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members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or

caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his

official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in
connection with his position or work except when his
monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor
of the GSIS.
It is clear from the above provision that COA disallowances
cannot be deducted from benefits under RA 8291, as the same
are explicitly made exempt by law from such deductions.
Retirement benefits cannot be diminished by COA
disallowances in view of the clear mandate of the foregoing
Accordingly, the GSIS interpretation of Section 39 that COA
disallowances have become monetary liabilities of respondents
to the GSIS and therefore fall under the exception stated in the
law is wrong. No interpretation of the said provision is
necessary given the clear language of the statute. A meaning
that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very
language of the statute cannot be placed therein by
Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS interpretation, then it
would be unnecessary to single out COA disallowances as
among those from which benefits under RA 8291 are exempt.
In such a case, the inclusion of COA disallowances in the
enumeration of exemptions would be a mere surplusage since
the GSIS could simply consider COA disallowances as monetary
liabilities in its favor. Such a construction would empower the
GSIS to withdraw, at its option, an exemption expressly granted
by law. This could not have been the intention of the statute.
That retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be
withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government
has been settled in several cases. In this case, the Court had to
distinguish between the COA disallowances that were allowed
from those that were not. Since the disallowance only accrued
when the respondents were already retired, it gave rise to a
case of solution indebiti. Nonetheless, it may be recovered not
by deducting on the retirement pay, but on the other assets of
the respondents.
Prescriptive period
4 years from date of contingency except life and retirement
which do not prescribe.
Sec. 39
GSIS v NLRC security guards money claims
The case revolves around the decision of the NLRC holding
GSIS solidarily liable for the judgment rendered in favor of the
security guards who were considered their employees because
the contractor was declared a labor-only contractor.
GSIS argues that the enforcement of the decision is
impossible because its charter unequivocally exempts
it from execution. The Court rejected this argument
and held that GSISs charter should not be used to
evade its liabilities to its employees, even to its
indirect employees, as mandated under the Labor
RA 7699
When applicable?
Gamogamo v PNOC
The Court found baseless petitioner's contention that the
principle of tacking of creditable service was mandated by
Republic Act No. 7699. It held that the totalization of service
credits was resorted to only when the retiree did not qualify for
benefits in either or both the Social Security System (SSS) and
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). In this case,
petitioner was qualified to receive benefits granted by the
GSIS, if such right had not yet been exercised. In any case,
petitioner's fourteen years of service with the DOH may not
remain uncompensated because it may be recognized by the
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GSIS pursuant to Section 12 of the Government Service

Insurance Act of 1977, as may be determined by the GSIS.
Since petitioner may be entitled to some benefits from the
GSIS, he cannot avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 7699.
When is totalization resorted to?
A member of GSIS who does not qualify for old age and other
benefits by reason of non-fulfillment of the required period of
service may be able to qualify for such benefits by making use
of the period during which he rendered services to a private
employer and for which contributions were paid to SSS. This is
allowed under RA 7699 (approved May 1, 1994)
PD 442, as amended
Presumption of Compensability
Workmens Compensation Act - This Act works upon the
presumption of compensability which means that if the injury
or disease arose out of and in the course of employment, it is
presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the
provisions of the law. Simply put, the employee need not
present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should
prove that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the
course of employment.
Theory of Aggravation
All that the Workmens Compensation Act requires to entitle
claimants to its benefits is a showing that the nature of the
deceased's work and duties did aggravate his illness as in this
case.|||(Belmonte v. Workmen's Compensation Commission)
In the present law, for the sickness and resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the claimant must prove either of
two things:
a. Doctrine of Occupational Disease that the sickness was
the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of
the Rules on Employees Compensation
b. Theory of Increased Risk if the sickness was not so
listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by
the claimants working conditions
The diseases listed in Annex A are presumed to be workrelated but not every death resulting therefrom automatically
entitles a claimant to death benefits. Annex A requires that,
for the statutory presumption of causal relation to arise, it must
be established beforehand that the listed disease was
contracted under certain working conditions.
The following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The employees work must involve the risks described
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the employees
exposure to the described risk
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
Art. 203, Labor Code (Prohibition against demand or
charge for fee)
ART. 203. Prohibition. - No agent, attorney or other person
pursuing or in charge of the preparation or filing of any claim
for benefit under this Title shall demand or charge for his
services any fee, and any stipulation to the contrary shall be
null and void. The retention or deduction of any amount from
any benefit granted under this Title for the payment of fees for
such services is prohibited. Violation of any provision of this
Article shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred
pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for
not less than six months nor more than one year, or both, at
the discretion of the court.
; compare with SSS
Meaning of accident

Unforseen for which the injured party is not legally responsible.

ECC Board Resolution Nos. 12-03-08
Declaring the compensability of death of an employee due to
assault when the same occurred in the course of performance
of official functions notwithstanding the fact that the motive
was personal in nature.
declare the compensability of death of an employee due to
assault notwithstanding the fact the motive is personal in
nature if the same occurred in any of the following situations,
in addition to those provided under Item II of Circular No. 03709 dated 22 July 2009:
1. The employee was at his assigned/designated workplace, or
at a place where his work requires him to be;
2. The employee was executing an order from the employer
regardless of the time and place of the incident, or in the
performance of his official functions; or
3. The employee was "going to or coming from" his workplace,
subject to the existing guidelines of the same.
ECC Board Resolution Nos.14-02-15
Compensability of Injuries or death of the soldiers and
policemen when responding to a crime situation when they are
not at their assigned post
ECC Board Resolution Nos. 15-04-15
Paragraph 6.1 of Board Resolution No. 93-08-0068, dated
August 5, 1993, is hereby modified or amended to read as
"Personal Comfort Doctrine
"6.1. Acts performed by an employee
a. within the time and space limits of his employment to
minister to personal comfort such as satisfaction of his thirst,
hunger or other physical demands
b. while on the places of recreation within the employer's
premises, or
c. to protect himself from extreme temperature in a place
within the employer's premises,
shall be deemed incidental to his employment and injuries
which the employee suffered in the performance of such acts
shall be considered compensable and arising out of and in the
course of employment."
ECC Board Resolution Nos. 15-01-20
The following are the series of events which should be
considered in the grant of EC benefits:
1. The word "missing" refers to unknown fate or there is no
trace of whereabouts of a worker, employee and uniformed
personnel while he/she is in the performance of his/her duties
during calamities or fatal events.
2. The worker, employee or uniformed personnel was not seen
or heard from after the lapse of four years from the occurrence
of the incident.
3. The disappearance of the worker, employee or uniformed
personnel gives rise to presumption of death.
4. The death of the worker, employee or uniformed
personnel arises out of and in the course of
ECC Board Resolution Nos. 10-03-45
According to the case of Buena Obra vs SSS and Mesa vs. SSS,
when a claimant filed a claim for disability or death benefits
before the Systems either under the SSS Law or GSIS Law, the
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claim for same benefits under the Employees Compensation

Law should be considered as filed.
The filing of disability or death benefits under either the SSS
Law or the GSIS Law within 3 years from the time the cause of
action accrued would stop the running of the prescriptive
period under P.D. 636, as amended.
ECC Board Resolution Nos.11-04-10
In the case of ECC vs. Sanico, the Supreme Court held that:
1. "Permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of
similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality
and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute
2. "In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is
compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in
the impairment of one's earning capacity;
3. "The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims
should be reckoned from the time the employee lost his
earning capacity, i.e., terminated from employment, due to his
illness and not when the same first became manifest."
This Commission RESOLVES that the prescriptive period for
filing compensation claims should be reckoned from the time
the employee lost his earning capacity.
ECC Board Resolution Nos.12-01-02
"Bunkhouse Rule" - ". . . where the employee is required to stay
in the premises or in quarters furnished by the employer,
injuries sustained therein are in the course of employment
regardless of the time the same occurred."
declare the compensability of injuries, and its resulting
disability or death, sustained by stay-in local employees in their
quarters regardless of the time of its occurrence except when
the disability or death was occasioned by the employee's
intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another,
or notorious negligence as provided under Article 172 of P.D.
No. 626, as amended.
In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational
disease in the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation.
Hence, it is supposed to be upon the claimant or private
respondents to prove by substantial evidence that the risk of
contracting Osteosarcoma was increased by the working
conditions of the late Abraham. Substantial evidence means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The records show that
Abraham failed to present evidence to establish that the
development of his ailment was traceable to his working
conditions in the Philippine Navy, the now defunct Philippine
Constabulary and the PNP. Further, private respondents'
allegation in their petition for review with the CA that Abraham,
as a rifleman in the Philippine Navy, may have been exposed to
elements like a virus which could have contributed to his
ailment does not satisfy the requirement of substantial
evidence. The rule is that awards of compensation cannot rest
on speculations and presumptions as the claimant must prove
a positive thing. The application of the rules would mean that
absent any proof that the risk of contracting the ailment was

increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham,

private respondents would not be entitled to compensation.
Considering, however, that it is practically undisputed that
under the present state of science, the proof referred by the
law to be presented by the deceased private respondent
claimant was unavailable and impossible to comply with, the
condition must be deemed as not imposed.
Before the amendment, the law simply did not allow
compensation for the ailment of respondent. It is under this
set-up that the Raro case was decided. However, as the ECC
decision noted, the law was amended and now "the present
law on compensation allows certain diseases to be
compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of
contracting is increased by the working conditions." It,
therefore, now allows compensation subject to requirement of
proving by sufficient evidence that the risk of contracting the
ailment is increased by the working conditions.
As earlier noted, however, in the specific case of respondent,
the requirement is impossible to comply with, given the
present state of scientific knowledge. The obligation to present
such as an impossible evidence must, therefore, be deemed
void. Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation,
consistent with the social legislation's intended beneficial
Alano v ECC
The deceased was waiting for a bus to the school where she
works as a principal. However, while waiting, she was bumped
by a mini van that resulted to her death. The petitioner alleges
that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course
of her employment." The respondent Commission reiterates its
views and contends that the present provision of law on
employment injury is different from that provided in the old
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is "categorical in
that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the
workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the
employer." We rule in favor of the petitioner. It is not disputed
that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She
was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of
work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the
school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was
there because her employment required her to be there.
Lorenzo v GSIS
The wife of the deceased died due to Cardio-Respiratory Arrest
due to Terminal Leukemia. Petitioner, being the surviving
spouse, claimed for Employees Compensation death benefits
from the GSIS. It was denied on the ground that the GSIS
Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department (MEUD) found
Rosario's ailments and cause of death, Cardio-respiratory
Arrest Secondary to Terminal Leukemia, a non-occupational
diseases contemplated under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
Sickness, as defined under Article 167 (1) Chapter I, Title II,
Book IV of the Labor Code of the Philippines refers to "any
illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness
caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
It is well to stress that the principles of "presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" found in the old Workmen's
Compensation Act is expressly discarded under the present
compensation scheme. As illustrated in the said Raro case, the
new principle being applied is a system based on social
security principle; thus, the introduction of "proof of increased
risk." As further declared therein:
The present system is also administered by social
insurance agencies the Government Service
Insurance Syatem and Social Security System under
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the Employees Compensation Commission. The intent

was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay
workmen's compensation and the employee's right to
receive reparation for work-connected death or
GSIS v Capacite
The deceased was a DAR employee who died of lung
cancer. The CA justified the compensability of her
disease by saying that Elma had been exposed to
voluminous dusty records and other harmful
substances that aggravated her respiratory
While item 17, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules of
Employee's Compensation considers lung cancer to be
a compensable occupational disease, it likewise
provides that the employee should be employed as a
vinyl chloride worker or a plastic worker. In this case,
however, Elma did not work in an environment
involving the manufacture of chlorine or plastic, for
her lung cancer to be considered an occupational
disease. There was, therefore, no basis for the CA to
simply categorize her illness as an occupational
disease without first establishing the nature of Elma's
work. Both the law and the implementing rules clearly
state that the given alternative conditions must be
satisfied for a disease to be compensable.
Limitation to compensability
Section 1. Limitation No compensation shall be
allowed to the employee or his dependents when the
injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by
any of the following:
a. His intoxication persons condition in being under
the influence of liquor or prohibited drugs to the
extent that his acts, words or conduct are impaired
visibly as to prevent him from physically and mentally
engaging in the duties of his employment
b. His willful intention to injure or kill himself or
another; or
c. His notorious negligence something more than
mere or simple negligence; deliberate act to disregard
own personal safety

GSIS v Angel
With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the
death of Sgt. Angel did not result from an accident
which is compensable under Presidential Decree No.
626. It was on the contrary occasioned by an
intentional or designed act which removes the
resulting death from the coverage of the State
Insurance Fund. It is unexpected that the discussion
below by the GSIS, the ECC and the Court of Appeals,
veered away from the indispensible antecedent that
the death must be caused by accident and, instead,
focused on the requirement that the death must arise
out of or in the course of employment. Such that, the
ECC denied compensability because:
Clearly the deceased was not performing his official
duties at the time of the incident. On the contrary, he
was being investigated regarding his alleged
involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he
was found dead in his cell, an activity which is foreign
and unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus,
the protective mantle of the law cannot be extended
to him as the documents appear bereft of any showing
to justify causal connection between his death and his

Coverage formula
"arising out of" upon consideration of all
circumstances, a causal connection between the
condition under which the work is required to be
performed and resulting injury, refers to the origin or
cause of the accident
"in the course of employment" refers to time,
place and circumstances under which the accident
takes place.
24-hour-duty doctrine
The concept of workplace cannot always be literally to
a soldier on active status whom for all intents and
purposes, is on a 24 hour official duty status, subject
to military discipline and law and call of his superior
officers at all times, except when he is on vacation
leave status; this doctrine should not be sweepingly
applied to all acts and circumstances but only those
which, although not on official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character
Valeriano v ECC

The Court ruled that petitioner's injuries and

consequent disability were not work-connected and
thus not compensable. Petitioner was not able to
demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver
was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he
sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal
and social function having dinner with some friends
is clear from the records of the case. His injuries
were not acquired at his work place; nor were they
sustained while he was performing an act within the
scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of
his superior. The Court also ruled that the 24-hourduty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner's case,
because he was neither at his assigned work place nor
in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met
an accident. But the more important justification for
the Court's stance is that he was not doing an act
within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or
any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained
his injuries.

Can a claim for benefit be defeated by

the mere fact of separation from service?

GSIS v Cuanang

In the instant case, the wife of the

respondent died a year after her retirement. Clearly,
the period between her retirement and demise was
less than one year. Indeed, if a death which occurred
almost four and one half years after retirement was
held to be within the coverage of the death benefits
under PD 626, as in the Manuzon case, with more
reason should a death which occurred within one year

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after retirement be considered as covered under the

same law. A claim for benefit for such death cannot be
defeated by the mere fact of separation from service.

Further, we agree with the pronouncements

of the Court of Appeals that there was substantial
evidence to support respondent's claim. Hence, the
degree of proof required under PD 626 was satisfied,
i.e., "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Probability and not ultimate degree of certainty is the
test of proof in compensation proceedings.

In the case at bar, the requisite substantial

evidence came from the expert opinion of Dr. Arsenio
A. Estreras Jr., a Diplomate in Internal Medicine who
issued the Death Certificate.

parents as beneficiaries

Bartolome v SSS

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the

phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to
be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly
limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did.
The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore,
include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law
does not distinguish, one should not distinguish.
Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,
who are in need of support or assistance.
Prescriptive period

Art. 201: 3 years from the time the cause of

action accrued.

When did the cause of action accrue? From

the date of the occurrence of the contingency.


ECC v Sanico

Prescription not to be
became known but from
time employee lost his
(termination from job due
to illness)
Defenses against EC claims
1. Not work connected or not occupational
2. Limitations (intoxication, etc..)
No notice was given to the employer under Art. 212
the Labor Code
4. Prescription


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