Wills Legitime Cases

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 1 of 31
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
Manila
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4,
1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together
with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The
trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother
can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.
Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court
appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated
June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased
and prescribing their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter),
1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is
a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are
the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the
estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit
by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated,
an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate
succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation
provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil
Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him
in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by
right of representation, and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or

widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate
child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse)
is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision
which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by
the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude
the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate
heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it
would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,

shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in
which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does
not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of
the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v.
Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married
to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect
to his
estate.
...
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their

legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by
those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that
the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate
which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that
of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the
estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the

inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970
and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of
the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

SUPREME COURT
Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA
DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law

and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by
law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio
Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales,
but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the
same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by
his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased
father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary
to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is
not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court
for further proceedings.SO ORDERED. 4 71 SCRA 262, 265 L-42257, June 14, 1976.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the
Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed
counter-project of partition. 1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon
(herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these
seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the
oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in
the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely
Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina
Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at
P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of
P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at
P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March
13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and
admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix
of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters
testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of
Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the
estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in
toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a
total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven
compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved
for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary
disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and
eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively
devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrixappellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received
in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the
appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received
less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their
respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and
Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the
cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime
mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched.
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of
partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of
the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the
value of one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half ()
amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants
should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally
reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire
estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left by the
Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren
who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively
devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the
sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition
made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above
stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of
the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting
the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided
among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of
partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically
provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and
adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be
taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the
oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is
in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has
chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.
This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With
reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix
as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors
(excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court
ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet
with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired
is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last
wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this
appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in
the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore
subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under
Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of
the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account
of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the
testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In consonance therewith, our Civil
Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a
testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and
"(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which
will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these rules of
interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's
decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions
raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's
words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the
matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only
law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by
his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties
nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and
restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary
disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third
paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as
well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of
her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be
paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property
be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following,
whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the
particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to
whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil
Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition
his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil
Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than
the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,
wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and
assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their
respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant,
Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition
by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of
the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080
"now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his
estate by actinter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing
doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an actinter vivos, he must
first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative
commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not
here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to
probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the
provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than
the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they
would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to
one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or
legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the
other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy
and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It
would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that
"(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the
deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his
daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as

being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil
Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations
thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by
the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of
law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him'
(Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights
and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto
except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil
Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her
share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present
case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in
their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix'
repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real
properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the
equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to
them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion,
that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory
heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs
or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's
estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the
testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all
devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition
by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value
already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I
bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to
convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable
portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as
mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the
third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of
those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his
forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of
the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be
taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second
paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has
compulsory heirsmay dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by
oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code
covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by
the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who
is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,provided its value does not
exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally,
of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by
mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions
upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be
respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory
heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is
not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the
legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction
thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this
article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it
may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the
present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire
estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her
lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor
having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of
the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the
secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to
demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this
has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer
demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed
and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with
real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project
of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called
upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the
testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of
transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the
executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by
the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint
petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question and
none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of
the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the
purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix'
death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the
wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and
accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates
would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is
evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors,
Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which,
per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication made
to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of
the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash
by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the
law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the
testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors
would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has
declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at
the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing
value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON,
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of
the two projects of partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which
will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus,
where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each
compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was
interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an
attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries.
Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to
be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of
devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of
Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he
cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore,
called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot
dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her
entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the
testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is
thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of the
following decision) with Article 886.
FACTS:
In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the
appellee while the others were the appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The
beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8
million) which included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at
Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of
the deceaseds estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance
with her testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific
real properties comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on
the partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as
follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which
was comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based
on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in
the will less the cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the
estate where Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executors project of partition citing that Art 906
and 907 NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed. The court cited that if the
proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will substantially result in a
distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC

ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits
of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the
disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v.
Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all
questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must
be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning
of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter
of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain,
when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose
mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors,
heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts
may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors
proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the
nature of a partition. In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that
upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and
funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration of
her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is
my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified
each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC,
providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act
inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project of partition as the
oppositors were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to
them by the decedent in her will and the differential to complete their legitimes were
taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously
favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than
the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they

would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to onehalf and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises and legacies, to
one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the
estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors'
proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto
nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors,
subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties
to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole
context of the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for
some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion)
that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will.
Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of
adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said
dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory
heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following
her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise
command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them
shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death
shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and
partition of the entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her having made any
previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the
legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call
for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and
this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no
longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as
bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46903
July 23, 1987
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private
respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in
due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the
fruits thereof, had not been included.1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties
cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private
respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil
Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to
collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not
officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs
if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor
should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which
held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay,
expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in,
and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent
court** holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition
to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation
and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of
the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa
akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda,
may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may
pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa
nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana,
sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng
mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon
pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang
maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang
pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang
makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa
sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang
legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga
lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may
layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court
correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not
be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation
is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation
required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed
of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he
understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to
suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included
therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was
an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the
question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole
issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see
none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the
rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the
12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As
we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to
decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render
their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in
Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the
courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition
of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious
studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Record on Appeal, pp. 14-23.
Ibid., pp. 69-73.
Judge Manuel T. Reyes.
Rollo, pp. 16-25.
**
San Diego, J., ponente, and Busran and Jimenez, JJ.

Ibid., pp. 31-35.

5
Id., pp. 15-16.
The
Tagalog Forms for Notaries Public, Rosendo Ignacio, 1967, 2nd. Ed., pp. 21,
23, 26, 28, 31.
6
121 SCRA 51; New Frontier Mines vs. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502; Federation of
free farmers vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-41222, Nov. 13, 1985.
7

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN,
MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL
ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN,
MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF
EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.
petition was initially
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186
affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in
favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano
B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages is sought.
in these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a
second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents
were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due course
and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with
the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena,
all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in
the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among
his three (3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were
adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the
petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18)
hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in
Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to
Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled
properties which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona
Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in the
course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens
System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were
surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to
Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as
the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his
wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney
Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their
properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides
of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"
(i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her
"Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness.
In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay
without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa
Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate
proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which
she submitted to the probate court for approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items
mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form
part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while
items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her
nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria LorayesCornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio
Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she
made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of
any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often
than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria
Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian,
was her life-long companion in her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact,
hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave,
and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began
transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own,
properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales
and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to
his Locsin nephews and nieces:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000
Jose R. Locsin
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000

Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio

favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000

in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto Aurea Locsin
16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto favor of Mariano Locsin
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others:
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300

favor of Francisco
Maquiniana
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000
favor of Ireneo Mamia
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750
favor of Zenaida Buiza
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Felisa Morjella
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000
favor of Inocentes Motocinos
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Casimiro Mondevil
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200
favor of Juan Saballa
25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500
of Rogelio Marticio
Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming
and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her
husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives
agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the
properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by
the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of
her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews
and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her
estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case
No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during
her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration,
and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest
to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs
(Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of
P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice
to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants. 9
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and

against the defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and
Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the
entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin,
being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan
and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of
Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and
exchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate
of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the
inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null
and void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to
cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real
properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and
derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey
ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs,
together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and
delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants
from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this
action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for
reasons that might have intervened and prevent the same,
defendants shall pay for the value of such properties, fruits and
incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of
this case
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which
rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's
decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the
properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her
death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the
decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which
Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no
longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay
claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the
time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one
and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to
impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter
vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are
compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews
and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents'
rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is
not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could
conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that
the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to
dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750,
Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of
the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or
in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all
relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by
law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation,
the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected.
(634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old
when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years
she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by
her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the
properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not
support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina
had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties
which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957
to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years
before she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew,
Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m.
portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina, Julian
Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the
other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due
execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito
Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other coowners of Lot 2020.
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of
property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally
incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such
suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties
to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties
in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964
(21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later,
or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian
Locsin. 19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her
relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida
Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and
Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private
respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to
Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to
make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was
equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his
wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said
estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in
the teeth of Doa Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1
to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part
of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34
to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have
known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal
property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was
signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special
Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the
assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely
would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his
aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before
Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that
their respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal
relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of
Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also
prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa
Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew
Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her
nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective
husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and
undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins, although
it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively
demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made
the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to
Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ
"fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or
donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of
her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law,
Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and
donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted
legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation
dated November 19,
1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4,
1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9,
1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is
married to Doa Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is
married to another niece, Maria Olbes. 26The sales which she made in favor of
Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena
Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been
anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground
of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been
consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4)
years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of
Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an
injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign
ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was
constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of
properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi
City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Facts:
Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife,
Catalina Jaucian Locsin,as the sole and universal heir of all his properties.
Thespouses being childless, had agreed that their properties, after both of them sh
all have died shouldrevert to their respective sides of the family, i.e.,Mariano's
properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"(i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews
and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives."Don Mariano died of
cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was
probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from
both sides of the family. Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms
of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as
if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also
advancing in years,
DoaCatalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's a
s well as her own,properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She
made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from
her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces: Four years before her
death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 she had made a will affirming and
ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her
husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives
agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the
properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by
the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of
her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to
distribute.In 1989, some of her Jaucian nephews andnieces who had already receiv
ed their legacies andhereditary shares from her estate, filed action in theRTCLegaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her
lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without
consideration,and intended solely to circumvent the laws onsuccession. Those who
were closest to Doa Catalinadid not join the action. After the trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of Jaucian, and against the Locsin. The CA affirmed the said
decion, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are
entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten
(10) years before her death.
Held: NO
They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary
estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession."The rights to a person's succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Property
which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her
lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her
heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her
estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs. Even if those transfers
were, one and all,
treatedas donations, the right arising under certaincircumstances to impugn and
compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure
to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced)
heirs.
Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she
had any such,
hencethere were no legitimes that could conceivably beimpaired by any transfer of
her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy
that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject
only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
breached, the respondents may not invoke: Art. 750. The donation may
comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he
reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation,
are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the
donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. Petition for review is
granted.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 136773
June 25, 2003
MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO
MANONGSONG, Petitioners, vs. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA
JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA
O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR.,
BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO
DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
DECISION
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of 26 June 1998
and the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685,
partitioning the property in controversy and awarding to petitioners a portion of the
property.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children,
namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of
respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo
("Jumaquio sisters"); (3) Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4)
Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor
Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married
to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents Benjamin Jr.,
Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and
Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros
Lopez Manongsong ("Manongsong").
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las
Pias, Metro Manila with an area of approximately 152 square meters ("Property").
The records do not show that the Property is registered under the Torrens system.
The Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-003903 as
bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo
Lavana and west by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was
registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30 September
1984 in the name of "Benigna Lopez, et al".4 However, the improvements on the
portion of the Property denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las
Pias were separately declared in the name of "Filomena J. Estimo" under Tax
Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14 October 1991.5
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners") filed a Complaint6 on 19 June 1992,
alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the
Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code,7 petitioners prayed for the partition
and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its
prevailing market value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon
Guevarras death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died
without offspring, there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the
five children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a
fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her
fathers 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation.
BOUNDARIES:
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras
children and their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as
they can remember. The area actually occupied by each respondent family differs,
ranging in size from approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only
descendants not occupying any portion of the Property.
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION BILANG 911.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and
Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo ("Ortiz family"), as well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and
Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio ("Dela
Cruz family"), entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the
Stipulation of Facts and Compromise Agreement8 dated 12 September 1992
("Agreement"), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each
group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The signatories to the
Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this effect and
prayed further that "those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced
so that those who have less and those who have none shall get the correct and
proper portion."9
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each
occupy 50 square meter portions of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not
sign the Agreement.10 However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed
petitioners claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro ("Navarro"),
supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarras daughter
Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 91111 for the year
1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential
parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St.,
Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north,
I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street to the east and San Jose Street to the
west. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona
Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA12 ("Kasulatan") dated 11 October 1957, the relevant portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa LAS
PIAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na
matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong
napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO

(P250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA
LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las Pias, Rizal, at
sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga na
buong kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT INILIPAT sa
nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili, ang kabuuang
sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang anomang
pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing
lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that the
"KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta
Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October 1957 and
entered in his Notarial Register xxx."13 The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada
was a duly appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the
Property for more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive
prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches.
The Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed years
earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he was alive or by Manongsong when the
latter reached legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in
1992 when Manongsong was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in
favor of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent
evidence attacking its validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According
to defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through conveyance by means of a
Deed of Sale executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother
Enriqueta, which deed was presented in evidence as Exhs. "4" to "4-A". Plaintiff
Milagros Manongsong debunks the evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the
observance of the Court, is however duly authenticated by means of a certificate
issued by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly notarized public document
(Exh. "5"). No countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or

impugn the documents legality or its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the
property conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been
introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarros
spouse/husband was not mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at
the time the conveyance was made to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her
compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of
the estate under question to the exclusion of others. She is entitled to herlegitime.
The Deed of Sale [Exhs "4" & "4-1"(sic)] did not at all provide for the reserved
legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona
Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children including the grandchildren, by right of
representation, as described in the order of intestate succession. The same Deed of
Sale should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The
compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases
expressly specified by law like for instance disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was directed against
the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and
Felomena J. Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:
1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be
immediately partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her
lawful share of 1/5 of the area in square meters, or the prevailing market
value on the date of the decision;
2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory
damages for having deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits
of her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the
sum of P10,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the
first time a supposed photocopy of the death certificate16 of Guevarra, which stated
that Guevarras mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an
affidavit17 from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only
by name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for some years
with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these
documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and
affidavit presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally
offered these documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission
that Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that
Justina Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject
property and was the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their
Reply-Memorandum averred:
"As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as
follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA
NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the
other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx xxx.
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the
parties. Since this is the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that there
should have been proper document to extinguish this status of co-ownership
between the common owners either by (1) Court action or proper deed of tradition,
xxx xxx xxx."
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court
held:
"x x x
xxx
xxx
With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of
relationship of the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina
Navarro is the common ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must
be noted that the parties failed to amplify who was the husband and the number of
compulsory heirs of Justina Navarro. xxx xxx xxx"
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina
Navarro was their common ancestor and was the original owner of the subject
property.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the
Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned
as follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all
property of marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coveture
is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.
1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE

ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE
REVIEWABLE;
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;
4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND
SHOULD PREVAIL;
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER COHEIRS;
6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF
PETITIONERS.21
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove,
by the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the
Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject
property was acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not
supported by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for
taxation purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the
land is the paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees
complaint in so far as defendants-appellants are concerned.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees. SO ORDERED.18
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in its Resolution of 21 December 1998.19
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and
resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied the petition for review due to
certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due course to the petition in
its Resolution of 31 January 2000.20
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only
questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the
factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the
authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower
courts.22 This is precisely the situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of
evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison
v. Court of Appeals :23
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof,
and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in
the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The
concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it
means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a coowner or co-heir of the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her
father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that the Property originally
belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5
interest in the Property. As the parties claiming the affirmative of these issues,
petitioners had the burden of proof to establish their case by preponderance of
evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax
declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also
presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted
petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail
the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.24 Otherwise the authenticity
and due execution of the document should be upheld.25 The trial court itself held
that "(n)o countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn
the documents legality or its validity."26
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document
and thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years
old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by
any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.27
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property
was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not
agree. The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on
evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.28
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property
during her marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under Article
160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911
showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarros
name.29 This tends to support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in
the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As
opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for
valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the
disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but
merely a substitution of values,30 that is, the property sold is replaced by the
equivalent monetary consideration.1wphi1
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are:
(1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price
certain in money or its equivalent.31 The presence of these elements is apparent on
the face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.32
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by
petitioners for the first time on appeal
We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to the
alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.
Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their appellees brief. Petitioners
could easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents for the first time on appeal
without any explanation. For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer
in evidence these documents before the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.33 To admit these documents now is contrary to due
process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert
them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert
Navarros ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated
merely that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not personally acquainted
with her.34 Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether
Navarro was indeed the mother of Guevarra. These documents do not prove that
Guevarra owned the Property or that Navarro did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of
Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro
was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this constitutes
an impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not
only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process.35
If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine
petitioners case. Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and
Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then
to the latters children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be
no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from
Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not undermine respondents position since
they anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance
from Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed
to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were
not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to
Guevarras estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for
partition of the Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio
Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina Navarro,
which is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had six children,
one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong
(Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed
that the property was actually sold to them by Justina Navarro prior to her death.
The respondents presented deed of sale dated October 11, 1957. Milagros and
CarlitoManongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying
for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right
of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is
subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugalcharacter and
that AgatonaGuevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to
participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of
others. The Deed of Sale did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the
heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should
be declared a nullity ab initio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by
the alleged sale of the property by Justina.
RULING:
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is
a public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution.
There is no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in the
Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed
to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for
valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the
disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but
merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the
equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.
The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is
void ab initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension
of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is
presumed tobelong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption under Article 160 of
the
Civil
Codeapplies only
when there
is
proof
that
the
property
was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.
There
was
no
evidence
presented
to
establish
that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage.
\
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126376
November 20, 2003
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ
and EMMA JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA
LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES
TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and
SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA
JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES GAVINO

JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Decision2 dated 26 June 1996
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision3 dated 18 February 1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case
after it found that the parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration
and that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the defendants.
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a consideration
of P20,000.00 (Exh. "G"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157203 was issued in her name (Exh.
"G-1").
6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395
executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a consideration of P25,000.00
(Exh. "K"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779 was issued in his name (Exh. "K-1").]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates
of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
- XXThe deeds of sale, Annexes "C," "D," "E," "F," and "G," [and "K"] are simulated as
they are, are NULL AND VOIDAB INITIO because
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of
plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel,
Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The
married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real
property executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in
favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title
issued in their names, to wit:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395
executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a consideration
of P6,000.00 (Exh. "C"), pursuant to which TCT No. [36113/T-172] was issued in her name
(Exh. "C-1");
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a consideration
of P1[2],000.00 (Exh. "D"), pursuant to which TCT No. S-109772 was issued in her name
(Exh. "D-1");
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin and Conchita
Bernardo, for a consideration of P54,[3]00.00 (Exh. "E"), pursuant to which TCT No.
155329 was issued to them (Exh. "E-1");
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Artemio Joaquin and Socorro
Angeles, for a consideration ofP[54,3]00.00 (Exh. "F"), pursuant to which TCT No. 155330
was issued to them (Exh. "F-1"); and
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx
over the properties in litis;
b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in
the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more
valuable than the measly sums appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the
parties (vendors and vendees); and
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the
compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
- XXI Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
36113/T-172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the
Registrar of Deeds over the properties in litis xxx are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action
against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over
the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and
made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of
the consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were
issued with sufficient factual and legal basis.4 (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant
spouses Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis.5 Instead of filing an Answer with their codefendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion to Dismiss.6 In granting the
dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that "compulsory
heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right
commences only from the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article
777 of the Civil Code of the Philippines."7
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the
complaint. The trial court stated:
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx
father will show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable
consideration. This assertion must prevail over the negative allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action
against defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of
their parents. The court finds this contention tenable. In determining the legitime,
the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art.
908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed
as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an
impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question.

Neither do they claim to be creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently,
they cannot be considered as real parties in interest to assail the validity of said
deeds either for gross inadequacy or lack of consideration or for failure to express
the true intent of the parties. In point is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde,
et al. vs. Paez, et al., 101 SCRA 376, thus:
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or
subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their
validity.
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their
legitime by the dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their
defendant brothers and sisters. But, as correctly held by the court a quo, "the
legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the
decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while
their parents live."
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by
plaintiffs-appellants is inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
plaintiffs-appellants. SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the instant petition.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together,
the counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
No costs. SO ORDERED.8
Issues
Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.1wphi1 The appellate
court ruled:
To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this
case, which is, whether xxx they have a cause of action against appellees.
Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant
brothers and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin
and Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties
of their defendant parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only
upon the latters death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of
their properties, provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE

IN QUESTION HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN ASSUMING
THAT THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS OF
SALE DO NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE
WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING
THE REST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND
FELICIANA LANDRITO OF THEIR INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS

HAVE A GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds
of Sale before discussing the issues on the purported lack of consideration and
gross inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds
of Sale
Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint,
petitioners asserted that the "purported sale of the properties in litis was the result
of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory
heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime." Petitioners strategy was to have the
Deeds of Sale declared void so that ownership of the lots would eventually revert to
their respondent parents. If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and
their respondent siblings will then co-own their parents estate by hereditary
succession.11
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties
subject of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the
properties. The trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this
reason alone. An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-ininterest.12
[T]he question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would
be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."
xxx
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are
those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or
subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the
contract even though they did not intervene in it (Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai
Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.
These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The
phrase present substantial interest more concretely is meant such interest of a
party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive
law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand
and the defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him."13
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds
of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their parents properties
is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents death. While still living, the
parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their
overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that
theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their
parents estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent
value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices
stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the
court to declare the Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual
contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting
of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the
breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract,
then the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting
of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the
contract is simulated, then the contract is void.14 Article 1471 of the Civil Code
states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of
sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract.
Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the
consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to
demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid
contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.15
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely
simulated. To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdozs
testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he
would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of
the purchase price.16 The trial court did not find the allegation of absolute
simulation of price credible. Petitioners failure to prove absolute simulation of price
is magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings financial

capacity to buy the questioned lots.17 On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which
petitioners presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only
did respondents minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was also
stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings
have also fully paid the price to their respondent father.18
showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.20 In the instant
case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that
the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their
respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the
seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto. SO ORDERED.
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly
inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:

Footnotes
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as
may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation
or some other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and
1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale.
Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the
subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the
commutative value of what they gave. As we stated in Vales v. Villa:19
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., concurring.
Penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos.
Rollo, pp. 29-31.
Records, pp. 189, 204.
Ibid., pp. 170-175.
Ibid., p. 189.
Ibid., pp. 355-356.
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
10
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains,
protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or
annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of
persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person
has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or
overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use
miserable judgment, and lose money by them indeed, all they have in the world;
but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition,
a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable
wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it.
(Emphasis in the original)
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
11
Article 1078 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased."
12
Section 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
13
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).
14
See Ladanga, et al. v. CA, et al., 216 Phil. 332 (1984). Cesar L. Villanueva, Philippine Law on Sales 54 (1998).
15
Rido Montecillo v. Ignacia Reynes and Spouses Redemptor and Elisa Abucay, G.R. No. 138018, 26 July 2002.
16
TSN, 17 May 1991, pp. 497-498.
17
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties
and carry greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial
court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a
See Embrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51457, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 335; TSN, 17 May 1991, 497-498 (Emma Joaquin Valdoz); TSN, 22 May 1991, pp. 11-12, 20-21 (Nora
Joaquin Edra).
18
TSN, 14 June 1991, p. 19 (Leonardo Joaquin); TSN, 30 October 1991, p. 6 (Fidel Joaquin); TSN, 27 November 1991, p. 10 (Felicitas Joaquin Carreon); TSN, 7 January 1992, pp. 5-6
(Artemio Joaquin); TSN, 31 January 1992, p. 12 (Clarita Joaquin Mendoza); TSN, 11 March 1992, pp. 16-17 (Tomas Joaquin).

19
35 Phil. 769 (1916).
20
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, 18 October 2000, 343 SCRA 637.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by

her duly appointed guardians, AGNES
P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO,
Petitioner,
- versus FRANCISCO
PASCUAL,
PASCUAL
and
MIGUEL
G.R. No. 189776

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN,
MENDOZA,** and
SERENO, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 15, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters[1] Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.[2]
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by
respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located
in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, may be
considered as an advance legitime of petitioner.
Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of
the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.[3]
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which
respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it may be
considered as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate
court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedents estate,[4] the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of
the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is
subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:[5]
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory

heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime
of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate
estate. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring that:
1.
The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of

Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2.
The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to

collation;
3.
1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the

mezzanine and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City
form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
4.
The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N.

Pascual:
a.
1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal
Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental
income thereon;
b.
1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square

meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT
No. 119063;
c.
Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at

Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
d.
Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the

following
Certificate
Numbers: A0011036,
A006144,
A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950,
C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865,
A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128,
S58308, S69309;
e.
Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the

following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308,
S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;
f.
share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold Mining

Co.;
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in

the name of Nona Arellano;
i.
Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now

covered by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati
City;
j.
Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by

Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

a.
To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No.

181889;
b.
To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the

real properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property
covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally between
them up to the extent that each of their share have been
equalized with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the
time of donation, the value of which shall be determined by
an independent appraiser to be designated by Amelia P.
Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the
real properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then
Franciscos and Miguels shares may be satisfied from either
in cash property or shares of stocks, at the rate of
quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided equally
among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO
IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER
ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED ANGEL
N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL
JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.[6] (underscoring supplied)
By Decision[7] of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners

appeal partly meritorious. It sustained the probate courts ruling that the property
donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is
the rule on equality of division, We hold that the property subject
of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to
collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent
and we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such
immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime,
should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The
trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included
the said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.
[8]
(citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the
probate court, herein petitioner was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares
of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory
submitted by the administrator.
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of
inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as
well as the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are
concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further
proceedings in accordance with the disquisitions herein.[9] (underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration [10] having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution[11] of October 7, 2009, the present petition for review
on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO PETITIONER
AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER

COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
IS SUBJECT
TO
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
IV
DECEASED
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL,

JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR
INTESTATE HEIRS.[12] (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is
subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been
ordered equally distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate
of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.[13]
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory
heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the
legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.[14]
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir,
there is no legitime to be safeguarded.[15]
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateralrelatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of
the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for compulsoryheirs.[16]
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2)
secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are
those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory
heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory
heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only
in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and
ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring
compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary
or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the
surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.[17]
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for
his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that
it was valid,[18] is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the
free portion of the estate.[19] There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among
his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to
the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters
of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering
the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate
of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135
of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings
in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and
thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
SO
ORDERED.
The Case:
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Angel, who died
without heirs, leaving behind his siblings, Amelia, Francisco and Miguel, the
respondents Francisco and Miguel alleged that a parcel of land donated by Angel to
Amelia (covered by TCT No. 181889) was part of estate, and may be considered as
an advance legitime to Amelia, subject to collation. The RTC ruled that it cannot
determine the validity of the donation, but it may provisionally pass upon the
question of title to the property for the purpose of determining whether it formed
part of the decedents estate. It held that the Deed of Donation was valid in view
of the presumption of validity granted to notarized documents, thus subject to
collation under Article 1061 of the Civil Code. It then partitioned the estate,
adjudging to Amelia the donated lot, and to the respondents the other lots, and the
other properties equally among themselves. Amelia, represented by her guardians,

Agnes and Nona, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA partially granted the
appeal, affirming the RTCs ruling on the subject of collation, but remanded the
case to the Court for further proceedings on the matter of shares of stocks which
were not included in the estate.
Not satisfied, the petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, on the
issue of whether or not the subject property should be collated with the estate of
Angel, and whether or not the respondents, who are mere collateral relatives, are
entitled to legitime.
On the first issue:
The Ruling:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate
of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.1
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so
far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so
that inofficious donations may be reduced.2
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is
no legitime to be safeguarded.3
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of
the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for compulsory heirs.4
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and
exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary
compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in
the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are
secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who
succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the
illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.5
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime,
he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it
was valid,6 is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the
free portion of the estate.7 There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his
heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to
the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shallinherit in equal shares.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering
the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate
of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the
Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the
case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and
thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties. SO
ORDERED.

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Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 1 of 31

Republic of the Philippines

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 2 of 31

descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 3 of 31

estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the

Republic of the Philippines

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 4 of 31

Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 5 of 31

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 6 of 31

daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 7 of 31

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 8 of 31

distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 9 of 31

the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 10 of 31

Record on Appeal, pp. 14-23.

Ibid., pp. 69-73.

Judge Manuel T. Reyes.

Rollo, pp. 16-25.

San Diego, J., ponente, and Busran and Jimenez, JJ.

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 11 of 31

Id., pp. 15-16.

Republic of the Philippines

petition was initially

Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 12 of 31

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 13 of 31

3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)

2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio

24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000

26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300

Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 14 of 31

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 15 of 31

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 16 of 31

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 17 of 31

Republic of the Philippines

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 18 of 31

NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 19 of 31

(Exh. "5"). No countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 20 of 31

1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE

The Ruling of the Court

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 21 of 31

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 22 of 31

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 23 of 31

SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES GAVINO

Wills Legitime Cessy Ciar - Page 24 of 31

Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question.