Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations.

An Interview with Ambassador Walid

Al-Moualem
Author(s): Walid al-Moualem
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), pp. 81-94
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
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INTERVIEW
FRESH LIGHT ON THE
SYRIAN-ISRAELI

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
AN INTERVIEWWITH AMBASSADOR
WALID AL-MOUALEM

in hisinterview
withCNNin September
thatthe
JPS:PresidentAsad'sstatement
Israelishad agreedto withdrawto the4 June1967 linesseemsto have revived
thewholeissueof "missedopportunities.
"ManyIsraelishave beensayingthatif
Syriahad been movingon thenegotiations
front,Israel wouldnothave called
earlyelections.
AmbassadorMoualem.This is not true.Thingswere moving.In January1996,
DennisRoss declaredthatmorehad been achievedin two sessionsof talksin
Marylandthanhad been achievedin the entirepreviousfouryears.This is on
recordat theStateDepartment.
Andbecause of thisprogress,UriSavir,Dennis
Ross,and I, as theheads ofthedelegations,
decidedthatwe wouldholdcontinuous talksto finalizethestructure
ofan agreement
on all issues.We seta deadline
forourselves,agreeingto close theremaining
gaps and finalizeall theelements
ofan agreement
byJune1996,atwhichtimewe wouldsendwhatwe had agreed
to a specialdrafting
committee.
The expectation
was thatbySeptember1996the
finaldocumentwould be ready.
Mr.[Shimon]Peres called
So we were verysurprisedwhen,soon afterward,
earlyelections.The talkswere stillgoingon when Secretary[ofStateWarren]
me of Prime
came to Wye Plantationon 25 Januaryand informed
Christopher
Minister
Peres'sdecision.Thiswas notpleasantnews forus and theAmericans,
butwe said:"Thisis theirdecision."Secretary
thenaskedme to conChristopher
vey to the SyrianleadershipthatPresidentClintonand PrimeMinisterPeres
wantedto continuethetalksin Maryland
despitethedecisionto hold earlyelecWe had thefirst
sessionthe
tions.Andforthatreason,we resumedin February.
and Tel Avivand theIsraelis
weekendbeforethebombswentoffinJerusalem
thattheyhad suspendedthe talks.From
informed
us, throughthe Americans,
and Israeli
thattime,of course,everything
began to collapse.The international
focusshiftedto combatting
terrorism.
WiththeSharmal-Shaykh"antiterrorism"
WALID AL-MouALEM,
Syria'sambassadorto theUnitedStatessince 1990,has been thehead

oftheSyriandelegationto thepeace talkswithIsraelsinceJuly1994and a memberofthe

ofOctober1991.He was interviewed
Syriannegotiating
teamsincetheMadridConference
in Washington
on 15 October,12 November,and 25 November1996 by LindaButler,
managingeditorofJPS.

Journal of Palestine Studies XXVI, no. 2 (Winter1997), pp. 81-94.

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82

JOURNAL OF PALESTINE

STUDIES

summitand a follow-upconference
inWashington,
no one was talkingaboutthe
peace process anymore.Then came the electionsand Mr. [Benjamin]Netanyahu'svictory,
and untilnow we feelthatthepresentIsraeligovernment
has no
strategy
forpeace withSyria.
JPS.FormerPrimeMinisterPeressaid in a recentinterview
thatwhentheSyrians informedtheIsraelis throughtheAmericansthattheywanted to reach
peace by1996,Israel'sone conditionhad beenthatthetalksbe upgradedto the
heads ofstateleveland thatPresidentAsad wouldnotcommithimself
toa date.
AmbassadorMoualem:In fact,therewas nothingnew in theIsraelidemandto
meetat thehead of statelevel; [former
PrimeMinister
Yitzhak]Rabin,too, had
alwayswantedto negotiateatthesummit.
Butwe havestatedrepeatedly
thatthis
typeofmeetingrequirescarefulpreparation:
Ifa meetingatthesummitlevelis a
failure,all further
opportunities
willbe closed.You need to definebeforehand
preciselywhatpointsthesummitshouldsolve;thegaps betweenthetwo positionsmustbe narrow,and you need to knowthatthismeetingis trulythefinal
Forthesereasons,whenPresident
stageoftheagreement.
of
Asadwas informed
PrimeMinister
Peres'swishto meet,he said itwas premature.
So the Israelisknew beforehandwhatPresidentAsad's responsewould be,
because thiswas an ongoingrequeston theirpart.Thiscould nothave been the
reasonfortheircallingearlyelections-andat thetimetheydid notgive it as a
reason.Peres'sdecisionto call earlyelectionsmusthave dependedon pressures
fromwithinhis own party,because the marginbetweenLaborand Likudhad
startedto narrowin thepolls.
In myopinion,whatPeressaid in theinterview
was an excuse,a wayofblaming theSyriansfornotreachingan agreement,
insteadof takingtheblamehimselfforhis errorin callingearlyelections.Once electionsare scheduled,you
can'treachan agreementwhenyou are notsure abouttheresults,and anyway
in February-thiswas a one-sided
the Israelissuspendedthe talksunilaterally
decisionbecause theybelievedthattheirpublicopinionwouldnotagreeto continuetalkswithSyriaafterthePalestiniansuicidebombs.As I mentioned,they
then changed the priorityfromthe peace process to combattingso-called
terrorism,
thattheIsraelishad agreed to
JPS:Gettingback to PresidentAsad's statement
withdrawto the4 June 1967 lines:Was thisa formalcommitment?
are
AmbassadorMoualem.It was. Whenyou are in official
talks,commitments
he was
formal.When PrimeMinister
Rabincommitted
himselfto withdrawal,
representing
Israel,not himselfpersonally.AfterRabinwas assassinated,Peres
informed
us in Novemberthrough
theAmericans
thathe wantedto continuethe
talks,and he repeatedthecommitment.
to complywith
JPS:Many havefound itpuzzlingthat,iftheIsraelishad offered
theSyriansnevermentionedthisfact.
Syria'sbasic demand offullwithdrawal,

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INTERVIEW

WiTH AMBASSADOR

WALID

AL-MouALEM

83

AmbassadorMoualem:Of coursewe could notmentionit.We agreedwiththe

Israelisnot to announcedetailsof the talksbeforefinalizing
an agreement.It
would nothave been rightto announceonlyone element-theelementthatis
suitableforSyria-without
theotherelementsneeded to sell thedeal as a completepackage.
I shouldstressthatitwas notPresident
Asad who firstannouncedtheagreementof fullwithdrawal.
Our side onlymentionedit because ithad been made
publicon theIsraeliside,followingthepublicationin Septemberof a book in
Hebrewgivingan accurateaccount,fromIsraelisources,ofwhathappened.Earlier,[Egyptian]
President[Husni]Mubarakhad said in an interviewwith the
Arabicnewspaperal-HayatthatRabinhad informed
himofhisreadinessforfull
withdrawal
to thelinesof 4 June1967.
JPS: Throughwhatmediumdid Rabin conveyhis withdrawaloffer?
AmbassadorMoualem:I prefernotto say.
JPS: Was thefull withdrawalofferrepeatedin thenegotiatingroom?
AmbassadorMoualem:Yes. Itwas repeatedinMaryland.
AndI toldDennisRoss:
"Pleaseregister
whattheIsraeliside said."In fact,everything
thatwas said,was
said in thepresenceof theAmericans.
Important
pointsof agreementwere alwaysdepositedwiththem.EversinceJuly1994,theywerealwaysin theroomMr.DennisRoss and Mr.MarkParris.BeforeMr.Parris,therewas MartinIndyk
withDennisRoss.
JPS:Can you commenton how thenegotiations
developedwiththeAmericans
present?Whatwas theirrole?
AmbassadorMoualem: They were facilitators,
witnesses.You could consider
themmoderators,
evenpartners
because theymadeproposalsto bridge
brokers,
brokeofftheirtalks
gaps.Forinstance,
whentheSyrianand Israelichiefsofstaff
in December1994because we werenotsatisfied
with[Israelichiefofstaff
Ehud]
it
was
drafted
forward
a
Barak'soffer,
the Americanswho
and pushed
paper
whichenabledus to recalled "Aimsand Principlesof Security
Arrangements,"
sume talksinJune1995.
JPS:It mightbe usefulto have some idea oftheactual negotiating
procedure.
For example,you alludedto "registering"
or "depositing"
pointswiththeAmericans. Did theAmericanstakeminutes?
How werethingsdone?
In addition,
AmbassadorMoualem:Allthreedelegationstaketheirown minutes.
we formally
depositwiththeAmericansanysubjecton whichthe Syriansand
Israelishave agreed.Because our aimfromthebeginningwas a comprehensive
agreement,not a seriesof agreementson each point,we do not sign on the
individualpointsbutdepositthemwiththeAmericansuntilall theissues have
theagreement-are
been resolved.Thenthesepoints-whatwe call structuring

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84

OF PALESTINESTUDIES
JOURNAL

This is normalprocefordrafting.
to a specializedcommittee
to be transferred
durein all negotiations.
Above and beyondthis,at theend of each session,Mr.Ross used to make a
would be discussed,sometimes
summaryof whatwe achieved.This summary
modified,and thenthefinaldraftwould be approvedby bothdelegations.This
on his tripsto the reChristopher
summarywould thenbe takenby Secretary
gion. When the draftis approvedby the leadershipof bothsides,it becomes
official.
JPS: WhenNetanyahuwas asked in a recentinterviewabout thewithdrawal
statements
but "hypothetical
issue, he said therehad been no commitments
"
says thatit willnotrecogmade in thecourseofnegotiations.His government
nize anythingthatis not writtenand signed.
law.In negoofinternational
AmbassadorMoualem:Thisis a new interpretation
an agreement,
you can'twriteand signon each pointyou agreeon before
tiating
processis that
writing
up thefinaldocument.As I said,thenormalnegotiating
you discussa subject,finalizeitand putitaside,moveon to anotherissue,finalwiththe
ize it and put it aside, and so on, witheach finalizedpointregistered
Iftheway impliedby Netanyahuwere adopted,therewould be no
Americans.
in theworld:Each side would have to writeout itsposition
morenegotiations
and offeritto theotherside and receivea written
response,whichis notappropriatefornegotiating.
JPS:Let'sgo back once again to thisissueofwithdrawal.Can you commenton
wasfirstmade?
thetiming,about whenthewithdrawalcommitment
came onlyafter
to fullwithdrawal
AmbassadorMoualem: Israel'scommitment
FromMadridonward,the only issue
enormouseffort.
we would even consentto discusswas fullwithdrawal.
a,~j&gg,~ azi~iu~t
Under the Likud,of course,it was a dialogue of the
112e yran
wou not
deaf-I thinkBen Aharon,thehead oftheIsraelidelegamove
befrebeing

xrnviced
fIsrel's
inienhio
offidi

to theletter
PrimeMinister
[former
tion,was following

to continuetalkingforten
Yitzhak]Shamir'sinstructions
Rabinbecame primeminister
yearswithoutresult.After
t-e Qpenin&
in June1992,we stillinsistedon discussingwithdrawal
realizedthattheSyrianswould
only.WhenRabinfinally
notmove a stepahead in discussinganyoftheotherelementsofa peace settlehe madethe
mentbeforebeingconvincedofIsrael'sintention
offullwithdrawal,
opening.
Thatwas in August1993,and we negotiatedthedetailsofthewithdrawal
elementforalmosta year,untilJuly1994,whenwe finalizedtheagreementon full
withdrawal
to the4 June1967lines.Thisopened thewayfornegotiations
on the
PrimeMinister
otherelementsofa peace agreement-what
Rabinused to call the
"fourlegs of the table."Besides withdrawal,
theseelementsare normalization,
and thetimetableof fulfillment.
So in September1994,I
securityarrangements,

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INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADORWALID AL-MOUALEM

85

began discussingwithMr.Rabinovitch
theotherthreeelementsand presented
our visionof each.
JPS:Whyare the4 June1967 lines,as opposedto theinternational
boundaries,
so importantto Syria?
AmbassadorMoualem:The difference
betweentheinternational
borderand the
4 Juneborderis veryslighton theground,actually.This land has no strategic
importance,
buttheissue is sovereignty.
Everyinchof our land is sacredto our
people.
JPS.Thequestionremains.IfIsraelagreedto withdrawtothe4 June1967 lines,
Syria'sprincipaldemand,whatpreventedthenegotiations
fromgoingforward
morequickly?
AmbassadorMoualem:Firstof all,people seem to believethatitis theSyrians
thatare not moving.This is not the case. Israelmoved veryslowly,verycauuntilafterOslo II had been concludedand especiallyuntilPeresbecame
tiously,
primeminister.
Rabin'sstrategy
was to decouplethePalestinian,
Syrian,
Jordanian,
and Lebanese tracks-hecontrolledthepace of our negotiations
accordingto whatwas
happeningon theothertracks.Whenhe movedon thePalestinian
trackin September1993,forexample,he informed
us throughtheAmericansthathe could
notproceedon theSyriantrackbecause theIsraelipublicneeded timeto digest
theOslo Accord.So he suspendedour talks.Then he movedon theJordanian
trackin 1994 and informed
us thattheIsraelipublicneeded timeto digestthe
Jordanian-Israeli
agreement.
Again,our talkswere suspended.It was onlyafter
the IsraelisfinalizedOslo II withthe Palestiniansin September1995 thatthey
turnedto us and wantedto moveveryquickly.
Anotherelementwas thepersonaldifference
betweenRabinand Peres.Both
menwantedto achievea settlement
withSyria,buteach had hisown speed and
conditions.Rabin was reluctant,
suspicious,very cautious. He moved very
he was in a hurry-he
slowly,inchbyinch.WhenPeresbecameprimeminister,
wantedto entertheelectionswiththeSyrian-Israeli
agreementin his hand.He
wantedto "flyhighand fast,"as he used to say.I used to telltheIsraelicounterto know when and
to flybut it is also veryimportant
partthatit is important
whereto land-you can'tcontinueto flyhighand fast.We haveourpublicopinion and need to sell the agreementto themto get themto accept it. But he
couldn'twait.He was in officeless thanthreemonthswhenhe called elections.
But as I said earlier,we had been movingforwardand had set as a target
A monthlater,Israelsuspended
betweenus to finalizeall elementsbymid-1996.
thetalks.

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86

JouRNALOF PALESrE STUDIES

JPS: What had in fact been the major stumblingblocks to reaching an

agreement?
AmbassadorMoualem:Mainly,itwas theIsraeliexaggeration
in two fields:securityarrangements
and normalization.
First,security.
The Israelishave military
superiority
overanycombination
ofArabstates.Theyhave nuclearbombs,the
mostadvancedarmsand technology.
Americanarmsand suppliesand technologyare completely
open to them.Israelmanufactures
60 percentofitsneeds in
military
equipmentand is thefifth
armsexporter
in theworld.Yet despiteall this,
theyused to tellus theyare afraidofSyria.We did notbelievethis,and we kept
askingourselveswhatwas themotivebehindthisexaggeration.
JPS:In specificterms,whatweresomeofthethingsthattheIsraeliswereasking
withregardto securityarrangements?
AmbassadorMoualem: For example,theywantedan early-warning
stationon
the Golan aftertheirwithdrawal,
whichwe consideredan infringement
of our
as iftheywantedto spyon us fromourown territory-and
sovereignty,
thisin a
situationof peace, not a situationof war.Theyalreadyhave the technologyincludingsatellites,
theirown and American-that
can do thejob farmoreeffectivelyon thegroundthanearly-warning
stations.
Theirinsistenceon groundstationsput a questionmarkin our minds.
Theyalso spoke of thesize of theSyrianarmy,as ifwhatwas important
was
numbersratherthanthequalityand typeofequipmentand armaments
and such
thingsas thepossessionofa nucleararsenal.Finally,
theyinsistedthatthedemilitarizedzones reachjustsouthof Damascus.Thismeansyou open thecapitalto
them.We refusedall thesedemands.
JPS. Whatabout normalization?
AmbassadorMoualem:Israelbelievedthatyoucan pusha buttonto makepeace
froma stateof war to a stateof peace.
warm,to directSyrianpopularattitudes
Thisis notlogical,especiallysinceitis rareto finda householdin Syriathathas
notlostsomeoneon thebattlefield.
Itis alwaysnecessaryto educateand inform
to their
thepeople. Theyneed to readtheagreement
to see whetheritconforms
interests,
theyneed to believein it.You can'tobligethemto buyIsraeligoods or
visitIsraeliftheyare notconvincedthatIsraelhas changedfrombeingan enemy
to a neighbor.An agreement,
whichis signedby the leadership,tellswhat is
requiredfromour side,butwe cannotbe obligedto makethepeace warm.
JPS: Whatdid theIsraeli demandsfor normalizationmean in concreteterms?
AmbassadorMoualem: They wanted open borders,open marketsfor their
on ourown economy.Our
goods,and so on. Thiswould havean obviouseffect
economicregulations
are notagainstthem;we do notopen our marketsto any
two economieswhen one has a per capita
Andhow can you integrate
country.

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87

INThRVIEWwrrHAMBASSADORWAUD AL-MOUALEM

incomeof $900 per yearand theotherhas a per capitaincomeof $15,000per

periodduris notpossible,so we discusseda transitional
year?Such integration
ingwhichwe could raiseoureconomyto thelevelwheretherecan be competitionwithoutundue hardshipon our society.
somepeople have suggestedthatitmight
JPS:In thelightofNetanyahu'svictory,
have been betterfor Syria to recoverthe Golan, even ifit meant having a
groundstationin theGolan,thatthisis notsuch a heavyprice.
AmbassadorMoualem:We are theonlypartywho can decide whethertheprice
People mustread thefinal
matter.
is heavyor not heavy.It is not a theoretical
and
needs,so theycan support
rights
their
and see in ittheirintegrity,
agreement
here-we are speakingabout our terriit.We are notspeakingaboutCalifornia
We
tory.These thingsmatterto us, because itis a questionof our sovereignty.
manned
a groundstationin ourterritory
willnotpermitunderanycircumstances
by theIsraelis-we would refuseeven ifitwould be mannedby theAmericans.
Theyofferedus a groundstationin Safad,and we said no because we willnot
means,theonlyreasonfor
allow one on oursoil.Givenadvancedtechnological
the Israelisto insiston havinga groundstationis to show thattheyare in the
Golan againstour sovereignty.
As I mentioned,muchprogresshad been made in theseareas.In Maryland
therewas a new Israeliteamand we had startedto findsolutions,on certain
itemswe foundbridges.Thencame thedecisionto hold earlyelectionsand the
suspensionof thetalks.
JPS:Alongthesame lines,how wouldyou respondtothecommentthatSyria,in
would have been betteroffto make a smallgestureto help
its own interests,
Peres win theelections?
AmbassadorMoualem: Afterhe began bombingLebanonin Grapes of Wrath,
aftertheQana massacre,how could Syriamake a gestureforhim?
The Israelis
in Israel'saffairs.
But more important,
Syriadoes not interfere
have to vote accordingto theirwill.Nobodycan impose peace on theotherof bothsides.IftheIsraelisdo notsee peace
theinterests
peace mustrepresent
thisis forthemto decide.
in theirinterests,
all along.We alwaysfelt
This,actually,was a problemwiththenegotiations
thattheIsraeliswantedSyriato do theirworkforthem.

theirpublicthatpeacewas
Theywantedus toconvince
ourpublicforpeacewith
Weprepared
interests.
intheir

t oterwr

o hm

Israel. Many thingschanged in our media. But they

n hergi
wantedus to speak in theIsraelimediato prepareIsraeli !I ~
a
visit
ta
ec
to
Israelis
to
allow
us
wanted
publicopinion.They
Syria.We consideredsuch insistencea negativesign:
When you do not prepareyourown public forpeace
to make
withyourneighbor,thismeansyou do not reallyhave the intention
peace.

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88

OF PALESrINE STUDIES
JOURNAiL

in theGolan discussedat thenegotiations?

JPS: Was theissue ofsettlements
AmbassadorMoualem. Not specifically,
because it was understoodthatPresidentAsad's demandof "fullwithdrawal"
to the4 June1967linesincludedboth
civilianand military
withdrawal.
JPS:Somepeople say thatthereappears to have been an Israelichangeofattitudeevenbeforethetalksweresuspendedin February-for
example,theIsraeliTurkishagreement.Do you thinkthereis any truthin this?
AmbassadorMoualem:Israel'smilitary
relationswithTurkeywereformalized
in
February.
Itwas whentheIsraelissuspendedthetalksthattheybegan trying
to
isolateSyria.One aspectof thiswas expandingtheirrelationswithTurkey.Anotheraspectwas,ofcourse,theoperationinLebanon.Therewas also pressurein
thatourrelationswiththeUnitedStatesneverprogressedduringthefouror five
yearsofthisprocess;to thecontrary,
we werekepton theAmerican"blacklist,"
and Congresstriedto adopt additionalmeasuresagainstSyriathissummer.
JPS:But theLebanon operation,
for example,was afterthenegotiationswere
suspended.So to whatend weretheypressuringSyria?
AmbassadorMoualem: To make us accept theirconditions,in the eventthat
negotiations
resume.Ofcourseone can'timaginetalkswithoutpressure,butthis
does not changetheSyrianposition.We keptsayingthatpeace is our strategic
we did not interrupt
option.We pursuedpeace, we stayedin thenegotiations,
them,and we are readyto resumewherewe leftoffand on the basis thatthe
Israelisrecognizethecommitments
made by thepreviousgovernments.
JPS:Duringthesefouryearsoftalks,sometimes
intense,was thereanypersonal
or
the Syriansand the Israeli
camaraderie
that
between
rapport
developed
negotiators?
butthereis no interaction
AmbassadorMoualem:You respectyourcounterpart,
at thepersonallevel.
thattheSyrian
have gleanedfromSyrianstatements
JPS:Some commentators
viewofa comprehensive
peace now involvesmainlyLebanonand Syria.Is that
a fair characterization?
AmbassadorMoualem:We said thatcomprehensive
peace fromourperspective
includesSyriaand Lebanontogetherat the same time.We sign together,
and
Israelwithdraws
bothfromsouthLebanonand theGolan Heights.
JPS:How do you reconcilethiswithyourlonginsistenceon a peace involving
theentireregion?

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INTERVIEW wITH AMBASSADORWALID AL-MOUALEM

89

AmbassadorMoualem: We stillwantcomprehensiveness-comprehensiveness
was one basisoftheMadridprocess.Ourforeign
minister
inMadridwentaround
to thevariousArabdelegationsto insiston thesame venue and timingforthe
negotiations,
and herein Washington
we had regularcoordinating
meetingsfor
theheads ofArabdelegations.In theregion,ourforeignminister
used to discuss
developments with the other Arab parties under the umbrella of
comprehensiveness.
But we were takenby surpriseby Oslo-we did not know about thesecret
talks untilthe agreementwas announced.We were also surprisedby the
We were not informed
Jordaniantreaty.
of whatwas happeningon thattrack,
when KingHusseinand Rabinmetin Londonand agreedto sign.So we did not
leave the Palestiniansor theJordanians.
Theyleftus. We are not complaining,
but that'stheway it is. Maybethingswillchangein thefuture.
I shouldstressthatwe neverhad secrettalkswiththeIsraelis.We neverhad
back channelnegotiationsor "testing"
meetings;everything
takesplace in the
negotiating
room.Thishas been ourpolicyfromDay One. Thereis no need fora
back channel:Bothsides can go throughtheAmericanmediatorwithany new
ideas,and in ourview secrettalkseventually
are bound

tocausemistrust
andmisunderstanding.
Wemaynotre- Wenvrha
with
veal thedetailsbutwe alwaystellourpublicthegeneral
eIs.ris

sert "tak

directionof our talks,wherewe are meeting,whenwe

whenwe finish.
Thatis whyyou findsupportfortheSyrianpositionin the
start,
Arabworld.
I shouldalso mentionthatwe havealwaysinsistedthatwhateveragreement
is
Because ambiguity
reachedmustbe veryclear,withoutanytraceof ambiguity.
cannotmakefora lastingpeace.
JPS: WhenNetanyahufirstcame topower,therewas considerabletalkabout a
"LebanonFirst"policy.If, in fact,Israel were to withdrawunilaterally
from
southLebanon,whatwouldSyria'sreactionbe?
UN Security
AmbassadorMoualem:We wouldapplaud.IfIsraelfulfilled
Council
Resolution425 obligingitto withdrawto theinternational
border,withoutprewe would be delighted.
conditions,
to theKnessetin June were
JPS: TheLikudgovernment's
guidelinessubmitted
veryclear. Specifically,
theysay "thegovernmentviewsthe Golan Heightsas
overtheGolan
essentialto thesecurityofthestate.RetainingIsraelisovereignty
does
thissay about
with
What
will be the basis of any arrangements
Syria."
futurenegotiations?
AmbassadorMoualem: Quite simply,thisis why thereare no talksbetween
was
Syriaand Israel.Evenbeforetheguidelines,duringhiscampaign,Netanyahu
fromtheGolan,"no"to an
speakingaboutthe"threenoes": "no"to withdrawal
If he is
independentPalestinianstate,and "no" to compromiseon Jerusalem.
I'm
for
seriousaboutthesethreenoes,whatis thereto negotiate? speaking Syria.

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90

JOURNAL OF PALESrIME STUDE[S

Ifwe are notcertainthattheend resultofthenegotiations

willbe a returnofthe
Golan to thelinesof4 June1967,thereis no reasonforus to go fortalks.As long
as he wantsto negotiateon thebasis of"peace forpeace,"he willfindno Syrian
willingto talkto him.
JPS.NetanyahumaintainsthattheGolan is notreallya priorityfor
Syria.In an
interview
just beforehis election,heputsfour otherprioritiesahead oftheGolan: internalstability,
Syria'sregionalrole,itsrolein Lebanon,and itsrelations
withthe UnitedStates.
AmbassadorMoualem: These fourfieldshe mentionsare resultsof a peace
treaty,
notelementsofthepeace treaty
itself.
Nothingcan compensatetheSyrian
people forlosingone inchin theGolan.Not even themoon.The Golan is our
territory.
Itis a sacredcause fortheSyrianpeople,and we willcontinueto struggle untilwe recoverthisterritory
to thelinesof 4 June1967.
JPS:Recentlytherehas been a revivaloftalkon theIsraeliside about how they
cannotwithdraw
fromtheGolan becausefor nineteenyears theSyrianswere
shellingthemfromtheHeights.Do you have any commentabout that?
AmbassadorMoualem: I have one verybriefcomment.The recordsof the
UnitedNationsTruceSupervision
Organization
provethatthisis a big lie. Ifyou
takethe 1949Armistice
linesbetweenSyriaand Israeland look at theDemilitarizedZones (DMZs), you see thatall theseDMZs were capturedby theIsraelis
is thetinyterribetween1949and 1967exceptforone tinybit,al-Himmeh-this
torywhereour troopswere locatedon 4 June1967.IftheSyrianswere shelling
the Israelis,the questionthatshouldbe asked is: Why?The answeris thatthe
not belongingto themin
Israelisattackedand moved in to occupyterritories
whichwe bothsigned.
clearviolationof theArmistice
Agreement,
JPS:In thepresentsituation,have therebeenformalapproachesbytheAmericans withformalproposalsbytheIsraelis?
AmbassadorMoualem: In July1996,afterNetanyahu'sfirstvisitto the United
States,Dennis Ross visitedPresidentAsad in Latakiato assure him about the
ClintoncontainletterfromPresident
Americanposition.He came witha written
to theprinciplesand basis of theMaing assurancesofAmerica'scommitment
242 and 338 and theprinciple
CouncilResolutions
dridConference-UNSecurity
Dennis Ross thatSyriais readyto
of land forpeace. PresidentAsad informed
and
resumetalkson thatbasis and thatNetanyahuhonorsthe commitments
fromthepointwherewe had
on theSyriantrackand goes forward
achievements
Thisis stillour position.
leftoffin Maryland,
withtheAmericanparticipation.
JPS:Have therebeen any approachessince then?
NetanAmbassadorMoualem:DennisRosswentto Israelto briefPrimeMinister
yahu,who thensent Dore Gold to Washingtonto informthe Americansthat

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INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADORWALID AL-MouALEM

91

Israelis readyto resumetalksin Marylandand to discusssecurityaccordingto

do notconofInvitation
theLetters
ofInvitation
to Madrid.However,theLetters
tainthetermsof reference
fortheMadridConference-theprincipleof land for
Bakersent
ofAssurancethatSecretary
peace-which are specifiedin theLetters
to theparticipants.
indicatesthattheIsraeliswantto finda new
It is our beliefthatthisinitiative
basis forthenegotiations
In otherwords,theyare
and new termsof reference.
our territory
to
willingto make peace withus on conditionthatwe surrender
them.Netanyahu
theworkofthelastfouryears.Ifwe accept
wantsto disregard
theprecedentof goingback to squareone everytimethereis a changeof govwe willneverreachan agreement.
The factthatthereis a new Israeli
ernment,
is bound
government
does notmeanthereis a new Israel,and each government
by theagreements
of itspredecessor.
now are focusedon thePalesThatis wherewe stand.The Americanefforts
tiniantrack.We don'tmind.We are not in a hurry.If the Israelisare not in a
hurry,
we are not.
JPS:Are theAmericanstakinga positionon thisissue of whetherthecurrent
is bound by theundertakings
ofLabor?
government
AmbassadorMoualem:To myknowledge,no. Theysaid theycannottakea position.To take a positionwould contradict
theirrole as cosponsor,mediator,
honestbroker.Buttheywerewitnessesand cannotdenywhatwas achieved.
JPS.On theSyriantrack,have theAmericansbeen trueto theirroleas honest
broker?
to answer.Of courseyou cannotcomAmbassadorMoualem.This is difficult
pare theAmericans'relationswithSyriawiththeirrelationswithIsrael,but at
withtheirrole.
leastwe are satisfied
thatyou had tolda high
JPS.RecentlyIsraeli televisionran a storyreporting
could resumeifIsrael issuesa declaration
Americanofficialthatnegotiations
formula.
ofprinciplerecognizingtheland-for-peace
AmbassadorMoualem:Thisis notaccurate.We havea singleposition,and ithas
Itis as I just
neverchanged.The principleoflandforpeace alone is notsufficient.
Israelto-full withsaid: We need Israeliacceptanceof whatRabincommitted
to the"Aimsand Prindrawalto thelineof4 June1967-and Israelicommitment
in
afterRabin'svisitto
reached
of
paper
May
1995
ciples Security
Arrangements"
Washington.
Theyalso have to agreeto resumetalksfromthepointwherethey
leftoffin February1996.Alltheseissueswere approvedin thepresenceof the
Americancosponsor.
These pointsare crucialforSyria.If everwe were to agree to returnto the
commitment
bothto fullwithdrawal
and to honorthe
tablewithoutNetanyahu's
would
lose all we
we
American-drafted
paper on securityarrangements,

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92

JOURNAL OF PALESnNE

STUDIES

Itwouldbe likethrowing
achievedin thenegotiations.
awayIsrael'searliercomand goingback to squareone.
mitments
JPS: Thisis thesecondtimeyou mentionthepaper 'Aimsand PrinciplesofSecurityArrangements."
Whatis itssignificance?
AmbassadorMoualem:Firstof all,I shouldgivethebackgroundforthispaper,
whichfollowedthefailureof a meetingbetweenthetwo chiefsof staffin December1994.In January1995,I was recalledto Damascus and remainedthere
fortwo months.PresidentClintonwrotetwo lettersto PresidentAsad aimed at
renewingthetalksbetweenthetwo chiefsof staff.
PresidentAsad insteadsuggestedthatbothsides,afteranalyzingwhythetalksbetweenthechiefsof staff
had failed,shouldreachan agreement
on theaimsand theprinciplesof theseto set a framework.
would notmake
curity
arrangements,
Thisway,themilitary
exaggerateddemandsin thesecurity
domain.PresidentClinton,afterdiscussing
thissuggestionwithRabin,gave his approvalforthe ambassadorsto discuss
I returned
such an agreement.
and in MarchItamarRabinovitch,
to Washington,
DennisRoss,and myselfbegan discussingwhatwould become thepaper called
traveled
"Aimsand Principlesof Security
Arrangements."
Secretary
Christopher
twiceto theregionto discussand finalizesome itemsinthepaperwithPresident
Asad and PrimeMinisterRabin.Then,on 7 May 1995,the U.S. administration
invitedRabinto come to Washington
to discussthepaper theyhad draftedon
Shara'to come to
the basis of our talks,and thentheyinvitedForeignMinister
on 15 May.Finally,
on 22 May1995,Syriaand Israel(withtheUnited
Washington
States)agreedto thefinalversionof thepaper "Aimsand Principlesof Security
and depositeditwiththeUnitedStates.Thispaper constitutes
a
Arrangements"
in whichthe securityexpertsof bothsides discussthe securityarframework
and itpavedthewayforthetwochiefsofstaff
to resumemeetingin
rangements,
June1995.
The importance
ofthepaperis thatitestablishestheprinciplethatthesecurity
of one side mustnot be at the expense of the securityof the otherside-the
on one side
and thefactthatany arrangement
principleof equality,mutuality,
mustbe equal on theother.
backtothepresentimpasse,doyou considerthatthisrequestbythe
JPS:Getting
to increaseitsdefensebudgetby$1 billionhas any implications
Israelimilitary
the
track?
for
Syrian-Israeli
doubt.The increasedmilitary
AmbassadorMoualem:Without
budget,combined
on thebasis of "peace forpeace" and
withtheIsraelis'insistenceon negotiating
is notto make
intheGolan,showsthattheirintention
theirexpandingsettlement
withSyria.
peace withSyria,butto makeconflict

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93

INTERVIEw WITH AMBASSADORWAIUD AL-MouALEM

JPS: TheIsraelissay thattheneedfor an increasedmilitarybudgetis because

Syria'stroopredeployment
in Lebanonpoints to Syria'spreparationsfor war
againstIsrael.
AmbassadorMoualem:The Israelisalwaystryto puttheblameon theotherside.
Ne-......
In fact,ourredeployment
followed
PrimeMinister

to go aftanyahu'svisitto southLebanonand histhreats

terHizballahand Syriantroopsin Lebanon.Because we

had no experience with this man, we took these threats

seriously.Our redeployment,
therefore,
was a verycautious,defensivemove.

w
-

JPS: Whatcan you say about theFrenchand European role?

AmbassadorMoualem: Europe's vitalinterestsin the region-historical,
geographical,and cultural-haveto be recognized.One cannotexpectthemsimply
to act as cashiers,payingfortheagreements
reached.Everyoneagreesthatthe
Americanroleis essential,butwe believethattheEuropeanroleis notcontradicWe considertheEuropeanrole to be veryimportant.
torybutcomplementary.
JPS:Summingup, wheredoes thepeace processstand today?
AmbassadorMoualem:Syriais committed
to a comprehensive
settlement
based
on the Madridtermsof reference-Security
CouncilResolutions242, 338, and
425 and theprincipleof land forpeace. These principleswere agreedto by all
and withoutthistherewould have
parties,includingthe Shamirgovernment,
been no MadridConference.
Since then,we have had a recordof achievement
on theSyriantrackwithRabin,whichwas reaffirmed
by thePeresgovernment.
This achievementconsistsprincipally
of two things:Israelicommitment
to full
withdrawal
to thelinesof4 June1967,and commitment
to thepaperon security
aims and principles.Netanyahumustcommithimselfto theseelementsso we
can buildon whatwas achievedduringfouryearsofnegotiations
and notallow
of thesefouryearsto evaporate.
theefforts
JPS:And ifNetanyahudoes not commithimselj?If the collapse of thepeace
processprovesdefinitive?
AmbassadorMoualem:Ifpeace fails,all optionsare open. In Syria,peace is still
announceditin
ourstrategic
Asadfirst
option,as ithas been eversincePresident
summitwithPresidentClintonin Geneva.Butyou
January1994 duringhis first
cannotachievepeace byyourself-youneed a partnerforpeace. We do notyet
has
is sucha partner
or thatNetanyahu
see signsthattheNetanyahugovernment
whichare
a strategy
forpeace. He has a strategy
forexpandingthesettlements,
bulletsin theheartof thepeace process.For thatreason,all optionsare open.
JPS:Do you want to elaborateon that?

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94

JOURNAL OF PALESTNE

STUDIES

AmbassadorMoualem:No,I do notwantto.Alloptionsareopen. Let'sleave itat

that.
thatIsraelmightbeginmilitary
operJPS:Whatinyourvieware thepossibilities
ations against Syriantroopsin Lebanon or even in SyriaitselJ7
AmbassadorMoualem: The possibilityof a conflictlaunchedby the Israelis
forpeace in
againstSyriais real,especiallyin theabsence of an Israelistrategy
whichis nothiddenbutannounced.
theregionand giventheirpoliticalprogram,
First,
IsraelandSyriacan resumetalksaimed
What,infact,arethealternatives?
Second,theregion
at reachinga finalagreement
on thebasistowhichI referred.
can returnto the stateof no war,no peace. Third,therecan be a returnto a
ofconflict.
oftheregionfrom1948to thepresent,
situation
Lookingatthehistory
I thinkitis clearthatthesituation
ofno war,no peace cannotlast.Thatleavesthe
on thebasisto
to negotiations
othertwo.We hope thatIsraelwilloptfora return
whichI have referred.

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