DISCUSSION

THE CONCEPT OF MOKSA - AN ANALYSIS

The object of the present paper is to remove some of the misunderstandings likely to be caused by Rajendra Prasad's misrepresentation'-both in history and in analysis-of the logic of Indian
theory of purusarthas, the ultimate goals of man's existence. The
atte~nptof Rajenda Prasad in analyzing the concept of moksa is
certainly praiseworthy in so far as not much work has been done
in the logical analysis of the basic concepts which are common to
all, or peculiar to individual, systems of Indian thought. For example, expressions like vyapti, samanya, samavaya, Karma, avidya, etc.
are those which are employed by most of the systems, but they still
suffer from a lack of clear definition. Similarly, in the sutra works
such characteristic terms are used which are basic to and indicative of a particular school, as, for instance, maya is for the Advaita
Vedanta of Sankara. We can go a long way in apprehending the true
spirit and significance of the different systems if their basic concepts
and key terms are logically reasoned out. However, the aim of thz
present paper is not to deal with this task but to point out some
of the logical pitfalls in Rajendra Prasad's paper.
The paper under discussion begins with an examination and
refutation of an argument advanced by some peopleZ for maintaining the superiority of Indian philosophy over Western philosophy.
Though I myself do not subscribe to the view that Indian philosophy
is superior to Western, or vice versa, nor do I justify the validity
of the ,argument in question, yet I would like to point out that
Rajendra Prasad's explication of the argument does not seem to
be logically satisfactory. The argument, as worded by him, is as
follows:
"The goal of Western philosophy is acquisition of knowledge,
where as acquisition of knowledge, for Indian philosophy, is only
a means to self-realization (moksa). That is, Indian philosophy goes
1
2

"The Concept of Moksa," Philosophy and Phenome~otogica~

Research, March 1971.
Rajendra Prasad has not referred to their names and works.

much further or deeper than Western philosophy. It begins where

the latter ends."3
While explicating this argument he brings out the following
assumptions on which, he thinks, it. is based:
1. that self-realization is the proper or real goal of philosophy,
2. that knowledge can be and is a means to self-realization,
3. that it is more competent than knowledge to be a philosophic
goal,
4. and that the self-realization talked about in Indian philosophy
is better or more genuine than that to which one may find
reference in Western philosophy.
A faithful analysis of the argument reveals that no assumption,
except number two, is in any way relevant to it. The argument does
not assume that bare self-realization is the philosophic goal but
that self-realization which is brought about by knowledge. The third
assumption, for this very reason, is equally irrelevant and misconceived. The legitimate assumption should have been, self-realization
brought about by knowledge is more competent than mere knowledge to be a philosophical goal. The fourth assumption is not only
irrelevant to the argument but also contrary to its very spirit. The
argument asserts that Western philosophy aims only at knowledge
and not at self-realization, whereas this assumption implies that it
aims at self-realization also. What Rajendra Prasad should have
pointed out was that the argument involved a false premise. It is
not true to say that the goal of western philosophy is knowledge
alone because one does find there references to self-realization.
Not only has Rajendra Prasad failed to lay hand on the real
assumptions but he has also indulged in self-contradiction. On the
one hand he writes, "I am not going to question or examine here
any one of these assumptions." On the other hand, in the same
sentence he opines, "the truth of none of them is obvious." Such
a judgment should only be an outcome of an objective examination
which evidently the author has not undertaken. Further, it is not
at all obvious what criterion of obviousness the author has resorted to.
The paper attempts to belittle the importance of the practical
3 What the advocates of this argument presume is that whereas Western philosophy
has only "knowledge," Indian philosophy has "knowledge leading to best living" as
the goal, and in this wider perspective lies the superiority of the latter. The ideal of
"knowledge for the sake of best living," they maintain, is more comprehensive than
the ideal of "knowledge for the sake of knowledge."

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RESEARCH

character of Indian philosophy. I do share its author's feelings

when he suggests that in the study of Indian philosophy logical,
epistemological, ethical, and semantical issues should be paid due
attention, but this does not justify him in playing down its practical
character. His thinking (and for that matter his analysis of the
concept of moksa) seems to be prejudiced by his philosophical preconception that the task of philosophy is not to provide speculative
trurns but only to do a conceptual analysis or mapping. That is why
he argues that problems of practical character are not "really
philosophical in the current sense of the term." Such a narrow position, though acceptable to a logical analyst, cannot be acceptable
to a speculative metaphysician or to an existentialist thinker.
It is stated in the paper that "the religious end is always
spiritual" but the instance of Hinduism, for example, having material
well-being (abhyudaya) as one of the goals falsifies it. Perhaps Rajendra Prasad is unmindful of the popularly accepted definition of
religion given by Kanada, the author of the Vaisesika sutras, which
unequivocally declares that religion is that which brings about material well-being as well as spiritual enhancement.4 Postulation of
arlha and kama as the ends of human life, the importance given to
worldly and social duties of the individual, the emphasis on the
sa~nskaras(sacraments) and grhasthasrama (stage of householder's
life) etc. amply prove the falsity of his statement. Instead of making
a general statement he should have stated that "the religious end is
mainly spiritual," but then the point that he wanted to make would
have been rendered baseless.
In the paper there is a strange remark that "seeking of artha
and kama are contrary to the general spirit of Indian systems."
But this is true neither historically nor logically. That historically
it is not so is quite evident from the place given to sex in Hindu
culture, in literature, art, and architecture. Nonacquisition of artha
and kama has never been enjoined in the Hindu tradition. The
well-known convocation address of the Taittiriya upanisad5 enjoins
upon the students to lead the life of a householder and not to
break the line of progeny. The concept of pitr rna, unpermissibility
of balasamnyasa (child-recluse), the rule of leading worldly life till
a grandson is born, etc. are sufficient to testify that artha and kama
were never despised. Nor is this true logically because complete
4
5

Vaisesika sfitra 1.1.2.

Prajdtantum ma vyavacchetsi.

renunciation and extreme austerity have never been the ideals in

Hindu tradition, though they have been inculcated in the sister
tradition of the sramanas, especially the Jaina. The seeking of artha
and kama is in full conformity with the Hindu ideal of moksa
which is a state of perfection and bliss. Of course artha and kama
are not acceptable in their gross form, but certainly they are not
unacceptable in their transformed form. The very definition of
Brahma, the ultimate reality, as bliss (Raso vai sah) belie Rajendra
Prasad's assertion. It may be true for a part of Indian culture but
on that basis one cannot justifiably make a sweeping statement
about the whole. Rajendra Prasad is either uninformed of the distinction between the brahmana and the sramana traditions of Indian culture or he commits the fallacy of mixing up the two, taking
the characteristics of the latter as those of the former as well.
The term purusartha is understood in the paper to mean "that
which is sought" whereas it really is employed to mean "that which
ought to be sought." Indian theoreticians were not ignorant, as has
been alleged, of the fact that there could be no legitimate passage
from the descriptive to the prescriptive and had enough sense to
discern the logical difference of "ought" from "is." However, they
were also not oblivious of the fact that there is no unbridgeable gulf
between the "actual" and the "ideal." While discussing the interrelation of the four purusarthas Rajendra Prasad himself mixes up
"artha is sought" with "artha ought to be sought," a fallacy which
he is at great pains to point out as allegedly committed by the
Indian thinkers. It is true that artha is sought both as a means
and as an end, but from this he cannot be warranted to draw the
conclusion that according to Indian thinkers artha ought to be
sought both as a means and as an end. In the fourfold classification
of the purusarthas there are two intrinsic values, viz., kama and
moksa, dealing respectively with empirical (material) and transcendental (spiritual), and there are two instrumental values, viz., artha
and dharma, artha leading to kama and dharma to moksa. From
this it is quite clear that artha ought to be sought only as a means
to kama, and Rajendra Prasad is mistaken in holding that according
to them it is to be sought as an end also.
Rajendra Prasad regards this fourfold classification of human
goals as logically unneat, on the ground that it is based on two
principles instead of one. First, he is wrong in singling out kama
for subjugation to dharma. In fact artha has also been subjugated to dharma as is testified by the Mahabharata saying, "Tato

artham dharma samyutam." Secondly, it should not be overlooked

that it is only to ensure the needed smooth and even realization of
all the goals that the subsidiary principle of justified-justifier has
been introduced, along with the principle of means-end, and also
that the former principle is not independent of the latter. Simply
because apparently two principles, neither incoherent nor independent, are resorted to does not render it logically unneat. Such a
remark would have been justified had these been incoherent or
independent, or had there been a better substitution based on a
single principle. Rajendra Prasad discusses some possible amendments, but, as he himself admits, none of them makes any sense.
And for this reason his claim that "their introduction would bring
about a modification which would be greatly detrimental to the
Indian theory" appears meaningless.
Though Rajendra Prasad appreciates the subjugation of kama
to dharma, he apprehends a possibility (which does not seem to
be possible) of one and the same pleasure being approved by one
moral rule and disapproved by another, or the same rule approving
two different sorts of pleasures. Such a situation is possible when
the moral system is ill-formed, but if it is a well-knit system with
no inner contradictions these possibilities are inconceivable.
The issue of the relation between morality and religion has been
discussed in the paper. It should be remembered here that in India
morality and religion were always considered as one coherent
system and that is why their common designation, viz., dharma,
was so understood as to rule out all the possibilities of conflict
between morality and religion. That is why there was no need for
them to search for any logical distinction between them, a distinction which did not exist in their notion of dharma. Rajendra Prasad
seems to be uncharitable in accusing them of not searching the
black cat in the dark, which in fact does not exist there.
Rajendra Prasad raises the question of justification of dharma
and fails to find any. In Indian thought, however, there is a twofaceted justification. To the question, "Why should I do what the
dharma prescribes?", one facet of the answer is because it is the
command of the scriptures whose authority is obligatory; and the
other facet is, because it is a means to moksa, the adequacy of the
means being guaranteed by the scriptures. Rajendra Prasad seems
to be misled when he writes that according to Prabhakara morality
is its own justification. What Prabhakara denies is only motivational
justification and not any justification. Also for him morality needs

justification from scriptural authority.6 It is the scriptural authority

which has its own justification.
The logicality of the introduction of the concept of moksa in
the Indian theory of values has also been questioned on the ground
that being a descriptive term it cannot provide justification for
that which is normative. But it is wrong to take moksa as descriptive. Simply because in Indian metaphysics there exist several
theories about the nature of moksa does not preclude it from
being normative. No cogent reason has been put forth which can
justify the ousting of this concept from the class of normative
concepts. Therefore, the point that moksa cannot stand in justification of dharma holds no water.
The question, "Why should I seek moksa?" has also been raised.
While discussing the question, "Why should I do what the dharma
prescribes?" Rajendra Prasad seems to be inclined towards the
Bradleyan position that morality, being an end in itself, does not
need any extraneous justification. But likewise, can it not be argued
that moksa being an end in itself is self-justifying?"
It has been asked why moksa should be regarded as an ultimate
value. This is not merely because it is the ultimate reality but also
because it alone can provide the fullest efflorescence to man's
existence, his needs and aspirations. The ultimate reality is also an
ultimate value, is an assumption, but it is not an unfounded one
because the reality is regarded as ultimate not only in existence
but also in bliss and in other respects. Rajendra Prasad denies the
status of obvious truth to it, but he cannot do so without assigning
any valid reason. He also indulges in an unwarranted hairsplitting
over the phrase, "eternal bliss." The state of bliss is eternal by its
very definition and the adjective, eternal, is quite superfluous. He
cannot therefore be allowed to make any capital out of it. His
counter argument, viz., "it may be that bliss is desirable because
of a contrast with pain which is on the other hand undesirable;
therefore, eternal bliss, because when achieved it will annihilate
all pain, may no longer remain desirable," is not only vague insofar
as it fails to convey any precise meaning, but it is also invalid,
since the conclusion does not follow from the premise. Similarly,
in arguing that honesty is superior in value to profit-making, he
commits the fallacy of equivocation because the term honesty is
taken in two different senses. In fact the entire controversy re6

See his commentary on the sutra 1.1.2.

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PHILOSOPHY
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RESEARCH

garding the superiority of moksa over dharma and reduction of it

to a sort of ethical intuitionism is misconceived since in Indian
philosophy reason has never been given the task of establishing this
superiority which has always been accepted on the authority of
the scriptures. Of course this may open it to the charge of dogmatism, which Rajendra Prasad could have justifiably pointed out.
The basic fallacy which pervades the entire paper is that a
reference has nowhere been made as to whose views are being
referred to or whose thesis and arguments are being examined.
No advocate of the concept of moksa has argued in the way in
which Rajendra Prasad has put the arguments for them. A t many
places fictitious positions have been constructed, illogically explicated, and attacked in the name of logicality.
S. R. BHATT.
UNIVERSITYOF DELHI.