b) Whether or not the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest?

violates the
Postal
Law?
STATUTORY CASES
Case Title: G.R. No. L-19650 (September 29, 1966)
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his capacity as The Postmaster
General
1) Facts
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar, parying that judgment be rendered declaring its
Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering
respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the
attention of the public.
In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest? which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.?
The contest is open to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivres?.
There is neither a fee or consideration required nor a purchase required to be made.
The forms are available upon request at each Caltex station and there is also a
sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.
Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the contest,
thus, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for
the use of mails for the contest. However, the postal authorities denied their request
in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code
(Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which prohibits the use of mail in
conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme.
Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no consideration
involved in the part of the contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their
view and even threatened Caltex that if the contest was conducted, a fraud
order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives?. This
leads to Caltexs filing of this petition for declaratory relief.
The court ruled that the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution or said rules by the mails?.
The respondent then appealed.
2) Issue(s)
a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief?

3) Ruling
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest as described in the
rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal
Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
4) Ratio
Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions. Based on
Section 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief should be
filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance.
Requisites for Declaratory Relief:
- There is justiciable controversy
- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse
- The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy
- The issue is ripe for judicial determination

The Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? is a mere gratuitous

distribution of property by chance?. It does not qualify as a lottery due to
the lack of consideration. An act to be deemed as a lottery must constitute
a (1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) consideration. The participants are not
required to do anything or purchase anything from Caltex in order to
participate in the contest. The true test for having consideration is
whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance,
and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of
value in return for the distribution of the prize.?

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma

GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on
leave
Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for
direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga
Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the
firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3

May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal
termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor
practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and employment of oppressive alien
management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.
On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers
and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of private property with
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The union filed a motion
for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of
picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas
Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The
motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law.
Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not
admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived
exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis
of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217
vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691
reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after
Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and
since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or
claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be
applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is
therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first
instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the
scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for
damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.
The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside
the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition,
and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to
which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil
Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent
the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Paat v. CA
GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)
Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring
Facts: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzmans truck was seized by Department of
Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its
ways to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENROs Jovito Layugan issued an order of
confiscation of the truck. Its owner, De Guzman, failed to submit the required
explanation within the reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989,
DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao
CENROs action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking
Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. De
Guzman filed for reconsideration but was denied.
The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, a
suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by De Guzman and company against
Layugan and Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2), contending that the only
the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in the
transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 68.
De Guzman further contended that the seizure is illegal, as she did not use the truck
in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by the
Regional Executive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court
thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to De Guzman. The
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal
one. Hence, the petition.
Issues:

Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to forfeit

conveyances belongs to the courts
Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section
68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277

Held: The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts
exclusively (pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention
of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to the
fact that conveyances are not mentioned nor included in the former provision. In the
construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the
purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be
given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and
secure the benefits intended. In the case at bar, the phrase to dispose of the same
is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the

government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with

pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law

cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.

Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of the amendatory
executive order, when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and
inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, meant that the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a
distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no

longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It
may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal
on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist
in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes
sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the
present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October
decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining
order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to
resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring

People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of
the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4.
Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of
Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court
rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to
imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a
question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the
governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials
and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those
firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts
to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with
the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel
Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed
an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors
mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to
adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction
cannot adopt.
Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to
adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the
New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the
Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The
children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include
grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a
statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that
only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of
statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the
grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the
adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement
as to costs.

Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)

GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49)
En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan
City who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay, which was approved by
the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but
which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioners opposition. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan
City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial
court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court
lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his
counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting
that the barangay recall election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled
the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place
within one year preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan
elections slated on the first Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union
v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, the Court in which case considered
the SK election as a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular
local election in a recall proceeding
Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines
its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. T
he too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot
countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose
and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the
letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of
Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election. The
Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this
would render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would be
more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe
regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the
local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.

The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become moot
and academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay office concerned
were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12
January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.

Floresca v. Philex Mining

GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)
En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part, others dissenting
Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations
mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workmans
Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the
company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection. The heirs
decided to file a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on
an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has
no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are
compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the WCA
covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA
under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the
employer is negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as
their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on
damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.
Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of 26
November 1976, involving the issue whether the action of an injured employee or
worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmens Compensation
Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured
employee or his heirs action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited
compensation provided under the Workmens Compensation Act, (2: Selective)
whether an injured employee or his heirs have a right of selection or choice of action
between availing of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the
employer or of his other employees, or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured employee
or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae are diverse.
The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is
selective, i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies, but
that they cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance the
relative advantage of recourse under the Workmens Compensation Act as against
an ordinary action. It further held that the petitioners who had received the benefits
under the Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing
an action before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on

ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is
guilty of judicial legislation.
Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does
not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of
social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of
the 1935 Constitution, and later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended,
and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and
2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs.
Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as
the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of this jurisdictions legal system. It argues that the application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Courts application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports
to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to
Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that No judge or court shall decline
to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court do
and must legislate to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator,
like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to
which the law may apply.
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result
Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila,
and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to
spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are
separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony,
that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court

rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto
the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as
psychological incapacity
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family
rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as
his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause
the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at
the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of
the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically
permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards
parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed
decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.

Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued
by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for
a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with
the aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna,
Rodolfos wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting
insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the
Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent,
Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a
renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at
that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her
husbands desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty
and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial
courts decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the
present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office
of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna
may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent
of the Insurance Act
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits
a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement
of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act
from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an
insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes
the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate courts ruling that the

petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under
its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in
paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is any person
who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.
Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance
policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189
of the Insurance Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of
the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
China Bank v. Ortega (J)
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)
Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part
Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B
Forest Development Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of
money. The trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within
the reglementary period, and rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.
To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B &
B Forest Development Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong,
the banks cashier, disallowed the same invoking the provisions of Republic Act
1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. On
4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by
B & B Forest Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong
moved to reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was directed to
comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be
ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank and Tan Kim Liong instituted the
petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court
does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon
written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon
order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials,
[4] or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation), and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be
criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by
B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the case, the
position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest

Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final

judgment against it in view of the aforementioned provisions of law.
Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the
provisions of Republic Act 1405.
Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of
Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit
under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction
of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of
the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process.
Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond
the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did
not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform
the court whether B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the
bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March
1972, with costs against the petitioners.
Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista
GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)
First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring
Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War
that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his
military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans Administration,
formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an
agency of the Government charged with the administration of different laws giving
various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents. On
July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of
Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering
from Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to
Gasilaos failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish
his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the Board on 18
December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to complete his supporting

papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators
found out that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of
section 9 of Republic Act 65.
Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an
increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and each of the
unmarried minor children. Gasilaos monthly pension was, however, increased only
on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the fact
that it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the
amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15
January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and
allow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date.
In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he
claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for
pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved. The Board contends,
however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that since the section impliedly
requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of
Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of
pension benefits should commence from the date of approval of the application.
Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.
Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran
pensions is to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the
hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more particularly,
those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or
injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a
governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered
service for the country, especially during times of war or revolution, by extending to
them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal
construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts
tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered
with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend
on its own particular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran
pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in
order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges, and benefits granted thereunder,
among which are the right to resume old positions in government, educational
benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a life pension for the

incapacited, pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical
benefits. Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon
approval of the application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the
Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years.
Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with
the spirit and intent of the law. Gasilaos claim was sustained.
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilaos pension effective 18 December 1955 at
the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried
minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22 June
1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said
Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the
period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753
subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.
Salvatierra v. CA
GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)
First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was
survived by his legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and
sister Marcela, all surnamed Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three parcels of
land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax Declaration 11950, Cadastral Lot 26,
covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot 27, covered by Tax
Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvatierra sold Lot 26 to his son,
Anselmo Salvatierra by means of a deed of sale, and in consideration of P1,000.00.
Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to Venancio. Bartolomes share was sold by his
heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968, an Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation
of Sale was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and descendants of
Enrique Salvatierra. After the partition, Venancio owned 1041 square meters
consisting of Lot 27 and portion of Lot 26 (which is approximately 749 square
meters), Anselmo owned 405 square meters of Lot 26, while the heirs of Tomas
owned 1,116 square meters, the whole of Lot 25. Thereafter on 15 June 1970,
Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 to
spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through
a relocation survey that the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 was outside
Longalongs fence as Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a title in his name

(Original Certificate of Title 0-4221) covering the whole of Lot 26). Efforts to settle
the matter at the barangay level proved futile because Purita Salvatierra (widow of
Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to the latter the
149 square meter portion of Lot 26.
Longalong filed a case with the Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of the
said portion of Lot 26. The court a quo dismissed the case on the grounds that
Longalong failed to establish ownership of the portion of the land in question, and
that the prescriptive period of four years from discovery of the alleged fraud
committed by defendants predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs
should have filed their action had already elapsed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, ruling that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is
authorized to sell; and as to the co-owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell
his pro indiviso share therein to, but he cannot sell more than his share therein.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in
Lot 26
Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and
plain meaning thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil
Code (If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.) Contracts
which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to
the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no
matter what their forms maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity
are present. In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations
of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale). Since
Macarios share (later Anselmos) is only 405 of the 749 square meters comprising
Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the remaining 344 square meters of Lot 26, 149
square meters of which was sold to Longalong. Supplemented by the holding that
the prescriptive period on reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in
Caro v. CA, Longalong is entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was filed five
years after the constitution of Anselmos fraudulent Original Certificate of title.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for want of merit, with costs against
petitioners.

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company

GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.
The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for
mandamus. The court determined Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to compel
the employer to make the deduction of the employees debt from the latters salary
and turn this over to the employees credit union; but which does not convert the
credit unions credit into a first priority credit.
Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of payments
to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.
Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts
to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation,
must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles 2241, 2242
and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. In the present case,
the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself; there being no
ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2
of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the
obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so
expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023 which
provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall
enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees wages and salaries.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Abellana v. Marava [GR L-27760, 29 May 1974]
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concur, 1 concur based on paragraph 2 & 3 of
opinio
Facts: Francisco Abellana was charged with the City Court of Ozamis City with the
crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck,
hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, Marcelo
Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeo. Abellana was
found guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise being
awarded.

Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, Lamason et.al. filed with
another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and independent civil
action for damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of
Abellana. In such complaint, Crispin Abellana, the alleged employer, was included
as defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action principally on
the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of
Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the
criminal case was already on appeal. The judge in the latter CFI ordered on 28 April
1967 that the City Court judgment is vacated and a trail de novo be conducted. He
noted that the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or reserved
their right to institute it separately in the City Court; but which they filed in the CFI. In
view of the waiver and reservation, the Court would be precluded from judging civil
damages against the accused and in favor of the offended parties. the motion to
dismiss is denied. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the
petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.
1. Appeal of judgment in municipal trial court, new trial as if originally
instituted
in
the
CFI
The rule in the jurisdiction of the Court is that upon appeal by the defendant from a
judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and
the appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it had been
originally instituted in that court (Section 7 of Rule 123, People v. Jamisola). So it is
in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. An interpretation that an independent civil
action is barred absent a reservation under Section 1 of Rule 111 is a non-sequitur,
as the inference does not per se arise from the wordings of the rule and ignores
what is explicitly provided in Section 7, Rule 123.
2. A statute must not be construed in a manner giving rise to a constitutional
doubt
A court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would
give rise to a constitutional doubt. The grant of power to the Court, both in the
present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution,
increase or modification of substantive right. Thus, substantive right cannot to be
frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight,
the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil
suit. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear when it provides that in cases of .
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the

criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
3. Assurance of parties justice according to law must not be ignored in the
pursuit of serving the interest of a client; Construction should be based on
legal
norm,
not
literalness
A counsel must not ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure
parties justice according to law, in serving the interest of his client. He is not to fall
prey to the vice of literalness. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its
function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm,
particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given
an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.

1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural questions

set
aside
due
to
demands
of
public
interest
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the
public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide,
setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper
remedy to test Misons right to the office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.

Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]

En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur

2.
Constitutional
Construction
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to
which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez) The Court
will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with
how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide.

Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors
of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions
of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on
the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the
confirmation
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full
authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition
in intervention, without costs.

3.
Presidents
power
to
appoint
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4
groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers can
be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of
Constitutional Commission.
4.
Express
enumeration
excludes
others
not
enumerated
It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it
would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

5. Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and adopted in

light
of
prior
laws
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in
the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.
Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar
with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate,
and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935
Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution,
the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of horse-trading and
similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive
amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly
any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in
the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the
Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it,
struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,
without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second
and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The
proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.

6. Construction of also in second sentence; consideration of different

language
of
proximate
sentences
to
determine
meaning
The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in like
manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said second sentence
means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first
sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers
mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President
shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as
he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of
consideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the context of
said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that
the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the
second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of
different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference
in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in
alien juxtaposition.
7.
Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character; Limitations
construed
strictly
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.
Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such
limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the
case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by
the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
8. The use of word alone after President in third sentence is a lapse in
draftsmanship,
a
literal
import
deemed
redundant
After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
Court found the use of the word alone after the word President in said third
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in
draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers
was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first
sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word
alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in

the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence.
The word alone in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3,
section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light
of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except
those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
9.
President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs;
Commissioner not included with the first group of appointment
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one
of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission
on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the
position of heads of bureaus from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is
expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
(RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by
PD34 on 27 October 1972).
10. Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must be
read
in
harmony
with
the
new
one
RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937
and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that,
while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that
devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Perfecto v. Meer
GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.
Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members
of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such

compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. It also provides that until Congress shall provide otherwise,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. When
Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not provided otherwise, by fixing a
different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the
Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.
The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income
tax upon his salary as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the amount under
protest. He contended that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable
for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the
Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.
Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary
amounts to a diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be considered as a
diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of compensation and power and need
of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly
ignores the prevailing state of affairs. Further, the Constitution provides that judges
shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for
their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. In
the general course of human nature, a power over a mans subsistence amounts to
a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater importance
than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or
privilege. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable
consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose
fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary.
The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the
independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the
compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be
prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and
capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured

salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the
judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments,
sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the
discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the
guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption
from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are
liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a
nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose
promoted is received in the place of the tax.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes
from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The lower court held that
under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the
collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia
was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.
Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to authorize
and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not to
counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary,
after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the
salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary,
after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature
may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task

of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a
case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act
590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined
and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our
form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but
not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic
law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department.
Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions.
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative
department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive
department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said
laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not,
it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of
the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict
between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to
be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary
of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is
reiterated.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer
and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Resolution)

GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from

salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary.
This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52,
19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with
stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making
any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. With the filing of the petition,
the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if
it had dealt with the matter administratively.
Issue: Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exempt
justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.
Held: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the present case, Section 10,
Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing
another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher
than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the
discussion in the Constitutional Commission. Thus, the debates, interpolations and
opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was
finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the

City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the

Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of
the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a
civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce
the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of
the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the
Constitution.
Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion
as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles
of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino
people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence,
in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious
nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men
and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here
as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be advantageous to the Government. Of course, the phrase
advantageous to the Government does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the
use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance
of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular
church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take
advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of

showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997
En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as
the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel
sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused
to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel
came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right

it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional

provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such
a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere
fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of
any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily
an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has

become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was

restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has
to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall
be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the
Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to

cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and
to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter
execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for the purpose.