The One of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle

Author(s): John M. Rist

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Sep., 1973), pp. 75-87
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
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THE ONE OF PLOT-INUS AND THE GOD OF ARISTOTLE

JOHN M. RIST

LOTiNus

criticized

for making

Aristotle

mind

self-thinking

the first principle of the universe.1 His major objection is that any
mind, if engaged in thinking, must be thinking of something, and
thus mind

be a simple

cannot

In the case

entity.

of the Aristotelian

mind Plotinus argues that not only is there the duality of subject
and object, the thinker and the thought, but that the thought itself
We recognize it as a limited plurality, that is, the
is a multiplicity.
Platonic world of Forms, the intelligible world.2 Like all else that
is plural,

a quasi-material

it has

scribed) called "intelligible matter."

All this might be of only antiquarian
of a supposedly
of Aristotle
and
a number
much

long-outworn

preceding

Early

pomorphic.
the
cized

But
of his

poets
in their

First

Plotinus'

Greek

"theology,"
Greek
philosophers,

on

and

mythologists
different
ways,

had

pre

interest, the ramifications

metaphysic.

consequent
development
of wider
interest.
features

of

(as Aristotle

component

Plotinus'

critique

own

position
present
of all, in contrast
to

One may

not

like Xenophanes,
but
score,4

this

be anthro
had
Plato

criti
and

are similarly
For
open to attack.
a
is
us
what
makes
each
of
man,
(or
primarily)
than an animal.5
Men
it is true, use their minds
rather
cannot,
on the non-contingent
can.
all the time;
But
the difference
gods

Aristotle,
Aristotle

mind

is

one

not of kind.
come
of degree,
Mind
may
perhaps
6
not
of
be
that
the
and
part
is,
outside,"
body-soul
complex,
an eternal
in some form, but that only emphasizes
have
existence
of the "human"
and
the essential
the "divine"
mind.
similarity
to be

looks

"from

And
from

in Aristotle
an examination

1
Cf. Enneads
2

all

the

5.1.9;

for

evidence

of human

5.3.

the working
of mind
a theory
and
from
psychology,

11-14;

5.6; 6.7.35-37.

5.3.12.

3For

this see in particular Ennead

frr, 11-17 (DK).

2.4.1-5.

'Xenophanes
6

N.B.

1166A17 ; 1169A2 ; 1178A2.

6De
gen. an.

736B27ff.

; 744B21ff.

Cf. Met.

1070A24.

comes
about

JOHN M. RIST

76
we

in which

the way

think.

in a perfect

applied,

The

form,

of

results

to God.

are
analysis
active
intellect,

this

Aristotle's

then
dif

ferent in each individual man,7 looks so like the Prime Mover that
the better commentators have often failed to distinguish them.
Certainly they should be distinguished, but the commentator can
hardly be blamed for failing to do so, when he is faced with the
difficulty, very real to him at least, that otherwise Aristotle would
come
that

a non-identity
to postulating
is in some sense
the Prime Mover
near

of mind

the active

than
No

one

a purified

soul

too.

Plato's

intellect.8

of
a bigger

indiscernibles?except
and better
example

And Aristotle's

problem

has

is

Plato

yet
explained
why
satisfactorily
so sharply?for
in the myth
of the Phaedrus?
example
distinguishes
souls and gods.
That
be a difference
between
there must
is clear
But how can a fall be possible
; souls may
fall, gods do not.
enough

when

(conversant with

looks so like a god?

of course,
Plotinus,
phism,

but

it does

not

live

would

the

Nous

same

put

accuse

not

on a form

an attack

effects of his critique.

Plotinus

does

the Forms

and the Good)

Aristotle

of anthropomor
is one of the

of anthropomorphism

(the divine mind)

life ; it does not do the

the same activities.

it, have

is not like the One ;

same

things

or, as

surely

Nous

But

is identified with the One in the "Mystical Union," as uNous loving?"9

Only by abandoning its intellectual activity: Nous loving is dis
tinguished
"become
is still more

from Nous
like"

the One

informative.

thinking.
in union,
The

Soul
but
soul

too

here
ceases

and
the
to be

even

our

souls may
uses

Plotinus

language
itself (6.9.11.

11-12).

When it sees the Forms, when it is "identified" with Nous, it is still

itself. When it attains to the One, it has a different kind of life, a
I do not intend
life which is inexpressible but can be experienced.
to explore the epistemological aspects of this idea. What I want to

7Cf. J. M.
Rist, "Notes on De Anima 3.5," CP 61 (1966) 8, reprinted
in Ancient Greek Philosophy
in Essays
(Albany,
1971), p. 506.
8Of course
a plurality
if Aristotle
of unmoved
always
postulated
movers
and was
(as argued by P. Merlan,
consistently
"polyth?iste"
Traditio
4 (1946) 1-30), the problem
Unmoved
of
'Aristotle's
Movers,"
seems to have an inkling of
arises more acutely,?Plotinus
indiscernibility
most
of his commentators,
5.1.9.26?but
and normally
this at Ennead
Plotinus
himself, have read him "tnonotheistically."
9For the
6.7.35.24.
NoOs vo?v is e/z<?pcw.
phrase see Ennead

THE ONE OF PLOTINUS

77

consider is that by insisting that the modes

of the One's existence

our comprehension
are beyond
and not reducible
to conceptual
of avoiding
the construction
Plotinus
opens up the possibility
in man's
first principle
image.

it may

But,

the One does have

be objected,

form,
of a

certain kinds of

are

of "intensive
like ours; after all it is capable
think
activity
But
of language,
this kind
(Karap?rjo-Ls) or higher
thinking.10
ing"
in
not
the
fact tells an
uncommonly
Enneads,
implied
throughout
we too have a
Aristotle's
God
is mind?and
unusual
Where
story.
that

a less powerful
of
one?Plotinus,
though
perhaps
agreeing
and that "thinking"
that we have a mind,
tells us something
or
insists not that the One has a better
of the One,
the nature

mind,
course
about

more effective mind,

(vorjaei ?r?pws fj Kara tyjp vov v?rjtnv).

kind

is of a different

but that its "mental" activity

In

order

to

understand

what Plotinus wants to do, and why he objects to the Aristotelian first
itself.
principle in more detail, let us look back at the Metaphysics
that we

After

some

can approach

of Plotinus'

in context.

criticisms

It has frequently been pointed out that Aristotle's concept of

God depends on his following a single line of inquiry: he wants to
account

for

the

existence

first mover

unmoved

He

of motion.

(or unchanged

first

thinks
changer)

that
and

an

he

needs

he

therefore

posits such a being. Faced with determining its characteristics, he

has little difficulty in deciding that itmust exist in actuality (1072B)
than

rather

as a mere

potentiality.

Its

activity

must

be

concerned

with what is best and it must be the best kind of activity.

This,
the major assumption, for Aristotle is thinking. And since it must
think of the most eternal and valuable thing (1074B25), itmust only
think of itself. There is no argument that thought is the most
for Aristotle's
the reason
but we know
view
; it is
activity,
us
men
from the higher animals
that separates
; it is a faculty
thought
men
if
not only as
Aristotle
which
any) possess.
only
(and gods,
valuable

sumes

that

thought

is a sine

qua non

that it is themost important activity

highest and purest form it is in contact
it is the unchanging; hence it is divine
divine, the gods (or God) must possess

10
5.4.2.17;

6.8.16.33.

of human

existence,

but

also

of human existence.
In its
with the unchanging ;hence
(Oeiov);and (perhaps), if it is
it.

JOHN M. RIST

78
far the

So

looks

argument

at least Aristotle

has his doubts.

only

on one

but

simple,

Knowledge,

seem to be of
(?iavoia)
thought
sense
in a subsidiary
(?v wap?py

and

and

direct,

perception,

something
else,
of
themselves
)

he

point

opinion
and

argues,

(1074B36-37).

Hence the problem: the thinking of God is of itself primarily; it

would thus appear to be different in kind. But Aristotle regards this
as

In

soluble.

the

the act of thinking itself which

see

to

that

this

is the object of thought.

is argued,
rather
however,
to be assuming
what
exactly

seems

Aristotle

(?wl r v dec?pyjTLKcov)it is

sciences

contemplative

It is hard

than assumed;
indeed
he needs
to prove.

We have already noticed one aspect of Plotinus' critique. Mind

must have an object and that object is itself a plurality, the world of
Forms.

may

look at the

In the De

involving

Anima

he
and

hear,

of Aristotle's

aspect

as we

saw,

Aristotle,
of externals
knowledge

position,
assumes
that

involve

of the process of knowledge

involve) knowledge
and

second

of self-consciousness.

activities

mental

see

us now

Let

the matter

(or perhaps

incidentally.

the question
of how we perceive
see
that we perceive
that we

raises
decides

that we
and

hear

through the same organs as those by which we see and hear (425B12ff).
But

the question
the quality
about

by
he not

(adversely)
is because
also

the

that

cannot

tant.lt

does

Aristotle
at once,

that the same organ

is involved,
but
an
is comparatively
(as
activity
accidental)
unimpor
disturb
the quality
of the perception
itself.
Certainly
not seem to regard
it as a matter
of doing
two things
thinks

only

for that

it to be

nizes

of great concern.
He does not raise problems
of our perceptions
insofar as they may
be affected
our awareness
we are doing.
of what
this
Perhaps
is not

could certainly
be distracting,
and Aristotle
recog
so in the Nicomachean
Ethics.
cannot
You
do philos

ophy and enjoy listening to flute-playing at the same time (1175B4).

It is curious

to Aristotle's.
one

is genuinely

himself

was

able

he

was

ordinary

life.11 The

11
Porphyry,

in two

justification

Vita Plotini

8-9;

contrary

at least, it is possible

activities

his mind

various

is exactly

position

concerned with

to concentrate

performing

Plotinus'

to Porphyry

to engage

vided
as

that

According

sense

important

to notice

necessary

at

the

of them.

both

on the real at the

but

mundane

for this attitude

cf. Ennead

same

1.4.13.

in one

time,

pro

Plotinus
same
duties

time
of

lay, for Plotinus

79

THE ONE OF PLOTINUS

man.

outer

and

inner

of awareness
question
in Ennead
1.4.9.
discussion

for- the

As

is an impressive

there

behavior,

of man,

in the notion of the double psychology

and Porphyry,

of

the
one's

Plotinus

is
that happiness
assertion
seemingly
paradoxical
or
illness
the
if a man
loses consciousness
through
his
of magic.
Such
effect
"outer"
only
things
self, as does
and unaffected.
all the while
The
His
inner self is active

with

begins

the

even

possible
effects
sleep.

scene is thus set for the question : is the good man better off if he is
aware
ness

(a?adap?fxepos) that he
no difference.
makes

handsome

whether

the case

is similar.
to

of wisdom

or not

be

says
No,
is equally

is aware

he

of the

fact.

or equally
healthy
And with wisdom
it is of the essence

the objection,
answer
Plotinus'

surely,
self-aware.

into a man

introduced

to

from

outer

self,

our

body-soul

awareness,

complex,
at the level of pure

apparently,
cannot now apprehend.
of the body,
In the next chapter Plotinus
pursues
it looks
of mind
ceeds

as though
he
which
"we,"

to explain

when the mind

that

awareness

exhibit

mental-pictures
these mental-pictures
But
when
of the mind12?and
a total

rejection

the matter

of intellectual

is reflexive and when

of our thinking.

soul, which

they

do not,

of the necessity

(eiraKrov),
and
our
is an

There

because

"we,"
further.

So far

for a self-awareness
miss.
activity

He

then

arises

pro

"in us"

the soul is peaceful enough to

(<t>apTacr?ai) of the
do not necessarily

Does Plotinus

if

that

present,
whether

or not.

is arguing
unambiguously
the body-soul
complex,

is

this

outside

something
make
the argument
sense, but since it is always
might
no difference
an
as
it makes
active
substance,
present
is aware

aware

his

Plotinus,

runs

But

were

wisdom

is good?
A man

we

workings

of

the

mind.

the activity
accompany
are not "aware"
obviously

then go further in the direction of

of a "self-awareness"

of the mind?

That is, does he want to say that it adds nothing to the power of the
mind if we say "N (Nous) is aware that it is thinking its objects"
rather than "N is thinking its objects?" The move might look
Aristotelian except that the Plotinian mind has content, the Forms.
But it is not clear whether Plotinus wishes to make it. He does
draw
as

our

reading

to

attention
when

12
Cf. 4.3.30.5.

we

the

read,

fact
or of

that

awareness

courageous

of
behavior

such

an

when

activity
we are

JOHN M.

80

RIST

the activity
itself.
It is
detract
from and enfeeble
may
courageous,
on our activity
that we cease to be
when we are really concentrating
set for the asser
it. The
aware
is
that we are doing
stage
certainly
would

self-awareness

that

tion

indeed

for Nous

be unnecessary

and

For thinking is not

would add nothing to the scope of its activities.
merely of thinking but of objects of thought. Plotinus has in effect
or less banished

more

to the

of self-awareness

the problem

lower

soul

(to the faculty of perception), though he does not formally say so.
The interest in the comparison with Aristotle is that Plotinus is
aware

fully

of

the

at the

six of his Concept of Mind

In Chapter

alia

inter

argued
Ryle
same way as we

get

that

we

to know

of perception.13

level

(London 1949) Gilbert

to know

get
other people

far

that

argues

it ceases to exist on

of mind,

we know

in the variety

least

level?at

but

self-awareness,

characteristic

from its being the major

that

of

problem

in much

ourselves

is a thesis,

this

; and

the

which,

certain modifications which we need not discuss here, is both

widely accepted and apparently useful. One of its implications is
with

that we

are able

to objectify
and that
ourselves,
from such objectification.
is inseparable

standing

from the infant who makes

the

and
an

very

little distinction

of under
grow

up

between himself

our mental
is thus marked
world,
development
by
to distinguish
to be ourselves,
in our ability
ourselves,

external

increase

both the subject and object of thought.

in Plotinus'

language,
in conscious
form

involves,
sarily
and
conscious

later

ness.

thesis

If

this

transcendence
is certainly

Plotinus

human

about

has merit,
does
of self-consciousness

the understanding
the

the process
As we

that

arguing

neces

Thus understanding
the

development
sense
of a strong

growth
it follow

and
that

is of

in un

first

of self-aware

the

of

development
account
Plotinus'

of

its nature

stultifying?
is something
to

self-consciousness

outgrow.

The comparison with Ryle brings Plotinus'

For

perspective.

less "spiritual"
become

aware

Ryle,

whose

and more
we

of what

concept

biological
are, we

theory out into clear

of development

than Plotinus

grow

as human

is obviously

would
beings,

like, we
by

nizing ourselves as like other people, but different existentially

them.

For Plotinus

18For

such

this see 5.3.3.

a process

will

certainly

lead

recog

from

to an emphasis

81

THE ONE OF PLOTINUS

on the duality of the intellect and will thus ultimately be a hindrance

to advance to union with the One. Yet it is important to notice
that Plotinus does not reject the objectifying stage in human prog
not in the sense of awareness
of what we are
Self-awareness,
our origin?and
the consequent
but in the sense of knowing
doing,
a neces
with
its concomitant
with Mind
identification
plurality?is
ress.

sary

in human

stage

with Aristotle

ultimate

man's

Just as when attacking

non

highest

disagrees

of human

intellectual
cannot

capabilities

the Gnostics,

Plotinus

decent

behavior,

ordinary

morality,

"bourgeois"

qua

Plotinus

he agrees that the de

holds that without

Plotinus

limitations)

while

of mind,

is a sine

in man

of mind

velopment

Like Aristotle

For

development.

about the primacy

progress.

life (with its

be

realized.

insists that ordinary

is a stage,

a neces

sary albeit limited stage, of the progress of man to intellectual life

(2.9.15),14 so when concerning himself with a higher life than that of
he
the mind,
is unnecessary.

to be

unable

existence

in contact

notion

seductive

with

the use

that

of the mind

aware
it is a stage, and a mere
us at the level of duality,
still
leaves
as we have
the One.
seen, it is
And,

is necessary,

Self-knowledge
of the self's

ness

the

refuses

but

an activity which may impede other activities.

In the One it is
transcended ;hence it can be transcended in us. Mind thinking is an
state

inferior
Plotinus'
to

to mind

use
frequent
the unselfconcerning
which
is to be anything
kind

any
activity,
a
which
suggests
to be pressed
have

toys

the

with
suggest

14
Cf.
16Cf.

term

33)

the

higher
reality.
kind
of "intellectual"

If

some

term

aware,

will

of suggestions
lines.
these
along
Kara
where
the
could
(5.4.2.17),

He

service.

a number

Karap?rjais
in a treatise

which

is number

per
7 of Porphyry's

list; and in the same treatise he says that the One is

to

"transparent
logically

into

intensity,

chronological

of

involves
any
at the level of the One,
of knowing,
a state
of being
total
transparency,

makes

Plotinus

out beyond
and
going
itself,
serves
of "divine
drunkenness"

nature

indicate

there

haps

loving, mind
of the notion

itself"

he proposes

1.2.3.
6.8.18.26.

(waPTrj foaKpiriKbp
virepp?rjais,1* but

?avrov).
perhaps

In 6.8.16
again

all

(chrono
that
is

JOHN M.

82

RIST

clear is that he wants to indicate that some kind of thinking different

of mind

that

from

in some

and

5.4.2.18-19)

But

different

in kind.

6.7.3.8-9

he seems

way
is no

there

the unique mode

(eTn?oXrj)to designate

in
Finally,
explanation.16
term "contact"
technical

real

on the Epicurean

to settle

(olop crvpcuaOrjaei,

self-perceptive

and that it is not only different but

is still available,

of knowing

that the One

that we

the experience
and 3.8.9.20
of itself, and at 6.8.11.23
But
these passages
of the One.
have
hardly
help us
has

can

see what

to

precisely is involved, and though the notion of "contact" would

certainly reflect Plotinus' view that the language of touch is often
more

than

appropriate

the

to describe

of vision

language

the

rela

tionship between the elevated soul and the One, the purely material
variety of contact advocated by Epicurus in his use of epibole cannot
help

us

a much

to attain

closer

of precision.

degree

So let us now turn for help to some further implications of

For
Plotinus' break with the tradition originating with Aristotle.
in
we
the
as
mind
both
is the highest reality,
have seen,
Aristotle,
cosmos

and

in man.
seems

Aristotle

Hence

It

is specifically

to believe,

though

the most

to be

said
we

cannot

not

valuable.

argue

it here,

that it is in virtue of their possession of intelligence that men possess

whatever

intrinsic

value

they

have.

For

the

Plotinus

case must

be

different; for Plotinus it is in virtue of the ultimate derivation from

the One that everything has value. This is exhibited in the notion
that

the mere

ness,

and hence

existence
value,17

indicates
of a subject
as well as something

that

it possesses

good
of the "contemplative"

faculty which is not identified with intellect and hence can be shared
by things both living and non-living, even those which do not possess
intellect

The

(3.8.1.1).

way

is clear

for a recognition

of the value,

derived from the fact that all is the product of the One, of everything
is precisely the point that Plotinus wishes to argue
that exists?this
strongly against the Gnostics and other denigrators of the physical
For Plato such a position could only be adopted with
universe.
for even

less enthusiasm,

in the Timaeus,

where

Plato

is at his

least

dualistic, the fact that "matter" exists independently of the Demiurge,

and

of the Forms

which

16Cf. J. M.
Rist,

17

5.5.9.36;

cf.

are his models,

Plotinus

1.8.6.27.

(Cambridge,

militates

against

1967) 42-52.

the

good

83

THE ONE OF PLOTINUS

ness

to overcome
is enabled
Plotinus
objects.
in his own unplatonic
the Timaeus
way
reading

this

of material
by

jection

ob

as teach

ing the derivation of matter from the One.

Plotinus finds in the world other traces of the One than intellect.
not

is, of course,

He

to say

prepared

that

for

is F, G, H,18

the One

he fears that to say "x is F" is to say that x is to be identified with

or to exclude

F,

etc.

G, H,

is a "logical"

Predication

is (perfectly)

be used primarily to describe the Forms whose Beauty

F-ness

where

beautiful,

is F.

But

although

to say that the One is intellect or intellectual,

some

associate

Here

sively.
For Aristotle,
causes designed

of

kind
is the

"mental"

as mind.

time,

But

does
but

not,

For

most

obvious

of course,

in its eternity.
can

exist.

believe

they
is that

Now

at

or

of maker
creation

and

go

useful,
last we

be

from

the metaphysics
"classical"
thinkers

are

of pattern
imposition
are
Plotinus'
arguments

should

"creator."
cosmos

of the

in endless

in

succession.

the One

material
the
is no pre-existent
substrate,
Timaeus
is
rather
the
Or
re-interpreted.
It
Plotinus
separates
over-emphasized.

of Plato

the

to the

to.

add up

in the
come

Worlds

There

notwithstanding.
cannot
doctrine

now

Plotinus,

they are held in existence by the One, and without

nothing
Timaeus
This

and

see what

and

of these

first

Plotinus

exclu
though
of Aristotelianism.

if not more

of description
be useful,
may
of a first principle.
into the nature

The

not

it can be argued that other faculties and

is dethroned,

some

to

he still wishes

the Plato of the Laws and the

identified

other modes
enquirer
consider

wish

rejection
import
as the last in a series of
is reached
"God"
although
in this
to explain
of movement?and
the phenomena

is immediately

that mind

it,

the

is following and developing

Aristotle
Phaedrus?he

with

power
of

real

not

does

Plotinus

to

technique

and

concerned
or form
concerned

for whereas
these
Aristotle,
a metaphysic
with
of
of order,
or chaotic,
on the indeterminate
with

existence.

In

the

history

of philosophical "proofs" of the existence of God this puts Plotinus

Like Aristotle, he is not
midway between Aristotle and Aquinas.
in
time ; like Aquinas he is concerned with
concerned with creation
a cause

That

of existence,

not

only

with

is not to say that Plotinus

18

Cf.

5.3.13.1.

a cause

of movement

or change.

is not concerned with a first cause of

JOHN M,

84

RIST

motion.
Like Aristotle, he is concerned with that, but not only
with that. The role of the One is both to support existence rather
than
rational

to

and

non-existence,
movements

and
organize
(indirectly)
exists
insofar as they are

of what

since the One is the cause of existence,

Clearly

the

arrange
rational.

it is not limited

to "moving"
sense as a final cause.
the world
only in the Aristotelian
Its activity
must
and must
flow directly
be direct,
outwards.
There
as
an
as
as an
must
Plotinus
the
well
from
be,
puts
activity
One,
it,

activity of the One (5.4.2.27). The One must be "outgoing" as well

as "inward looking." This is part of what he calls the power of the
and

One,

and holds

it

is this

which

power

it in being.

of the Aristotelian

energy

generates

perpetually

would

Plotinus

as an

mind

criticize

inadequate

the

cosmos

the self-directed
conception

of the

notion of power ; certainly it implies that such power is limited, and

the limitation is imposed because of the artificial and schematic
notion that, since God is mind, its thought must be directed exclu
sively to the highest possible object, that is, itself. For from
Aristotle's point of view anything else would imply the identity of
the mind with what is inferior to itself. Such is the price of empha
sizing

so conceived,

that mind,

is at the

A further concern of Plotinus'

top

of the

cosmic

hierarchy.

is to emphasize the inevitability

as against
of
the One,
the contingent
existence
not
other things.
is
is why he argues
that
the
One
That
constantly
we say
"as it happened
to be" but "as it willed
to be."19 When
we do not mean
the One
that anything
compelled
"inevitability,"
of

the

of

existence

be out of the question)

(that would
at
random.20
Since
therefore
i.e.,
by

or

in any

way

itself"21?perhaps

subject
the first,

or that
the One

the One

arises

is caused

but

to anything
it has to be "cause
of
else,
and certainly
the first clear use of this

kind of language in the history of metaphysics.

needs

to be fleshed

a cause?
answer

How

out.

does

this

to this question

uncaused,
not caused

In what
strange
is striking,

sense
kind
and

But such a phrase

is this noncontingent
of causation
occur?
again

"unclassical."

"being"
Plotinus'
He

has

to take over the language (and the spirit) not of philosophy but of
theology. Christian writers (and presumably others) were already
19
Eg.,

20

21

6.8.13;

6.8.13-14.
6.8.20-21.

6.8.21,

passim.

85

THE ONE OF PLOTINUS

talking about God's will.22 And indeed if it is not intellect, and not
chance or (evprjuel)matter which brings the One into being, there is
other

little

Hence

choice.

6.8 we

in Ennead

constantly

hear

of the

One being what it willed to be, not what it happened to be.

A question arises. Does this kind of emphasis, particularly
late Ennead 6.8 (chronologically 39)
strong in the comparatively
indicate an attempt by Plotinus to distinguish (or to point towards a
distinction to be made by others) between a faculty of knowing and
a faculty of willing? Normally
such a distinction
is unknown
whom
for
entails
among the Platonists,
knowing good
(as for the
an attempt

in the Timaeus)
Demiurge
of Aristotle's
abandonment

to do good.
of mind

worship

Or has Plotinus'
a new

up

opened

line

of enquiry?
to be no

seems

There

reason

to suppose,

and

indeed

good

reason

to deny, that Plotinus separated knowing from willing.

But what
on
the willing of the One is emphasizing
he is doing by his emphasis
once

the

again

nature

indivisible

of the One's

By

activity.

empha

sizing willing, Plotinus is showing how the One is not merely cogni
For the One to will is to
tive like Aristotle's God, but productive.
and by emphasizing
achieve,
us of the Humean
dictum
to act.

strange
strange
should

The

"Platonic"

us

further

how

"desire"

it can be

it does.

The

to the Greeks

to understanding

assistance

of the Plotinian

last "characteristic"
is its Eros.

sense

of willing
Plotinus
reminds
a man
cannot
itself
drive
by

to forget

give

mention
know

reason

and
does, but this is confusing
knowledge
we
are
with
knowl
when
easy
dealing
"platonic"
And
although,
by his use of the
thought.23
"platonic"
as we
have
the
term
seen, Plotinus
emphasizes
epibole,
on willing
his emphasis
of the One's
mode
"knowledge,"
True,

it is very
or
edge

the notion
that

I leave

for it is hard

untranslated,
It should mean

desires

implies

itself
lack,

"desire,"

(6.8.15).

a need,

nature.

One which deserves

the word

translated.

One

the One's

an

Yet

and

to
in a

normally

incompleteness;24

22
2.9.1 and the followers
of Pantaenus
Eg., Origen, De Principiis
et Gregorii?Clem.
fr. 7,
Alex.
diff. locis Dionysii
(Max. Conf., De Variis
p. 224, llff.)
23
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. 2, part 3.
24Yor Plotinus'
normal view of the Eros of the soul, see especially
Il
is the need to reconcile
the Sym
3.5.4.24-26.
The basis of his treatment
posium's account of Eros with that of the Phaedrus.

JOHN M.

86
of the One

the Eros

and
seems

to want

to develop

the

we

Here

for at

Plotinus
:first

reasons

two

least

of all that exists, and yet he has to

devoid

contrast mind

of metaphor
saw, Plotinus

language
as we

(pods ?p p) with mind

loving

The

(6.7.35).

marks

him

find

and, at least in the

of duality.
Hence,

unselfconscious
nation,

which

characteristics.

its appearance
in the
elsewhere
a
use
to
he
is
inclined
following
path
more
the One with
and then strip off
compare
something
generally:
of the image.
Eros
the more undesirable
features
is utterly
Secondly
purge

universe.

"need"

of these

concept

is a mark

of all because Eros

it of the

none

has

RIST

of the

attractiveness

and

imagi
is able to

(povs powp)

thinking
is that

i?ros-language

it suggests

a state inwhich the activity of the subject is in no way at all hindered

by

self-consciousness.

is explicitly
else when
are more
conclude
expresses)

and

less

and

full-blooded

irreducible

Plotinus

has

vinity?

Are

of

many

large?

safely
than

and

of
supporter
It is a much

analysis
than Aristotle

had proposed.

it mean

Could

that

di
anthropomorphic
men
the
of
merely
qualities
qualities
as more
to
than the intellect
raised
alone)
primitively

these

pace Aristotle,
(viewed,
As Homer's
the highest
power?
and everlasting,
stronger,
bigger,

writ

cause

at the end?

a more

to

reverted

(rather

who

of the One.

cause

But where does it leave Plotinus

may

indicates

best

non-contingent
to conceptual

of a first

concept

those

although
we
disagree,

might

fecundity

power,

will,
cause

and

j&ros-language

And

intercourse?

.EVos-language

creativity

all

into

put it, who can think of anything

intense

prosaic
for Plotinus,

Creativity,
first
existence,
more

in sexual

engaged

that,
the

is built

idea

The

As Aristotle

sexual.

Zeus

man

is a Homeric

is Plotinus'

God

writ

the

Should we still describe the Plotinian

larger,

philosopher

God as anthro

sum

of his
is clear:
the
characteristics
thing
an
to Plotinus
of
the
Absolute
ascription
impersonal
certainly
is conceptually
For
irre
the One
to accept.
although
impossible
a "personal"
or
seem
we
it
to
have
of
have
the
"traces"
ducible,
One

pomorphic?

makes

But

"human" flavor.
not

impersonal,

and

between

arbitrate
is in any

not

ample,

and
sense

fundamental

In at least one
are

others

them

important

anthropomorphic.
or of causation.

friends would say that his God is

if Plotinus'
that
how

it is anthropomorphic,
far can we say that

a new
respect
Consider

the

In men

Eros

marks

his

descriptions
concept
desire

can we

conception

in Greek

phenomenon
Plotinus'

how

thought?
of the One
ex

of Eros,

for

and need

; in the

THE ONE OF PLOTINUS

One

not.

it does

fundamental
to creation

In other

and

causation
of human

the

level

Eros

of

the most

the One

in regard
the One's
look
actions,
they may
though
a
be
and
similar
beings
expressed
through

are quite different.

in existence
rather

vocabulary,
hold beings

at

words
of human

characteristic

like the actions

87

For
than

is lacking.

to be

the

cause

to reconstruct

And

to
of existence,
from inde

them

It is impossible
pendent material, is uniquely the power of the One.
in both these instances to argue that the One ismodelled on human
; rather

beings

nature

human

itself and different

provides

a pointer

to something

in kind from itself, namely,

outside

the One. We may

it as a mere
argue that no such being exists ;we cannot dismiss
copy
of human nature.
Here
the comparison
with Aristotle
is again useful
;

for Aristotle we live briefly the kind of intellectual life that God
enjoys all the time (Met. 1072B 25). For Plotinus the One's most
fundamental

activity

is something

which

we

cannot

not make

clear.

The

total

problem

may

be

for our

achieve

selves, though whether we can share in it mystically

summed

Plotinus

does

as follows

up

are we to say that we are like the One, or that the One is like us
The
(in which case we have to say that it is "anthropomorphic")?
answer

formal

is clear

to any

reader

of Plotinus

: he

says

and

again

again that we can attain likeness to the One and be like it ; he never
says that the One can be or is like us.25 And what I have tried to
suggest in this paper is that the formal answer is borne out at least
to some
which

by analysis.
degree
are not merely
human

There
powers

are unique
and human

remind us of these
features
but
powers
In this sense Plotinus
has transcended
the higher
of Plato
and Aristotle.26

human

features

of the One

activities

writ

cannot

equal

large ;
them.

anthropomorphism

University

of Toronto

25It
for Plotinus
that the relationship
of like
is, of course, axiomatic
is asymmetrical.
261 should like to thank Professor A. H. Armstrong,
Dr. H. Blumen
on earlier versions of this paper.
thal, for their helpful comments

ness