De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals et. al.G.R. No.

L-47822, December 22, 1988

FACTS:
Respondent Cendena was engaed in buying bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. He utilized
two (2) six-wheelertrucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. In 1970,
petitioner De Guzman, an authorized dealer ofGeneral Milk Company in Pangasinan,
contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk
from a warehouse in Makati, Rizal, to the petitioners establishment in Pangasinan.
150 cartons were loaded on atruck driven by respondent himself while 600 cartons
were loaded to the other truck which was driven by
respondents driver. Only 150 boxes of milk were delivered and the other 600 boxes never
reached the petitioner
because the said truck was hijacked on its way to Pangasinan. Petitioner commenced an action
againts respondent
Cendena demanding payment of the value of the lost merchandise plus damages and
attorneys fees. Respondent
however denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could not be held liable for
the lost goods since itwas due to force majeure. The trial court found respondent Cendena to be
a common carrier and held him liable. TheCourt of Appelas, however, reversed the decision of
the trial court and held that Cendena is not a common carrier
because he just entered into a sideline only in d
elivering the goods. Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUES:(1)
WON respondent Cenmdena may be properly characterized as a common carrier.
(2)
WON the absence of a certificate of public convenience concludes that respondent is not a
common carrier.

ELD:(1) YES
. According to Art. 1732 of the Civil Code,

Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or Associationsengaged in the businedd of

carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air forcompensation,
offering their services to the public

. The said article makes no distinction between one whosePRINCIPAL business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying as and
ANCILLIARY or sideline activity. Nor does the article mak
e any distinction between a carrier offering its services on aREGULAR BASIS or on
an OCCASSIONAL BASIS.
The meaning of public service under the Public Service Act was usedto supplement the
concept of common carrier which inludes xxx every person th
at now or hereafter may own,operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or
compensation,
with general pr limited clientele, whetherpermanent, occasional, or accidental, and
done for general business purposes
xxx. It appears that respondent isproperly characterized as a common carrier even though he
merely back

hauled goods for other merchants fromManila to Pangasinan, althoughsuch was done on an
occasional manner and even though respondents principal
occupatiuon was not the carriage of goods for others.
(2) NO
. The Court ruled that a certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under theCivil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises the
moment a person or firm acts as a commoncarrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier
has also complied with the requirements of the applicableregulatory statute and implementing
regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or otherfranchise. To
exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured
thenecessary certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy.
Ruling
: The hijacking cannot be considered an exception to the liability of the common carrier because
Article 1734 isa closed list. However, due to the grave or irresistible force by the thieves, the
occurrence of the loss must reasonablybe regarded as quite beyond the control of the common
carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. Hence,Cendena was not held liable for
the loss of the merchandise.

(1)
Katipunan v. Tenorio
Facts:Marcos Katipunan and Rita Tenorio had been married for seven years. Tenorio
suffered a mental ailment. Katipunanwanted to annul their marriage on the ground
of insanity.Issue:WON mental ailment after the celebration of the marriage be
considered as insanity and as a ground for annulment.Held:There is no ground to
annul the marriage. Insanity occurs after the celebration of the marriage does not
constitute acause for nullity. The wife was mentally sound at the time of the
marriage. Note:Definition sa Mental illness is usually a broader and more inclusive
term than Insanity. Insanity is usually reservedfor describing severe conditions
involving psychotic-like breaks with reality, while Mental Illness can include
bothsevere and milder forms of mental problems (such as anxiety disorders and
mild depressions).
(2)
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 December 29, 1998
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a
will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels
father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as null
and void. Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of
the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an

illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this
petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion
of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be
upheld.
ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion
thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents
a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?
HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its
judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage
be declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art.
85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes
for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and
the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme
Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that
void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void
marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a
voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set
aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically,
the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been
entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second
paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called
natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be
covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that
children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate.