ESTATE OF HEMADY v LUZON SURETY CO., INC.

No. L-8437, 28 November 1956

100 Phil 388
Article 774 provides that by succession, the properties, rights
and obligations of a deceased person are transmitted through his death to
his heirs either by his will or by operation of law. Hemady holds that the
contingent liabilities of the decedent are part of the obligations
transmitted by his death to his heirs. Accordingly, contingent claims
against the estate of a deceased person arising from the decedent's
contractual undertakings under various indemnity agreements executed
in favor of various persons and entities are money claims which may be
proved against his estate and/or heirs. These contingent claims may be
proved during settlement proceedings by an indemnified surety even if
in the meantime, no actual liability on the part of an indemnified surety
has arisen by reason of actual payment made under the suretyship
agreement. Accordingly, Hemady holds that the contingent obligations
of a deceased person arising from his personal guaranty are not
extinguished by his death.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v ALMEIDA
G.R. No. 162784, 22 June 2007
525 SCRA 383
An affidavit made a certain disposition of property which is to
take effect upon the death of the affiant. This case holds that such an
affidavit is in the nature of a will and that therefore, the transmission of
the property and/or rights pertaining thereto is not in the nature of an
assignment. The mode of acquisition is succession.
However, Chief Justice Puno also insisted that whatever
property, rights and obligations which a deceased person may leave
behind, the same should go to his or her estate for eventual distribution
to the heirs, either by will or by intestacy. This statement is prone to
misinterpretation because in Article 777, the rights to succession are
transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Therefore, ownership of the inheritance is automatically and
immediately transferred to the heirs. Any proceeding to settle the estate
is in the nature of an administrative formality in order to ensure the
payment of liabilities, the proper identification of the heirs, and the
correct allocation of hereditary shares. Note that in Speed Distributing
Corporation v Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 149351, 17 March 2004 (425
SCRA691)], Justice Calleja, speaking for the Court, ruled that The
general rule under the law on succession is that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory
heirs are call upon to succeed by operation of law to the inheritance
without the need of further proceedings.
Note too, that in this case, Chief Justice Puno recognized
explicitly that not only property and rights are transmitted to the heirs
under the law; it includes the obligations that are not extinguished by the
death of the decedent. Compare this statement to the ponencia of Justice
Brion in Reyes v RTC Branch 142 Makati where he said: This interest
(referring to the co-ownership of the heirs over the undivided corporate
shares), at this point, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a
settlement proceedings; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive
shares of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the
estate of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to
what remains after payment of the decedents debts; whether there will
be residue remains to be seen.

The final outcome of this case is predictable. The Supreme

Court considered the affidavit as a will. As such, it should comply with
the formal requisites prescribed in Articles 804, 805, and 806 of the
Civil Code. With only 2 attesting witnesses and in the absence of an
attestation clause, the affidavit, most certainly, will be denied probate
and the estate of Margarita Herrera shall be distributed under the rules of
intestacy.
NAZARENO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 138842, 18 October 2000
343 SCRA 637
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality
of its own. It therefore has a right to recover property belonging to it that
were improperly disposed.
PACIO v BILLON
No. L-15088, 31 January 1961
1 SCRA 384
Properties not validly conveyed by a person during his
lifetime will form part of his estate upon his demise. Pacio holds that a
parcel of land which was not validly donated (propter nuptias) by the
husband to the wife did not leave his patrimony, and therefore formed
part of his inheritance upon his demise.
USON v DEL ROSARIO, et al.
No. L-4693, 29 January 1953
92 Phil 530
Article 777 provides that the right to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Accordingly,
Uson holds that the inheritance pertains to the heirs from the moment of
the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed
and delivered to the heirs a deed for the same before his death. This
transmission takes place by operation of law.
BONILLA v BARCENA
No. L-41715, 18 June 1976
71 SCRA 491
The transmission of the hereditary estate from the decedent to
the heirs takes place from the moment of the death of the decedent. A
prior judicial declaration of heirship is not necessary to perfect the
transmission. Bonilla holds that claims to or rights over property which
were initiated by the decedent during his lifetime by appropriate court
proceedings are not extinguished by his death. These claims or rights
over property are transmitted to his heirs upon his death.
BUTTE v MANUEL UY & SONS, INC.
No. L-15499, 18 February 1962
4 SCRA 526
The right of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil
Code is property. Thus, where a decedent dies without having exercised
a right of redemption (and provided it has not expired), the said right
shall be transmitted to his heirs upon his death. In this event, the right of
redemption is part of the inheritance. However, where the right of
redemption was acquired after the death of the decedent, the same
pertains to the heirs directly in their individual capacities, and not
derivatively from the decedent. Butte makes a clear distinction as to
when the right of redemption is part of the hereditary estate, and when it
is not. Accordingly, Butte clarifies the issue as to who may exercise the
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right of redemption.
While there is no dispute that the decision arrived at is correct,
the matter of tender of the redemption price and the fact of its judicial
consignation invite further scrutiny. Was the tender of PNB cashier's
check to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. a valid and proper tender of payment?
Was Angela Butte required under the law to make a judicial
consignation of the redemption price when Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
refused to accept the same?
It would seem that the estate of Jose V. Ramirez was
insolvent. If indeed it could be proved that the claims of the creditors far
exceed the value of the assets, then none of the heirs would receive any
part of the inheritance, as the same shall be liquidated to pay the
creditors. In this eventuality, can any of the Ramirez heirs claim the
right of redemption?
The motives of Angela Butte might also be looked into. Why
was she eager to redeem the share sold by Garnier to Manuel Uy &
Sons, Inc.? What is the immediate effect of her having redeemed the
share sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.?
DE BORJA v VDA. DE BORJA
No. L-28040, 18 August 1972
46 SCRA 577
The right to the inheritance is transferred to the heirs precisely
at the moment of the death of the decedent. From such time, the heirs
are deemed to be the owners of the same. De Borja confirms that from
the moment of death of the decedent, the heirs begin to enjoy all the
attributes of ownership, including the right to dispose (jus disponendi).
De Borja holds that the pendency of the probate proceeding is no bar to
the exercise of such proprietary rights, since ownership over the
hereditary estate has vested in the heirs from the time of the death of the
testator.
De Borja must be distinguished from the prohibition against
disposicion captatoria in Article 875 of the Civil Code. Likewise, it
must be reconciled with the provision of Article 784 which states that
the making of a will is a strictly personal act of the testator.
GO ONG v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-75884, 24 September 1987
154 SCRA 270
Go Ong adds another dimension to the transmission of the
hereditary estate from the decedent to the heirs. An heir may encumber
his share in the estate during settlement proceedings, even without prior
approval of the court. Go Ong holds that the substantive rights of the
heir cannot be impaired by the provisions of the Rules of Court. Also,
Go Ong holds that pending settlement proceeding, the half share of the
surviving spouse in the conjugal estate is freely alienable by said
surviving spouse.
LEE v REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BR. 85
G. R. No. 146006, 23 February 2004
423 SCRA 497
Lee gives another dimension to the right of an heir to dispose
properties forming part of the inheritance, pending judicial settlement
proceedings. In this case, the dispositions made by the two heirs relate to

specific properties which have not been finally adjudicated by the

intestate court. There were also claims made by 5 illegitimate children
which have not been acted upon. But more importantly, in this case the
legitimate family executed a deed of extra judicial partition, to the
exclusion of the illegitimate children, pursuant to which they divided the
estate of the decedent amongst themselves. And this deed of extra
judicial partition was executed while the intestate proceedings remain
pending in court.
The decision in Lee is consistent with the law. However,
Court omitted to state a very important reason why no heir can sell any
specific property of the estate prior to the final settlement of the estate
without court approval. The reason is that prior to the partition of the
estate among the heirs, all of the heirs are co-owners of the inheritance,
each having an ideal or pro indiviso share therein. This co-ownership
prevents any heir from alienating a specific property without court
approval, because all other co-heirs have an interest in each of the
specific property of the estate. It is only upon the partition of the estate
that each of the heirs may probably acquire absolute title to specific
properties.
One wonders if the Court could have allowed the sale in Lee,
but subject to the outcome of partition. After all, the hereditary estate is
transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that the transmission of the estate
to the heirs prior to partition is a transmission of aliquot shares, not a
transmission of specific property. Thus, where an heir disposes a
specific property for his own benefit, such disposition unjustly deprives
the other co-heirs of their undivided interest in the thing alienated.
Note too the tactical move of Jose Ortaez in seeking the
removal of the Special Administratrix Enderes, his illegitimate halfsister. By disposing the shares over which Enderes as administration, he
claimed that the appointment has become moot and academic. But the
precise reason why such administration became irrelevant was his own
unauthorized and surreptitious act of disposing the property subject of
administration without court approval. Such machination constitutes a
contemptuous act as it sought to indirectly frustrate the courts directive
to put Special Administratrix Enderes in charge of the Philinterlife
shares.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS AND
ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. v LINA
G.R. No. 141634, 5 February 2001
351 SCRA 183
In this case, Justice Panganiban correctly classified the
transaction between Buyer and Seller as a conditional sale, thereby
correcting the CAs findings that the transaction was a contract to sell.
Justice Panganiban correctly distinguished between a contract to sell
(wherein the transaction is subject to the positive suspensive condition
that the buyer will deliver the purchase price) from a conditional sale
(wherein the obligation of the seller to execute the deed of sale is
conditioned upon the procurement of the approval of the intestate court).
Thus, when the intestate court approved the sale of the property, the
condition of the sale was fulfilled and the Seller and the Buyer are
obligated to perform their respective obligations under the contract.
As to the scope of the property that must be sold, Justice
Panganiban correctly ruled that the sale can only cover the undivided
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interest of Eliodoro to the extent of his conjugal share, and his 1/10
share as an intestate heir of Remedios. Therefore, the obligation of the
Administrator is to sell to Alex A. Lina + 1/10 of the property or 3/5
thereof undivided share.

of the case. Issues of ownership are beyond the jurisdiction of the

probate court. However, the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to the disposition of any property pertaining to the estate, as well
as the distribution of the shares of the instituted heirs.

The Court reiterates the basic rule that an heir may sell his
ideal share of the inheritance. Court approval is not necessary before the
heir could sell. Judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive
right of the heir to dispose his own pro indiviso share in the co-heirship
or co-ownership.

In this case, three things are interesting as they are puzzling.

First, of the twenty-three (23) instituted heirs in the will, nine (9) were
not among the so-called heirs of Salvador who were substituted in the
reconveyance case. Of the twenty-one (21) heirs substituted for
Salvador, seven (7) were not instituted in the will. Therefore, there were
fourteen (14) instituted heirs who were also named as substitutes in the
reconveyance case. It would therefore seem that everyone knew what
was going on. Second, the reconveyance case as well as the probate
proceedings were then being heard in two different branches of the same
court. The reconveyance court must have known that probate
proceedings involving the same properties were pending before another
branch of the same court. Third, what led the Court of Appeals to order
the reconveyance of the properties to the substituted heirs? The Court of
Appeals virtually pre-empted the probate court in the task of
determining who the heirs of Celestino Salvador were. In addition, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals could result in a situation were the
properties of the deceased would be transferred to the heirs even before
the debts of the estate are paid, or before tax obligations are fully settled.

As to the sale of the entire property to the buyer, Justice

Panganiban correctly ruled that the pro-indiviso shares of the non-selling
heirs should be excluded from the sale. Hence the transaction between
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and Alex Lina cannot extend beyond Eliodoros
undivided interest in the property.
REGANON v IMPERIAL
No. L-24434, 17 January 1968
22 SCRA 80
The undivided share of an heir in the inheritance may be
levied upon and/or garnished by an unpaid creditor in order to satisfy a
judgment debt of the said heir. The fact that the hereditary estate has not
been divided among the heirs is of no consequence, particularly if
heirship is not disputed and the estate is not burdened by any debt. This
is a necessary consequence of the automatic transmission of ownership
under Article 777.
It was argued that the property comprising the hereditary
estate was in custodia legis and therefore could not be levied upon,
garnished, or be subject to execution. It must be noted that since the
guardianship proceeding terminated ipso facto upon the demise of the
ward, and that the ownership of the same transferred to the heirs from
the moment of such death, the argument was devoid of merit.
It must be borne in mind, however, that prior to the final
distribution of the hereditary estate among the heirs, an unpaid creditor
may not attach or garnish a specific property forming part of the estate.
The attachment or garnishment must refer to the hereditary share of the
debtor-heir. And in any event, the attachment or garnishment will be
effective as regards the properties which may eventually be allocated to
the debtor-heir pursuant to partition.
SALVADOR v STA. MARIA
No. L-25952, 30 June 1967
20 SCRA 603
While the rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent, Salvador holds that the right of an heir
to his distributive share thereto is not determinable until all the estate
liabilities have been paid. Until then, the right of an heir to his share is
not demandable, and is subject to the existence of a residue after the
payment of debts.

RAMIREZ v BALTAZAR
No. L-25049, 30 August 1968
24 SCRA 918
While it is true that heirs inherit from the moment of the death
of the decedent, the heirs are, pending judicial confirmation of heirship,
precluded from commencing an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased. The rule is necessary for an orderly administration
of the estate of the deceased person. Therefore, as a rule the power to
commence suit in behalf of the estate is generally given only to the
administrator. However, where the administrator fails or refuses to act,
or cannot be expected to act in a particular circumstance, then by way of
an exception to the rule, the heirs may commence the necessary action
even if in the meantime, their heirship has not been judicially confirmed.
In general, the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent. The right to commence suit is not,
however, one of those rights granted to the heirs, pending judicial
confirmation of heirship. What is the justification for denying an heir the
right to commence legal action before judicial confirmation of heirship?
The very patent conflict of interest demonstrated in this case
must be noted.
PUNO v PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 177066, 11 September 2009
599 SCRA 585
Notwithstanding Article 777, an alleged heir of a deceased stockholder
does not, upon the demise of the stockholder, automatically become a
stockholder of the corporation.

Salvador further holds that the proceeds of the sale of a

property forming part of the estate, likewise forms part of the estate.

REYES v REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI BR. 142

G.R. No. 165744, 11 August 2008
561 SCRA 593

It must be noted that the reconveyance court had jurisdiction

over the determination of ownership of the parcels of land subject matter

Further to Puno v Puno Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court

in this case clarified the relationship between the corporation, on the one
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hand, and the heirs of a deceased stockholder, on the other. While the
ruling in relation to Section 63 of the Corporation Code seems to be
correct, the dictum of the court in relation to the opening of succession
under Article 777 of the Civil Code, and the consequences thereof,
appear to be debatable. In addition, the ruling of the Supreme Court in
relation to the acquisition or vesting of title to the estate of the deceased
person in favor of the latters heirs is clearly in conflict with the statutory
definition of the term inheritance in Article 776 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the statement of the Court to the effect that the undivided
interest of the co-heirs, in relation to the shares forming part of the
estate of the deceased person, is still inchoate and subject to the
outcome of a settlement proceedings is rather disturbing as it clearly
runs against the explicit dictum of Article 777. See the ruling in
Santos v Lumbao, 519 SCRA 408, supra.
SANTOS v LUMBAO
G.R. No. 169129, 28 March 2007
519 SCRA 408
Santos explains in very specific terms the rights of the coheirs, as co-owners of the estate of a deceased person. The decision
specifically refers to a parcel of land which, upon the death of the
decedent, passed in co-ownership to her children.
The dictum in this case should be compared to the ponencia
of Justice Brion in Reyes v Regional Trial Court of Makati, infra, where
he stated: In the present case, each of Anastacias heirs holds only an
undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still
inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceedings; the
right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be
determined until all the debts of the estate of the decedent are paid.
You will note that Rita, in this case, validly sold to the Spouses Lumbao
a portion (107 square meters) of her undivided share in the property (467
square meters in the aggregate) even while the property still stood in the
name of her mother Maria from whom She (Rita) inherited the same.
This ruling contradicts Justice Brions opinion that pending the
settlement proceedings, the undivided rights of co-heirs to the
inheritance is at best inchoate; for if such rights were inchoate, Rita
would not have been able to sell a portion of her undivided share to the
Spouses Lumbao. At best, Rita would have been able to sell a mere
expectancy. The question now is: which decision is correct?
BLAS v SANTOS
No. L-14070, 29 March 1961
1 SCRA 899
Article 776 of the Civil Code defines the inheritance of a
person. Article 1347 of the same Code prohibits any contract involving
future inheritance. Blas interprets the meaning of Article 1347 in
connection with Article 776.
DIZON-RIVERA v DIZON
No. L-24561, 30 June 1970
33 SCRA 554
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render
any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition
submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give the
greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus,
where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each

compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath"
was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa,
rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to
the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties
assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial
payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to
note the provision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of
the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has
reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs."
Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot dispose of".
In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her
entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily,
the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate called
"legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080
(which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
VDA. DE VILLAFLOR v JUICO
No. L-15737, 28 February 1962
4 SCRA 550
The following decision illustrates the application of the rule
that the language of a will must be interpreted in such a way that every
expression therein must be given some effect. Therefore, an
interpretation which suppresses a provision cannot be adopted if there is
another way of construing the said dispositions.
BELLIS v BELLIS
No. L-23678, 6 June 1967
20 SCRA 358
The formal validity of a will depends upon the observance of
the law in force at the time of execution. On the other hand, the
substantive validity of the dispositions therein is governed by the laws in
force at the time of the death of the testator.
DE GUZMAN v INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO
BENITEZ
G.R. Nos. 61167-68, 20 January 1989
169 SCRA 284
De Guzman does not definitively settle the issue of
testamentary capacity insofar as it involves soundness of mind.
However, the medical record of the testator should be noted as it
influenced to a great extent the factual findings of the probate court and
the affirmance of such findings by the Court of Appeals.
LEE v TAMBAGO
A.C. No. 5281, 12 February 2008
544 SCRA 393
Lee explains the reason for the stringent formalities prescribed by law in
the making of a notarial will. It is disturbing that in this decision, the
court ruled that the non-notation of the residence certificates of the
notarial witnesses and/or the use of the testators expired residence
certificate are sufficient to invalidate a will.
SUROZA v HONRADO
Adm. Matter No. 2026-CFI, 19 December 1981
110 SCRA 388
Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or
4

dialect known to the testator. In this case, the testatrix was proved to be
illiterate. However, her alleged notarial will was written in English,
which in the opening paragraph of the will, was supposedly a language
known to her. The contradiction in the concluding paragraph of the will
clearly indicated the nullity of the purported will.
The procedural lapses of the counsel for oppositor must
likewise be noted.
Considering that the Supreme Court confirmed the nullity of
the will, did such fact entitle the intestate heirs of the testatrix to the
property devised under the void will?
REYES v VDA. DE VIDAL
No. L-2867, 21 April 1952
2 SCUD 53
Every will must be executed in a language known to the
testator. While this requirement is mandatory and, as a rule, must be
proved during probate proceedings, a failure to introduce evidence in
this respect does not necessarily justify the denial of probate. Under
certain conditions, knowledge of the language in which the will was
written may be presumed.

the test of presence. It is not essential that the testator and the witnesses
should look at the paper purporting to be the will of the testator at the
time each of them affix their signatures. It is sufficient that each of them
be physically present at the place where execution will take place and
that they be in such position with respect to each one, that by merely
casting their eyes in the proper direction, they would have been able to
see each one affix his signature on the will without any physical
obstruction.
Is it enough, therefore, that the testator and each of the
witnesses be able to see each of them sign the will without physical
obstruction - even if there is lack of understanding as to the nature of the
document being executed?
TABOADA v ROSAL
No. L-35033, 5 November 1982
118 SCRA 195

In this case, the probative value of the testimony of the

instrumental witnesses must be noted, particularly when such testimony
is sought to be controverted by the testimony of an expert witness.

Article 805 requires that the testator should sign at the end of
the will. This requirement does not apply to the subscribing witnesses,
who may sign in any other part of each page of the will. The duty of the
witnesses to subscribe is substantially complied with by any such
signature. The failure of the attestation clause to indicate the number of
pages upon which the will is written is, as a rule, a fatal defect.
However, where the notarial acknowledgement does indicate the
number of pages of the will, and the same conforms to an actual count of
the pages, the deficiency is cured. A reference to Article 809, in this
regard, is appropriate.

BALONAN v ABELLANA, ET AL.

No. L-15153, 31 August 1960
109 Phil 359

ICASIANO v ICASIANO
No. L-18979, 30 June 1964
11 SCRA 422

Article 805 of the Civil Code prescribes the manner in which

the will must be signed by the testator; i.e., "subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself, or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence and by his express direction. Balonan
confirms that this requirement is mandatory, and that a failure to comply
therewith is a fatal defect. It is not important that the person to whom
the function of writing the testator's name indicates or writes his own
name. But it is imperative that this individual should write the name of
the testator. Balonan gives two alternate ways of complying with the
statutory requirement.

Article 805 requires that each of the subscribing witnesses

should sign each and every page of the will on the left margin. This
requirement is, as a rule, mandatory and a failure to comply therewith is
a fatal defect. Icasiano holds that the failure of a witness to sign one of
the pages of the will through inadvertence or oversight (there being no
bad faith or fraudulent intent) can be cured by the presentation of a
carbon duplicate of the will which contains all the required signatures.
This ruling is based on the principle of liberal interpretation of the
statutory requirements for the formal validity of the will, provided that
the need to safeguard the genuineness and authenticity of the will is not
compromised. It is important, for the proper understanding of this case,
to differentiate a duplicate copy of a document from a duplicate-original
thereof.

GARCIA v LACUESTA
No. L-4067, 29 November 1951
90 Phil 489
Where it appears that the testator caused another person to
write his name in the will, such fact must be stated in the attestation
clause. A failure to make such a recital is a fatal defect. That the testator
affixed the sign of the cross after his name written by another person is
not sufficient indication that the testator in fact signed the will, absent a
clear showing that the sign of the cross is the customary signature of the
testator, or at the very least, one of the ways by which the testator signed
his name.
NERA v RIMANDO
No. 5971, 27 February 1911
18 Phil 450
Article 805 requires that the will must be signed by the
testator and the witnesses in the presence of one another. Nera provides

CAGRO v CAGRO
No. L-5826, 29 April 1953
92 Phil 1032
The attestation clause must be signed by the witnesses at the
bottom thereof. If the signatures of the attesting witnesses are affixed on
the left margin, or in any other place, the attestation clause would be
fatally defective, resulting in the nullity of the will. The opinion of the
majority of the Court in this case is diametrically opposed to its opinion
in the case of Abangan v Abangan. The technical difference between the
factual bases of the two cases should be examined. In any event, Cagro
is not a unanimous decision.
LOPEZ v LIBORO
No. L-1787, 27 August 1948
81 Phil 429
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Article 805 requires that every page of the will be numbered

correlatively in letters. The failure to affix the page number on the first
page is not necessarily a fatal defect. The pagination requirement admits
of a liberal interpretation, particularly if the purpose of the law has been
satisfied.
In addition, the will need not state that the language used
therein is known to the testator. Knowledge by the testator of the
language used in the will may be proved by extrinsic evidence, and,
may, under certain conditions, even be inferred by the probate court.
SAMANIEGO-CELADA v ABENA
G. R. No. 145545, 30 June 2008
556 SCRA 569
Samaniego holds that an error in the number of pages of the will as
stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the will.
AZUELA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006
487 SCRA 119
Of note is the decision of the RTC which admitted the will to
probate notwithstanding the defects thereof (no signature of witnesses at
the bottom of the attestation clause, no signature of the testator on the
left margin of the second page of the will, the failure of the attestation
clause to state the number of pages used upon which the will was
written, and the lack of acknowledgment). As to the missing signature of
the witnesses at the bottom of the attestation clause, the RTC ignore the
ruling in Cagro v Cagro (although arguably the ruling in Cagro has a
very strong dissenting opinion). As regards the missing number of pages
in the attestation clause the RTC invoked the doctrine of liberal
interpretation but conveniently ignored the conditions laid down in the
case of Rodelas. As regards the missing acknowledgement, the RTC
ignored the ruling in Carcia v Gatchalian. It can well be said that the
decision of the RTC is one for the books.
This case also highlights the fundamental difference between
a jurat and an acknowledgment, and based on the distinction, the Court
held that a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public
is void, even if it was sworn to before a notary public.
VDA. DE RAMOS v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-40804, 31 January 1978
81 SCRA 393
The law requires at least three attesting witnesses to a notarial
will. The witnesses shall be called upon, during probate, to recount the
incidents which occurred thereat. To a large extent, admission to or
denial of probate depends on the testimony of these instrumental
witnesses. However, if contrary to expectation, these witnesses, or some
of them, should testify against the formal validity of the will, the
proponent of the will may use other evidence, direct or circumstantial, to
establish compliance with the formalities prescribed by law. A will is
not necessarily void because the witnesses declared against its validity.
CRUZ v VILLASOR
No. L-32213, 26 November 1973
54 SCRA 31
Article 806 requires that the testator and the three witnesses
must acknowledge the will before a notary public. Cruz involves a

situation where one of the three witnesses to the will was the same
person who notarized the same. By reason thereof, the Supreme Court
disallowed the will for the reasons stated hereunder. While the
proponent of the will relied on American decisions which permit a
notary public to be a witness to an instrument notarized by him, the
Supreme Court rejected the application of the foregoing decisions to the
case at bar. It would seem that the strongest argument against the
proponent is the fact that the witnesses themselves are required by law to
acknowledge the document. For which reason, it is obvious that a
witness cannot simultaneously be the notary public before whom the
will shall be acknowledged. A different result may be expected if the
witnesses were not required by law to acknowledge the document.
It is equally important to note the ethical problem which may
arise if the acknowledging witness were the same person who would
notarize the document.
GUERRERO V BIHIS
G.R. No. 174144, 17 April 2007
521 SCRA 394
Guerrero defines acknowledgment and the competent
officer before whom it should be made in the execution of a notarial
will. The case further explains the reason for the requirement of Art. 806
and the function of the acknowledgment. Guerrero holds that a notarial
will acknowledged before a notary public outside of the latters
territorial jurisdiction is void. Effectively, the will is not acknowledged
as required by Art. 806.
GABUCAN v MANTA
No. L-51546, 28 January 1980
95 SCRA 752
Incompetence takes various forms. The foregoing case is
classic in a very special way as it resulted not only in a waste of time but
also of taxpayers' money. The non-attachment of DST does not
invalidate a will.
GARCIA v VASQUEZ
No. L-26884, 30 April 1970
32 SCRA 490
Article 808 of the Civil Code prescribes an additional
formality in the case of a blind testator. Garcia holds that if a testator's
vision does not permit him to read the document, even if he can see
distant object, the testator is deemed blind for the purpose of requiring
the observance of the additional formality prescribed in Article 808.
Justice Reyes opined that if the testator is blind or incapable
of reading the will (as when he is illiterate) the requirement of reading
must be complied with in order to enable the testator to object to
provisions which are not in accordance with his wishes. While the
opinion seems reasonable, Article 808 makes specific reference to a
blind person. An illiterate person with good vision was not mentioned in
the law. There is serious doubt, therefore, if the provision of Article 808
is applicable to an illiterate testator.
ALVARADO v GAVIOLA, JR.
G.R. No. 74695, 14 September 1993
226 SCRA 347
This is the second instance where the Court had occasion to
6

discuss the meaning of the term "blind testator." Alvarado confirms that
a person unable to read the draft of his will, either because of poor,
defective or blurred eyesight must be considered blind for the purpose of
compliance with the additional formalities prescribed in Article 808. In
addition, the Court confirms that inability to read by reason of illiteracy
is included within the broader concept of "blindness" for the purpose of
the same article. However, Alvarado makes a landmark exception to the
rule of strict compliance when it affirmed the probate order despite noncompliance with the double reading requirement. How this decision will
affect the courts interpretation of the other formal requirements of the
law remains to be seen.
GIL v MURCIANO
No. L-3362, 1 March 1951
88 Phil 260
Article 809 enunciates the doctrine of liberal interpretation.
Accordingly, in the absence of bad faith, forgery, fraud or undue and
improper influence and pressure, defects or imperfections in the form of
attestation clause or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid, if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with the requisites of law. Gil involves an
attestation clause which omitted to state that the testator signed the will
in the presence of the witnesses. Such fact was, however, stated by the
testator in the body of the will. There is no question as to the
genuineness of the will, as even the opponents concede that issue.
It is most unfortunate that there was a sharp division in the
court. In the original decision, six voted for its nullity and five for its
validity. In resolving the motion for reconsideration, six members of the
court voted for the validity of the will, five against it. Consequently, the
issue remained controversial and far from having been resolved. The
text below is part of the resolution of the motion for reconsideration. The
text of the original decision (which has been reversed) was omitted.
CANEDA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103554, 28 May 1993
222 SCRA 781
Caneda affirms the ruling in Gil v Murciano. However, the
results of these two cases are divergent. Gil allowed the probate of the
will, whereas Caneda disallowed the will. The factual difference
between these two cases should be noted.
ROXAS v DE JESUS, JR.
No. L-38338, 28 January 1985
134 SCRA 245
Article 810 of the Civil Code requires, among others, that a
holographic will be dated. While a complete date is generally required,
an incomplete date which sets forth only the month and the year of
execution, is not a fatal defect if it can be shown that there was no bad
faith, fraud, and undue and improper influence and pressure. Probate is
further justified if the genuineness of the handwriting of the testator is
proved, or otherwise admitted by the parties, and the only ground for
opposing probate is the technicality resulting from an incomplete date.
Roxas explains the reason for requiring a holographic will to be dated.
LABRADOR V COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-83843-44, 5 April 1990
184 SCRA 170
The required date which must be indicated in a holographic

will is substantially complied with if the date were incorporated as part

of the body of the will.
GAN v YAP
No. L-12190, 30 August 1958
104 Phil 509
Article 811 prescribes the evidence required for the probate of
a holographic will. Gan stresses that if the holographic will sought to be
probated is lost, or otherwise cannot be presented in court, the same
must be denied probate. This is so because the only guarantee of
authenticity (i.e., the handwriting of the testator) is not available for
scrutiny. It is equally important to take notice of footnote no. 8 of the
decision, which is the basis of the ruling in the subsequent case of
Rodelas v Aranza.
RODELAS v ARANZA
No. L-58509, 7 December 1982
119 SCRA 16
Rodelas traces its antecedents to Gan v Yap, particularly in
footnote no. 8 of the latter decision. In an obiter incorporated through a
footnote, the court noted in Gan that a lost holographic will might be
proved through a "photographic or photostatic copy" thereof, or perhaps
even through a "mimeographed or carbon copy". Accordingly, the court
in Rodelas reversed the order of the lower court dismissing the petition
for probate (as well as the motion for reconsideration) by reason of the
proponent's inability to produce the original copy of the alleged lost
holographic will. It must be noted that Rodelas did not categorically
rule on the admissibility to probate of a secondary evidence of the
missing holographic will. It must be noted further that the dispositive
portion of the decision ended at the point where the denial of the motion
for reconsideration was set aside. It would seem that the logical result of
such "setting aside" of the order would be the remanding of the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with the
aforesaid decision.
One final note: the court observed that with a photocopy of
the lost or missing holographic will, the handwriting of the testator can
be authenticated. This observation must be tested in the light of
established principles governing the authentication of questioned
documents, for it is sufficiently clear that an analysis of the handwriting
of the testator based on a photocopy of the lost or missing holographic
will cannot go beyond a comparison of strokes with an accepted
standard. Circumstances such as speed of writing and the pressure of the
handwriting cannot be tested based on a photocopy of the questioned
document.
What added value did Rodelas give to existing jurisprudence
on the matter?
AZAOLA v SINGSON
No. L-14003, 5 August 1960
109 Phil 102
The case involves an interpretation of the three-witness rule
required under the first paragraph of Article 811. The ruling
distinguishes between the execution of a notarial will on the one hand,
and the execution of a holographic will on the other. Based on the
difference in the formalities required, the court inferred that the first
paragraph of Article 811 is merely directory, and that to give it a
7

mandatory tenor may result in legal absurdities.

CODOY v CALUGAY
G.R. No. 123486, 12 August 1999
312 SCRA 333
Codoy is an unusual case with an unusual decision. The bone
of contention between the parties was whether or not the oppositors to
the probate of a will may yet present evidence against the admission of
the will, after they have unsuccessfully made a demurrer to evidence. In
short, the core issue is whether the oppositors should be allowed to
present controverting evidence after the demurrer was denied. As
correctly ruled by the Supreme Court, the oppositors should be
permitted to present their evidence.
However, Codoy is a controversial decision as it held that the
3-witness rule in Article 811 of the Civil Code is a mandatory
requirement in the case of contested holographic wills. Hence noncompliance therewith would be a fatal error. Azaola vs. Singson, a
decision penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that the requirement in
Article 811 is merely directory. Justice Reyes explained in detail the
reason for such conclusion. Now, with Codoy reaching a different
conclusion, there is now a divisional ruling that is diametrically opposed
with a prior en banc ruling.
But was it absolutely necessary for Codoy to disturb
Azaola? I do not think so. Codoy could have been decided purely on
the procedural issue that was raised. To support the conclusion
reached by the Court, it would have been sufficient to discuss the
deficient evidentiary basis for the admission of the holographic will
to probate. It was totally unnecessary to rule that compliance with the
3-witness requirement in Article 811 is mandatory.
RIVERA v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
No. L-75005-06, 15 February 1990
182 SCRA 322
Under Article 811 of the Civil Code, if the authenticity of the
holographic will is contested, three witnesses are required to identify the
handwriting and signature of the testator. Failing which, or if the court is
not convinced, expert testimony may be resorted to. Rivera presents a
critical twist to the provision of law. Oppositor challenged the
authenticity of the holographic will and claimed that in fact the decedent
died intestate. This would have necessitated the application of the threewitness rule, where it not for the supervening finding of the court that
the oppositor is not related to and in fact a stranger with respect to the
decedent. Consequently, and despite his opposition, the three-witness
rule is not applicable.

the provision of Article 830 indicates clearly that "cancellation" is a

mode of revocation. Can the institution of the original heir, therefore, be
construed as having been expressly revoked by the cancellation of her
name by the testatrix? If so, and considering that the subsequent
institution of the second heir is inoperative, who inherits the estate of the
deceased?
AJERO V COURT OF APPEALS
No. 106720, 15 September 1994
236 SCRA 488
Ajero upholds the proposition that Articles 813 and 814 do
not form part of the requisites for formal or extrinsic validity of a
holographic will. Thus, a failure on the part of the testator to observe the
requirements of Articles 813 and 814 does not justify the disallowance
of the will. However, the relevant provisions may be disallowed. The
court further stresses that proof of compliance with the requirements of
Articles 813 and 814 cannot ordinarily be dealt with during probate
proper, because at this stage, the court's area of inquiry should, in
general, be limited to the following issues: (1) whether the instrument
submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether
the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law; (3) whether the decedent had testamentary capacity at the time the
will was executed; and (4) whether the execution of the will and its
signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
VDA. DE PEREZ v TOLETE
G.R. No. 76714, 2 June 1994
232 SCRA 722
This case outlines the procedure for the reprobate of a will
that was executed and probated in accordance with foreign law.
DE LA CERNA v REBACA-POTOT
No. L-20234, 23 December 1964
12 SCRA 576
Article 818 of the Code prohibits the execution of joint wills,
whether they be for the reciprocal benefit of the testators, or for the
benefit of a third person. However, it must be noted that if a probate
court erroneously admitted a joint will to probate, the error thus
committed would be considered an error of law and not of jurisdiction.
Therefore, such an error must be corrected by appeal; failing which the
erroneous decision would become final.
The foregoing notwithstanding, please note that in the
following case, the joint will, while deemed operative with respect to the
husband, was considered void as to the wife. The issue of jurisdiction
should be noted in particular.

KALAW v RELOVA
No. L-40207, 28 September 1984
132 SCRA 237

GONZALES v COURT OF APPEALS

No. L-37453, 25 May 1979
90 SCRA 187

Article 814 requires the authentication of any alteration in a

holographic will. The failure to authenticate such alterations results in
the invalidity of the desired change. However, where the testator
canceled the name of the original heir, and substituted in lieu thereof
another name, without the requisite authentication, the institution of the
new heir is inoperative by reason of a failure to comply with the
requirement of Article 814. Should the nullity of the alteration result in
the effectivity of the original disposition? The court in Kalaw ruled in
the negative, stating among other things, that the intention of the
testatrix has become indeterminable. Nevertheless, an examination of

Article 805 requires the notarial will to be attested by at least

three credible witnesses. Article 820 prescribes the qualifications of a
witness, while Article 821 enumerates the disqualifications. Thus, an
issue arises as to whether or not a witness competent under Articles 820
and 821 is necessarily credible as required by Article 805. Gonzales
makes a distinction between a competent witness and a credible witness.
Furthermore, Gonzales stresses that competence may be proved or
inferred; whereas, credibility, which is a matter to be determined by the
court, is presumed unless evidence to the contrary is presented.
8

GAGO v MAMUYAC
No. 26317, 29 January 1927
49 Phil 902
A will being essentially ambulatory, it may be revoked at any
time by the testator at any time prior to his death. Article 830
enumerates the modes of revocation. Gago holds that a revocation of the
will may be implied if the testator in his lifetime had ready access to the
same, and that after his death the will cannot be found. The presumption,
while disputable, may be reinforced by testimony regarding the
circumstances of the alleged revocation of the will. And if the
presumption of revocation should apply, a duplicate copy of the said will
cannot be admitted to probate.
Please note that in Gan v Yap, the Court had the occasion to
opine that a lost holographic will might be proved through a
photographic, photostatic, mimeographed or carbon copy thereof. And
in Rodelas v Aranza, the court reversed an order of the probate court
which dismissed the proceeding based solely on the fact that the original
copy of the holographic will could not be presented for examination.
TESTATE ESTATE OF ADRIANA MALOTO v COURT OF
APPEALS
No. L-76464, 29 February 1988
158 SCRA 451
The burning of a will is one of the modes of revocation.
Under Article 830, the act of destroying the document must be done by
the testator himself, and if done by a third person, it must be executed
pursuant to the testator's express direction and in his presence. Maloto
reversed the Court of Appeals which upheld the revocation of the will
on the basis of sufficient proof of animus recovandi on the part of the
testator. While there are various requisites for the validity of a
revocation by means of an overt act (which requisites were not discussed
in Maloto), this case holds that if a third person executed the overt act of
destroying the will, the same must be upon the express direction of the
testator and in his presence. Both requisites must be duly proved,
otherwise evidence intended to establish the due execution and the
contents of the destroyed will might be admissible. If the due execution
and the contents of the destroyed will is sufficiently established, the will
may be admitted to probate as a will which had been invalidly revoked.
RODRIGUEZ v RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 175720, 11 September 2007
642 SCRA 642
Rodriguez emphasizes the need for probate of a will, as
mandated in Article 838 of the Civil Code. Without probate, the will is
ineffective and does not produce legal effect. In this case, the Supreme
Court recognized the testators right, during his lifetime, to sell the
property which he had previously adjudicated to his heirs in his will. In
this regard, the provision of Article 957 of the Civil Code is worth
considering: The legacy or devise shall be without effect: x x x (2) If
the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed
or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy
or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus
alienated. x x x. Article 957 is one of the 7 provisions of the Civil
Code and the Family Code which pertains to implied revocation of a
testamentary disposition.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM v UMENGAN
G.R. No. 168156, 6 December 2006
510 SCRA 496

Lasam emphasizes the necessity of probate. Without which, a

purported will cannot be the source of any right and could not be relied
upon to establish the right to possession.
Lasam further confirms the ambulatory nature of a will, such
that at any time prior to his death, the testator may change or revoke it.
GALLANOSA v ARCANGEL
No. L-29300, 21 June 1978
83 SCRA 676
Article 838 of the Code requires probate as a condition
precedent for the effectivity of a will. Probate is limited to a
determination of two issues: one, the testamentary capacity of the
testator; and two, the due execution of the will. Testamentary capacity
has two components: first, the soundness of mind of the testator, and
second, the requisite age. Due execution refers to compliance with the
formal requisites prescribed by law. If the proponents of the will are
able to prove testamentary capacity and due execution, the probate judge
will forthwith issue an order admitting the will to probate. Once the
probate order becomes final, the testamentary capacity of the testator
and the due execution of the will becomes incontestable. Res judicata
will apply to any attempt to reopen and or revisit the issues of
testamentary capacity and due execution.
Gallanosa illustrates the inevitable result of an attempt to
reopen probate proceedings long after the probate order has become
final. It is important to note that the present procedural laws do not
permit nor sanction the institution of an action for the "annulment" of a
will.
MANINANG v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-57848, 19 June 1982
114 SCRA 478
While as a rule the area of inquiry of a probate court is
restricted to the twin issues of testamentary capacity and due execution,
practical considerations may necessitate an inquiry into substantive
validity. This is particularly true if none of the testamentary dispositions
could be given effect and therefore, an inquiry into extrinsic validity
would be a waste of time.
Nuguid v Nuguid is squarely in point. However, while much
reliance on Nuguid was made by the oppositor in Maninang, the same
was not favored by the court since the nullity of the testamentary
dispositions in the questioned will did not appear to be indubitable. It
seems that the court sought a determination as to whether or not the
oppositor was preterited or disinherited under the terms of the
questioned will. However, one finer point of law must be considered.
While preterition involves the omission of a compulsory heir in the
direct line, the supposedly preterited heir in the foregoing case is an
adopted child. It would therefore seem that the more crucial issue is the
determination as to whether or not an adopted child should be
considered as a compulsory heir in the direct line of the testator. The
issue is significant because an adopted child may not have blood ties
with the testator, and therefore whether or not such adopted child is a
relative in the direct line is disputable.
PASTOR, JR. v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-56340, 24 June 1983
122 SCRA 885
9

Pastor is a detailed account of the jurisdiction of a probate

court, particularly in the matter of liquidating the estate of a deceased
person. The appropriate procedure must be noted in the light of the
unusual haste in which the probate judge sought to deliver a legacy to
the designated legatee. More importantly, the jurisdiction of a probate
court to determine the issue of ownership must be noted.
QUASHA ANCHETA PENA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE
v LCN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
G.R. No. 174873, 26 August 2008
563 SCRA 426
Further to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Pastor, J. v
Court of Appeals, this case explicitly permits the partial distribution of
the estate of a deceased person prior to the payment of the debts, under
specific conditions.

testamentary disposition in favor of a mistress. A distinction between

these two cases is therefore necessary.
PASCUAL v DE LA CRUZ
No. L-24819, 30 May 1969
28 SCRA 421
Undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud
are grounds to disallow a will. These twin grounds were invoked in this
case. While the Court considered only the issue of improper influence
and pressure, and summarized the rulings thereon, it is equally important
to consider the effect of alleging undue influence and pressure
simultaneously with fraud.
ORTEGA v VALMONTE
G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005
478 SCRA 247

JIMENEZ v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-75773, 17 April 1990
184 SCRA 367

Ortega discusses two issues: (i) how to prove the fact of fraud
in the making of the will; and (ii) what constitutes a sound and disposing
mind.

The probate court, as a rule, cannot pass with finality on

issues affecting ownership of property. Jimenez holds that this limitation
applies also to proceedings in intestacy where an intestate court can only
pass upon on issues of title on a provisional basis only. And despite a
ruling of the intestate court on the matter, the parties are not barred by
res judicata from instituting a separate and subsequent independent
action to thresh out the matter.

NEPOMUCENO v COURT OF APPEALS

No. L-62952, 9 October 1985
139 SCRA 206

OZAETA v CUARTERO
No. L-5597, 31 May 1956
99 Phil 1041
A will executed through undue and improper pressure of
influence may be denied probate by reason of the involuntariness of its
execution by the testator. However, an allegation of undue and improper
pressure and influence must be substantiated by competent evidence to
prove that it was indeed exerted. Mere inferences resulting from
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will do not suffice to
justify the denial of probate, particularly where the execution of the will
was attended by respectable members of the bar. In addition, even if
such undue pressure and influence were to be proved, the testator would
be deemed to have ratified the contents of the will if, having been given
ample opportunity to revoke the same, he did nothing until the time of
this death. This is because while undue pressure and influence vitiates
consent, such vitiation ceases when the undue pressure and influence
ceased. Thus, if the testator did not exercise his option to revoke or alter
the provisions of the will which are not consistent with his wishes, a
presumption arises that he has silently ratified the same.
COSO v FERNANDEZ DEZA
No. 16763, 22 December 1921
42 Phil 596
Coso discusses the nature of "undue influence" which vitiates
the will of the testator. Further to Ozaeta, Coso holds that mere
influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will. Influence must overpower
and subjugate the mind of the testator so as to destroy his free agency
and make him express the will of another, rather than his own.
However, the interesting twist of this old case is the fact that the
beneficiary accused of exercising undue influence on the testator is a
mistress of the testator. Nevertheless, the Court allowed the will,
including the disposition in favor of the mistress. In the case of
Nepomuceno v Court of Appeals, supra, the Court invalidated a

While the general rule is that the probate court's area of

inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, practical
considerations may compel the probate court to pass upon matters of
intrinsic validity. In particular, where a testamentary provision is void
on its face, a probate court, in accordance with the ruling in Nuguid v
Nuguid, pass upon such provision for the purpose of declaring its
nullity.
ROBERTS v LEONIDAS
No. L-55509, 27 April 1984
129 SCRA 33
Probate of a will is mandatory in order that the said will may
pass property. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that "it is
anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled
in an intestate proceeding." Accordingly, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the testate and intestate proceedings, and for the judge
hearing the testate case to continue hearing the consolidated cases.
In de Borja v vda de Borja, infra, the Supreme Court allowed
and in fact enforced the compromise agreement between a stepson and
his stepmother, despite the fact that the tenor of the compromise
agreement is not consistent with the tenor of the will of the testator. It is
important to distinguish the variance between the ruling in de Borja and
the ruling in Roberts. Based on the dictum of the Supreme Court in these
two cases, is it lawful for the heirs to divide the estate in accordance
with a freely negotiated compromise agreement and in the process
disregard the terms of the will? Or will such a compromise agreement
result in an "anomalous" situation deplored by the Supreme Court in
Roberts?
DOROTHEO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108581, 8 December 1999
320 SCRA 12
Dorotheo distinguishes between the extrinsic and intrinsic
validity of a will. It holds that the admission of a will to probate does not
10

necessarily mean the provisions of the will can be given effect. The
inquiry during probate of the will focuses only on formal or extrinsic
validity. Even as a probate order is issued, it is not a guaranty that the
testamentary dispositions are valid and would thus be given effect. In
sum, extrinsic validity is one thing; intrinsic validity is another.
AUSTRIA v REYES
No. L-23079, 27 February 1970
31 SCRA 754
The statement of a false cause in the institution of heirs shall
be disregarded, unless it is proved that the testator would not have made
such institution had he been properly appraised of the truth. Aside from
the fact that the false cause must be stated in the will, the opponents of
the will are likewise mandated to prove by substantial evidence that the
testator would not have made such a disposition had he known the true
state of affairs. Therefore, inferences and conjectures are not sufficient
to invalidate a provision which is challenged as one made on the basis of
a false cause.
Please note that the false cause which led the testator to make
a particular testamentary disposition is treated in the same way as a
mistake, which in contract law, vitiates consent.
REYES v BARRETTO-DATU
No. L-17818, 25 January 1967
19 SCRA 85
Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the death of the
testator, or born subsequent thereto. Among other things, Reyes holds
that omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must be
a total omission, such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line received
something from the testator under the terms of the will, such heir cannot
be considered preterited.
AZNAR v DUNCAN
No. L-24365, 30 June 1966
17 SCRA 590
The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is
further explained in this case. While the traditional concept of omission,
based on Roman Law, means that the compulsory heir was not instituted
as an heir, the same was abandoned so that if a compulsory heir were
given a legacy by the testator in the will (without instituting him or her
as an heir), the said compulsory heir can no longer claim the benefit of
Article 854.
One point deserves some consideration. Admittedly, the
testator was a citizen of the State of California. Under the present Civil
Code, "testate and intestate succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration." (Article 16,
Civil Code) In the foregoing case, the estate of the testator was
distributed in accordance with Philippine law, taking into account the
fact that Article 854 was made to apply. This point needs clarification.
NUGUID v NUGUID
No. L-23445, 23 June 1966
17 SCRA 449

As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is

limited to the testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution
of the will. However, if it should appear on the face of the will that the
sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is gained
from an inquiry into extrinsic validity, then a probe into the testamentary
disposition, and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for
practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution
of heir, the court is justified in declaring the entire will void if the only
testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the institution of the
universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the
testamentary disposition would be the same as the nullification of the
will itself.
BALANAY, JR. v MARTINEZ
No. L-39247, 27 June 1975
64 SCRA 454
Balanay stresses the jurisdiction of the probate court. Unless
the nullity of the will is patent on its face, the probate court should first
pass upon the extrinsic validity of the will before passing upon its
substantive validity. Hence, the distinction between this case and
Nuguid.
Upon the other hand, while the court correctly modified the
husband's right to waive his hereditary right with respect to the estate of
the deceased spouse, and his right to waive his half share in the conjugal
estate, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 750 and 752 of the Civil
Code, the court was silent on the validity of the husband's conformity to
the distribution of the conjugal estate in accordance with the terms of the
will of the wife. Obviously, the court assumed the validity of the
renunciation of the husband of his share in the conjugal estate. Such
waiver, however, may fall into one of two possible categories, i.e., inter
vivos or mortis causa. If it was a waiver effective inter vivos, then it
would have amounted to a donation to inter vivos to the wife. That
would have been illegal under existing laws. On the other hand, if it was
a waiver mortis causa, then the formalities of a will should have been
observed, failing which, the waiver would be void. Furthermore, the
waiver mortis causa would have required the wife to survive the
husband. In either case, the alleged waiver by the husband of his half
share in the conjugal estate resulted in a transmission of property to the
wife. And consequently, a characterization of such waiver along the
parameters mentioned above is necessary and inescapable. The
fundamental question, therefore, that demands an answer is whether or
not a husband or wife could waive his or her share in the conjugal estate
in favor of the other by an act inter vivos. We exclude, however, a
waiver resulting from a successful petition for separation of property,
and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership (or for that matter, the
absolute community of property) resulting from the issuance of a decree
of annulment or a decree of nullity.
It may be surmised that the validity of the waiver had to be
assumed, properly or improperly, otherwise the case will fall under the
provision of Article 784 which categorically states that the making of a
will is strictly a personal act, and that the exercise of testamentary
discretion cannot be delegated by a person to another. In any case,
Balanay leaves many questions unanswered. Let alone the fact that the
decision did not discuss why the husband was not preterited within the
meaning of Article 854.
CAYETANO v LEONIDAS
No. L-54919, 30 May 1984
11

129 SCRA 522

154 SCRA 294

Article 854 does not apply in the case of a foreign testator

who omits in his or her will the compulsory heirs in the direct line. In
the case of a foreign testator, the conflict rule enunciated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code applies. Therefore, regardless of whatever public policy
or good customs may be involved, the provision of Article 854 of the
Civil Code cannot is never meant to apply to a foreign testator.

Mapa resolved a dispute between two sides of a family with

respect to the interpretation of a testamentary disposition obligating the
surviving husband to deliver to the nephews and nieces (both on the side
of the deceased and on his side) the residue of the entire estate.
Claimants advance the theory that the obligation of the surviving
husband constituted either (a) an express trust, or (b) an institution
subject to a fideicommissary substitution. It will be noted that if the
testamentary disposition were to be treated as a fideicommissary
substitution, the substitution would have been void since the second
heirs are not related to the first heir within the first degree by
consanguinity, as required in Ramirez v Ramirez, infra. If the
substitution were to be declared void, the surviving husband would have
inherited the residue of the estate free and clear of any condition or
encumbrance. Consequently, upon his demise, the nephews and nieces
coming from the side of the deceased wife would be excluded from
participating in the distribution of the properties. It is worthwhile noting
that the properties in question were largely from the estate of the
deceased wife.

ACAIN v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

No. L-72706, 27 October 1987
155 SCRA 100
Acain resolved once and for all the issue as to whether or not
a surviving spouse could be preterited. This issue was not definitively
answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain resolved that an adopted child
may be preterited. This issue was not resolved in Maninang. The
foregoing notwithstanding, the Court did not explain the reason why an
adopted child (while given the same rights and obligations as a
legitimate child under the provisions of P.D. 603) could be preterited. It
must be noted that given the said provisions, the adopted child is not
entitled to the right of representation, which is available to a legitimate
child. It would seem, however, that with the provisions of the Family
Code, specifically on the status of an adopted child, the preterition of an
adopted child finds greater support.
SEANGIO v REYES
G.R. No. 140372-72, 27 November 2006
508 SCRA 177
Seangio resolves a number of legal questions. First, it
confirms that where the sole disposition of a purported will is the
disinheritance of a compulsory heir, the disinheritance is considered a
property disposition. Therefore, the document is must be considered a
will because it conveys property. Second, the failure of the testator to
institute an heir or to even mention by name any of the compulsory heir,
per se, does not constitute preterition. Third, the Court gave an
indication of what could constitute maltreatment which would give an
ascendant a ground to disinherit a descendant under Article 919.
RAMIREZ v RAMIREZ
No. L-27952, 15 February 1982
111 SCRA 704
Some commentators of the Civil Code have expressed the
opinion that a fideicommissary substitution is in fact a disguised case of
successive institutions. This is because both the first and the second
heirs inherit from the testator and not from one another. The beneficial
use and possession of the inheritance are first given to the first heir for a
lifetime at most, and thereafter transferred to the second heir. The law
requires that the first and second heirs must be "one degree apart" from
each other. This limitation became the object of two divergent views.
One view holds that the "one degree" apart rule refers to one transfer.
Ramirez settled the controversy by upholding the more restrictive view.
In an obiter, the Court opined that the constitutional
prohibition against alien ownership of land does not permit an alien to
acquire the same by testamentary succession. Would such a ruling apply
to a case where the foreign beneficiary is both a testamentary and a
compulsory heir?
VDA. DE MAPA v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-38972, 28 September 1987

If equity were to be taken into account, the decision of the

Supreme Court would seem to be correct. However, the decision fail to
argue convincingly that the testatrix indeed intended to constitute a trust.
CRISOLOGO v SINGSON
No. L-13876, 28 February 1962
4 SCRA 491
Crisologo stresses that the essence of a fideicommissary
substitution is the imposition of an obligation on the part of the first heir
to preserve and to transmit the property to the second heir upon the
former's death or upon the happening of a particular event. The
obligation to preserve and transmit must be done in an expressed
manner either by calling the substitution fideicommissary, or by
imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation to preserve and
deliver the inheritance to the second heir. In the absence of either, the
substitution would at best be considered simple or vulgar.
Two points raised in the decision should be noted. First, it
inferred that if Consolacion were instituted subject to a fideicommissary
substitution, her rights would be limited to that of a usufructuary. This is
error, because the first heir in a fideicommissary substitution acquires
title to the property, subject merely to the resolutory term of the
substitution. Second, while the court ruled that the substitution is simple,
it stated in the penultimate paragraph that the substitution shall take
place whether the death of Consolacion takes place before or after the
death of the testatrix. There seems to be something wrong with the
statement. Substitution was premised precisely upon the death of
Consolacion, and for no other cause. Therefore, if Consolacion survives
the testatrix, as in fact she did survive, then the substitution becomes
academic. To allow the substitution even if Consolacion were to survive
the testatrix would be to give effect to a fideicommissary substitution,
which the same court overturned. The resulting conclusion would be in
contradiction with the finding that no fideicommissary substitution was
intended by the testatrix.
RODRIGUEZ v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-287334, 28 March 1969
27 SCRA 546

12

A testamentary disposition prohibiting the alienation of the

hereditary estate for a period exceeding twenty years is void. However,
the Court has ruled that the nullity refers not to the prohibition to
alienate, but to the prohibition in excess of the first twenty years.
Justice Fernando made a cryptic statement in the penultimate
paragraph of the decision. He opined that the intestate heirs may never
even have the right to challenge the question provision of the will which
created the trust. Is he suggesting that the said intestate heirs (first cousin
of the testatrix) must survive the twenty year period in order to have the
personality, at that time, to challenge the trust? If so, is there a
suggestion that the successional right of the intestate heirs would ripen
only if they survive the period? This point is important for two reasons:
(a) the first cousins are relatives of the testatrix within the fifth degree,
and beyond which relationship with the testatrix is no longer recognized
by law; (b) the said first cousins, assuming they do not survive the
twenty-year period, cannot, under the present law, be represented by
their own respective descendants.
RABADILLA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725, 29 June 2000
334 SCRA 522
Rabadilla distinguished between a conditional institution and
a modal institution, It also discussed the various forms of substitution of
heirs.
Justice Purisima concluded that in case of doubt, the
institution must be deemed modal and not conditional. Following his
discussion, he noted that while a modal institution obliges, it does not
suspend the effectivity of the institution. On the other hand, a
conditional institution suspends the efficacy of the institution, although it
does not impose any obligation on the instituted heir.
One question that should probably be asked is: what happens
to the mortgage in favor of PNB and RPB upon the cancellation of the
title of the property in the names of the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla? If the
mortgage is to be honored, the heirs of Aleja Belleza will receive the
property subject to the encumbrance. On the other hand, if the mortgage
is to be cancelled, PNB and RBP will be prejudiced.
FRANCISCO v FRANCISCO-ALFONSO
G.R. No. 138774, 8 March 2001
354 SCRA 112
The legitime is a portion of the estate of the deceased person
which is reserved by law for the compulsory heirs. An attempt to
deprive a compulsory heir of the legitime by way of a simulated sale
will not be tolerated. The simulated sale will be set aside.
In this case, the simulation of sale was proved by the fact that
neither of the two buyers of the property had sufficient financial
resources to justify their acquisition of the property by way of a cash
purchase. And because the decedent had no property other than those
parcels of land which he allegedly sold to his illegitimate daughters, the
simulation of said sale resulted in the dissipation of his assets and the
deprivation of the legitimate daughter of her legitime.
The second reason proffered by the Supreme Court in
sustaining the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The Courts reasoning
was: even if the sale was not simulated, the same violated Aidas

legitime. Therefore, the sale is void. The reasoning is flawed. If the sale
was bona fide in that consideration was indeed paid, then Aida would
have no cause to complain, because her father Gregorio, in his lifetime
had every right to dispose the land for valuable consideration. Aidas
legitime will have to be determined at the time of death of Gregorio, at
which time, the land had already been validly sold.
The Courts argument seems to suggest that the simulated sale
was Gregorios way of depriving Aida of her rightful participation in the
distribution of his estate. However, there is nothing in the decision that
would seem to prove that intent. Indeed, the decision states that
Gregorio confided to Aida that the titles to the property were in the
possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. There is no
indication that he admitted to having fraudulently sold the property to
the latter. The inference is that the titles were merely entrusted to Regina
and Zenaida. Consequently, I fail to appreciate the Courts suggestion
that the transfer of the property to Regina and Zenaida was Gregorios
way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense
of his legitimate daughter.
In any event, there is merit to the nullification of the sale
based on the first theory that the sale was simulated. I do not believe that
the second reason preferred by the Court is correct, nor did it support the
conclusion.
CASTRO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 50974-75, 31 May 1989
173 SCRA 656
An illegitimate child is a compulsory heir of his or her parent.
Under the Civil Code, the successional right of an illegitimate child is
conditioned upon the fact of recognition, whether voluntary or
involuntary. The requirement of recognition has been abolished under
the Family Code. Thus, under the present law, an illegitimate child
inherits regardless of whether or not his or her parent recognized him or
her as a child. The antecedent facts of the present case occurred while
the Civil Code was still in force. Accordingly, the legal issues raised in
the case should be governed by the provision of the said Code.
However, the Supreme Court applied the more liberal provisions of the
Family Code on the basis of the provision of Article 256 of the Family
Code which allowed a retroactive application, provided no vested or
acquired rights are impaired.
TAYAG v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 95229, 9 June 1992
209 SCRA 665
On facts nearly identical with those of Castro v Court of
Appeals, supra, the Supreme Court arrived at a diametrically opposed
conclusion. It is therefore important to distinguish between these two
cases.
BARITUA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 82233, 22 March 1990
183 SCRA 565
While legitimate parents are considered as compulsory heirs
of their legitimate child, the parents are secondary compulsory heirs and
inherit only in default of legitimate children and decendants of the
deceased. Thus, the legitimate parents have no right to demand
indemnification for the death of their deceased child, and such right to
indemnification properly belongs to the latter's descendants and/or
spouse.
13

VAN DORN v ROMILLO, JR.

No. L-68470, 8 October 1985
139 SCRA 139
A foreign divorce validly obtained by a foreign national in a
foreign court against his Filipino spouse produces effects in the
Philippines. Van Dorn suggests that the divorce decree should likewise
terminate the status of the foreign party as a "compulsory heir" of the
former Filipino spouse. It must be noted, however, that the dictum of
the court in this respect is merely an obiter inasmuch as heirship was not
an issue in this case.
ROSALES v ROSALES
No. L-40789, 27 February 1987
148 SCRA 69
A daughter-in-law is not a compulsory heir of her mother-inlaw. This is because of the absence of blood relationship between the
two.
PADURA v BALDOVINO
No. L-11960, 27 December 1958
104 Phil 1065
The division of the reservable property among the reservees is
the subject matter of the following decision. The court rejected the
theory of reserva integral espoused by Spanish commentators such as
Scaevola, and categorically adopted the theory of delayed intestacy.
EDROSO v SABLAN
No. 6878, 13 September 1913
25 Phil 295
A reservor's right to the reservable property is not just
usufructuary in nature. The reservor, having inherited the reservable
property from the prepositus, acquires ownership thereof, subject to a
resolutory condition. Thus, a reservor has a registrable title to the
property, and may institute land registration proceedings in the
appropriate case.
It must be noted, however, that during the registration
proceedings, the reservees should intervene solely for the purpose of
ensuring that the reservable nature of the property is properly inscribed
in the title. Otherwise, a clean title issued pursuant to a decree of
registration, may in the proper case extinguish the reserva.
SIENES v ESPARCIA
L-12957, 24 March 1961
1 SCRA 750
The reserva creates a double resolutory condition: (1) the
death of the reservor, and (2) the survival of the reservee at the time of
the death of the reservor. While the decision refers to the first as a
resolutory condition, it would seem more likely that the same is a term.
In any event, the case confirms that either the reservor or any of the
reservees may alienate the reservable property, and the final outcome of
the sales will be determined by the timeliness or untimeliness of the
death of the seller. It is important to distinguish the sales referred to
herein from the concept of a double sale which is regulated in Article
1544 of the Civil Code.

The subject matter of the two sales referred to herein must be

clarified. It would seem fairly clear that the reservor sold the reservable
land in question, since at the time of the said sale, she was the registered
owner of the property and in fact in possession thereof. The sale
executed by the reservees may be viewed from a different perspective.
Since the reservor was still alive at the time of the said sale, it would
seem that the reservees could not have validly sold the same parcel of
land, which obviously was not theirs. If the said sale were to refer to the
parcel of land, then the sale should properly be construed as a
conditional sale - the condition being the survival of the seller-reservees
upon the death of the reservor. Upon the other hand, it is also possible to
construed this sale of the reservees as a sale of their inchoate right to
acquire the property. Hence the subject matter of the sale would not be
the reservable land, but the rights of the reservees thereto, which is
conditional.
LACERNA v VDA. DE CORCINO
L-14603, 29 April 1961
1 SCRA 1227
The reserva applies only where the property sought to be
reserved was acquired by operation of law by an ascendant from a
descendant who in turn, acquired it by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, brother or sister. Thus, where the disputed property was
acquired by a descendant from an ascendant, there is yet no reserva
because there has yet to be a second transmission of the property to
another line by operation of law.
SOLIVIO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83484, 12 February 1990
182 SCRA 119
The reservor can never be a descendant of the supposed
prepositus. Thus, where properties were inherited from a mother (origin)
by a daughter (as prepositus), which properties were later inherited by
her son, the son holds the properties subject to no reservation in favor of
any relative, since this case is not contemplated by Article 891 which
establishes the reserva troncal. In addition, the reserva applies only if the
prepositus dies without issue.
CHUA v CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V
L-29901, 31 August 1977
78 SCRA 414
The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property by the
prepositus from the origin of the reservable property was interpreted in
this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay a certain amount to a third
party for the purpose of acquiring the reservable property, if such
payment obligation was not imposed by the origin, the acquisition by the
latter is still gratuitous in nature.
FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO
No. 14856, 15 November 1919
40 Phil 480
Florentino settles a number of issues. First, with respect to the
right of representation accorded the reservee, the same may be exercised
only by such person seeking to represent if he himself is a relative within
the third degree of the prepositus. Second, Florentino rejected the theory
that if the reservable property does not fall into the hands of strangers,
then the reserva is not applicable. Thus, whether or not the reservable
property was devised or willed by the reservor to a relative of the
prepositus coming from the same line as the origin, the reservable nature
of the property is not lost. From this principle arises an inference that
14

the reservable property is not part of the estate of the reservor upon his
demise. Third, there is an affirmation that the title of the reservor to the
reservable property is not in the nature of full dominion, by reason of the
reservation provided by law. However, there is serious doubt as to the
validity of this proposition in the light of the more recent
pronouncements of the Court. That the reservor is a mere usufructuary
(as intimated in Florentino), is contradicted by later decisions
characterizing the title of the reservor to the reservable property as
absolute but possessed with a resolutory condition.
Notice, however, that the court, in the dispositive portion of
this decision, committed an error in the distribution of the reservable
property.
GONZALES v COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
L-34395, 19 May 1981
104 SCRA 481
Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature and
effects of reserva troncal. Among other things, it stresses that the
reservable property does not form part of the estate of the reservor, if
upon his or her death he or she is survived by qualified reservees. As
such, the reservor cannot will or bequeath the reservable property in his
or her will, nor can the reservor choose who or discriminate among the
reservees should get the property. The reservees inherit the reservable
property not from the reservor, but from the prepositus. Thus, Gonzales
affirms the ruling in Padura v Baldovino and follows the theory of
delayed intestacy in the matter of distributing the reservable property
among the reservees. It should be noted that the Court relied heavily on
the ruling in Florentino and quotes substantially from the text of the said
decision. However, there is a failure to note the oversight committed by
the Court when it failed to distinguish between full-blood brothers from
half-blood brothers. The opportunity to rectify an error was lost.
DE PAPA v CAMACHO
No. L-28032, 24 September 1986
144 SCRA 281
Between two groups of reservatarios: (a) uncles and aunts of
the prepositus, and (b) a niece of the prepositus, the latter is preferred to
the exclusion of the former in the distribution of the reversionary estate.
This is pursuant to the application of the ordinary rules of intestate
succession which govern the distribution of the reversionary estate.
Please note that brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces rank fourth in the
order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Upon the other hand,
the uncles and aunts (collectively referred to as collateral relatives within
the fifth civil degree) rank fifth in the order of intestate succession to a
legitimate person. Thus, following the order of preference, those who
rank fourth will exclude all those relatives who rank fifth. Again, this is
a reaffirmation of the theory of delayed intestacy first initiated in Padura.
CARILLO v DE PAZ
No. L-22601, 28 October 1966
18 SCRA 467
Carillo establishes that the rights of a reservatario to the
reservable property may be lost by extinctive prescription. Thus a
reservatario must institute action to recover the reservable property
either within ten or thirty years from the time the right to recover the
same accrued. In this case, it must be noted that the ten-year
prescriptive period applied on the premise that the possessor of the
reservable property was a possessor in good faith and with a colorable
title to the same.

SUMAYA v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. Nos. 68843-44, 2 September 1991
201 SCRA 178
The reversionary rights of the reservees may be lost to an
innocent purchaser of the reservable property. For the protection of the
said reservees, it is important that the reservable character of the
property must be properly annotated at the back of the title thereto.
However, even absent such annotation, if it can be shown that the third
party purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the reservable
character of the property, then the reversionary rights of the reservees
shall be upheld.
NIEVA AND ALCALA v ALCALA AND DEOCAMPO
No. 13386, 27 October 1920
41 Phil 915
Nieva ruled that reserva runs only in the legitimate family.
MATEO v LAGUA
No. L-26270, 30 October 1969
29 SCRA 864
Mateo outlines the procedure for the liquidation of the estate
of a deceased person, where in particular, an allegation is made that
certain dispositions inter vivos impaired the legitime of a compulsory
heir. It must be noted that collation is important only if the decedent left
compulsory heirs. Otherwise, collation would be irrelevant. Note,
further, that the procedure outlined in Mateo does not take into account
the prior liquidation of the conjugal partnership or absolute community,
in case the deceased is survived by a spouse. The procedure for
liquidating the same are found in Articles 102 and 103 of the Family
Code for the absolute community of property, and Articles 129 and 130
of the same Code for the conjugal partnership of gains.
NATCHER v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133000, 2 October 2001
366 SCRA 385
Natcher succinctly outlines the procedure for the calculation
of the legitime of compulsory heirs. Of equal interest is the assumption
of jurisdiction by a court of general jurisdiction over an issue which
relates to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. Note that the
trial court, after ruling that the deed of sale executed by Graciano in
favor of Patricia (his wife) is void; that the deed of sale cannot gain
validity by treating it as a donation to Patricia, went further to state that
the instrument may, however, be construed as a document pertaining to
the grant of advance legitime to Patricia. It is ironic that a document that
is void (either as a sale or as a donation) could be the source of a right.
On the issue of impairment of legitime, the outcome could be
predictable if Graciano left no other asset. Of Gracianos share in the
subject property (5,326.85 sq. m,), he donated 4,849.38 sq. m. (or more
than 90% thereof) to his children. He sold 80.90 sq. m. or (1.5% thereof)
to a third party, and purportedly sold to Patricia 447.60 sq. m. (or 8.4%).
Each child received by way of a donation from Graciano some 808 sq.
m. while the Graciano attempted to give Patricia 447 square meters.
Based on the numbers, it is clear that if anyone suffered an impairment
of the legitme, it would be Patricia, the surviving spouse. This therefore
raises the question as to whether or not the children were properly
advised to seek the annulment of Patricias title to 447 sq. m. parcel of
land.
15

VDA. DE TUPAS v BR XLIII RTC OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

No. L-65800, 3 October 1986
144 SCRA 622
Vda. de Tupas outlines the procedure for the determination of
the hereditary estate of a deceased person, particularly where
impairment of the legitime is an issue. The case outlines the step-bystep procedure for the determination of the legitime of the compulsory
heirs, as well as the determination of the freely disposable portion,
which in turn will determine the validity of donations inter vivos made
by the deceased.
RODRIGUEZ ET AL. v BORJA, ET AL.
No. L-21993, 21 June 1966
17 SCRA 418
Intestate succession is subsidiary or subordinate to
testamentary succession. This is because intestacy arises only in the
absence of a valid and operative will. Thus, it is inappropriate for an heir
to institute proceedings in intestacy if he knows the existence of a will,
and neither will an intestate court acquire jurisdiction over the estate of a
deceased person, while proceedings in testacy is on-going in another
court. Rodriguez, therefore, is authority to the proposition that
proceeding in testacy is preferred over proceedings in intestacy. A
contrary rule may result in an anomalous situation where a
determination of the intestate court would have to be set aside by reason
of the admission of a will to probate.
MADARCOS V DE LA MERCED
G.R. No. 39975, 30 June 1989
174 SCRA 599
The Court had an opportunity to construe the meaning of the
words "legal heirs." The restrictive meaning thereof would refer to heirs
called upon to inherit by intestacy. The more liberal interpretation
would, however, include any person called to succeed, either by virtue
of a will, or by intestacy.
The dispositive portion of this case must be carefully
understood. Both Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain were
intestate heirs or legal heirs of the original homesteaders. The Court
ruled that they were qualified redemptioners of the property sold. Why
then did the Court allow Francisca Madarcos to redeem the property, but
at the same time affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as regards the
other petitioner, Telesforo Catain?
DE LOS SANTOS v DE LA CRUZ
No. L-29192, 22 February 1971
37 SCRA 555
De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the nearer
relatives exclude the more remote ones, except if the right of
representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate succession, the nephews
and nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific instance, is
barred from exercising the right of representation.
BAGUNU v PIEDAD
G.R. No. 140975, 8 December 2000
347 SCRA 571
Under the rule of proximity, a maternal aunt (a relative within
the 3rd degree) excludes the daughter of the first cousin of the decedent
(a relative within the 5th degree), even if under the order of intestate
succession, both of them fall within sixth level of preference. Moreover,

the daughter of the first cousin is not entitled to the right of

representation in order to elevate her status to a relative of a nearer
degree because representation in the collateral line is limited to children
of brothers and sisters of the decedent.
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No 116775, 22 January 1998
284 SCRA 511
A half-blood nephew is a collateral relative within the third
degree. He excludes the children of first cousins, even if the
relationship of the decedent with the former is of the full blood. The
relative nearer in degree excludes those who are more remote,
regardless of the full or half blood relationship.
DE LA PUERTA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77867, 6 February 1990
181 SCRA 861
The right of representation does not extend to the adopted
children of the person to be represented. This is because the fictional tie
that binds the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of
the adopter. Thus, the adopter may adopt an heir for himself, but he
cannot adopt one for his relatives.
ABELLANA-BACAYO v FERRARIS-BORROMEO
No. L-19382, 31 August 1965
14 SCRA 986
As an exception to the general rule that the right of
representation is available only in the descending line, Art. 975 of the
Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but only in
intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are
concerned. When such nephews and nieces inherit by representation,
they succeed to that portion which their predeceased or incapacitated
father or mother would have otherwise been entitled to inherit. By right
of representation, these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two
degrees remote from the decedent. However, the prerequisite for the
exercise of the right of representation is that the nephews and nieces
must concur with at least one uncle or aunt. Otherwise, nephews and
nieces will inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the
decedent.
It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own
right as third degree relatives, nephews and nieces are preferred over the
uncles and aunts of the decedent (who are likewise relatives within the
third degree of the decedent). This is because of the order of intestate
succession which ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in
the order of succession, whereas other collateral relatives, including
uncles and aunts of the deceased, are ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise
of the right of representation is subject to the barrier between the
legitimate and illegitimate families under Article 992.
In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006
(480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through Justice Corona ruled that
(u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of representation
in the collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and
sisters (nephews and nieces), Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces.
16

Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug

clarified that the right of representation is generally available only in
the descending line, never in the ascending. In the collateral line, the
right is limited to children of brothers and sisters who concur with
uncles and/or aunts. No other collateral relative can benefit from the
right of representation.
MALANG v MOSON
G.R. No. 119064, 22 August 2000
338 SCRA 393
The rights to the succession of a Muslim who died during the
effectivity of the Muslim Code shall be governed by the said law. Prior
to the effectivity of the Muslim Code, the succession to the estate of a
Muslim is governed by the Civil Code.
The capacity of an heir to succeed is determined by the law
in force at the time of the conception or birth of the heir.
SAYSON v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, 23 January 1992
205 SCRA 321
The right of representation accorded to legitimate
grandchildren is reiterated in this case, although there were legal issues
raised with respect to such legitimacy. The unavailability of the right of
representation to the adopted children was likewise confirmed. The
conflicting theory of the petitioners in this case should be noted.
DEL PRADO v SANTOS
No. L-20946, 23 September 1966
18 SCRA 68
An illegitimate child succeeds his or her illegitimate father to
the exclusion of the legitimate brothers and sisters of the latter. The
legitimacy of the collateral relatives within the second degree does not
create a preference over the illegitimate status of the descendant. Note
that under the Family Code, recognition of the filiation of the
illegitimate child has been abolished.
CACHO v UDAN
No. L-19996, 30 April 1965
13 SCRA 693
The Court reaffirms the exclusion of legitimate brothers and
sisters of the decedent by the latter's illegitimate child. Note, however,
that the Court disallowed the intervention of the brothers in the probate
proceedings, since regardless of the outcome of the probate, the brothers
cannot inherit from the deceased. Implicitly, the lower court also
disqualified the said brothers from claiming any right against the
illegitimate son of the deceased by reason of Article 992, when the said
court instructed the fiscal to study the propriety of instituting escheat
proceedings.
CUARTICO v CUARTICO
No. 11190-R, 16 November 1955
52 O.G. 1489
Cuartico explains the reason for the barrier in Article 992. The
reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate succession is
obviously the intervening antagonism and incompatibility between
members of the natural family and those of the legitimate family.

No. L-22469, 23 October 1978

85 SCRA 567
Corpus illustrates an instance where a legitimate child is
excluded from the inheritance of an illegitimate relative.
LEONARDO v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-51263, 28 February 1983
120 SCRA 890
The filiation of a person may be looked into for the purpose of
determining his qualification to inherit from a deceased person. In
Leonardo, the Court found after looking into the birth certificate of the
petitioner, that he is an illegitimate child and hence barred by Article
992 to claim a share in the inheritance of his great grandmother.
DIAZ v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
No. L-66574, 17 June 1987
150 SCRA 645
This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992. As will
be noted, the legitimate collateral relative of the intestate was preferred
over the illegitimate descendants. There was no showing that between
the grandmother and her illegitimate grandchildren, there was animosity.
It must likewise be noted that the deceased grandmother did not have
any other descendants other than the illegitimate children who were
excluded from her inheritance.
DIAZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 66574, 21 February 1990
182 SCRA 427
This resolution settled the motion for reconsideration filed by
the illegitimate children on the decision immediately preceding. An
argument is raised that the word "relatives" used in Article 992 cannot
possibly refer to the grandmother of the illegitimate children, but only to
the other collateral relatives. The argument stresses the injustice
resulting from the fact that while the illegitimate children of an
illegitimate child can exercise the right of representation, the same right
is denied the illegitimate children of a legitimate child.
MANUEL v FERRER
G.R. No. 117246, 21 August 1995
247 SCRA 476
If an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting ab intestato
from the legitimate relatives of his father or mother, the latter are barred
in the same manner from inheriting from the illegitimate child.
Notice, however, that in this case Court took special note that
the beneficiary of the estate of the illegitimate child (who executed a
affidavit of self-adjudication as sole heir) is not even an heir of the
deceased illegitimate child. While the beneficiary was raised by the
deceased as his own daughter, she was not formally adopted. It would
therefore seem that the State was short-changed because in the absence
of any qualified intestate heir, the State succeeds the decedent pursuant
to Article 1011.
SUNTAY III v COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183953, 16 June 2010
621 SCRA 142
While the barrier in Art. 992 remains in force, Justice Nachura sets the

CORPUS v CORPUS
17

tone in what could lead to a reconsideration of the ruling in Diaz v

Intermediate Appellete Court, supra. Be mindful, however, that the
excerpt cited above is at best an obiter since the principal issue raised in
this case relates to the preference in the appointment of an administrator.
VERDAD v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 109972, 29 April 1996
256 SCRA 593
When a surviving spouse inherits, she acquires all the rights and
privileges of ownership pertaining to the property thus acquired. Hence,
where a surviving spouse becomes a co-owner of property through
succession to her deceased spouse, the former is entitled to the right of
redemption in the circumstances described in Article 1620 of the Civil
Code. Verdad confirms this fact when a widow was granted the right to
redeem a property in which she was a co-owner, that her brothers and
sisters-in-law sold to a third party without giving her prior written
notice.
SANTILLON v MIRANDA
No. L-19281, 30 June 1965
14 SCRA 563
Santillon resolved the dispute regarding the intestate shares of
a surviving spouse concurring with one legitimate child. In addition to
the arguments clearly stated in the text of the decision, it may be stressed
at this point that commentators who insist on a 3/4 - 1/4 sharing in favor
of the legitimate child adhere to the theory of preference. In short, there
the order of intestate succession listed the legitimate children as having
first priority in the intestate estate of the deceased parent, and the spouse
as fourth, then the law must be interpreted as having given a preference
to the legitimate child or children with respect to the hereditary estate,
after the legitime of all other compulsory heirs shall have been paid.
Obviously, Santillon rejected the theory of preference and adopted the
theory of concurrence. Accordingly, heirs who do not mutually exclude
each other shall ratably share the inheritance. Since preference is not
inferred from the order of intestate succession, then the free disposal
(after payment of legitime to the compulsory heirs) must be distributed
in a manner that would result in the least disproportion between or
among the respective shares of the concurring intestate heirs.
Two other theories in relation to the disposition of the free
disposal might be mentioned. Under the theory of equality, the free
disposal is divided equally among the concurring intestate heirs,
regardless of the order of intestate succession. Another theory advanced
by other commentators is that the free disposal must be proportionately
distributed among the concurring intestate heirs based on their
respective legitime.
PARISH PRIEST OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
VICTORIA, TARLAC v RIGOR
No. l-22036, 30 April 1979
89 SCRA 496
Capacity to succeed is determined from the moment of the
death of the testator or the decedent. To be capacitated, an heir, legatee
or devisee must be living at the time succession opens, except in case of
representation whenever appropriate. A testamentary disposition giving
a devise to the nearest male relative who would pursue an ecclesiastical
career is meant to refer to such relatives living (or at least conceived) at
the time of the testator's death. A contrary interpretation may be upheld
only if there is a clear intention to the contrary. Nevertheless, the
enforceability of such a testamentary disposition is necessarily limited to

twenty years from the time succession opens, in order that the
disposition be consistent with the rule prohibiting perpetuities.
CID v BURNAMAN
No. L-24424, 31 July 1968
24 SCRA 435
The capacity of an heir to inherit is to be determined at the
time succession opens. Cid refers to the provision of the Civil Code of
1889 which disqualifies an illegitimate child who has not been
acknowledged by his or her putative parents from inheriting. The status
of an acknowledged natural child must be established as of the death of
the deceased parent in order to entitled such illegitimate child to certain
successional rights. Without such acknowledgement as of such time, no
successional rights shall accrue to said child.
Please note, however, that the requisite acknowledgment has
been repealed by the Family Code. This case, therefore, and the
pertinent provisions of law referred to herein, shall not longer apply to
deaths occurring after the effectivity of the Family Code.
DIMAYUGA v COURT OF APPEALS
L-48433, 30 April 1984
129 SCRA 111
Article 1043 provides that no person may accept or repudiate
an inheritance unless his is certain of the death of the person from whom
he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. A compulsory heir
who is deprived of a portion of his legitime through a donation inter
vivos executed by his father, or through a partition inter vivos made by
his father, is not deemed to have repudiated the inheritance to the extent
of the shortfall of his legitime, even if in the meantime he had executed
an affidavit confirming and accepting his share of the distributed
property.
GUY v COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 163707, 15 September 2006
502 SCRA 151
Guy holds that a waiver of hereditary share, in order to be
effective, must make an explicit reference to the hereditary rights that
are being waived. A waiver must pertain to a known or established
right. Where there is a waiver of the hereditary rights of illegitimate
children, it is essential that their hereditary rights must be established
prior to the waiver. Hence, if proof of illegitimate filiation has not been
commenced, a waiver of hereditary rights would be premature.
The Court made reference to the rule on repudiation of an
inheritance. Specifically the Court cited Article 1044 which requires the
judicial approval of a repudiation of hereditary rights of a minor or an
incapacitated person. It is not altogether clear what Justice Santiago
referred to Article 1044. The fact that the mother acknowledged receipt
of P300,000.00 on behalf of her minor children and an educational plan
for their education (which is the basis of the waiver of claim) is
indicative that there was indeed an acceptance of the inheritance. It
would seem that Justice Santiago viewed the payment made to the
mother, on behalf of the minor children, was the monetary consideration
for the waiver of hereditary rights. The question, however, is whether a
waiver of hereditary rights is functionally equivalent to repudiation.
LEVISTE V COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. L-29184, 30 January 1989
160 SCRA 581
18

partition. This was construed as a sale of the parent herself.

Article 1052 in part provides that if an heir repudiates the
inheritance to the prejudice of his creditors, the latter may petition the
court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. This right
pertains to creditors, and excludes an attorney who may have a claim
against his client-heir based on a contingent fee arrangement.
DE ROMA V COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-46903, 23 July 1987
152 SCRA 205
Collation seeks to preserve the legitime of the compulsory
heirs, and at the same time, to equalize the shares of the heirs in the
hereditary estate. As a general rule, all gratuitous conveyances made
by the decedent during his lifetime are collationable. By way of an
exception, the donor may provide that a particular donation shall not
be collationable. In the exceptional case, it is necessary that the
prohibition to collate is expressed. Otherwise, no inference can be
deduced that the intention of the donor was to excuse collation.
VIZCONDE v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118449, 1 February 1998
286 SCRA 217
This is a very important case as it discussed at length the
concept of collation. Because of the complicity of the matter, I reserved
my observations by including footnotes to the more significant
statements in the body of the decision. Based on my personal
observations regarding this decision, I would say that I can only agree
with it to the extent that the Court ruled that the Paraaque property is
not collationable.
MANG-OY V COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-27422, 12 September 1986
144 SCRA 33
Article 1080 permits a person to make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos, or by will. Such partition shall be respected
provided the legitime of the compulsory heirs is not prejudiced. The
Court held that this partition is not in the nature of a donation nor of a
will. It is of a special character which does not even require the
execution of a prior will. The partition is revocable at any time during
the lifetime of the causante, and does not operate to convey ownership
of the properties involved until the death of the latter.
CHAVEZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G. R. No. L-68282, 8 November 1990
191 SCRA 211

Finally, it must be noted that in the case of a partition inter

vivos under Article 1080, the law does not specify a particular form. The
court opined that such a partition may be made orally or in writing.
ALONZO V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
No. L-72873, 28 May 1987
150 SCRA 261
Article 1088 of the Code gives to co-heirs the right to redeem,
within 30 days from written notice of the sale, the hereditary property
sold by a co-heir to a stranger. The Court has interpreted this provision
(as well as the counterpart provision in Article 1623) that the notice
must be in writing and sent by the seller to all prospective
redemptioners. The Court took exception in this case in view of the
peculiar circumstances and waived the written notice requirement.
BAUTISTA v BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 160556. 3 August 2007
529 SCRA 187

Bautista holds that an action to set aside a void extra judicial

partition is imprescriptible. However, the Courts statement that an
invalid partition transmits no right is rather disturbing. Notice that it is
the death of the decedent that transmits ownership of the hereditary
estate to the heirs not the partition that is executed between or among
them. In Go Ong v Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the sale of of
the property which pertains to the conjugal share of the wife, setting
aside only the sale insofar as the portion of the property that is subject
of settlement proceedings. In the instant case, Angelica and Alegria
already acquired ownership of their respective shares of the property
upon the demise of Teodora. Shouldnt the Court uphold the sale to
Pacita, and Pacitas sale to Pedro, at least insofar as the shares of
Angelica and Alegria are concerned?
NON v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000
325 SCRA 652
The omission of a compulsory heir in the distribution of the
partible estate, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, will not result in the
rescission of the partition. In Article 1104, the law uses the phrase
preterition of any of the compulsory heirs. Preterition as used in this
article should be distinguished from preterition under Article 854.

While Mang-oy holds that a partition inter vivos executed in

accordance with Article 1080 is revocable by a person at any time
during his or her lifetime, and that such partition will not result in a
transfer of ownership to his heirs during his lifetime, Chavez holds that
an exception may be taken if the partition has in fact been implemented
and that one (or some) of the heirs, with the consent of the person
making it, conveys or sells his or her pro-indiviso share to another coheir. Estoppel bars a selling heir from disavowing the sale and from
proceeding contrary thereto.
The Court, in passing, mentioned that the several sales among
the co-heirs did not constitute contracts involving future inheritance.
This is because each of the sales among the co-heirs was with the
expressed consent and authorization fro the parent who executed the
19