NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R.

NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]

Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media

which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections;
and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally
argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression
with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992.
It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and
duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion
relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of
media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the
Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television
broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume
of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing
and

limiting

Issue:

the

Whether

right

or

Not

of

voters

Section

11

to

information

and

(b)

of

Act

Republic

opinion.

No.

6646

constitutional.

Held:

Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of

Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom

of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be
seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e.,
"during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to
proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources
that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the
basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may
be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed
legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone
beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during
election

periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By

virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations

of

news

or

news-worthy

events

relating

to

candidates,

their

qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section

11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as
such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for
particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read
as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible
media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as
designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.

Atienza vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 108533 December 20, 1994]

Post under case digests, Political Law at Wednesday, February 22, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Private respondent Antonio Sia was elected mayor

of the Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1988 local
elections obtaining a plurality of 126 votes over petitioner
Lou Atienza. Following Sias proclamation by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers, petitioner filed an election protest
with the RTC questioning the results of the elections in a
number of precincts in the municipality. Consequently, in
the revision ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtained
a total of 2,826 votes, a plurality of 12 votes over the
private respondent. The RTC rendered its decision
declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections
and ordering the private respondent to reimburse
petitioner the amount of P300,856.19 representing
petitioners expenses in the election protest.
The COMELEC en banc issued an Order setting aside the
preliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to
assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending
resolution of his appeal. However, following the
synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding
Commissioner of the COMELECs Second Division issued
an Order dismissing petitioners appeal for being moot and
academic pursuant to the Commissions decision in

Resolution No. 2494 declaring the election protest and

appeal cases arising out of the January 18, 1988 elections
dismissed and terminated as of June 30, 1992.
Thereupon, private respondent sought clarification of the
order of dismissal of EAC No. 20-89 referred to the protest
case in the Regional Trial Court or to the appeal case in
COMELEC. In response, the Second Division of
COMELEC stated that it is only the appeal case that was
dismissed for being moot and academic, not the money
judgment of the trial court.
Issue: Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion in reversing
that portion of the trial court's decision awarding election
expenses in the amount of P300,856.19?
Held: No. The Omnibus Election Code provides: Actual or
compensatory damages may be granted in all election
contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance
with law. Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
Thus, in addition to specific provisions of law allowing
actual or compensatory damages in certain situations, the
Civil Code elaborates that the proper setting for allowance
of actual or compensatory damages occurs in breaches of
obligations, i.e., in cases of contracts and quasi-contracts,
and in crimes and quasi-delicts, where the defendant may

be held liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained
of. Given this setting, it would appear virtually impossible
for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or
compensatory damages in the absence of the conditions
specified under Articles 2201 and 2202 of the Civil Code,
or in the absence of a law expressly providing for
situations allowing for the recovery of the same. It follows,
naturally, that in most election protest cases where the
monetary claim does not hinge on either a contract or
quasi-contract or a tortious act or omission, the claimant
must be able to point out to a specific provision of law
authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses
against the losing party. This, petitioner has been unable
to do.
Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely
provides for the granting of actual and compensatory
damages in accordance with law. That it was the intent of
the legislature to do away with provisions indemnifying the
victorious party for expenses incurred in an election
contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission
clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid.
The intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions
merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong
without damage or damage without wrong neither
constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant
Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law

or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous

cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the partylist system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
BANAGA,

JR.

G.R.

vs.

COMELEC

No.

July

134696

31,

2000

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the en banc resolution of public respondent Commission
on Elections promulgated on June 29, 1998, in a COMELEC special action case, SPA No. 98-383.

Facts:

Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of the City of
Paraaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers proclaimed respondent
Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.s 68,970 votes.

Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition to Declare Failure of
Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was replete with election offenses,
such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that numerous Election Returns pertaining to the
position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Paraaque appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.

In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses. Therefore, the incidents were
sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be considered as the true will of the people.

Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the City of
Paraaque,

during

the

May

1998

local

elections.

Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioners suit and held that the election offenses relied upon by petitioner
do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election
tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and
that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot be viewed as an election protest.

Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis
whatsoever

and

without

giving

him

the

benefit

of

hearing.

Issue:

WON petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of election is considered as an election
protest.

WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners petition, in the light
of

petitioners

foregoing

contentions.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public respondent is AFFIRMED.
Costs

against

petitioner.

Ratio

Decidendi:

1) No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was a special action under the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary governed by Rule 20 on ordinary
actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions.
Petitioner also did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest such as failing to pay filing
fee

and

cash

deposits

for

an

election

protest.

2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition to declare
failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless. The petition to declare a failure
of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a
failure to elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only based its decision on the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of election. There are three instances where a failure of
election

may

be

declared,

namely:

(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,

violence,

terrorism,

fraud

or

other

analogous

causes;

(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud

or

other

analogous

causes.

The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC have no other
recourse but to dismiss the petition.

CARUNCHO VS COMELEC
Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the
lone district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized elections. The other candidates were: Arnulfo
G. Acedera, Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP); Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C. Bassig
(Independent); Esmeraldo T. Batacan (PDR-LM Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C. Rivera,
Jr. (PRP/PDR); Elpidio G. Tuason (Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal Party/LAMMP).
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of May 12, 1998, respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers
composed of Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. as Chairman, Atty. Grace S. Belvis as Vice-Chairman, and Dr.
Florentina Lizano as Member, started to canvass the election returns. The canvass was proceeding
smoothly when the Board received intelligence reports that one of the candidates for the congressional
race, retired General Arnulfo Acedera, and his supporters, might disrupt and stop the canvassing.
At exactly 6:00 o'clock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General Acedera and his supporters
stormed the Caruncho Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing of election returns was
being conducted. They allegedly forced themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the
process. As pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning shots causing those present in the
canvassing venue, including the members of the Board and canvassing units, to scamper for safety. The
canvassing personnel exited through the backdoors bringing with them the Election Returns they were
canvassing and tallying as well as the Statement of Votes that they were accomplishing. They entrusted
these documents to the City Treasurer's Office and the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO).
Election documents and paraphernalia were scattered all over the place when the intruders left.
The following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units recovered the twenty-two (22)
Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurer's Office and the PESO. However, page 2
of each of the 22 election returns, which contained the names of candidates for congressmen, had been
detached and could not be found. An investigation was conducted to pinpoint liability for the loss but it
yielded negative result. Hence, the Board secured proper authority from the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), 1 through Election Director for the National Capital Region Atty. Teresita Suarez, for the
reconstitution of the missing page by making use of the other copies of the election returns, particularly
the provincial copy or the copy in the ballot boxes placed therein by the Board of Election Inspectors.
At 2:40 a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board, satisfied that it had finished canvassing the 1,491
election returns from as many clustered precincts, proclaimed Henry P. Lanot as the winner in the
congressional race for the lone district of Pasig. 2 The votes obtained by the leading three candidates
were: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes; Emiliano R. "Boy" Caruncho III 42,942 votes, and Arnulfo
Acedera 36,139 votes. The winner, Lanot, led his closest rival, Caruncho, by 17,971 votes.

However, on May 21, 1998, petitioner Caruncho filed a "Motion to Nullify Proclamation on the
Basis of Incomplete Returns" with the COMELEC. He alleged that the Board had proceeded with the
proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winning congressional candidate even though one hundred fortyseven (147) election returns involving about 30,000 votes, were still not canvassed. He prayed that the
COMELEC en banc declare the proclamation null and void and that the Board of Canvassers be directed
to convene and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the votes of the candidates for the House of
Representatives and thereupon proclaim the winner.
On June 8, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued an Order requiring respondent
Pasig City Board of Canvassers to comment on the amended motion to nullify Lanot's proclamation. In his
comment filed on June 23, 1998, respondent Atty. Casiano G. Atuel, Jr. admitted the disruption and
stoppage of the canvass of election returns on May 11, 1998 but asserted that there were only twenty-two
(22) election returns, not 147 as claimed by Caruncho, that were missing but these were eventually
recovered. The Board stated in part:

. . . . Contrary to the insinuation of Atty. Irene D. Jurado, only 22 Election Returns

were reported missing. On the following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing
units have recovered the 22 missing Election Returns and the Statement of Votes
from the Treasurer's Office and from the Pasig Employment Service Office
(PESO). There are no missing election returns.
That to the surprise of the Board and of the 22 canvassing units, they
found out that Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns they recovered were detached
and missing. We wish to inform the Commission that Page 2 of the Local Election
Returns contained the name of candidates for Congressman. We conducted
investigation on who did the detachment of Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns.
However, nobody from the Treasurer's Office nor from the PESO admitted that
they committed such election offense.
Xxxx
The facts as established show that all the legal steps necessary to carry out the reconstitution of the
missing page 2 of the twenty-two (22) election returns have been followed. Proper authorization for the
reconstitution of that page was secured from the COMELEC. The reconstitution was based on the
provincial copy of the election returns that was retrieved from the sealed ballot boxes The board of
canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have been received by it terminated
the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the available election returns. The facts
further show that the 22 alleged misisng election returns represented only 4,400 votes. (Ref.

CARUNCHO III vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 135996,September 30, 1999).

QUESTIONS: 1.Caruncho contends that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the
basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate
unless all returns are considered and none is omitted. He concludes that the proclamation of Lanot was
erroneous. Rule on the contention.
2.Lanot claims that his proclamation is valid as the canvass was valid. Is he correct?
3.Are the facts abovecited qualify for a pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest? Explain.
4.Premises considered, who should be the rightful mayor? Explain.
Nolasco v COMELEC

FACTS
A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged
performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts
of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is
allowed by the law.
The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided
against Blanco.
A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as
intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him.
The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolascos motions thus this
petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor
Held:
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to
prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention that the minimum
quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require
is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates
proclamation.
2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case
of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer
would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be
assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the
disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.

TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN ( G.R.

No. 133676)
TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN
G.R. No. 133676
April 14, 1999
FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the
COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies
between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To

avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the
automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts
of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that
the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots.
They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots,
as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called
for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu
elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan
and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should
be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to
manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were
received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated
machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected
because they had the wrong sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and
recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day,
COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of
Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s
recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued
Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid
down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual
count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for
a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no
showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 981750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of first impression
and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the
petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough
considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in
relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.

The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well
established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The
technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the
automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing
Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An
automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the
sovereignty of the electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not
machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot
prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by
giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count
does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC
that cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu,
a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating
peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly
shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They
were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer
of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count
from beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The
plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there
is a failure of election, viz:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes,
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in
any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing,
call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election
only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to
equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are
now discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually
counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced.
Private respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.

ACTS:
Petition for certiorari challenging the resolutions of respondent COMELEC.

Silvestre de la Cruz filed a petition for disqualification against

Larrazabal for alleged false statements in COC regarding her residence.
TRO was issued by SC against Larrazabal from being proclaimed
governor in the event that she obtains the winning margin of votes. (Since
COMELEC was not yet fully constituted that time)

Abella filed objections to COMELEC charging Larrazabal with

falsification and misrepresentation in her residency.

COMELEC lifted TRO upon motion of Larrazabal.

Feb 14, 1991, Comelec 2nd Division, disqualified L. (Held: Affirmed)

July 18, 1991, Comelec en banc denied Ls petition declaring decision

void. STILL DISQUALIFIED. (Held: Affirmed)

COMELEC, in the same decision disallowed Abellas proclamation as

governor.

Hence, the petitions.

August 1, 1991 On petition by Larrazabal for the issuance of TRO to

COMELEC, SC: CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing decision. (Held: Lifted,
disqualification enforced)

Vice Gov took oath as governor thru COMELEC resolution, Court further
resolved that Petilla (Vice Gov) should DESIST from assuming position.

Position of petitioners against L: respondent is neither a resident nor a

registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed, but a resident of
Ormoc City, a component city but independent of the province.

L: she is a resident of Kananga, Leyte. She had intent to return (animus

revertendi) to Kananga even if she physically transferred to Ormoc.

SC: There is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left

her residence in Kananga, Leyte to pursue any calling, profession or
business. COMELEC relied on provisions of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte?

1. Petitioner Adelina Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of

votes (declared winner but subsequently disqualified by COMELEC)

2. Petitioner Benjamin Abella (2nd highest but not proclaimed as gov

after disqualification of Larrazabal)

3. Leopoldo E. Petilla, Vice Gov of Leyte.

HELD:

Article X of the Constitution is explicit that aside from highly-urbanized

cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting
for provincial elective officials are independent of the province.
connotes 2 prohibitions. One, from running for, and the second, for
voting for any provincial elective official.
Resolution of COMELEC AFFIRMED. TRO issued against it was lifted.
Costs against petitioners.

With regard to Abella, Larrazabal was voted for, and election

proceeded. Net effect was that Abella lost, and repudiated by the
electorate.
In the Firvaldo (governorship of Sorsogon) and Labo(mayor in Baguio)
cases, this is exactly the reason why the candidates obtaining second
highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions.

BATERINA vs. COMELEC Case Digest

SALACNIB F. BATERINA, et al., vs. COMELEC, et al.,
205 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioner Salacnib F. Baterina was a candidate for Governor of Ilocos Sur in the special local
elections held on 25 January 1988. The other petitioners were candidates for Vice Governor and
Provincial Board Members, in the same local elections. In the course of the canvass proceedings,
verbal objections were raised by petitioners to certain election returns based on the grounds
mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236, in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt
and custody of the election returns. The objections were aimed at excluding the election returns from
the canvass. Petitioners submitted to the BOARD their objections in written form within twenty four
(24) hours from the time the verbal objections were made as required in Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code. On September 6, 1990, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution affirming the
Resolutions dated 23 March 1988 and 5 June 1989, containing rulings adversely against petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its en
banc Resolution dated September 6, 1990.

Held: The Court thinks not. The date 21 January 1988 appearing in the Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division is plainly a typographical error. The correct date is 31 January 1988. This
fact does it ipso facto annul a proclamation which may have been already made. In this regard,
petitioners reliance on Section 245 to support their claim of nullity of the proclamation made by the
BOARD for lack of authorization from the COMELEC is misplaced. In which case, no proclamation
can be made by the Board of Canvassers without authorization of the COMELEC until after the latter
has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party.

In the case at bar, when the proclamation was made by the BOARD on 31 January 1988, there was
no pending appeal filed by petitioners before the COMELEC from the rulings made by the BOARD
on their objections to election returns rendered on 29, 30 and 31, 1988. What was filed by petitioners
on 30 January 1988, before the proclamation, was a petition seeking merely to restrain the canvass
and proclamation or suspend the effects of any proclamation. This petition, however, is clearly not

the appeal referred to in Section 245 that will operate to bar the BOARD from making any
proclamation of the winning candidates without authority from the COMELEC after the latter has
ruled on the objections elevated to it on appeal. Consequently, there was no legal impediment to the
proclamation of private respondents by the BOARD on 31 January 1988.

Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., protestant, vs. Gloria MacapagalArroyo, protestee.
______________________________________________________________________
_______

Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the
Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed
an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant
died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. Now, the widow of
FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to
intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ.
Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during
the pendency of the latters protest case.
Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is
personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal
and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would
oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution
and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any
claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we
can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election
protest.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case DIgest [G.R. No. 192474]

FACTS:
While serving as Mayor of Tampilasan Zamboanga del Norte, Petitioner, Romeo Jalosjos sought the
transfer of his voter's registration record to Precint 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
Dan Erasmo filed a petition with the MCTC which rendered judgement excluding Jalosjos from the list of
voters in question on the ground that he did not abandon his domicile in Tampilasan and is still the
incumbent mayor.

Jalosjos appealed the decision to the RTC but the MCTC ruling was affirmed.
Through a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
Jalosjos elevated the case to the CA. His application was granted and his name was reinstated in the
voter's list pending resolution of the petition.
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 2010 national elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition with the
COMELEC to deny or cancel said COC. His petition was denied by the COMELEC for insufficiency in
form and substance.
Pending Erasmo's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Jalosjos won the elections
and was proclaimed representative.
Meanwhile, CA rendered in his favor judgement on the pending petition. Erasmo filed a petition for review
of the CA's decision before the Supreme Court.
Thereafter, COMELEC en banc granted Erasmo's motion anf declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election
as representative for not satisfying the residency requirement because of his incumbency as mayor of
Tampilisan.
Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of Jalosjos residency
qualification considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the
discharge of that office.
RULING:
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such
power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the
resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives.
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor
of the HRET.
After Jalosjos' proclamation, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue
of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
On election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second
Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final
judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The

last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second
Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any
order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his
proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged
lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in
declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case.
Necessarily, Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the
registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELECs failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The
Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.
Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the respondent COMELEC En Bancs order,
and REINSTATES the Commissions Second Division resolution