Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
COMPOSITION
Senate President as ex-officio chairman (shall not vote except in case of a
tie.)
12 Senators
12 Members of the House
The 12 Senators and 12 Representatives are elected on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and party-list
organizations.
The CA shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and the House of
Representative shall have been organized with the election of the President
and the Speaker. The CA shall act on all appointments within 30 session days
from their submission to Congress.
The CA shall rule by a majority vote of all its members.
Meetings: CA meets only while Congress is in session.
Meetings are held either at the call of the Chairman or a majority of all its
members.
Since the CA is also an independent constitutional body, its rules of procedure
are also outside the scope of congressional powers as well as that of the
judiciary. Jurisdiction: 1. CA shall confirm the appointments by the President
with respect to the following positions: a) Heads of the Executive
Departments (except if it is the Vice-President who is appointed to the post) b)
Ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls c) Officers of the AFP from
the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain d) Other officers whose appointments
are vested in him by the Constitution (e.g. COMELEC members) 2. Congress
cannot by law require that the appointment of a person to an office created by
such law shall be subject to confirmation by the CA. 3. Appointments
extended by the President to the above-mentioned positions while Congress is
not in session shall only be effective until disapproval by the CA or until the
next adjournment of Congress.
DAZA VS SINGSON
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a
political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation
in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by
Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the
chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of
the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly
changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the
House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily
connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the
requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.
COSETENG VS MITRA
1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is
justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of
the government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman,
twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected
by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it
within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987
Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission
on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political
parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They
represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%).
Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments
would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members
from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano- Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced
Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition
party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House
membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit
in the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective
political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by
their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The
validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments -eleven (11)
from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable
GUINGONA VS GONZALES
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDPLABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP,
2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators
from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LPPDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that
the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDPLABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of
LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the
compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys
representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation
of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article
VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is
what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled.
The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a
whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to
elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission
on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance
with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator
Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation
of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should
have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one
member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such,
the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional
representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other
party
DRILON VS DE VENECIA
FACTS: The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered
moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent
to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.
As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails.
The second petition filed by Senator Jamby Madrigal in a summary tackle
about the reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in the
meantime, "all actions of CA be held in abeyance as the same may be
construed as illegal and unconstitutional.
Sur, was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and
Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC
proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating
Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios
located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted
upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill?
HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to
the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily
weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
CRUZ VS PARAS
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the
TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT
GRANTING
MUNICIPAL
OR
CITY
BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION
OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT
WITHIN
THEIR
RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that
they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the
pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to
Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated
and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers
and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws
or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to
be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by
an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should
and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
TOBIAS VS ABALOS
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of
the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same
bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking
their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for
the the conversionof Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA
7675 and making it in effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1.
Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding
'one subject one bill rule".
2.
Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of
members of the Congress to
250
and reappropriating the legislative districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of
constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was
enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the
members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which
drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
General Limitations:
Appropriation
Appropriations must be for a PUBLIC
PURPOSE
Cannot appropriate public funds or property, directly or indirectly, in favor of
1. Any sect, church, denomination, or sectarian institution or system of
religion or
2. Any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such.
EXCEPT IF THE PRIEST IS ASSIGNED TO.
AFP
GOVERNMENT
ORPHANGE
LEPROSARIUM
o The government is not prohibited from appropriating money for a valid
secular purpose, even if it incidentally benefits a religion, e.g. appropriations
for a national police force is valid even if the police also protects the safety of
clergymen.
o Also, the temporary use of public property for religious purposes is valid, as
long as the property is available for all religions.
Specific Limitations
PRESIDENT
SENATE PRESIDENT
CJ OF SC
Budget preparation
Legislative authorization
Budget execution
Budget accountability
DEMETRIA VS ALBA
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to
prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to
Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria
assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section
provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act,
to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer
funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether
or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to
another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency
and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.
GUINGONA VS CARAQUE
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with
P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA
6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,
entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act),
by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
(i)
PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund
(the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii)
PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI
of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case
of PD 910 and PD 1869.
ARAULLO VS AQUINO
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation.
So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted
to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth
was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as
an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the
DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non -Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan , and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law. Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is
based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the
President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments
by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
Limitations
o Public. Power to tax should be exercised only for a public purpose
o Uniform and Equitable.
Operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it
is found
Does not prohibit classification for the purpose o taxation
Requirements for valid classification: Based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences
Germane to the purpose of law
Applies to present and future conditions substantially identical to those of the
present
Applies equally to those who belong to the same class
o
Progressivity.
The rate increases as the tax base increases
Tax burden is based on the taxpayers capacity to pay
Suited to the social conditions of the people
Reflects aim of the Convention that legislature following social justice
command should use taxation as an instrument for more equitable distribution
of wealth
o Constitutional Tax Exemptions:
Religious, charitable, educational institutions and their properties
All revenues and assets of NON-STOCK NON- PROFIT EDUCATIONAL
institutions are exempt from taxes and duties PROVIDED that such revenues
and assets are actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes
( sec. 4 (3) Art XIV).
Grants, endowments, donations or contributions used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax, subject to
conditions prescribed by law (sec. 4 (4) Art XIV).
o Special Funds
o
Money collected on a tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.
O
Once the special purpose is fulfilled or abandoned, any balance
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government
TOLENTINO VS SEC OF FINANCE
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that
this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even
though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in
the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter
Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text
and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a
House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the
HB. Tolentino and co -petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate
Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative
must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before
where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far
as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns
a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
LUNG CENTER VS QC
Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity
established by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered owner of the land on
which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected. A big space in
the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen
and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use
the same as their private clinics. Also, a big portion on the right side of the
hospital is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known
as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and hospital
building for real property taxes, the Lung Center of the Philippines filed a
claim for exemption on its averment that it is a charitable institution with a
minimum of 60% of its hospital beds exclusively used for charity patients and
that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The
claim for exemption was denied, prompting a petition for the reversal of the
resolution of the City Assessor with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
of Quezon City, which denied the same. On appeal, the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed the local boards decision,
finding that Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable institution and
that its properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes. Hence, the present petition for review with averments that
the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution under Section
28(3), Article VI of the Constitution, notwithstanding that it accepts paying
patients and rents out portions of the hospital building to private individuals
and enterprises.
Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a charitable institution within the
context of the Constitution, and therefore, exempt from real property tax?
Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution. To
determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the elements
which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its
corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of
administration, the nature of the actual work performed, that character of the
services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries and the use and
occupation of the properties.
However, under the Constitution, in order to be entitled to exemption from
real property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that
(1) it is a charitable institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY,
DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. While portions
of the hospital are used for treatment of patients and the dispensation of
medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions
thereof are being leased to private individuals and enterprises.
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as
follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission
to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff
rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
FABIAN VS DESIERTO
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District
(FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and
when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted
her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal
to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy
Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is
final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective
November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -In all administrative
diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument
has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
A.
Must be by any member of the HoR or senate except for some measures
that must originate only from the former chamber
FIRST READING:
The reading of the title and the number; the bill is passed by the Senate
President or Speaker to the proper committee
SECOND READING
Entire text is read and debates are held and amendments introduced. The
bill as approved in the second reading is printed in its final form and
copies are distributed three days before the third reading
THIRD READING
Only the title is read, no amendments are allowed. Vote shall be taken
immediately thereafter and the yeas and nays entered in the journal
SENT TO OTHER CHAMBER
Once the bill passes the third reading. It is sent to the other chamber
where it will go under third readings
ENROLLED BILL
The bill is printed as finally approved by the Congress, authenticated
with the signatures of the Senate President or the Speaker and the
Secretary and approved by the President.
b. SUBMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT
the PRESIDENTS VETO POWER
if the President does nit approve of the bill, he shall veto the
same and return his objections to the House from which it
originated. The house shall enter the objections in the journal
and proceed to reconsider it
this veto will not affect items to which he does not object
VETO of a Rider
2.
3.
4.
It becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the
exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative
jurisdiction begin.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION UNDER THE COUNTRYWIDE
DEVELOPMENT FUND: implementation of the priority projects
specified in the law while the authority given to members of Congress
is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented.
o
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN TO THE MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS IS ONLY TO PROPOSE AND IDENTIFFY
PROJECTS TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE PRESIDENT
MERELY RECOMMENDATORY.
o
It is the President who shall implement them.
THE PROCEDURE OF PROPOSING AND IDENTIFYING BY
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF PARTICULAR PROJECTS OR
ACTIVITIES UNDER ART. XLI OF THE GAA OF 1994:
IMAGINATIVE AND INNOVATIVE.
o
CDF attempts to make equal the unequal.
o
Members of Congress are likely to be KNOWLEDGEABLE
ABOUT THE NEEDS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
CONSTITUENTS and the priority to be given each project.
The members ONLY DETERMINE THE NECESITY OF THE
REALIGNMENT OF THE SAVINGS IN THE ALLOTMENTS for
their operating expenses BUT IT IS THE SENATE PRES. AND THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOW WHO SHALL APPROVE THE
REALIGNMENT.
o
They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones
who know whether there are savings available in some items
and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their
operating expenses that need AUGMENTATION.
o
Before SP and SHOR approve:
1.
The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually
savings in the items of expenditures from which the
same are to be taken.
2.
The transfer of realignment is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
transfer or realignment is to be made.
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION
DIRECTS
HIGHEST
BUDGETARY PRIORITY TO EDUCATION MERELY
DIRECTORY (Guingona vs. Carague).
GENERALLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS TO VETO THE ENTIRE
BILL, not merely parts. EXCEPT in regard to general appropriations
bills where he may veto any particular item or items, in which case he
has to veto the ENTIRE ITEM.
DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION: any provision
which does NOT RELATE to ANY PARTICULAR ITEM, or which
EXTENDS IN ITS OPERATION BEYOND AN ITEM OF
APPROPRIATION CAN BE VETOED SEPARATELY FROM AN
ITEM.
o
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS and PROVISIONS
WHICH ARE INTENDED TO AMEND OTHER LAWS
these are maters of general legislation more appropriately dealt
with in separate enactments.
Second paragraph of SP No. 2 divergence in policy of Congress
(30% of the total appropriation for road maintenance should be
contracted out) and the President (70% - more efficient, economical
and practical) VETO IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
o
The SP is NOT AN INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION NOT
ALIEN to the appropriation for road maintenance.
o
SPECIFIC: 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
SP requiring that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health (RA No. 6675) an appropriate provision
VETO IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
o
Directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item
on purchases of medicines by AFP SP cannot be vetoed by
the President without also vetoing the said item.
Appropriation for the modernization of AFP: SP No. 2 (Use of Fund)
and entire SP No. 3 (Specific Prohibition) VETO IS VALID.
o
SP No. 2 is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto
a means by the legislature can block or modify admin action
taken under a statute; a form of legislative control in the
implementation of particular executive actions what
Congress cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by
attaching conditions to the exercise of that power.
o
SP No. 3 is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the
passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs VETO IS VALID.
o
PRESIDENT MSG: The deactivation should be done in
accordance to his timetable, taking into consideration the peace
and order situation in the affected localities.
o
Appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose
must be manifested in another law; existing laws on the
CAFGUs need to be amended.
Conditions on the appropriation for the SC, Ombudsman, COA, and
CHR Petitioner: Fiscal autonomy? VETOES ARE VALID.
o
The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public
funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the
President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed.
The Courts interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of
its enactment.
4.
5.
Dec. 1988: Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal
Year 1989) which eliminated or decreased certain items included in the
proposed budget submitted by the President.
Dec. 1988: President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but VETOED 7
SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND SEC 55, A GENERAL PROVISION.
Feb. 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution
decided to contest the constitutionality of the veto of the president of
SEC 55 only DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL, therefore
VOID.
SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several departments to
augment any item in the GAB violation ART. VI SEC 25(5).
PETITIONER: (1) the President's line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY
'89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) When the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) The
item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) The power of
augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution,
has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested
with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power.
SOLICITOR GENERAL: (1) the issue in the present case is a political
question beyond the power of this Court to determine; (2) Gonzales et
al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto; (3) Section
55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and,
therefore, merits the President's veto; (4) The power of the President to
augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had
already been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44
3.
7.
8.
ISSUE:
WON the veto by the President of certain provisions in the GAA 1992 relating
to the payment of the adjusted portions of retired Justices of the SC and CA is
unconstitutional .YES.
2.
10
3.
4.
5.
WON the par. 5, Art. VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is valid. NO.
RATIO: Under this provision, the regional offices of the Department of Labor
have been given ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER:
3.
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
ARTICLE 2 OF CC
LAWS SHALL TAKE EFFECT AFTER 15DAYS FOLLOWING THE
COMPLETION OF THEIR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE,
UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED. THIS CODE SHALL TAKE
EEFECT ONE YEAR AFTER SUCH PUBLICATION
unless otherwise provide this phrase refers to the date of effectivity and nit
the publication is indispensable.
TANADA VS. TUVERA: nakalimutan ko na kasi tong case na to
EO 200
ISSUE:
1.
2.
11
DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year
of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.
8.
Published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83 No. 26 Page 3038-A on June 29,
1987.
9.
10.
11.
12.
ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
BUENAVISTA ESTATE
The Philippine government LEASED FROM SAN JUAN
DE DIOS HOSPITAL FOR 25 YEARS the Buenavista estate
had an OPTION TO PURCHASE THE SAME FOR P 3
MILLION.
Republic tendered the owner the sum of P 3 million
REJECTED deposit the said funds in Court, together with
the accrued rentals of P 324,000.
SAN JUAN DE DIOS ON JUNE 29, 1946 SOLD THIS
SAME PROPERTY TO ERNEST H. BURT, a non-resident
American for P 5,000,000 with the initial down payment of P
10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable terms
BURT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE
TERMS AGREED.
TAMBOBONG ESTATE
THE SAME BURT PURCHASE FROM PHILIPPINE
TRUST CORPORATION, THE TAMBOBONG ESTATE
FOR P 1.2 MILLION WITH A DOWNPAYMENT OF P
10,000.00.
THERE WAS HOWEVER NO OTHER PAYMENT
RECEIVED FROM BURT.
THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE
RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, ACQUIRED
THIS SAME PROPERTY FROM ITS ORIGINAL OWNER
FOR THE SUM OF P 750,000 instituted a notarial
demand upon Burt FOR THE RESOLUTION AND
CANCELLATION OF HIS CONTRACT OF PURCHASE
WITH PHILIPPINE TRUST FOR NON PAYMENT.
FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, DESPITE THE FACT THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT ALREADY OWNED BOTH THE
ABOVE ESTATE, IT AGAIN BOUGHT THE SAME FROM
BURT: P4.5 million = Buenavista and P500k = Tambobong).
The government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and
the full amount of P 500,000 for Tambobong through TWO
CORPORATIONS ACTING AS BURTS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
REPRESENTED IN THE TRASACTION BY ONE AND THE
SAME PERSON, PET. JEAN L. ARNAULT.
The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into
THE PHILIPPINE SENATE ADOPTING RESOLUTION 8
WHICH CREATED A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
Among the witnesses and apparently the most important was PET.
JEAN ARNAULT, THE PERSON WHO REPRESENTED BURT IN
THE TRANSACTIONS.
During the said hearing, ARNAULT CONFIRMED RECEIVING
THE
MONEY
FROM
THE
GOVERNMENT
AND
ISSUE:
WON the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. YES.
WON the Senate lack authority to commit him for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative process. NO, they have such authority.
RATIO: THE POWER OF INQUIRYWITH THE PROCESS TO
ENFORCE ITIS AN ESSENTIAL AND APPROPRIATE AUXILLARY TO
THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION.
-
The necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form
and character of the action itself are determined by THE SUM
TOTAL OF THE INFORMATION TO BE GATHERED AS A
RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION.
THE RULING OF THE SENATE ON THE MATERIALITY OF
THE INFORMATION SOUGHT FROM THE WITNESS IS
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT.
The Court cannot determine, any more than it can direct Congress,
what legislation to approve or not to approve THAT WOULD BE
AN INVASION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE.
THERE IS NOTHING T PREVENT THE CONGRESS FROM
APPROVING OTHER MEASURES IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY
AFTER COMPLETING THE INVESTIGATION It is not within
the Courts province to determine or imagine what those measures
12
CFI, arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held that
The RP (rep. PCGG) filed with the Sandiganbayan civil case: RP vs.
Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez alleges that defendants
BENJAMIN and JULIETTE R. took advantage of their relationship
13
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
ISSUES:
WON the SBRCs inquiry is in aid of legislation. NO.
WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of
government. YES.
WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. YES.
RATIO: THE SPEECH OF SENATOR ENRILE CONTAINED NO
SUGGESTION OF CONTEMPLATED LEGISLATION HE MERELY
CALLED UPON THE SENATE TO LOOK INTO A POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF SEC. 5 OF RA NO. 3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
"THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT."
-
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ISSUES:
WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress. YES.
RATIO: POWER OF INQUIRY: SEC. 21, ART. VI: may conduct inquries IN
AID OF LEGISLATION.
-
14
2.
3.
4.
15
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
ISSUE
:
WON EO No. 1, Section 4(b), is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. YES.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
16
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
HOWEVER, WHEN PROBED FURTHER ON WHAT THEY
DISCUSSED ABOUT THE NBN PROJECT, PETITIONER
REFUSED
TO
ANSWER,
INVOKING
EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed
him to approve.
HE LATER REFUSED TO ATTEND THE OTHER HEARINGS.
Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied.
HE WAS CITED IN CONTEMPT OF RESPONDENT
COMMITTEES AND AN ORDER FOR HIS ARREST AND
DETENTION UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT HE WOULD APPEAR
AND GIVE HIS TESTIMONY.
PETITIONER: Contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
MATTERS RELATING TO DIPLOMACY OR FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions
meant to explore options in making policy decisions."
These discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials on the country's
diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and
the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and
lenders in the Philippines."
RESPONDENT COMMITTEES:
(1) Petitioner's testimony is material and pertinent in the
investigation conducted in aid of legislation;
(2) There is no valid justification for petitioner to claim
executive privilege;
(3) There is no abuse of their authority to order petitioner's
arrest; and
(4) Petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ISSUE:
WON those questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. YES.
WON the respondent committees committed GAD. YES.
RATIO:
WHY?
1.
2.
3.
The communications relate to a "QUINTESSENTIAL AND NONDELEGABLE POWER" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
The communications are "RECEIVED" BY A CLOSE ADVISOR OF
THE PRESIDENT. Under the "OPERATIONAL PROXIMITY" test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo's cabinet.
There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGES
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
1.
Communications, docu-ments
or other materials that reflect
presidential deci-sion-making
and delibera-tions and that the
President
believes
should
DELIBERATIVE
PROCESS
PRIVILEGE
1.
Advisory
opinions,
recommendations
and
deliberations comprising part
of a process by which
governmental decisions and
remain confidential.
Applies to decision-making of
the President.
Rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power
and the Presidents unique
constitutional role.
Applies to documents in their
entirety, and covers final and
post-decisional materials as
well as pre-deliberative ones.
Congressional
or
judicial
negation of the presidential
communications privilege is
always subject to greater
scrutiny than denial of the
deliberative process privilege.
MEANT TO ENCOMPASS
ONLY THOS EFUNCTIONS
THAT FORM THE CORE OF
PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY QNDP such a
commander-in-chief
power,
appointment
and
removal
power, the power to grant
pardons and repress, the soleauthority
to
receive
ambassadors and other public
officers, the power to negotiate
treaties.
2.
3.
ELEMENTS
OF
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE (Nixon, In Re Sealed Case):
1.
The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power."
2.
The communication must be authored or "solicited and
received" by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
"operational proximity" with the President.
3.
The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought "likely
contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Presidential communications privilege are PRESUMPTIVELY
PRIVILEGED and that the presumption can be overcome only by
mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to
conversations.
THE PETITIONER MADE HIMSELD AVAILABLE TO THEM
DURING 9/26 HEARING, WHERE HE WAS QUESTIONED FOR
11 HOURS expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception of those covered by
his claim of executive privilege.
ART III, Sec. 7 right of people to information on matters of public
concern SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of certain information.
NOTE: right of Congress of its Committees to obtain information in
aid of legislation NOT EQUAL TO peoples right to public
information.
While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people,
it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every
exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right
to information.
ENUMERATION IS NOT EVEN INTENDED TO BE
COMPREHENSIVE just only to assure that the Committees will
not be left in the dark.
GAD:
1.
There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the
issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional
infirmity.
2.
Respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement
laid down in Senate vs. Ermita the invitations should
17
3.
4.
Issuance is arbitrary and precipitate resp. com. Should have exercised the
same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. HE HOLDS
A HIGH POSITION IN THE CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.
GARCILLANO V. HOR
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
OTHER POWERS
a, oversight
ABAKADA VS PURISIMA
Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and
employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the
limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as
to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed
mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law.
Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly
classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct
from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created
a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members
from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The
Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at
least two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members
representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become
functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22,
2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to
confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the
concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34
is illuminating:
18
leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not
have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our
constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive
disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new
legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing
post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable
to determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with
legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment
upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment
measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine
the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend
that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents
veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial
branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances
separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent
agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting
requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not
allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they
do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of
congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to
participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law"
or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority
by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response
by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers."
In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto "is the
most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the
evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role
in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy
within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. 45 It can itself
formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility
for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those
standards.46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential
terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. 47 Thus, what
is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into
actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement
and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute
itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with
finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 51 Congress, in the guise
of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not
they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial
power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
B.
C.
D.
19
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
20