You are on page 1of 5

Lim vs.

G.R. No. L-8587
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing
plaintiff's action for the recovery of real property for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of
Manila, with a total area of 29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the last
world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be
registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 64904 to 65140,
On March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the
Enemy Act of the United States, as amended, vesting in himself the ownership over
two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2
On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (successor of the Alien
Property Custodian) under the authority of the same statute issued a supplemental
vesting order, vesting in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4.
On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf of
the President of the United States) and the President of the Philippines, executed
two formal agreements, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4,
whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of
the Philippines upon the latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States for
all claims in relation to the property transferred, which claims are payable by the
United States of America or the Philippine Alien Property Administrator of the United
States under the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and for all such costs
and expenses of administration as may by law be charged against the property or
proceeds thereof hereby transferred.
On November 15, 1948, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed a formal notice of claim
to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator On the theory that
the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez. that they were mortgaged by
her to the Mercantile Bank of China; that the mortgage having been foreclosed, the
property was sold at public auction during the war to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa,
who, by means of threat and intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez
from exercising her right of redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any valid
title to the property because he was ineligible under the Constitution to acquire
residential land in the Philippines by reason of alien age.
On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the Vested Property Claims
Committee of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, and copy of the decision
disallowing the claim was received by claimant's counsel on the 15th of that month
On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate
estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney
General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back
rents. The complaint was later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant.

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines be sued?

The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant
Republic of the Philippines to which is was transferred cannot be maintained
because of the immunity of the state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a
charge against, or financial liability to, the Government and consequently cannot be
entertained by the courts except with the consent of said government.
Plaintiff argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the Philippines, in effect,
waived its right of non-suability, but the Republic intervened in the case merely to
unite with the defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's
claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in the
answer in intervention it filed.
Clearly, this is not a case where the state takes the initiative in an action against a
private party by filing a complaint in intervention, thereby surrendering its
privileged position and coming down to the level of the defendant but one where
the state, as one of the defendants merely resisted a claim against it precisely on
the ground, among others, of its privileged position which exempts it from suit..
Further, no suit or claim for the return of said properties pursuant to Section 9 or 32
(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act was filed by Plaintiff within two years from the
date of vesting, the later date and the last on which suit could be brought. A
condition precedent to a suit for the return of property vested under Trading with
the Enemy Act is that it should be filed not later than April 30, 1949, or within two
years from the date of vesting, whichever is later, but in computing the two years,
the period during which there was pending a suitor claim for the return of the
property of the Act shall be excluded.

Republic vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 90478
The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint
which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive
Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been served with
summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of
Other Portions."
The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition.
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories
under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which the PCGG responded by filing a
On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG
filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution.
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On July
27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion
for production and inspection of documents respectively. PCGG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to
the Amended Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions. Hence, this
present petition.
Whether or not petitioner can object to the interrogatories served on it in
accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court?
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in ordering for the production and
inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in the possession of PCCG?
No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule,
be sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests
itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the
level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to
the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.

No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be
produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked
preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and
even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is
nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No serious objection can
therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of
those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during
the trial for any purpose allowed by law.

Santos v. Santos
92 Phil 281
An undivided parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Las Pias, Province of
Rizal with an area of 21,577 square meters was owned by the petitioners and the
respondent in the proportion of 1/7 undivided share for Teodora Santos and 1/14
undivided share each for Josefina Santos and Emiliana Santos and 5/7 undivided
share for Leoncio Santos.
Petitioners complained that from 1945 to 1949 Leoncio Santos collected from the
Army of the United States of America rentals for the use and occupation of a parcel
of land and later sold the lot the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration on or about 13 May 1949.
Petitioners demand for the accounting of the payments for the rentals of the lot and
to give to the portion of the fruits of the rentals according to their portion of the said
lot. They also prayed to restore to their ownership the portions of the said land that
belongs to them contending that the said contract of sale is null and void because it
is performed without their consent and to pay the petitioners for damages and cost.
The Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of the complaint against him. This
motion was granted on the ground that the Civil Aeronautics Administration not
being a juridical person has no capacity to sue and be sued and for that reason it
cannot come under the jurisdiction of the court.
Whether or not the petitioners can sue the Civil Aeronautics Administration who is
not a juridical entity.
An obligation or liability of the state created by statute is enforceable against the
officer or agent charged with the duty to execute the law. If there should be
anything demandable which had been paid or delivered to or collected by officers or
agents of the state without the authority of law, the action would not be against the
state but against the responsible officers or agents who received what was not due
the state or made the unauthorized collection. Punishable acts or omissions
committed by officers or agents of the state are crimes and violations of law
perpetuated by such officers or agents and not by the state.

The same postulate may be applied to torts committed by officers or agents of the
state. Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government enters into a
contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and
purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or
reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if the law
granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or name the
officer against whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof, the
state itself may be sued even without its consent, because by entering into a
contract the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its
consent to be used is implied from the very act of entering into such contract.
If the dignity of the state, the sacredness of the institution, the respect for the
government are to be preserved and the dragging of its name in a suit to be
prevented, the legislative department should name the officer or agent against
whom the action may be brought in the event of breach of the contract entered into
under its name and authority. And the omission or failure of the legislative
department to do so is no obstacle or impediment for an individual or citizen, who is
aggrieved by the breach of the contract, to bring an action against the state itself
for the reasons already adverted to, to wit; the descent of the sovereign state to the
level of the individual or citizen with whom it entered into a contract and its consent
to be sued implied from the act of entering into such contract.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration, even if it is not a juridical entity, cannot legally
prevent a party or parties from enforcing their propriety rights under the cloak or
shield of lack of juridical personality, because it took over all the powers and
assumed all the obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered into the
contract in question. In National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro *, G.R. No. L-5122,
30 April 1952, we held that the Civil Aeronautics Administration may be sued and
that the principle of state immunity from suit does not apply to it. The order
appealed from dismissing the complaint as to the Civil Aeronautics Administration is
reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with law. No cost shall be taxed.