G.R. No.

179922
December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,
versus
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as
FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II,
respondents.
Spouses Carlos (Felix and Felipa) died intestate. They left
properties to their compulsory heirs Teofilo and petitioner Juan.
Thereafter, following the demise of Teofilo, who also died intestate, he
was survived and his properties were left to Felicidad and Teofilo II.
On the basis of these circumstances, petitioner Juan filed before
the RTC the following proceedings:
1. Declaration of nullity of marriage, on the ground that the
marriage between respondent Felicidad and his late brother
Teofilo was not supported by the required marriage license.
2. Status of the child, on the basis that Teofilo II was neither natural
nor adoptive son of his late brother
3. Recovery of property, reconveyance and sumof money and
damages.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage between Felicidad and
Teofilo viod ab initio for lack of marriage license.
CA reversed
o Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the
rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may
be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among
the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)
in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect
the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage
contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos
and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not
as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the
dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage
license is corroborated by the following statement in the

affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the

Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a
marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed
by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the
number of said marriage license was inadvertently not
placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it
was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked
the same."
o Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court,
We are of the considered view that the veracity and
credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly
threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
o If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the
primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage
did not take place, neither should appellants' nonpresentation of the subject marriage license be taken as
proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof
to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized,
rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the standing to question the validity of
the subject marriage.
HELD: remanded to determine whether petitioner is a real party in
interest
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for
marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code,
except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on
the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.

 Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by
any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a
right of the spouses by stating:
o SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
o Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the
sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are
the only ones who can decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of
their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and
actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can
and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance
with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only
to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against

the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale
of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases
already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This
is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15,
200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
o As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code
is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage
void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in
the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any
person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic
in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26

 Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or

an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-ininterest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28
where the Court held:
o True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at
the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a
party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause
of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights
o In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree
and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows
or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to
P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to
file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

 The case must be remanded to determine whether or not

petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died
intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law.
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would
then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister,
acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the
merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is
called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of
marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that
Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the RTC for
contracting marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, while
having been legally married with Rafael M. Alocillo

 Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the

RTC.
Petitioner then filed against Alocillofor declaration of nullity of
their marriage.
Subsequently, petitioner was convicted of the crime of bigamy
charged against her.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto.
In the meantime, the RTC declared petitioners 1974 and 1975
marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillos psychological incapacity.
In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction.
However, in its Resolution, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals, denied reconsideration and ruled that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in proceeding with the bigamy case

despite the pendency of a nullity of marriage case.

HELD:
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:

o x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a

second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. x x x
o x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this
legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. x x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8
where it was held thus:
o The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused
could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted.

 Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or

voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases,
petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two
marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a
judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy
make any difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage."11
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is
punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25
of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides
that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents x x x ."

 Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as

far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that
time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged
to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing
to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for
petitioners defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent
upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy
already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that
petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support
her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy
in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does
not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating
evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
o x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the
person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous
marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the
confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the
latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive
period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being
counted from the date of registration of the bigamous
marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is,
therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an

erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again,
petitioner is mistaken.

 The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall

be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without
first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves
it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine
the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range
of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods
into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances
are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed
on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The
penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years
imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within
the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period,
which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court
correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that
petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by
final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latters
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was
subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to
reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, as maximum.