July 20, 2016

Authors
Matthew Ansley,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Patrick E. Boyle,
Harvard Kennedy School
Nicholas Dube,
East Carolina University
Najia Humayun,
Georgia Institute of Technology

ATLANTIC MEMO #50

Future-Proofing NATO:
A Forthcoming Decade of Change

Stephan Lbbert,
Leuphana University Lneburg
Joss Meakins,
Columbia University
Edgar Palomino,
University of Pennsylvania
Alfie Shaw,
University of Oxford

INTRODUCTION
NATO is now closer to the brink of war than it has been since 1991. If peace and
prosperity are to be maintained, the Alliance must adapt to the proliferation of
threats that it faces, which is only possible if it recognizes that the 20th century's
bipolar world of stable borders, guaranteed identities, and clearly defined opponents
is over. In order to address new threats in the forthcoming decade effectively, the
Alliance must (1) improve its electronic warfare capabilities, (2) adopt hybrid models
of national defense, (3) coordinate efforts on economic warfare, (4) secure its
space-based infrastructure, and (5) integrate research into developing threats.
The key to dealing with unconventional threats is to strengthen unity and cohesion.
This should be achieved by: (1) countering disinformation campaigns with the help
of NGOs, (2) redoubling public diplomacy efforts, and (3) state-building efforts in
regions of high risk.
NATO should adopt an innovative conventional response to the rising ambitions of
Russia and China that is appropriate to the contemporary context in which it exists,
rather than a rehash of its Cold War strategy. In the case of the former, the Alliance
has overlooked the Arctic area and must close its capabilities gaps. As regards the
latter, NATO must involve China in both dialogue and operations in order to create
an effective diplomatic platform.

Cornel Turdeanu,
Simon Fraser University
Dawid Walentek,
University of Amsterdam

Policy Workshop Competition

Shaping our NATO: Young Voices
on the Warsaw Summit
Category A:
Preparing for NATO 2026

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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Directors

1. Adapt to revolutions in warfare.

Current Alliance strategy and procurement indicates a preference for adaptation of
Cold War planning rather than innovation. This view is underpinned by the belief
that NATO needs only improve on its twentieth century tools, rather than developing
a new strategic armory better suited to twenty-first century challenges. The Alliance
must be proactive in planning if it is to maintain its technological and strategic edge,
avoiding surprises on the battlefield.
1.1 Rectify electronic warfare inferiority through investment.
NATOs inferiority to opposing forces in electronic warfare (EW) will be a major issue for defending both current and future members. EW threatens NATO's advanced C3I capabilities, which are critical to NATO strategy and tactics. Denied
these capabilities, NATO forces may find themselves at a disadvantage on the battlefield. Investing further in EW capabilities will reduce the risk of NATO intelligence,
troop, and equipment losses whilst enhancing NATO's military effectiveness.

Dr. Johannes Bohnen

Jan-Friedrich Kallmorgen

Potential adversaries have committed more resources to EW than has NATO. While
attempting to match potential adversaries may be unfeasible for bureaucratic, financial, or political reasons, NATO's EW mission should at least be enlarged. There
should be enough EW capability to ensure shifts and deployments of sustainable duration. Excessively long shifts invite mistakes. Emphasis should be placed on keeping
NATO's C3I systems functioning reliably, including investing in personnel specialized
in cyber defense. Though part of an EW mission, this task force may be raised from
other NATO areas such as the Alliance Communications and Information Systems
School in Latina, Italy. NATO forces should be trained to operate in a network-denied
environment so that they are prepared to meet this possibility.
The costs of the expanded program should be borne collectively by the allies. This
could be achieved with joint initiatives across national boundaries, drawing upon inherent specialties and benefiting from diverse perspectives within and from allies.
Special care should be given to assessing EW equipment already in NATO's possession; upgrades represent a cheaper alternative to development.
1.2 Counter hybrid offense with hybrid defense.
At current levels of defense spending, NATO cannot deter by being a lion, so it must
be a fox. Rather than countering hybrid tactics with smart defense, the Alliance should
counter hybrid attack with hybrid defense. This strategy should center on the (re)introduction of national military service. NATO should invest in preparation for asymmetric defensive warfare in its threatened allies. Following the Swiss model of national
defense, NATO must, amongst other things, encourage the adoption of total defense
strategies by its most vulnerable members in order to raise not only the cost of conflict, but the cost of occupation for potential adversaries, thereby reducing the risk of
conflict. Hybrid defense cannot be NATO's only response to hybrid offense, but, given
current willingness to act and to spend on defense, it represents a viable and positive
alternative.
This strategy would undermine the advantage that NATO's would-be enemies gain
from superior concentrations of conventional troops by raising the cost of an invasion
to prohibitively high levels, not necessarily at the invasion phase, but certainly by the
occupation phase, forcing the enemy to question at the strategic level whether conflict
is a worthwhile pursuit. In addition, strengthening in-situ capability would reduce the
Alliance's vulnerability to anti-access and area denial tactics, a key threat to the Alliance's utility.
This strategy would strengthen national identity and emphasize the values that underpin NATO, reducing vulnerability to hybrid offense of the sort seen in Crimea. It would
increase the visibility of the military in society and heighten popular and political support for it.
1.3 Target adversaries' financial infrastructure.
NATO has underachieved in asymmetric conflicts and confrontations with non-state
actors. Targeting adversaries' financial infrastructure will counter asymmetry, while
complementing conventional capabilities.
Targeting financial infrastructure should become a structural element of NATO's policy. Economic warfare has been used in the past by individual NATO members, but
never by the Alliance. NATO's interest in this area should move beyond research on
merely macroeconomic trends.
NATO should target the elements of the financial infrastructure: physical (e.g. trade
and transport nodes and pipelines) and non-physical (e.g. banking, online sales platforms). Terrorist groups, organized crime, and those advancing offensive hybrid strategies largely depend on the combination of the two in order to finance their activities.
Economic warfare means mapping enemies' financial infrastructure, then identifying
and targeting the weakest element of the system through either soft (e.g. introduction
2

of economic sanctions), or hard (e.g. destroying an element of transport infrastructure)

means.
Research and acquisition of economic warfare capability is currently conducted at the
national level. Allowing NATO to synthesize such efforts will increase efficiency and,
consequently, reduce expenditure while broadening the pool of knowledge.
1.4 Defend spaceborne strategic infrastructure.
NATO must move to actively safeguard critical strategic spaceborne infrastructure,
both from direct attack and the growing threat of orbital debris. If nothing is done, the
Alliances GPS, communications, and intelligence satellites will be threatened. Investing in defenses for existing space-based infrastructure against ground threats is critical. Future satellites and currently deployed systems could be better protected by
dedicated space surveillance and tracking, ground-launched and space-based interceptors, and pre-programmed evasive patterns in satellite or ground-control memory
for ready use. Defenses should be equally effective against both hostile attack and
errant debris. NATO should also investigate economical debris-clearing technologies,
including reducing the debris from each launch with reusable rockets like SpaceX's
Falcon 9, and using high-energy ground-based lasers to deorbit strategic debris safely.
NATO must revamp its training exercises to include honing navigational and command
and control techniques without the communications or navigation satellites it currently
uses. A recent US Navy exercise in California is a novel model, where GPS and other
satellite capabilities were jammed intentionally. Devoting resources to developing
methods to rapidly replace satellite capabilities that are lost due to orbital debris or a
direct attack will also increase the redundancy of this infrastructure. Funding research
and development of rapid space lift capabilities to quickly get a new satellite into orbit
and for high atmosphere balloon GPS and communication systems are both plausible
avenues.
1.5 Create a NATO Opposing Force Office.
Intelligence, technology and expertise with personnel and perspectives from across
the Alliance should be combined in a NATO Opposing Force Office to conduct research and investigations into future opponents technologies, strategies and counterpoints. Given the game-changing nature of technologies like autonomous weapons
systems, advanced directed energy and kinetic weapons, and the proliferation of
stealth technology, the Office's adversary team-mindset will allow forward-thinking
investigations into battlefield utility every member can use, preventing future opponents from surprising NATO forces with new tricks.

2. Reduce vulnerability to unconventional threats by encouraging unity and

cohesion.
In most areas NATO has developed an intimidating strength in traditional military warfare. As a response, state and non-state actors increasingly opt for Hybrid Warfare
and unconventional ways to throw NATO off balance. Instead of attacking the Alliance
in a conventional way, state and non-state adversaries try to weaken the community
from the inside through the clandestine dissemination of ideologically loaded disinformation or various recruitment strategies. To counter for unconventional risks and
protect NATO's foundation unity and cohesion it is crucial to explain the importance of NATOs ability to act and the actions the Alliance undertakes in an objective and multi-perspective manner to the citizens of the member countries.
2.1 Promote of NGOs to create independent information.
To tackle the threat of disinformation and declining willingness to act amongst NATO
member state populations, NATO needs to restructure its information policy. Most
citizens are only confronted with half-truths from media, hearsay, and other subjective
reports about NATO. Individual investigations into NATO, require citizens to invest
3

significant time and effort in research or the utilization of NATO media such as its Facebook page and YouTube channel. Although these formats represent a significant
improvement in NATO public diplomacy, they are not suited to future challenges. With
the population becoming increasingly multicultural, national interests diversifying, and
the influence of ideology increasing, the variety of personal interests and perspectives
increases even more.
Unilateral information broadcast from NATO itself would not be accepted in all parts of
society and could be perceived as NATO propaganda, as the reception of Russian
media disinformation has shown. Hence, the role of private institutions offering sound
information from multiple perspectives will become increasingly important in the struggle for unity and cohesion within the alliance.
NATO should support independent NGOs in order to promote objective and multiperspective media sources. Increasing support will allow such institutions to improve
their current offerings and add new accessible formats, for example monthly TV debates and independent video-channels.
2.2 Expand public diplomacy to increase support for specific policies.
In light of the threat of declining support for specific NATO policies among the publics,
NATO should foreground its role in defending the democratic values of such populations. Those that produce anti-NATO rhetoric often paint the Alliance as a militaristic
and confrontational actor. To counter these arguments and declining willingness to
act, NATO must credibly be understood as an Alliance that serves to underwrite
peace, ensuring the principles of democracy, the freedom of the individual and the rule
of law principles in stark contrast to those of the Alliance's adversaries.
To promote this understanding amongst member state populations, NATO should
ensure that Public Affairs work is not just a marketing strategy, but a real chance for
dialogue between NATO leaders and the public. Only if people feel that they can contribute to defending peace will they value NATO's capacity to act and, concomitantly,
demand independent and objective information. For this reason, the Alliance should
expand its current outreach and engagement efforts (e.g. NATO conferences for university students) and develop continuous interaction formats like public polls, panel
discussions and citizen workshops that highlight NATO's values, broaden access to
the Alliance, and provide an insight into security policy topics.
2.3 Improve social programs to reduce vulnerability to hybrid warfare.
To prevent conflicts within member countries, many fueled by weaponization of the
media by adversaries, NATO should prevent the alienation and marginalization of
recently stateless former-Soviet citizens and international refugees. NATO should
increase cooperation with the EU, starting by participating in the Eastern Partnership
Program, and expand the work of the NATO Centre for Excellence in Civil Military
Operations in order to encourage social projects. Furthermore, non-EU NATO members should contribute financially to existing EU or national programs in those countries targeted (e.g. social inclusion of Russian minority in Estonia or Syrian refugees in
Germany). Within the member countries, domestic best practices should be adopted
to ensure that the respective ethnic groups will be optimally integrated into member
countries' society and their values.

3. Prevent conflict within a changing international system.

NATO must prepare to interact with a fluctuating international balance of power in a
manner which prioritizes cooperation over competition. The possibility for conflict due
to increasing tensions in the Arctic should be deterred through the strengthening of
NATO's military presence there. NATO should react to the rise of China through diplomatic means by establishing partnership with the country and giving it an active
voice in NATO operations in which it is a stakeholder.

3.1 Strengthen presence in contentious Arctic areas.

NATO must ensure that it closes its capability gaps in the Arctic. These gaps are evident when comparing Russias and NATOs icebreaker fleets, search and rescue assets, and Arctic military bases. Several measures can be taken to ensure the gaps in
these sectors are closed.
In response to Russia's numerical and qualitative superiority in icebreakers, NATO
must begin a multinational project to develop a common heavy icebreaker platform.
Arctic allies like Canada, Denmark, Norway, and USA should take the lead on this
project and involve other willing partners through a smart defense project. Development of both nuclear and conventionally fueled icebreakers should be considered. By
developing one icebreaker platform as opposed to several, money could be saved on
R&D and duplication of work and capability avoided. Next a NATO Arctic icebreaker
fleet should be created with a common rotating command, based in several locations
in the Arctic.
NATO should build search-and-rescue bases in the Arctic. This would be done to assure safe passage is possible through Arctic shipping routes in the NATO allies' Arctic.
It would ensure that NATO allies are better prepared to respond to emergencies than
Russia, therefore strengthening sovereignty. The bases would be operated under a
framework nations concept system, with a focus of personnel and equipment from
larger allies and Arctic allies. These bases would lay groundwork and establish infrastructure like air strips, so that they may quickly be converted into military bases if
tensions in the Arctic increase in the future.
The use of drones should become a mainstay for surveillance and quick response to
emergencies. Unmanned aircraft and watercraft are able to be deployed in much larger numbers and at longer intervals than manned vehicles could ever be. This would be
ideal for the vast Arctic geography and could be deployed from search and rescue
bases.
3.2 Establish partnership with China.
Chinas rising status in the international system may form an unfamiliar balance of
power in the next decade. NATO must prepare to not be surprised by this shift, and
must avoid isolating China, thereby reducing the belligerent tendencies it is already
exhibiting the beginning stages of. There are practical ways the US can work within
the structure of NATO to promote peace with China. Primarily, NATO must make China a "partner". NATO must assure that this offer of partnership is not merely symbolic
by giving China a concrete role in operations in which it is a stakeholder. Economic
negotiations, such as the terms of the opening of shipping routes in the Arctic, can
serve as a feasible starting point. Through this partnership, NATO can choose cooperation over competition with China.

CONCLUSION
Effectiveness is a significant source of NATOs legitimacy. The Alliance is one of the
key guarantors of peace and order in a period otherwise characterized by disorder,
confusion, and animosity. NATO must be both reactive and directive, forcing its enemies to respond to its changes in strategy and new procurements, but also preparing
to adapt its own strategies to those of its opponents. Only then can NATO maintain its
supremacy and uphold the defense of its members well beyond 2026.
Wars of the future may not only involve battlefields, but shift to include the realms of
cyber- and economic-warfare. NATO should invest in deeper understanding and capability in these types of conflict, preparing to combat a range of actors. In electronic
warfare, NATO cannot afford to fall behind, either in its own defenses for its strategic
and tactical communications and intelligence sharing, or in its offensive capability.
Shifting conventional threats mean that NATO must be willing to adopt hybrid defen5

sive strategies to counter otherwise intractable problems, embracing options such as

national service within member countries or economic-warfare.
Moving to protect its space-based strategic infrastructure, both against direct attack
and environmental threat, is also critical to ensuring allies' safety and Alliance operability in both near- and long-term scenarios. Creating an Opposing Force Office will
further allow NATO to pre-empt its opponents, further reducing the prospect of conflict.
NATO must prepare itself to meet the challenges of the upcoming decade with unity
and cohesion among its members information and communication play a key role in
this domain. The Alliance's public image must be improved, and when necessary rehabilitated, in order to strengthen NATO's legitimacy within member countries and
around the globe. Developments in information warfare make it crucial that NATO and
its members ensure their citizens receive accurate and unbiased information about the
Alliance and its activities emphasizing the links between domestic prosperity and
defense preparation.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, twenty-five years ago,
NATO has proved resilient to changing international power structures, and this upcoming decade will test that ability again. NATO must meet head-on rebalancing in the
Arctic, as global warming opens up trade routes and rich oil, gas, and mineral deposits
in an area where Russia is currently devoting significantly more effort than NATO is.
Development of a common ice-breaker platform and fleet will enhance and fortify
NATO's ability to operate in that arena, while search and rescue assets and unmanned systems provide greater coverage in the event of crises of all kinds in the
region. Incorporating China is key to future international diplomacy, particularly if
NATO wishes to avoid a belligerent relationship. Concrete offers of partnership and
joint operations will go a long way in creating a solid foundation for future cooperation.
Matthew Ansley studies Russian and mechanical engineering at the Georgia Institute
of Technology. Since a young age he has fostered a deep interest of defense, geopolitics, and international affairs.
Patrick E. Boyle is a graduate of the Air Force Academy and student at the Harvard
Kennedy School as well as an officer in the US Air Force. The views he expresses are
his own, and not necessarily those of the US Govt/USAF.
Nicholas Dube studied International Studies with a Security Studies concentration at
East Carolina University. He is a research intern for a think-tank in the Washington,
D.C. area.
Najia Humayun is a second year Economics and International Affairs major with a
Spanish minor and pre-law focus at Georgia Institute of Technology.
Stephan Lbbert is a qualified wholesale and foreign trade merchant. Now he studies
Master of Education at Leuphana University Lneburg. Besides he works for a sociopolitical innovation consulting company, located in Berlin.
Joss Meakins is a graduate student at Columbia University studying Russian and International Politics. He recently graduated from Cambridge with a BA in Russian and
French.
Edgar Palomino is a senior at the University of Pennsylvania studying political science
and international relations.
Alfie Shaw is Development Director of Oxford University Strategic Studies Group.
Previously, he was President of Oxford International Relations Society. He reads Geography at the University of Oxford and tweets as @shaw_alfie.

Cornel Turdeanu is a fourth year Political Science Student at Simon Fraser University
in Vancouver British Columbia. He is a founder of NATO@SFU, a group currently
working to engage students in the discussion on NATO.
Dawid Walentek is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He is interested in trade policy of the EU and the US.

The authors have written this Memo after qualifying with individual submissions, which
provide more detailed information on the aforementioned policy recommendations for
those interested:
Matthew Ansley: NATO Must Keep Up with Opposing Force Research
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/nato-must-keep-up-with-opposing-force-research

Patrick E. Boyle: Space Junk: The Biggest Threat to NATO Interoperability in 2026
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/space-junk-the-biggest-threat-to-nato-interoperability-in-2026

Nicholas Dube: The Domino Effect of Environmental Threats

http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/the-domino-effect-of-environmental-threats

Najia Humayun: Partnering with China and Stifling ISIS's Funding

http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/partnering-with-china-and-stifling-isis-s-funding

Stephan Lbbert: Cultural Diversity vs. NATO's Capacity to Act

http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/cultural-diversity-vs-nato-s-capacity-to-act

Joss Meakins: The Battle for Tallinngrad: New Ways to Fight an Old War
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/the-battle-for-tallinngrad-new-ways-to-fight-an-old-war

Alfie Shaw: If NATO Cannot Be a Lion, It Must Be a Fox

http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/if-nato-cannot-be-a-lion-it-must-be-a-fox

Edgar Palomino: Shortfalls in Electronic Warfare Pose a Danger to NATO

http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/shortfalls-in-electronic-warfare-pose-a-danger-to-nato

Cornel Turdeanu: Identifying and Closing NATO's Arctic Capability Gap

http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/identifying-and-closing-nato-s-arctic-capability-gap

Dawid Walentek: NATO Should be Targeting the Financial Infrastructure of the Enemy
http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/nato-should-be-targeting-the-financial-infrastructure-of-the-enemy

The articles have been written for category A Preparing for NATO 2026 of the Shaping our NATO competition and respond to the questions: What could surprise NATO
in 2026? What scenario is NATO currently insufficiently addressing? What can realistically be done to prepare?
The competition has been made possible by generous contributions from the NATO
Public Diplomacy Division, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Foundation for
Polish-German Cooperation.

Atlantic-community.org maintains editorial independence and this Memo reflects the

opinions of the authors, not those of the sponsors.