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COMMISION ON APPOINTMENTS

COMPOSITION
Senate President as ex-officio chairman (shall not vote except in case of a
tie.)
12 Senators
12 Members of the House
The 12 Senators and 12 Representatives are elected on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and party-list
organizations.
The CA shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and the House of
Representative shall have been organized with the election of the President
and the Speaker. The CA shall act on all appointments within 30 session days
from their submission to Congress.
The CA shall rule by a majority vote of all its members.
Meetings: CA meets only while Congress is in session.
Meetings are held either at the call of the Chairman or a majority of all its
members.
Since the CA is also an independent constitutional body, its rules of procedure
are also outside the scope of congressional powers as well as that of the
judiciary. Jurisdiction: 1. CA shall confirm the appointments by the President
with respect to the following positions: a) Heads of the Executive
Departments (except if it is the Vice-President who is appointed to the post) b)
Ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls c) Officers of the AFP from
the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain d) Other officers whose appointments
are vested in him by the Constitution (e.g. COMELEC members) 2. Congress
cannot by law require that the appointment of a person to an office created by
such law shall be subject to confirmation by the CA. 3. Appointments
extended by the President to the above-mentioned positions while Congress is
not in session shall only be effective until disapproval by the CA or until the
next adjournment of Congress.
DAZA VS SINGSON
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a
political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation
in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by
Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the
chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of
the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly
changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the
House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily
connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the
requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.
COSETENG VS MITRA
1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is
justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of
the government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman,
twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected
by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it
within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The

commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987
Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission
on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political
parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They
represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%).
Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments
would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members
from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano- Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced
Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition
party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House
membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit
in the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective
political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by
their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The
validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments -eleven (11)
from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable
GUINGONA VS GONZALES
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDPLABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP,
2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators
from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LPPDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that
the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDPLABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of
LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the
compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys
representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation
of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article
VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is
what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled.
The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a
whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to
elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission
on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance
with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator
Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation
of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should
have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one
member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such,
the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional
representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other
party
DRILON VS DE VENECIA
FACTS: The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered
moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent
to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.
As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails.
The second petition filed by Senator Jamby Madrigal in a summary tackle
about the reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in the
meantime, "all actions of CA be held in abeyance as the same may be
construed as illegal and unconstitutional.

Senator Jamby Madrigal petitions to REORGANIZE the membership of the


CA is based upon the OBSERVATIONS that she herself observe in the list of
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS membership that there are certain
POLITICAL PARTIES acquire a seat of membership in CA held a position
which supposedly are not allowed in the provision of the constitution
moreover, she added to estopped the intention of the committee request that
"all actions of the Commission be held in ABEYANCE" .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned.
HELD: Senator Madrigal contention has been dismissed due to the guidelines
she ignored.Petitioner has no standing to file the petition .Petitioner failed to
observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort.
Each House of Congress has the sole function of reconstituting or changing
the composition of its own contingent to the CA.The extraordinary remedies
of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO are not available to the
Petitioner.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution
providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
Wherefore,the Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition in G.R.
No. 180055 is Granted. The Petition is Withdrawn. The Petition in G.R. No.
183055 is Dismissed.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
A.KINDS
1.
GENERAL
a. Legislative Powers (Scope) powers of appropriation, taxation and
expropriation authority to make, frame and enact laws vested in Congress by
the Consitution except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum
b. Non-legislative Powers(Scope)
1. power to canvass the presidential elections
2. declare the existence of war
3. give concurrence to treaties and amnesties
4. propose constitutional amendments
5. Impeach
6. derivative and delegated power
7. implied powers such as the power to punish contempt in legislative
investigations
2. Specific Powers
a. Constitutent power
b.Legislative Inquiries
c.Appropriation
d.Taxation
e.Concurrence in treaties and international agreements
f.War powers and delegations powers
3. Inherent Powers
a. Police Power
9. Make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, as they shall judge for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth and of the subjects of the same
10. Includes maintenance of peace and order, protection of life, liberty and
property and the promotion of general welfare b Power of Taxation c Power of
Eminent Domain d. Implied Powers Contemptpower B. Limitations: 1.
Formal or Procedural Limitations
Prescribes the manner of passing bills in the form they should take
Limitations provided by Sec26,ArtVI
o Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title o No bill passed by either house shall become
law unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days o Printed copies in its
final form have been distributed to its members 3 days before the passage of
the bill

Exception: president certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to


meet a public calamity or emergency
2.Substantive Limitations
Circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subject of
legislation
Express limitations:
Circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subject of
legislation
Express limitations:
o Sec 24-26, 28-30, Art VI
Express limitations on general powers o Bill of rights
Implied Limitations
o No power to pass irrepealable law
o Non-encroachment on powers of other departments
o Non-delegability of powers
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
A.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO BILLS.
1. AS TO TITLE OF BILLS
TIO VS VRB
Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987
entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also
reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code.
The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each processed
video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of
five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes
shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to
regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry.
The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if
videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross
receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax
imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the
PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject.
HELD: The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied
with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each
and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is
satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign
to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.
The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In
the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in
its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general
subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and
control mechanisms scattered throughout the
PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry
in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms
is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of
the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD, which is the
creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is
unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an
index to the body of the PD.
LIDASAN VS COMELEC
Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled
An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del

Sur, was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and
Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC
proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating
Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios
located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted
upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill?
HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to
the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily
weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
CRUZ VS PARAS
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the
TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT
GRANTING
MUNICIPAL
OR
CITY
BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION
OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT
WITHIN
THEIR
RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that
they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the
pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to
Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated
and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers
and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws
or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to
be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by
an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should
and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
TOBIAS VS ABALOS
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of
the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same
bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking
their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for
the the conversionof Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA
7675 and making it in effect.

Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1.
Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding
'one subject one bill rule".
2.
Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of
members of the Congress to
250
and reappropriating the legislative districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of
constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was
enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the
members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which
drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
General Limitations:
Appropriation
Appropriations must be for a PUBLIC
PURPOSE
Cannot appropriate public funds or property, directly or indirectly, in favor of
1. Any sect, church, denomination, or sectarian institution or system of
religion or
2. Any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such.
EXCEPT IF THE PRIEST IS ASSIGNED TO.

AFP

ANY PENAL INSTITUTION

GOVERNMENT
ORPHANGE

LEPROSARIUM
o The government is not prohibited from appropriating money for a valid
secular purpose, even if it incidentally benefits a religion, e.g. appropriations
for a national police force is valid even if the police also protects the safety of
clergymen.
o Also, the temporary use of public property for religious purposes is valid, as
long as the property is available for all religions.
Specific Limitations

For General Appropriations Bills Congress may not increase the


appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. Form, content and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general


appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein.
Procedure in approving appropriations FOR THE CONGRESS shall strictly
follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. However,
the following may, BY LAW, be authorized to AUGMENT any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.

PRESIDENT

SENATE PRESIDENT

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE

CJ OF SC

HEADS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMISSIONS


DISCRETIONARY FUNDS appropriated FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS
shall be disbursed only: For public purposes To be supported by appropriate
vouchers Subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law No public

money or property shall be appropriated If Congress fails to pass the general


appropriations bill by the end of any fiscal year: The general appropriations
bill for the previous year is deemed reenacted It shall remain in force and
effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress.
For Special Appropriations Bill Shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended. Shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer or corresponding therein to be raised by revenue proposal.
Limitation on Use of Public Funds (Sec 29, Art VI) No money shall be paid
out of the National Treasury EXCEPT in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law. However, this rule does not prohibit continuing appropriations, e.g. for
debt servicing, for the reason that this rule does not require yearly or annual
appropriation.
Four phases of Governments budgeting process.

Budget preparation

Legislative authorization

Budget execution

Budget accountability
DEMETRIA VS ALBA
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to
prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to
Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria
assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section
provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act,
to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer
funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether
or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to
another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency
and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.
GUINGONA VS CARAQUE
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with
P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA
6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,
entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act),
by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment

Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities


Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,
therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is
unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education,
it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and
for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is
at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
BELGICA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump- sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations
from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development
Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a.
P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to
P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings,
schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical
assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b.
P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c.
P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources:
(a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from
the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed
that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being
used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the
pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles: a. Separation of
Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of


funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the
laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats
happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated
to
a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs
Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive
will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative
power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that
which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i)
delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii)
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify
the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule
on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is
solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and
not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does
it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate.
But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the
GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop
their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the
PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a
project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where
the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles
with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State
policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all
that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes
more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is
that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of
the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i)
PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund
(the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii)
PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI
of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case
of PD 910 and PD 1869.
ARAULLO VS AQUINO
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation.
So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted
to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth
was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as
an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the
DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non -Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan , and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law. Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is
based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the
President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments
by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.


HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it
did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required.
Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds
refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no
impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by
the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other
non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are nonexistent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they
are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by
the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without
legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by
the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only
occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned.
The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source
for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of
an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can
no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good
faith.
Taxation (Sec 28, Art VI)
Nature
o Sec 28 is an enumeration of the limits on the inherent and otherwise
unlimited power
Purpose
o Pay debts and provide for the common defense and general warfare
o Raise revenue
o Instrument of national and social policy
o Instrument for extermination of undesirable acts and enterprises
o Tool for regulation
o Imposition of tariffs designed to encourage and protect locally produced
goods against competition for imports.

Limitations
o Public. Power to tax should be exercised only for a public purpose
o Uniform and Equitable.
Operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it
is found
Does not prohibit classification for the purpose o taxation
Requirements for valid classification: Based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences
Germane to the purpose of law
Applies to present and future conditions substantially identical to those of the
present
Applies equally to those who belong to the same class
o
Progressivity.
The rate increases as the tax base increases
Tax burden is based on the taxpayers capacity to pay
Suited to the social conditions of the people
Reflects aim of the Convention that legislature following social justice
command should use taxation as an instrument for more equitable distribution
of wealth
o Constitutional Tax Exemptions:
Religious, charitable, educational institutions and their properties
All revenues and assets of NON-STOCK NON- PROFIT EDUCATIONAL
institutions are exempt from taxes and duties PROVIDED that such revenues
and assets are actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes
( sec. 4 (3) Art XIV).
Grants, endowments, donations or contributions used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax, subject to
conditions prescribed by law (sec. 4 (4) Art XIV).
o Special Funds
o
Money collected on a tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.
O
Once the special purpose is fulfilled or abandoned, any balance
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government
TOLENTINO VS SEC OF FINANCE
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that
this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even
though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in
the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter
Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text
and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a
House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the
HB. Tolentino and co -petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate
Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative
must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before
where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far
as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns
a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
LUNG CENTER VS QC
Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity
established by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered owner of the land on
which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected. A big space in
the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen
and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use

the same as their private clinics. Also, a big portion on the right side of the
hospital is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known
as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and hospital
building for real property taxes, the Lung Center of the Philippines filed a
claim for exemption on its averment that it is a charitable institution with a
minimum of 60% of its hospital beds exclusively used for charity patients and
that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The
claim for exemption was denied, prompting a petition for the reversal of the
resolution of the City Assessor with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
of Quezon City, which denied the same. On appeal, the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed the local boards decision,
finding that Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable institution and
that its properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes. Hence, the present petition for review with averments that
the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution under Section
28(3), Article VI of the Constitution, notwithstanding that it accepts paying
patients and rents out portions of the hospital building to private individuals
and enterprises.
Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a charitable institution within the
context of the Constitution, and therefore, exempt from real property tax?
Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution. To
determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the elements
which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its
corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of
administration, the nature of the actual work performed, that character of the
services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries and the use and
occupation of the properties.
However, under the Constitution, in order to be entitled to exemption from
real property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that
(1) it is a charitable institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY,
DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. While portions
of the hospital are used for treatment of patients and the dispensation of
medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions
thereof are being leased to private individuals and enterprises.

the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as
follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission
to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff
rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
FABIAN VS DESIERTO
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District
(FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and
when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted
her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal
to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy
Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is
final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective
November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -In all administrative
diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument
has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in


addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In
1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil
products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan,
avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6
of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since
the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

B. PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILL.


BILLS that must originate EXCLUSIVELY FROM THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
APPROPRIATION BILLS
A BILL CREATING A NEW OFFICE AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR IS NOT AN APPROPRITION BILL.
A law regulating an industry, though incidentally imposing a taz does not
make the law a revenue bill
Revenue bills
Tariff bills
Bills authorizing the increase of debt
Bills of local application
Private bills

Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others,


debarred from participation or enjoyment. If real property is used for one or
more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted
purposes but is subject to taxation.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.


HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within
the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to

A.

Procedure for enactment

Must be by any member of the HoR or senate except for some measures
that must originate only from the former chamber
FIRST READING:
The reading of the title and the number; the bill is passed by the Senate
President or Speaker to the proper committee

SECOND READING
Entire text is read and debates are held and amendments introduced. The
bill as approved in the second reading is printed in its final form and
copies are distributed three days before the third reading
THIRD READING
Only the title is read, no amendments are allowed. Vote shall be taken
immediately thereafter and the yeas and nays entered in the journal
SENT TO OTHER CHAMBER
Once the bill passes the third reading. It is sent to the other chamber
where it will go under third readings
ENROLLED BILL
The bill is printed as finally approved by the Congress, authenticated
with the signatures of the Senate President or the Speaker and the
Secretary and approved by the President.
b. SUBMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT
the PRESIDENTS VETO POWER

every bill, in order to become law, must be presented to and


signed by the President

if the President does nit approve of the bill, he shall veto the
same and return his objections to the House from which it
originated. The house shall enter the objections in the journal
and proceed to reconsider it

the President must communicate his decision to veto within


30days fro the date of receipt thereof. If he fails to do so, the
bill shall become a law as if he signed it

to override the beto, at least 2/3 of ALL the members of each


house must agree to pass the bill. In such case the vero is
overridden and becomes a law as if he signed it

the President may veto particular items in appropriation,


revenue or tariff bill

this veto will not affect items to which he does not object
VETO of a Rider

a rider is a provision which does not relate to a


particular appropriation stated in the bill.

Since it is an invalid provisoon under Section(25)2 the


President may veto it as an item.

PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL PROVISION OF ART XLVIII


OF THE GAA OF 1994.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners have locus standi. YES.
WON the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service
and the automatic appropriation of funds is constitutional. NO, an attempt to
repeal PD 1177.
RATIO: A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity
of a presidential veto or any other act of the Executive which injures the
institution of Congress.
-

TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE (SUPRA)


PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:
1.

2.

3.
4.

HOUSE BILL NO. 10900, THE GENERAL APPROPRIATION BILL


OF 1994 (GAB OF 1994) passed and approved by both houses of
Congress on December 17, 1993.
Imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by
the President.
Authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign
their respective operating budgets.
President signed the bill into law, making it as Republic Act No. 7663,
entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE,
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994).
SAME DAY: the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he
imposed certain conditions.
PETITIONERS: ASSAIL THE SPECIAL PROVISION ALLOWING
A MEMBER OF CONGRESS TO REALIGN HIS ALLOCATION
FOR OPERATIONAL EXPENSES TO ANY OTHER EXPENSE
CATEGORY.
Violates Section 25, Article 7 of the Constitution.
To declare unconstitutional and void THE PROVISION
UNDER ARTICLE 16 OF THE COUNTRYWIDE
DEVELOPMENT FUND AND THE VETO OF THE

It becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the
exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative
jurisdiction begin.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION UNDER THE COUNTRYWIDE
DEVELOPMENT FUND: implementation of the priority projects
specified in the law while the authority given to members of Congress
is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented.
o
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN TO THE MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS IS ONLY TO PROPOSE AND IDENTIFFY
PROJECTS TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE PRESIDENT
MERELY RECOMMENDATORY.
o
It is the President who shall implement them.
THE PROCEDURE OF PROPOSING AND IDENTIFYING BY
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF PARTICULAR PROJECTS OR
ACTIVITIES UNDER ART. XLI OF THE GAA OF 1994:
IMAGINATIVE AND INNOVATIVE.
o
CDF attempts to make equal the unequal.
o
Members of Congress are likely to be KNOWLEDGEABLE
ABOUT THE NEEDS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
CONSTITUENTS and the priority to be given each project.
The members ONLY DETERMINE THE NECESITY OF THE
REALIGNMENT OF THE SAVINGS IN THE ALLOTMENTS for
their operating expenses BUT IT IS THE SENATE PRES. AND THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOW WHO SHALL APPROVE THE
REALIGNMENT.
o
They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones
who know whether there are savings available in some items
and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their
operating expenses that need AUGMENTATION.
o
Before SP and SHOR approve:
1.
The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually
savings in the items of expenditures from which the
same are to be taken.
2.
The transfer of realignment is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
transfer or realignment is to be made.
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION
DIRECTS
HIGHEST
BUDGETARY PRIORITY TO EDUCATION MERELY
DIRECTORY (Guingona vs. Carague).
GENERALLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS TO VETO THE ENTIRE
BILL, not merely parts. EXCEPT in regard to general appropriations
bills where he may veto any particular item or items, in which case he
has to veto the ENTIRE ITEM.
DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION: any provision
which does NOT RELATE to ANY PARTICULAR ITEM, or which
EXTENDS IN ITS OPERATION BEYOND AN ITEM OF
APPROPRIATION CAN BE VETOED SEPARATELY FROM AN
ITEM.
o
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS and PROVISIONS
WHICH ARE INTENDED TO AMEND OTHER LAWS
these are maters of general legislation more appropriately dealt
with in separate enactments.
Second paragraph of SP No. 2 divergence in policy of Congress
(30% of the total appropriation for road maintenance should be
contracted out) and the President (70% - more efficient, economical
and practical) VETO IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
o
The SP is NOT AN INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION NOT
ALIEN to the appropriation for road maintenance.

o
SPECIFIC: 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
SP requiring that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health (RA No. 6675) an appropriate provision
VETO IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
o
Directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item
on purchases of medicines by AFP SP cannot be vetoed by
the President without also vetoing the said item.
Appropriation for the modernization of AFP: SP No. 2 (Use of Fund)
and entire SP No. 3 (Specific Prohibition) VETO IS VALID.
o
SP No. 2 is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto
a means by the legislature can block or modify admin action
taken under a statute; a form of legislative control in the
implementation of particular executive actions what
Congress cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by
attaching conditions to the exercise of that power.
o
SP No. 3 is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the
passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs VETO IS VALID.
o
PRESIDENT MSG: The deactivation should be done in
accordance to his timetable, taking into consideration the peace
and order situation in the affected localities.
o
Appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose
must be manifested in another law; existing laws on the
CAFGUs need to be amended.
Conditions on the appropriation for the SC, Ombudsman, COA, and
CHR Petitioner: Fiscal autonomy? VETOES ARE VALID.
o
The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public
funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the
President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed.
The Courts interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of
its enactment.

GONZALES VS. MACARAIG: upheld the authority of the President and


other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from
savings in the interest of EXPEDIENCY and EFFICIENCY.
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

Dec. 1988: Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal
Year 1989) which eliminated or decreased certain items included in the
proposed budget submitted by the President.
Dec. 1988: President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but VETOED 7
SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND SEC 55, A GENERAL PROVISION.
Feb. 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution
decided to contest the constitutionality of the veto of the president of
SEC 55 only DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL, therefore
VOID.
SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several departments to
augment any item in the GAB violation ART. VI SEC 25(5).
PETITIONER: (1) the President's line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY
'89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) When the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) The
item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) The power of
augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution,
has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested
with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power.
SOLICITOR GENERAL: (1) the issue in the present case is a political
question beyond the power of this Court to determine; (2) Gonzales et
al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto; (3) Section
55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and,
therefore, merits the President's veto; (4) The power of the President to
augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had
already been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44

and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA 6670 (4 August 1988); and


(5) The President is empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions
or other "distinct and severable parts" of an Appropriations Bill.
ISSUES:
WON Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are provisions, not items,
in the appropriation bill. NO.
WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriation Bill, and
subsequently, its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is
unconstitutional and without effect. NO.
RATIO: THEY ARE INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS THAT SHOULD BE
TREATED AS ITEMS: The challenged "provisions" fall short of this
requirement.
1.
2.

3.

The vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive


appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or
reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
The disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the
original recommendations made by the President and to the source
indicated by the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring
Office."
The vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional
policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a
budgetary appropriation.

They are even inappropriate conditions: THEY ARE ACTUALLY


GENERAL
LAW
MEASURES
MORE
APPROPRIATE
FOR
SUBSTANTIVE AND, THEREFORE, SEPARATE LEGISLATION.
-

SECTIONS 55 (FY '89) AND 16 (FY '90) PARTAKE MORE OF


A CURTAILMENT ON THE POWER TO AUGMENT FROM
SAVINGS; IN OTHER WORDS, "A GENERAL PROVISION
OF LAW, WHICH HAPPENS TO BE PUT IN AN
APPROPRIATION BILL."
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27
of the 1987 Constitution.
IT ALLOWS THE EXERCISE OF THE VETO OVER A
PARTICULAR ITEM OR ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATION,
REVENUE, OR TARIFF BILL.
The President may not veto less than all of an item of an
Appropriations Bill THE POWER GIVEN THE EXECUTIVE TO
DISAPPROVE ANY ITEM OR ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATIONS
BILL DOES NOT GRANT THE AUTHORITY TO VETO A PART
OF AN ITEM AND TO APPROVE THE REMAINING PORTION
OF THE SAME ITEM.
The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the
President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill
NOT ONLY DISREGARDS THE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT A
DISTINCT AND SEVERABLE PART OF A BILL MAY BE THE
SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE VETO BUT ALSO OVERLOOKS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE THAT ANY PROVISION IN THE
GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS
BILL SHALL RELATE
SPECIFICALLY TO SOME PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION
THEREIN AND THAT ANY SUCH PROVISION SHALL BE
LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION TO
WHICH IT RELATES.
THE PRESIDENT PROMPTLY VETOED SECTION 55 (FY '89)
AND SECTION 16 (FY '90) BECAUSE THEY NULLIFY THE
AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND HEADS OF
DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT TO AUGMENT
ANY ITEM IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR
THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER
ITEMS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROPRIATIONS, as
guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.
When Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) prohibit the restoration or
increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced
by Congress, THEY IMPAIR THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER
KEY OFFICIALS TO AUGMENT ANY ITEM OR ANY

APPROPRIATION FROM SAVINGS IN THE INTEREST OF


EXPEDIENCY AND EFFICIENCY.
o
The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or
reduced items by no means VESTS IN THE EXECUTIVE
THE POWER TO REWRITE THE ENTIRE BUDGET.

BENGZON VS. DRILON


FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

Petitioners retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of


Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as
amended by RA 1797.
President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797
which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and
officers and enlisted members of the AFP.
PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the
automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men
was restored, while that of the retired justices was not.
RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990.
President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
VETOED BILL: PROVIDED FOR THE INCREASE OF THE
PENSIONS OF THE RETIRED JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS AS WELL AS
MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION.
Marcos issued PD 644 which repealed RA 1797, BUT IT never
became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law
that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous
because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away
validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
PETITIONERS: (1) The subject veto is not an item veto. YES, they
are provisions, (2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers, (3) The veto deprives the retired
Justices of their rights to the pensions due to them, (4) The questioned
veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy granted by the Constitution. YES.

ISSUE:
WON the veto by the President of certain provisions in the GAA 1992 relating
to the payment of the adjusted portions of retired Justices of the SC and CA is
unconstitutional .YES.

RATIO: The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an


exercise of a constitutionally vested power.
-

BUT EVEN AS THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS THE POWER, IT


ALSO PROVIDES LIMITATIONS TO ITS EXERCISE. THE VETO
POWER IS NOT ABSOLUTE.
IN THE EXERCISE OF THE VETO POWER, IT IS GENERALLY
ALL OR NOTHING.
However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the
Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government
and it cannot veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable
features.
o
The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the
entire bill, including its undesirable parts.
o
It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided
the "item veto powers" to avoid inexpedient riders being
attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure.
GONZALES VS. MACARAIG: The Constitution provides that
ONLY A PARTICULAR ITEM OR ITEMS MAY BE VETOED. The
power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item.
THE ARE PROVISIONS, NOT items: the augmentation of specific
appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, BY
TRANSFERRING SAVINGS FROM OTHER ITEMS OF
APPROPRIATION IS A PROVISION AND NOT AN ITEM. WHY?
It gives power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to

another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.


WHAT THE PRESIDENT REALLY VETOED:
1.
RA 1797 enacted as early as Jun 21, 1957 (provided for the
adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which privilege
was extended to retired members of the ConCom).
2.
The Resolution of the Supreme Court (Nov. 28, 1991).
SINCE PD 644 NEVER REALLY BECAME A LAW (AND THE
COURT HAD ALREADY RULED ABOUT THAT), IT COULD
NOT HAVE REPEALED RA 1797 VETOING THIS IS BEYOND
THE PRESIDENTS POWER.
O
WHY? THE EXECUTIVE HAS NOT AUTHORITY TO
SET ASIDE AND OVERRULE A DECISION OF THE
SC.
O
The Presidents power is merely to execute the laws as
passed by Congress.
O
THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER TO ENACT OR
AMEND STATUTES PROMULAGATED BY HER
PREDECESSORS, MUCH LESS TO REPEAL EXISTING
LAWS.
FISCAL AUTONOMY:
1.
The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates A GUARANTEE OF FULL FLEXIBILITY TO
ALLOCATE AND UTILIZE THEIR RESOURCES WITH
THE WISDOM AND DISPATCH THAT THEIR NEEDS
REQUIRE.
2.
It recognizes THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO LEVY,
ASSESS AND COLLECT FEES, FIX RATES OF
COMPENSATION NOT EXCEEDING THE HIGHEST
RATES AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR COMPENSATION
AND PLAY PLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
ALLOCATE AND DISBURSE SUCH SUMS as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.
3.
Fiscal autonomy means FREEDOM FROM OUTSIDE
CONTROL.
4.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman MUST HAVE THE INDEPENDENCE AND
FLEXIBILITY NEEDED IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES.
THE FREEDOM OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE IS WITHHELD: TO
MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE UTILIZATION OF THE FUNDS
APPROPRIATED FOR THE EXPEDITURES OF THE JUDICIARY,
INCLUDING THE USE OF ANY SAVINGS FROM ANY
PARTICULAR ITEM TO COVER DEFICITS OR SHORTAGES IN
OTHER ITEMS OF THE JUDICIARY.
O
It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal
restraints.
Retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due to
them pursuant to RA 1797.

MILLER VS. MARDO


FACTS:
1.

2.

CASE 1: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the


Department of Labor, claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was
arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay.
Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer
Mardo of the Dept. of Labor on ground that HO has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case.
Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did
not repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original
jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims regarding
violations of labor standards.
CASE 2: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the Department of
Labor against Chin Hua Trading Co., for not being paid overtime and
vacation leave pay as a driver in the company.
Court issued permanent injunction against hearing the cases
by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void.

10

3.

4.

5.

CASE 3: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against Sen


Bee Trading Company for being underpaid, not being paid overtime,
without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as a seamstress
Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does
not have jurisdiction as money claims must be filed with
Regional Office of Department of Labor under Reorg. Plan
2-A
CASE 4: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DOL Sia
Leng did not file an answer and a decision was rendered in favor of
Romero.
But Labor Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ
of execution of the decision as he believed that Sia Seng
deserved to be heard.
They insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a
statute and unconstitutional.
CASE 5: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DOL a complaint
against Fred Wilson and Co., as he was summarily dismissed
without cause, without separation pay, and without sufficient notice.
They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body,
with no power to adjudicate money claims.

WON the par. 5, Art. VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is valid. NO.
RATIO: Under this provision, the regional offices of the Department of Labor
have been given ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER:

3.

All cases falling under the WORKMENS COMPENSATION LAW.


All cases affecting MONEY CLAIMS arising from VIOLATIONS
OF LABOR STANDARDS ON WORKING CONDITIONS,
UNPAID WAGES, UNDERPAYMENT, OVERTIME, SEPARATION
PAY AND MATERNITY LEAVE OF EMPLOYEES AND
LABORERS.
All cases for UNPAID WAGES, OVERTIME, SEPARATION PAY,
VACATION PAY AND PAYMENT FOR MEDICAL SERVICES OF
DOMESTIC HEALTH.

Before, DOL had no authority over B and C ONLY AUTHORITY: to


mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing ERGO, B
and C ARE NEW CONFERMENT OF POWER.
-

Violates the constitutional provision requiring POSITIVE and


SEPARATE ACTION BY EACH HOUSE of Congress
REVERSAL OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
ARTICLE 2 OF CC
LAWS SHALL TAKE EFFECT AFTER 15DAYS FOLLOWING THE
COMPLETION OF THEIR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE,
UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED. THIS CODE SHALL TAKE
EEFECT ONE YEAR AFTER SUCH PUBLICATION
unless otherwise provide this phrase refers to the date of effectivity and nit
the publication is indispensable.
TANADA VS. TUVERA: nakalimutan ko na kasi tong case na to

EO 200

ISSUE:

1.
2.

NOT VALID BECAUSE: THESE FUNCTIONS (RA 1241


CREATING
THE
GOVERNMENT
SURVEY
AND
REORGANIZATION COMMISSION) REFER MERELY TO
ADMINISTRATIVE, not judicial functions.
Why? THE GSRC was created to carry out the reorganization of the
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,
which plainly DID NOT INCLUDE THE CREATION OF COURTS.
Constitution: the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law.
THE LEGISLATURE CAN CONFER RO ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARDS OR BODIES QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MUST BE
STATED IN ITS INTENTION IN EXPRESS TERMS THAT
WOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT, AS EVEN QUASI-JUDICIAL
PREROGATIVES MUST BE LIMITED, IF THEY ARE TO BE
VALID ONLY INCIDENTAL TO OR IN CONNETION WITH
THE PERFORMANCE OF JURISDICTION OVER A MATTER
EXCLUSIVELY VESTED IN THE COURTS.
CANNOT BE IMPLIED FROM A MERE GRANT OF POWER TO
A BODY SUCH AS THE GSRC.
COROMINAS V. LABOR STANDARDS: THELEGISLATURE
MAY NOT AND CANNOT DELEGATE ITS POWER TO
LEGISLATE OR CREATE COURTS OF JUSTICCE TO ANY
OTHER AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
THE PLAN BECAME A LAW BY NON-ACTION ON THE PART
OF CONGRESS:
1.
The Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A to the President.
2.
President transmitted the same to Congress.
3.
Congress
adjourned
WITHOUT
PASSING
A
RESOLUTION DISAPPROVING OR ADOPTING THE
SAD PLAN.

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN


THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL
CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT
FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that
"laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided . . . ;" cdasia
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a
publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some
problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Taada, et al. vs.
Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986), when it observed
that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not
be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and
limited readership;"
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly;" and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the
Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective
must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
do hereby order:
SECTION 1.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided. cdtai
SECTION 2.Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
SECTION 3.This Executive Order shall take effect immediately
after its publication in the Official Gazette.

11

DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year
of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.
8.
Published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83 No. 26 Page 3038-A on June 29,
1987.
9.

QUESTION HOUR AND LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION


SEC21-22 OF THE CONSTITUTION

10.
11.

12.
ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO
FACTS:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

BUENAVISTA ESTATE
The Philippine government LEASED FROM SAN JUAN
DE DIOS HOSPITAL FOR 25 YEARS the Buenavista estate
had an OPTION TO PURCHASE THE SAME FOR P 3
MILLION.
Republic tendered the owner the sum of P 3 million
REJECTED deposit the said funds in Court, together with
the accrued rentals of P 324,000.
SAN JUAN DE DIOS ON JUNE 29, 1946 SOLD THIS
SAME PROPERTY TO ERNEST H. BURT, a non-resident
American for P 5,000,000 with the initial down payment of P
10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable terms
BURT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE
TERMS AGREED.
TAMBOBONG ESTATE
THE SAME BURT PURCHASE FROM PHILIPPINE
TRUST CORPORATION, THE TAMBOBONG ESTATE
FOR P 1.2 MILLION WITH A DOWNPAYMENT OF P
10,000.00.
THERE WAS HOWEVER NO OTHER PAYMENT
RECEIVED FROM BURT.
THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE
RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, ACQUIRED
THIS SAME PROPERTY FROM ITS ORIGINAL OWNER
FOR THE SUM OF P 750,000 instituted a notarial
demand upon Burt FOR THE RESOLUTION AND
CANCELLATION OF HIS CONTRACT OF PURCHASE
WITH PHILIPPINE TRUST FOR NON PAYMENT.
FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, DESPITE THE FACT THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT ALREADY OWNED BOTH THE
ABOVE ESTATE, IT AGAIN BOUGHT THE SAME FROM
BURT: P4.5 million = Buenavista and P500k = Tambobong).
The government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and
the full amount of P 500,000 for Tambobong through TWO
CORPORATIONS ACTING AS BURTS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
REPRESENTED IN THE TRASACTION BY ONE AND THE
SAME PERSON, PET. JEAN L. ARNAULT.
The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into
THE PHILIPPINE SENATE ADOPTING RESOLUTION 8
WHICH CREATED A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
Among the witnesses and apparently the most important was PET.
JEAN ARNAULT, THE PERSON WHO REPRESENTED BURT IN
THE TRANSACTIONS.
During the said hearing, ARNAULT CONFIRMED RECEIVING
THE
MONEY
FROM
THE
GOVERNMENT
AND

WITHDRAWING, IN CASH, P440,000 WHICH HE GAVE TO


SOMEONE ON INSTRUCTION OF BURT.
WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY THE PERSON HE GAVE THE
MONEY TO, HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HIS
NAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE MET THE PERSON ON
MANY OCCASIONS.
WHEN PRESSED TO ANSWER, HE ALSO SAID THAT
ANSWERING THE QUESTION MIGHT INCRIMINATE HIM
SENATE ARRAIGNED HIM FOR CONTEMPT AND
SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND HIM GUILTY OF THE CHARGE.
He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until
he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to.
PETITIONER: (1) Senate has no power to punish him for contempt
for refusing to reveal the name of the person BECAUSE SUCH
INFORMATION IS IMMATERIAL TO, AND WILL NOT SERVE,
ANY INTENDED OR PURPORTED LEGISLATION AND HIS
REFUSAL TO ANSWER THE QUESTION: NOT EMBARASSED,
OBSTRUCTED, OR IMPEDED THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS.
(2) The Senate lack authority to commit him for contempt FOR A
TERM BEYOND ITS PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION
(Lopez vs. De los Reyes). (3) He would incriminate himself if he
should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the money.
SENATOR SUMULONG, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE: the
investigation had NOT BEEN COMPLETD because of the
contumacy of the witness.
Res. No. 16: his committee was empowered and directed to
continue its investigation THE EXAMINATION OF THE
WITNESS.

ISSUE:
WON the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. YES.
WON the Senate lack authority to commit him for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative process. NO, they have such authority.
RATIO: THE POWER OF INQUIRYWITH THE PROCESS TO
ENFORCE ITIS AN ESSENTIAL AND APPROPRIATE AUXILLARY TO
THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION.
-

A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively IN THE


ABSENCE OF NFORMATION RESPECTING THE CONDITIONS
WHICH THE LEGISLATION IS INTENDED TO AFFECT OR
CHANGE.
MERE REQUESTS FOR SUCH INFORMATION ARE OFTEN
UNAVAILING, and also that information WHICH IS
VOLUNTEERED IS NOT ALWAYS ACCURATE OR COMPLETE
SO SOME MEANS OF COMPULSION IS ESSENTIAL TO
OBTAIN WHAT IS NEEDED.
Does NOT by necessary implication EXCLUDE THE POWER TO
PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT ANY OTHER PERSON.
BUT no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness UNLESS
HIS TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED IN A MATTER INTO WHICH
THAT HOUSE HAS JURISDICTION TO INQUIRE.

THE MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION MUST BE DETERMINED BY


ITS DIRECT RELATION TO THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY and not by its
indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
-

The necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form
and character of the action itself are determined by THE SUM
TOTAL OF THE INFORMATION TO BE GATHERED AS A
RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION.
THE RULING OF THE SENATE ON THE MATERIALITY OF
THE INFORMATION SOUGHT FROM THE WITNESS IS
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT.
The Court cannot determine, any more than it can direct Congress,
what legislation to approve or not to approve THAT WOULD BE
AN INVASION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE.
THERE IS NOTHING T PREVENT THE CONGRESS FROM
APPROVING OTHER MEASURES IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY
AFTER COMPLETING THE INVESTIGATION It is not within
the Courts province to determine or imagine what those measures

12

may be: Same as RE CHAPMAN.


IF THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE IS WITHIN THE RANGE OF LEGITIMATE
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY AND THE PROPOSED TESTIMONY
OF THE WITNESS CALLED RELATES TO THAT
SUBJECT,OBEDIENCE TO ITS PROCESS MAY BE ENFORCED
BY THE COMMITTEE BY IMPRISONMENT.
Until after the Senate shall have determined who the parties
responsible are and shall have taken such measures as may be within
its competence to take to redress the wrong that may have been
committed against the people as a result of the transaction.

THE SENATE O FTHE PHILIPPINES IS A CONTINUING BODY.


-

THE RESOLUTION OF COMMITMENT WAS ADOPTED BY


THE SENATE, WHICH IS A CONTINUING BODY AND WHICH
DOES NOT CEASE TO EXIST UPON THE PERIODICAL
DISSOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS OR OF THE HOR no
limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted THE
INVESTIGATION HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED.
o
If NOT, the Senate would have to resume the investigation
and REPEAT THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS absurd,
unnecessary, and vexatious procedure AVOIDED.
HIS INSISTENT CLAIM BEFORE THE BAR OF THE SENATE
THAT IF HE SHOULD REVEAL THE NAME HE WOULD
INCRIMINATE HIMSELF, NECESSARILY IMPLIED THAT HE
KNEW THE NAME UNBELIEVABLE.
HE GAVE THE MONEY TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF BURT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LATTERS VERBAL INSTRUCTION
no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to answer might
incriminate him.
HE HAS A CLEAR DUTY AS A CITIZEN TO GIVE FRANK,
SINCERE, AND TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY BEFORE A
COMPETENT AUTHORITY. THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO
EXACT FULFILLMENT OF A CITIZEN'S OBLIGATION,
CONSISTENT OF COURSE WITH HIS RIGHT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.

ARNAULT VS. BALAGTAS


FACTS:
1.

While still in confinement in Bilibid, PET. ARNAULT EXECUTED


AN AFFIDAVIT history of the government purchase and
NAMING JESS SANTOS AS THE PERSON WHO RECEIVED
THE P440k: presented evidence in corroboration thereof.
2.
The Senate Committee conducted an investigation.
3.
At the end of the hearing, THE COMMITTEE DID NOT BELIEVE
ARNAULTS STATEMENT Res. No. 114: continued confinement
of Arnault until HE HAS PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT.
4.
PET. ARNAULT filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
5.
CFI-Pasay City declared the CONTINUED DETENTION AND
CONFINEMNT IS ILLEGAL Senate: GAD.
ISSUES:
WON the petitioner had already purged himself of the contempt charges when
he disclosed the fact that the one to whom he gave the money is Jess Santos.
NOT YET.
WON the Court can review the findings of the Senate Special Committee
regarding the petitioners statement. NO.
RATIO: SENATE FINDING: the fact that PETITIONER "HAS FAILED
AND REFUSED, AND CONTINUES TO FAIL AND REFUSE, TO
REVEAL THE PERSON TO WHOM HE GAVE THE AMOUNT OF
P440,000" AND THAT THE SITUATION OF PETITIONER "HAS NOT
MATERIALLY CHANGED SINCE HE WAS COMMITTED TO PRISON."
-

CFI, arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held that

THE "PETITIONER HAS SATISFACTORILY SHOWN THAT THE


PERSON OF JESS D. SANTOS ACTUALLY AND PHYSICALLY
EXISTED IN THE HUMAN FLESH," that THE OPINION OR
CONCLUSION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS NOT BORNE
TO OUT BY THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT THE
INVESTIGATION, that THE SENATE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION order the release of petitioner
ERRONEOUS.
WHY? IT ASSUMED THAT COURTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO
REVIEW FINDING OF LEGISLATIVE BODIES IN THE
EXERCISE OF THE PREROGATIVE OF LEGISLATION, OR
INTEREFERE WITH THE PROCEEDINGS OR THEIR
DISCRETION IN WHAT IS KNOWN AS THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS purely of legislative cognizance.
THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEGISLATURE IS FINAL,
EXCEPT WHEN SO ARBITRARY AS TO BE VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN.
PET. WAS NOT DENIED OF DUE PROCESS: such right has fully
been extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to
be heard personally and by counsel in all the proceedings prior to the
approval of the Resolution ordering his continued confinement.
THE SENATE FOUND THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE
DID NOT DISCLOSE, BY THE MERE GIVING OF THE
NAME JESS D. SANTOS, THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON
TO WHOM THE SUM OF P440,000 WAS DELIVERED, AND,
IN ADDITION THERETO THAT PETITIONER WITHHELD
SAID IDENTITY ARROGANTLY AND CONTUMACIOUSLY
IN CONTINUED AFFRONT OF THE SENATE'S AUTHORITY
AND DIGNITY POWER TO PUNISH FOR A PAST
CONTEMPT IS AN APPROPRIATE MEANS.
HOW COULD THE AUTHORITY AND POWER BECOME
COMPLETE IF FOR EVERY ACT OF REFUSAL, EVERY ACT OF
DEFIANCE, EVERY ACT OF CONTUMACY AGAINST IT, THE
LEGISLATIVE BODY MUST RESORT TO THE JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT FOR THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY?
LEGISLATURE: THE PROCESS BY WHICH A CONTUMACIOUS
WITNESS IS EALTH BY THEM IS TO ENABLE IT TO
EXERCISE ITS LEGISLATIVE POWER OF AUTHORTIY
necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process.
O
LEGISLATURE'S AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH THE
DEFIANT AND CONTUMACIOUS WITNESS SHOULD
BE SUPREME, and unless there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power
coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the
exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial
interference.
DIFFERENT FROM JUDICIARY: THE PROCESS BY WHICH
OFFENDERS ARE BROUGHT TO THE COURTS OF JUSTICE
FOR THE MEETING OF THE PUNISHMENT WHICH THE
CRIMINAL LAW IMPOSES UPON THEM has to do with the
enforcement and application of the criminal law.
In order that the petitioner may be considered as having purged
himself of the contempt, IT IS NECESSARY THAT HE SHOULD
HAVE TESTIFIED TRUTHFULLY, DISCLOSING THE REAL
IDENTITY OF THE PERSON SUBJECT OF THE INQUIRY.
THE SENATE COMMITTEE REFUSED TO BELIEVE, AND
JUSTLY, THAT IS THE REAL NAME OF THE PERSON WHOSE
IDENTITY IS BEING THE SUBJECT OF THE INQUIRY.
O
Be taken as insult to the intelligence of the honorable
members of the body that conducted the investigation.
Period of punishment for contempt already exceeded? NO. ONLY 5
MONTHS HAD PASSED: AFFIDAVIT Dec. 13, 1951;
RESOLUTON: Nov. 6, 1952.

BENGZON VS. SEN. BLUE RIB. COMMITTEE


FACTS:
1.

The RP (rep. PCGG) filed with the Sandiganbayan civil case: RP vs.
Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez alleges that defendants
BENJAMIN and JULIETTE R. took advantage of their relationship

13

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

with defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos TO ENGAGE IN


SCHEMES TO ENRICH THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE.
THE SENATE MINORITY FLOOR LEADER, HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE a speech "on a matter of personal privilege"
before the Senate ON THE ALLEGED "TAKE-OVER OF SOLOIL
INCORPORATED, THE FLAGSHIP OF THE FIRST MANILA
MANAGEMENT OF COMPANIES (FMMC) BY RICARDO
LOPA" and called upon "THE SENATE TO LOOK INTO THE
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE LAW IN THE CASE,
PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019,
THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT."
Referred by the Senate to the COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the
matter.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to
appear before it and TESTIFY ON "WHAT THEY KNOW"
REGARDING THE "SALE OF THE THIRTY-SIX (36)
CORPORATIONS BELONGING TO BENJAMIN "KOKOY"
ROMUALDEZ.
LOPA declined: his testimony may unduly prejudice the
defendants of the Civil Case. BENGZON refused: invoked his
constitutional right to due process.
SBRC REJECTED the please. THE COMMTTEE VOTED TO
PURSUE AND CONTINUE ITS INVESIGATION OF THE
MATTER.
PETITIONERS FILED THIS PRESENT PETITION: SBRC was
acting in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose clear
blatant disregard of human rights, etc.

ISSUES:
WON the SBRCs inquiry is in aid of legislation. NO.
WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of
government. YES.
WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. YES.
RATIO: THE SPEECH OF SENATOR ENRILE CONTAINED NO
SUGGESTION OF CONTEMPLATED LEGISLATION HE MERELY
CALLED UPON THE SENATE TO LOOK INTO A POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF SEC. 5 OF RA NO. 3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
"THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT."
-

PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY: TO FIND OUT WHETHER OR


NOT
THE
RELATIVES
OF
PRESIDENT
AQUINO,
PARTICULARLY MR. RICARDO LOPA, HAD VIOLATED THE
LAW IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALLEGED SALE OF THE 36
OR 39 CORPORATIONS BELONGING TO BENJAMIN "KOKOY"
ROMUALDEZ TO THE LOPA GROUP NO INTENDED
LEGISLATION INVOLVED.
o
NOT RELATED to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress.
o
The matter is MORE WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE
COURTS rather than of the legislature.
FILING IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN CAME FIRST:
o
The issue sought to be investigated by the respondent
Committee is ONE OVER WHICH JURISDICTION HAD
BEEN ACQUIRED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
o
THE ISSUE HAS BEEN PRE-EMPTED BY THAT COURT.
o
To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own
investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan
WOULD NOT ONLY POSE THE POSSIBILITY OF
CONFLICTING
JUDGMENTS
BETWEEN
A
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE and THE POSSIBILITY OF
ITS INFLUENCE BEING MADE TO BEAR ON THE
ULTIMATE JUDGMENT OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
cannot be discounted EN-CROACHMENT INTO THE
EXCLUSIVE DOMAIN OF JUICIAL JURISDICTION.

SENATE VS. ERMITA


FACTS:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

10.
11.

Committee of the Senate ISSUED INVITATIONS TO VARIOUS


OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FOR THEM
TO APPEAR AS RESOURCE SPEAKERS IN A PUBLIC
HEARING ON THE RAILWAY PROJECT OF THE NORTH
LUZON RAILWAYS CORPORATION WITH THE CHINA
NATIONAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT GROUP
(HEREINAFTER NORTH RAIL PROJECT).
The public hearing was sparked by A PRIVILEGE SPEECH OF
SENATOR JUAN PONCE ENRILE URGING THE SENATE TO
INVESTIGATE THE ALLEGED OVERPRICING AND OTHER
UNLAWFUL PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT COVERING
THE NORTH RAIL PROJECT even to some officials of the AFP.
AFP Chief of Staff: requested for its postponement "due to a pressing
operational situation that demands [his] utmost personal attention"
while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to
other urgent operational matters."
Exec. Sec. ERMITA respectfully requested for the postponement of
the hearing to afford time and opportunity to study and prepare for
the various issues.
SEN. PRES. DRILON REPLIED unable to accede to the request
because everything had already been set the previous week.
PRESIDENT ISSUED EO 464. BARS THE APPEARANCE OF
EXEC. OFFICIALS BEFORE CONGRESS.
EXEC. SEC. ERMITA: the officials of the Executive WILL NOT BE
ABLE TO ATTEND THE SAME WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF
THE PRESIDENT.
The investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense
and Security pushed through, WITH ONLY COL. BALUTAN AND
BRIG. GEN. GUDANI AMONG ALL THE AFP OFFICIALS
INVITED ATTENDING.
For defying President Arroyo's order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, BRIG.
GEN. GUDANI AND COL. BALUTAN WERE RELIEVED FROM
THEIR MILITARY POSTS AND WERE MADE TO FACE COURT
MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS.
Another investigation on the alleged mismanagement and use of the
fertilizer fund most of them failed to attend.
Budget hearings communicated their inability to attend due to lack
of appropriate clearance from the Pres.

ISSUES:
WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress. YES.
RATIO: POWER OF INQUIRY: SEC. 21, ART. VI: may conduct inquries IN
AID OF LEGISLATION.
-

Essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.


A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
BROAD ENOUGH TO COVER OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH.
THE OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT, BEING A LEGITI-MATE
SUBJECT FOR LEGISLATION, IS A PROPER SUB-JECT FOR
INVESTIGATION.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: the power of the Government to WITHHOLD


INFORMATION FROM THE PUBLIC, THE COURTS, AND THE
CONGRESS (Schwartz).
-

The right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to


withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public (Rozell).
Premised on the fact that CERTAIN INFORMATIONS MUST, AS A

14

MATTER OF NECESSITY, BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL IN


PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
1.
STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE: information is of such
nature that ITS DISCLOSURE WOULD SUBVERT
CRUCIAL MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES.
2.
INFORMERS PRIVILEGE: the privilege of the
Government NOT TO DISCLOSE THE IDEN-TITY OF
PERSONS WHO FURNISH INFORMA-TION OF
VIOLATIONS OF LAW to officers charges with the
enforcement of that law.
3.
GENERIC PRIVILEGE: for internal deliberations
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which government decisions and policies are
formulated.
REQUIRED INFO MUST FALL WITHIN ONE OF THE
TRADITIONAL PRIVILEGES + PRIVILEGE NEEDS TO BE
HONORED IN A GIVEN PROCEDURAL SETTING.
US VS. NIXON: (privilege against production of certain tapes and
documents relating to the Watergate investigations) rejected the
President's claim of privilege, ruling that THE PRIVILEGE MUST
BE BALANCED AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE
FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ: The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution . . .
CHAVEZ VS. PCGG: governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic
and other national security matters.
CHAVEZ VS. PEA: The right to information does not extend to
matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of
powers," by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, WHETHER ASSERTED AGAINST
CONGRESS, THE COURTS, OR THE PUBLIC, IS RECOGNIZED
ONLY IN RELATION TO CERTAIN TYPES OF INFORMATION
OF A SENSITIVE CHARACTER.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, A CLAIM
THEREOF MAY BE VALID OR NOT DEPENDING ON THE
GROUND INVOKED TO JUSTIFY IT AND THE CONTEXT IN
WHICH IT IS MADE.

SECTION 1 (VALID ON ITS FACE): applied to department heads not


made to depend on the department heads possession of any information
which might be covered by executive privilege.
-

The consent is grounded on ART. VI, Sec. 22: QUESTION HOUR


ATTENDANCE WAS MEANT TO BE DISCRETIONARY.
o
OBJECTIVE: to obtain information in pursuit of Congress
oversight function. .
Sec. 21: ATTENDANCE WAS COMPULSORY IN INQUIRIES IN
AID OF LEGISLATION.
o
OBJECTIVE: to illicit information that may be used for
legislation.
The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 basis:
principle of separation of powers.
WHILE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS A CO-EQUAL BRANCH
OF THE LEGISLATURE, IT CANNOT FRUSTRATE THE POWER
OF CONGRESS TO LEGISLATE BY REFUSING TO COMPLY
WITH ITS DEMANDS FOR INFORMATION.
ONLY ONE EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL MAY BE EXEMPTED
FROM THIS POWER THE PRESIDENT ON WHOM
EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED except through the power of
impeachment. WHY? DUE RESPECT ACCORDED TO A COEQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT WHICH IS SANCTIONED
BY A LONG-STANDING CUSTOM.

SECTION 2(b) [INVALID BECAUSE IT IS NOT ASSERTED, MERELY


IMPLIED]: executive privilege actually covers PERSONS MISUSE: exec.
Privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of
INFORMATION, and NOT TO CATEGORIES OF PERSONS.

REQUIREMENT: he first secure the consent of the President prior to


appearing before Congress bars the appearance of the official
concerned unless the same is permitted by the President.
o
IMPLIED CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE IS NOT ALLOWED: 1)
secure the consent 2) President has not reversed such
determination.
o
THE LETTER ASSUMES THAT THE INVITED
OFFICIALS ARE COVERED BY EO 464.
SECTION 3 [INVALID]: requires all the public officials (i.e.
department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and
the National Security Adviser) enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.
The letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, THE
IMPLIED CLAIM AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 3 OF E.O. 464 IS
NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY SPECIFIC ALLEGATION OF
THE BASIS THEREOF (E.G., WHETHER THE INFORMATION
DEMANDED INVOLVES MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC
SECRETS, CLOSED-DOOR CABINET MEETINGS, ETC.).
o
Congress has the right to know WHY THE EXECUTIVE
CONSIDERS THE
REQUESTED
INFORMATION
PRIVILEGED.
o
A CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE, BEING A CLAIM OF
EXEMPTION
FROM
AN
OBLIGATION
TO
DISCLOSE INFORMATION, MUST, THEREFORE, BE
CLEARLY ASSERTED THE FACTS MUST BE
ESTABLISHED.
o
ABSENT THEN A STATEMENT OF THE SPECIFIC
BASIS OF A CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE,
THERE IS NO WAY OF DETERMINING WHETHER IT
FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE TRADITIONAL
PRIVILEGES,
OR
WHETHER,
GIVEN
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT IS MADE, IT SHOULD
BE RESPECTED AN IMPROPERLY ASSERTED
CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE IS NO CLAIM OF
PRIVILEGE.
O
BUT Congress must not require the executive to state the
reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect.
OTHERVIOLATIONS: 1) AGAINST RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO
INFORMATION, 2) PUBLICATION.

SABIO VS. GORDON


FACTS:
1.

2.
3.

4.

SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO INTRODUCED


PHILIPPINE SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 455 (SENATERES. NO.
455) directing AN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION ON
THE ANOMALOUS LOSSES incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation
(POTC),
Philippine
Communications SatelliteCorporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC).
Why? Due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors.
The Senate invited Presidential Commission on Good Governance
(PCGG) CHAIRMAN CAMILO L. SABIO to be the resource person
in a public meeting that would deliberate on the issues presented in
Senate Res. No.455.
Chairman Sabio, however, declined the invitation, invoking
SECTION 4, PARAGRAPH (B) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1,
which provides:
NO MEMBER OR STAFF OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE
REQUIRED TO TESTIFY OR PRODUCE EVIDENCE IN ANY
JUDICIAL,
LEGISLATIVE
OR
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING CONCERNING MATTERS WITHIN ITS
OFFICIAL COGNIZANCE.

15

5.

6.
7.
8.

9.

Senator Richard J. Gordon issued a subpoena ad testificandum


require Chairman Sabio and the FOUR PCGG COMMISSIONERS
TO APPEAR IN THE PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULED and
TESTIFY ON WHAT THEY KNOW RELATIVE TO THE
MATTERS SPECIFIED IN SENATE RES. NO. 455.
AGAIN, CHAIRMANSABIO REFUSED TO APPEAR.
Another notice was sent to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear
and testify on the same subject matter, but Chairman Sabio still did
not comply (3rd TIME).
UNCONVINCED, THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES ISSUED AN ORDER
DIRECTING MAJOR GENERAL JOSE BALAJADIA (RET.),
SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, TO PLACE CHAIRMAN SABIO
AND HIS COMMISSIONERS UNDER ARREST FOR CONTEMPT
OF THE SENATE BEARS THE APPROVAL OF SENATE
PRESIDENT VILLAR AND THE MAJORITY OF THE
COMMITTEES' MEMBERS.
CHAIRMAN SABIO FILED WITH THIS COURT A PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS against the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker
P. Arroyo and Members.

ISSUE
:
WON EO No. 1, Section 4(b), is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. YES.

NERI VS. SENATE


FACTS:
1.

RATIO: Sec. 21, Art. VI, 198 Constitution EO No. 1.


-

The power of inquiry is INHERENT in the power to legislate.


BRIGGS VS. MCKELLAR: The right to pass laws, necessarily
implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which may
become the subject of a law. It is essential to the full and intelligent
exercise of the legislative function THE POWER OF INQUIRY IS
"AN ESSENTIAL AND APPROPRIATE AUXILIARY TO THE
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
ARNAULT: THE OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT, BEING A
LEGITIMATE SUBJECT FOR LEGISLATION, IS A PROPER
SUBJECT FOR INVESTIGATION" AND THAT "THE POWER OF
INQUIRY IS CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE.
WE FIND SECTION 4(B) DIRECTLY REPUGNANT WITH
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 21. SECTION 4(B) EXEMPTS THE
PCGG MEMBERS AND STAFF FROM THE CONGRESS'
POWER OF INQUIRY NOWHERE IN THE CONSTITUTION
IS ANY PROVISION GRANTING SUCH EXEMPTION.
The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, ENCOMPASSES
EVERYTHING THAT CONCERNS THE ADMINISTRATION OF
EXISTING LAWS AS WELL AS PROPOSED OR POSSIBLY
NEEDED STATUTES extends "TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
CREATED BY CONGRESS AND OFFICERS WHOSE POSITIONS
ARE WITHIN THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE OR
EVEN ABOLISH." PCGG belongs to this class.
A mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power
of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
ALSO INCONSISTENT WITH PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY: IT PLACES THE PCGG MEMBERS AND
STAFF BEYOND THE REACH OF COURTS, CONGRESS AND
OTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES.
INSTEAD
OF
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, THE SAME
PROVISION ONLY INSTITUTIONALIZES IRRESPONSIBILITY
AND NON-ACCOUNTABILITY.
ALSO INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE XI, SECTION 1 OF THE
CONSTITUTION: THE POWERS SO DELEGATED TO THE
OFFICER ARE HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PEOPLE AND ARE
TO BE EXERCISED IN BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OR
OF ALL CITIZENS WHO MAY NEED THE INTERVENTION OF
THE OFFICERS.
o
Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties
pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are
but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.

ALSO OF SEC. 28, Art. II (full public disclosure of all transactions


involving public interest), SEC. 7, Art. III (the right of people to
information on matters of public concern).
THE PEOPLE ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED WITH THIS
PROCEEDING AND HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE
THEREIN IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS the
extent of their participation will largely depend on the information
gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to
information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies
of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
NO ACT SHALL BE VALID, HOWEVER NOBLE ITS
INTENTIONS, IF IT CONFLICTS WITH THE CONSTITUTION.

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

April 21, 2007: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND


COMMUNICATION (DOTC) ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT
WITH ZHONG XING TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project IN THE AMOUNT OF U.S. $
329,481,290 (APPROXIMATELY P16 BILLION PESOS).
The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
P.S. Res. No. 127 (Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr), entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
INDUSTRY TO
INVESTIGATE,
IN
AID
OF
LEGISLATION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO
THE APPROVAL OF THE BROADBAND CONTRACT
WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE
OFFICIALS
CONCERNED
IN
GETTING
IT
CONSUMMATED
P.S. Res. No. 144 (Senator Mar Roxas), entitled A
RESOLUTION
URGING
PRESIDENT
GLORIA
MACAPAGAL
ARROYO
TO
DIRECT
THE
CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE CONTRACT.
P.S. Res. No. 129 (Senator Panfilo M. Lacson), entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO CONDUCT
AN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AWARDING
THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK CONTRACT
TO THE CHINESE FIRM ZTE CORPORATION.
P.S. Res. No. 136 (Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago),
entitled RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER
SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN
AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL
BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
September 18, 2007, JOSE DE VENECIA III TESTIFIED THAT
SEVERAL HIGH EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS AND POWER
BROKERS WERE USING THEIR INFLUENCE TO PUSH THE
APPROVAL OF THE NBN PROJECT BY THE NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon.
HE APPEARED IN ONE HEARING WHEREIN HE WAS
INTERROGATED FOR 11 HOURS AND DURING WHICH HE
ADMITTED THAT ABALOS OF COMELEC TRIED TO BRIBE
HIM WITH P200M IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS APPROVAL OF
THE NBN PROJECT he informed President Arroyo about the

16

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

12.

13.

bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
HOWEVER, WHEN PROBED FURTHER ON WHAT THEY
DISCUSSED ABOUT THE NBN PROJECT, PETITIONER
REFUSED
TO
ANSWER,
INVOKING
EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed
him to approve.
HE LATER REFUSED TO ATTEND THE OTHER HEARINGS.
Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied.
HE WAS CITED IN CONTEMPT OF RESPONDENT
COMMITTEES AND AN ORDER FOR HIS ARREST AND
DETENTION UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT HE WOULD APPEAR
AND GIVE HIS TESTIMONY.
PETITIONER: Contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
MATTERS RELATING TO DIPLOMACY OR FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions
meant to explore options in making policy decisions."
These discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials on the country's
diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and
the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and
lenders in the Philippines."
RESPONDENT COMMITTEES:
(1) Petitioner's testimony is material and pertinent in the
investigation conducted in aid of legislation;
(2) There is no valid justification for petitioner to claim
executive privilege;
(3) There is no abuse of their authority to order petitioner's
arrest; and
(4) Petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

ISSUE:
WON those questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. YES.
WON the respondent committees committed GAD. YES.
RATIO:
WHY?
1.

2.

3.

The communications relate to a "QUINTESSENTIAL AND NONDELEGABLE POWER" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
The communications are "RECEIVED" BY A CLOSE ADVISOR OF
THE PRESIDENT. Under the "OPERATIONAL PROXIMITY" test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo's cabinet.
There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGES

PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
1.
Communications, docu-ments
or other materials that reflect
presidential deci-sion-making
and delibera-tions and that the
President
believes
should

DELIBERATIVE
PROCESS
PRIVILEGE
1.
Advisory
opinions,
recommendations
and
deliberations comprising part
of a process by which
governmental decisions and

remain confidential.
Applies to decision-making of
the President.
Rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power
and the Presidents unique
constitutional role.
Applies to documents in their
entirety, and covers final and
post-decisional materials as
well as pre-deliberative ones.
Congressional
or
judicial
negation of the presidential
communications privilege is
always subject to greater
scrutiny than denial of the
deliberative process privilege.
MEANT TO ENCOMPASS
ONLY THOS EFUNCTIONS
THAT FORM THE CORE OF
PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY QNDP such a
commander-in-chief
power,
appointment
and
removal
power, the power to grant
pardons and repress, the soleauthority
to
receive
ambassadors and other public
officers, the power to negotiate
treaties.

2.
3.

policies are formulated.


Applies to decision-making of
executive officials.
Rooted on common law
privilege.

ELEMENTS
OF
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE (Nixon, In Re Sealed Case):
1.
The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power."
2.
The communication must be authored or "solicited and
received" by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
"operational proximity" with the President.
3.
The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought "likely
contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Presidential communications privilege are PRESUMPTIVELY
PRIVILEGED and that the presumption can be overcome only by
mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to
conversations.
THE PETITIONER MADE HIMSELD AVAILABLE TO THEM
DURING 9/26 HEARING, WHERE HE WAS QUESTIONED FOR
11 HOURS expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception of those covered by
his claim of executive privilege.
ART III, Sec. 7 right of people to information on matters of public
concern SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of certain information.
NOTE: right of Congress of its Committees to obtain information in
aid of legislation NOT EQUAL TO peoples right to public
information.
While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people,
it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every
exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right
to information.
ENUMERATION IS NOT EVEN INTENDED TO BE
COMPREHENSIVE just only to assure that the Committees will
not be left in the dark.
GAD:
1.
There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the
issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional
infirmity.
2.
Respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement
laid down in Senate vs. Ermita the invitations should

17

3.
4.

contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need


for the inquiry", along with "the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in
furtherance thereof.
Only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee was present during the deliberation
MAJORITY.
Resp. Com. Violated Sec. 21 of Art. VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedures. subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate are procedurally
infirm.

Issuance is arbitrary and precipitate resp. com. Should have exercised the
same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. HE HOLDS
A HIGH POSITION IN THE CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.

investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are


considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress
and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time.
RESPONDENTS: never been amended since 1995; published in
booklet form available for anyone for free NO.
The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any
custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate. WHY? Carpio:
they put a persons liberty at risk.
Invocation of RA 8792 INCORRECT.
The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure".
NOTE: very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the
October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. THE
RECENT PUBLICATION DOES NOT CURE THE INFIRMITY OF
THE INQUIRY SOUGHT TO BE PROHIBITED BY THE INSTANT
PETITIONS.

GARCILLANO V. HOR
FACTS:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

Then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a


privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes", and set in motion a
congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and
Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees).
NBI submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged
"original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
conversation.
The tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.
The hearings for HELLO GARCI tapes were suspended on Aug. 3,
2005 indefinitely.
ALARMED, PET. GARCILLANO filed to restrain the committees
from using these tape recordings of the ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
wiretapped conversations DISCUSSION STOPPED
AFTER TWO YEARS, Senator Panfilo Lacsons speech: promised to
provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the what's,
when's, where's, who's and why's" of the alleged wiretap, and sought
an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications
providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
Senator Lacson's speech was referred to the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon,
who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.
Senate proceeded with its public hearings.

HELD: Court dismissed PET. GARCILLANOs petition for BEING MOOT


AND ACADEMIC. THEY WERE ALREADY PLAYED.
-

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the


questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
WHY THE NEED FOR PUBLICATION? To satisfy the basic
requirement of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.
RULES OF SENATE, RULE XLIV, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: All
pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as
if present for the first time.
o
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative

9.

OTHER POWERS
a, oversight

ABAKADA VS PURISIMA
Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and
employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the
limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as
to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed
mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law.
Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly
classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct
from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created
a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members
from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The
Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at
least two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members
representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become
functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22,
2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to
confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the
concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34
is illuminating:

18

Concept and bases of congressional oversight


Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken
by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased
frequency to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the
executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has
delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch
and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to
make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the
authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers
may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and
supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of
legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the
other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass
resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
xxx
xxx
xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the
facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more
intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is
recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx
xxx
xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive
branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance,
congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of
delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto
power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an
executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law.
These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any
regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually
provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a
certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of
the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a
proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance
of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as
it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to
independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise
of such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law.
They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it
provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative
agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too
deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by
actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and
general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the
discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but

leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not
have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our
constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive
disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new
legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing
post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable
to determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with
legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment
upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment
measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine
the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend
that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents
veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial
branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances
separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent
agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting
requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not
allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they
do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of
congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to
participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law"
or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority
by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response
by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers."
In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto "is the
most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the
evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role
in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy
within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. 45 It can itself
formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility
for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those
standards.46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential
terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. 47 Thus, what
is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into
actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement
and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute
itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with
finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 51 Congress, in the guise
of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not
they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial
power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
B.

ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL


ELLECTION

PIMENTEL VS JOINT COM

C.
D.

CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION FOR PRESIDENCY


DECIDE ON DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT

19

E.

F.
G.

LEGISLATIVE VETO OR EXTENSION FOR SUSPENSION OF


WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR DECLARATION OF
MARTIAL LAW
PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTIES
CONCUR IN TREATIES

H.
I.
J.
K.

L.

DECLARATION OF EXISTENCE OF WAR


DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION
POWER OF IMPEACHMENT

20

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