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further
proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the
criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefore.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and
filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the
case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search
warrants incident to the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED.