A.C. No.

6198
September 15, 2006
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for having uttered a
falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002
hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an
agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now
receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and thereafter
ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and "file the appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such
pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction
of justice,"5 was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never
entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain
his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement. 8 Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to
settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial" 9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity")
had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant. 11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely
stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 12 and recommending that he be "suspended
from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three months." 13 This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of
Governors on August 30, 2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at
all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth
and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of
ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law." 17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done.
From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the
hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement
that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade
responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to
complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, 19 cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an
unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a
presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the
light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial," 21perhaps it is not
unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed
agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing
in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact
that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor 22 forbids recourse to such a
tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the
case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's
recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to
determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would
be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge
Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his
suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be
going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the
practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few
circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the
falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be
considered as a mitigating circumstance.23 And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance. 24

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not
enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion
that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS.He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate General's
Service.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.

A.C. No. 3731

September 7, 2007
MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant) filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for "obstructing,
disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court,
and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and
dilatory tactics."
The Facts
Complainant alleged the following:
1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the Department of Agrarian Reform who represented Fernando
Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases which raised the same issues.1Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a land owned by complainants spouse
and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from
agricultural to residential. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of
disturbance compensation.2 The RTCs judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals3 and the Supreme Court.4
2. Respondent, as Tanliocos counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. The RTC dismissed the
complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of action.5
3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The case raised the same
issues of conversion and disturbance compensation.6
4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since she misused the rules of procedure through forumshopping to obstruct the administration of justice.7
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to comment on the complaint lodged against her.8
After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Comment,9 respondent submitted her Comment alleging the following:
1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also not authorized to prosecute the disbarment suit. 10
2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the "Attorneys Oath" and performed duties in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.11
3. Respondents client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal remedies to obtain benefits secured for him by law.12
On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant alleged that respondent did not confront the issues of her disbarment squarely but
raised issues that were decided upon with finality by the courts. 13
On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder within 10 days from notice. 14
On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June 1992 stating that respondent failed to comply with the 25 March 1992 Court
Resolution to file a Rejoinder.15
On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for failure to comply with
the Courts 25 March 1992 Resolution. The Court also required respondent to Comment on the complainants 2 June 1992 Manifestation. 16
On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging that she had substantially complied with the Courts orders relative to her
defenses. She advised the Court that she had transferred to the Public Attorneys Office and since she was no longer a "BALA lawyer," the cases
involved in this proceeding had become moot and academic.17
On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the administrative case against respondent "has not been mooted and nothing set out
in her Manifestation excuses her failure to obey this Courts Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992." 18 The Court had also resolved
to impose a fine of P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992
Resolutions.19
On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation stating that respondent had not complied with the Courts orders. 20
On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest of respondent for detention at the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that respondent should comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions. 21
On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI detained respondent for five days and released her on 25 October 1993. 22
On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for hearing and decision. 23
On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder. Respondent claimed that complainant had no legal personality to file this case. 24 Respondent
also alleged that she was merely protecting the interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of office. Respondent contended that
"she had comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of being disciplined by the latter if only to impart truth and justice." 25
On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating Commissioner Jose) submitted his report and
recommendation to the IBP. Investigating Commissioner Jose enumerated respondents violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility that
rendered her unfit to continue the practice of law:
1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an obstruction of justice. 26
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The duplication or multiplication of suits should be avoided, 27 and respondents acts
were tantamount to forum-shopping which is a reprehensible manipulation of court processes and proceedings. 28
3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at everybody during the hearing on 25 May 1995. 29 The want of intention is not an
excuse for the disrespectful language used.
On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 dated 30 March 1996. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved Investigating Commissioner Joses recommendation that respondent be "suspended indefinitely from the
practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets and requirements
of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of law." 30 Governor Angel R. Gonzales recommended
her "outright disbarment."31
In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the IBP Resolution suspending respondent indefinitely.32
On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to circularize the resolution of the IBP
dated 30 March 1996 suspending respondent indefinitely from the practice of law.33
On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, issued Circular No. 30-99 informing all courts that respondent had
been suspended indefinitely.

On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Consider the Case Closed and Terminated. Respondent apologized for her demeanor and
prayed that the suspension be lifted.34
On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for report and recommendation. 35
On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating Commissioner Raval) conducted a hearing. Respondent
claimed that she did not receive any notice of the OCAs Circular on her indefinite suspension. 36 Respondent alleged that the Court Resolution
which she received merely noted the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite suspension. 37 Respondent claimed that she only knew of the suspension
when she filed an application for a judicial position in Mandaluyong City.38
In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong City despite her suspension because she
believed that a notation by the Court in the 20 January 1997 Resolution did not mean an implementation of the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite
suspension.39
Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another hearing was held on 19 September 2003. Complainants counsel asserted that
respondent had been practicing law in the midst of her suspension and this constituted a violation of the suspension order which she wanted to be
lifted.40 Investigating Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid ground to lift the suspension order.41 Respondent requested that her
detention for five days at the NBI be converted into a five-year suspension, one year for every day of detention such that she would have served
five years of indefinite suspension.42
Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the parties to file simultaneously their Verified Position Papers. 43
In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that respondents motion did not state valid grounds to convince the Court to lift the
suspension order. Complainant stated that by continuing to practice law, "she is flaunting her defiance of the Supreme Court by showing that she
can hoodwink another branch of government."44Complainant also prayed for respondents disbarment due to the gravity of her offense. 45
In respondents Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-interest since the property that was litigated was owned by
complainants wife. She asserted that she never betrayed her clients cause, she was never unfaithful to her oath, and it was complainant who filed
this case for harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be considered closed and terminated due to lack of merit. 46
Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a Resolution in a Preliminary Investigation case which
she handled. Respondent contended that in this Preliminary Investigation case, she recommended its dismissal because the offended party was not
the real party-in-interest.47
Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the personality to file the disbarment complaint against her; hence, it should have been
dismissed outright.48
After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-229 dated 16 April 2004. The IBP
adopted Investigating Commissioner Ravals Report and Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for her "manifest flagrant misconduct in
disobeying the SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension." 49
As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which recommended respondents indefinite suspension.
"The term noted means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter it does not imply agreement or approval." 50 Hence, the penalty of indefinite suspension
imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:
Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.
xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis supplied)
Necessarily, the Court will now give its "final action" on this complaint.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBPs findings. However, the Court disagrees
with the penalty imposed on respondent.
Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis51 and they belong to a class of their own.52 They are neither civil nor criminal actions
but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officer.53 They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance.54
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the misconduct of its officers. This Court requires
that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence. 55 "Lawyers must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers
for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court." 56
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings. 57
The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the Courts lawful orders in two instances:
1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10 days from notice. However, she only submitted
the rejoinder on 11 November 1993 after she was detained at the NBI for five days for failure to heed the Courts order.
2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to comment on complainants manifestation. She instead submitted a
manifestation on 3 February 1993 or almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent alleged that she had substantially complied
with the Courts orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993 Resolution stated that nothing set out in respondents manifestation excused her
failure to obey the Courts Resolutions.
These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 58 of the Rules of Court is in itself a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes
utter disrespect to the judicial institution.59Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." 60 Respondents obstinate refusal to comply
with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which
is only too deserving of reproof."61
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof
will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. 62

Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross misconduct. The Court
defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration
of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause." It is a "conduct that is generally motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose." 63
In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez,64 the Court held that failure to comply with the Courts directive to comment on a letter-complaint constitutes gross
misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect. In Cuizon v. Macalino,65 a lawyers failure to comply with the Courts Resolutions requiring him
to file his comment was one of the infractions that merited his disbarment.
Furthermore, respondents defenses are untenable. Firstly, respondent contends that complainant is not the real party-in-interest since the property
that was litigated was owned by complainants wife. The Court is not persuaded with this defense.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in
disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome."66 "A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer." 67
In Heck v. Santos,68 the Court held that "any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to
institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charges.69
Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her client. In Suzuki v. Tiamson,70the Court enunciated that "while
lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients rights, they should not forget that they are
first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." Respondents
act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court is beyond the bounds of the law. "To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their
clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of justice." 71
Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanliocos counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and
Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that "an
important factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of
similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.72 Indeed, "while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the
expense of truth and administration of justice." 73
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. It is
evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent
violated the proscription in Canon 19.
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court. In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondents acts of wantonly
disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar
a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Respondent also violated Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her suspension is consequently warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period ofTHREE YEARS effective from
notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

EDGAR O. PEREA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RUBEN ALMADRO, respondent.

RES OLUTIO N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Edgar O. Perea against Atty. Ruben Almadro for gross neglect of his duties as
lawyer of herein complainant.
Complainant narrates: Respondent was his counsel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 99) where he (complainant
Perea) is being charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide. On February 26, 1996, the said RTC issued an order granting Atty. Almadros
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence within ten (10) days from said date. All the while, complainant thought that respondent filed said
demurrer and the case against him dismissed. It was only sometime in 1999 that complainant learned that Atty. Almadro failed to file any
demurrer. The trial court ordered the herein complainant to present evidence in his defense. Later, a warrant was issued for his arrest prompting
him to surrender to the court and post bail. Complainant suffered financially and emotionally due to respondents neglect of his duties.
Respondent has not attended any of his hearings which led complainant to plead with respondent to withdraw formally as his counsel so he could
hire another lawyer. Because of Atty. Almadros neglect, complainant is now facing the loss of his freedom and livelihood. [1]
Respondent filed three motions for extension of time to file comment. [2] On November 13, 2000, the Court resolved to grant the said
motions with a warning that no further extensions shall be granted. [3] On November 17, 2000, respondent, through the law firm Sua and Alambra,
filed a Manifestation and Motion that respondent has not yet received a copy of the complaint hence it asked the Court to order the complainant
to furnish them a copy.[4]
On December 20, 2000, respondent through said law firm submitted an Answer [5] to the complaint, contending that: two days after the RTC
granted the manifestation of defense to file motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, he had finished the draft of the motion and the
accompanying pleading which he stored in a magnetic computer diskette intended for editing prior to its submission in court; a few days before
the deadline, herein respondent tried to retrieve the draft from the diskette but said drafts were nowhere to be found despite efforts to retrieve
them; this led him to believe that the drafts must have been finalized and the edited versions accordingly filed since it is his practice to expunge
from the diskette drafts that were already finalized and acted upon; meanwhile, the presiding judge of the RTC retired, as a consequence, actions
on pending cases were held in abeyance; moreover, communications with the herein complainant had become rarer; thereafter, towards the end of
1997 up to the next five months of 1998, respondent was preoccupied with the congressional elections in Biliran where he ran and subsequently
lost; then he was offered a position at the Philippine Stock Exchange as head of the Compliance and Surveillance Division which he accepted; his
time and attention was spent in the performance of his demanding job at the PSE as well as in the preparation of his testimony before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee in connection with the BW scam; anent the case of herein complainant, he offered on several occasions to withdraw as
one of the defense counsel of the complainant even to the extent of offering to return his acceptance fee which the latter however refused; [6] it is
not true that complainant pleaded with respondent to withdraw as his counsel, the truth being that it was complainant who refused to let go of
respondent as his counsel; also, while he is a counsel of complainant in the criminal case before the RTC, he was merely a collaborating counsel,
the lead counsel being Atty. Solomon Villanueva;[7] finally, he was actually mulling over the possible procedural steps to take with regard to
complainants case when he received instead, a copy of the present complaint. [8]
On February 28, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution [9] referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On June 13, 2001, the IBP through Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted its report, pertinent portions of which are quoted
verbatim:
We are not convinced about the truth of respondents affirmative allegations. It is clear that he as well as his counsels are lying. First off, the
manifestation with motion filed by respondents counsels, Sua and Alambra is incredibly unbelievable. In fact, to be blunt about it, respondents
counsels were clearly lying when they manifested that the respondent has yet to receive a copy of the complaint... This is an outrageous lie. The
respondents three (3) motions never once mentioned that he had not received copy of the complaint. In fact, in his second motion for further
extension of time to file comment, Atty. Almadro CLEARLY stated in the second paragraph thereof that:
He is in the process of reviewing an initial draft of said comment and will need said period of ten (10) days to complete and finalize the
draft.

From the afore-quoted portion of Mr. Almadros manifestation and motion, it is obvious he already had a copy of the complaint. The
manifestation and motion filed on his behalf by Attys. Sua and Alambra with the Honorable Supreme Court is a brazen and deliberate
misrepresentation which deserves an uncompromising and vigorous condemnation.
The respondent claims he is in solo practice. How then can he honestly claim that when he could not find the draft of his demurrer in the
magnetic computer diskette where he allegedly stored it, he was led to believe that the drafts must have been finalized and the edited versions
thereof accordingly filed. This allegation is pure unadulterated garbage. All Mr. Almadro had to do was check his case folder to see if a demurrer
had indeed been filed. As a solo practitioner like this representation, we can only surmise that logically, nothing happens or goes down in Mr.
Almadros office without his knowledge and indispensable participation. If so, how could he have been led to believe anything? To be sure, he
would have read and signed the demurrer before it was accordingly filed. Being a solo practitioner no one else could have signed that demurrer.
And does Mr. Almadro expect anyone to believe that after finishing the draft (in his computer) he would not even bother to print a hard copy for
him to read, edit and correct without having to do so from his computer monitor?
Incidentally, this representation verified the records of the complainants criminal case before RTC-Branch 99, Quezon City. We came upon an
Order of the incumbent presiding judge declaring the respondent herein in contempt of court for repeatedly failing to submit an explanation as
ordered by the court.
The undersigned is convinced that Atty. Ruben L. Almadros actuations reveal not only serious neglect or indifference to his duties as a lawyer
but more gravely his open disrespect for the court and the authority it represents.
We wish to put on record our extreme DISPLEASURE at the behavior of respondent Atty. Ruben L. Almadro. We strongly recommend that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and that he be fined Ten Thousand (PhP10,000.00) Pesos. We likewise
recommend strongly that Attys. Sua and Alambra be ordered to explain why they should not be held in contempt for deliberately foisting a
deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation on the Honorable Supreme Court by declaring that their client had not received a copy of the
complaint when such was not true. By their misrepresentation the afore-named counsels have exhibited contemptible disrespect not only for the
Court but also the authority it represents.[10]
The report was adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline with some modifications thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that Atty. Ruben L. Almadros
actuations reveal not only serious neglect or indifference to his duties as a lawyer but more gravely his open disrespect for the court and the
authority it represent. Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and FINED for Ten Thousand (P 10,000.00)
Pesos. Likewise, Atty. Sua and Atty. Alambra are ordered to explain why they should not be held in contempt for deliberately foisting a deliberate
falsehood and misrepresentation.[11]
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on September 11, 2002, this time in his own behalf, of the above quoted IBP Board
Resolution.[12] This was denied on October 19, 2002.[13]
We are in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
As clearly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility CANON 18 --- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 --- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 --- A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request
for information.
It is plain from the records that respondent lawyer failed to submit a demurrer to evidence for which he had earlier asked permission from
the trial court and which his client, herein complainant was relying on. More than that, he failed to contact his client and to apprise the latter
about the developments of the case leaving complainant completely surprised and without any protection when years later, he received summons
from the trial court asking him to present evidence in his defense and, not long after, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest.

In the recent case of Sps. Galen et al. vs. Atty. Paguirigan[14] the Court is explicit in its pronouncement that:
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his client
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his
client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to not just
competent service but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and
diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect within the bounds of law the interest of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for disciplinary action. [15]
In other cases, the Court also held that while a lawyer may decline a person to become his client for valid reasons, once he agrees to take
up the cause of a client, he begins to owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. As a
lawyer, he must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
Indeed, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied. [16] His client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense.[17]
Respondents negligence is compounded by his attempt to have this tribunal believe the story of how his draft, stored in a magnetic
diskette, mysteriously disappeared and how the absence of such file in his diskette led him to believe that the same was already filed in court. In
his Answer, he even tried to depict himself as a conscientious lawyer by stating that he was actually mulling on the procedural steps he would
undertake regarding complainants case when instead he received a copy of this complaint for disbarment. Such story, as observed by the IBP, is
not only outrageous but is contemptuous as it makes a mockery of the Court.
Again, the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter:
CANON 10--- A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 ---A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.
In Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs Atty. Flores,[18] the Court, aside from citing Canon 10 above stated that a lawyer must be a
disciple of truth. Indeed, it cannot be stressed enough how important it is for a lawyer as an officer of the court to observe honesty at all times,
especially before the courts.
Respondent would have this Court believe a very preposterous story of how his draft disappeared, all the time avoiding the simple fact that
he failed to submit the necessary pleading before the trial court. Such behavior cannot be countenanced and deserves stern penalty therefor.
The act of the IBP in requiring Atty. Kenton Sua and Atty. Alan Alambra to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court
for deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation in the preparation of the Answer for herein respondent is appropriate. Records reveal that both
Attys. Sua and Alambra have filed their joint Explanation.[19]
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Ruben Almadro guilty of serious neglect of his duties as a lawyer and of open disrespect for the
court and the authority it represents, as embodied in Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with
a WARNING that any or similar acts of dishonesty would be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of the Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty. Alambra in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Let the records of herein case be remanded to the Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further action on the contempt
proceedings against Atty. Kenton Sua and Atty. Alan Alambra.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 5768

ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR. vs. ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR.,
Promulgated: March 26, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit[1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary
action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:
1.
On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandonpresented a falsified document in court.
2.
Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the
document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor
was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document.
3.
On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk,
threatened Atty. Barandon saying,
Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasamaang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang aboga
do na rito ay mgataga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito.
4.
Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of
Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven
otherwise.
5.
The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for
sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal
cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time
record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined,
Atty. Ferrerrepeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1.
Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against
him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrers clients filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2.

The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.

3.
At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daetwas already in session. It was
improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4.
Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded
the law profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his character.
5.
The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the
latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave
threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,[2] Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30
p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his sons taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycles
passengers.[3] But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the
taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities.
[4]

Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty.Ferrer allegedly
received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1,[5] the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of
Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge
and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending
the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation
of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the
falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a
party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other
counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225,[6] adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioners recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution[7] of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already
endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of
Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[8] On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation[9] of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[10]
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008.[11] On August 12,
2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment,[12] reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by
courts in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk.[13]
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1.
Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty.Ferrer guilty of the
charges against him; and
2.

If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.

The Courts Ruling

We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.[14]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of
the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had
been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a
fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1.
That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and FALSIFICATION of documents, committed to mislead this
Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court,
for presenting a grossly FALSIFIED document, in violation of his oath of office as a government employee and as member of the Bar, for the
reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT, wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in
view whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth
of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for DISBARMENT of the one responsible for
said falsification and distortions.[15]
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. [16]
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court
hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from
the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a
subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.

Atty. Ferrer said,

Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magalingna abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang aboga
do na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindikayo taga-rito. Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy,
humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in
court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. [17] Atty.Ferrer ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.
Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. [18] So long as the parties are given the
opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. [19] Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,
hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[20] Atty. Ferrers display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct
in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very
ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809
and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrers personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same
be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

Adm. Case No. 7252

[CBD 05-1434]

November 22, 2006

JOHNNY NG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27, 2006 of the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents propensity to resort to undeserved language
and disrespectful stance, Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern Warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case
similar misconduct is again committed. Likewise, the counter complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
A verified complaint1 dated February 15, 2005 was filed by Johnny Ng (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment.
Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC
NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is the counsel for complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
NLRC rendered a Decision2affirming the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit
(MRMI),3pertinent portions of which read:
x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration was merely copied from the pleadings of respondents-appellees
with very slight modifications. But we cannot accept the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable individuals, that the actual writer of the
said decision is not at all connected with the NLRC First Division.
x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in maintaining that the separation pay should be only one half month
per year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not clear enough, or is there another reason known only to them?
x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, First Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law on the part of
the commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually resulted in prosperity and not losses. xxxRespondents failed to prove their
claim of losses. And the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability to see these glaring facts.
x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One month per year of service and all of it to the affected workers not to some
people in the NLRC in part.
x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices of employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of the First
Division do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.
x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to see for themselves the evidence before them and not merely rely on
their reviewers and on the word of their ponente. If they do this honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty on the part of the
Commissioners concerned is what is lacking, not the evidence. Unfair labor practice stares them in the face.
If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division are doubly so and with
malice thrown in. If the workers indeed committed an illegal strike, how come their only "penalty" is removing their tent? It is obvious that the
Labor Arbiter and the Honorable Commissioners know deep in their small hearts that there was no strike. This is the only reason for the
finding of "illegal strike". Without this finding, they have no basis to remove the tent; they have to invent that basis.

x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of Management" and its Annexes has shown very clearly that the so called strike is a
myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the tent in front of the wall and
closed his eyes to the open wide passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and egress of the premises, are blocked by
something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims. Whereas, before, the established rule was, in cases of money claims the
employer had the burden of proof of payment. Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a better name we should call this new rule the
"Special Dinopol Rule". But only retirable commissioners are authorized to apply this rule and only when the money claims involved are
substantial. When they are meager the ordinary rules apply.
x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips proved that the sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their service incentive
leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim from the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking of the ingress and egress is a myth seem invisible to the impaired sight of
Commissioner Dinopol. He needs more of it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as ponente [of] the decision that he signed and caused his co-commissioners
in the First Division to sign) has shown great and irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and ignorance of the law. He is a
shame to the NLRC and should not be allowed to have anything to do with the instant case any more. Commissioner Go and Chairman
Seeres, by negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but, since the NLRC rules prohibit the inhibition of the entire division, Chairman Seeres
should remain in the instant case and appoint two (2) other commissioners from another division to sit with him and pass final judgment in the
instant case.4 (Emphasis supplied)
In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005, respondent Alar contends that the instant complaint only intends to harass him and to
influence the result of the cases between complainant and the workers in the different fora where they are pending; that the Rules of Court/Code
of Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary
matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for adequate sanctions against
misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to
lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of
Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary; and that the labor lawyers who are honestly and conscientiously
practicing before the NLRC and get paid on a contingent basis are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger when they get cheated in their
cases by reason of corruption and collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who make their lives and the lives of their constituents miserable,
with impunity, unlike lawyers for the employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore have no reason to feel aggrieved. 5
Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union president Marilyn Batan wherein it is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in several instances, such that while the labor case is pending before the NLRC, respondents Paras
and Cruz filed a new case against the laborers in the Office of the City Engineer of Quezon City (QC) to demolish the tent of the workers, thus
splitting the jurisdiction between the NLRC and the City Engineer's Office (CEO) of QC which violates Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that
although Ng signed the disbarment complaint against Alar, respondents Parass and Cruzs office instigated the said complaint which violates
Canon 8; that Ng's company did not pay income tax for the year 2000 allegedly for non-operation due to fire and respondents consented to this
act of the employer which violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that when the case started, there were more or less 100 complainants, but due to the
acts of the employer and the respondents, the number of complainants were reduced to almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule 19-01, 19-02
and 19-03.6
In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005,7 respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no time did they file multiple actions arising
from the same cause of action or brook interference in the normal course of judicial proceedings; the reliefs sought before the CEO has nothing to
do with the case pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and illegal structures is a cause of action completely irrelevant and
unrelated to the labor cases of complainant; the CEO was requested to investigate certain nuisance structures located outside the employer's
property, which consist of shanties, tents, banners and other paraphernalia which hampered the free ingress to and egress out of the employer's
property and present clear and present hazards; the Office of the City Engineer found the structures violative of pertinent DPWH and MMDA
ordinances; the pendency of a labor case with the NLRC is completely irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or not, did not validate or
justify the construction of illegal nuisance structures; the CEO proceeded to abate the nuisance structures pursuant to its power to protect life,
property and legal order; it was not their idea to file the disbarment complaint against respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client on how
to go about filing the case, after having been served a copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be perceived as an excuse for lawyers to
turn their backs on malicious acts done by their brother lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the only reason the number of complainants
were reduced is because of the amicable settlement they were able to reach with most of them; their engagement for legal services is only for
labor and litigation cases; at no time were they consulted regarding the tax concerns of their client and therefore were never privy to the financial
records of the latter; at no time did they give advice regarding their client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt at a disbarment case against
them is unwarranted, unjustified and obviously a mere retaliatory action on his part.

The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Patrick M. Velez for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of using improper and abusive
language and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of not less than three months with a stern warning that more severe penalty
will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again committed.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find any actionable misconduct against Attys. Paras and Cruz and therefore
recommended that the Counter-Complaint against them be dismissed for lack of merit.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors issued the Resolution hereinbefore quoted. While the Court agrees with
the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of
partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit any
justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,8 the Court ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the
30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to
supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and
trust in judicial administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat,9 the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.10 A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate
and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.11 Submitting pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes against the NLRC and
attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary;
and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla,12 the Court held that
respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of
the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics.13
Respondents argument that labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter the Court from
exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar.14
The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,15 thus:

2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of
the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. Resort by an attorney in a
motion for reconsideration to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the least
necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize
the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." It is in this context that we must say that
just because Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him unbridled license in
language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Courts attention to the issues
involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief."
Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm,
or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be
circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government. 16
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of the legal
profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondents violation of
the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so.1wphi1
At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the Office of the City Engineer really partakes of a different cause of action, which has
nothing to do with the NLRC case. The decision was made by the city engineer. Respondents remedy should be to question that decision, not
bring it to this Commission which has no jurisdiction over it. We can not substitute our judgment for the proper courts who should determine the
propriety or sagacity of the city engineers action.
Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves of remedies available in law provided; these acts do not exceed the bounds of
decency. In supporting the action against respondents conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the attorneys duty as an officer of the
court to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack. This requires of him not only to refrain from subjecting the judge
to wild and groundless accusation but also to discourage other people from so doing and to come to his defense when he is so subjected. By the
very nature of his position a judge lacks the power, outside of his court, to defend himself against unfounded criticism and clamor and it is the
attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbents of the judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143
citing People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946); Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102
Phil. 152 (1957) Whether the disbarment complaint was filed by Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of great import, what is more apropos
would be the contents of the complaint and whether the same is sufficient to consider disciplinary sanctions.
Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the respondent lawyers have already stated that they were not engaged as counsels to
take care of their clients tax problems, then they cannot be held accountable for the same. If any wrongdoing has been committed by complainant
Ng, he should answer for that and those lawyers who were responsible for such acts be held liable jointly. There is no showing [that] attorneys
Paras and Cruz were responsible for that tax fiasco.1wphi1
Finally, while it may be true that Batans group has been greatly diminished from about 100 claimants to less than half the number is not by itself
an actionable misconduct. Lawyers are duty bound to foster amicable settlement of cases; litigation and adversarial proceedings while a necessary
part of the practice is not encouraged, because it will save expenses and help unclogged [sic] the dockets. If the compromise is fair then there is
no reason to prevent the same. There is nothing in the counter-complaint which shows that the compromise agreement and waivers executed
appear to be unfair, hence no reason to hold lawyers liable for the same. Besides, a "compromise is as often the better part of justice as prudence
the part of valor and a lawyer who encourages compromise is no less the clients champion in settlement out of court than he is the clients
champion in the battle in court." (Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in Court, 5 (1958); cited in Agpalos Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is
therefore respondent Alar[]s beef with the execution of these waivers if these were executed freely by his clients?

All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence the dismissal of the counter-complaint against
them is proper for absolute lack of merit.17
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS, APP

CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION*
AND CESAR GOCO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 162525

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

- versus CITY OF URDANETA, CEFERINO J. CAPALAD, WALDO C.

DEL CASTILLO, NORBERTO M. DEL PRADO, JESUS A.
ORDONO AND AQUILINO MAGUISA,*
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Promulgated:
September 23, 2008

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions[1] dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 76170.

This case stemmed from a Complaint[2] for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary
restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad
doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific
Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.

Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the preliminary design,
construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds
amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95
million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men. The object is a piece of land
belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the
contracts, from the feasibility study to management and lease of the future building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to
the Goco family.

In their Answer,[3] APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the
citys Answer,[4] joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from
the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of
action. For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer [5] with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on
the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.

Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also
in their capacity as taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention[6] adopting the allegations of Del Castillo.

After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus Motion[7] with prayer to
(1) withdraw Urdaneta Citys Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit UrdanetaCitys complaint; and (4)
conduct a new pre-trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal representation caused its
inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.

In its Order[8] dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted the entry
of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city
as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillos complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the citys
complaint.

In its February 14, 2003 Order,[9] the RTC denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002 Order. It also grantedCapalads motion to
expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta
was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City. The RTC also directed APP and APPCDC to answer
Capalads complaint.

Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its April 15, 2003 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping, (2) failure of the
petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTCs assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack of written explanation
why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal. [10] The Court of Appeals also denied APP and APPCDCs motion for
reconsideration in its February 4, 2004 Resolution.[11]

Hence, this petition, which we treat as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the proper remedy to assail the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals.[12]

Petitioners argue that:

I.
THE APPELLATE COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY
SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES DESPITE
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE [THEREWITH]
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY
CAPRICIOUSLY
(a.)

Entertaining the taxpayers suits of private respondents del Castillo, del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa despite their
clear lack of legal standing to file the same.

(b.)

Allowing the entry of appearance of a private law firm to represent the City of Urdaneta despite the clear statutory
and jurisprudential prohibitions thereto.

(c.)

Allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their
respective answers and admitting their complaints as well as allowing the appearance of Atty. Jorito C. Peralta
to represent Capalad although Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun, his counsel of record, had not withdrawn from the case,
in gross violation of well settled rules and case law on the matter.[13]

We first resolve whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and
APPCDCs subsequent compliance.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition on mere technicalities since they have attached the
proper documents in their motion for reconsideration and substantially complied with the rules.

Respondent Urdaneta City maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition because Cesar Goco had no proof he was
authorized to sign the certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of APPCDC.

Indeed, Cesar Goco had no proof of his authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. [14] Thus, the Court of Appeals is allowed by the rules the discretion to dismiss the petition since only
individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. Proof of
said authority must be attached; otherwise, the petition is subject to dismissal.[15]

However, it must be pointed out that in several cases, [16] this Court had considered as substantial compliance with the procedural
requirements the submission in the motion for reconsideration of the authority to sign the verification and certification, as in this case. The Court
notes that the attachments in the motion for reconsideration show that on March 5, 2003, the Board of Directors of APPCDC authorized Cesar
Goco to institute the petition before the Court of Appeals. [17] On March 22, 2003, Ronilo Goco doing business under the name APP, also
appointed his father, Cesar Goco, as his attorney-in-fact to file the petition. [18] When the petition was filed on March 26, 2003[19] before the Court
of Appeals, Cesar Goco was duly authorized to sign the verification and certification except that the proof of his authority was not submitted
together with the petition.

Similarly, petitioners submitted in the motion for reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders and we may also
consider the same as substantial compliance. [20] Petitioners also included in the motion for reconsideration their explanation [21] that copies of the
petition were personally served on the Lazaro Law Firm and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance. The affidavit of
service[22] supported the explanation. Considering the substantial issues involved, it was thus error for the appellate court to deny reinstatement of
the petition.

Having discussed the procedural issues, we shall now proceed to address the substantive issues raised by petitioners, rather than remand this case to
the Court of Appeals. In our view, the issue, simply put, is: Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of discretion in (a) entertaining the taxpayers suits;
(b) allowing a private law firm to represent Urdaneta City; (c) allowing respondents Capalad and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to
becoming complainants; and (d) allowing Capalads change of attorneys?

On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only sue where the act complained of directly involves illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The allegation of respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that the
construction of the project is funded by the PNB loan contradicts the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the funds are not directly derived
from taxation.

Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their personality to sue was not raised by petitioners APP and
APPCDC in their Answer and that this issue was not even discussed in the RTCs assailed orders.

Petitioners contentions lack merit. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers suits. In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Roxas,[23] we
held:
In the case of taxpayers suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
xxxx
Petitioners allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the Republic and
NPC are serviced or paid through a disbursement of public funds are not disputed by respondents, hence, they are invested
with personality to institute the same.[24]

Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that P95 million of the P250 million PNB loan had
already been paid for minimal work is sufficient allegation of overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them with personality to
sue. Petitioners do not dispute the allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously, that public funds are not involved. Under Article
1953[25] of the Civil Code, the city acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the money public fund. The city will have to pay
the loan by revenues raised from local taxation or by its internal revenue allotment.

In addition, APP and APPCDCs lack of objection in their Answer on the personality to sue of the four complainants constitutes
waiver to raise the objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. [26]

On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can represent Urdaneta City and that law and jurisprudence
prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as the citys counsel.

The Lazaro Law Firm, as the citys counsel, counters that the city was inutile defending its cause before the RTC for lack of needed legal
advice. The city has no legal officer and both City Prosecutor and Provincial Legal Officer are busy. Practical considerations also dictate that the city
and Mayor Perez must have the same counsel since he faces related criminal cases. CitingMancenido v. Court of Appeals,[27] the law firm states that
hiring private counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to redress a valid grievance. [28]

We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm. Its appearance as Urdaneta Citys counsel is against the law as it provides expressly who
should represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the city.

Section 481(a)[29] of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 [30] mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section 481(b)
(3)(i)[31] of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special proceedings wherein the city
or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[32] we cited that under Section 19[33] of Republic Act No. 5185,[34] city governments may
already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of

the city shall be transferred. [35] In the case of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter [36] was
enacted way back in 1998.

Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutors appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as the
citys legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC
should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably, the citys Answer was sworn to before the
City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared the citys pre-trial brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No
question was raised against the City Prosecutors actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate
legal representation.

Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides when a
special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province ofPangasinan. And we have consistently held that a local government unit
cannot be represented by private counsel [37] as only public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire
private lawyers.[38] Pro bonorepresentation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.[39]

Neither is the law firms appearance justified under the instances listed in Mancenido when local government officials can be
represented by private counsel, such as when a claim for damages could result in personal liability. No such claim against said officials was made
in this case. Note that before it joined the complainants, the city was the one sued, not its officials. That the firm represents Mayor Perez in
criminal cases, suits in his personal capacity,[40] is of no moment.

On the third point, petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid and,
in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in good faith.

We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.

Section 5,[41] Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of
the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial
Order[42] dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties evidence
on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule
10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.

In addition, despite Urdaneta Citys judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence to be presented
for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, [43] e.g., the contracts assailed. A partys testimony in open court may
also override admissions in the Answer.[44]

As regards the RTCs order admitting Capalads complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad insists
that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun represents
petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty.
Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.

Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing Capalads change of attorneys, if we can properly call it as such,
considering Capalads claim that Atty. Sahagun was never his attorney.

Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their
pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a court of technicalities [45] for validly dismissing their
defectively prepared petition. They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, an incompetent judge. [46] In explaining the
concededly strong language, Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals dismissal of the case shows its
impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity and such dismissal smacks of retaliation and does not augur
for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of the appellate court. [47]

Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,000[48] each payable to this Court within ten days
from notice and we remind them that they should observe and maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and judicial officers; [49] abstain from
offensive language before the courts;[50] and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record. [51] Similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388
and EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta City; (4) ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in Civil Case No.
U-7388; (5) AFFIRM the RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from
representing Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in behalf of Capalad.

Let the records of Civil Case No. U-7388 be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante for their use of offensive language,
payable to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent.

RES OLUTIO N
PUNO, J.:
On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint [1] with the then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging
respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis Oriental Chapter, for having employed
fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still alive, the sum
of P763,060.00. According to complainant, respondents unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly triggered the death of her husband, who died
disillusioned and embittered. [2] The letter-complaint and affidavit also alleged that notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by Mr. Espino
and complainant (after the death of Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the amounts represented by the eight checks which had all been
dishonored. Complainant surmised that Atty. Presquitos refusal to pay may be due to his reliance on the influence of his father-in-law, a former
Executive Judge of the RTC (Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro).
The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was introduced to complainants late husband, Mr. Virgilio M.
Espino. Mr. Espino, a resident of Davao City, had sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of Cagayan de Oro, regarding the sale of his
piece of land with an area of 11,057.59 sq.m. situated in Misamis Oriental. The discussion between Mr. Espino and the respondent resulted in the
sale of the property to respondent.[3] Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino and respondent, [4] the purchase price of the land
wasP1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by installments. [5] Pursuant to the terms of payment in the agreement, respondent issued
eight post-dated checks, totaling P736,060.00.[6] Respondent then entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares
for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own use. [7]The
land was eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.
Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino made repeated demands for payment from
respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect from respondent the value of
the eight checks. When complainants numerous pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997.
In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had employed fraud,
trickery and dishonest means with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless. The complaint, according to respondent, stemmed from
complainants lack of knowledge as to the real story of the transaction between complainants husband and respondent. He also vehemently
took exception to the imputation that he was banking on the influence of his father-in-law and uncle-in-law.
Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What respondent claims, however, is that the nonpayment was justified by the
unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares have with respect to the right-of-way of the land. He alleged that Mr. Espino had made assurances that the
land had a right-of-way required for its development, but respondent later found out that such road-right-of-way required the consent of four other
land owners, and the expense would be considerably more than he was made to believe. According to respondent, he and Mr. Espino had agreed
that the latter would not encash the checks or demand the equivalent of the same until the right-of-way problem of the land had been resolved.
[8]
Respondents position is that until the problem of obtaining a right-of-way to the land has been resolved, nothing has yet accrued against him or
Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be very unfair and unjust for them to pay Mr. Espino when the land could not be developed and sold. [9]
Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount he owes Mr. Espino or his heirs from the purchase of the land,
the advances he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost he incurred when he defended Mr. Espinos son in a criminal case. He later on manifested that
he has fully paid the portion of the land which had been titled in his name through the same advances and incurred expenses. [10]
In a resolution dated November 26, 1997,[11] the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation/decision, and assigned to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002,[12] Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found that the facts and credible
evidence made available in this case indubitably establish respondents failure to live up to the demands of the Lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. For having failed to act with candor and fairness toward complainant, Commissioner
Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months, and ordered to immediately account with
complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land which had been subdivided in the name of respondent and his business partner. On June 21,
2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution adopting/approving the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Dulay,
finding that respondents lack of fairness and candor and honesty [was] in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree that respondent was wanting in fairness, candor and honesty
demanded of him by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. We find, however, the recommended penalty
of six (6) months suspension too light considering respondents gross misconduct.
Complainants testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was an agreement between respondent and complainants late
husband for the sale of the latters land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with said agreement; (3) these checks were
dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-right-of-way. Complainants exhibits were formally offered as early
asJanuary 6, 1999,[13] and were admitted without objection from respondent.[14]
In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon respondent to prove a legal excuse or defense for nonpayment of the eight
checks.
Respondent utterly failed in this regard.
From the termination of complainants presentation of evidence on December 1998 until Commissioner Dulays report on November 12,
2002, the records show that respondent was unable to present evidence - either testimonial or documentary - to prove that he had legal cause to
refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Even respondents own statements - which, without corroborating evidence,
remain mere self-serving allegations - fall short of testimony, as he failed to submit to cross-examination by opposing counsel or for clarificatory
questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen documents to his comment, but only went so far as to mark (without a formal
offer) the agreement between him and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and the partnership agreement between him and Mrs. Ares. Thus,
respondent had no evidence other than his own allegations.
Respondents failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [15] especially in the light of
the numerous postponements and resettings he requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed more time to prepare his
evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to present his evidence on December 14, 1998. Two years - five resettings, and three
orders submitting the case for resolution - later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary evidence.
Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his financial difficulties, i.e., he could not afford to spend for travel
expenses of his witnesses.[16] We are not persuaded. First, it boggles the mind how financial constraints could have prevented respondent from
presenting the originals of the documents attached to his comment, proving, among others, the alleged advances and costs on Mr. Espinos
behalf. The originals of these documents are presumably in his possession. Second, with respect to the absence of testimony, respondent could
have submitted the affidavits of his witnesses - the taking of which he could have done himself in Cagayan de Oro to keep down the cost. The
records are clear that he was allowed this option.[17] But he did neither.
All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion that respondent could not present evidence because there really was none
to justify his nonpayment.[18]
Even if we were to excuse respondents procedural lapse and consider his written pleadings as testimony, we agree with Commissioner
Dulay that respondents problems with respect to the right-of-way or his partnership with Mrs. Ares do not excuse his nonpayment. As stated in
the IBP-CBD report:
[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands of respondent.We note that respondent has already taken title over
the property together with Guadalupe Ares by making complainants late husband, sign over the property by way of the Deed of Sale. We
therefore find respondents position vis--vis the widowed complainant sneaky and unfair. We reiterate that respondent has assumed
responsibility for the negotiations on the road-right-of-way and was aware of the problem. To [sic] our mind he has used the alleged road-rightof-way problem only as an afterthought and a reason to delay and in fact deny the complainant payment of what is due her. Respondent also
alleges and blames the deceased husband of complainant for the failed project but the facts show otherwise. They are just bare allegations and
remain unsubstantiated. Besides, respondent and Ares took risks in the business venture and are now the titled owners of the property. The seller
cannot be blamed for any failure in the project. Respondents actuations in the whole transaction is [sic] not at par with the standards demanded
of him as a member of the bar. Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The fact that he has unreasonably delayed and
failed to account with complainant for a long time and the fact of his having allowed the checks he issued to bounce is [sic] unacceptable and
censurable behavior for a member of the bar.[19] [citations omitted]
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored checks, respondents indifference to complainants entreaties for
payment was conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late husband, [20] first by allowing the eight (8)
checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint, and finally by
deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics. Considering that the property of complainant and her late husband is

already in respondent and Mrs. Ares name, the injustice of respondents different maneuvers to evade payment of the eight checks - due and
unpaid since 1996 - becomes more manifest.
It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without regard to its deleterious effects to public interest
and public order. We have already declared, most recently in Lao v. Medel,[21] that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,
and puts the erring lawyers moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar. [22] He not
only sets himself liable for a serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for law.
It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not
only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. [23] A lawyer may be disciplined
for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. [24] Thus, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

[26]

Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued worthless checks - Lao v. Medel,[25] Co v. Bernardino,
and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr.,[27] - we find respondents reprehensible conduct warrants suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year, and ORDERED to immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land, which has been
subdivided in the name of respondent and his business partner.
Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar Confidant and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave

ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA,

Complainant,

A.C. No. 6273

Present:

- versus ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO,

Respondent.

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
March 15, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

An Information for Estafa[1] was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) along with others based
on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate
the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court granted. [2] Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied[3]

Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdrawthem.[4]

On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO),
received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of
Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager.[5] The notice was signed by respondent.

At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco(Gerangco), who
were not members of the then current Board, [6] Gerango, complainants predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair,
appointed others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.

On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities,
and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal from
the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties of their positions. [7]

Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment
of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.

The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general assembly null and void
for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCOs By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. [8] The RDs Resolution
of February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction[9] of CDA.

In her present complainant[10] against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT
TO THE SAME[11]
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION[12]
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL [13]
X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW[14]
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC.
(GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS WELL [15]
Despite the Courts grant,[16] on respondents motion,[17] of extension of time to file Comment, respondent never filed any
comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with,[18] but just the same he failed to comply.[19]

The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. [20]

It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the following issues:
1.

2.

Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
following:
1.1

Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal [processes].

1.2

Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

1.3

Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

1.4

Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

1.5

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to
do so.

Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyers oath, particularly the following:
2.1

support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein

2.2

will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court

3.

2.3

will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same

2.4

will delay no man for money or malice

Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by the Supreme Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. [21]

Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint, misconduct was committed by respondent.[22]

After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position papers. [23] Complainant filed hers,[24]but
respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper.

In her Report and Recommendation,[25] Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent guilty of violating the
Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been
previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the complaint, however, for lack of
merit.[26]

On Motion for Reconsideration, [27] the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent
violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which
provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.

When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer
shall not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same.

When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Courts
subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so. Sebastian v. Bajar[28] teaches:
x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts
Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her
character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is underscored by the
fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions
as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to
show respect to their processes.[29] (Citations omitted).

The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six months for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,[30] he having been found to have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case
for her when he had not.[31] It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this time is thus called for.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for violation of Canons
1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, vs. HON. DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals [1] affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case No. 1266-96 entitled Royal
Becthel[2] Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al., for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific
Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S.
Espaol of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996
directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to
cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to
cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendenswas granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a
Rejoinder to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court.[3]
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired:
ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.
ATTY CORDERO:

Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for contempt, your Honor. May we
know from the record if the Register of Deeds is properly notified for todays hearing.
COURT:

Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER:

Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.

COURT:
There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which directed your office to register lis pendens of
the complaint in connection with this case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:

Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o clock [in the morning] the subpoena.

ATTY. BUGARING: May we put it on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of Deeds was furnished with a
copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer, opposition or
pleadings with respect to this motion.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy Register of Deeds and I
was not informed by the receiving clerk of our office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received this
morning the subpoena, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the respondent that he was not informed.
COURT:

That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is recorded.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case against this
receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is
irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned.
COURT:
Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording at this proceedings. There is no
permission from this Court that such proceedings should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied me this morning.
COURT:

Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
COURT:

Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots should be done.

ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an occasion last night and I am not yet
come home, your Honor please. I could prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I
was just surprised why he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court
your Honor please.
COURT:

It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or permission should be secured.

ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.

COURT:

After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to that guy your Honor
please if this representation is being .
COURT:

That is very shallow, dont give that alibi.

ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as part of our motion for contempt,
your Honor please.
COURT:

What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?

ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking. I am
willing now to testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings, contempt
proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
COURT:

If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:
COURT:

Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.

Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.

That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply represented.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:

As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing

ATTY. BARZAGA[4]: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.

ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibits which are
part of the record of the case and thereafter your Honor please.
COURT:
You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty.
Barzaga is considered as the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt proceedings. How
much time do you need to go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA:

Second call, your Honor.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------COURT:

Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I noticed that the
motion for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, the record of
the case shows up to the filing of this motion, the Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court Orders dated February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996,
respectively. However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated
September 18, 1996 addressed to the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and
519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the annotation of the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in the
book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the attention of the Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed
on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was made by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18,
1996, your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been issued by the Hon. Court reading as
follows, Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic)
and 51950 (sic).
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence.
COURT:
You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation, he has not
prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly
proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your Honor, considering that the order
regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that we be given a
period of ten days from today your Honor, within which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.
COURT:
Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in connection with the refusal of the
Register of Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is
appearing in the earlier part of the record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending subdivision plan, it is so
stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May I have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA:
COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.

COURT:
Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be guided accordingly. Because this Court believes
that the root of the matter started from that. After the submission of the . what are you suppose to submit?
ATTY. BARZAGA:

Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.

COURT:
After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going
to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within which to submit his reply.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we will be marking first our
documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for today, your Honor please.
COURT:

If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are we going to receive as evidence.

ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please

COURT:

Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of the comment.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for contempt was copy furnished with the
Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.
COURT:
Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This should be an orderly proceedings and
considering that this is a Court of record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut the
argument that is going to be put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.
ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished of this contempt
proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled
for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this Court, your Honor.
COURT:

(Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.

COURT:

And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we
have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor.
COURT:

If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the Court to this representation ever since I
appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT:

Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.
COURT:

Do that right away.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.
COURT:

You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.

ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.

COURT:

With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I dont want to comment on anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this
Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT:

You can do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.

COURT:

As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

COURT:

Yes, you know your rules thats why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.

ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, Ive been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor
please, Ive been winning in many certiorari cases, your Honor.
COURT:
Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am
going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.
COURT:

You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting my client, your
Honor.
COURT:
That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) Will you see
to it that this guy is put in jail. (pp. 29-42. Rollo)
Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol cited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the
proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his
documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he
admitted that they came from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the
plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that
although the proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not sought, such situation was an
abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed
Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be
allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a
written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already
perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly
procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point,
Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered words insulting the Court; such as: that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his cases of
certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
allegedly being antagonistic to his client, and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Courts sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court
in a disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment
and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.[5]
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00. [6]

While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order citing him in
direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6, 1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.[7]
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment
of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that
respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt of court, and that said Order was null and
void for being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.[8]
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on December 5, 1996,
it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and
sarcastic towards the court.[9] It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00
prescribed by the Rules of Court,[10] and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH TO PETITIONERS SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.[11]
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that the
contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court
as he always addressed the court with the phrase your honor please.
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such
court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior
court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior
court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioners alleged deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the
respondent judge as your Honor please throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is
contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5,
1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from
attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
3. behaving without due regard to the trial courts order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp.
36-40, Rollo) is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyers duty to maintain
towards the courts (1) respectful attitude in order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf of the
other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and
5. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be
heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness with fairness and due consideration, and
Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioners use of the phrase your honor please. For, after using said phrase he
manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be
countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings. [12]
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel
and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the courts system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.
[13]
Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without
hearing.[14] Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her
chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner
was cited in contempt of court during the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt
order on the same day.[15]
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his client - by persisting to have
his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judges contrary order - he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the
interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his clients cause (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that
he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He
should not , therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12
of the same Canons (Ibid).
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay,
impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. [16]
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the amount of
P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16,
1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the excess of
P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed
in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 7062

[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355]
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON,
CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS,
Complainants,

Promulgated:
September 26, 2006

- versus ATTY. JOSE A. SUING,

Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Complainants, via a complaint[1] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A.
Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]

Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98, Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented
by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil, forUnfair Labor Practice
(ULP)

and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the

therein respondents. Said case was consolidated with NLRC

Case No.

00-04-03161-98, Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al., forIllegal Strike.

By Decision of August 29, 2001,[3] Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the employerclients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared guilty of Unfair Labor
Practice for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in
NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former
position with full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement computed as follows:
xxxx
3. CRISANTO CONOS
Backwages:
Basic Wage:
2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.
P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104, 504.40
10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos.
P223.50 x 26 days x 12 =
69, 732.00
11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos.
P250.00 x 26 days x 10 =
65,000.00
P239,236.40
13th Month Pay:
1/12 of P239,236.40 =
SILP
2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.
P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22
1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.
P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.50

19,936.36

1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.

P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33
4,053.05
P263,225.81
xxxx
7. RONALD SAMBAJON
(same as Conos)
263,225.81
8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
(same as Conos)
263,225.81
9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON (same as Conos)
263,225.81
Total Backwages
P2,370,674.38
Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages including the various monetary
claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorneys fees of all
sums owing to complainants.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution.[5]

In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by
seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004. [6]

Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to
before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar,
alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, frustrated the implementation of the Writ of Execution by
presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.

In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent, together with his clients Johnny and
Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutors Office of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203. [7]

In his Report and Recommendation [8] dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation
of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning,
in light of his following discussion:

The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged
RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and
falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court
on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress
against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the
performance of his duties as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his
good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case.

All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due execution of the questioned RELEASE
WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification
are PENDING resolution in their respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the
identities of the herein complainants is not impleaded by the complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to
ascertain true and real identities of person executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of regularity unless proven
otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed the despicable act
would seem to be fairly debatable under the circumstances.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Hababag.

After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar Discipline of the
IBP[10] transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-226[11] filed by respondent.

One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition [12] filed before the OBC, assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The
Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the
Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he (Sambajon)
having transferred from one residence to another.

Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the

3-day delay in filing the present petition, in the interest of justice,

this Court gives his petition due course.

In respondents Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those whom he met face to face before
Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. [13] He hastens to add though
that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before Arbiter Santos. [14] Complainants[15] and their former
counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan[16] claim otherwise, however. And the Minutes[17]of the proceedings before the National Conciliation Mediation
Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute, which minutes bear respondents and complainants
signatures, belie respondents claim that he had not met complainants before.

Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the request of his clients who told
him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and waivers ,
heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But
respondent himself had the same responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients interest, especially given the amount allegedly
given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not,
however, show that he discharged such obligation.

COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the
employee?

money of your client would go to the deserving

ATTY. SUING:
I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call it before a precedent in February
of 1998 when my client directly made settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original complainants,
Your Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is my belief that
the best way, Your Honor, to have a dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion,
well let them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to say, when lawyers are
involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
xx xx
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one, to witness the signing of the
documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent
them in that proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG:
My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given
Quitclaim Receipt and Release?

to you and yet there would be a signing of

ATTY. SUING:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there

were no complaints, Your Honor.

COMM. HABABAG:
Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a voucher so you just rely on your
precedent, is that what you mean?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties
them better than I do, Your Honor.

who are talking and it is my client who knows

COMM. HABABAG:
So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos office because there
would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release, it that clear?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money

intended for the payment of these workers?

ATTY. SUING:
I did not ask.
COMM. HABABAG:
You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the
ATTY. SUING:
As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.

documents?

COMM. HABABAG:
The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before

February of 1998.

COMM. HABABAG:
When you say they whom are you referring to?
ATTY. SUING:
Im referring to my client, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple [ sic] of
Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I made one but this document, Your Honor, is only a single
document where all the signatories named are present because my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that so
that each of them will be there together and they will identify themselves, see each other para ho siguradong
sila-sila yong magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing took place in February of 2004
it was made for any [sic] individual, Your Honor, no longer the document that I prepared when all of the
seven will be signing in one document.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?

ATTY. SUING:
I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there are already people there, the seven
complainants plus another woman.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

To be sure, respondents client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive
witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert vigilance to
protect his clients interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus:
ATTY. SUING:
To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s] are properly signed and that these
people are properly identified and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos.[19] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a compromise agreement with his clients in which
he did not participate and from which no problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the Labor
Arbiters office that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter.

Besides, by respondents own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed the
Release Waiver and Quitclaims. [20] That should have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients
interest. But he was not and he did not.

Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence. A
lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes
entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law
legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that extreme measure of
care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All
that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x x
x[21] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before
Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG:
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and
Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Sila po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Si Atty. Suing po.
ATTY. SUING:
In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what?
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino
ang may gawa nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?
MR. RODIL:
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang gumawa nito?
MR. RODIL:
Matagal na ho yan eh.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:

Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel
Cadiente Santos?
MR. RODIL:
Si attorney po.
ATTY. SUING:
Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala ng mga dokumento?
MR. RODIL:
Yong mga tao.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and
Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Kay attorney po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney?
ATTY. SUING:
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo.
MR. RODIL:
Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:
Huwag kang tatawa. Im reminding you serious tayo dito.
MR. RODIL:
Opo serious po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
MR. RODIL:
Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?
MR. RODIL:
Atty. Suing po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay.
ATTY. SUING:
Your Honor,
COMM. HABABAG:
Pabayaan mo muna. Ill come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?
MR. RODIL:
Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.
x x x x[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him
(respondent). His client contradicted respondents claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one
presented at the Arbiters Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the money for and in
consideration of the execution of the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its
cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. [23] While the
Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in
reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.[24]
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.[25] the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to
give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession.

While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as
recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct and isSUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and
Pairing Judge, Branch 30,

A.C. No. 5921

Present:
Complainant,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J.,

CARPIO MORALES,
and
INGA, JJ.

ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and

ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA,

Promulgated:
Respondents.

March 10, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom (Judge Lacurom), Pairing
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia VelascoJacoba (respondents). Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,[1] 11.04,[2] and 19.01[3] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a civil case for unlawful
detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos (Barrientos).[4] The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor
of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing
judge.
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution (Resolution) reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.
[5]

The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES
the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997.

Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the
defendant-appellant FedericoBarrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the
smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house
thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City;
and Barrientos is ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) [7] dated 30 July 2001 (30 July 2001motion),
pertinent portions of which read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual and
legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were
the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The
mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings
of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT period of time, came this
STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and
peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence,
this Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part of the records
of the case, all loaded in favor of the alleged TENANT. Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and
an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to
a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this
conclusion? x x x ThisHORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that The [court]
A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:

Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is determined by the
averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx

7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To
Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiffs HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS
committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously
LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon.
Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight! [8]

The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance and (2) the
Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. [9] Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Velasco-Jacoba) signed the motion on behalf of theJacoba-VelascoJacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in
contempt of court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.[10] In her Explanation, Comments
and Answer,[11] Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the
undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case. [12]Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any conscious or deliberate intent to
degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of
justice.[13] She rationalized as follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we
are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they
present a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-hitting
remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just articulating their feelings of
shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast
aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no
more no less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade.
x x x [14]

Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of
unguarded discretion when [they] may have stepped on the line and gone out of bounds. She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous
phrases stricken off the record.[15]
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a
fine of P1,000.[16]

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon
hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her and said O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, bakamahuli. (Sign this as it is due today, or

it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her husband of 35 years with
whom she entrusted her whole life and future.[17] This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not
sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law.[18]
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused
Judge Lacurom of harboring a personal vendetta, ordering her imprisonment despite her status as senior lady lawyer of the
IBPNueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over. [19] At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacuromshould have
inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because [Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman.[20]
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an
affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and
ignorance[21] and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019). [22] The first charge became the subject of a preliminary investigation [23] by the City
Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit [24]filed on 28 August 2001
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in
contempt.

[25]

Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July

2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacobas statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence.[26] Judge Lacurom later
rendered a decision[27] finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro (IBP
Commissioner Navarro) despite sufficient notice.[28]
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from
the practice of law for six months. [29] IBP Commissioner Navarro found that respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory
remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority. [30] Although the remarks were not directed at
Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at his position as a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole. [31]

The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted IBP Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation, except for the length of
suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months. [32] On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court,
together with the documents pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:[33]

xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice;
the same issues involved in this case are raised before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CAG.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving the same issues
we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view
of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;
5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present complaint should likewise be
dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of Appeals. [34] (Emphasis supplied)

The Courts Ruling

On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacobas contention that the present complaint should be considered sub judice in view of the
petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary injunction (petition for certiorari) [35] filed before the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to nullify the following orders issued by
Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying respondents respective motions
for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege that
Judge Lacurom acted with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in violation of express provisions of the law and
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.[36]
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing
on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Courts dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this
complaint. Judge Lacuroms orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a petition
for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to
judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final
declaration that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is administratively
liable.[37]

The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The corresponding implications of their actions also give rise
to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.

There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion. VelascoJacobasresponsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter
therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)

By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for
the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a
court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her husbands request but she did not know its
contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each others pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to
Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the
number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other. [38] By Velasco-Jacobasown admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule
7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground

for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. [39]
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility
of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes
account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental.[40]
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate
and spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was raised only after
controversy;

a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the

and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobas assertion

that she had not actually participate[d] in the prosecution of the case.

Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari
before deciding the contempt charge against him.[41] This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was,
in fact, Jacobas handiwork.[42]
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any
conduct that may be construed as implied consent. [43] This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001
motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to
the case.

No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his clients
cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake,horrible error, boner,
and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacobaacknowledged that the words created a
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.[44]
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. [45] However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by
the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according
to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession.[46] The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and
trust in judicial administration.[47]
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the clients
cause through fair and honest means, thus:
Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding.

Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two administrative
cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before JudgeLacuroms sala. The Courts attention
is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the cases were intended as
leverage against Judge Lacurom.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we
suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months because of his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of
property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriffs fees. [48] In
Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties when he failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in the
dismissal of his clients appeal. We imposed the penalty of one year suspension. [49]
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a
party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.[50]
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we
are faced with the question of whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the
bar and officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this
Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision.
We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.