Case Analysis

Response to the U.S. Embassy

Bombing in Nairobi, Kenya on
August 7, 1998
Roberta McMichael
October 25, 2007
 On the morning of August 7, 1998, a truck carrying two passengers pulled up to

the exit of the underground garage of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Two unarmed

local security guards were manning the gate, located at the rear entrance of the U.S.

embassy. A white truck carrying two occupants pulled up to the exit of the underground

garage. One of the occupants demanded entry, and the security guards refused. One

occupant began shooting at the security guards, while the other tossed a homemade flash

grenade in their direction. The security guards ran for cover, and attempted to contact the

Marine Security Guards (MSGs) by both hand-held radio and telephone. The only radio

frequency available to them already had traffic on it, and the phone line was busy.

Employees in the embassy and surrounding buildings were drawn to the sound of gunfire

and the subsequent grenade explosion. They crowded to windows to see what was

happening below.

At approximately 10:45 a.m., the truck bomb was detonated. The Ufundi

Cooperative, a 5-story building directly behind the embassy, collapsed completely onto

itself and into the rear of the U.S. embassy, trapping many beneath the debris. The

embassy itself was destroyed internally, especially on the rear side facing the Ufundi

building and parking lot. The remainder of the casualties and injuries were incurred by

pedestrians on the busy streets adjacent to the embassy. In total, 213 people were killed,

including 12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) employed at the

embassy. 4,000 people were injured. Another truck bomb was detonated in Dar es

Salaam, Tanzania nearly simultaneously, resulting in another 11 deaths and injuring 86

others.
 The response to this terrorist attack was unprepared and disorganized. The

location of the embassy and the condition of its security made it a prime target for

terrorists. The lack of disaster planning or emergency management training at the local

level caused a scene which was unnecessarily chaotic. Logistics and transportation

problems plagued response teams from the United States and military response from

Europe. This paper attempts to understand the source of the problems leading up to,

during, and after the terrorist attack.

Problem Analysis

Most of the mistakes made in emergency response come from the fact that man-

made disasters, such as terrorist attacks, come as a surprise. We can see the path a

hurricane takes, and can recommend evacuations and make some preparations for

landfall. A terrorist attack is more like an earthquake. From terrorist threats and activity

you may know you are sitting on a fault line, but have no idea if and when the earthquake

will hit. Still, preparation and planning make all the difference.

Security

Security guards at the embassy were unarmed and untrained. Their employer was

United International Investigative Services (UIIS), a private firm contracted to

supplement the Marine Security Guards at the embassy. UIIS had fallen behind on their

contractual obligations to provide security training of certain quality and frequency. The

guards had no training in detection of vehicular bombs (Champagne et al). There were

no procedures in place about what would cause the guards to trigger an alarm if a

suspicious vehicle attempted to enter the parking lot. The guards did not train with the
Marines, nor did they participate in embassy emergency drills (Accountability Review

Board).

The two security guards correctly denied entry to the underground parking lot, an

act that saved the lives of many of those inside the embassy. When threatened with

gunfire, the two security guards ran for cover and attempted to alert the MSG about the

situation. But they had no panic or duress alarms they could trigger, unlike their

counterparts that guarded the embassy residences (Accountability Review Board). They

tried to contact their Marine counterparts by radio and telephone. The only frequency

that was available to the guards had other traffic on it. Though the embassy had requested

another radio frequency from the Kenyan government, their requests had been repeatedly

denied. The phone lines were busy. Despite their efforts, the security guards were unable

to warn others before the truck bomb was detonated.

Even if they had been able to sound an alarm, the Emergency Action Plan (EAP),

sanctioned by the State Department, had no procedures in place for gunfire or vehicular

bombs. The employees were not trained to lie down or take cover when they heard the

gunshots or grenade blasts (Accountability Review Board). Instead, human curiosity

made them crowd to the windows. The EAP had no practice scenario for a large-scale

event of any kind, especially one that would require emergency response or search and

rescue (Champagne et al).

In the case of the U.S. embassy bombing in Kenya serious flaws in location and

security had already been pointed out by Ambassador Prudence Bushnell. In 1985, after

the Marine barracks attack in Lebanon, the U.S. State Department created a commission

to investigate the security of U.S. embassies and other diplomatic buildings around the
world. Their recommendations were coined the Inman standards after commission chair

Admiral Bobby R. Inman. These standards included replacing or renovating 126 of the

262 United States’ embassies abroad, along with 210 structures owned by other agencies.

(McCutcheon). The commission proposed a minimum 100 foot setback from public

streets specifically to minimize collateral damage from a bomb blast, and mitigate the

threat of a car bomb parked next to the government building (Champagne et al).

In a cable communication in December 1997, Ambassador Bushnell reviewed the

recent threats made against the chancery1. She called attention to the lack of sufficient

setback – the embassy sat only 30 feet from the street (Risen) -- and requested funds for a

new chancery that met the Inman standards. The State Department responded that the

embassy met security standards for its medium-threat location in Nairobi. When

USCENTCOM commander General Zinni visited the embassy in early 1998, he noted the

lack of security, calling it “an easy and tempting target for terrorists,” and made an offer

to the State Department to send his own team to assess the security of the embassy and

make recommendations (Champagne et al). The State Department declined the offer, but

sent a security assessment team the following March to evaluate any need for upgrades to

the existing structure. The security team did approve several security upgrades, but they

focused on protection from political or criminal violence, not a terrorist attack directed at

the building itself (Accountability Review Board).

In April 1998, Ambassador Bushnell again requested a new chancery from the

State Department. In June 1998, they responded that there was no need for a new
1
The term "embassy" is often used to refer to the building or compound housing an
ambassador's offices and staff. Technically, "embassy" refers to the diplomatic delegation
itself, while the office building in which they work is known as a chancery, but this
distinction is rarely used in practice. Ambassadors reside in ambassadorial residences,
which enjoy the same rights as missions. <http://www.reference.com/search?q=embassy>
chancery, but approved a plan to extend the existing chancery’s useful life and provide

new windows (Accountability Review Board).

The U.S. embassy in Kenya was located near one of the busiest intersections in

the city, at the corner of Moi and Haile Selassie Avenues in downtown Nairobi. At the

front entrance of the building was Moi Avenue (Figure 1). To the rear, the embassy

shared a parking lot with the Cooperative Bank House, and between them was the Ufundi

Cooperative Building. The location made it particularly susceptible to a vehicular bomb

(Vick). The bomb blast collapsed the Ufundi Cooperative Building, which contained a

secretarial school, trapping many people inside. The collapsed building partially fell onto

the embassy building, destroying the rear face. Debris reached 4 feet deep inside the

chancery. The detonation caused windows to blow out up to one and half miles away

(Vick).

Figure 1. (Source: Washington Post, 1998 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

srv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/maps/nairobimap.htm)
 Figure 2. A Toyota Dyna, like the one used in the attack.

Initial Response

As happens in most disasters, the first responders were civilian bystanders.

Volunteers and good Samaritans swarmed over the piles of rubble, in an attempt to save

and direct help to those buried beneath (Vick). They were also putting themselves in

danger. Traffic surged towards the embassy, as thousands of people tried to find the

source of the blast (Clack et al). There was concern over another possible attack in the

area. All of this interfered with rescue efforts.

Control of the area took several hours, and rescue efforts were chaotic throughout

the first day (MacIntyre et al). The Kenyan riot police established a several block

perimeter around the embassy and Cooperative Bank. They allowed some members of

the media to pass through, giving them full access to the disaster site. They were seen

climbing on the collapsed Ufundi building (Macintyre et al). The MSGs and security

established a tighter perimeter, closer to the embassy. The British Embassy in Nairobi

sent troops over to help secure the perimeter until more U.S. security could arrive and

they also sent engineers to aid in recovery efforts.

Local emergency agencies were quickly overwhelmed. Fire and rescue resources

were already very limited, and they were not trained for emergency disaster response. All

local medical facilities filled up rapidly as patients were carried in by the general public.
Ambulance services in Nairobi operate on a prepaid system, and most cannot afford it

(MacIntyre et al). Buses, taxes, and bicycles were used to get the injured to hospitals.

Americans were transported to at least six different locations in the city, and it took three

days to find them all (Geiling).

Washington’s Response

The State Department was alerted immediately following the terrorist attack. The

staff began notifying officials in the White House, Pentagon, and intelligence and law

enforcement communities. A cable alert was sent to all U.S. embassies to place them on

heightened alert. The State Department Operations Center joined with the Bureau of

African Affairs to form the East Africa Task Force. The task force made arrangements

for medical, security, and transportation support. This task force would operate 24 hours

a day, on 8 hour shifts. They were the liaison between the State department and

personnel in Kenya. They were the only form of centralized control of the situation, but

they were thousands of miles away.

The East Africa Task Force was part of a rehearsed and organized crisis response

team. It was headed by the Bureau of East African Affairs, but contained members from

different government agencies. The Bureaus of Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security,

Political and Military Affairs, and Public Affairs, the Office of the Medical Director, the

Secretary’s Office of Counter Terrorism, and the Family Liaison Office all had

representatives on the task force. The FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the USAID

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance were also represented (Miles).

The task force deployed medical supplies and support to the region within hours.
They coordinated the efforts of U.S. government agency medical professionals in the

area. They also requested military medical assistance from the DoD.

The Office of Family Liaison handled desperate phone calls from embassy family

members looking for loved ones. When family members arrived in Washington, D.C.,

Family Liaison representatives met them at the airports and helped them with

accommodations.

Funerals and ceremonies were coordinated by the Bureau of Western Hemispheric

Affairs. They were responsible for the arrival ceremonies at Andrews Air Force Base.

Those that passed away in the attack were laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery.

They also made provisions for family members to visit the injured in Washington

hospitals, or for them to attend services for those buried at Arlington (Miles).

The Bureau of Public Affairs handled the media attention. Members collected

details on the bombings for the State Department spokesperson to use at press briefings

(Miles). On the ground in Kenya, the embassy public affairs office was quickly

inundated with requests for information. When they focused on international press

queries, they ignored the local press. The local press quickly turned on them, focusing

the brunt of their anger on the embassy and the United States, insinuating that the U.S.

was concerned only with its own people. The State Department’s public affairs office

cleared in advance what the Ambassador could and could not say. This “limited her

ability to counter the firestorm of criticism in the local media” (Accountability Review

Board).

Search and Rescue

 The first response team to arrive was the 170-person Israeli Special Response

Team from Tel Aviv, which arrived 22 hours after the blast. They were a highly skilled

search and rescue operation that had offered their services to the Department of Defense

(DoD). The DoD readily accepted their offer (Fullerton). They brought hydraulic

equipment, sensitive listening devices, stretchers, and dogs trained to find corpses (Vick).

They were the first trained rescue personnel on the scene.

The U.S. response was much slower, in part due to the relative location of Nairobi

to U.S. resources. Ambassador Bushnell and her staff moved operations to the nearby

USAID mission offices in Nairobi. The East Africa task force that was established earlier

in the day was able to determine the extent of the injuries and begin the logistical

operation of getting resources to Nairobi. Overall confusion occurred because of a shift

change within the task force in Washington, and field requests for resources from Nairobi

were needlessly duplicated (Accountability Review Board).

The Foreign Emergency Service Team (FEST) departed from Fairfax, Virginia

within 6 hours of its alert time. But the plane experienced mechanical difficulties in

Spain which delayed the FEST an additional 16 hours. By the time they landed in

Nairobi, it was 41 hours after the initial blast. While they were able to assist with rescue

operations, communications, and restoration of embassy functions, they also found they

could not find necessary resources in large quantities in Kenya. And while the FEST was

familiar with terrorist activities such as hostage taking, the “regular personnel package

was not quite accustomed to the situation in Nairobi” (Accountability Review Board).

Because international search and rescue groups had already taken over the

operations on the collapsed Ufundi building, they confined their operations to the
chancery building. On the following day, the decision to keep operations separate was

reversed, and the FEST was permitted to assist the Ufundi building search and rescue

teams.

The FEST was also unable to respond to the bombing in Dar es Salaam for

another 24 hours, since two separate attacks had not been anticipated (Champagne et al).

Additional support personnel were sent from Washington, but their plane also had

mechanical difficulties in Sicily. It was delayed an additional 8 hours. Another aircraft

delay was experienced by a group of 50 Marines deployed from Bahrain to provide

supplemental security.

Medical Response

The embassy staff included one medical officer and one nurse, who were

incredibly spared from any injuries during the bomb blast, although they were less than

30 yards away. The medical officer, Dr. Gretchen McCoy, was able to assume the role of

lead medical advisor and report assessments and needs back to the State Department

(Geiling). She coordinated with Dr. Cedric Dumont, the State Department’s medical

director, through an open telephone connection set up by the East Africa Task Force. A

U.S. Army physician and two Medical Service Corps officers arrived from the US Army

Medical Research Unit Kenya, which was only 3 miles away. Dr. McCoy was able to set

up several medical triage stations.

The State Department sent a medical response team comprised of medical

personnel from surrounding embassies. Upon arrival, they completed an evaluation of

medical facilities and resources in the area. They found a lack of coordinated emergency

medical response. Some of the agencies they found were St. Johns Ambulance Service, a
private service that only had first aid capabilities. The Kenyan Red Cross could

transport victims, but they had no vehicles with medical capabilities. The Israeli search

and rescue team included some medical personnel, but their capabilities and supplies

were not known to the U.S. response team (Macintyre et al).

When they attempted to assess the resources of local hospitals, they were unable

to gain entry due to the large crowds formed outside. When they were able to establish

telephone contact, they found the hospitals filled to capacity with critically injured

patients (Macintyre et al). They would have to find alternate means of providing injury

care, and medical evacuation seemed to be the only viable option. Private air ambulances

were considered, but the quickest one would still take hours.

The medical team coordinated with the US military to establish military

transportation for medical needs (Geiling). The U.S. Air Force sent medevac aircraft

which arrived in Nairobi on August 8 from Ramstein Air Base, Germany. The

Accountability Review Board also found that medical supplies, already palletized and

positioned, had not been loaded onto this aircraft due to load capacity restrictions on the

C-9 Nightingale. Miscommunication on the ground meant that they did not immediately

return to Ramstein with the most seriously wounded Americans. Only one flight crew

deployed, and they needed crew rest before being able to take off again.

The DoD flew 17 missions, moving 418 people and 140 short tons of equipment,

from Washington, the Middle East, and Europe (Fullerton). But with confusion about

requests from the field, not all of those supplies were needed, and may have hindered

operations on the ground. For instance, the DoD shipped 200 units of blood without
demonstrated need. The influx of blood units burdened medical personnel, who now had

to distribute the blood to local medical facilities (Geiling).

Recommendations

Security

First, the security guards should be trained according to their contractual

agreements. Until the bombings, the security guards and MSGs had not been trained in

vehicle bomb detection, or what to do if they found a vehicle bomb. Vehicle bombs had

been used before, and there was no reason to think one could not be used. The

Ambassador herself had raised concerns about the use of a car bomb, and so requested a

new chancery in line with the Inman standards. Her requests were ignored, and one State

Department staffer admitted she was viewed as “…a nuisance who was overly obsessed

with security” (Champagne et al).

The U.S. embassy should secure use of an additional radio frequency for

emergency use only. Security guards should also have use of a panic or duress alarm.

Perimeter security was an issue in the immediate aftermath of the explosion.

While the general public did make valiant efforts to save those in the collapsed building,

the chaos also kept response agencies at bay. A secure perimeter, allowing only those

involved in emergency response through, could have alleviated a lot of the initial

confusion. It would also allow responders to work while minimizing the threat of another

attack.

Preparation & Training

The EAP for the embassy should be reviewed and modified. Specifically, it

should include procedures for small arms fire or vehicle bomb detonation. Had those
inside the embassy known to lie on the floor and stay away from windows, lives could

have been saved and injuries minimized. The embassy had prepared for criminal acts and

political violence, but the stakes have been raised significantly in the past 20 years. Car

bombs and suicide bombs are choice methods used by terrorists today.

The EAP should emphasize common problems and solutions. Evacuation routes,

search and rescue, communication outages, casualty tracking, dealing with the media, and

dealing with volunteers should all be a part of a standard EAP, since all of these could be

in response to a number of emergency situations.

Public affairs personnel should also be deployed when a disaster of this nature

occurs. The lack of a sufficient number of public affairs officers in Nairobi allowed those

in place to focus on only international inquiries. Had they not been overwhelmed, they

would have been able to respond to local journalists as well. This would have placated

the journalists, and they may not have been so aggressive in breaking through the

perimeters, or writing negative articles about the embassy or the United States.

Medical

A local emergency medical management system should be established.

Communication between response agencies is essential. In Nairobi, there was confusion

about the location of patients, the capacity and resources of hospitals, and finding proper

medical staff. The system should also include the training of likely first-responders, such

as police, doctors, and firefighters, but should also include local bus and taxi drivers.

An emergency civilian medical team could be trained to manage a disaster until

more support arrived, military or civilian. The International Medical Surgical Response

Teams (IMSuRTs) were formed after the Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings,
specifically to augment military medical assets (Rollins). They are a cooperative effort

between the Department of State and the National Disaster Medical System, and deploy

up to 10% of their volunteer members to any given disaster. They include doctors,

nurses, EMT/Firefighters, paramedics, and other medical personnel. A system like this

would have greatly helped on the ground in Nairobi.

There should be an evacuation plan in place for when medical facilities are

overwhelmed or operating at maximum capacity. Those requiring evacuation should be

held at a central location. Medevac personnel should deploy with more than one crew, to

stop delays due to crew rest. Again, there is room to use commercial aircraft when

necessary.

The military response came primarily from U.S. military bases in Europe,

although Nairobi falls under USCENTCOM’s geographical coverage area.

Finally, there should be plans in place for logistical problems. Several planes

were grounded for hours due to mechanical issues. Could the State Department (or

Department of Defense) secure a commercial aircraft to complete emergency missions?

Conclusion

Since the bombings, there have been marked improvements in the response

planning. The IMSuRTs have been established. FESTs no longer deploy on a single

team with no medical personnel. They are deployed on two separate teams, about 10

hours apart, and include personnel trained to make an evaluation of the medical

requirements and conditions. The State Department has reviewed the option of using

commercial airplanes when necessary for more reliable transportation. The U.S. embassy

in Nairobi has been moved to a location outside Nairobi, and meets all Inman standards.
 “Sudden impact disasters,” like terrorist attacks, often occur without warning, but

their effects are predictable. They typically overwhelm local resources, whether in the

United States (Oklahoma City bombing) or abroad. They possess certain characteristics

that are predictable by analysis of past events (Geiling).

The sources of the mistakes made in the response to the Nairobi embassy

bombing are rooted in lack of planning and preparation. While everyone involved made

heroic efforts with what they had, a bit of training and preparation would have mitigated

the effects. There will always be room for improvement in disaster response.
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