G.R. No.

L-15351

January 28, 1961

MORCOIN CO., LTD. and SUTER, INC., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, THE MAYOR OF MANILA, THE CITY TREASURER and THE
CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA, defendants-appellants.

There can be no question that Sections 773 and 774 of Ordinance No. 1600, as amended
by Ordinance No. 3628, was enacted pursuant to section 18 [1] of the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila (Republic Act No. 409 as amended), which provides that the Municipal
Board has the legislative power "to regulate and fix the license fees for . . . slot
machines . . .". The power to regulate and impose license fee for the operations of slot
machines which include juke box machines, pinball machines and other coin-operated
contrivances-should not, however, be construed as including the power to impose license
taxes for revenue purposes. Indeed, a cursory reading of the legislative powers of the
Municipal Board enumerated in section 18 of the City's Revised Charter shows that the
power to tax is given where it was intended to be exercised and is not given where it was
not so designed. As the authority was withheld, it must logically result that the power
granted under the above-quoted provision of the City's Charter is purely regulatory for
police purposes. (Pacific Commercial Co. vs. Romualdez and Alfonso, 49 Phil. 917;
Hercules Lumber vs. Municipality of Zamboanga, 55 Phil. 653.) Such being the case, the
amount of license fees that may be imposed upon juke box machines and other coinoperated contrivances cannot be prohibitive, extortionate, confiscatory or in an unlawful
restraint of trade, but should be approximately commensurate with and sufficient to cover
all the necessary or probable expenses of issuing the license and of such inspection,
regulation and supervision as may be lawful. (Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818; City of
Iloilo vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. L.12695, March 23, 1959; 33 Am. Jur. 367; 53 C.J.S. 517;
See also the cases cited therein.) Any ordinance which imposes a license fee which is
substantially in excess of the reasonable expense of issuing the license and regulating the
occupation to which it pertains, is invalid. (25 Am. Law and Proc. 611; 28 id. 749, 750.)
G.R. No. L-16254

February 21, 1922

G.A. CUUNJIENG, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRED L. PATSTONE, engineer of the city of Manila, defendant-appellant.

When the power to license for revenue has been clearly granted, the rule as to the amount
of the tax or fee laid down in Fire Department vs. Stanton (159 N.Y., 225), is applicable to
the municipality as much as to the state:
The legislature of the state is not without power to impose a tax on a business in the
form of a license fee, when it deems such to be warranted by considerations of
public interest and for the general welfare, and the only limitation upon its exercise
of power, in tha respect, is that there shall be no discrimination or oppression, and
that the burden shall be equally charged upon all person in similar circumstanes.

Applying the legal principles above stated to the case at bar, we are constrained to hold
that in imposing a fee equal to one-half of the assessed value of the portion of the sidwalk
covered by the arcade in question, the Municipal Board of the city of Manila exceeded its
powers. The construction of buildings is a useful enterprises and the amount of the license
fee should therefore be limited to the cost of licensing, regulating, and suverveillance. It
appears that without the arcade the normal fee for the building permit would have been
about P31, with the arcade the fee exacted is P525.60. It does not appear tha the cost of
licensing, regulaitng, and surveillance would be materially increased through the
construction of the arcade, and it is therefore clear that the excess fee is imposed for the
purpose of revenue

G.R. No. L-12695

March 23, 1959

CITY OF ILOILO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS SIAN VILLANUEVA and EUSEBIO VILLANUEVA, defendants-appellants.

We disagree. As may be seen from the definition of each establishment hereunder quoted,
a tenement house is different from a hotel, lodging house, or boarding house. These are
different purposes. And it is preposterous to contend that a tenement house may be
considered as included in the clause "other establishments likely to endanger public safety
or give rise to conflagration or explosions" mentioned in the Charter, for as to them the
power given to the city is merely to fix their location to protect the safety of the public, and
not to impose a license fee or tax.
G.R. No. 175356

December 3, 2013

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT
and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Respondents.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., we recognized that x x x a taking also could be found if
government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. No formula or rule can be
devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter
of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require
that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government
and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated
on those few persons subject to the public action.
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The impact or effect of a regulation, such as the one under consideration, must, thus, be
determined on a case-to-case basis. Whether that line between permissible regulation
under police power and "taking" under eminent domain has been crossed must, under the
specific circumstances of this case, be subject to proof and the one assailing the
constitutionality of the regulation carries the heavy burden of proving that the measure is
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. The time-honored rule is that the burden of
proving the unconstitutionality of a law rests upon the one assailing it and "the burden
becomes heavier when police power is at issue.