City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery PDF

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029
VOL. 29, OCTOBER 30, 1969
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
819
City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

No. L-25134. October 30, 1969.
THE CITY OF BACOLOD, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAN
MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., defendant-appellant.
Remedial law, Civil actions; Actions in general; One suit for a
single cause of action; Case at bar.A party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action. In the case at bar, when
appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling
charges from July 1, 1959, such act of appellant in violation of the
right of appellee to be paid said charges in full under the
Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under the Ordinance,
appellee became entitled, as a result of such non-payment, to two
reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of. the basic charges;
and (2) the payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter
being merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former. Upon
these facts, it is obvious that appellee has filed separate complaints
for each of two reliefs related to the same single cause of action,
thereby splitting up the said cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Splitting a cause of action; Effect.
Whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the
same violation of a right, the filing of the first complaint on any of
the reliefs born of the said violation con stitutes a bar to any action
on any of the other possible reliefs arising from the same violation,
whether the first action is still pending, in which event the defense
to the subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it has
already been finally terminated, in which case, the defense would
be res adjudicata.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Negros Occidental. Querubin, J,
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014ee26e6adb40af7d3c000a0094004f00ee/p/AMF123/?username=Guest
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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

First Assistant City Fiscal Raymundo O. Rallos for
plaintiff-appellee.
Picazo & Agcaoili for defendant-appellant.
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820
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BARREDO, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental in its Civil Case No. 7355, ordering
the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the City of Bacolod
the sum of P36,519.10, representing surcharges on certain
fees which, under existing ordinances of the City of
Bacolod, the San Miguel Brewery should have paid
quarterly to the treasurer of the said city for and/or during
the period from July, 1959 to December, 1962, but which
were paid only on April 23, 1963.
On February 17, 1949, the City Council of Bacolod
passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949 imposing upon
"any person, firm or corporation engaged in the
manufacture or bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange,
lemonade, and other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of
the City of Bacolod, x x x a fee of ONE TWENTY-FOURTH
(1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a
surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24%
for one whole year," upon "such local manufacturers or
bottlers above-mentioned who will be delinquent on any
amount of fees due" under the ordinance.
In 1959, this ordinance was amended by Ordinance No.
150, series of 1959, by increasing the fee to "one-eighth
(1/8) of a centavo for every bottle thereof." In other words,
the f fee was increased f rom P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft
drinks. Appellant refused to pay the additional fee and
challenged the validity of the whole ordinance.
Under date of March 23, 1960, appellee sued appellant
in Civil Case No. 5693 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, with the corresponding Complaint
alleging, inter alia:
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"3.That the defendant, Manager of the San Miguel Brewery,

Bacolod Coca Cola Plant, Bacolod Branch since the approval of
Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949 as amended by Ordinance No. 150,
Series of 1959, which took effect on July 1, 1959, only
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VOL. 29., OCTOBER 30, 1969
821

paid to the plaintiff herein the P0.01 bottling tax per case of soft
drinks thereby refusing to pay the P0.03 bottling tax per case of soft
drinks which amounted to P26,306.54 at P0.02 per case of soft
drinks such as coca cola and tru orange manufactured or bottled by
said company as per statement submitted by the Assistant City
Treasurer of Bacolod City herewith attached as Annex 'C' of this
complaint;"
and praying
"'x x x that judgment be rendered for the plaintiff:
'(a) Ordering' the defendant to pay the plaintiff the bottling taxes of
P0.03 per case of soft drinks as provided for in Section 1, Ordinance No.
66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No. 160, Series of 1959, as
well as the sum of P26,306.54 representing unpaid bottling taxes due
with legal rate of interest thereon from the date of the filing of this
complaint until complete payment thereof; x x x costs, etc.' "
In due time, appellant filed its answer. This was followed

by a stipulation of facts between the parties, whereupon,
the court rendered judgment on November 12, 1960, with
the following; dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, San Miguel Brewery, Inc. is ordered to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P26,306.54 and the tax at the rate of three
centavos per case levied in Ordinance No. 66 and 150 from March,
1960, and thereafter. Costs against the defendant."
Appellant appealed from the said decision to this Court

where it pressed the question of the invalidity of the
abovementioned taxing ordinances. In that appeal (G.R.
No. L-18290), however, this Court affirmed the decision
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appealed from and upheld the constitutionality of the

questioned ordinances and the authority of the appellee to
enact the same. For reasons not extant in the record, it was
already after this decision had become final when appellee
moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying that the
same be amended so as to include the penalties and
surcharges provided for in the ordinances. Naturally, the
said motion was denied, for the reason that "the decision is
already final and may not be amended." When execution
was had before the lower court, the appellee again sought
the inclusion of the surcharges referred to; and
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once again the move was frustrated by the Court of First

Instance of Negros Occidental which denied the motion, as
follows:
"Acting upon the motion dated October 24, 1963, filed by the
Assistant City Fiscal, Raymundo Rallos, counsel for the plaintiff,
and the opposition thereto filed by attorneys for the defendants
dated November 9, 1963, as well as the reply to the opposition of
counsel for the defendants dated December 5, 1963, taking into
consideration that the decision of this Court as affirmed by the
Supreme Court does not specifically mention the alleged surcharges
claimed by the plaintiff-appellee, the Court hereby resolves, to deny,
as it hereby denies, the aforesaid motion, for not being meritorious."
Failing thus in its attempt to collect the surcharges

provided for in the ordinances in question, appellee filed a
second action (Civil Case No. 7355) to collect the said
surcharges. Under date of July 10, 1964, it f iled the
corresponding complaint before the same Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental alleging, inter alia, that:
"6. That soon after the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court
affirming the decision of the Hon. Court, the defendant herein on
April 23, 1963 paid to the City of Bacolod. the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY
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FOUR PESOS and TWENTY CENTAVOS (P156,924.20) as taxes

from July, 1959 to December, 1962 in compliance with the provision
of Section 1. Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by
Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959, which corresponds to the taxes
due under said section in the amount of P0.03 per case of soft drinks
manufactured by the defendant, but refused and still continued
refusing to pay the surcharge as provided for under Section 4 of
Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No.
150, Series of 1959, which reads as follows:
'SEC. 4.A surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24%
for one whole year, shall be imposed on such local manufacturer or
bottlers above mentioned who will be delinquent on any amount of fees
under the ordinance.'
which up to now amounted to THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE

HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS AND TEN CENTAVOS
(P36,519.10), as shown by the certified statement of the office of the
City Treasurer of Bacolod City herewith attached as Annex 'E' and
made an integral part of this complaint;
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"7. That the said Interest and/or penalties to the said bottling taxes
which defendant refused to pay have long been overdue;"
and again praying

"x x x that judgment be rendered for the plaintiff:
(a) Ordering the defendant to pay the penalty and/ or interest therein
Section 4 of Ordinance No, 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance
No. 150, Series of 1959 the total amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND
FIVE
HUNDRED
NINETEEN
PESOS
and
TEN
CENTAVOS
(P36,519.10), representing the surcharges from August 1959 to December,

1962, inclusive, and the 24% penalty computed as of June 30, 1964, from
the amount of P 152,162,90, with legal rate of interest thereon from the
date of the filing of this complaint until complete payment thereof ;' plus
costs, etc."
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On July 24, 1964. appellant filed a motion to dismiss the

case on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action is barred
by a prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action, This motion was
denied by the court a quo in its order dated August 22,
1964; so appellant filed its answer wherein it substantially
reiterated, as affirmative defenses, the above-mentioned
grounds of its motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the parties
submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings,
whereupon, the court rendered judgment on March 11,
1965 with the following dispositive portion:
"IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum
of P36,519.10 representing the surcharges as provided in section 4
of Ordinance 66, series of 1949 of the City of Bacolod. No costs."
Appellants moved for reconsideration but its motion was

denied, hence, the instant appeal.
Appellant has only one assignment of error, to wit:
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE AP PELLANT
LIABLE TO THE APPELLEE FOR THE SUM OF P36,519.10
REPRESENTING SURCHARGES AS PROVIDED IN
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TAX ORDINANCE NO. 66, SERIES OF 1949, AS AMENDED, OF

THE CITY OF BACOLOD."
Under this, it argues that the action of appellee cannot be

maintained because (1) a party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action; and (2) appellee's
action for recovery of the surcharges in question is barred
by prior judgment.
We find appellant's position essentially correct. There is
no question that appellee split up its cause of action when
it filed the first complaint on March 23, 1960, seeking the
recovery of only the bottling taxes or charges plus legal
interest, without mentioning in any manner the
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surcharges.
The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule
2 of the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in force
then provided:
"SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden.A single cause of
action cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the
subject of different complaints.
"SEC. 4. Effect of splitting.If separate complaints were brought
for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the f irst
may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon
the merits in either is available as a bar in the others."
Indeed, this rule against the splitting up of a cause of

action is an old one. In fact, it preceded the Rules of Court
or any statutory1 provision. In Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs.
Icaragal, et al., this Court already explained its meaning,
origin and purpose, thus:
"But, even if we have no such section 708 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, or section 59 of the Insolvency Law, we have still the
rule against splitting a single cause of action. This rule, though not
contained in any statutory provision, has been applied by this court
in all appropriate cases. Thus, in Santos 'vs. Moir (36 Phil. 350,
359), we said: 'lt is well recognized that a party cannot split a single
cause of action into parts and sue on each part separately. A
complaint for the recovery of personal property with damages for
detention states a single
________________
1
68 Phil. 287, 292-293.

825
825

cause of action which cannot be divided Into an action for
possession and one for damages; and if suit is brought for posses
sion only a subsequent action cannot be maintained to recover the
damages resulting from the unlawful detention/ In Rubio de Larena
vs. Villanueva (53 Phil. 923, 927), we reiterated the rule by stating
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that 'x x x a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of

action and make it the basis for several suits' and that when a lease
provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each
installment constitutes an independent cause of action, but when,
at the time the complaint is filed, there are several installments
due, all of them constitute a single cause of action and should be
included in a single complaint, and if some of them are not so
included, they are barred. The same doctrine is stated in Lavarro
vs. Labitoria (54 Phil. 788), wherein we said that "a party will not
be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis
for several suits' and that a claim for partition of real property as
well as for improvements constitutes a single cause of action, and a
complaint for partition alone. bars a subsequent complaint for the
improvements. And in Blossom & Co. vs. Manila Gas Corporation
(55 Phil. 226-240), we held that "as a general rule a contract to do
several things at several times is divisible in its nature, so as to
authorize successive actions; and a judgment recovered for a single
breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to suit f or a
subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is
entire, and the breach total, there can be only one action, and
plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.'
"The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended 'to
prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to
the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from
unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident
to numerous suits.' (1 C.J. 1107) It comes from that old maxim nemo
debet his vexare pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice
vexed for one and the same cause). (Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall 163,
168; 21 Law Ed 872; also U.S. vs. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61; 25 Law
Ed. 93). And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of
the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon principles of
public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to
repeated and unnecessary litigations. (1 C. J. 1107)."
In the light of these precedents, it cannot be denied that

appellant's failure to pay the bottling charges or taxes and
the surcharges for delinquency in the payment thereof
constitutes but one single cause of action which under the
above rule can be the subject of only one complaint, under
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pain of either of them being barred if not included in the
same complaint with the other. The error of appellee
springs from a misconception or a vague comprehension of
the elements ,of a cause of action. The classical definition of
a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which the
rights of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant." Its
elements may be generally stated to be (1) a right existing
in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a corresponding obligation on
the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an
act or omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation
of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to
respect. For purposes, however, of the rule against splitting
up of a cause of action, a clearer understanding can be
achieved, if together with these elements, the right to relief
is considered.
In the last analysis, a cause of action is basically an act
or an omission or several acts or omissions. A single act or
omission can be violative of various rights at the same
time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of
several separate and distinct legal obligations. This
happens, for example, when a passenger of a common
carrier, such as a taxi, is injured in a collision thereof with
another vehicle due to the negligence of the respective
drivers of both vehicles. In such a case, several rights of the
passenger are violated, inter alia, (1) the right to be safe
from the negligent acts of either or both the drivers under
the law on culpa-acquiliana or quasi-delict; (2) the right to
be safe from criminal negligence of the said drivers under
the penal laws; and (3) the right to be safely conducted to
his destination under the contract of carriage and the law
covering the same, not counting anymore the provisions of
Article 33 of the Civil Code. The violation of each of these
rights is a cause of action in itself. Hence, such a passenger
has at least three causes of action arising from the same
act. On the other hand, it can happen also that several acts
or omissions may violate only one right, in which case,
there would be only one cause of action. Again the violation
of a single right may give rise to more than one relief. In
other words, for a single cause of action or violation of a
right, the plaintiff may
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be entitled to several reliefs, It is the filing of separate
complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes
splitting up of the cause of action. This is what is
prohibited by the rule.
In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to
pay the difference in bottling charges from July 1, 1959,
such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee to
be paid said charges in f full under the Ordinance, was one
single cause of action, but under the Ordinance, appellee
became entitled, as a result of such non-payment to two
reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic
charges; and (2) the payment of the corresponding
surcharges, the latter being merely a consequence of the
failure to pay the former, Stated differently, the obligation
of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation
by said appellant of the same right of appellee from which
the obligation to pay the basic charges also arose. Upon
these facts, if; is obvious that appellee has filed separate
complaints for each of two reliefs related to the same single
cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of
action.
The trial court held that inasmuch as there was no
demand in the complaint in the first case for the payment
of the surcharges, unlike in the case of Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. Blas Gutierrez, et al., G.R. No. L-13819. May
25, 1960, wherein there was such a demand, there is no bar
by prior judgment as to said surcharges, the same not
having been "raised as an issue or cause of action in Civil
Case No. 5693." This holding is erroneous.
Section 4 of Rule 2, above-quoted, is unmistakably clear
as to the effect of the splitting up of a cause of action. It
says, "if separate complaints are brought for different parts
(reliefs) of a single cause of action, the filing of the first
(complaint) may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and
a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar
in the others," In other words, whenever a plaintiff has
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filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a

right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs
born of the said violation constitutes a
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bar to any action on any of the other possible reliefs arising

from the same violation, whether the first action is still
pending, in which event, the defense to the subsequent
complaint would be litis pendentia, or it has already been
finally terminated,
in which case, the defense would be res
2
adjudicata. Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata, on
the one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on the
other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since either of
the former is by law only the result or effect of the latter,
or, better said, the sanction for or behind it.
It thus results that the judgment of the lower court must
be, as it is hereby, reversed and the complaint of appellee is
dismissed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment reversed.
A N N O T *A T I O N
ACTIONS
1. In General
A Nature
B Ordinary Action
________________
2
The corresponding provision in the Revised Rules of 1964 expresses
these points more specifically. Section 4 of Rule 2 provides:

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"If two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of
action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or
others, in accordance with section 1 (e), Rule 16, (on pendency of another
action) and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the
others."
altho the writer of this opinion feels that a happier wording would be:
"A single cause of action cannot be the subject of more than one complaint."
*
Taken from SCRA Quick Index-Digest covers only vols. 106 to 107 of
the Philippine Reports and vols. 1 to 11 and 16 to 27 of the Supreme

Court Reports Annotated.
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829

C New Action
D Actions In Personam and in Rem
E Actions by and against the Government
F Actions for Damages
2. Right of Action
A Generally
B Condition Precedent
C Premature Action
3. Consolidation; Choice of Remedies; Joinder of
Causes of Action
A Multiplicity of Actions
B Splitting Causes of Action
4. Civil and Criminal Actions
5. Abandonment
6. Dismissal of Actions
7. Declaratory Relief
8. Miscellaneous
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See also Administrative Law; Arrastre Service: Complaints

and Courts.
See annotations on Prescriptibility of Actions for
Reconveyance Based on Trust, 2 SCRA 490; Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction in Forcible Entry and Detainer
Actions, 6 SCRA 123; Moral Damages for Breach of
Contract, 16 SCRA 445; Real Action for Purposes of Venue,
17 SCRA 5; Suits by or against Foreign Corporations, 17
SCRA 1041; Recovery of Damages Based on Quasi-Delict,
22 SCRA 567; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction, 22
SCRA 1159, and Third Party Complaint, 25 SCRA 651.
1. In General.
830
830

A Nature.
1. Cause of action is not made different by merely
changing form of action.Where the alleged cause
of action in both cases is the same, i.e., appellant's
claim to non-liability for compensating taxes,
appellant cannot, by merely changing the form of
his action, plead the nonapplication of the rule of
bar by former judgment. Ipekdjian Merchandising
Co., Inc, vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 9 SCRA 72.
2. An action is not prejudicial to another if its result is
not determinative of the latter.Defendantappellant's allegation that the action instituted by
the widow of his donor seeking reconveyance from
herein to, and occupied by, defendant-appellant, is
prejudicial to that filed against him by plaintiff,
wherein the latter asserts ownership of the lot, is
untenable, because the result of such action for
reconveyance will not be determinative of the latter
case, appellant not being a party of the
reconveyance action. J.M. Tuason & Co. vs.
Cadampog. 7 SCRA 808.
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3. Ground for action for reconveyance.To succeed in

an action for reconveyance after the lapse of one
year from the decree 'of registration, actual fraud in
securing the title must be proved. J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 6 SCRA 939.
4. Grounds for action for annulment of Torrens title.
To sustain the truthfulness of the averments of the
complaint. defendants could not thereunder be held
personally liable in their private capacity for the
relief sought. The complaint alleged that the
supposed wrongf ful acts were committed by
defendants in their official capacities as chairman
and members of the Board of Liquidators.
Mindanao Realty Corporation vs. Kintanar, 6 SCRA
814.
5. Where an action may be barred by former judgment.
It is a rule of procedure that a fact or question
which was judicially or directly in issue in a former
suit and was judicially passed upon and determined
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein so
far as concerns the
831
831

parties to that action and their privies, and cannot
be again litigated in any future action upon either
the same or different cause of action. Gibbs vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 SCRA 469;
Pleider vs. Hodges, 5 SCRA 805.
6. When advice of counsel is a complete defense of the
action."It is the general rule, in the absence of
any statutory provision to the contrary, that advice
of counsel is a complete defense to an action for
malicious prosecution where it appears that the
prosecution was instituted in reliance in good faith
on such advice, given after a full statement of all
the facts to the attorney. This is true whether the
advice was sought in respect of a civil action or
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criminal prosecution. Moreover, it is immaterial

that the attorney's advice was unsound or
erroneous; if the defense is worth, anything to a
party it must be available when through error of
law, as well as of fact, his action has failed; the
lawyer's error will not deprive his client of the
defense." Rehabilitation Finance Corporation vs.
Koh, 4 SCRA 536.
7, How purpose of action and governing law is
determined.The purpose of action or suit and the
law to govern it is to be determined by the
complaint itself, its allegations and the prayer for
relief. Santiago vs. Dimayuga. 3 SCRA 919.
8. Accrual of cause of action upon death.The action
to enforce the wife's promise to convey in her
testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal
properties, did not arise until and after her death
when it was found that she did-not comply with her
promise. Blas vs. Santos. 1 SCRA 899.
9. Successors-in-interest may bring suit.Successorsin-interest of parties to a contract may sue for the
annul-ment of that contract. Descutido vs. Baltazar.
1 SCRA 1174.
10. Suit to enforce judgment against non-parties.In
the case at bar, the trial court has jurisdiction over
the
832
832

instant suit which is not an action to enforce a

judgment within five (5) years from its rendition,
but an action to have non-parties to that judgment
held responsible for its payment. McConnel vs.
Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA 723.
11. Lack of cause of action against sheriffs.No cause
of action could possibly arise against the sheriffs
who, in compliance with an order of the court, the
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validity of which is not questioned demolished the

houses of the plaintiffs. Vergara, vs. Brucela, 1
SCRA 525.
12. A promissory note for an amount payable in
installment gives rise to a separate cause of action
for each installment.Soriano vs. Ubat, 1 SCRA
366.
13. When action has become moot and academic.An
action far prohibition, filed by a Provincial
Governor in his official capacity. has become moot
and academic, in view of the expiration of his term
and of the circumstance that, within thirty days
after his successor has taken office, it has not been
shown that there is a substantial need for
continuing the action. Almeda vs. Provincial
Treasurer of Surigao, 1 SCRA 346.
14. Where an action to recover mining claims is barred
by prescription.An action filed in 1958, to recover
mining claims conveyed to the defendants in 1937,
is barred by prescription since a period of more
than twentyone years had intervened. Under Act
190, the prescriptive period is ten years. Bambao
vs. Lednicky, 1 SCRA 330.
15. Where action is properly instituted in the Court of
First Instance.An action, whose purpose is to
rescind a contract and to recover possession of an
hacienda, is a real action which was properly
instituted in the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is situated. De Jesus vs.
Coloco, 1 SCRA 272.
16. Action for reconveyance based on fraud may be
barred by statute of limitations.Gerona vs.
Guzman, 11 SCRA 154.
833
833

17. Discovery of fraud is counted from registration of
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deed and issuance of new titles.Id.

18. Cause of action and ultimate facts defined.A cause
of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal rights of the other. Ultimate
facts refer to the essential facts constituting
plaintiff's cause of action. Remitere vs, Vda, de,
Yulo, 16 SCRA 251.
19. Filing in court of a claim converts the same into an
action or suit.Lopez vs. Filipinas Compaia de,
Seguros. 16 SCRA 855.
20. A complaint filed with the office of the Insurance
Commissioner is not an action or suit.Id.
21. Action for specific performance.Inducil as. De los
Santos, 17 SCRA 332.
22. Action based on denial of cohabitation and desertion
of husband.The argument that the action on tort
had prescribed because it was not f iled within f our
years f rom the marriage in 1948, is erroneous. The
marriage was not the cause of appellee's wrongful
conduct. Her denial of cohabitation, refusal to
render consortium and desertion of her husband
started right after their wedding, and such have
continued ever since, so the period of limitation had
never been completed. Tenchavez vs. Escao, 17
SCRA 674.
23. Prescription of actions to recover real property.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes ten
years as the period of prescription for actions to
recover real property, counted from the time the
cause of action accrued. This is the applicable law
because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides
that "Prescription already running before the
effectivity of this Code (August 30, 1950) shall be
governed by laws previously in force." The suit
herein having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or
more than ten years from April 24, 1950, has
prescribed. Carillo vs. De Paz, 18 SCRA 467.
834
834
Page 17 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM

24. Complaint alleging that defendant has knowledge of
tax sale has cause of action.Vda. de Carbajal vs.
Coronado, 18 SCRA 635.
25. Requisites before action can be filed on contractor's
penal bond.The law, it may be noted, requires
that before an action may be filed on the bond the
principal contract with the Government must have
been completed and settled. This requirement is
necessary so that those who have furnished labor
and materials to the contractor may have equal
chances to file their respective claims for payment.
If an early supplier of labor and materials were
allowed to file suit even before the work is
completed, he would have a distinct advantage over
later supplier, whose claim might not be settled in
full if the bond should prove insufficient. Such a
procedure would render ineffective the provision
that "if the recovery on the bond should be
inadequate to pay the amounts found. due to all the
said creditors, judgment shall be given to each
creditor pro rata of the amount of the recovery."
Mindanao Motors Corporation vs. Bessire, Housing
Corporation, 19 SCRA 159.
26. When certiorari to set aside an injunction against a
striking union had become moot.Where a labor
union, which. had declared a strike, filed a petition
for certiorari to set aside a writ of preliminary
injunction issued against it by the lower court, and
later the union and the employer entered into a
"Return to Work Agreement," which settled the
labor dispute between them thus ending the strike
and picketing:, the petition should be dismissed
because the acts restrained by the writ of injunction
no longer exist. The case had become moot. A court
will not determine moot questions or abstract
propositions, nor express an opinion in a case
where- no practical relief can be granted. Meralco
Workers Union vs. Yatco, 19 SCRA 177.
27. Action of quo warranto should be brought within
Page 18 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
one year.Castro vs. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196.

835
835

28. Venue of a tort action against a corporation in
inferior court.Where the action filed against a
corporation in the inferior court is based on tort, it
should be filed in the place where the corporation
has its principal office, not in the place where it has
its branch off fice. To allow an action against a
corporation to be instituted in any place where a
corporate entity has its branch offices would create
confusion and work untold inconvenience to the
corporation. Clavecilla Radio System vs. Antillon,
19 SCRA 379.
29. Moratorium Law suspended action on 1944 note.
Where the ten-year period, within which an action
on a promissory note should be filed, was
suspended by the Moratorium Law for eight years
and six months, and said action, which acrrued on
May 11, 1944, was filed on December 8, 1961, said
action had not yet prescribed since only eight years
and six months of the ten-year period has elapsed
when the action was filed! Republic vs. Martir, 19
SCRA 468.
30. Action for specific performance or for "final
injunction" is within the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance.De Jesus vs. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554.
31. Prescription of action to collect taxes.The proper
prescriptive period for bringing civil actions to
collect taxes is five years from the date of the
assessment. The three-year period in section 51 (d)
of the Tax Code refers only to the summary
remedies of distraint and levy for the collection of
income taxes. Where the action to collect a tax was
commenced one year, ten months and three days
after the assessments were made, the action is well
within the prescriptive period. Arches vs. Bellosillo,
Page 19 of 54
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20 SCRA 32.
33. Action for compulsory recognition is within the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Court but
an action for partition of decedent's estate is outside
of its jurisdiction.Paterno vs. Paterno, 20 SCRA
585.
836
836

City of Bacolod vs, San Miguel Brewery, lnc.
34. Action against quasi-judicial bodies.An action to

restrain the Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board from implementing Republic Act
No. 3137 is one for prohibition and not an ordinary
injunction suit since the Board exercises both quasijudicial and discretionary powers. It can
promulgate rules and regulations for the control
and supervision of the embroidery and apparel
industry, etc. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 517.
35. Action to quiet title.An action to quit title,
brought by a person who is in possession of the
property, is imprescriptible. However, if the plaintiff
is not in possession, the action would prescribe
within the proper prescriptive period. Gallar vs.
Husain, 20 SCRA 186.
36. Action for reconveyance.A person, whose purchase
of land is evidenced by a private instrument, may
bring an action to compel the prior owner or his
heirs to execute a deed of conveyance in a public
instrument. Id.
37. Period within which action to annul a contract on
the ground of duress should be brought.An action
to annul a contract on the ground of duress, which
is a mere vice or defect of consent, must be brought
within four years after if had ceased. Where the
intimidation ceased 28 years before the action for
annulment was filed and nine years had passed
Page 20 of 54
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after the person, who allegedly employed

intimidation had died, the action has prescribed.
Moreover, the plaintiff had entered into a series of
subsequent transactions which confirmed the
contracts, which she is seeking to annul on the
ground of duress. Her action is clearly barred.
Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908.
38. Actions that survive a decedent's executor or
administrator.The actions that survive against a
decedent's executor or administrators are: (1)
actions to recover real and personal property from
the state; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
(3) actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property. A suit to re
837
837
City of Bacolod vs, San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

cover damages, based on the alleged tortious acts of
the manager of a government corporation, survives.
It is not a mere money claim that is extinguished
upon the death of a party. Board of Liquidators vs.
Heirs of Maximo Kalaw, 20 SCRA 987.
39. Sufficiency of cause of action.The test of the
sufficiency of the facts in the complaint, to
constitute a cause of action, is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, a valid judgment can be
rendered thereon. Ramos vs. Condez, 20 SCRA
1146.
40. An action to restrain respondents from acting 'as
director and officers of a corporation is a quo
warranto action.Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, 20
SCRA 1205.
41. Action or defense for declaration of inexistence of
contract is imprescriptible.De los Santos vs.
Rodriguez, 22 SCRA 459.
42. Suspension does not amount to evidentiary proof.
Mercado vs. Medina, 22 SCRA 577.
Page 21 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
43. Action for reformation of instrument and action for

annulment of contracts, distinguished.An action
for reformation should not be confused with an
action for annulment of contract. Reformation of
instrument presupposes a valid existing contract, in
which there had been a meeting of the minds of the
parties but the instrument drawn up and signed by
them does not correctly express the terms of their
agreement. Annulment of a contract, on the other
hand, presupposes a defective contract in which the
minds of the parties did not meet, or the consent of
one was vitiated. The -equity of reformation is
ordinarily limited to written agreements, and its
purpose is to establish and perpetuate the true
agreement; annulment, on the other hand, is
intended to declare the inefficiency which the
contract already carries in itself and to render the
contract inefficacious. Veluz vs. Veluz, 24 SCRA 559.
44. An action for reformation of instrument prescribes
in ten years.Id.
838
838

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc,
45, The sufficiency to state a cause of action is

determined by the allegations in the complaint.
Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 25 SCRA
530; Socorro vs. Vargas, 25 SCRA 593.
46. Insufficiency of cause of action must appear on the
face of the complaint.Azur vs, Provincial Board,
27 SCRA. 50.
B Ordinary Action.
1. Prescription -of action for partition starts from
assertion of adverse title.Gerona vs. Guzman, 11
SCRA 154.
C New Action.
Page 22 of 54
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1. Where decision in first case may settle issue in the

second case.Montesa vs, Directo, 27 SCRA 509,
D Actions In Personam and In Rem.
1. How jurisdiction over defendant can be acquired.
In an action strictly in personam, like the case at
bar, personal service of summons, within the forum,
is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court. Summons by publication cannot confer upon
the court jurisdiction over said defendant.
Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761.
2. Submission to jurisdiction by asking court for
affirmative relief.The rule stated in the case of
Banco Espaol vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, to the
effect that in proceedings in rem the relief must be
confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully
render a personal judgment, was laid down for
those cases where the defendant never submitted to
the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. In the
present case, Escao, while objecting to the
jurisdiction of' the Court over her person, also filed
an answer with a counterclaim asking for an award
of damages against plaintiff-appellant. She took the
offensive and asked the Court for a remedy, and
this after the court
839
839

below overruled her objection that she was not
within its jurisdiction. In asking the court for
affirmative relief, she 'submitted to its jurisdiction.
Tenchavez vs. Escao. 17 SCRA 674.
3. Reason for the rule.The reason for the rule is that
the courts cannot look with favor upon a party
adopting not merely inconsistent, but actually
Page 23 of 54
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contradictory, positions in one and the same suit,

claiming that a court has no jurisdiction to give a
decision in its favor. In the case at bar, although
Escao made a reservation of her former plea of
non-jurisdiction when she filed her counterclaim,
such reservation did not remove the obnoxious
contradictory position she assumed. Id.
4. Foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem.A
proceeding for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is an
action quasi in rem. It is based on a personal claim
sought to be enforced against a specific property of
the defendant. Its purpose is to have the property
seized and sold by court order to the end that the
procedure thereof be applied to the payment of
plaintiff 's claim. Ocampo vs. Dimalanta, 20 SCRA
1136.
5. Real actions distinguished from personal ones.
The mere fact that the resolution of the controversy
in this case would wholly rest on the ownership of
the streams involved herein would not necessarily
classify it as a real action. The purpose of this suit
is to review the decisions of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to enjoin him from
enforcing them and to prevent him from making
and issuing similar decisions conserving the
streams in question. The acts of the Secretary are
the object of the litigation, that is, petitionerappellee seeks to control them. Hence, the suit
ought to be filed in the CFI whose territorial
jurisdiction encompasses the place where the
respondent Secretary is found or is holding office.
For the rule is that outside its territorial limits, the
court has no power to enforce its orders. Santos vs,
Moreno, 21 SCRA 1141.
840
840

6. In an action in personam occupant is entitled to be
Page 24 of 54
heard to justify possession.Cabonitalla

Santiago, 27 SCRA 212.
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
vs.
7. Claim which should not be settled.In an action in

rem, there is no reason why claims which do not
partake of the nature of real rights or rights in rem
should be settled therein. Leyva vs. Jandoc, 4 SCRA
595.
8. Action for recovery of land wrongfully registered.
The existence of a decree of registration in favor of
one party is no bar to an action to compel
reconveyance of the property to the true owner,
which is an action in personam, even if such action
be instituted after the year fixed by Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act as a limit to the review of
the registration decree, provided it is shown that
the registration is wrongful and the property
sought to be reconveyed 'has not passed to an
innocent third-party holder for value. Caladiao vs.
Vda. de Blas, 10 SCRA 691.
9. Prescription not applicable to action for
reconveyance of land.Under Act 190, Section 38,
which is the governing statute in the case at bar,
prescription does not apply to continuing and
subsisting trusts; so that actions against a trustee
to recover trust property held by him are
prescriptible. Actions for- the reconveyance of
property wrongfully registered are of this category.
Id.
10. Filing of action not premature where supposed
agreement of extension could have proven ineffective
if the trial court had admitted parol evidence of
condition precedent not complied with.Land
Settlement and Development Corporation vs. Garcia
Plantation Co., Inc., 7 SCRA 751.
E Action by and against the Government.
1. When exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
necessary.In the case at bar the parties had to
agree and the court had to approve the agreement
that the Director of Public Schools shall recommend
to the proper officials not later than June 30, 1958
Page 25 of 54
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and before the closing

841
841

of office hours on that date the commitment of the
sum of P840.00 claimed by petitioner to be due him
under Republic Act No. 842, to accounts payable in
order to prevent its reversion. This is a recognition
by the parties as well as the court of the validity
and urgency of the action taken by petitioner.
Under the circumstances, petitioner should be
deemed to have had sufficient cause of action at the
time he filed his petition for mandamus on June 11,
1958, and in view of the special situation, resort to
the court without awaiting for the final decision of
the administrative officers is not premature. Alzate
vs. Aldana, 107 Phil. 298.
2. How to determine the nature of proceeding.The
nature of a proceeding is determined by the
allegation in pleading and the relief therein sought
not by the validity of the claim. In the case at bar,
the dismissed member of the police force insisted in
maintaining in his petition, as well as in all his
pleadings, that he had not been actually reinstated.
He likewise insisted in praying for an order of
reinstatement, and regardless of the merits or
demerits of this prayer, the case retained its
original character as a special civil action for
mandamus. It did not become an ordinary civil
action for the recovery of damages on the
assumption that the said member of the police force
had been reinstated while the case was pending
trial. Hence, it is not necessary for petitioners
herein to file a record on appeal in order to seek a
review, by a higher court, of the decision rendered
by respondent judge. Remo vs. Palacio, 107 Phil.
803.
3. What determine purpose of suit and the governing
Page 26 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
law.The purpose of an action and the law

governing it, including the period of prescription,
are determined not by the claim of the party filing
the action but by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. Piano vs. Gayaning, 7 SCRA
397.
4. Money claims against the government should be
filed with Auditor General.Garcia vs. Armed
Forces of the Philippines, 16 SCRA 120.
842
842

City of Bacolod vs, San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
5. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is
necessary before filing court action under
Commonwealth Act 327.Manuel vs. Jimenez, 17
SCRA 55.
6. Performance by a non-corporate government entity
of a proprietary function does not make it suable.
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc, vs. Customs
Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120; Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co. vs, Maersk Lim Far East Service, 27
SCRA 519.
7. When court may entertain action although there has
been no exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies only when there is an express
legal provision requiring such administrative step
as a condition precedent to taking action in court
(Azuelo vs. Arnaldo, 58 O.G. 4738). However, it is
discretionary upon the court to permit an aggrieved
party to institute a court action without first
resorting to an administrative remedy for the
purpose (Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of New
York, 85 Phil. 201). Where there already exists a
justifiable controversy between real parties
asserting adverse legal interest, which is ripe for
judicial determination, the recourse to the courts
would not be premature (Caltex Philippines. Inc. vs.
Page 27 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
Palomar, L-19560, Sept. 29, 1966). C.N. Hodges vs.

Municipal Board of lloilo, 19 SCRA 28.
8. Petitioner must be the proper person to bring the
action to the court and he should establish a clear
right to the office he is after.Castro vs. Del
Rosario. 19 SCRA 196,
9. The Provincial Board of Assessment has jurisdiction
over the dispute on assessment to the exclusion of the
Court of First Instance under the doctrine of the
primacy of administrative remedies.Victorias
Milling Co., Inc, vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 22 SCRA
1008.
10. Immunity of the government from suit.Any suit,
action or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing
would actually be a suit, action or proceeding
against the Government itself. A government
cannot be sued without
843
843

its consent, much less over its objection, Bureau of
Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees
Association, 1 SCRA 341. See Arrastre Service and
Constitutional Law.
11. Action not a suit against the Government.An
action to compel the officials of the Bureau of Public
Works to release the amount claimed from the
funds already set aside and retained for the
purpose is not a suit against the Government.
Moreno vs. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 701.
F Action for Damages.
1. Article 33 of the New Civil Code partially amends
Rule 107.Article 33, new Civil Code contemplates
a civil action for recovery of damages that is
entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of
the case. This is the reason why only a
Page 28 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
preponderance of evidence and not proofs beyond

reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient. Azucena vs.
Potenciano, 5 SCRA 468.
2. Pendency of another action.An action for damages
filed against the landowner for his failure to
execute the deed of sale and his interference in the
negotiations for the resale of the land is not a bar to
an action by the landowner against the plaintiff in
the prior action for rescission of the contract to sell
the land and for the recovery of the possession
thereof. De Jesus vs. Coloco, 1 SCRA 272.
3. Actions for damages based on malicious
prosecution.Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
vs. Koh, 4 SCRA 536.
4. When utterances are not sufficient to support action
for damages.The letter in question is not
sufficient to support plaintiff's action for damages.
Although the letter says that the plaintiffs are
under the control of the unnamed persons therein
alluded to as "planters" of a coup d'etat, the
defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that the plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of
the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge." In other words, the very document
upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly
indicates that they
844
844

might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely
unwitting tools of the planners. This statement is
not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of
entitling them to recover damages. Jimenez vs.
Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876.
5. Venue of an action for damages.Where plaintiff's
action is for the recovery of damages due to the
Page 29 of 54
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alleged illegal logging operations of the defendants

within plaintiff's timber concession in Agusan, that
is to say, that the damages arose from the violation
of plaintiffs right to cut, collect and remove timber
within the area defined in its license agreement,
said action is a personal action and it was properly
filed in Manila, where plaintiff corporation has its
main office (See. 1, Rule 5, Old Rules of Court, now
substantially Sec. 2[b], Rule 4; See Hodges vs.
Treasurer of the Philippines,. 50 Phil, 1). Calo vs,
Bislig Industries, Inc., 19 SCRA 173.
6. Injunction against the commission of violation and
intimidation cannot be a ground for damages,
Meralco Workers Union vs. Yatco, 19 SCRA 177.
2. Right of Action.
A Generally.
1. Effect of failure of arrastre operator to act on claim
within one year from discharge of goods.Where
the arrastre contractor fails to act on a claim within
the period of one year from the complete discharge
from the carrying vessel, the claim must be deemed
rejected as of the expiry date of the said period, and
the action must be filed within one year from such
expiry date (Continental Insurance Company vs.
Manila Port Service, L-22208, March 30, 1968;
Delgado Brothers vs,, Manila Port Service, L21781,
June 30, 1966). Fireman's Fund Company vs.
Manila Port Service. 18 SCRA 150.
2. Prescription of action to enforce arrastre claim is
one year.Id.
3. Prescription of action for payment of deficiency in
845
845
Page 30 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
come tax may be suspended.Republic vs. Ker &

Company, 18 SCRA 207.
4. Action for oral defamation.The plain import of the
last paragraph of Article 360, Revised Penal Code,
is that where defamation imputes a crime, which
cannot be prosecuted de officio, the general rule
that criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information (Rule 110 of the 1964
Rules of Court) must give way; the criminal action
must have to be brought solely "at the instance of
and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended
party". The converse proposition, however, cannot
be true. Reasonable construction will not permit a
deduction which would construct criminal
prosecutionof
defamation
which
can
be
prosecuted de officioby means of information.
Balite vs. People, 18 SCRA 280.
5. Prescription of action for collecting tax.Section
332 (c) of the Tax Code restricts the time within
which a proceeding in court may be brought: "but
only if begun (1), within five years after the
assessment of the tax". Implicit in the words but
only is that, unless otherwise authorized by statute,
the five-year period is absolute. The Tax Code itself
recognizes but one exception: If suit is stated "prior
to the expiration of any period for collection agreed
upon in writing by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the taxpayer before the expiration of
such five-year period"which may be extended by
subsequent written agreements made "before the
expiration of the period previously agreed upon".
Cordero vs. Gonda, 18 SCRA 331.
6. Action to collect forest charges may prescribed.Id.
7. When action commences.The rule of lis pendens
refers to another pending "action"; and an action
starts only upon the filing of a complaint in court
(Section 6, formerly Section 2, Rule 2, Rules of
Court), not upon extrajudicial demand. Pampanga
Bus Company vs, Ocfemia, 18 SCRA 407.
846
Page 31 of 54
846
7/31/15, 12:46 PM

8. Action against non-resident.Where a Swiss
citizen, residing in Switzerland, was served with
summons through. his wife, who was residing here
and who was his representative and attorney-infact in a prior civil case, which was apparently filed,
in the Rizal Court of First Instance, at her behest in
her aforementioned capacity, the lower court
acquired jurisdiction over the non-resident husband
by means of the 'said service of summons. As the
wife had authority to sue, and had actually sued in
behalf of her non-resident husband, so she was also
empowered to represent him in suits filed against
him, particularly in a case which is a consequence
of the action brought by her in his behalf'. Gemperle
vs. Schenker, 19 SCRA 45.
9. Legal representative can take the place of deceased
party.Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462.
10. Suit between members of the same family.Article

222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires
that before a suit between members of the same
family (in this case between husband and wife) is
filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made. The
only way to make it so appear is by a proper
averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the
law forbids a suit filed or maintained unless such
efforts at compromise appear, the showing that
such efforts had been exerted is a condition
precedent to the existence of the cause of action.
Hence, the failure of the complaint to plead that the
plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a
settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack
of cause of action. It may be so attacked at any
stage of the case on appeal. Mendoza vs. Court of
Appeals, 19 SCRA 756; Versoza vs. Versoza, 28
SCRA 78,
11, Action for compulsory recognition.A complex
action for compulsory recognition and partition,
Page 32 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
filed by a minor against the surviving spouse of his

deceased putative father, is not barred by the final
judgment in an
847
847

adoption proceeding wherein the said deceased
adopted a person other than the plaintiff. At the
time the adoption proceeding was filed, the plaintiff
did not have the status of an acknowledged natural
child and so paragraph 1. article 335 of the New
Civil Code did not apply and constituted no
impediment to the proceeding. The plaintiff had no
personality to appear in the adoption proceeding.
The adoption did not deprive him of his right to
seek recognition as a natural child. Bongal vs.
Bongal, 20 SCRA 79.
12. Action to enforce a right under the Eight-Hour
Labor Law can be brought anytime within three
years after the cause of action accrued.National
Shipyards and Steel Corporation vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 20 SCRA 134.
13. Action for quo warranto should be filed within one
year.Masa vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142.
14. Requisites to constitute that a public official is
guilty of non-feasance and dereliction of duty.
Mercado vs. Medina, 22 SCRA 577.
15. Proof of bad faith is essential to constitute
misfeasance or abuse of discretion.Id.
16. An action upon a cause of action pertaining to a. principal cannot be brought by an attorney-in-fact
in his name.Filipinas Industrial Corporation vs,
San Diego, 23 SCRA 707.
17. A principal cannot authorize his agent to sue in his
behalf.Id.
18. Actions an claim for overtime pay commenced before
the effectivity of Republic Act 1993 are not affecfed
Page 33 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
by the period therein prescribed.Artuyo

Gonzalvez, 27 SCRA 1148.
vs.
C Condition Precedent.
1. In a suit between members of the same family, the
848
848

attempt to compromise and inability to arrive
thereat, is a, condition precedent to the filing of the
suit.Versoza vs. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78.
2. Claim for loss of goods.Filing of claim within 15
days from discharge of last package from vessel is a
condition precedent for filing action for recovery of
claims. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Manila
Port Service, 6 SCRA 464,
D Premature Action.
1. Filing of action not premature where supposed
agreement of extension could have been proven
ineffective if the trial court had admitted parol
evidence of condition precedent not complied with.
Land Settlement and Development Corporation
vs. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 7 SCRA 751.
2. When foreclosure action was not premature.The
institution on February 12, 1953 of an action to
foreclose a mortgage obligation, which fell due on
April 1, 1953, was not premature where it appears
that mortgagor was insolvent and, therefore, it lost
the benefit of the term. People's Bank & Trust
Company vs. Dahican Lumber Company, 20 SCRA
84.
3. Consolidation; Choice of Remedies; Joinder Joinder of

Causes of Action.
Page 34 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
1, There is still res judicata, although the forms of

action and the relief are different as long as the
cause of action is the same.People vs, Planas, 18
SCRA 182.
2, Cause of action defined.A cause of action is an act
or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other. Cazeas vs. Rosales, 19
SCRA 462,
3, Sufficiency of cause of action.The test of
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is
whether or not the court could render a valid
judgment as prayed for, accepting as true the
exclusive facts set forth in the com
849
849

plaint, if the court should doubt the truth of the
facts averred, it must not dismiss the complaint but
should require an answer and proceed to trial on
the merits. Republic Bank vs. Cuaderno, 19 SCRA
671.
4. Pendency of other cases.A case should not be
dismissed due to the pendency of other litigations
between the same parties if said ground was not
invoked in the motion to dismiss. The fact that said
case may be incorporated, by amendment, in any
one of the other pending actions does not justify its
dismissal since the amendment of the complaint in
the other cases rests on the discretion of the court.
It is possible that the amendment would not be
allowed. Id.
5. Joinder of causes of actions.In an action for
damages arising' from the loss of a maritime
shipment, the plaintiff may sue the carrier or the
arrastre operator in the alternative if he is not
certain whether the shipment was lost in transit or
while in the custody of the arrastre operator.
Page 35 of 54
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Fireman's Insurance Company vs. Compaia

General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 19 SCRA 874.
6. Where cause of action in joint venture. was not
established.Where plaintiff Carlos and defendant
Overseas agreed that they would divide equally the
proceeds of the sale of rice to be turned over to them
by the National Rice and Corn Corporation, after
deducting and reimbursIng to each party the
expenses each had incurred, and it appears that the
Naric had not made any payment of such proceeds
and, in fact, Overseas had suffered losses in its
transactions with the Naric, the plaintiff has no
cause of action against Overseas on their joint
venture for the importation of rice. Plaintiff has not
established by a preponderance of evidence that
Overseas had violated its contract with 'her and
that the officers of Overseas had acted in bad faith.
Carlos vs. Overseas Factors, Inc.. 20 SCRA 469.
7. Joinder of alternative causes of action.A money
claim of less than P10,000.00 against an arrastre
operator may be joined with an action involving
admiralty, filed
850
850

in the Court of First Instance against alternative
defendants, where the money claim and admiralty
aspect of the suit arose out of one and the same
transaction. American Insurance Company vs.
Macondray & Company, Inc., 20 SCRA 1103.
8. Complaint must contain ultimate facts constituting
plaintiff's cause of action.Ramos vs. Condez, 20
SCRA 1146.
9. Action of deed conveying land.The vendee's action
for delivery of the land sold accrued on June 25,
1952, the date of the sale. The ten-year period for
bringing the action was interrupted by the vendors'
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letter dated November 10, 1956, acknowledging the

validity of the sale and promising to deliver the
land sold. Hence, the action, filed on May 22, 1963
had not prescribed. Id.
10. Delay caused by respondent. is counted against him.
De los Santos vs. Rodriguez, 22 SCRA 459.
11. Failure to appeal a decision of the Immigration
Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice violates the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.Go
King vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 22 SCRA
401.
12. When joinder of causes of action is proper.Where
one of the alternative causes of action, namely
admiralty, is cognizable by the Court of First
Instance, the suit should be filed, as was correctly
done by the plaintiff, in said court, notwithstanding
that the other cause of actionif standing alone
would fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal
court, by reason of the amount of the demand.
Insurance Company of North America vs. Manila
Port Service, 23 SCRA 114.
13. The test in determining whether a case states a
cause of action.The test of the legal sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action, is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint. La Suerte
851
851
City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, lnc.

Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. Central Azucarera
de Danao, 23 SCRA 686.
14. Joinder of causes of action.Where two causes of
actions may be combined to lay a proper basis f or
an action for rescission. Marsman Investment, Ltd.
vs. Philippine Abaca Development Company, 9
Page 37 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
SCRA 783.
A Multiplicity of Actions.
1. Application of rule of multiplicity of suitto make
wife personally liable is the same as ; to hold
paraphernal properties liable. Laperal vs,.
Katigbak, 4 SCRA 582.
2. Variance between frauds in two cases immaterial if
their aim is the same.Aring vs. Original, 6 SCRA
1022,
3. Theory to be adopted when complaint presents two
apparent theories.Where complaint presents two
apparent theories, the theory which is clearly
intended by facts pleaded should be adopted. De
Leon Brokerage vs. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA 517.
4. Setting up of compulsory counterclaim in
subsequent actions is not allowed.De Jesus vs.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 18 SCRA 403.
5. Lack of knowledge of the filing of another action is
immaterial.Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. vs.
Ocfemia, 18 SCRA 407.
6. Suit against several defendants in the alternative.
In an action for damages arising from the loss of
a maritime shipment, the plaintiff may sue the
carrier or the arrastre operator in the alternative if
he is not certain whether the shipment was lost in
transit or while in the custody of the arrastre
operator. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company 'vs.
Compaia General de Tabacos, 19 SCRA 874,
7. Varying form of action does not prevent application
of res judicata.Clemente vs. H.E. Heacock
Company, 20 SCRA 115.
852
852

8. Party may in one pleading state in the alternative
Page 38 of 54
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several causes of action.American Insurance

Company vs. Macondray & Company, Inc., 20 SCRA
1103.
9 . Kinds of actions for recovery of possession of real
property.There are three kinds of actions
available to recover possession of real property: (a)
the summary action for forcible entry (where
preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought
within ten days from the filing of the complaint
under article 539 of the Civil Code) or illegal
detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical
possession only and is brought within one year in
the municipal court; (b) the accin publiciana,
which is for the recovery of the right to possess and
is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in
a Court of First Instance; and (c) accin
reivindicacin, which seeks the recovery of ownership, which includes the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi, also brought in the Court of First Instance.
Emilia vs. Bado, 23 SCRA 183.
B Splitting Causes of Actions.
1. Different causes of actions.Where the previous
case was merely a plenary action for recovery of
possession or accin publiciana, involving only the
question of who, between the parties, had the better
right to possess the property in question, and in the
present case between the same parties, plaintiffs
seek to compel the other to execute a formal deed of
sale over the same property to enable him to obtain
a transfer certificate of title in his name and quiet
his title over the same, the second action is not
barred by final judgment in the previous case,
which is res judicata only insofar as one of the
parties was held to have the better right of
possession. Cabaero vs. Tesoro, 107 Phil. 1.
2. When pendency of action is a bar to another.The
test by which to determine whether or not the
pendency of another action is a bar to a second
action is whether or not "the judgment to be
rendered in the action first instituted will be such
Page 39 of 54
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that, regardless of which party is successful, it will

amount to res adjudicata against the second action"
(Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation
853
853

lecoa & Co., 30 Phil. 255). Zambales Chromite Co.
vs. Robles. 107 Phil. 60.
3. When action for ejectment is not a bar to an action
in the Court of First Instance.The action for
ejectment in the Justice of the Peace Court may not
bar plaintiff's suit in the Court of First Instance
praying. among other things, that defendant be
restrained from operating the mining properties
without necessarily ejecting him therefrom, because
If it is finally decided that defendant should be
ejected from the mining premises in the illegal
detainer case, plaintiff could still prosecute his
causes of action against defendant in the Court of
First Instance. Id.
4. Rule against splitting causes of action.The two
actions in the case at bar are founded on one and
the same contract, and the rule is that where the
covenant or contract is entire and the breach total,
there can be only one action. (Blossom & Co. vs.
Manila Gas Corporation, 55 Phil 226.) When a trial
is had, it is intended that all matters growing out of
the controversy are to be finally determined in one
and the same suit. The object is to prevent a
multiplicity of actions and to prevent the possibility
of one part of the cause being tried before one judge
which would unnecessarily harass the parties and
produce needless litigations and accumulate costs.
(Pascua vs. Sideco. 24 Phil. 26, Strong vs. Gutierrez
Repide. 22 Phil. 9). Jimenez vs. Camara, 107 Phil.
590.
5. Splitting causes of actions.Section 3 of Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court provides that a party to an
Page 40 of 54
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action cannot split his cause of action into many

causes. When, therefore, the plaintiff in the case at
bar filed his action for reinstatement, he should
have included in said action the supposed damages
that be now claims in his complaint. It is wellsettled that a party, after presenting an action.
cannot by a subsequent proceeding or suit recover
other damages or remedies to which he was entitled
in the former action. Valencia vs. Cebu Portland
Cement Co.. 106 Phil. 732.
6. The rule against splitting of a single cause of action
The rule on splitting a single cause of action is
not ap
854
854

plicable where the two actions are different.
Enrique vs. Ramos, 7 SCRA 265.
7. No splitting cause of action.The filing of an action
to establish plaintiffs' filiation as illegitimate
children and of a separate action for partition of the
estate of their deceased father does not violate the
rule against splitting a cause of action since each
action is cognizable by a different tribunal. Paterno
vs. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585.
8. The rule against splitting of a cause of action
applies only where the actions are between the same
parties.Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs. SagiloItogon Workers' Union, 24 SCRA 874.
4. Civil and Criminal Actions.

1. Delay in filing as indicating malice and ill-will.
The delay in filing the criminal case shows that
the defendant had brought said criminal charge
motivated by malice and ill-will and as a retaliatory
measure for the civil action filed by the plaintiff.
Page 41 of 54
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Yutuk vs. Manila Electric Company, 2 SCRA 337.

2. Reservation to file action includes action based on
quasi delicts.De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA 517.
3. Pendency of Criminal case for tax evasion.
Pendency of criminal case for tax evasion does not
suspend period to file civil action for recovery.
Republic vs. Ret, 4 SCRA 783.
4. Civil and criminal actions being distinct from each
other the latter may be filed independently from the
other.Gorospe vs. Nolasco, 4 SCRA 684.
5. Exception.There is an exception to the principle of
separation and independence of the criminal and
civil actions from each other, namely, when the
offended party not only fails to reserve the right to
file a separate civil action but also intervenes
actually in the criminal suit by appearing through a
private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering
indemnity for damages therein, in which case
855
855

a. judgment of acquittal bars a subsequent civil
action. Azucena, vs. Potenciano, 5 SCRA 468.
6. Civil action under Article 33, new Civil Code,
unrelated to criminal aspect of the case.Article 33
of the Civil Code contemplates a civil action for the
recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to
the purely criminal aspect of the case, This is the
reason why only a preponderance of evidence and
not proof beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient. Id.
7. A civil action for damages against a common
carrier's driver is allowed even if the driver has
been acquitted on reasonable doubt. If in a criminal
action the common carrier's driver is acquitted on
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages against
him may be Instituted for the same act or omission
Page 42 of 54
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(Rule 107, par. [d]; Art. 29,, New Civil Code), If such
is the rule as against him, a fortiori it must in the
case of his employer. Bernaldes vs. Bohol Land
Transportation, Inc., 7 SCRA 276
8. Distinction of civil and criminal actions in common
carrier.A civil action based on the contractual
liability of a common carrier is distinct from the
criminal action instituted against the carrier or its
employee based on the latter's criminal negligence.
The first is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code and not by those of the Revised Penal Code,
and it being entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, the same may be instituted and
prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the
result of the latter. Id.
9. No class suit where no sufficient representative
parties have been joined.ln any suit, before the
case proceeds to trial, it is the duty of the court to
see to it that all parties having interest in the
subject are joined therein, in order that the results
of the suit would be binding on all. This is
necessary in order to prevent multiplicity of suits or
to prevent other persons claiming the same rights
as the plaintiffs from instituting another action and
mo lesting the defendants in their right.
Consequently, in the case at bar, where it appears
that no sufficient represen
856
856

tative parties have been joined, the dismissal by the
trial court of the action, despite the contention by
the plaintiffs that it is a class suit, is correct.
Niembra vs. Director of Lands, 11 SCRA 525.
10. Special civil

petition for
without first
whether or
action.Considering that the instant

prohibition could not be resolved
receiving the necessary evidence as to
not a new contract of lease was
Page 43 of 54
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concluded between the parties two months before

the expiration of the original contract (which was
what the respondent court was prevented from
doing by virtue of this petition), then under the
present stage of the case, we consider the filing of
this petition premature, since it is of importance
that the issue be first determined by the respondent
court. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that
this petition has been improvidently filed. Escobar
vs. Ramolete, 16 SCRA 126.
11. Sufficiency of the cause of action.The complaint
sufficiently states a cause of action against
defendants, for under the indemnity agreement,
their.obligation was joint and several. And under
article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the creditor may
proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or
some or all of them simultaneously. The indemnity
agreement could not have been modified by the
counter-guaranty agreement, since the former was
executed one day after the latter, Philippine
American General Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, 16
SCRA 298.
5. Abandonment.
1. Dismissal of the unlawful detainer case.The
abandonment or dismissal of the unlawful detainer
case will not substantially affect the rights of the
plaintiff over the property in litigation, particularly,
possession thereof, for the reason that such
possession may well be included in the relief prayed
for in the Court of First Instance under the prayer
at the end of the complaint that "plaintiff further
respectfully prays the Honorable Court to such
other relief as to it may seem just and equitable
under the premises." Zambales Chromite Mining
Co. vs. Robles, 107 Phil. 69.
857
857
Page 44 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM

2. Waiver of his right.Failure of offended party to
reserve right to recover civil indemnity against
carrier is not a waiver of his right to institute
separate action based on contractual liability.
Bernales vs. Bohol Transportation, Inc., 7 SCRA
276.
3. Failure to prosecute is not presumed from mere
failure to appear in court.De Guzman vs. De
Guzman, 5 SCRA 458.
6. Dismissal of Action
1. Action for indefeasibility of title.While a certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds
covering .land granted by the 'Bureau of Lands by
virtue of a homestead patent under Section 122 of
Act. No. 496 becomes conclusive and indefeasible
after the lapse of one year, the same is immaterial
in determining the action of plaintiffs in the case at
bar. Mabana vs. Mendoza, 105 Phil. 260.
2. Dismissal of action.An action for damages filed
against the landowner for his failure to execute the
deed of sale and his interference in the negotiations
for the resale of the land is not a bar to an action by
the landowner against the plaintiff in the prior
action for the rescission of the contract to sell the
land and for the recovery of the possession thereof.
De Jesus vs. Coloso, 1 SCRA 272.
3. Erroneous
dismissal.An
order,
dismissing
plaintiffs action to annul a homestead patent,
which order was based on the failure of the plaintiff
to introduce in evidence the said homestead, is
erroneous where it appears that defendant Director
of Lands attached said patent to his motion to
dismiss. Evangelista vs. Mendoza, 1. SCRA 338.
4. Failure to pay installment when due constitutes
breach giving rise to a cause of action and it is
erroneous to dismiss the same.International
Page 45 of 54
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Tobacco Co., Inc. vs. Wang Wan Tat, 2 SCRA 118.

858
858

5. An action against a wrong party should be
dismissed.National Rice & Corn Corporation vs.
Antonio, 2 SCRA 643.
6. Dismissal of an action on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata.
Montinola vs. Barrido, 4 SCRA 633.
7. Dismissal of civil suit does not bar criminal
proceedings.Gorospe vs. Nolasco, 4 SCRA 684.
8. When motion to dismiss action was held to be
proper-.Sy-quia vs. Antonio, 4 SCRA 889.
9. Pending action for forcible entry and detainer a bar
to another action.In view of the pendency of an
action for forcible entry and detainer filed by
plaintiffs against defendants, plaintiff should not be
permitted to file another action in the Court of First
Instance for injunction, in view of the principle
against the. multiplicity of suits. Caseas vs.
Jandayan, 5 SCRA 83.
10. Pendency of another action; requisites.The ground

of pendency of another suit between the same
parties has the following requisites, to wit: (1)
identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity in
the two cases should be such that the judgment
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata
in the other. Matela vs. Chua Tay, 5 SCRA 164.
11. When action may be dismissed for pendency of
another action.Id.
12. Ground for dismissal of complaint.Complaint
may be dismissed for failure to amend complaint to
Page 46 of 54
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implead indispensable party. Garchitorena vs. De

los Santos, 5 SCRA 491.
13. Dismissal of action for ambiguity of contract.An
action should not be dismissed upon mere
ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty of the
complaint, for these are
859
859
City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery Inc,

not grounds .for a motion to dismiss but rather for a
bill of. particulars. Amaro vs. Sumanguit, 5 SCRA
707.
14. Facts not alleged in the complaint as basis.Under
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a motion 'to dismiss,
unlike a. demurrer provided for in the old Code of
Civil Procedure, may be based on facts not alleged
in the complaint. Canite vs. Madrigal & Co., Inc., 5
SCRA 943,
15. Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.An action which
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may be
brought in the proper court alter one year of such
dismissal. F.H. Stevens & Co., Inc. vs. Norddeuscher
Lloyd, 6 SCRA 180,
16. Dismissal of complaint is understood to he with
prejudice if it is without condition.Guanzon vs.
Mapa, 7 SCRA 457.
17. Doubt as to veracity of allegations to petition is not a
proper ground for dismissal of action.Nicolas vs.
Director of Lands, 9 SCRA 934.
18. When novation extinguishes cause of action.
Although at the time the complaint was presented
there was due from the defendant the amount
described therein, yet where novation had already
taken place, showing that at the time the case was
submitted for decision there was no real
controversy because the period of extension within
which to pay the obligation had not yet expired and
Page 47 of 54
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no proof was adduced that the debtor could pay

within the period agreed upon, it is held that the
cause of action alleged in' the complaint had lost its
force and effect, and there being by then no
justifiable issue, said complaint was properly
dismissed for being premature, Prudential Bank
and Trust Co. vs. Saura Import and Export Co.,
Inc., 10 SCRA 779.
19. The action brought by the plaintiff being one for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon did not
survive after the death of the defendant debtor.
Macondray & Company, Inc. vs. Dungao, 11
SCRA 72.
20. Where an action brought by the plaintiff on a
promissory note is one for recovery or collection of a
sum
860
860

of money.Although at the bottom of the

promissory note sued upon and before the signature
of obligor there appears the f following: "The
payment of this note is secured by mortgage on
personal property," yet where it does not appear
that the plaintiff sought to foreclose said mortgage,
it is held that the action brought by the plaintiff on
said note is one for recovery or collection of a sum of
money and the same should have been dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
the Rules of Court. Id.
21. Lack of cause of action must appear on the face of
the complaint of warrant for dismissal.Remitere
vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251.
22. Motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action.
For the purpose of a motion to dismiss, based on
lack of cause of action, the allegations in the
complaint are deemed admitted (Alquigue vs. De
Page 48 of 54
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Leon, L-15059, March 30, 1963). Vda. de Valencia

vs. Deudor, 17 SCRA 133.
23. Cause of action for unpaid wages.An action for
unpaid wages, termination pay and overtime pay
(Comm. Act No. 444 and Rep. Act No. 1052) should
not be dismissed where the complaint contains
sufficient allegations supporting the action.
Although the defendant is a religious order, it is
liable to the plaintiff if it is engaged in a dormitory
business for profit. Garcon vs. Redemptorist
Fathers, 17 SCRA 341.
24. When there is lack of cause of action and due process
was observed where merits and demerits of defense
were fully discussed, the dismissal of action is
lawful.Quiem vs. Seria, 17 SCRA 567.
25. Action should be dismissed where issue has become
moot.Sarmenta vs. Garcia, 17 SCRA 795.
26. An action to collect war profit tax is barred under
the rule of res judicata where a, prior action for the
same tax was dismissed on the ground of
prescription and no appeal was made from the order
of dismissal.Republic vs. Planas, 18 SCRA 132.
861
861

27. Dismissal of petition before answer is filed.The
rule in ordinary actions may be applied to special
civil actions by virtue of Section. 1, of Rule 65 (now
Section 1 of Rule 62) provided it is not Inconsistent
with the provisions on special civil actions. In the
case at bar, there is no such. inconsistency that bars
the application of the rule (Rule 8, not Rule 16)
allowing the filling of a motion to dismiss before
filing an answer. Dismissal would also be proper if,
before the answer is filed, the attention of the court
is called to the fact that from its own allegations,
the petition appears to be without merit (Arvisu vs.
Page 49 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
Vergara, 90 Phil. 621, 623-624). Chan vs. Galang,

18 SCRA 345.
28, Dismissal of action.The dismissal of action
pursuant to section 3 of Rule 17 rests upon the
sound discretion of the court and will not be
reversed upon appeal in the absence of abuse. The
burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is
upon appellant since every presumption is in favor
of the correctness of the court's action. Where the
Issues were joined as early as December 24, 1953
and the plaintiff failed to move for trial as late as
June 14, 1956, the dismissal of the petition for
relief from judgment was clearly proper for failure
of petitioner to prosecute. Inter-Island Gas Service,
Inc. vs. De la Cerna, 18 SCRA 386.
29. Requisites of lis pendens as ground for dismissal of
complaint.The requisites for lis pendens as a
ground for dismissal of a complaint are: (1) identity
of parties or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights
asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (3) the identity in both cases is
such that the judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case. (Del Rosario vs. Jacinto, L-20340,
September 10, 1965.) Pampanga Bus Company vs.
Ocfemia, 18 SCRA 407.
30. When dismissal of petition for certiorari is proper.
The dismissal of a petition for certiorari is proper
even before an answer is filed where the attention
of the court
862
862

is called to the fact that it is deficient in substance
or from its own allegations the petition appears to
be without merit (Santos vs. Galang, L-21732, Oct.
Page 50 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
17, 1966). Mayuga vs. Maravilla, 18 SCRA 1115.

31. Dismissal on the ground that there is another
pending action.Alarcon vs. Torres, 19 SCRA 706.
32. Dismissal for lack of cause of action.Espinosa vs.
Belda, 19 SCRA 715.
33. Ineffectual amendment of complaint after dismissal.
An amendment to the complaint, made after it
was
dismissed,
which
amendment
added
allegations already considered by the lower court in
its order of dismissal, cannot be regarded as a new
matter. Perez vs. Central Azucarera Don Pedro, 19
SCRA 739.
34. Erroneous dismissal of action for compulsory
recognition.An action for compulsory recognition
and partition was erroneously dismissed on the
ground that the putative father had adopted a child
and that the requirements regarding recognition
were not observed. Bongal vs. Bongal, 20 SCRA 79.
35. When a motion to dismiss is based on lack of cause
of action, the averments in the complaint are
deemed hypothetically admitted.Acua vs. Batac
Producer Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,
20 SCRA 526.
36. Action filed beyond the ten-year period is barred.
Joaquin vs. Cojuangco, 20 SCRA 769.
37. Effect of a previous dismissal of an action based on
culpa aquiliana upon the application of article 103,
Revised Penal Code.Lacson vs. Glorioso, 22 SCRA
316.
38. Action which can be. dismissed on the grounds of res
judicata and lis pendens.Lacson vs. San JoseLacson, 24 SCRA 837.
39. Action may not be dismissed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction when the action was principally to
recover possession of land, recovery for yearly
damages at the rate
863
863
Page 51 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM

of P5,000.00 from 1961 up to the recovery of
possession, and moral damages plus attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation.Atega vs. Ortiz, 27
SCRA 480.
40. Case may be dismissed where there is pending
action between same parties over the same cause.
Montesa vs. Director, 27 SCRA 509.
41. Action should not be dismissed where petitioner has
cause of action against respondent Artuyo vs.
Gonzales, 27 SCRA 1148.
7. Declaratory Relief.
1. There will be no action for declaratory relief if there
is already breach.Pilar vs. Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, el al., 19 SCRA 358.
2. Declaratory relief is not a remedy to secure
declaration
of
citizenship.Dy
Poco
vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 16 SCRA 615.
3. Declaratory relief is not proper if it is for the
determination of issues.Id.
8. Miscellaneous.
1. Service of summons when defendant does not reside
in the Philippines.Considering that the summons
was delivered to defendant's sister in Pasig, Rizal,
although at the time the complaint against him was
filed, he was a resident of the United States, being
then an enlisted man of the United States Navy, the
summons af oresaid was not served in the manner
provided by Section 17, Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Zulueta vs. Muoz, 17 SCRA 972.
2. Moratorium law suspended action on 1944 note.
Where the ten-year period within which an action
on a promissory note should be filed was suspended
by the Moratorium Law for eight years and six
Page 52 of 54
7/31/15, 12:46 PM
months, and said action, which accrued on May 11,

1944, was filed on December 8, 1961, said action
had not yet prescribed since only eight years and
six months of the ten-year period
864
864

Mateo vs. Lagua.
had elapsed when the action was filed. Republic vs.
Martir, 19 SCRA 468.
3. When action for reconveyance of registered land
cannot prosper.Certain parcels of land registered
under the Torrens system in 1921 and 1925,
allegedly in the names of the administrators thereof
in their fiduciary capacity, can no longer be
recovered in 1959 from the persons to whom said
lands were transferred by the administrators. The
trust relationship did not extend to the transferees,
who acquired the lands for value and claimed
adverse title in themselves. The action for
reconveyance on the theory of trust might prosper,
if at all, against the trustees and provided that they
still hold the lands, but not against third persons
who do not occupy the same fiduciary position.
Joaquin vs. Cojuangco, 20 SCRA 769.
4. The respondent judge is entitled to exoneration when
the charges against him were, not established by
preponderance of evidence.Buyco vs. Zosa, 22
SCRA 1235.
CLPCI EDITORIAL STAFF

_____________
Page 53 of 54
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City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery PDF

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

VOL. 29, OCTOBER 30, 1969

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

"3.That the defendant, Manager of the San Miguel Brewery,

VOL. 29., OCTOBER 30, 1969

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

In due time, appellant filed its answer. This was followed

Appellant appealed from the said decision to this Court

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

appealed from and upheld the constitutionality of the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

once again the move was frustrated by the Court of First

Failing thus in its attempt to collect the surcharges

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

FOUR PESOS and TWENTY CENTAVOS (P156,924.20) as taxes

which up to now amounted to THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE

VOL. 29, OCTOBER 30, 1969

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

and again praying

(P36,519.10), representing the surcharges from August 1959 to December,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

On July 24, 1964. appellant filed a motion to dismiss the

Appellants moved for reconsideration but its motion was

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

TAX ORDINANCE NO. 66, SERIES OF 1949, AS AMENDED, OF

Under this, it argues that the action of appellee cannot be

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

Indeed, this rule against the splitting up of a cause of

68 Phil. 287, 292-293.

VOL. 29, OCTOBER 30, 1969

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

that 'x x x a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of

In the light of these precedents, it cannot be denied that

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

VOL. 29, OCTOBER 30, 1969

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

bar to any action on any of the other possible reliefs arising

The corresponding provision in the Revised Rules of 1964 expresses

these points more specifically. Section 4 of Rule 2 provides:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

the Philippine Reports and vols. 1 to 11 and 16 to 27 of the Supreme

VOL. 29, OCTOBER 30, 1969

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

See also Administrative Law; Arrastre Service: Complaints

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029

3. Ground for action for reconveyance.To succeed in

VOL. 29, OCTOBER 30, 1969

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 029