Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative vs

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of

Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation
in connection with pending legislation related
to the operations of public utilities. Invited in
the hearing were the heads of NORECO II
(Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.)
Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is
alleged to have installed inefficient power lines
in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to
appear before the SP and they alleged that the
power to investigate, and to order the
improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines
to conform to standards is lodged exclusively
with the National Electrification Administration
(NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of
Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP
such power. The SP averred that inherent in the
legislative
functions
performed
by
the
respondent SP is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it,
the power to punish for contempt in inquiries
on matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether
contempt.

or

not

LGUs

can

issue

HELD: No. There is no express provision either

in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337)
granting local legislative bodies, the power to
subpoena witnesses and the power to punish
non-members
for
contempt.
Absent
a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise
of these powers, the only possible justification
for the issuance of a subpoena and for the
punishment of non-members for contumacious
behavior would be for said power to be
deemed implied in the statutory grant of
delegated legislative power. But, the contempt
power and the subpoena power partake of a
judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the
grant of legislative power. Neither can they
exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative
bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis
would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. There being no provision in the LGC
explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the

power to punish for contempt, the SP of

Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.
The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body
has even less basis to claim that it can exercise
these powers. Even assuming that the SP and
the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue
the subpoena and the order complained of,
such issuances would still be void for being
ultra vires. The contempt power (and the
subpoena power) if actually possessed, may
only be exercised where the subject matter of
the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body.
Gamboa vs Aguirre and Araneta
(members of SP)
Facts:
In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela,
petitioner
Romeo
J.
Gamboa,
Jr.
and
respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y.
Araneta were elected Negros Occidental
Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members,
respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the
governor designated petitioner as Acting
Governor for the duration of the formers
official trip abroad until his return.
When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its
regular session, respondents questioned the
authority of petitioner to preside therein in
view of his designation as Acting Governor and
asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter,
however, refused to do so. In another session,
7members of the SP voted to allow petitioner
to continue presiding while 4 others voted
against with 1 abstention. Respondents filed
before the lower court a petition for declaratory
relief and prohibition. In the meantime, the
Governor re-assumed his office.Later, the trial
court rendered a decision and declared
petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated
to preside over the sessions of the SP during
the period that he is the Acting Governor.
Petitioner filed a petition for review raising the
issue earlier mentioned. Although this case is
dismissible for having become moot and
academic considering the expiration in 1998 of
the terms of office of the local officials involved
herein, the Court nonetheless proceeds to
resolve this common controversy but novel
issue under the existing laws on local
government.
Issue:

WON Gamboa, while serving as the Acting

Governor, temporarily relinquished the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of the
Vice-Governor, including the power to preside
over the sessions of the SP
Held:
YES
Ratio Decidendi: What the LGC provides:
The LGC provides that the Vice-Governor shall
be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to
such function, he becomes the
Governor and assumes the higher office for the
unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of
permanent vacancy therein. When the
vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the
Vice- Governor shall automatically exercise
the powers (subject to certain limitations) and
perform the duties and functions of the
Governor. But, no such contingency is provided
in case of temporary vacancy in the office of
the Vice-Governor. Vice-Governor as Acting
Governor: When the Vice- Governor exercises
the powers and duties of the Governor, he
does not assume the latter office. He only
acts as the Governor but does not become
the Governor. His assumption of the powers,
duties and functions of the provincial Chief
Executive does not create a permanent
vacuum or vacancy in his position as the ViceGovernor. Necessarily, he does not relinquish
or abandon his position and title as ViceGovernor by merely becoming an Acting
Governor or by merely exercising the powers
and duties of the higher office. A Vice-Governor
who is concurrently an Acting Governor is
actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for
purposes
of
exercising
his
legislative
prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a
non-member of the SP.
MANUEL
ZAMORA
CABALLERO, ET AL.

VS.

GOV.

JOSE

G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2002

Facts: Manuel Zamora, a member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela
Valley, filed before the RTC a petition to
invalidate all acts executed and resolutions
issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions
held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of
quorum. Said sessions noted the resignation
letter of Board Member Sotto, declared the

entire province under a state of calamity and

approved the Governor to enter into the
contract with the Allado Company. Zamora, the
petitioner, argued that the Sanggunian, during
its February 26 session, conducted official
business without a quorum since only 7 out of
the 14 members were present. He further
questioned the February 8 sessions validity
arguing that only 7 members were present and
the failure to provide written notice to all
members at least 24 hours before the holding
of the special session. Respondents argued
that Board Member Sotto was in the United
States during such sessions and that the actual
number of Board Members in the country was
only 13 which, they claimed, should be the
basis for the determination of a quorum. Such
petition raised by Zamora was dismissed by
the RTC but reversed and granted by the
Supreme Court.

Issues: 1) Whether or not Section 53 (a) of the

LGC provides and specifies applicable rule
regarding the determination of a quorum.

2) Whether or not Sanggunian Members who

are abroad should not be included in the
counting of the entire Sangguniang body.

3) Whether or not the approved decisions

during the sessions, alleged to be without
quorum, is deemed to be valid.

Held: Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : A

majority of all members of the Sanggunian who
have been elected and qualified shall
constitute a quorum to transact official
business. Quorum is defined as the number
of members of a body which, when legally
assembled, will enable the body to transact its
proper business or that number which makes a
lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a
law or ordinance or do any valid act. When
required to constitute a quorum, majority
means the number greater than half or more
than half of the total.
As further stated, it requires the majority of ALL
members of the Sanggunian. Quorum should,
thus, be based on the total number of
members regardless of whether or not a
member is said to be abroad.

Therefore, in cases where decisions have been

made during sessions deemed to have not met
the required quorum, such sessions and
decisions shall be considered void.

Concepcion, excluding Zurita who died during

the pendency hereof.

On September 21, 1994, the information filed

before the Sandiganbayan reads as follows:
Malonzo v. Zamora
323 SCRA 875
FACTS: A supplemental budget was passed by
the councilors upon three readings held on the
same day.
They were charged with
misconduct.

HELD: There is no law prohibiting the holding

of the three readings of a proposed ordinance
in one session day.
AYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION

That on or about July 27, 1992 or sometimes

(sic) prior or subsequent thereto, in Mariveles,
Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, OSCAR DELOS REYES
and JESSE CONCEPCION, both public officers,
being Municipal Mayor of Mariveles, Bataan
and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mariveles, Bataan, passed and approved the
said resolution appropriating the amount of
P8,500.00 for payment of the terminal leave of
two (2) employees of the municipality, when in
truth and in fact as both accused knew well the
same is false and incorrect as the said
resolution was not approved by the aforesaid
Sangguniang Bayan for which both accused
has the obligation to disclose the truth.

ROMERO, J.:
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The significance of the minutes taken during
the session of a local legislative assembly is
the determinant issue in this present petition.

Petitioner, along with two others, was charged

with the crime of falsification of a public
document, specifically Resolution No. 57-S-92
dated July 27, 1992 of the Municipal Council of
Mariveles, Bataan. The complaint[1] alleged
that the resolution, appropriating the amount
of P8,500.00 for the payment of the terminal
leave of two municipal employees, was
anomalous for not having been approved by
the said Council, as the minutes of the
proceedings therein made no reference to the
supposed approval thereof. It contended that
its seeming passage was carried out by
petitioner in connivance with Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) Member Jesse Concepcion and SB
Secretary Antonio Zurita.

After preliminary investigation, the deputized

prosecutor of Balanga, Bataan recommended
the filing of an information[2] for Falsification of
Public Document against petitioner and

On October 14, 1994, prior to his arraignment,

petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
arguing, among other things, that the
Ombudsman previously dismissed a similar
complaint against him involving the same
factual setting.[4]

Likewise adduced in the motion is the joint

affidavit of the other members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles attesting to
the actual passage and approval of Resolution
No. 57-S-92.

In a resolution dated December 29, 1994,

respondent Sandiganbayan denied the Motion
for Reinvestigation, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

Acting on accused Mayor Oscar delos Reyes

Motion for Reinvestigation and accused Jesse
Concepcions Manifestation, the same are
hereby DENIED, being without merit and the

prosecution having vigorously opposed

Motion. The allegations of fact and
arguments of counsel are best taken up in
trial on the merits. As found by
prosecution, a prima facie case exists.

the
the
the
the

Consequently, let the arraignment of the above

entitled case be set on March 03, 1995, at 8:30
A.M.[5]

After the motion for reconsideration was denied

on May 24, 1995, petitioner filed this instant
petition for certiorari. On September 18, 1995,
the Court resolved to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for by petitioner.

The order of respondent Sandiganbayan must

be sustained.

In an effort to exonerate himself from the

charge, petitioner argues that the deliberations
undertaken and the consequent passage of
Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature.
He adds that as local chief executive, he has
neither the official custody of nor the duty to
prepare said resolution; hence, he could not
have taken advantage of his official position in
committing the crime of falsification as defined
and punished under Article 171[6] of the
Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court

that the final step in the approval of an
ordinance or resolution, where the local chief
executive affixes his signature, is purely a
ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article
109(b) of the Local Government Code outlines
the veto power of the Local Chief Executive
which provides:

Article 109 (b) The local chief executive, except

the punong barangay shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or
resolution adopting a local development plan
and public investment program or an ordinance
directing the payment of money or creating
liability. x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the

veto power confers authority beyond the
simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance
or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability.
Such power accords the local chief executive
the discretion to sustain a resolution or
ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and
return it with his objections to the Sanggunian,
which may proceed to reconsider the same.
The Sanggunian concerned, however, may
override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of
all its members thereby making the ordinance
or resolution effective for all legal intents and
purposes. It is clear, therefore, that the
concurrence of a local chief executive in the
enactment of an ordinance or resolution
requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the
application of judgment after meticulous
analysis and intelligence as well.

Petitioners
other
contention
that
the
Ombudsman should have dismissed the
present case in view of a previous dismissal of
a similar complaint involving the same factual
context is likewise misplaced.

As explained by Deputy Special Prosecutor

Leonardo P. Tamayo in his comment, the other
case relied upon by petitioner has no relation
whatsoever with the one in question. Notably,
the former case was subject of a separate
complaint and preliminary investigation, hence,
the findings and records therein could not be
made part of the case under consideration.[7]

It must be stressed that the Ombudsman

correctly relied on the minutes taken during
the session of the Sangguniang Bayan held last
July 27, 1992, which petitioner regards as
inconclusive evidence of what actually
transpired therein. In a long line of cases, the
Court, in resolving conflicting assertions of the
protagonists in a case, has placed reliance on
the minutes or the transcribed stenographic
notes to ascertain the truth of the proceedings
therein.

The following cases illustrate the importance of

the minutes:

It was held that contrary to petitioners claim,

what the minutes only show is that on August
12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a vote on the
administrative case of respondent Mayor and
not that it then rendered a decision as required
by Section 66(a) of the Local Government
Code.[8]

With the same factual context as in the case at

bar, petitioners herein were accused of having
falsified or caused the falsification of the
excerpts of the minutes of the regular sessions
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino
province on August 15, 1988 and September
19, 1988. x x x.[9]

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that

there were no written notices of public
hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code
that were sent to interested parties as required
by Article 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of
the Local Government Code nor were copies of
the proposed ordinance published in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general
circulation pursuant to Article 276(a). No
minutes were submitted to show that the
obligatory public hearings had been held.[10]

It appears from the minutes of the board

meeting of February 28, 1958 that the names
of the members present as well those who
were absent have been recorded, and that all
those present took active part in the debates
and deliberations. At the end of the session,
when the presiding officer asked the members
if there were any objections to the approval of
the proposed budget, only one councilor raised
an objection. The minutes, therefore, could
readily show who of the members present in
the deliberations voted pro and who voted con.
[11]

The certification of the election registrar relied

upon by the petitioner is correct as far as it
goes. Only 80 votes appear to have voted
according to the precinct book in the sense
that only 80 voters affixed their signatures
thereon after voting. But this does not
necessarily mean that no other voters cast
their ballots in the questioned precinct: there

were 279 in all, according to the minutes of

voting, although only 80 of them signed the
precinct book.[12]

As found by the trial court, the said minutes of

the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do not
mention the execution of any deed to perfect
the agreement. An engineer was appointed to
survey the old abandoned road, but this act
does not in any manner convey title over the
abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor
extinguishes their ownership over the land
traversed by the new provincial highway.[13]

In the case at bar, the minutes of the session

reveal that petitioner attended the session of
the Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is
evident, therefore, that petitioner approved the
subject resolution knowing fully well that the
subject matter treated therein was neither
taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the
Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative
session.[14]

Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the

minutes as the official repository of what
actually transpires in every proceeding. It has
happened that the minutes may be corrected
to reflect the true account of a proceeding,
thus giving the Court more reason to accord
them great weight for such subsequent
corrections, if any, are made precisely to
preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of
the conflicting claims of the parties in the case
at bar, the Court, without resorting to the
minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving
the dispute at hand.

With regard to the joint affidavit of some

members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting
to the actual passage and approval of
Resolution No. 57-S-92, the Court finds the
same to have been belatedly submitted as a
last minute attempt to bolster petitioners
position, and, therefore, could not in any way
aid the latters cause.

Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioners

counsel are best taken up in the trial on the
merits.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated
December 29, 1994, and May 24, 1995, are
hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on September 18,
1995, is hereby LIFTED.

The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to set

Criminal Case No. 21073 for arraignment and
trial.

SO ORDERED.
Percival Moday vs Court of Appeals
Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan,
Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution
authorizing
the
mayor
to
initiate
an
expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion
of Modays land. Purpose of which was to erect
a gymnasium and other public buildings. The
mayor approved the resolution and the
resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan which disapproved the said
resolution ruling that the expropriation is not
necessary because there are other lots owned
by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose.
The
mayor
pushed
through
with
the
expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may

expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which

the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that
is inseparable from sovereignty.
It is
governments right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose.
Inherently
possessed
by
the
national
legislature, the power of eminent domain may
be validly delegated to local governments,
other public entities and public utilities. For
the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for

public
use
and
there
must
be
just
compensation. The only ground upon which a
provincial board may declare any municipal
resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when
such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond
the powers conferred upon the council or
president making the same. This was not the
case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated
that there are other available lands for the
purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to
declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the
expropriation case is valid.
PANDACAN OIL DEPOT MUST GO: SOCIAL
JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA CASE
DIGEST
Facts:
On
November
20,
2001,
The
Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr.
approved the said ordinance on November 28,
2001. and it became effective on December
28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial
to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the
date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the socalled Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies
Caltex, Petron and Shell.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila

and the Department of Energy entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the oil
companies in which they agreed that :scaling
down of Pandacan Terminals was the most
viable and practicable option. Under the
memorandum of understanding, the City of
Manila and the Department of Energy permits
the Oil Companies to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements, within the
limited area resulting from the joint operations
and the scale down program.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the

memorandum of understanding in Resolution
No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian
declared
that
the
memorandum
of
understanding was effective only for a period
of six months starting July 25, 2002.
Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the
Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13
extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to

April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to

issue special business permits to the oil
companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also
called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has the

mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26,
2002 memorandum of understanding and the
resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes

upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of
Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city. One of
these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to put
into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
negated by the courts.

On the other hand assuming that the terms of

the memorandum of understanding were
contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding
on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force
and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the
Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as
mayor of the city of Manila to immediately
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., 517
SCRA 657 (2007)
If an ordinance says something to be done,
then the mayor can only comply and
implement it. Here the City Council of Manila
passed an ordinance reclassifying an area
where the oil depot of the big petroleum
companies was located from industrial to
commercial. That meant that the oil terminals
had to go. A timetable was provided but after
some time the oil depot was still there. The
Court held that the mayor had no discretion
but comply with the ordinance. Its well within
the police power of the city. The objective of
the ordinance is to protect the residents from
the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the

Pandacan
Terminals.
On
motion
for
reconsideration, the Court stood pat on its
earlier position. The ordinance was intended
to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not
just of a particular class. The depot is
perceived,
rightly
or
wrongly,
as
a
representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as
there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
became necessary to remove these terminals
to dissipate the threat.
With regard to zoning ordinances, the Court
expounded: A zoning ordinance is defined as a
local city or municipal legislation which
logically arranges, prescribes, defines and
apportions a given political subdivision into
specific land uses as present and future
projection of needs. As a result of the zoning,
the continued operation of the businesses of
the oil companies in their present location will
no longer be permitted. The power to establish
zones for industrial, commercial and residential
uses is derived from the police power itself and
is exercised for the protection and benefit of
the residents of a locality.
In coming up with a new zoning ordinance,
would that not result in some taking for
which there should be compensation? In the
exercise of police power, there is a limitation
on or restriction of property interests to
promote public welfare which involves no
compensable taking. Thus, [t]he restriction
imposed to protect lives, public health and
safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely
the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use
which interferes with paramount rights of the
public. Nobody else acquires the use or
interest
therein,
hence
there
is
no
compensable taking.

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO and G.R. No.

150270
HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN,
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
ROLANDO BANIQUED,
Respondents. November 26, 2008

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

OFT-QUOTED in cases involving searches and

seizures is the principle that a mans home is
his castle. Not even the king would dare
desecrate it. In protecting his home, the
poorest and most humble citizen or subject
may bid defiance to all the powers of the State.
[1] Indeed, a man is king in his own house.

The case before Us views the sanctity of a

mans home in a different light. It is about a
mans struggle against the attempt of the State
to demolish his house.

Petitioners Leo Bernardez, Jr. and Mauricio

Domogan question by way of appeal under
Rule 45 the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the
Order[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
dismissing the complaint[5] for prohibition with
temporary restraining order (TRO)/injunction
filed by private respondent Rolando Baniqued.

The Facts

Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-infact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar,

Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a
complaint with the Office of the Mayor of
Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house
built on a parcel of land[6] located at Upper
Quezon Hill, Baguio City.

On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city

mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of
Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against
spouses
Rolando
and
Fidela
Baniqued.
Pertinent parts of the notice read:

The investigation and ocular inspection

conducted by the City Engineers Office
(memorandum dated 18 February 1998)
showed that you built your structures
sometime in 1999 without any building permit
in violation of P.D. 1096 and possibly R.A. 7279,
qualifying your structure structures illegal,
thus, subject to demolition.

The Anti-Squatting Committee in its Resolution

No.
52-4
dated
22
April
1999
has
recommended for the demolition of your illegal
structures.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, you are hereby

notified to voluntarily remove/demolish your
illegal structures within seven (7) days from
receipt of this notice, otherwise the City
Demolition Team will undertake the demolition
of your illegal structures at your own expense.
[7]

Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint

for prohibition with TRO/injunction before
Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City.

In his complaint, Baniqued alleged that the

intended demolition of his house was done
without due process of law and was arrived at
arbitrarily and in a martial-law like fashion.
Specifically, Baniqued alleged that he was (1)

never given any copy of the complaint of

Generoso Bonifacio; (2) never summoned nor
subpoenaed to answer that complaint; (3)
never
allowed
to
participate
in
the
investigation and ocular inspection which the
City Engineers Office allegedly conducted, as a
consequence of the complaint of Bonifacio,
much less to adduce evidence in support of his
position; (4) never summoned nor subpoenaed
to
appear
before
the
Anti-Squatting
Committee; and (5) not given the opportunity
to contest the complaint against him, before
such complaint was decided and to be carried
out by the Defendants.[8]

Baniqued buttressed his complaint by arguing

that Article 536 of the Civil Code should be
applied, i.e., there should be a court action and
a court order first before his house can be
demolished and before he can be ousted from
the lot.[9] More, under Section 28 of Republic
Act 7279, an adequate relocation should be
provided first before demolition can be had.
[10] Too, by virtue of the National Building
Code or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096, the
demolition of buildings or structures should
only be resorted to in case they are dangerous
or ruinous. Otherwise, the remedy is criminal
prosecution under Section 213 of P.D. No. 1096.
[11] Lastly, the 1991 Local Government Code
does not empower the mayor to order the
demolition of anything unless the interested
party was afforded prior hearing and unless the
provisions of law pertaining to demolition are
satisfied.[12] Thus, Baniqued prayed for the
following reliefs:

A. Immediately upon the filing hereof, a

temporary restraining order be issued stopping
the Defendants, or any other person acting
under their orders or authority, from carrying
out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of
Plaintiffs residential unit at Upper Quezon Hill,
Baguio City under Notice of Demolition No. 55;

B. After due notice and hearing, a writ of

preliminary injunction be issued for the same

purpose as to that of the TRO, and, thereafter,

for this preliminary writ to be made permanent;

C. A writ of prohibition be issued, commanding

the Defendants to stop carrying out, or causing
to carry out, the demolition of the aforesaid
unit of the Plaintiffs.[13]

On June 7, 1999, the RTC enjoined the carrying

out of the demolition of the house of Baniqued.
The hearing on his application for preliminary
injunction was also set.[14]

On June 25, 1999, petitioners moved to

dismiss[15] the complaint of Baniqued on the
ground of lack of cause of action because (1)
there is nothing to be enjoined as there is no
Demolition Order issued by the City Mayor and
that the Demolition Team does not demolish on
the basis of a mere Notice of Demolition; (2) he
has no clear legal right to be protected as his
structure is illegal, the same having been built
on a land he does not own without the consent
of the owner thereof and without securing the
requisite building permit; (3) the Notice of
Demolition was issued in accordance with law
and in due performance of the duties and
functions of defendants, who being public
officers, are mandated by law to enforce all
pertinent laws against illegal constructions;
and that (4) [d]efendants do not exercise
judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Neither
was the issuance of the assailed Notice of
Demolition an exercise of a ministerial function.
Nor is there any allegation in the complaint
that defendants acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On October 15, 1999, the RTC granted the

motion of petitioners and dismissed the
complaint of Baniqued with the following
disposition:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion to

dismiss filed by the defendant, the same is
hereby GRANTED and this case is hereby
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

Atty. Melanio Mauricio is hereby cited for

contempt of court and is hereby warned that a
repetition of his use of improper language
whether orally or in any of his pleadings will be
dealt with more severely in the future.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC reasoned that petitioners are

unquestionably members of the executive
branch whose functions are neither judicial nor
quasi-judicial.[18] The RTC also sustained the
argument
of
petitioners
that
the
act
complained of can hardly qualify as ministerial
in nature as to put it within the ambit of the
rule on prohibition.[19] Lastly, the complaint of
Baniqued was procedurally infirm because he
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.[20]

Baniqued moved for reconsideration[21] which

was opposed.[22] On March 3, 2000, the RTC
denied the motion.[23]

According to the CA, it may be true that the

mayor is an executive official. However, as
such, he has also been given the authority to
hear controversies involving property rights. In
that regard, the Mayor exercises quasi-judicial
functions.[25]

The CA also held that the allegations in the

complaint of Baniqued state a cause of action.
The averments in the complaint call for a
determination whether court action is needed
before Baniqued can be ousted from the
questioned lot.[26]

Petitioners attempted at a reconsideration[27]

to no avail. Left with no other recourse, they
interposed the present appeal.[28]

Issues

Petitioners impute to the CA the following

errors, viz.:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT
THE ACT OF THE CITY MAYOR IN ISSUING A
NOTICE OF DEMOLITION IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTION;

Refusing to give up, Baniqued appealed the

decision of the RTC. The CA sustained
Baniqued, disposing as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant

petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders
dated October 15, 1999 and March 3 2000 are
both RECALLED and SET ASIDE and a new one
issued DENYING the Motion to Dismiss dated
June 25, 1999. After the finality of this
judgment, let the entire original records of the
case at bench be returned to the court a quo
which is reminded to decide the case on the
merits and with dispatch. No pronouncement
as to costs.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT
THE ACTION OF PROHIBITION FILED BY
BANIQUED WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS PROPER
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES;

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.[29]
(Underscoring supplied)

SO ORDERED.[24]
In sum, petitioners claim that Baniqued
incorrectly availed of the remedy of prohibition.

issuance is governed by equitable principles.

[32] (Citations omitted)
Our Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of

prohibition. Prohibition or a writ of prohibition is
that process by which a superior court prevents
inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons
from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with
which they have not been vested by law.[30]
As its name indicates, the writ is one that
commands the person or tribunal to whom it is
directed not to do something which he or she is
about to do. The writ is also commonly defined
as one to prevent a tribunal possessing judicial
or quasi-judicial powers from exercising
jurisdiction over matters not within its
cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in
matters of which it has cognizance.[31] At
common law, prohibition was a remedy used
when subordinate courts and inferior tribunals
assumed jurisdiction which was not properly
theirs.

Prohibition, at common law, was a remedy

against encroachment of jurisdiction. Its office
was to restrain subordinate courts and inferior
judicial
tribunals
from
extending
their
jurisdiction and, in adopting the remedy, the
courts have almost universally preserved its
original common-law nature, object and
function. Thus, as a rule, its proper function is
to prevent courts, or other tribunals, officers, or
persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction with which they are not vested by
law, and confine them to the exercise of those
powers legally conferred. However, the
function of the writ has been extended by
some authorities to cover situations where,
even though the lower tribunal has jurisdiction,
the superior court deems it necessary and
advisable to issue the writ to prevent some
palpable and irremediable injustice, and, x x x
the office of the remedy in some jurisdictions
has
been
enlarged
or
restricted
by
constitutional or statutory provisions. While
prohibition has been classified as an equitable
remedy, it is generally referred to as a
common-law remedy or writ; it is a remedy
which is in nature legal, although, x x x its

Prohibition is not a new concept. It is a remedy

of ancient origin. It is even said that it is as old
as common law itself. The concept originated in
conflicts of jurisdiction between royal courts
and those of the church.[33] In our jurisdiction,
the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section
2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, to
wit:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the

proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that the judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as the law and justice
require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a

certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

It is very clear that before resorting to the

remedy of prohibition, there should be no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Thus, jurisprudence teaches that resort to
administrative remedies should be had first
before judicial intervention can be availed of.

This Court in a long line of cases has

consistently held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-

condition that he should have availed of all the

means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted
to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is
fatal to ones cause of action. x x x[34]

Explaining the reason behind the rule, Mr.

Justice Justo Torres, Jr., expounded, thus:

x x x This doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies was not without its
practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to
state that the courts of justice for reasons of
comity and convenience will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with
so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error
and to dispose of the case. x x x[35]
Petitioners are of the view that the complaint of
Baniqued for prohibition is fatally defective
because he failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. If he felt aggrieved by the issuance
of the notice of demolition, administrative
remedies were readily available to him. For
example, he could have easily filed a motion
for reinvestigation or reconsideration.[36]

The argument fails to persuade.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies is not an iron-clad rule.[37] It admits
of several exceptions. Jurisprudence is wellsettled that the doctrine does not apply in
cases (1) when the question raised is purely
legal; (2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need
for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim
involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage
will be suffered; (7) when there is no other

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; (8) when

strong public interest is involved; (9) when the
subject of the proceeding is private land; (10)
in quo warranto proceedings; and (11) where
the facts show that there was violation of due
process.[38]

Here, there was an urgent need for judicial

intervention. The filing of a motion for
reinvestigation or reconsideration would have
been a useless exercise. The notice of
demolition is very clear and speaks for itself.
City Mayor Domogan already made up his mind
that the house of Baniqued was illegally built
and was thus subject to demolition. It could
reasonably be assumed that a motion for
reinvestigation or reconsideration would have
also been denied outright. The irreparable
damage to Baniqued in case his house was
demolished cannot be gainsaid.

Petitioners contend, though, that the complaint

of Baniqued is premature. They say that what
was issued by City Mayor Domogan was only a
notice of demolition, and not an order of
demolition.[39] In short, petitioners are saying
that Baniqued jumped the gun. He should have
waited first for the issuance of a demolition
order because no demolition can be carried out
in the absence of such order.

To Our mind, the distinction between a notice

of demolition and an order of demolition is
immaterial. What is material is that Baniqued
felt threatened with the impending demolition
of his house. It would have been too late and
illogical if he waited first for his house to be
actually demolished, before seeking protection
from the courts. Acting in the earliest
opportunity and availing of the best remedy
available to protect his right was the prudent
course of action.

Petitioners also argue that the complaint of

Baniqued should not prosper because he never
alleged that the act complained of was done
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.[40] To support their
stance, they cite Reyes v. Romero[41] where
this Court denied the petition for prohibition

because there was no allegation whatsoever

charging the respondent Judge with lack of
jurisdiction or with having committed grave
abuse of discretion.[42] Put differently,
petitioners argue that for a complaint for
prohibition to prosper, there should be a
specific allegation that the act complained of
was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.

The argument is specious on two grounds.

First, Romero is not necessarily applicable to

the instant case because it involved a different
set of facts. There, a team of PC Rangers
raided a house in Pasay City, Rizal, which was
dubbed as a Gambling Casino. As a result,
twelve persons were charged for violating the
gambling law. The case was tried in the branch
of the Municipal Trial Court in Pasay presided
by Judge Lucio Tianco. The accused were later
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

An off-shoot of the raid was the prosecution of

petitioners as maintainers of a gambling den.
The case was also assigned to the sala of Judge
Tianco. However, as Judge Tianco was on leave,
the Secretary of Justice designated Judge
Guillermo Romero to preside over said branch.

Sometime later, Judge Tianco returned to office

and resumed his duties. This, notwithstanding,
Judge Romero ordered the continuation of the
trial before him. Petitioners then sought the
inhibition of Judge Romero in view of the return
of Judge Tianco. The motion was denied. The
matter was brought directly to this Court on
petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction. One of the two issues resolved by
the Court was whether respondent Judge in
refusing to inhibit himself from continuing with
the trial of the criminal case in question, acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.[43]

Clearly, the surrounding circumstances in

Romero are absent in the case now before Us.
They cannot be remotely applied even by
analogy.

Second, petitioners misconstrued Romero by

interpreting it literally. The better interpretation
is that the absence of specific allegation that
the act complained of was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion would not automatically cause the
dismissal of the complaint for prohibition,
provided that a reading of the allegations in the
complaint leads to no other conclusion than
that the act complained of was, indeed, done
without or in excess of jurisdiction. To subscribe
to the reasoning of petitioners may lead to an
absurd situation. A patently unmeritorious
complaint for prohibition may not be given due
course just because of an allegation that the
act complained of was committed without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.

This interpretation is supported by Romero

itself. Petitioners overlooked that the case goes
on to say that even if there were allegations of
grave abuse of discretion, there can be no
abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, for
respondent Judge to comply with a valid and
legal Administrative Order (No. 183) of the
Secretary of Justice.[44]

The Mayor, although performing executive

functions, also exercises quasi-judicial function
which may be corrected by prohibition. As a
parting argument, petitioners contend that the
complaint of Baniqued is outside the scope of
the rule on prohibition which covers the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. The
issuance of the notice of demolition by the City
Mayor is never a judicial, ministerial or rulemaking function. It is strictly an act of law
enforcement and implementation, which is
purely an executive function. Neither is the
Office of the City Mayor a quasi-judicial body.
[45]

Again, petitioners are mistaken. We need not

belabor so much on this point. We quote with
approval the CA observations in this regard,
viz.:

Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is

given powers not only relative to its function as
the executive official of the town. It has also
been endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to
come out with an effective order or resolution
thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasijudicial functions. This power is obviously a
truism in the matter of issuing demolition
notices and/or orders against squatters and
illegal occupants through some of its agencies
or authorized committees within its respective
municipalities or cities.

Lest this Decision be misunderstood, We

hasten to clarify that We have not prejudged
the merits of the case. Whether or not
Baniqued is, indeed, entitled to a writ of
prohibition is a matter which the trial court
should determine in the first instance without
further delay.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is

AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an
executive official nor is the matter of issuing
demolition notices or orders not a ministerial
one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that
in determining whether or not a structure is
illegal or it should be demolished, property
rights are involved thereby needing notices
and opportunity to be heard as provided for in
the constitutionally guaranteed right of due
process. In pursuit of these functions, the city
mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.
Moreno, in his Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd
Edition, defines quasi-judicial function as
applying to the action discretion, etc. of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature (Midland Insurance Corp. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 458
[1986]). Significantly, the Notice of Demolition
in issue was the result of the exercise of quasijudicial power by the Office of the Mayor.[46]

We also agree with the CA that the complaint

of Baniqued states a cause of action. The
averments in the complaint call for a
determination of whether or not there is need
for a court action or a court litigation to oust
plaintiff from the possession of the subject lot,
or, it is within the jurisdictional prerogative of
the Office of the Mayor to eject [an] unlawful
occupant from a private titled land he does not
own.[47]

CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA,

petitioners, vs. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE,
Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan
City, ALBERTO A. CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of
Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA
HERNANDEZ
SANTIAGO
and
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK (PNB), respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the

decision[1] dated August 31, 1992, of the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 27423, ordering
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 123, to implement an alias writ of
execution dated January 16, 1992. The
dispositive portion read as follows:

WHEREFORE the petition is hereby granted

ordering the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan
City, Branch 123, to immediately effect the
alias writ of execution dated January 16, 1992
without further delay.

Counsel for the respondents are warned that a

repetition of their contemptuous act to delay
the execution of a final and executory
judgment will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.[2]

It is important to state at the outset that the

dispute between petitioner and private
respondent has been litigated thrice before this
Court: first, in G.R. No. L-39288-89, entitled
Heirs of Abelardo Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial
Samson, et al., decided on January 31, 1985;
second, in G.R. No. 98366, entitled City
Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., resolved on May 16, 1991, and third, in
G.R. No. 102625, entitled Santiago vs. Sto.
Tomas, et al., decided on August 1, 1995. This
is not to mention the numerous concurrent
efforts by the City Government of Caloocan to
seek relief from other judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies. The present petition for certiorari is the
fourth time we are called upon to resolve the
dispute.

The factual and procedural antecedents follow.

Sometime in 1972, Marcial Samson, City Mayor

of Caloocan City, through Ordinance No. 1749,
abolished the position of Assistant City
Administrator and 17 other positions from the
plantilla of the local government of Caloocan.
Then Assistant City Administrator Delfina
Hernandez Santiago and the 17 affected
employees of the City Government assailed the
legality of the abolition before the then Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch
33.

In 1973, the CFI declared the abolition illegal

and ordered the reinstatement of all the
dismissed employees and the payment of their
back salaries and other emoluments. The City
Government of Caloocan appealed to the Court
of Appeals. Respondent Santiago and her coparties moved for the dismissal of the appeal
for being dilatory and frivolous but the
appellate court denied their motion. Thus, they
elevated the case on certiorari before this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-39288-89, Heirs
of Abelardo Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial
Samson, et al. In our Resolution dated January
31, 1985, we held that the appellate court
erred in not dismissing the appeal, and that the
appeal of the City Government of Caloocan was
frivolous and dilatory. In due time, the
resolution lapsed into finality and entry of
judgment was made on February 27, 1985.

In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid

respondent Santiago P75,083.37 in partial
payment of her backwages, thereby leaving a
balance of P530,761.91. Her co-parties were
paid in full.[3] In 1987, the City of Caloocan
appropriated funds for her unpaid back
salaries. This was included in Supplemental
Budget No. 3 for the fiscal year 1987.
Surprisingly, however, the City later refused to
release the money to respondent Santiago.

Respondent Santiago exerted effort for the

execution of the remainder of the money
judgment but she met stiff opposition from the
City Government of Caloocan. On February 12,
1991, Judge Mauro T. Allarde, RTC of Caloocan
City, Branch 123, issued a writ of execution for
the payment of the remainder of respondent
Santiagos back salaries and other emoluments.
[4]

For the second time, the City Government of

Caloocan went up to the Court of Appeals and
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to stop the trial court from enforcing
the writ of execution. The CA dismissed the
petition and affirmed the order of issuance of
the writ of execution.[5] One of the issues
raised and resolved therein was the extent to
which back salaries and emoluments were due
to respondent Santiago. The appellate court
held that she was entitled to her salaries from
October, 1983 to December, 1986.

And for the second time, the City Government

of Caloocan appealed to this Court in G.R. No.
98366, City Government of Caloocan vs. Court
of Appeals, et al. The petition was dismissed,
through our Resolution of May 16, 1991, for
having been filed late and for failure to show
any reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The resolution subsequently attained
finality and the corresponding entry of
judgment was made on July 29, 1991.

On motion of private respondent Santiago,

Judge Mauro T. Allarde ordered the issuance of
an alias writ of execution on March 3, 1992.
The City Government of Caloocan moved to
reconsider the order, insisting in the main that
respondent Santiago was not entitled to

backwages from 1983 to 1986. The court a quo

denied the motion and forthwith issued the
alias writ of execution. Unfazed, the City
Government of Caloocan filed a motion to
quash the writ, maintaining that the money
judgment sought to be enforced should not
have included salaries and allowances for the
years 1983-1986. The trial court likewise
denied the motion.

On July 27, 1992, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo

levied and sold at public auction one of the
motor vehicles of the City Government of
Caloocan, with plate no. SBH-165, for
P100,000. The proceeds of the sale were
turned over to respondent Santiago in partial
satisfaction of her claim, thereby leaving a
balance of P439,377.14, inclusive of interest.
Petitioners filed a motion questioning the
validity of the auction sale of the vehicle with
plate no. SBH-165, and a supplemental motion
maintaining that the properties of the
municipality were exempt from execution. In
his Order dated October 1, 1992, Judge Allarde
denied both motions and directed the sheriff to
levy and schedule at public auction three more
vehicles of the City of Caloocan - [6]

ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Station

Wagon); Motor No. C-240-199629; Chassis No.
MBB-910369C;

ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Series 11Diesel); Engine No. 4FB1-174328, Chassis No.
MBB-910345C; Plate No. SDL-653;

ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Series 11Diesel); Engine No. 4FB-165196; Chassis No.
MBB 910349C.

All the vehicles, including that previously sold

in the auction sale, were owned by the City and
assigned for the use of herein petitioner Norma
Abracia, Division Superintendent of Caloocan
City, and other officials of the Division of City
Schools.

Meanwhile, the City Government of Caloocan

sought clarification from the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on whether respondent
Santiago was considered to have rendered
services from 1983-1986 as to be entitled to
backwages for that period. In its Resolution No.
91-1124, the CSC ruled in the negative.

On November 22, 1991, private respondent

Santiago challenged the CSC resolution before
this Court in G.R. No. 102625, Santiago vs. Sto.
Tomas, et al. On July 8, 1993, we initially
dismissed the petition for lack of merit;
however, we reconsidered the dismissal of the
petition in our Resolution dated August 1,
1995, this time ruling in favor of respondent
Santiago:

The issue of petitioner Santiagos right to back

salaries for the period from October 1983 to
December 1986 having been resolved in G.R.
No. 98366 on 16 May 1991, CSC Resolution No.
91-1124 promulgated later on 24 September
1991 in particular, its ruling on the extent of
backwages due petitioner Santiago was in fact
moot and academic at the time of its
promulgation. CSC Resolution No. 91-1124
could not, of course, set aside what had been
judicially decided with finality x x x x the court
considers that resort by the City Government of
Caloocan to respondent CSC was but another
attempt to deprive petitioner Santiago of her
claim to back salaries x x x and a continuation
of the Citys abuse and misuse of the rules of
judicial procedure. The Citys acts have resulted
in wasting the precious time and resources of
the courts and respondent CSC. (Underscoring
supplied).

On October 5, 1992, the City Council of

Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of
1992,
which included
the amount
of
P439,377.14 claimed by respondent Santiago
as back salaries, plus interest.[7] Pursuant to
the subject ordinance, Judge Allarde issued an
order dated November 10, 1992, decreeing
that:

WHEREFORE, the City Treasurer (of Caloocan),

Norberto Azarcon is hereby ordered to deliver
to this Court within five (5) days from receipt

hereof, (a) managers check covering the

amount of P439,378.00 representing the back
salaries of petitioner Delfina H. Santiago in
accordance with Ordinance No. 0134 S. 1992
and pursuant to the final and executory
decision in these cases.

Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr.,

however, refused to sign the check intended as
payment for respondent Santiagos claims. This,
despite the fact that he was one of the
signatories of the ordinance authorizing such
payment. On April 29, 1993, Judge Allarde
issued another order directing the Acting City
Mayor of Caloocan, Reynaldo O. Malonzo, to
sign the check which had been pending before
the Office of the Mayor since December 11,
1992. Acting City Mayor Malonzo informed the
trial court that he could not comply with the
order since the subject check was not formally
turned over to him by the City Mayor who went
on official leave of absence on April 15, 1993,
and that he doubted whether he had authority
to sign the same.[8]

Thus, in an order dated May 7, 1993, Judge

Allarde ordered Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo to
immediately garnish the funds of the City
Government of Caloocan corresponding to the
claim of respondent Santiago.[9] On the same
day, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo served a copy of
the Notice of Garnishment on the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Sangandaan Branch,
Caloocan City. When PNB immediately notified
the City of Caloocan of the Notice of
Garnishment, the City Treasurer sent a letteradvice informing PNB that the order of
garnishment was illegal, with a warning that it
would hold PNB liable for any damages which
may be caused by the withholding of the funds
of the city. PNB opted to comply with the order
of Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a
managers check amounting to P439,378. After
21 long years, the claim of private respondent
Santiago was finally settled in full.

On June 4, 1993, however, while the instant

petition was pending, the City Government of
Caloocan filed yet another motion with this
Court, a Motion to Declare in Contempt of
Court; to Set Aside the Garnishment and
Administrative Complaint against Judge Allarde,
respondent Santiago and PNB. Subsequently,

the City Government of Caloocan filed a

Supplemental Petition formally impleading PNB
as a party-respondent in this case.

The instant petition for certiorari is directed

this time against the validity of the
garnishment of the funds of the City of
Caloocan, as well as the validity of the levy and
sale of the motor vehicles belonging to the City
of Caloocan. More specifically, petitioners insist
that Judge Allarde gravely abused his discretion
in:

(a) ordering the garnishment of the funds of

the City of Caloocan deposited with the PNB,
since it is settled that public funds are beyond
the reach of garnishment and even with the
appropriation passed by the City Council, the
authority of the Mayor is still needed for the
release of the appropriation;

(b) ordering the levy and sale at public auction

of three (3) motor vehicles owned by the City
of Caloocan, which vehicles are necessary for
public use and cannot be attached nor sold in
an execution sale to satisfy a money judgment
against the City of Caloocan;

(c) peremptorily denying petitioner City of

Caloocans urgent motions to vacate and set
aside the auction sale of the motor vehicle with
PLATE NO. SBH-165, notwithstanding that the
auction sale by the Sheriff was tainted with
serious irregularities, more particularly:

i. non-compliance with the mandatory posting

of the notice of sale;

ii. non-observance of the procedure that a sale

through public auction has to be made and
consummated at the time of the auction, at the
designated place and upon actual payment of
the purchase price by the winning bidder;

iii. violation of Sec. 21, Rule 39 of the Rules of

Court to the effect that sale of personal
property capable of manual delivery must be

sold within the view of those attending the

sale; and,

iv. the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale contained

false narration of facts respecting the actual
time of the public auction;

(d) the enforcement of the levy made by the

Sheriff covering the three (3) motor vehicles
based on an alias writ that has long expired.

The petition has absolutely no merit. The trial

court committed no grave abuse of discretion
in implementing the alias writ of execution to
settle the claim of respondent Santiago, the
satisfaction of which petitioner had been
maliciously evading for 21 years.

Petitioner argues that the garnishment of its

funds in PNB was invalid inasmuch as these
were public funds and thus exempt from
execution. Garnishment is considered a specie
of attachment by means of which the plaintiff
seeks to subject to his claim property of the
defendant in the hands of a third person, or
money owed by such third person or garnishee
to the defendant.[10]

The rule is and has always been that all

government funds deposited in the PNB or any
other official depositary of the Philippine
Government by any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, whether by general or
special deposit, remain government funds and
may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in
the absence of a corresponding appropriation
as required by law:[11]

Even though the rule as to immunity of a state

from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts
ends when the judgment is rendered. Although
the liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine
for itself whether to pay the judgment or not,
and execution cannot issue on a judgment
against the state. Such statutes do not
authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
judgments recovered, and only convey an

implication that the legislature will recognize

such judgment as final and make provision for
the satisfaction thereof.[12]

The rule is based on obvious considerations of

public policy. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.[13]

However, the rule is not absolute and admits of

a well-defined exception, that is, when there is
a corresponding appropriation as required by
law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity
of public funds from seizure or garnishment
does not apply where the funds sought to be
levied under execution are already allocated by
law specifically for the satisfaction of the
money judgment against the government. In
such a case, the monetary judgment may be
legally enforced by judicial processes.

Thus, in the similar case of Pasay City

Government, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, Br. X, et
al.,[14] where petitioners challenged the trial
courts order garnishing its funds in payment of
the contract price for the construction of the
City Hall, we ruled that, while government
funds deposited in the PNB are exempt from
execution or garnishment, this rule does not
apply if an ordinance has already been enacted
for the payment of the Citys obligations

Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the

petitioner-appellants moved for its quashal
alleging among other things the exemption of
the government from execution. This move on
the part of petitioner-appellants is at first
glance laudable for all government funds
deposited with the Philippine National Bank by
any agency or instrumentality of the
government, whether by way of general or
special deposit, remain government funds and
may not be subject to garnishment or levy. But
inasmuch as an ordinance has already been
enacted expressly appropriating the amount of
P613,096.00 as payment to the respondentappellee, then the herein case is covered by
the exception to the general rule x x x x

In the instant case, the City Council of

Caloocan already approved and passed
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating
the amount of P439,377.14 for respondent
Santiagos back salaries plus interest. Thus this
case fell squarely within the exception. For all
intents and purposes, Ordinance No. 0134,
Series of 1992, was the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The sum
indicated in the ordinance for Santiago were
deemed automatically segregated from the
other budgetary allocations of the City of
Caloocan and earmarked solely for the Citys
monetary obligation to her. The judgment of
the trial court could then be validly enforced
against such funds.

Indeed, this conclusion is further buttressed by

the Certification issued on December 23, 1992
by Norberto C. Azarcon, City Treasurer of
Caloocan:

In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that

public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided by
statute x x x x

Similarly, we cannot agree with petitioners

argument that the appropriation ordinance of
the City Council did not authorize PNB to
release the funds because only the City Mayor
could authorize the release thereof. A valid
appropriation of public funds lifts its exemption
from execution. Here, the appropriation passed
by the City Council of Caloocan providing for
the payment of backwages to respondent was
duly approved and signed by both the council
and then Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. The mayors
signature approving the budget ordinance was
his assent to the appropriation of funds for
respondent Santiagos backwages. If he did not
agree with such allocation, he could have
vetoed the item pursuant to Section 55 of the
Local Government Code.[18] There was no
such veto.

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that according to the records

available in this Office the claim for backwages
of the HON. JUDGE DELFINA H. SANTIAGO has
been properly obligated and can be collected in
accordance with existing accounting and
auditing rules and regulations.

This is to certify further that in case the claim

is not collected within the present fiscal year,
such claim shall be entered in the books of
Accounts Payable and can still be collected in
the next fiscal year x x x x (Underscoring
supplied)

Petitioners reliance on Municipality of Makati

vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] and
Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San
Diego,[16] does not help their cause.[17] Both
cases implicitly affirmed that public funds may
be garnished if there is a statute which
appropriated the amount so garnished. Thus, in
Municipality of Makati, citing San Diego, we
unequivocally held that:

In view of the foregoing discourse, we dismiss

petitioners unfounded assertion, probably
made more out of sheer ignorance of prevailing
jurisprudence than a deliberate attempt to
mislead us, that the rule that public funds (are)
beyond the reach of levy and garnishment is
not qualified by any condition.[19]

We now come to the issue of the legality of the

levy on the three motor vehicles belonging to
the City of Caloocan which petitioners claimed
to be exempt from execution, and which levy
was based on an alias writ that had purportedly
expired. Suffice it to say that Judge Allarde, in
his Order dated November 10, 1992,[20]
already lifted the levy on the three vehicles,
thereby formally discharging them from the
jurisdiction of the court and turning them over
to the City Government of Caloocan:

x x x x the levy of the three (3) vehicles made

by Sheriff Alberto Castillo pursuant to the
Orders of this Court dated October 1 and 8,
1992 is hereby lifted and the said Sheriff is
hereby ordered to return the same to the City
Government in view of the satisfaction of the
decision in these cases x x x x

It is thus unnecessary for us to discuss a moot

issue.

We turn to the third issue raised by petitioners

that the auction sale by Sheriff Alberto A.
Castillo of the motor vehicle with plate no.
SBH-165 was tainted with serious irregularities.
We need not emphasize that the sheriff enjoys
the
presumption
of
regularity
in
the
performance of the functions of his office. This
presumption prevails in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary and
cannot be overcome by bare and self-serving
allegations. The petitioners failed to convince
us that the auction sale conducted by the
sheriff indeed suffered from fatal flaws. No
evidence was adduced to prove that the sheriff
had been remiss in the performance of his
duties during the public auction sale. Indeed it
would be injudicious for us to assume, as
petitioners want us to do, that the sheriff failed
to follow the established procedures governing
public auctions.

On the contrary, a review of the records shows

that the sheriff complied with the rules on
public auction. The sale of the Citys vehicle
was made publicly in front of the Caloocan City
Hall on the date fixed in the notice July 27,
1992. In fact, petitioners in their Motion to
Declare in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the
Garnishment and Administrative Complaint
admitted as much:

On July 27, 1992, by virtue of an alias writ of

execution issued by the respondent court, a
vehicle owned by the petitioner xxx was levied
and sold at public auction for the amount of
P100,000.00
and
which
amount
was
immediately
delivered
to
the
private
respondent x x x x[21]

Hence, petitioners cannot now be heard to

impugn the validity of the auction sale.

Petitioners, in desperation, likewise make much

of the proceedings before the trial court on
October 8, 1992, wherein petitioner Norma

Abracia, Superintendent of the Division of City

Schools of Caloocan, was commanded to
appear and show cause why she should not be
cited in contempt for delaying the execution of
judgment. This was in connection with her
failure (or refusal) to surrender the three motor
vehicles assigned to the Division of City
Schools to the custody of the sheriff. Petitioner
Abracia, assisted by Mr. Ricardo Nagpacan of
the Division of City Schools, appeared during
the hearing but requested a ten-day period
within which to refer the matter of contempt to
a counsel of her choice. The request was
denied by Judge Allarde in his assailed order
dated October 8, 1992. Thus petitioner Abracia
claimed, inter alia, that: (a) she was denied
due process; (b) the silence of the order of
Judge Allarde on her request for time violated
an orderly and faithful recording of the
proceedings, and (c) she was coerced into
agreeing to surrender the vehicles.

We do not think so. What violates due process

is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
That opportunity, the Court is convinced, was
sufficiently accorded to petitioner Abracia. She
was notified of the contempt charge against
her; she was effectively assisted by counsel
when she appeared during the hearing on
October 8, 1992; and she was afforded ample
opportunity to answer and refute the charge
against her. The circumstance that she opted
not to avail of her chance to be heard on that
occasion by asking for an extension of time
within which to hire a counsel of her choice, a
request denied by the trial court, did not
transgress nor deprive her of her right to due
process.

Significantly, during the hearing on October 8,

1992, Mr. Nagpacan manifested in open court
that, after conferring with petitioner Abracia,
the latter was willing to surrender these
vehicles into the custody of the sheriff on the
condition that the standing motion (for
contempt) be withdrawn.[22] Her decision was
made freely and voluntarily, and after
conferring with her counsel. Moreover, it was
petitioner Abracia herself who imposed the
condition that respondent Santiago should
withdraw her motion for contempt in exchange
for her promise to surrender the subject
vehicles. Thus, petitioner Abracias claim that
she was coerced into surrendering the vehicles
had no basis.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that there

indeed existed certain legal infirmities in
connection with the assailed orders of Judge
Allarde, still, considering the totality of
circumstances of this case, the nullification of
the contested orders would be way out of line.
For 21 long years, starting 1972 when this
controversy started up to 1993 when her claim
was fully paid out of the garnished funds of the
City of Caloocan, respondent Santiago was
cruelly and unjustly deprived of what was due
her. It would be, at the very least, merciless
and unchristian to make private respondent
refund the City of Caloocan the amount already
paid to her, only to force her to go through the
same nightmare all over again.

this case. Yet, the City Government of

Caloocan, in a blatant display of malice and
bad faith, refused to comply with the decision.
Now, it has the temerity to come to this Court
once more and continue inflicting injustice on a
hapless citizen, as if all the harm and prejudice
it has already heaped upon respondent
Santiago are still not enough.

This Court will not condone the repudiation of

just obligations contracted by municipal
corporations. On the contrary, we will extend
our aid and every judicial facility to any citizen
in the enforcement of just and valid claims
against abusive local government units.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

for utter lack of merit. The assailed orders of
the trial court dated October 1, 1992, October
8, 1992 and May 7, 1993, respectively, are
AFFIRMED.

Petitioners and their counsels are hereby

warned against filing any more pleadings in
connection with the issues already resolved
with finality herein and in related cases.

Costs against petitioners.

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL vs. COURT OF
APPEALS

At any rate, of paramount importance to us is

that justice has been served. No right of the
public was violated and public interest was
preserved.

Finally, we cannot simply pass over in silence

the deplorable act of the former Mayor of
Caloocan City in refusing to sign the check in
payment of the Citys obligation to private
respondent. It was an open defiance of judicial
processes, smacking of political arrogance, and
a direct violation of the very ordinance he
himself approved. Our Resolution in G.R. No.
98366, City Government of Caloocan vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., dated May 16, 1991,
dismissing the petition of the City of Caloocan
assailing the issuance of a writ of execution by
the trial court, already resolved with finality all
impediments to the execution of judgment in

REGALADO, J.:
Facts: Atty. Felix E. Mendiola served as counsel
for the Municipality of Pililia in a collection suit
for unpaid business taxes, storage permit fee,
mayors permit fee, sanitary inspection fee,
and the cost of the suit against private
respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation
(PPC). The municipality won in the trial court,
and when PPC elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, the SC affirmed the aforesaid
judgment. The judgment became final and
executory and the records were remanded to
the trial court for execution.
In connection with the execution of said
judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a motion
in behalf of the municipality for the
examination of defendant corporation's gross
sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to

1991 for the purpose of computing business

tax.
Defendant
corporation
filed
a
manifestation that Pililla Mayor Nicomedes
Patenia received from it the sum of
P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the
above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme
Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim
documents executed by said mayor. The RTC
denied
the
municipality's
motion
for
examination and execution of judgment on the
ground that the judgment had already been
satisfied.
It was when the case was only when the case
was brought before to the CA that respondent
PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's
authority to represent petitioner municipality.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
having been filed by a private counsel in
violation of law and jurisprudence, but without
prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by
the Municipality of Pililla through the proper
provincial or municipal legal officer.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendiola can
represent the Municipality of Pilila
Held: No. The Court of Appeals is correct in
holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to
file a petition in behalf of and in the name of
the Municipality of Pililla. Section 1683 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent
provinces and provincial subdivisions in
litigation. The provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or
municipal district thereof in any court, except
in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested
in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality or municipal district in question is
a party adverse to the provincial government
or to some other municipality or municipal
district in the same province. When the
interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the
provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the
province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney
may be employed by its council.
Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal
attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality's authority to
employ a private lawyer is expressly limited

only to situations where the provincial fiscal is

disqualified to represent it.

PROVINCE OF CEBU vs. IAC, ATTY.

GARCIA,G.R. No. 72841 January 29,
1987147 SCRA 447
On 1964, while then incumbent Governor
Espina was on official business in Manila, the
Vice-Gov, Almendras and 3 members of the
Provincial Board enacted A Resolution donating
to the City of Cebu an area of over 380
hectares.
The
deed
of
donation
was
immediately executed in behalf of the Province
of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and
accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor
Sergio Osmea,Jr. The document of donation
was prepared and notarized by a private
lawyer.

The donated lots were to be sold by the City of

Cebu to raise funds that would be used to
finance its public improvement projects. Upon
his return from Manila, Governor Espina
disagreed with the donation and to prevent the
sale of the lots, the officers and members of
the Cebu Mayor's League along with some
taxpayers, including Atty. Garcia, filed a case
seeking to have the donation declared illegal,
null and void Named defendants in the suit
were the City of Cebu, City Mayor Sergio
Osmea, Jr. and the Cebu provincial officials
responsible for the donation of the provinceowned lots.

Subsequently, the court dismissed the Case on

the ground that plaintiffs were not the real
parties in interest in the case.

After the city announced the sale of the lots,

Governor Espina, engaged the services of
respondent Garcia, for the annulment of the
deed of donation

The Provincial Board passed a resolution

authorizing the Provincial Attorney, Baguia, to
enter his appearance for the Province of Cebu
and for the incumbent Governor, Vice-Governor

and members of the Provincial Board in this

case.

A compromise agreement was reached

between the province of Cebu and the city of
Cebu.

For services rendered atty, Garcia filed a Notice

of Attorney's Lien, praying that his statement
of claim of attorney's lien in said case be
entered upon the records. To said notice,
petitioner Province of Cebu opposed: the
payment of attorney's fees are not allowed by
law.

TC: in favor of atty garcia; on the basis of

quantum meruit and fixing the amount at
P30,000.00.

Both parties appealed from the decision to the

Court of Appeals. THe CA upheld the TC but
reduced the amount of the fees.

ISSUE: whether the governor may validly

engage the services of a private lawyer and
whether the province may be held liable to pay
the fees.

HELD: Collaboration of a private law firm with

the fiscal and the municipal attorney is not
allowed. Sec.1683 Revised Administrative
Code: The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality. When the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a
province, a special attorney may be employed
by its council

The municipality's authority to employ a

private lawyer is expressly limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent it

Ratio: (1) local government should not be

burdened with the expenses of hiring a private
lawyer; (2) the interests of the municipal
corporation would be best protected if a
government lawyer handles its litigations.
However, the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar are such that the rule (governor
must be authorized by resolution to hire private
lawyer) cannot be applied. The Provincial Board
would never have given such authorization.
The present case, the controversy involved an
intramural fight between the Provincial
Governor on one hand and the members of the
Provincial Board on the other hand. The
Provincial Board would not adopt a resolution
authorizing the Governor to employ Atty. Garcia
to act as counsel for the Province of Cebu for
the purpose of filing and prosecuting a case
against the members to the same Provincial
Board According to the claimant

A strict application of the provisions of the

Revise Administrative Code on the matter
would deprive the plaintiffs in the court below
of redress for a valid grievance.

Respondent counsel's representation of the

Province of Cebu became necessary because of
the Provincial Board's failure or refusal to direct
the bringing of the action to recover the
properties it had donated to the City of Cebu.

Anent the question of liability for respondent

counsel's services, the general rule that an
attorney cannot recover his fees from one who
did not employ him or authorize his
employment, is subject to its own exception.

His authority to appear for and represent

petitioner in litigation, not having been
questioned in the lower court, it will be
presumed on appeal that counsel was properly
authorized to file the complaint and appear for
his client.

We apply a rule in the law of municipal

corporations: "that a municipality may become
obligated upon an implied contract to pay the

reasonable a value of the benefits accepted or

appropriated by it as to which it has the
general power to contract. The petitioner
cannot set up the plea that the contract was
ultra vires and still retain benefits thereunder.
Having regarded the contract as valid for
purposes of reaping some benefits, the
petitioner is estopped to question its validity
for the purposes of denying answerability.

Monday, June 23, 2014

The RTC held that the anesthesiologist

ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the
patient, the surgeon was remiss in his
obligation to provide a good anesthesiologist
and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is
liable for the negligence of the doctors and for
not cancelling the operation after the surgeon
failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held
jointly and severally liable for damages to
petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the
Trial Court.

RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.

ISSUES:
Whether
or
not
the
private
respondents were negligent and thereby
caused the comatose condition of Ramos.

Ponente: Kapunan
HELD:
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure
to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a
surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los
Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka
assured them that he would find a good
anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go
as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for
the
operation,
Dra.
Gutierrez,
the
anesthesiologist botched the administration
of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a
coma and suffer brain damage. The botched
operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz,
sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of
Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the

hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist
for damages. The petitioners showed expert
testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist in not
exercising reasonable care in intubating
Erlinda.
Eyewitnesses
heard
the
anesthesiologist saying Ang hirap ma-intubate
nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki
ang tiyan.

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that

Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.

Yes, private respondents were all negligent and

are solidarily liable for the damages.

RATIO:

Res ipsa loquitur a procedural or evidentiary

rule which means the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself. It is a maxim for the rule that
the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may
permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation, where
ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
complaining party must present expert
testimony to prove that the attending physician
was negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On

the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos
already surrendered her person to the private
respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone
problem, she was neurologically sound and fit.
Then, after the procedure, she was comatose
and brain damagedres ipsa loquitur!the
thing speaks for itself!

Negligence Private respondents were not able

to disprove the presumption of negligence on
their part in the care of Erlinda and their
negligence was the proximate cause of her
condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist
in order to tell whether or not the intubation
was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here].
The Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first
time on the day of the operation which
indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and
which
is
an
act
of
negligence
and
irresponsibility.

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also

negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the captain of the ship in
determining if the anesthesiologist observed
the proper protocols. Also, because he was
late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery.

The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing

that it exercised the diligence of a good father
of the family in hiring and supervision of its
doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent
since they are the one in control of the hiring
and firing of their consultants. While these
consultants are not employees, hospitals still
exert significant controls on the selection and
termination of doctors who work there which is
one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee
reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a
share in the liability.

considered. In view of the damages sought in

the case at bar which, if granted, could result
in personal liability, respondents could not be
deemed to be improperly represented by
private counsel.
Municipality
Appeals

of

Makati

vs.

Court

of

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality
of
Makati
expropriated a portion of land owned by
private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors
Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of
Makati determined the cost of the said land
which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00
minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00.
It issued the corresponding writ of execution
accompanied with a writ of garnishment of
funds of the petitioner which was deposited in
PNB. However, such order was opposed by
petitioner through a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could
neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the
proper appropriation required under the law,
citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v.
Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the
latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner
now filed this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality

of Makati are exempt from garnishment and
levy upon execution.

Mancenido v. CA
G.R. NO. 118605(April 12, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioners, who are public school
teachers, filed a case against the provincial
officials to compel them to pay their claims for
unpaid salary increases. In this petition for
review on certiorari, they argue that the CA
erred in recognizing the authority of the council
of the provincial officials to file a notice of
appeal.

HELD: The SC held that in resolving whether a

local government official may secure the
services of private counsel in an action filed
against him in his official capacity, the nature
of the action and the relief sought are to be

Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the

orders of respondent RTC judge involved the
net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the
funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in
excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund
and thereby are exempted from execution
without the proper appropriation required
under the law. There is merit in this contention.
In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that
public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided for by
statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are

exempt from execution. Absent a showing that

the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating the said amount from
its public funds deposited in their PNB account,
no levy under execution may be validly
effected. However, this court orders petitioner
to pay for the said land which has been in their
use already. This Court will not condone
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal
obligation arising from expropriation of land
they are already enjoying. The State's power of
eminent domain should be exercised within the
bounds of fair play and justice.
Pasay City Government vs. CFI Manila

Held:

All government funds deposited with the PNB

by any agency or instrumentality of the
government, whether by way of general or
special deposit, remain government funds and
may not be subject to garnishment or levy. But,
inasmuch as an ordinance has already been
enacted expressly appropriating the amount of
P613,096.00 of payment to Isip, then the funds
may be garnished
G.R. No. L-37289

April 12, 1989

. Facts:
THE CITY OF NAGA, petitioner,
In 1964, Isip entered into a contract with the
City of Pasay represented by then Mayor Pablo
Cuneta for the construction of a new Pasay City
Hall for the contract price of P4.9 million. Isip
proceeded
with
the
construction
and
accomplished the amount of work equivalent to
P1.7 million. Pasay paid only the total amount
of P1.1 million, leaving a balance of P613,000.
Pasay failed to remit the amount, so Isip filed a
case for specific performance with damages
before CFI Manila. The parties arrived at a draft
amicable agreement wherein it was stated that
Pasay will remit P613,000 to Isip and that Isip
will start the construction work corresponding
to the next stage. The Municipal Board enacted
an ordinance which approved the Compromise
Agreement. CFI approved the compromise
agreement and subsequently issued a writ of
execution. An application for and notice of
garnishment were made and effected upon
Pasay's funds with the PNB. Pasay filed a
motion to quash the writ of execution, alleging
that the Sheriff has no power to levy or garnish
on execution the general funds, specially the
trust funds, of Pasay City. CFI denied the
motion and ordered the enforcement of
garnishment. Hence, Pasay filed a petition for
review before the SC.

Issue:

Are Pasay City funds deposited with PNB

exempt from execution or garnishment?

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and APOLONIO G.
MALENIZA, respondents.

Pelaez, Jalandoni,
petitioner.

Javier

&

Adriano

for

Luis Contreras and Associates for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a Petition to Review by certiorari

the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
81, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 32440-R entitled,
"Apolonio G. Maleniza, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.
City of Naga, Defendant-Appellant," affirming
the Decision of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Camarines Sur dated
June 27, 1962 with however one modification
the grant of indemnity to the City of Naga,
for the improvements it had made on the
athletes' Quarters and the ground floor of the
new grandstand. (Rollo, p. 8). The dispositive
portion of said appellate judgment reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modification,

the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed
with costs against the defendant-appellant,
City of Naga.

The plaintiff-appellee is hereby ordered to

amend his complaint by adding his capacity as
Provincial Governor of the Province of
Camarines Sur and joining the said Province as
co-plaintiff to conform to the evidence within
fifteen (15) days from notice of this decision.
The defendant-appellant is also hereby ordered
to amend its answer, special defenses and
counterclaims to accord with the evidence
within a like period.

MODIFIED. (p. 36, Rollo)

The facts are stated in the decision appealed

from. We quote:

In the general elections of November, 1959

Provincial Governor Juan Trivino a Nacionalista
of Camarines Sur was defeated by the plaintiff,
Apolonio G. Maleniza, a Liberal. The latter won
with a new set of members of the Provincial
Board. Before bowing out of office the
lameduck provincial administration passed
Resolution No. 1103 authorizing Provincial
Governor Trivino to execute a deed of sale
without consideration in favor of the City of
Naga
of
two
parcels
of
land
with
improvements, belonging to the province.
Pursuant to said resolution on November 23,
1959 Provincial Governor Trivino executed two
deeds of sale: one (Exh. G) conveying the title
and possession of a parcel containing 80,000
square meters on which the Camarines Sur
High School complex (classroom buildings,
library building, grandstand, etc.) are erected;
and Page 15 another (Exh. G-1) conveying the
title and possession of a 4 parcel of land
containing 19,044 square meters which is
devoted to horticulture, farming, gardening and
to the study of poultry and pig-raising. The
consideration for each sale is one peso (P1.00)
which has never been paid.

On November 25, 1959 the City of Naga moved

its offices to the athletes' quarters, a newly

constructed building and the ground floor of

the new grandstand, within the High School in
Complex. The police and fire departments and
the assessment division of the city are thus
housed in the ground floor of the grandstand.

The City spent P14,901.14 for improving the

Athletes' Quarter and the ground floor of the
grandstand to make them fit for offices.

On December 9, 1959, Private Respondent

Hon. Apolonio G. Maleniza, as taxpayer and
governor-elect of Camarines Sur filed a
complaint against the Province of Camarines
Sur and the City of Naga. The complaint prays
for the annulment of the two conveyances in
favor of defendant City of Naga of real
properties belonging to defendant Province of
Camarines Sur. The complaint also prays for
damages in the form of specified monthly
rentals and for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain defendants
from
effecting
the
transfer
of
the
"administration" of the said properties from the
Province of Camarines Sur to the City of Naga.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff is a

taxpayer and governor-elect of the Province of
Camarines Sur and as such "has an interest in
his private as well as in his official capacity in
the higher education of youth and in the
properties of the said province." (Rollo, p 38,
Defendant-Appellant's Brief)

Plain copies of the documents are attached to

the complaint which contain similar items
except the descriptions of the two different
parcels of land which are respectively set forth
therein. The said documents purport to be
public documents. They provide that the
properties respectively described therein are
sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed by J.F.
Trivino Governor of the Province of Camarines
Sur, pursuant to the authority granted upon a
resolution of the Provincial Board of the
Province of Camarines Sur, by way of Absolute
Sale in favor of Page 16 the City of Naga. The
said documents also provide that, from the
date thereon, November 23, 1959, possession
and dominion of the said properties are
"hereby ceded to the City of Naga, and the

lawful enjoyment of the same is hereby

warranted." (Defendant-Appellant's Brief, pp. 34, Rollo, p. 38).

The conveyances of the said properties in favor

of the City of Naga are alleged to be

Null and Void ab initio for they are against the

law and public policy, since as the properties of
the Province of Camarines Sur devoted to
public use, they cannot be the subject matter
of contracts for they are outside the commerce
of man, and as donations of real properties
they have not been accepted in public
documents by the defendant, City of Naga."
(Defendant-Appellants' Brief, p. 5; Rollo, p. 38).

The defendant Provincial Board (old) moved to

dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
does not state a cause of action; that the
plaintiff has no personality to bring the action
nor the legal capacity to sue; and that the
sales sought to be annulled are subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines
hence, the action is premature RA pp. 57-58).
The said motion was denied and defendant
board was required to file an answer to the
complaint. (Order of December 26, 1959, lbid.,
pp. 59-60) In the interim plaintiff Apolonio G.
Maleniza and the newly elected members
assumed office as Provincial Governor and
members of the Provincial Board in January,
1960 and on January 29 passed Resolution, No.
42, S. of 1960 (Exh. 1), revoking Resolution No.
1103, S. of 1959.

Understandably, the old Provincial Board

having ceased to exist, did not file an answer
to the complaint as required by the court a quo
and on March 26, 1960, it was declared in
default. (Ibid., pp. 94-95) (Rollo, p. 24)

The City of Naga filed its answer, alleging lack

of knowledge of the material averment of the
complaint and setting up affirmative and
special defenses that the plaintiff has no
personality to bring the action nor legal
capacity to sue; that the complaint states no
cause of action; that the sales sought to be
annulled are subject to the approval of the

President of the Philippines; therefore, the

action is premature.

It also filed a counterclaim for damages against

the plaintiff which the latter denies specifically.

In the interim on petition of plaintiff, a writ of

preliminary injunction was issued, enjoining the
City of Naga or its agents from occupying the
properties in question except the ground 4 1
floor of the new grandstand and the new
building (Athletes' Quarters) and the old
Provincial Board or its agents from i
transferring
the
administration
of
the
Camarines Sur High School to the City. (Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated January 5, 1960,
R.A. pp. 71-75, Rollo, p. 2)

The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to

intervene on the ground that the Camarines
Sur Trade School which is located on one of the
lots conveyed to the City of Naga, has been
converted into a National School of Arts and
Trade by R.A. No. 825; and that, as a
prerequisite to the conversion, the Province of
Camarines
Sur has
been required to
immediately
transfer
to
the
National
Government the present School Site buildings
etc., belonging to the Camarines Sur Trade
School. After negotiation between the National
Government and the City of Naga the latter
agreed to waive whatever rights it has over the
portion occupied as school site of the
Camarines Sur Trade School buildings, etc., and
authorized the city attorney to make the
corresponding manifestation of waiver, which
he did in February, 1960. (Rollo, p. 25)

Upon the joinder of the issues, the case was

tried. In the course of the trial on June 7, 1961
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Nepomuceno
appeared for the plaintiff. The plaintiff was also
represented by Attorney Luis Contreras. The
city attorney at once objected to the
appearance of Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Nepomuceno because previous stand of the
office of the Provincial Fiscal, as shown in its
motion to dismiss the complaint, is inconsistent
with his (Nepomuceno's) advocacy as one of
the counsel of the plaintiff. Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Nepomuceno countered by saying that

he is now appearing for the Provincial Governor

(Plaintiff-Maleniza). The City Attorney rejoined
that in that case it is necessary to amend the
complaint since the original allegation is to the
effect that plaintiff Maleniza filed the same in
his capacity as a private citizen and Governorelect. The court a quo permitted Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Nepomuceno "to appear for
the Provincial Governor, although it is not
alleged in the pleadings that Honorable
Apolonio Maleniza is not (sic) the Provincial
Governor at the time, but only a governor-elect
and that cannot be denied." (Rollo, p. 26)

In its memorandum filed in the court a quo the

City of Naga prayed, inter alia, that in the
event that the sales are annulled, the province
be ordered to pay P20,000 for the value of its
improvements. (Rollo, p. 26)

Hence, this petition,

assigned errors.

with

the

following

(A)
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE TWO CONVEYANCES
OF LAND IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.

(B)
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST THE
CITY OF NAGA (Rollo, p. 9).

We find the petition meritless.

Section 2068 of the Revised Administrative

Code provides that,
After trial the court a quo virtually decided the
case in favor of the Province of Camarines Sur
in its decision dated June 27, 1962, the
decretal portion reading as follows:

IN
VIEW
OF
ALL
THE
FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered: (a) declaring Resolution No. 1103
series of 1969, and deeds of sale (Exhs. G and
G-1) of the properties described in paragraph III
of the complaint, null and void; (b) ordering the
defendant, City of Naga, to vacate the
premises in question; (c) ordering the
defendant, City of Naga, to pay the Province of
Camarines Sur the sum of P600.00 per month
as damages for the use of the Athletes' Quarter
and the ground floor of the new grandstand
since November 25, 1959, until the final
restitution thereof; (d) declaring the writ of
preliminary injunction permanent; and (e)
ordering the defendant, City of Naga to pay the
costs. (Rollo, p. 8)

Appeal was timely made by the herein

petitioner, City of Naga, to the Respondent
Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R No.
32440. On July 30, 1973, the Respondent
Honorable Court of Appeals, Special Sixth
Division, promulgated a Decision affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Camarines Sur.

When the government of a province is a party

to a deed or i instrument conveying the title of
real property, such deed or instrument shall be
executed on behalf of the said Government by
the Provincial Governor, upon resolution of the
provincial board, and with the approval of the
President. (Sec. 2068, Rev. Adm. Code)

Without the needed Presidential approval, it is

evident that the conveyances were void. Note
that up to now, said approval has not been
obtained.

The respondent Court cannot likewise be

faulted for awarding damages to the City of
Naga, for the improvements it had introduced
on the premises. To eliminate this award would
certainly be less than fair. The damages can be
set off against the rentals to be paid by the
City.

In the Supplemental Petition filed in this Court

after the filing of the Original Petition,
petitioner raises two points; the termination of
office of the private respondent as governor,
and the transfer of the lots to the National
Government. Since both points are factual in
nature, and since the pleadings filed in the

courts below do not refer to them, We cannot

consider them now, since Our Court is not a
trier of facts.

WHEREFORE,
the
petition
and
the
supplemental petitions are both DENIED, for
lack of merit.

CITY
OF
ANGELES
VS
CA,
TIMOG
SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 97882. 1996
In a Deed of Donation , private respondent
donated to the City of Angeles, 51 parcels of
land situated in Barrio Pampang, City of
Angeles (50,676 sq m). The amended deed
provides that: The properties donated shall
be devoted and utilized solely for the site of
the Angeles City Sports Center. Any change or
modification in the basic design or concept of
said Sports Center must have the prior written
consent of the DONOR. The properties donated
are devoted and described as open spaces of
the DONORs subdivision, and to this effect, the
DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation,
releases the DONOR and/or assumes any and
all obligations and liabilities appertaining to the
properties donated .On 1988, petitioners
started the construction of a drug rehabilitation
center on a portion of the donated land. Upon
learning thereof, private respondent protested
such action for being violative of the terms and
conditions and also offered another site for the
rehabilitation center. However, petitioners
rejected the alternative because the site was
too isolated and had no electric and water
facilities. Private respondent filed a complaint
for breach of the conditions imposed in the
amended deed of donation and seeking the
revocation
of
the
donation.
Petitioners
admitted
the
commencement
of
the
construction but alleged that the conditions
imposed in the amended deed were contrary to
Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962,
otherwise known as the Subdivision Ordinance
of the Municipality of Angeles.
ISSUE: Whether a subdivision owner/developer
is legally bound under Presidential Decree No.
1216 to donate to the city or municipality the
open space allocated exclusively for parks,
playground and recreational use.
HELD: PD 1216 (amending PD 957) defines
open space as an area reserved exclusively for

parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools,

roads, places of worship, hospitals, health
centers, barangay centers and other similar
facilities and amenities
.
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds
and recreational use shall be non-alienable
public lands, and non-buildable. No portion of
the parks and playgrounds donated thereafter
shall be converted to any other purpose or
purposes. Upon their completion x xx, the
roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall
be donated by the owneror developer to the
city or municipality and it shall be mandatory
for the local government to accept;provided,
however, that the parks and playgrounds may
be donated to the Homeowners Association of
the project with the consent of the city or
municipality concerned. x xx. (amended sec.
31, PD 957) It is clear from the aforequoted
amendment that it is no longer optional on the
part of the subdivision owner/developer to
donate the open space for parks and
playgrounds; rather there is now a legal
obligation to donate the same. Although there
is a proviso that the donation of the parks and
playgrounds may be made to the homeowners
association of the project with the consent of
the
city
of
municipality
concerned,
nonetheless, the owner/developer is still
obligated under the law to donate. Such option
does not change the mandatory character of
the provision. The donation has to be made
regardless of which donee is picked by the
owner/developer. The consent requirement
before the same can be donated to the
homeowners association emphasizes this
point. We hold that any condition may be
imposed in the donation, so long as the same is
not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. The contention of
petitioners that the donation should be
unconditional because it is mandatory has no
basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that
the donation of the open space for parks and
playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule
that it should be so is tantamount to unlawfully
expanding the provisions of the decree. In the
case at bar, one of the conditions imposed in
the Amended Deed of Donation is that the
donee should build a sports complex on the
donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly requires
that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross are a allotted
for parks and playgrounds is non-buildable,
then the obvious question arises whether or
not such condition was validly imposed and is

binding on the donee. It is clear that the non

buildable character applies only to the 3.5%
to 9% area set by law. If there is any excess
land over and above the3.5% to 9% required
by the decree, which is also used or allocated
for parks, playgrounds and recreational
purposes, it is obvious that such excess area is
not covered by the non-buildability restriction.
Inasmuch as the construction and operation of
the drug rehabilitation center has been
established to be contrary to law, the said
center should be removed or demolished. At
this juncture, we hasten to add that this Court
is and has always been four-square behind the
governments efforts to eradicate the drug
scourge in this country. But the end never
justifies the means, and however laudable the
purpose of the construction in question, this
Court cannot and will not countenance an
outright and continuing violation of the laws of
the land, especially when committed by public
officials.

Case Digest: Fuguracion V. Libi, GR No.155688

(2007)
Facts: In 1948, the Cebu City government
expropriated a parcel of land of Galileo
Figuracion to be turned into a portion of N.
Escario Street. In 1989, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod approved the reconveyance of the
unused portion of the lot to the successor-ininterest, Isagani Figuracion. A new TCT was
issued to Isagani Figuracion. The Spouses Libi
were owners of an adjacent lot and has been
using the said lot as access to the road. They
refused to vacate the lot despite demand. The
lower court ordered that the Spouses Libi
remove the fence they have erected on the
said lot. The Spouses Libi filed for easement,
then amended their complaint and shifted
cause of action to one for the annulment of
sale to Figuracion with damages.
Issue: WON the action by the Spouses Libi to
annul the reconveyance of the lot to Figuracion
is proper.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the Spouses Libi
were not the real-parties-in-interest to annul
the TCT of Figuracion, since they are not
themselves claiming title to or possession of
the lot. Libi alleged that they bought the
adjacent lot in the belief that they had an
outlet to N. Escario Street through the lot
owned by the Cebu City government. Clearly,

they have no interest in the title of the lot.

Reversion is a proceeding by which the State
seeks the return of lands of the public domain
through the cancellation of private title
erroneously or fraudulently issued over it. The
action should be in the name of the State.
Thus, Spouses Libi cannot be considered the
proper parties therein.
The Spouses sole interest is the use of the
property as access to N. Escaro
Street. Such interest is tangential to any issue
regarding ownership or possession of the
property. Hence, it is not sufficient to vest in
them the legal standing to sue for reversion of
the property. They should have maintained the
action for easement. The wisdom and intent of
the City Council to recognize the right of
Isagani Figuracion to repurchase the lot cannot
be gainsaid. The City of Cebu has the power
and authority to sell the expropriated property
that is no longer needed for that purpose for
which it was intended. The Spouses Libi not
only lacked the legal personality but also have
no legal basis to challenge the reconveyance.
G.R. No. 150866

March 6, 2006

MANUEL MALLARI and MILLIE MALLARI,

Petitioners,
vs.
REBECCA ALSOL, Respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1
assailing the 9 August 2001 Decision2 and 12
November 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52681. The Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the 8
November 1995 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch
27 ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 870-AF.

The Antecedent Facts

Stalls No. 7 and 8 of the Supermarket Section

of the Cabanatuan City Public Market were
awarded to and occupied by Abelardo Mallari
("Abelardo"),
father
of
Manuel
Mallari
("Manuel") and Rebecca Alsol ("respondent").
Before Abelardos death on 16 July 1986, he
gave the stalls to Manuel and respondent.
Manuel and his wife Millie Mallari ("petitioners")
occupied Stall No. 7 while respondent and her
husband Zacarias Alsol occupied Stall No. 8.

In July 1988, respondents daughter became

sick and the Alsol family had to stay in Manila
for two months for the medical treatment. They
returned to Cabanatuan City in September
1988 only to find out that petitioners were
already occupying Stall No. 8. The partition
between Stalls No. 7 and 8 had been removed
and respondents merchandise and things were
already gone. Petitioners refused respondents
demand to vacate Stall No. 8.

Respondent sought the help of the City Market

Committee ("Committee"). On 5 May 1989, the
Committee passed Kapasiyahan Blg. 1, s-1989
granting Stall No. 7 to Manuel and Stall No. 8 to
respondent. On 4 June 1990, respondent and
the City Government of Cabanatuan ("City
Government"), represented by City Mayor
Honorato C. Perez ("Mayor Perez"), executed a
Contract of Lease ("Lease Contract"). The
Lease Contract granted respondent the right to
occupy Stall No. 8 for a monthly rental of P316
subject to increase or decrease in accordance
with the rules and ordinances of the City
Government.

However, petitioners still refused to vacate

Stall No. 8. Instead, they filed an action for
annulment of the Lease Contract before the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch
29 ("Branch 29"). The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 789-AF. In its Order of 25 May
1990, Branch 29 dismissed the case for nonexhaustion of administrative remedies and on
the additional ground that the Committee is
not the proper party to the case.5

On 17 October 1990, respondent filed an action

for recovery and possession before the trial
court. On 8 November 1995, the trial court

rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing

considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, by:

a) Declaring the plaintiff as the rightful

awardee of Stall No. 8, Building A, Cabanatuan
Public Market and ordering the defendants, or
any person acting in their behalf, to vacate
said Stall No. 8 and relinquish the possession
thereof to the plaintiff;

b) Condemning the defendants to pay to the

plaintiff the sum of P18,000.00, representing
the value of the merchandize [sic] and items
taken by the defendants from said Stall No. 8;

c) Ordering the defendants to pay to the

plaintiff the following amounts:

(1) P10,000.00 - as attorneys fees; and

(2) P20,000.00 - as exemplary and punitive

damages; and

d) Awarding costs in favor of the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioners appealed the trial courts Decision

to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 9 August 2001 Decision, the Court of

Appeals partly granted the appeal and affirmed
the trial courts Decision with modification. The
Court of Appeals sustained respondents right

to occupy Stall No. 8 by virtue of the Lease

Contract
she
entered
with
the
City
Government. However, the Court of Appeals
deleted the award of actual damages
amounting to P18,000 in favor of respondent
on the ground that there was no sufficient
proof of the loss. The Court of Appeals also
deleted the award of exemplary damages to
respondent amounting to P20,000.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the

Court of Appealss Decision. In its 12 November
2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether respondent is the proper awardee

of Stall No. 8.

2. Whether the Lease Contract executed

between respondent and the City Government
is valid.

3. Whether respondent is entitled to attorneys

fees.

The Ruling of This Court

The petition has no merit.

Ruling on Whether Respondent is the Proper

Awardee of

Stall No. 8 is Premature

The Court of Appeals pointed out that when the

Committee awarded Stall No. 8 to respondent,
petitioners filed an appeal before the Secretary
of Finance questioning the award. In their
appeal, petitioners alleged that respondent
failed to comply with the conditions set by the
Committee. The appeal was still pending when
the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed
Decision.
Petitioners
admitted
in
their
Memorandum the pendency of the appeal.7
Hence, the Court may not at this time rule on
whether respondent is the proper awardee of
Stall No. 8. Any resolution on this question will
preempt whatever ruling the Secretary of
Finance may issue on the pending appeal.

Validity of the Lease Contract

Respondent and the City Government executed

the Lease Contract on 4 June 1990 prior to
petitioners filing of appeal before the
Secretary of Finance. The pendency of the
appeal does not affect the validity of the lease.
As the Court of Appeals ruled, the Lease
Contract remains valid until revoked by the City
Government or annulled by the proper court in
a proper action.

Petitioners insist that the Lease Contract is not

valid because the City Treasurer should have
signed the Lease Contract and not Mayor
Perez. Petitioners allege that the Court of
Appeals erred in applying Republic Act No.
71608 ("RA 7160"), otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which took
effect on 1 January 1992 or long after the
execution of the Lease Contract on 4 June
1990. Petitioners further allege that granting
Mayor Perez has the authority to sign the Lease
Contract, Mayor Perez did not appear before
the notary public who notarized the Lease
Contract. Hence, the Lease Contract did not
produce any right in favor of respondent.

The Court agrees with petitioners that RA 7160

is not the applicable law. Instead, the Court of
Appeals should have applied Batas Pambansa
Blg. 3379 ("BP 337") or the old Local
Government Code. Still, even under BP 337,
city mayors have the authority to sign
contracts on behalf of city governments.

Under Section 171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of

BP 337, the powers and duties of the city
mayor are as follows:

Sec. 171. Chief Executive;

Powers and Duties.

Compensation,

(g) Represent the city in its business

transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on
the city treasury and all bonds, contracts and
obligations of the city;

(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service

law, rules and regulations, all officers and
employees of the city, whose appointments are
not otherwise provided in this Code;

xxxx

(2) The city mayor shall:

(a) Take care that the laws of the Philippines

and the ordinances and resolutions of the city
are duly observed and enforced;

(b) Maintain peace and order in the city, and in

pursuance thereof, he shall be entitled to
possess and carry the necessary firearms
within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to
existing rules and regulations on the
possession and carrying of firearms;

(c) Prepare and submit to the sangguniang

panlungsod the annual budget of the city for
the ensuing calendar year on the date and in
the manner provided and prescribed by law;

(d) See to it that executive officers and

employees of the city faithfully discharge their
respective duties, and for the purpose, cause, if
necessary, the institution and filing of
appropriate criminal or administrative action;

(e) Furnish the sangguniang panlungsod from

time to time, such information and recommend
such measures as he shall deem appropriate or
necessary;

(f) Examine the books, records, and papers of

all offices, officers, agents or employees of the
city;

(i) Cause to be instituted judicial proceedings

to recover property and funds of the city
wherever found, and cause to be defended all
suits against the city, or otherwise protect its
interests;

(j) As soon as possible but not later than March

31 of each year, prepare and submit to the
Ministry of Local Government an annual report
covering the operation of the city government
during the preceding calendar year;

(k) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of

the city are collected, and the city funds
applied in accordance with law or ordinance to
the payment and settlement of the city
expenses and obligations;

(l) Exempt, upon the recommendation of

superintendent of city schools, deserving
financially disadvantaged students from
payment of tuition and other school fees or
part thereof;

the
but
the
any

(m) Take such emergency measures as may be

necessary to protect the public from fires,
prevent and mitigate the effects of floods,
storms,
earthquakes
and
other
public
calamities;

(n) Grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law,

city licenses or permits, and revoke the same
for violation of law or ordinance or the
conditions upon which they are granted;

(o) Require owners of houses, buildings or

other structures constructed without the
necessary permit or in violation of existing law
or ordinance, to remove or demolish such
houses, buildings or structures within thirty
days, or cause its removal or demolition at the
expense of the owner;

(p) Grant permits to hold benefits, excepting

prohibited games of chance, for public and
charitable purposes without requiring approval
of the Ministry of Social Services and
Development;

(q) Act on the commutation of vacation, sick

and maternity leaves and of trips outside the
city of chiefs of offices appointed by him;

(r) Initiate appropriate action or proceedings

against any national government official or
employee rendering service within the city to
draw the attention of the corresponding
superior officer to the dereliction of the official
or employee involved;

(s) Authorize payment of medical attendance,

necessary transportation, subsistence, and
hospital fees of officials and employees of the
city who suffer any injury arising out of or in
the course of their employment. Absence in
such cases shall not be charged against any
leave credit;

(t) Approve the commutation of such

transportation
allowances
as
may
be
authorized by law for chiefs of offices;

(u) Direct the preparation and formulation of

the development plan and program of the city,
and upon approval of the sangguniang
panlungsod,
direct
and
supervise
the
implementation and execution of the same;

(v) Call a meeting of any or all of the officers

and employees of the city; and

(w) Perform such other duties and exercise

such other powers as may be prescribed by law
or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the powers and duties of

the city treasurer are enumerated under
Section 181(4), Article Five, Chapter 3 of BP
337, thus:

Sec.
181.
Appointment,
Qualifications,
Compensation, Powers and Duties. x x x x

(4) The city treasurer shall:

(a) Advise the city mayor, the sangguniang

panlungsod, other city officials, and the
national officers concerned with the disposition
of property of the city government;

(b) Collect taxes throughout the city, including

national, provincial and municipal taxes and
other revenues authorized by law;

(c) Take custody of and exercise supervision

over all city funds and property, including city
buildings and grounds and, subject to the
approval of the city mayor, assign rooms to city
officers and other public officials who by law
are entitled to office space in the city buildings;

(d) Make annual reports to the mayor of all

income disbursements, and acquisition and
disposition of all assets of the city during the
period, and furnish copies thereof to the
sangguniang panlungsod and to all department
heads of the city government;

(e) Take charge of the disbursement of all city

and other funds the custody of which may be
entrusted to him by law or other competent
authority;

(f) Upon designation by the Minister of Finance,

act as treasury fiscal examiner in the city under

the administrative authority of the Treasurer of

the Philippines in accordance with pertinent
rules and regulations;

(g) Inspect, under the authority of the

sangguniang panlungsod, the operation of
public utilities belonging to, leased or operated
by, the city government, such as telegraph and
telephone, land and water transportation,
waterworks, electric-light plants, irrigation
systems,
bonded
warehouses,
ferries,
slaughterhouses, and other commercial and
industrial enterprises of the city and all private
commercial and industrial establishments
within the city in relation to city tax ordinances;
and

(h) Perform such other duties as may be

required by law or ordinance.

Applying BP 337, there is nothing in the powers

and functions of the city treasurer that gives
the city treasurer authority to sign contracts for
the city government. Instead, Paragraph (g),
Section 171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of BP
337 clearly provides that the city mayor shall
represent the city in its business transactions
and sign contracts of the city. Hence, Mayor
Perez has the authority to sign the Lease
Contract on behalf of the City Government.
Even under the Revenue Code of Cabanatuan
City of 1974, the authority of the city treasurer
is limited to direct and immediate supervision,
administration
and
control
over
the
Cabanatuan
public
markets
and
its
personnel.10 The city treasurer has the
authority to designate spaces and stalls to
vendors,11 but the authority does not include
signing of contracts on behalf of the City
Government.

Petitioners also allege that the Lease Contract

is not valid because Mayor Perez did not
appear before the notary public who notarized
the document.

We cannot sustain this argument.

Notarization converts a private document into

a public document.12 However, the nonappearance of the parties before the notary
public who notarized the document does not
necessarily nullify nor render the parties
transaction void ab initio.13 Thus:

x x x Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the

necessity of a public document is only for
convenience, not for validity or enforceability.
Failure to follow the proper form does not
invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in
the form prescribed by law, the parties can
merely compel each other to observe that
form, once the contract has been perfected.
This is consistent with the basic principle that
contracts are obligatory in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all
essential requisites are present.14

Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite

Mayor Perezs failure to appear before the
notary public.

Award of Attorneys Fees

Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation,

attorneys fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendants act or omission has

compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution

against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or

proceeding against the plaintiff;

2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 52681.

OSMEA vs.COA

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and

evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable
claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of

household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;

G.R. No. 110045

November 29, 1994
NARVASA, C.J.:
FACTS: The controversy had its origin in the
stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo
de la Cerna, the son of the de la Cerna
Spouses. He was rushed to the Cebu City
Medical Center, but unfortunately died that
night. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would
not have died were it not for the ineptitude,
gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and
incompetence of the medical staff of the
Medical Center.

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens

compensation and employers liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil

liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are

awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it

just and equitable that attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorneys fees and expenses

of litigation must be reasonable.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the

award of attorneys fees is justified. Petitioners
refused to vacate and turn over Stall No. 8 to
respondent despite respondents repeated
demands and the existence of the Lease
Contract between respondent and the City
Government. Respondent was left with no
recourse but to litigate to protect her interest.
Hence, we sustain the award of attorneys fees
amounting to P10,000 to respondent.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM

the 9 August 2001 Decision and 12 November

The de la Cerna Spouses accordingly instituted

in the RTC of Cebu City a civil action, for
recovery of damages, based Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Named defendants were the city of
Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five
physicians of the Cebu City Medical Center. The
City of Cebu which, according to the complaint,
operates, maintains, and manages the Cebu
City Medical Center, was impleaded as
defendant on the theory that as employer of
the alleged negligent doctors, it was vicariously
responsible for the latters negligence since it
failed to exercise due care and vigilance over
the doctors while acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, to prevent them from
causing the death of Reynaldo. The Civil Code
provision relied upon by plaintiffs, pertinently
reads as follows:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article

2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those persons
for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx

After the action had been pending for some

time, negotiations for an amicable settlement
were commenced, which culminated in an
agreement designed to put an end to the
controversy in a manner acceptable to the
parties.

Since the compromise agreement included a

provision for the payment of the sum of
P30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by defendant City
of Cebu, the agreement was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City. The
sanggunian authorized the City Budget Officer
to include in Supplemental Budget of the
City . . .the amount of P30,000.00 for financial
assistance to the parents of the late Reynaldo
de la Cerna

Hence this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: WON COA commited grave abuse of

discretion in disallowing the payment of
P30,000.00 for the compromise agreement
between the parties herein involved.

HELD: Petition granted. The assailed COA

decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
Respondent COA is ORDERED to approve and
allow in audit the appropriation of P30,000.00
of Cebu City approved in connection with the
judicial compromise executed by it in the Civil
before the RTC of Cebu City

YES
The agreement was also submitted to the RTC
which rendered a judgment (f)inding the same
to be in conformity with law, morals and public
policy and enjoining the parties to comply
strictly with the terms and conditions thereof.

About 11 months later, however respondent

COA disallowed the financial assistance thus
granted to the spouses de la Cerna, saying that
no real or substantial relation to the public
health, morals, or general welfare of the
community can be perceived from the act of
giving such financial assistance.

The City of Cebu filed an MR, and the same

denied
due
course
by
respondent
Commission. Respondent ruled that the motion
was filed more than a year after receipt by the
City government of notice of its Decision and
therefore the decision had already become
final and executory.

In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Osmea

has come to this Court ascribing grave abuse
of discretion to the COA and its Members in so
disallowing
the
citys
appropriation
of
P30,000.00 made conformably with the
compromise agreement in the civil suit against
the City, embodied in due course in the Trial
Courts judgment.

There is to be sure no question that under the

Constitution, respondent COA has the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures, and uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by,
or pertaining to the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.

A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction

that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical
agreement by the Civil Code and is therein
dealt with in some detail. A compromise,
declares Article 2208 of said Code, is a
contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put
an end to one already commenced. The Civil
Code not only defines and authorizes
compromises, it in fact encourages them in
civil actions.

The participation by the City in negotiations for

an amicable settlement of a pending litigation
and its eventual execution of a compromise
relative thereto, are indubitably within its
authority and capacity as a public corporation;
and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is
involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate

transaction, not only recognized but even

encouraged by law.

comply strictly with the terms and conditions

thereof. 23

That the City of Cebu complied with the

relevant formalities contemplated by law can
hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement
was submitted to its legislative council, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it
conformably with its established rules and
procedure, particularly the stipulation for the
payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna
family. Neither may it be disputed that since,
as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the
power to sue and be sued, it has the authority
to settle or compromise suits, as well as the
obligation to pay just and valid claims against
it.

This judicial compromise is conclusive and

binding on all the parties, including the City of
Cebu. It is enforceable by execution, as above
stressed. There was no reason whatever to
object to it, much less disallow any
disbursement therein stipulated. It should have
been approved as a matter of course.

Obviously, respondent refused to take account

of the foregoing legal principles in relation to
the antecedents of the provision in the
supplemental budget of the City for payment of
P30,000.00. It failed to realize that payment
thereof was part of the consideration, not
merely for the settlement of a claim, but for
the settlement of an actual controversy, and
constituted one of the reciprocal concessions
which the law considers the very heart and
life of every compromise.

The Court shall endeavor to persuade the

litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair
compromise. And in line with this policy, the
Code directs

By making reciprocal concessions, the parties

in the civil case before the trial court put an
end to the action in a manner acceptable to all
of them. The City thus eliminated the
contingency of being made to assume heavier
liability in said suit for damages instituted
against it in connection with its operation and
management of the Cebu City Medical Center,
activities being undertaken by it in its
proprietary
(as
distinguished
from
its
government) functions and in accordance with
which it may be held liable ex contractu or ex
delito, for the negligent performance of its
corporate, proprietary or business functions.

It is noteworthy that the compromise in

question was approved by, and embodied in
the judgment of, the Court, which pronounced
it to be in conformity with law, morals and
public policy and enjoined the parties to

NOTES:

Article 2029 of the Civil Code states:

(a) the suspension, pursuant to the Rules of

Court, of every civil action or proceeding:

(1) if willingness to discuss a possible

compromise is expressed by one or both
parties, or

(2) if it appears that one of the parties, before

the
commencement
of
the action or
proceeding, offered to discuss a possible
compromise but the other party refused the
offer, as well as

(b) the mitigation of the damages to be paid

by the losing party who has shown a sincere
desire for a compromise.

The law regards compromises as standing on a

higher plane than ordinary agreements, for it
declares them, once entered into, to constitute
res judicata, although judicial execution thereof
is permitted only with respect to judicial
compromises.