In Caltex v palomar

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION;
CONSTRUCTION DEFINED; CASE
AT BAR. Construction is the
art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its
application to a given
case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, among
others, by reason of the fact
that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the
law (Black, Interpretation of
Laws, p. 1). In the present case,
the question of whether or not
the scheme proposed by the
appellee is within the coverage
of the prohibitive provisions of
the Postal Law inescapably
requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words
used therein. This is as much a
question of construction or
interpretation as any
other. (Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v.
Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650,
[September 29, 1966], 124 PHIL
763-781)
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Garcia v sss

It is a rule in statutory
construction that every part of
the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered
together with the other parts,
and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole

enactment. (Garcia v. Social

Security Commission Legal and
Collection, G.R. No. 170735,
[December 17, 2007], 565 PHIL
193-215)
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It is a cardinal rule in statutory

construction that in interpreting
the meaning and scope of a
term used in the law, a careful
review of the whole
law involved, as well as the
intendment of the law, must be
made. 24 Nowhere in the
provision or in the Decision can
it be inferred that the persons
liable are absolved from paying
the unremitted premium
contributions. (Garcia v. Social
Security Commission Legal and
Collection, G.R. No. 170735,
[December 17, 2007], 565 PHIL
193-215)
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Brent v Zamora

"It is a salutary principle in

statutory construction that there
exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were
never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a
construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous,
undefensible, wrongful, evil, and
injurious consequences." (Brent
School, Inc. v. Zamora, G.R. No.
L-48494, [February 5, 1990],
260 PHIL 747-765)
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" . . We have, here, then a case

where the true intent of the law
is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of
statutory construction that such
intent of spirit must prevail over
the letter thereof, for whatever
is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, since
adherence to the letter would
result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions and would defeat
the plain and vital purpose of
the statute." (Brent School, Inc.
v. Zamora, G.R. No. L-48494,
[February 5, 1990], 260 PHIL
747-765)

meanings, of being understood

in more than one way, or of
referring to two or more things
at the same time. A statute is
ambiguous if it is admissible of
two or more possible meanings,
in which case, the Court is called
upon to exercise one of its
judicial functions, which is to
interpret the law according to its
true intent. (Rizal Commercial
Banking Corp. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74851
(Resolution), [December 9,
1999], 378 PHIL 10-34)

RCBC V IAC

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A
TOO LITERAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE LAW LEADS TO
ABSURDITY WHICH CANNOT BE
COUNTENANCED. Moreover,
petitioner's too literal
interpretation of the law leads to
absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case,
the Court made the following
admonition: "We admonish
against a too-literal reading of
the law as this is apt to constrict
rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its
authors. That intention is usually
found not in 'the letter that
killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth' . . ." The spirit, rather
than the letter of a law
determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in this case,
must be read according to its
spirit and intent.
(Paras v.
Commission on Elections, G.R.

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION;
WHERE THE LAW SPEAKS IN
CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL
LANGUAGE, THERE IS NO ROOM
FOR INTERPRETATION BUT ONLY
FOR APPLICATION. It bears
stressing that the first and
fundamental duty of the Court is
to apply the law. When the law is
clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. As
has been our consistent ruling,
where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there
is no occasion for interpretation;
there is only room for
application. Only when the law is
ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning may the court interpret
or construe its true intent.
Ambiguity is a condition of
admitting two or more

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PARAS V COMELEC

EDIHSC|||

No. 123169 (Resolution),

[November 4, 1996], 332 PHIL
56-67)
It is likewise a basic precept in
statutory construction that a
statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the
Constitution. (Paras v.
Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 123169 (Resolution),
[November 4, 1996], 332 PHIL
56-67)
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LIDASAN V COMELEC

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
STATUTES; NO BILL SHOULD
EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE
SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE
EXPRESSED IN ITS TITLE. The
constitutional requirement is
that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of
the bill. This provision is similar
to those found in the
Constitution of many American
States. It is aimed against the
evil of the so-called omnibus
bills, and log-rolling legislation,
and against surreptitious or
unconsidered enactments.
Where the subject of a bill is
limited to a particular matter,
the members of the legislature
as well as the people should be
informed of the subject of
proposed legislative measures.
This constitutional provision thus
precludes the insertion of riders
in legislation, a rider being a

provision not germane to the

subject matter of the
bill. (Lidasan v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-28089,
[October 25, 1967], 128 PHIL
526-547)
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TOLENTINO V SEC FINANCE

ID.; ID.; INTERNAL RULES; NONCOMPLIANCE THEREWITH DOES

NOT WARRANT INVALIDATION OF
LEGISLATIVE ACT. There is no
basis for the charge that the
approval of the conference
committee report on what later
became R.A. No. 8240 was
railroaded through the House of
Representatives. Nor is there
any need for petitioners to
invoke the power of this Court
under Art. VIII, 1 of the
Constitution to determine
whether, in enacting R.A. No.
8240, the House of
Representatives acted with
grave abuse of discretion, since
that is what we have precisely
done, although the result of our
review may not be what
petitioners want. It should be
added that, even if petitioners'
allegations are true, the
disregard of the rules in this
case would not affect the
validity of R.A. No. 8240, the
rules allegedly violated being
merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements
for the enactment of laws. It is
well settled that a legislative act
will not be declared invalid for

non-compliance with internal

rules. (Arroyo v. De Venecia,
G.R. No. 127255, [June 26,
1998], 353 PHIL 623-630)
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MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO

CONSTITUTIONAL AND
POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIARY;
POLITICAL QUESTIONS NOT
WITHIN PROVINCE OF. Political
questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except
to the extent that power to deal
with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or
statutory provisions. (Mabanag
v. Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, [March
5, 1947], 78 PHIL 1-111)
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Casco v gimenez

enrolled bill which uses the

term "urea formaldehyde"
instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes,
61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Macias vs.
Comm. on Elections, L-18684,
September 14, 1961 ). If there
has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the
Executive on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of

powers and undermining one of

the cornerstones of our
democratic system the
remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by
judicial decree. (Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v.
Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931,
[February 28, 1963], 117 PHIL
363-367)
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mabanag v lopez vito

1. COURTS;
JURISDICTION;
CONCLUSIVENESS OF ENACTMENT
OR RESOLUTION DISTINGUISHED
FROM. Jurisdiction, which is a
matter of substantive law, should
not
be
confused
with
conclusiveness of an enactment or
resolution, which is a matter of
evidence and practice.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL
AND
POLITICAL
LAW;
JUDICIARY;
POLITICAL QUESTIONS NOT WITHIN
PROVINCE OF. Political questions
are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions
has been conferred upon the courts
by
express
constitutional
or
statutory provisions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPOSAL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT A
POLITICAL
QUESTION.

If
ratification of a constitutional
amendment is a political question,
a
proposal
which
leads
to
ratification has to be a political
question.
The
two
steps
complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a
single objective. It is to be noted
that the amendatory process as
provided in section 1 of Article XV
of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct

parts: proposal and ratification."

There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and withholding that character from the
other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly politics
function
performed
by
the
Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its
charge by the Constitution itself.
The exercise of this power is even
independent of any intervention by
the Chief Executive. If on grounds
of expediency scrupulous attention
of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is
less reason for judicial inquiry into

the validity of a proposal than into

that of a ratification.
4. EVIDENCE;
DULY
AUTHENTICATED
BILL
OR
RESOLUTION, CONCLUSIVENESS OF.
A duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts. The
rule conforms to the policy of the
law making body as expressed in
section 313 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2210.
||| (Mabanag v. Vito, G.R. No. L-1123,
[March 5, 1947], 78 PHIL 1-111)