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Table of Contents

Title 2: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State........................


...................................... 7 Art. 124: Arbitrary Detention .........
................................................................................
.............. 7 Milo v. Salanga (G.R. No. L-37007).............................
.............................................................. 7 Cayao v. Del Mu
ndo (A.M. No. MTJ-93-813) ......................................................
..................... 9 Astorga v. People (G.R. No. 154130).....................
................................................................. 11 Art. 125: D
elay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities ....
....... 13 People vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 126252) .................................
..................................................... 13 Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy
Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503) .................................. 15
Title 3: Crimes Against Public Order ...........................................
................................................... 17 Art.134: Rebellion or Ins
urrection ......................................................................
....................... 17 People vs. Silongan (G.R. No. 137182) ...............
.................................................................... 17 Enrile v
s. Amin (G.R. No. 93335) .......................................................
..................................... 18 People vs. Manglallan (G.R. No. L-38538
) ..............................................................................
19 Title 4: Crimes Against Public Interest ....................................
....................................................... 21 Art. 168: Illegal Pos
session and Use of False Treasury or Bank Notes and Other Instruments of Credit.
................................................................................
......................................................... 21 Tecson v. CA (370 S
CRA 181) .......................................................................
.......................... 21 Art. 171: Falsification by Public Officer, Employe
e; or Notary or Ecclesiastical Minister.......... 23 Art. 172: Falsification by
Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents .......................... 23
Amora v. CA (155 SCRA 388) ....................................................
.............................................. 23 Pajelga V. Scareal (167 SCRA 3
50) ............................................................................
............. 25 Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 88) ..............................
........................................................... 27 Art. 183: Perjury
...............................................................................
.......................................... 29 Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justic
e (475 SCRA 495)................................................................
29 Acuna vs. Deputy Ombudsman (450 SCRA 237) ..................................
.................................. 31 Choa vs. People (299 SCRA 145) ...........
................................................................................
. 33 Art. 185: Machinations in Public Auctions .................................
................................................ 35 Ouano v. CA.................
................................................................................
........................... 35 Art. 201: Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications
and Exhibitions, and Indecent Shows ...... 37 Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA (G.R. No.
119673) .......................................................................
......... 37 Pita v. CA (G.R. No. 80806)........................................
............................................................. 39 Fernando v. CA
(G.R. No. 159751) ..............................................................
........................... 41 Title 7: Crimes Committed by Public Officers ....
............................................................................ 43
Art. 204: Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment ..................................
.................................... 43 Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)
...............................................................................
43 Vuitton v. Villanueva (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643) ................................
........................................ 45
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Buenavista v. Garcia (A.M. No. RTJ-88-246) .....................................


..................................... 47 Art. 206: Unjust Interlocutory Order ..
................................................................................
....... 50 Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr. (323 SCRA 348) ............................
.................................................. 50 Art. 211: Indirect Bribery
...............................................................................
............................ 53 Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 149152) ..
.................................................................. 53 Art. 212:
Corruption of Public Officials .................................................
..................................... 55 Chua vs. Nuestro (A.M. No. P-88-256) ..
................................................................................
. 55 Art. 217: Malversation of Public Funds or Property ........................
.......................................... 56 Davalos v. People (G.R. No. 145229
) ..............................................................................
....... 56 People v. Uy (G.R. No. 157399) ......................................
........................................................ 60 Chan v. Sandiganbaya
n (G. R. No. 149613)............................................................
................ 63 Art. 220: Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property ..........
............................................................. 65 Tetangco v. Omb
udsman (G.R. No. 156427) .......................................................
.................. 65 Abdulla v. People (G.R. No. 150129) ......................
................................................................ 67 Parungao v.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96025) .................................................
...................... 69 Title 8: Crimes Againt Persons .......................
................................................................................
71 Art. 247: Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstanc
es ....................... 71 People v. Gelaver ................................
................................................................................
... 71 People v. Amamongpong ...................................................
.................................................... 73 People v. Oyanib .......
................................................................................
............................. 75 Art. 248: Murder ..............................
................................................................................
.......... 77 People vs Mallari (G.R. No. 145993) ..............................
........................................................ 77 People vs Gonzales (
G.R. No. 139542) ...............................................................
.................... 79 People vs Avecilla (G.R. No. 117033) ...................
.................................................................. 81 Art. 249:
Homicide .......................................................................
.............................................. 83 Navarro vs Court of Appeals (G
.R. No. 121087).................................................................
.... 83 People vs Ullep (G.R. No. 132547) ......................................
................................................... 85 People vs Antonio (G.R. N
o. 128900)......................................................................
............... 87 Art. 251: Death Caused in a Tumultous Affray ................
.......................................................... 89 People v. Anecito
Unlagada y Suanque (G.R. No. 141080) ...........................................
......... 89 Sison vs. People (G.R. No. 108280-83) .............................
...................................................... 91 People v. Cresenciano
Maramara (G.R. No. 110994) .....................................................
....... 94 Art. 254: Discharge of Firearms .....................................
............................................................ 96 Dado v. People (
G.R. No. 131421)................................................................
.......................... 96 Art. 257: Unintentional Abortion .................
.............................................................................. 9
9 People v. Salufrania (G.R. No. L-50884) ......................................
........................................... 99 People v. Genoves (G.R. No. L-428
19) ............................................................................
..... 101 Art 266: Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment ...................
.............................................. 102 Kingston(e) Li v. People and

CA (G.R. No. 127962) ...........................................................


... 102 2|Page

Art. 266-A: Rape ...............................................................


........................................................ 104 People v. Hermocill
a (G.R. No. 175830).............................................................
.................. 104 People v. Basquez (G.R No. 144035) ......................
.............................................................. 106 People v. Oga
(G.R. No. 152302) .............................................................
............................. 107 Title 9: Crimes Against Personal Liberty and S
ecurity ................................................................. 109 Ar
t. 267: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention ...............................
.................................. 109 People v. Ejandra (G.R. No. 134203) .....
...............................................................................
109 People v. Silongan y Linandang (G.R. No. 137182) ...........................
................................... 113 People v. Castro (G.R. No. 132726)......
................................................................................
116 Art. 268: Slight Illegal Detention ........................................
...................................................... 118 People v. Dadles (G.R
. Nos. 118620-21) ..............................................................
................ 118 People v. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262) ........................
............................................................. 120 People v. Rolu
na (G.R. No. 101797) ...........................................................
.......................... 122 Art. 270: Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Mino
r ............................................................... 124 People v.
Rubi-Rosa Pastrana (G.R. No. 143644) ...........................................
...................... 124 People v. Teresa Bernardo (G.R. No. 144316) .........
............................................................ 126 People v. Vicen
te Ty and Carmen Ty (G.R. No. 121519) ..........................................
............ 128 Art. 287: Light Coercions .....................................
..................................................................... 130 Balero
s v. People (G.R. No. 138099) ..................................................
.................................. 130 Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006) ..
........................................................................... 132
Title 10: Crimes Aganst Property ...............................................
.................................................. 133 Art. 293: Robbery .......
................................................................................
.............................. 133 People v. Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera
(G.R. No. 97426) ..................................... 133 People v. Calixto Zi
nampan, Artemio Apostol, Roger Allan (at large), and Elvis Doca (G.R. No. 126781
)...............................................................................
........................................... 135 People v. Donato Del Rosario (G.
R. No. 13106) ..................................................................
. 137 Art. 308: Theft ..........................................................
................................................................ 139 Laurel v. A
brogar (G.R. No. 155076) .......................................................
............................. 139 Alfonso D. Gaviola v. People G.R. No. 163297 .
.................................................................... 144 Santos
v. People (G.R. No. 77429) .....................................................
.................................. 146 Art. 310: Qualified Theft ...............
................................................................................
........... 149 People v. Salonga (G.R. No. 131131) ............................
....................................................... 149 Roque v. People (G.R
. No. 138954)...................................................................
................... 152 People v. Bustinera (G. R. No. 148233) .................
............................................................... 157 Art. 312: Oc
cupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property .............
...... 162 Quinao v. People (335 SCRA 741) .....................................
................................................... 162 Art. 315: Estafa........
................................................................................
................................. 164 Ong v. People (G.R. No. 165275) ..........
...............................................................................
164 Chua v. People (G.R. Nos. 150926 and 30) ...................................

....................................... 167 3|Page

Gonzaludo v. People (G.R. No. 150910) ..........................................


..................................... 169 Art. 318: Other Deceits ..............
................................................................................
.............. 172 Jaime Guinhawa vs. People (G.R. No. 162822) .................
................................................... 172 Title 11: Crimes against
Chastity ......................................................................
............................ 175 Art. 333, 334: Adultery and Concubinage .......
......................................................................... 175 Be
ltran v. People (G.R. No. 137567) ..............................................
...................................... 175 Vera Neri v. People (G.R. No. 96602)
................................................................................
... 177 Art. 338: Simple Seduction .............................................
......................................................... 179 People v. Pascua (
GR No. 128159-62)...............................................................
................... 179 People v. Teodosio (GR. No. 97496) .....................
............................................................... 182 Art. 344: Pr
osecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction, Rape and
Acts of Lasciviousness ........................................................
...................................................... 186 Beltran v. People (33
4 SCRA 106) ....................................................................
.................... 186 People v. Tipay (329 SCRA 52) .........................
.................................................................... 188 Alonte
v. Savellano (287 SCRA 245) ....................................................
................................. 190 Art.336: Acts of Lasciviousness ..........
................................................................................
...... 192 Amployo vs. People (457 SCRA 340) ...................................
................................................. 192 People vs. Collado (353 SC
RA 381) ........................................................................
.............. 194 Dulla vs. Court of Appeals (326 SCRA 32) ....................
........................................................ 196 Art. 337: Qualified
Seduction .....................................................................
.............................. 197 People v. Javier (G.R. No. 126096) ..........
............................................................................. 19
7 People v. Manansala (G.R. Nos. 110974-81).....................................
................................... 199 People v. Alvarez (G.R. No. L-34644) ...
................................................................................
202 Art. 342: Forcible Abduction ..............................................
...................................................... 205 People vs. Egan (GR N
o. 139338) .....................................................................
.................... 205 People vs. Ablaneda (G.R. No. 131914) .................
.............................................................. 209 People vs. Sa
brado (G.R. No. 126114) ........................................................
......................... 211 Art. 349: Bigamy..................................
................................................................................
..... 215 Diego v. Castillo ....................................................
................................................................ 215 Abunado v.
People .........................................................................
...................................... 216 Cacho v. People .....................
................................................................................
............... 217 Title 13: Crimes against Honor .............................
........................................................................ 219 Art
. 353: Libel ...................................................................
........................................................ 219 Fermin v. People (G
.R. No. 157643).................................................................
.................... 219 Magno v. People (G.R. No. 133896) .....................
................................................................ 225 Buatis v. P
eople (G.R. No. 142509) ........................................................
.............................. 231 Art. 358: Slander ...........................
................................................................................
........... 236 Villanueva v. People (G.R. No. 160351) .........................

...................................................... 236 Caal v. People (G.R. N


o. 163181) .....................................................................
.................. 238 4|Page

Pader v. People (G.R. No. 139157) ..............................................


......................................... 239 Title 14: Quasi-Offenses .........
................................................................................
...................... 240 Art. 365: Imprudence and Negligence .................
.................................................................... 240 Loney v
s. People (G.R. No. 152644) ....................................................
................................. 240 Abueva vs. People (G.R. No. 134387) ......
............................................................................ 242
People v. De los Santos (G.R. No. 131588) .....................................
..................................... 244 Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200) .
................................................................................
......... 247 Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Ester S. Garcia (G.R. No. 93833) ...
...................................... 247 Felipe Navarro vs. CA and People (G.R
. No. 121087) .......................................................... 249 Edg
ardo A. Gaanan vs. IAC and People (G.R. No. L- 69809) ..........................
...................... 251 Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. 6539) .....................
............................................................................ 254
People v. Bustinera (G.R. No. 148233)..........................................
....................................... 254 People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470) .
................................................................................
..... 256 People v. Lobitania (G.R. No. 142380) ................................
................................................. 258 Probation Law ............
................................................................................
.................................. 260 Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. Peopl
e (G.R. No. 152044)........................................ 260 Lilia Vicoy v. P
eople (G.R. No. 138203) ........................................................
........................ 262 Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and Peopl
e (G.R. No. 125108).............................. 264 Anti-Fencing Law .........
................................................................................
................................. 266 Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584) ......
............................................................................. 26
6 Tan v. People (GR No. 134298) ................................................
............................................ 271 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice
s Act (R.A. 3019) ..............................................................
.......... 276 People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405) ...............
................................................ 276 Rosalia M. Dugayon vs. Peop
le (G.R. No. 147333) ...........................................................
... 278 Arturo A. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. L-51065-72) ............
.............................. 280 Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. 532) .............
................................................................................
... 282 People v. Pascual (G.R. No. 132870) ....................................
................................................ 282 People v. Reanzares (G.R. N
o. 130656)......................................................................
.......... 283 People v. Cerbito (G.R. No. 126397) .............................
....................................................... 284 Comprehensive Danger
ous Drugs Act ..................................................................
....................... 285 People v. Bongcarawan (384 SCRA 525) ...............
............................................................... 285 Suson v. Peo
ple (494 SCRA 691) .............................................................
............................. 287 People v. Lagata (404 SCRA 671) ..............
........................................................................... 289
Illegal Possession of Firearms/Explosives Law (R.A. 8294) ......................
.................................... 291 Sayco v. People (G.R. No. 159703) .....
................................................................................
.. 291 People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559) .....................................
............................................ 293 People v. Tadeo (G.R. Nos. 1276
60 & 144011-12)............................................................... 2
96 Anti Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) .................................................
.................................................... 298 Francisco v. People (G.
R. No. 146584) .................................................................

................ 298 5|Page

Anti-Bouning Checks Law (B.P. 22) ..............................................


................................................ 301 Marigomen v. People (G.R. N
o. 153451) .....................................................................
........ 301 Sycip v. CA (328 SCRA 447) ........................................
.......................................................... 304 Recuerdo v. Peopl
e (G.R. No. 133036).............................................................
.................... 307 Art. 294(B): Robbery with Rape ........................
....................................................................... 309 Peop
le v. Moreno....................................................................
............................................. 309 People v. Domingo (383 SCRA 43
) ..............................................................................
......... 310 People v. Verceles (388 SCRA 515) ................................
...................................................... 312 Art. 148: Direct Assa
ult ............................................................................
................................ 313 People vs. Dural (223 SCRA 201) ...........
...............................................................................
313 People vs. Abalos (258 SCRA 523)............................................
............................................ 314 People vs. Tac-an (182 SCRA 201
) ..............................................................................
.......... 315
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John Aceveda 2008-0032


Title 2: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State
Art. 124: Arbitrary Detention
Milo v. Salanga (G.R. No. L-37007)
Facts: On April 21, 1973, at around 10 in the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manao
ag, Pangasinan, Juan Tuvera, a Barrio Captain, accompanied by several policemen,
maltreated Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fist blows an
d immediately thereafter without legal grounds, deliberately deprived Valdez of
his liberty. However, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the grou
nd that the facts charged are not sufficient to support the filing of the inform
ation made by Prosecutor Milo. That he was not a public officer who can be charg
ed with arbitrary detention. Respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion. Hence
this case. Issue: Whether or not Tuvera, a barrio captain, is a public officer w
ho can be liable for the crime of arbitrary detention? Decision: Yes. The Suprem
e Court ruled that long before the enactment of P.D. 299, Barrio lieutenants, wh
o were later named Barrio Captains and now Barangay Captains , were recognized a
s persons in authority. The Court ruled on its various decisions, ruled them as
deemed persons in authority. Under R.A. No. 3590, otherwise known as the Revised
Barrio Chapter, the powers and duties of a barrio Captain include the following
; to took after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the
municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the per
formance of their duties in such barrio, to look after the general welfare of th
e barrio, to enforce all laws and ordinances, and organize and lead an emergency
group for the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio. He is a peace o
fficer in the in the barrio considered under the
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law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons wit
hin legal limits.
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John Aceveda 2008-0032


Cayao v. Del Mundo (A.M. No. MTJ-93-813)
Facts:
Petitioner is a driver of Donny's Transit Bus. On October 22, 1992, while travel
ling the Mataas na Lupa, Alulod, Indang, Cavite, he overtook a Sto. Nio Liner dri
ven by Arnel Muloy. As a consequence thereof, the bus driven by the petitioner a
lmost collided head-on with an oncoming owner-type jeepney. It turned out that t
he jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Del Mundo who, at the
time of the incident, was one of the passengers therein along with his sons. On
the same day, he was apprehended by policemen of PNPIndang and immediately broug
ht before the sala of respondent judge. Thereat, petitioner was accused by the r
espondent of nearly causing an accident and without giving petitioner any opport
unity to explain, respondent judge insisted that complainant be punished. Petiti
oner was compelled by respondent judge to choose from three punishments, to wit:
(a) to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his driv
er's license; or (c) to be put in jail for three (3) days. Petitioner chose the
third and which he was forced to sign a "waiver of detention" by respondent judg
e. He was immediately escorted to the municipal jail. He was not actually incarc
erated but he still remained in the premises of the municipal jail for three day
s, by way of serving his "sentence". On the third day, complainant was released.
Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was unduly deprived of his liberty and that respon
dent judge can be held liable for arbitrary detention?
Decision:
Yes. The Supreme court ruled that while it is true that complainant was not put
behind bars as respondent had intended, however, complainant was not allowed to
leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not synonymous
only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify as confineme
nt that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal
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liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270 [1979]). Under the circumstances, responden
t judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer,
ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal. In overtaking ano
ther vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually committe
d a crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the case, the warrantl
ess arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at
bar, it was duly proved that petitioner was indeed deprived of his liberty for t
hree days on the ground of mere personal vengeance and the abusive attitude of r
espondent contrary to the law.
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John Aceveda 2008-0032


Astorga v. People (G.R. No. 154130) Facts: On September 1, 1997, the private off
ended parties who are members of the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources station at Tacloban City, a
ccompanied by SPO3 Cinco and SPO1 Capoquian, went to the Island of Daram, Wester
n Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activitie
s. At that afternoon, they found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 m
eters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petit
ioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the
boats. A heated altercation ensued between them. Petitioner accompanied by ten a
rmed men brought the DENR team to petitioners house where they had dinner and dri
nks. The team left at 2 in the morning. This matter was brought to before the Sa
ndiganbayan which ruled and holds petitioner for arbitrarily detaining the priva
te offended parties. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is criminally liable for a
rbitrary detention? Decision: No. the Supreme Court ruled that the determinative
factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is
fear. The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are: 1.) That the offende
r is a public officer or employee, 2.) That he detains a person and 3.) That the
detention is without legal grounds.There is no proof that petitioner instilled
fear in the minds of the private offended parties. There was no actual restraint
imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that
they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he
admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner
prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to tr
avel by boat. Petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his hosp
itality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. The testimony made by the pr
ivate offended parties negate
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the element of detention. Fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective.


Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any harda
nd-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and judgm
ent of the victim at the time of the crime.
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Gil Acosta 2008-0085


Art. 125: Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Autho
rities
People vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 126252)
Facts:
On Nov. 18, 1994 herein accused Jesus Garcia boarded a jeep carrying a plastic b
ag, and occupied the seat next to the driver. Also in that jeepney two policeman
who were in civilian clothes. After herein accused boarder smelled marijuana of
which seemed to emanate from the plastic bag carried by Garcia. To confirm thei
r suspicion, they decided to follow the accused when he gets of the jeepney. Whe
n the two policeman were certain that it was indeed marijuana that the accused w
as in possession they quickly identified themselves and arrested Garcia. The acc
used after the arrest was turned over to the CIS office at the Baguio Water dist
rict compound for further investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of the person as provided for in
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Decision:
NO. The Sc held that there was no irregularity with the turn over of the appella
nts to the CIS office. It was clarified that this has been the practice of the a
rresting officers as their office had previously arranged with the CIS for assis
tance with respect to investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office bein
g more specialized in the area of investigation. Neither can the police officers
be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS office. Art. 125
of the RPC, penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for some legal g
round and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes
punishable by the afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the reco
rd bears that appellant was arrested for possession of 5 kls. Of marijuana in No
v. 28, 1994 at 2 p.m. a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. He wa
s detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting officers to
the court in the
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afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of i
nvestigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law. i.e., 36 hours from the
time of his arrest.
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Gil Acosta 2008-0085


Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)
Facts:
On September 7, 1997 Jasper Agbay together with a Sherwin Jugalbot were arrested
and detained at the Liloan Police Station by herein private respondent policeme
n. They were arrested for an alleged violation of R.A. 7160. The following day a
complaint for violation of said law was filed against the two accused before th
e Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one Gicarya for and beh
alf of her daughter Gayle.
On September 10, 1997 the petitioner argued to the Chief of Police that they be
released, considering that the latter had failed to deliver the detained petitio
ner to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours from Sept. 7, 1997.
The Main argument of herein petitioners that they were not delivered to the prop
er judicial authority, hence herein private respondent policemen were in violati
on of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that the act of Gi
carya in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for the purposes of P.I. as th
e MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the case, thus not falling within the requirem
ents of Art. 25.
Isuue:
Wheter or not there was a violation of Art. 125 of the RPC?
Decision:
NO. The SC Held that upon filing of the Complaint to the MCTC, the intent behind
Art. 125 of the RPC is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained per
son is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with
the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this powe
r of the MCTC to order release when he applied for and was granted his release u
pon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Art. 125 of the RPC
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has been duly served with the MCTC. That the filing of the complaint with the MC
TC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
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Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052


Title 3: Crimes Against Public Order
Art.134: Rebellion or Insurrection
People vs. Silongan (G.R. No. 137182)
Facts:
The appellants in this case, who are a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel surrenderees, were convicted in the
Regional Trial Court for the crime of kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention
of Alexander Saldaa and his three companions. The four victims were taken to a mo
untain hideout and the appellants demanded ransom money for their release. Alexa
nder was detained for six months until he was finally released.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of kidnapping committed by the accused should be absorb
ed in rebellion?
Decision:
As regards the argument that the crime was politically motivated and that conseq
uently, the charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find the sa
me likewise to be without merit. As held in Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, the political motivation for the crime must be sh
own in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely beca
use it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Fr
ont or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the
crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Here, the evide
nce adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed was political
ly motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their allegation t
hat the present case was filed against them because they are rebel surrenderees.
This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like th
e defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.
17 | P a g e

Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052


Enrile vs. Amin (G.R. No. 93335)
Facts:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as
having committed rebellion with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, govern
ment prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Preside
ntial Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The prosecution i
n this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col.
Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house knowing
that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No
. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him?
Decision:
The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile wit
h rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and m
ultiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute
him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should b
e noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent p
rosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.
The intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charge
d with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the
latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely d
ifferent. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is
in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime
of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
18 | P a g e

Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052


People vs. Manglallan (G.R. No. L-38538)
Facts:
Ka Daniel, the leader of the New People's Army (NPA) in Sta. Ana, Cagayan direct
ed accused Andres Manglallan, Cesar Alvarez, Domingo Ramos, and Virgilio Ballest
eros, members of the NPA to go to Barrio Punti and kill one Apolonio Ragual who
was suspected by Ka Daniel to be a Philippine Constabulary (PC) informer. Said f
our went to the barrio of Ragual carrying with them their firearms. They arrived
at Punti at 9:00 A.M. and they saw Ragual at the river bank giving his carabao
a bath. Ramos went to him and after a while shot him with his gun. Manglallan al
so shot him followed with another shot by Alvarez, as a result of which Ragual f
ell down and died. Manglallan then placed on the dead body of Ragual a writing a
nd drawing made by their association warning the people and the PC of their acti
vities.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by the accused is rebellion or murder?
Decision:
In the case of People vs. Agarin, which was a prosecution for murder, like the p
resent case, where the accused Huk member with his companions killed the victim
because he was a PC informer, this Court held that the crime committed is simple
rebellion and not murder, as follows:
The offense perpetrated by appellant is murder, qualified by abuse of superior s
trength. Considering, however, the fact that the killing was committed as a mean
s to or in the furtherance of the subversive ends of the Huk balahaps (HUKS) bec
ause appellant and his companions,
Commander Manaing and Commander Vida suspected the deceased to have acted as a s
py and had informed the BOT
19 | P a g e

and Government agencies regarding the presence of the Huks in that region, we fi
nd Federico Agarin alias Commander "Smith" guilty of the crime of simple rebelli
on only (People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515; 52 Off. Gaz. [12] 5506; Sec
s. 4 and 5, Rule 116; People vs. Melecio Aquino, et al., 108 Phil 814; 57 Off. G
az [51] 91 80)'" [People vs. Agarin, 109 Phil. 430, 436]"
The Court, therefore, sustains the contention of the appellant that the crime he
committed is not murder but the crime of rebellion punishable under Articles 13
4 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
20 | P a g e

Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388


Title 4: Crimes Against Public Interest
Art. 168: Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury or Bank Notes and Other I
nstruments of Credit
Tecson v. CA (370 SCRA 181)
Facts:
On April 28, 1990, a buy-bust operation was held by the Central Bank Operatives
in order to capture a certain Mang Andy who is involved in a syndicate engaging
in the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. Labita and Marqueta (members of
the buy-bust operation team) acted as poseur-buyer, approached Mang Andy inside
the Jollibee restaurant. When the civilian informer introduced them to Mang Andy
, the latter was convinced and drew 10 pieces of US dollar notes from his wallet
. At that moment, Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central Bank oper
atives and apprehended Mang Andy whom they later identified as herein petitioner
, Alejandro Tecson.
Petitioner denies liability for the crime of illegal possession and use of false
treasury bank notes and other instruments of credit as defined in Art, 168 of t
he Revised Penal Code. According to him, to make him liable under the said provi
sion, his possession of counterfeit dollar notes should be coupled with intent t
o use. In other words, petitioner contends that possession without intent to use
counterfeit US dollar notes would not make him criminally liable.
Issue:
Whether or not from the facts of the case, Alejandro Tecson is liable under Art.
168 of the Revised Penal Code?
Decision:
It is true that in Art. 168, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled wit
h intent to use the same by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to constit
ute a crime. However, from the facts of the case it can be inferred that the
21 | P a g e

accused had the intent to use the fake dollar notes. In the course of the entrap
ment, petitioners natural reaction from the seeming interest of the of the poseur
-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly shows
his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to note
that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement wit
h the petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actual
ly the petitioner who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer di
d was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly
therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the inte
ntion to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that
he was only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overc
ome the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official
duties.
22 | P a g e

Melencio S. Faustino 2008-0094


Art. 171: Falsification by Public Officer, Employee; or Notary or Ecclesiastical
Minister Art. 172: Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Do
cuments
Amora v. CA (155 SCRA 388)
Facts: Petitioners Inocentes Amora, Jr. and Claudio Murillo were accused of four
(4) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. Petitioners allege
dly falsify the Time Book and Payroll Voucher of the municipality of Guindulman,
Bohol, covering the period from September 1 to 30, 1972 by making it appear tha
t Vicente Begamano and Alfredo Bagtasos rendered 21 days services each in "gathe
ring boulders for shore protection" for the period from September 1 to 30, 1972
when they did not in fact render said services. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Bohol finds the accused Guilty as charged.
The Court of Appeals held that the accused were not guilty of estafa because evi
dently the Municipality of Guindulman did not suffer any loss or damage arising
from the payrolls. On the contrary, the government gained from the said project.
However, the Court of Appeals found that Inocentes Amora, Jr. was a municipal e
mployee and convicted him of falsification by public officer. Although Claudio M
urillo was not in the government service he was also convicted of falsification
by public officer on the ground that there was a conspiracy between him and Amor
a. The Court of Appeals also held that the appellants were motivated by a single
intention and so found them guilty of only one (1) instead of four (4) crimes.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding their defense o
f good faith.
Decision: The Supreme Court held that although the accused altered a public docu
ment or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he
23 | P a g e
would

not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was
prejudiced by the alteration or error."
In the instant case, It is quite obvious that the proper method for claiming pay
ment under the pakyaw contract was for Murillo to simply bill the town for so ma
ny cubic meters of boulders which had been delivered and piled at the municipal
wharf. Instead he and Inocentes Amora, Jr. resorted to the payroll system which
is not only cumbersome but also involved falsification. The reason could only be
that they were ignorant and ill-advised as claimed.
From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered no
damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders actually delive
red was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the additional fac
t that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations suffered no
damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that the
falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith.
The petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals which adjud
ged the petitioners guilty of falsification is hereby reversed and the petitione
rs are acquitted.
24 | P a g e

Melencio S. Faustino 2008-0094


Pajelga V. Scareal (167 SCRA 350)
Facts:
Petitioner filed a Petition for review on certiorari of the Sandiganbayan's deci
sion finding him guilty of Falsification of Public Documents through reckless im
prudence in the first case and Infidelity in the Custody of Documents in the sec
ond case.
Petitioner now alleges that he cannot be convicted of falsification under either
paragraph (2) or paragraph (4) of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as he
was not a party to the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale, nor did he impersonate
anybody in furtherance of the sale. He also questions his conviction under Art.
171 (2) as he pleaded to and was tried on the basis of an information charging h
im with falsification under paragraph (4) of Art. 171. He contends that to convi
ct him under paragraph (2) of said Article would be to deprive him of his consti
tutional right against double jeopardy. The motive and intent to falsify attribu
ted to him are likewise alleged to be baseless, as there really was a contract o
f sale between him and Ablat executed two (2) months before the questioned sale
between Ablat and the provincial government of Batanes. Finally, petitioner cont
ends that, even assuming that there was falsification as defined in Art. 171 of
the Revised Penal Code, still, no conviction against him can lie as no material
damage was caused the government by reason of nonconsummation of the sale.
The Solicitor General, upon the other hand, maintains that the offense committed
is falsification, defined and penalized under paragraph (4) of Art. 171 of the
Revised Penal Code since the claim of the petitioner that Ablat was the owner of
the motorcycle is untruthful and petitioner was an active participant in the ma
king of the untruthful narration of facts.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the charge of falsification of public
or official document?
25 | P a g e

Decision:
Petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
As Justice Albert says: "in the falsification of public or official document und
er Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is not enough that the falsification b
e committed by a public officer; it is also necessary that it should be committe
d by a public officer with abuse of his office, that is, in deeds, instrument, i
ndentures, certificates, etc., in the execution of which he participates by reas
on of his office."
In the instant case, the deed of absolute sale executed by Ablat was adjudged to
be a falsified document because it conveyed the impression that Ablat was the o
wner of the motorcycle, subject matter of the transaction, when such was not the
case, as the petitioner Fajelga is the true and registered owner of the said mo
torcycle, thereby making an untruthful narration of facts.
It should be noted, however, that the statement that Ablat was the owner of the
motorcycle in question is not altogether untruthful since the petitioner Fajelga
had previously sold the motorcycle to him. While the deed of sale may not have
been registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation, Ablat nevertheless becam
e the owner thereof before its aborted sale to the provincial government of Bata
nes.
Besides, malicious intent to injure a third person is absent. In fact, neither t
he government nor any third person incurred any loss by reason of the "untruthfu
l" narration.
26 | P a g e

Melencio S. Faustino 2008-0094


Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 88)
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of
Public Document.
Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court of falsifying the signat
ure of Caridad Dorol, causing it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has signed he
r name on a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in his favor, when in truth a
nd in fact he well knew, that Caridad Dorol did not execute said document, to th
e damage and prejudice of the latter.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court except
for the award for damage.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed gave abuse of discretion in sustai
ning the conviction of the petitioner?
Decision:
We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion w
hen it affirmed petitioner's conviction by the trial court.
The petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a forg
ed document as found by the trial and appellate court. Petitioner, nonetheless,
argues that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that there is no pr
oof that the petitioner authored such falsification or that the forgery was done
under his direction.
27 | P a g e

This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any
direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly obser
ved by the Solicitor General, "the questioned document was submitted by petition
er himself when the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in po
ssession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who
merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor's Office of Sor
sogon. In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sal
e which purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. G
iven this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the f
orged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship
of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by
the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that
he is the material author of the falsification. As it stands, therefore, we are
unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appe
als.
28 | P a g e

Jaypee Garcia 2007-0280


Art. 183: Perjury
Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice (475 SCRA 495)
Facts:
Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before the Spe
cial Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of Finance against certain impo
rtations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. The matter involved 151.070 tons of
magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany.
Because of such protest a conference was made among and between the parties in o
rder for them to reach a compromise agreement.
As the compromise was done, the reception of documents ensued between the partie
s. On the process of such reception, the phrase in the agreement was change by i
nserting the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in the compromise.
The petitioner filed a case of perjury against the respondents which was dismiss
ed by the Secretary of Justice for lack of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether a criminal case of perjury will prosper?
Decision:
Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its mi
nimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful
29 | P a g e

statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articl
es, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter befor
e a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law
so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall c
ommit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles o
f this section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest co
ncerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the fals
e statement is made.
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The asse
rtion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must
be malice on the part of the accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil
intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious stat
ement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what
was true in fact. It is equivalent to knowingly. Deliberately implies meditated as
distinguished from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused knows his s
tatement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as
to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in
the truth of a statement is an adequate defense. A false statement which is obv
iously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by
the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defenda
nt did not believe those statements to be true.
30 | P a g e

Jaypee Garcia 2007-0280


Acuna vs. Deputy Ombudsman (450 SCRA 237)
Facts: Petitioner Celsa P. Acua (petitioner ) is a former teacher of the Angeles Cit
y National Trade School (ACNTS ) in Angeles City, Pampanga. Respondent Pedro Pascua
(respondent Pascua ) was ACNTS Officer-In-Charge while respondent Ronnie Turla (resp
ondent Turla ) was a member of its faculty.
A meeting within the school was conducted between teachers and personnels of the
school regarding matters which were arising among them. As on offshoot of the m
eeting, series of misconduct case were file by and among them.
Such cases though filed administratively, others still filed a cases for violati
on of perjury under the Revised Penal Code. Because of different acts which prov
e or tend to prove the same.
Issue:
Whether a criminal case for perjury will prosper?
Decision:
Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the existenc
e of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mi
nd, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The elements of perj
ury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competen
t officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement
or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehoo
d; and, (d) that the sworn statement or
31 | P a g e

affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent h
ere in that private respondents statements were not material to that case nor do
they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
32 | P a g e

Jaypee Garcia 2007-0280


Choa vs. People (299 SCRA 145)
Facts:
Alfonso Chan Choa, petitioner, is a Chinese national. On April 25, 1989, he file
d with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, a verified petition for natural
ization.
Later on, the petitioner withdrew such petition for naturalization for some unkn
own reason.
After 2 years, a case was filed against him by his wife for perjury, stating tha
t during within the time the petitioner is asking for naturalization, he committ
ed acts of perjury by stating material facts which his wife said was all false.
Issue:
Whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged false statem
ents he stated in his petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two years pri
or to the filing of the Information for perjury?
Decision:
We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor Gener
al that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in view of the with
drawal of the petition for naturalization containing his false material statemen
ts. In this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the proceeding in which the p
erjury is alleged to have been committed be first terminated before a prosecutio
n for the said crime is commenced. At the time he filed his petition for natural
ization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the elements of the
crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated mate
rial falsities in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition
without even stating any reason therefore. But such withdrawal only terminated t
he proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for per
jury he already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the S
tate
33 | P a g e

from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the Philip
pine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the petition f
or naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence of his
unlawful act.
34 | P a g e

Jm Sandino Imperial 2007-0297


Art. 185: Machinations in Public Auctions
Ouano v. CA
Facts:
On June 8, 1977, Julieta Ouano obtained a loan from PNB. As security for said lo
an, she executed a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land locataed at Opa
o, Mandaue City. She default;ted on her obligation.
On September 29, 1980, PNB filed a petition for extra judicial foreclosure with
the City Sheriff.
On November 4, 1980, the sheriff prepared a notice of sale setting the date of p
ublic auction of the two parcels of land on December 5, 1980 and caused the noti
ce to be published in the Cebu Daily Times, a newspaper of general circulation i
n Mandaue City, in three separate issues. Likewise, he posted copies thereof in
public places in Mandaue City and in the place where the properties are located.
However, the sale as scheduled and published did not take place as the parties,
on four separate dates, executed Agreements to Postpone Sale.
Finally, on May 29, 1981, the sheriff conducted the auction sale, awarding the t
wo parcels of land to PNB, the only bidder.
On March 28, 1983, Julieta sent demand letters to PNB and petitioner, pointing o
ut irregularities in the foreclosure sale. Julieta filed a complaint with the Re
gional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu for the nullification of the foreclosure sale.
The RTC of Cebu rendered a decision saying that want of republication rendered t
he foreclosure sale void.
PNB and petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals and said Court affir
med the ruling of the Trial Court.
35 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not the requirements of Act. No. 3135, the governing law for extra-ju
dicial foreclosures were complied with?
Decision:
No, the republication and reposting of notice were not complied with. The waiver
by the parties only authorized the adjournment of the execution sale. There is
nothing in the statute that states that republication and reposting may be waive
d.
36 | P a g e

Shaun Jayoma 2005-0016


Art. 201: Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibitions, and Indecent
Shows
Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA (G.R. No. 119673)
Facts:
Respondent appellate court affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board xrating I
GLESIA NI CRISTOs TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show
that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for "attacking" other re
ligions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board's Voting Slip for Televisi
on) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for criticizing differe
nt religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible. They suggested tha
t the program should only explain petitioner's own faith and beliefs and avoid a
ttacks on other faiths. Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was xrated because
"the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says
that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because n
owhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. Exhibit "C" shows that Ser
ies No. 121 was x-rated for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, th
e Catholic religion. Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorabl
y recommended because it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. On second r
eview, it was x-rated because of its unbalanced interpretations of some parts of
the bible. In sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's TV program series
Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioner's controversial biblical interp
retations and its "attacks" against contrary religious beliefs. The respondent a
ppellate court agreed and even held that the said "attacks" are indecent, contra
ry to law and good customs.
Issue:
Whether respondent board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the ai
ring of petitioner's religious program for the reason that they constitute an at
tack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and goo
d customs?
37 | P a g e

Decision:
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any rel
igion" as a ground allegedly because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which ar
e contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully
disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word
"offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be
invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religio
n. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be empha
sized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any reli
gion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by P
D 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.
38 | P a g e

Shaun Jayoma 2005-0016


Pita v. CA (G.R. No. 80806)
Facts:
Pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ram
on D. Bagatsing, police authorities seized and confiscated reading materials bel
ieved to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized mater
ials in public. "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and coedited by plaintiff Le
o Pita was among the publications seized, and later burned. Pita filed a case fo
r injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction agai
nst Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera.
In his Answer and Opposition, defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscatio
n and burning of obscene reading materials but claimed that the said materials w
ere voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities, and that t
he said confiscation and seizure was undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as ame
nded by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. In op
posing the plaintiffs application for a writ of preliminary injunction, defendan
t pointed out that in that anti- smut campaign conducted on December 1 and 3, 19
83, the materials confiscated belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers
who voluntarily surrendered their reading materials, and that the plaintiffs es
tablishment was not raided.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
and, in effect, holding that the police officers could without any court warrant
or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of the
ir determination that they are obscene?
Decision:
(PD No. 960 as amended by PD No. 969) Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Arti
cles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures,
paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in Section 1
hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) shall be governed by the following
39 | P a g e

rules: (a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the Gove
rnment to be destroyed. (b) Where the criminal case against any violator of this
decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles involved in th
e violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevert
heless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. (c) The person aggrieved by
the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) day
s after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretar
y of National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defe
nse shall be final and unappealable.
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 re
v.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide: SEC. 12. Search without warrant of per
son arrested. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous wea
pons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Bu
t as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a l
awful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no p
arty has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, und
er Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code. To say that the responden
t Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaig
n) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal
laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and execu
tioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitio
ner.
40 | P a g e

Shaun Jayoma 2005-0016


Fernando v. CA (G.R. No. 159751)
Facts:
PNP-CIDG NCR conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaud
encio E. Fernando Music Fair because of the reports of sale and distribution of
pornographic materials. Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court issued
search warrant for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against p
etitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy.
Police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who,
according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music
Fair. The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tap
es and ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
Petitioners, with Warren Tingchuy, were charged for selling and exhibiting obsce
ne copies of x-rated VHS Tapes, lewd films depicting men and women having sexual
intercourse, lewd photographs of nude men and women in explicating positions wh
ich acts serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for lust or pornograph
y to public view.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the
search, they were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that since
he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene materials, t
he prosecution must prove that he was present during the raid and that he was se
lling the said materials. Moreover, he contends that the appellate courts reason
for convicting him, on a presumption of continuing ownership shown by an expired
mayors permit, has no sufficient basis since the prosecution failed to prove his
ownership of the establishment. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists that he
was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.
41 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene ma
terials?
Decision:
The Supreme Court emphasizes that mere possession of obscene materials, without
intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 2
01, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obsce
ne materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is
committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a person
be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to
be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or
exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engag
ed in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
42 | P a g e

Ray Nagrampa Jr. B. 2008-0061


Title 7: Crimes Committed by Public Officers
Art. 204: Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment
Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)
Facts:
On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto and Jorge de Perio, Jr both Filipino w
ere married. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Cre
scencia Escoto, with a civil status of single. A Decree of Divorce
was issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harri
s County, Texas (247th Judicial District) dissolving their marriage. Subsequentl
y, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein c
omplainants brother, Manuel P. Diego The marriage contract shows that this time,
the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status
of single.
A criminal case for bigamy was filed before respondent Judge and promulgated a d
ecision, on February 24, 1999 acquittal said accused.
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is
manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence and for allegedly knowi
ngly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment i
n gross ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not there was unjust judgment made by the respondent Judge?
Decsion:
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penaliz
ed under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must b
e proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust.
Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is
43 | P a g e

firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for k
nowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unj
ust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the s
ame was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in
a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew th
at said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge
liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with c
onscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense
to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.
As held in Alforte v. Santos, even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an
accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge
in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of
the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative c
omplaint.
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust ju
dgment.
44 | P a g e

Ray Nagrampa Jr. B. 2008-0061


Vuitton v. Villanueva (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643)
Facts:
This is a complaint filed by Louis Vuitton, S.A., represented by counsel, Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pea and Nolasco Law Office, against Judge Francisco Diaz Villa
nueva of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36, on the ground t
hat the latter knowingly rendered a manifestly unjust judgment.
A criminal case was file by entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose V. Rosar
io", Louis Vuitton, S.A. accusing the latter of unfair competition as defined by
paragraph 1 of Article 189, Revised Penal Code. But the trial court acquitted t
he accused because of lack of the element constituting said crime. complainant a
ssailed the judge decision for failure to consider the alleged lack of credibili
ty of Felix Lizardo, violated the constitutional mandate that decisions should b
e rendered within three (3) months from submission of the case and ignoring the
ruling Converse Rubber Corp. vs. Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc., that "the
statute on unfair competition extends protection to the goodwill of a manufactur
er or dealer"
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of knowingly rendering a manifestly un
just judgment?
Decision:
The Revised Penal Code holds a judge liable for knowingly rendering a manifestly
unjust judgment. Article 204 thereof provides: Any judge who shall knowingly ren
der an unjust judgment in a case submitted to him for decision shall be punished
. . .
The law requires that the (a) offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in
a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d)
45 | P a g e

he knew that said judgment is unjust. In some administrative cases decided by th


is Court, We have ruled that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown b
eyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with con
scious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
In this case, We are constrained to hold that complainant failed to substantiate
its claims that respondent judge rendered an unjust judgment knowingly. It mere
ly relied on the failure of respondent judge to mentioned the motion in the deci
sion, on his alleged reliance on the testimony of defense witness and on the del
ay in the promulgation of the case. But they are not enough to show that the jud
gment was unjust and was maliciously rendered. A judgment is said to be unjust w
hen it is contrary to the standards of conduct prescribed by law. 9 The test to
determine whether an order or judgment is unjust may be inferred from the circum
stances that it is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence.
The decision herein rests on two legal grounds: first, that there was no unfair
competition because the elements of the crime were not sufficiently proven; seco
nd, that Jose V. Rosarion who was accused as owner/proprietor of COD was not pro
perly charged as his personality is distinct from that of the COD's.
46 | P a g e

Ray Nagrampa Jr. B. 2008-0061


Buenavista v. Garcia (A.M. No. RTJ-88-246)
Facts:
In January 1987, Buenavista filed two complaints for rape in the Municipal Trial
Court of Aborlan Palawan , against Samuel M. Ledesma of having raped Gail Buena
vista, the 11-year-old daughter of the complainant. A no bail was recommended bu
t the judge admitted the accused to bail and directed that he be released from c
ustody.
On August 5, 1988, based on an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended
party on July 26, 1988, the day after she was kidnapped, a Motion to Dismiss the
rape cases dated July 4, 1988 was filed by Atty. Edgardo S. Arias, counsel of t
he accused. The affidavit was notarized by First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ses
inio B. Belen who certified that lie had "personally examined the above-named af
fiant" and that he was "convinced that she voluntarily executed the foregoing af
fidavit and understood the contents thereof'.
The complainant has filed an administrative case against Judge Marcelo Garcia wi
th gross ignorance of the law for dismissing the rape complaints on the basis of
the minor's affidavit of desistance knowing, as he should have known, that an e
leven-year old girl is incompetent to execute such affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly
issuing an unjust order or judgment?
Decision:
After a careful consideration of the complaint and respondent Judge's comment th
ereon, we find merit in the complainant's charge that Judge Garcia acted either
in gross ignorance of the law or with malice and deliberate intent to unjustly d
ismiss the criminal cases against Samuel Ledesma. As observed by Mr. Justice Cam
pos.
47 | P a g e

'To be guilty of 'knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,' it is necessary that


the judgment or order was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to perpe
trate an injustice And the test to determine whether the judgment or order is un
just, may be inferred from the circumstance that it is contrary to law or is not
supported by evidence. (In re: Rafael C. Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21,
1974; 55 SCRA 107). Judgment may be said to be unjust when it is manifestly aga
inst the law and contrary to the weight of evidence. (Sec. 1, par. [c], Rule 37,
Rules of Court). An unjust judgment is one contrary to the standards of right a
nd justice or standards of conduct prescribed by the law. (US vs. Oglesby Grocer
y Co., 264 F. 691; Komen vs. City of St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9; 289 S.W. 838).' (p. 4
, Report and Recommendation.)
In view of Judge Garcia's legal backs round as a former Assistant Provincial Fis
cal of Palawan in 1985, the Court cannot imagine that he would be ignorant of th
e law which penalizes statutory rape (Art. 335, Par. 3, Revised Penal Code) or t
hat he did not know that as the victim's consent in statutory rape is invalid, i
t is not a defense (People vs. Gonzales, 58 SCRA 265; People vs. Celic, 137 SCRA
166). Being incompetent to give valid consent to the rape committed against her
, her consent to the dismissal of the original charge against her rapist is like
wise invalid.
Judge Garcia's allegation that "ample amount" had been paid by the accused to th
e complainant to settle the case "during a sort of a conference between the part
ies in the chambers of the presiding judge" (Emphasis supplied; p. 13, Rollo) wh
ile evidently intended to impugn the motives of the complainant in prosecuting t
he rapist and kidnapper of his daughter has only succeeded in revealing Judge Ga
rcia's improper and immoral intervention in brokering a compromise of the crimin
al cases against Ledesma. It is an admission that he is either ignorant of the r
ule that criminal cases are not allowed by law to be compromised, and that an of
fer of compromise by the accused is an implied admission of guilt (Sec. 24, Rule
130, Rules of Court), or that he does not know that his participation in such a
transaction is unbecoming of a judge.
Respondent Judge also admitted that the offended party, Gail Buenavista, has nev
er appeared before him "even for once" (p. 13, Rollo), That circumstance would h
ave aroused suspicion in a more alert Judge that she was being
48 | P a g e

sequestered by the accused to prevent her from disowning the letter she supposed
ly signed in defense of the accused (Annex B, p. 24, Rollo) and her affidavit of
desistance (Annex B-2, p. 17, Rollo).
For
ous
der
ode

all the foregoing, we find respondent Judge Marcelo G. Garcia guilty of seri
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust or
or judgment. The last is punishable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal C
as follows:

Art. 204. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a case subm
itted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual disqu
alification.
49 | P a g e

Alvin Ocampo 2011-0386


Art. 206: Unjust Interlocutory Order
Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr. (323 SCRA 348)
Facts:
This is an administrative case initiated by the sworn affidavit-complaint of Luc
ia F. Layola, dated 12 August 1997, charging Presiding Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr
. of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, with a violation
of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and wit
h gross ignorance of the law. Complainant sent the above-mentioned affidavitcomp
laint to Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, BGen. Manuel B. Casaclang (Ret.), of
the Office of the Ombudsman who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Office of th
e Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. stands charged with a violation of Section
3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross ign
orance of the law. According to the complainant the respondent judge directed th
at accused SPO2 German be held in the custody of his immediate superior, the Chi
ef of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans any legal and factual basis,
instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused being indicted for murder, a
heinous and non-bailable crime. Thereafter, respondent judge denied the motion f
or reconsideration interposed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Mili
tary
The Office of the Court Administrator, after thorough examination of the evidenc
e submitted before it, found that the charges for violation of Section 3 (e), R.
A. 3019 and of issuing an unjust interlocutory order, bereft of merit but respon
dent judge was adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
As regards the charge of violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt P
ractices Act, the OCA stressed that the important element of the offense, which
is damage or injury to the complainant, or manifest partiality shown to any part
y, is anemic of evidentiary support. There is no allegation of any injury suffer
ed by the complainant as a result of the conduct or actuation of
50 | P a g e

the respondent judge, nor was there any showing of undue benefit or advantage gi
ven to the adverse party under the orders complained of.
With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in conne
ction with the denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration of t
he order granting the petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to tak
e custody of accused SPO2 German, the OCA found such a charge to be unfounded.
Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) tha
t the offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he
knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a manif
estly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or ign
orance.
The OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned or
der knowing it to be unjust, and neither is there any proof of conscious and del
iberate intent to do an injustice.
Thus, the OCA recommended: 1. x x x 2. That the charges of violation of Section
3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and issuance of an unj
ust interlocutory order be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. is liable for issuance of u
njust interlocutory order under Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code notwithsta
nding the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that the same
be dismissed for lack of merit?
Decision:
The Supreme Court sustained the recommendation of the Office of the Court Admini
strator, thus:
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It is a settled doctrine that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly render
ing an unjust judgment, it must be established beyond cavil that the judgment ad
verted to is unjust, contrary to law or unsupported by the evidence, and that th
e same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In
other words, the quantum of proof required to hold respondent judge guilty for a
lleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the Revised P
enal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, o
ne of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consis
tent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral c
ertainty and does not suffice to convict. Here, the allegations of the complaint
-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounce
d guilty on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on which con
viction can be anchored. The evidence must truly be beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Supreme Court found Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. guilty of gross igno
rance of the law.
52 | P a g e

Justiniano Quiza 2008-0290


Art. 211: Indirect Bribery
Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 149152)
Facts:
Petitioner was the personnel supervisor of the National Irrigation Administratio
n (NIA) in Tacloban City. Her duties include processing of appointment papers of
employees. She was charged for her alleged refusal to attend to the appointment
papers of a certain Mrs. Mutia, a coterminous employee. Mrs. Mutia testified th
at petitioner asked from her some money as a consideration.
Attempts to entrap petitioner then ensued. Petitioner and Mrs. Mutia supposedly
agreed to meet at the canteen. Some of their officemates Mrs. Sevilla and a cert
ain Mrs. Dimaano joined them in the canteen. They occupied two squareshaped tabl
es joined together. The petitioner sat at the head of the table with Mrs. Mutia
seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's) right and Mrs. Sevill
a at the right of Mrs. Dimaano. Member of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) broug
ht along a camera in order to take photographs of the entrapment. The marked mon
ey was folded altogether.
After the money had been delivered and received, pictures were taken, one of the
m depicting the accused held by member of the PC on the left hand and another sh
owing the accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC men, and the compl
ainant, Mrs. Mutia, drinking from a glass .
The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the entrap
ment. She denied having accepted the supposed bribe money.
The case was brought to the respondent court which ruled that the crime committe
d by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revi
sed Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as defined under Ar
ticle 211 of the same code.
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Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was properly convicted of the crime of indirect briber
y?
Decision:
No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of th
e Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the
gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of
the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own
property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketin
g the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance
or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude t
hat the crime of indirect bribery has been committed.
An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately af
ter the passing of the money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the
PC agents apprehended her. There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated
which should be her position immediately after the money was handed to her under
the table. None of the photographs show the petitioner in the process of approp
riating or keeping the money after it was handed to her.
54 | P a g e

Alexander Santos 2006-0205


Art. 212: Corruption of Public Officials
Chua vs. Nuestro (A.M. No. P-88-256)
Facts:
Complainant Rina V. Chua filed an administrative charge against the respondent f
or allegedly delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her favor afte
r demanding and getting from her the sum of P1,500.00. Asked to comment thereon,
the respondent denied the charge. The case was referred for investigation, repo
rt and recommendation to Judge Pardo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila who,
after hearing, found duly substantiated that to immediately enforce a writ of ex
ecution, complainant agreed to give P1,000.00 to the respondent, an additional a
mount of P500.00, but after the which the writ was still not enforced for the lo
sing party, against whom the writ was to be executed, showed an official Receipt
of payment of the supersedeas bond.
Issue: Whether or not complainants action constitute corruption of a public offic
ial?
Decision:
Yes, the court agreeing with the trial court adopts the recommendation that appr
opriate directive be issued to the City Prosecutor of Manila after preliminary i
nvestigation to charge complainant Rina Chua and Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr.
with corruption of public official under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code.
55 | P a g e

Renato Segubiense 2006-0040


Art. 217: Malversation of Public Funds or Property
Davalos v. People (G.R. No. 145229)
Facts:
On January 14, 1988, petitioner Davalos, as supply officer of the Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a cash a
dvance of P18,000.00 covered by Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. SN-1898
33-N for the procurement of working tools for a certain "NALGO" project. On May
5, 1988, petitioner received a demand letter from then Provincial Treasurer Timo
teo Magalang giving him until May 16, 1988 to submit a liquidation of the aforem
entioned P18,000.00 cash advance. This was followed by another letter received b
y petitioner on May 26, 1988, giving him this time up to May 31, 1999 to settle
his account. But as in the first instance, the second demand went unheeded.
In a letter dated August 16, 1990, the
informed the Provincial Prosecutor of
indings on the examination of the cash
er was found to have an unsettled cash

new Provincial Treasurer, Norma Cabungal,


Marinduque of the Commission on Audit's f
accounts of the province wherein petition
advance in the amount of P18,000.00.

Petitioner admitted receiving the P18,000.00 cash advance intended to purchase w


orking tools for the "NALGO" project. He, however, denied
allegations that he misappropriated the said amount. He testified, too, that, th
e purchase order (PO) for the said tools were already approved by the provincial
treasurer and the provincial auditor, the new administration decided to scrap t
he proposed transaction. According to petitioner, following the assumption to of
fice of Governor Luisito Reyes, his office files containing the said PO and the
requisition paper were taken and his services terminated per Governor Reyes' Mem
orandum No. 88-63 dated November 23, 1988. Said memorandum also stated that "sho
uld you apply for the commutation/payment of your unused leave/vacation and sick
/credits, the same may be approved it is first applied/charged to your unliquida
ted cash provided of
advance
P18,000.00." Pressing the point, petitioner stated that he then applied for his
56 | P a g e

terminal leave and other benefits through the following summary of vouchers whic
h he personally prepared, but were then disapproved.
Despite his belief that he was then no longer obligated to liquidate his P18,000
.00 cash advance, petitioner nonetheless settled his account. Petitioner brushed
aside the charge of malversation and declared that he had already been relieved
of his accountabilities by the Commission on Audit. He, however, admitted recei
ving from the provincial treasurer the two demand letters earlier adverted to da
ted May 5, 1988 and May 26, 1988 requiring him to submit his liquidation of the
P18,000.00 cash advance on the dates respectively indicated therein.
On June 30, 2000, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding petitioner gu
ilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds and se
ntencing him accordingly.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged acts of the petitioner constitute the crime charge?
Decision:
The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the above penal pr
ovision are; that the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody or c
ontrol of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the fund
s or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and that
he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or n
egligence, permitted another person to take them.
The Supreme court ruled that there can hardly be no dispute about the presence o
f the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying the positio
n of a supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque. In
that capacity, he receives money or property belonging to the provincial govern
ment for which he is bound to account.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient
proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did
57 | P a g e

not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made, and that he coul
d not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal m
isappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot
explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or pro
perty with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, i
s prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal
uses. When the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the a
ccused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is nev
er deemed to have existed at all. The petitioner failed to overcome this prima f
acie evidence of guilt.
Petitioner does not at all dispute the fact that he did receive a cash advance.
He also admitted receiving the demand letters of the provincial treasurer for hi
m to submit a liquidation of the cash advance on two occasions, which he failed
to do. He harps on Memorandum No. 88-63 issued by then Marinduque Governor Reyes
that he can offset his unliquidated cash advance of from the commutation of his
unused vacation and sick leave credits to justify his failure to liquidate his
cash advance. He also invites attention to the fact that, even before the approv
al of his application for the commutation of his leave credits, he already paid
his cash advance on January 27, 1995. Petitioners attempt at rationalization for
his failure to liquidate is unacceptable. Memorandum No. 88-63 merely informed p
etitioner that his application for commutation may be granted provided that the
commutated amount is first applied to his unliquidated cash advance. Nowhere in
the said memorandum did it state that he is exempted from submitting his liquida
tion of the same cash advance. As it is, petitioner failed to liquidate and retu
rn his cash advance despite repeated demands. He was able to return the said amo
unt only on January 27, 1995, that is, after almost seven (7) years from the las
t demand. The return of the said amount cannot be considered a mitigating circum
stance analogous to voluntary surrender considering that it took petitioner almo
st seven (7) years to return the amount.
In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of f
unds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the
criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely
58 | P a g e

affect the accused's civil liability thereunder and be considered a mitigating c


ircumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.
59 | P a g e

Renato Segubiense 2006-0040


People v. Uy (G.R. No. 157399)
Facts:
The accused in this case accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a
Treasurer at the NPC; accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the inf
ormation was the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAF
ED); Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at the time mentione
d in the information; Gamus does not have any custody to public funds; Ochoas pos
ition as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require him to take custody or control of
public funds. In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC ) became embroi
led in a controversy involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds
which were originally on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch
(PNB ) but were subsequently used to purchase two (2) managers/cashiers checks (the f
irst check was in the amount of P70,000,000.00 while the second was for P113,805
,291.25) in order to comply with its loan obligations to the Asian Development B
ank (ADB ). As NPCs debt in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was obligated to follow an
intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from a local bank (in th
is case, United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which local ba
nk was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-shore ban
k (in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then supposed to remit the y
en equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this case, the Bank of Japan
, Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the account of the ADB. The
contracts of NPC with the concerned banks (embodied in three 3 Payment Instructi
ons ) included a value date (which was July 13, 1990), the mere arrival of which wou
ld trigger the above-mentioned procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of t
he NPC obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted
Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise, per
routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted on said
value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however, despite the
fact that the PNB had already issued two (2)
60 | P a g e

managers/cashiers checks for such purpose, did not make the agreed remittance to C
redit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the funds it had remi
tted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered ex
planations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equiva
lent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were d
iametrically opposed.
The accused allegedly diverted the funds covered by the two PNB Managers checks b
y falsifying a commercial document called an Application for Cashiers Check (ACC) b
y inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after t
he name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not author
ize the insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC in
structing PNB to prepare a Managers check to be charged to NPCs savings account di
d not contain any account number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly s
ucceeded in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Rau
l Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas, George Aonuevo and Mara Aonuevo.
On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, finding the accused Ja
ime B. Ochoa guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds thru falsificat
ion of commercial documents. On the ground of reasonable doubt accused Jose Ting
Lan Uy, was acquitted. An alias warrant of arrest was issued against Raul Gutie
rrez.
Issue:
Whether or not the herein accused is guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that to be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution
must prove the the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody or con
trol of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds
or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; a
nd that he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or t
hrough abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, suc
h funds or property.
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The Supreme Court further ruled that Malversation may be committed either throug
h a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively th
rough negligence by allowing another to commit such
misappropriation. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be crim
inal intent or criminal negligence and while the prevailing facts of a case may
not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclud
e the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both ar
e equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is co
mmitted through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes
a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful malversat
ion, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the
evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that even on the putative assumption that th
e evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but t
he information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this
case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in
order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo
or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of t
he felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense o
f malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. The question of whe
ther or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means of dece
it will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of
first impression. An accused charged with willful or intentional falsification
can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence.
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Renato Segubiense 2006-0040


Chan v. Sandiganbayan (G. R. No. 149613)
Facts:
In November 1989, petitioner was hired as Accounting Clerk II and assigned at th
e Regional Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Cebu City, di
scharging the function of Cashier or Collection Officer. Petitioner went on leav
e from December 7 to 27, 1995. On December 27, 1995 Josephine Daclan, the audito
r from the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned to the NBI, conducted a routine au
dit examination of the accountability of petitioner. Petitioner being then on le
ave, the audit was conducted upon Delza Bas (Bas) who was officially designated
by the Regional Director to act as Collection Officer during her absence. The au
ditor found that all collections for the period beginning December 7, 1995 up to
the date of the audit, December 27, 1995, were accounted for, as reflected in h
er Cash Report dated December 27, 1995 signed by Bas.
On January 24, 1996, the same auditor conducted another audit examination. Since
petitioner had already reported for work, the audit covered the period beginnin
g June 15, 1995. The auditor found a shortage of P290,228.00 in petitioner's cas
h accountability which was reflected in her Cash Report dated January 24, 1996 o
n which petitioner affixed her signature. The auditor thus issued a demand lette
r to petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the shortage.
The COA Region VII thus filed a complaint against petitioner for Malversation of
Public Funds in the amount of P333,360.00 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsm
an (Visayas) on April 10, 1996. The said office found probable cause against pet
itioner and recommended the filing of the corresponding information against her.
Petitioner was thus indicted before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for Ma
lversation of Public Funds.
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Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner herein is guilty of the crime of Malversation of P
ublic Funds?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacks merit and guilty of te crime cha
rge. In affirming the courts below the Supreme Court pointed out the following r
easons, that the fact that Bas was given official designation during all the tim
es that she acted as collection officer, petitioner's liability is not, by that
fact alone, mitigated. Petitioner could still be held liable for the amount unre
mitted by Bas if it can be shown that the latter was under her supervision. The
questioned amount on time because it is incumbent upon him to exercise the stric
test supervision on the person he designated, otherwise, he would suffer the con
sequences of the acts of his designated employee through negligence. In short, b
y failing to exercise strict supervision he could be liable for malversation thr
ough negligence. The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitio
ner's account the shortage in the collections actually done by Bas. The failure
of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with w
hich he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prim
a facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The petitioner not only did omit to report the shortages of Bas to the proper a
uthority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having ass
isted Bas in covering up such shortages. Petitioner did not only lend Bas those
amounts given on November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She admittedly extended 'vales to
her and to others, also out of public funds.
The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an accountable o
fficer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public funds by other p
ersons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a l
icense to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use o
f public funds. The Supreme Court further ruled that the alleged acquiescence of
petitioner's superior, even if true, is not a valid defense. The fact that peti
tioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will
not exculpate him from his criminal liability.
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Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204


Art. 220: Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property
Tetangco v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 156427)
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent, alleging the latter
gave
Php 3,000 cash financial assistance to the chairman and Php 1,000 to each tanod
in a certain barangay. When it was not justified as a lawful expense, the latter
refunded the amount from the City of Manila.
Respondent asserted that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case, but it
is lodged in the COMELEC instead. He alse maintained his position on the validi
ty of the expenses made.
Issue:
Whether or not Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the c
ase against respondent?
Decision:
It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsm
ans determination of whether or not probable cause exists except when it commits
grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exe
rcised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of pa
ssion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of posit
ive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation o
f law.
The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause. Probable cause signifie
s a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently stron
g in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guil
ty of the offense with which he is charged. Here, the
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Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for financial assistance was neit
her authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cit
e any law or ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount
used for the financial assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appro
priation it was intended for.
The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the
offender is an accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or proper
ty under his administration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which
the public funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for whi
ch they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for t
echnical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties
had been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or ordin
ance. To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the p
urpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Pate
ntly, the third element is not present in this case.
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Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204


Abdulla v. People (G.R. No. 150129)
Facts:
Convicted
al use of
nal Code,
bdulla is

by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illeg
public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Pe
or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. A
now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45.

Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Inform
ation, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively,
of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties
are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the perfor
mance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with Darkis, also a publi
c officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply
for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of Php 40,000, which amount was
appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school te
achers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service. Appell
ants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appell
ant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon mo
tion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleti
ng the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of technical malversation?
Decision:
The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges o
f technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for
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public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have
committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State Colleg
e to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were en
titled to under existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the money
was spent for a public purpose payment of the wages of laborers working on vario
us projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which
laborers wages enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of t
he prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quan
tum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayans
improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecu
tions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever ti
lt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt.
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentia
ls of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third
element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fu
nd used should have been appropriated by law is therefore absent. The authorizat
ion given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the Php 40,0
00.00 allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teach
ers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the Php 40,000 released by the DBM f
or salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other
school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical m
alversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically ap
propriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the t
hird and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Pena
l Code are lacking in this case.
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Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204


Parungao v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96025)
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds allegedly committed by
him as a municipal treasurer. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him of
malversation of public funds but convicted him instead of illegal use of public
funds.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of illegal use of public funds
?
Decision:
The 1987 Constitution mandates that the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, s
hall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation agains
t him. From this fundamental precept proceeds the rule that the accused may be c
onvicted only of the crime with which he is charged. An exception to this rule,
albeit constitutionally permissible, is the rule on variance in Section 4, Rule
120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The essential elements of the crime of malversation are: (a) the offender is a p
ublic officer; (b) by reason of his duties he is accountable for public funds an
d property; and (c) he appropriates, takes, or misappropriates, or permits other
persons to take such public funds or property, or otherwise is guilty of misapp
ropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
The essential elements of this crime, more commonly known as technical malversat
ion, are: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he applies publ
ic funds or property under his administration to some public use; and (c) the pu
blic use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from t
he purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law ordinance.
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A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distin
ct and different from the other. In malversation of public funds, the offender m
isappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person
to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversati
on, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his
or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fu
nd was appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily in
clude the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. Sinc
e the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in
the information, and since technical malversation does not include, or is not in
cluded in the crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be co
nvicted of technical malversation.
Considering however that all the evidence given during the trial in the malversa
tion case is the same evidence that will be presented and evaluated to determine
his guilt or innocence in the technical malversation case in the event that one
is filed and in order to spare the petitioner from the rigors and harshness com
pounded by another trial, not to mention the unnecessary burden on our overloade
d judicial system, the Court deems it best to pass upon the issue of whether or
not the petitioner indeed is guilty of illegal use of public funds.
Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the utiliz
ation of this fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road w
as merely an internal arrangement between the Department of Public Works and Hig
hways and the barangay captain and was not particularly provided for by law or o
rdinance. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purposepaymen
t of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It i
s pertinent to note the high priority which laborers' wages enjoy as claims agai
nst the employers' funds and resources. In the absence of a law or ordinance app
ropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the pet
itioner cannot be declared guilty of the crime of illegal use of public funds.
70 | P a g e

Eddie Tamondong 2009-0178


Title 8: Crimes Againt Persons
Art. 247: Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstances
People v. Gelaver
Facts:
Eduardo Gelaver was charged with parricide for the killing of his wife Victoira
by multiple stab wounds at the latters residence. Husband and wife were already l
iving separately at the time of the killing.
The accused interposes the exempting circumstance embodied in Art. 247 of the RP
C (Death Under Exceptional Circumstances). He claimed that he only knew her wifes
residence when her daughter told him the night before that she (the wife) was l
iving in front of the church). And so, he went there with the intention of repai
ring the marriage only to find her wife having sex with her paramour (the accuse
d says that he doesnt know the paramours name) upon his (Eduardos) arrival. And it
was then that the paramour took a knife from the headboard and tried to stab Edu
ardo but Eduardo was able to wrest the knife from the paramour. And when he trie
d to stab the paramour, he was able to duck whereby the stab wounds intended for
the lover fell on his wife. The paramour, the accused claims, was able to get d
ressed and ran outside the house to avoid his wrath.
Nevertheless, he was still found guilty by the RTC of parricide.
Issue:
Should Eduardo be granted the exceptional circumstance under Art. 247 of the RPC
?
Decision:
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In order to appreciate Art. 247 of the RPC, the accused must be able to prove th
at: lover; 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise having sex with a
2) as a result of the rage, the accused kills or inflicts physical injuries to
the spouse and/or the lover; and 3) the accused never consented to the carnal ac
ts done by the spouse. Unfortunately for Eduardo, he wasnt able to establish the
existence of the aforesaid circumstances. His version of how things went down we
re too full of inconsistencies. First off, he stabbed his wife several times whi
ch is not consistent with an accidental killing (because he claimed he was aimin
g for the lover). Another was that he claimed that the paramour was able to GET
DRESSED while under attack. And another was that even his daughter testified tha
t she did not tell her father anything about her mothers residence or whereabouts
as even she did not know where her mother was staying.
So the guilty verdict is sustained.
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Eddie Tamondong 2009-0178


People v. Amamongpong
Facts:
Amamompong was charged with homicide for the killing of SPO1 Flores in their hou
se. The accused contends that not only was the killing done under exceptional ci
rcumstances (Art. 247 of the RPC), but that he was also justified in killing Flo
res under Art 11 of the RPC because his act was done in defense of the honor of
his wife.
Although a prosecution witness testified that he saw the accused actually hold a
scythe to hack Flores in the first floor of the house, the accused counters tha
t the incident took place in the bedroom located at the 2 nd floor of their resi
dence. And it was there that he saw Flores naked from the waist down attempting
to have sex with his wife. It was then that he pursued Flores with the scythe an
d thereby wounding him. And when the victim tried to run, Flores also drew his g
un but the accused was quick to wrestle the gun away and use it against Flores.
The accused whereby emptied the bullets on the victim.
Another prosecution witness testified that although the accused claims this all
happened in the second floor, large quantities of blood was found in the first f
loor and even on the stairs and that on the second floor, no apparent signs of s
truggle can be seen as all the furniture and appliances were in order. And excep
t for the victims bloody carcass, nothing else seemed out of the ordinary.
But Amamompong was steadfast in his defense.
Issue:
Should the accused be afforded the benefit under Art. 11 as well as Art. 247 of
the RPC?
73 | P a g e

Decision: No. Not only is the accused version of the events


fact that the accused claims BOTH Art 11 and 247 of the RPC
itself. One cannot claim that rage was brought upon when an
fe engaged in sexual intercourse willingly with a lover, and
that his acts were to defend the honor of his wife.

not credible, but the


is contradictory in
accused sees his wi
at same time claim

Add to this the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw the accused str
ike the victim with a scythe on the first floor, as well as the forensic evidenc
e pointing to the fact that the body of the victim could have been just carried
on the second floor to make it seem like the victim was attempting to have inter
course, then the Court has no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court t
hat Art 11 and 247 of the RPC can not be appreciated in the case at bar.
74 | P a g e

Eddie Tamondong 2009-0178


People v. Oyanib
Facts:
Michael Oyanib was charged with parricide and homicide for the killing of his wi
fe and her lover at Michaels wifes residence.
The following facts have been established:
That Michael and his wife Tita started living separately a year earlier. Michael
tried to win back Tita but the latter was openly flaunting his new lover Jesus
Esquirdo.
In one occasion, Micheal and Jesus almost came to blows when Michael saw his wif
e and Jesus in a loving embrace at the plaza. After this incident, Jesus and Tit
a were heard threatening Michael that they would kill him the next time they see
each other. A day before the killings, One of Michael and Titas children was ask
ed by the school to call her parents for a meeting. But because Michael was indi
sposed, he went to his wifes residence the next day to ask her if she could come.
But because of the threats of Jesus and his wife in the previous incident, he b
rought with him a hunting knife. Unfortunately, when the accused arrived at Titas
house, he saw Tita and Jesus having sex. Jesus launched at Michael but he (Mike
) was able to draw his knife and stab Jesus. Tita, meanwhile got a hold of a liq
uor bottle whereby she attacked Michael. And so, Michael also stabbed Tita.
But the RTC still found Mike guilty.
Issue
Should the exempting circumstance under Art. 247 be applied under the circumstan
ces?
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Decision:
In order for Art. 247 to apply, the accused or the defense must be able to show
the following elements: 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise having s
ex with a lover; 2) as a result of the rage, the accused kills or inflicts 3) th
e accused never
physical injuries to the spouse and/or the lover; and consented to the carnal ac
ts done by the spouse.
The evidence show that all three elements are present in this case. Michael was
still married to Tita (albeit living separately), he caught his wife and Jesus b
y surprise having sex, and Michael certainly did not approve of their relationsh
ip, much less their carnal act.
The fact that Mike brought with him a hunting knife is consistent with his excus
e that he was fearful of an attack by either Jesus or Tita because of past event
s.
So the decision of the RTC is modified. Mike is found guilty only under Art. 247
of the RPC.
76 | P a g e

Mark Vergara 2008-0323


Art. 248: Murder
People vs Mallari (G.R. No. 145993)
Facts:
While Joseph and Liza (wife) were watching a basketball game at the barangay bas
ketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons, a
rrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they
were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked ne
ar the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over th
e latter, which caused his instantaneous death.
Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted R
ufino of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for the c
rime of murder?
Decision:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. U
pon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Jo
seph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by
Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present ca
se. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused ther
ein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the plac
e where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which caused the lat
ters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by
running over him. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kill
s another by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor
vehicle
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qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mi
tigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to b
e imposed on Rufino.
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Mark Vergara 2008-0323


People vs Gonzales (G.R. No. 139542)
Facts:
Noel Andres overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his path. Noel
Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted Inocencio. Noel later on also ha
d an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the accused. Inocencio seeing his s
on having confrontation with Noel, got his gun to protect Dino. Accused fired on
Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the victims John K
enneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death o
f the latter. The Trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting was a
ttended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilt
y of the complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres and for two cou
nts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin
Valdez.
Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present for the crime
of murder?
Decision:
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by its
elf amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant delib
erately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he
fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the positio
n of the appellants car was not of his own doing but it became so when Noel Andre
s overtook his car and cut off his path.
Appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after the latter cu
t off the appellants path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not alig
ht from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it. For his pa
rt Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor thre
atened Andres during their short spat. Gonzalez, although he had his gun in
79 | P a g e

his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter was having an altercati
on with the appellants son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son
was in imminent danger.
There is no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers w
hen he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a
conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue
advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive evidenc
e to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime committed is h
omicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime com
mitted are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines
whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is
made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill
the victim. In a case wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding
behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requi
ring treatment for three days, the crime committed is slight physical injuries.
In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convict
ed of the lesser offense of physical injuries.
80 | P a g e

Mark Vergara 2008-0323


People vs Avecilla (G.R. No. 117033)
Facts:
Accused-appellant arrived at the basketball court located on Dapo Street, Pandac
an, Manila, and for no apparent reason, suddenly fired a gun in the air. Four me
ters from the basketball court, on a nearby alley, he initiated an argument with
the group of Boy Manalaysay, Jimmy Tolentino and Macario Afable. Afable tried t
o pacify accused-appellant, whereupon, the latter placed his left arm around Afa
ble's neck and shot him pointblank on the abdomen. Afable ran toward the alley a
nd accused-appellant ran after him. Another shot rang out, so one of the bystand
ers, Carlos Taganas, went to the alley and there, he saw accused-appellant and A
fable grappling for possession of the gun. The Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and
was able to wrest the gun away from accusedappellant, who immediately fled from
the scene of the incident. Afable died afterwards after being rushed to the Phil
ippine General Hospital.
Regional Trial Court of Manila, rendered judgment convicting accusedappellant of
the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the illegal possession of firearms by the accused is a qualifying
circumstance for murder?
Decision:
Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1994. The pertinent provisio
n of the said law provides:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
cture of Firearms or Ammunition. The
mum period and a fine of not less than
81 | P a g e

Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of


Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufa
penalty of prision correccional in its maxi
Fifteen thousand

pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufac
ture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rim
fire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firear
m, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in t
he manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, that no other crime was c
ommitted.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such u
se of an unlicensed firearm such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considere
d as an aggravating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the us
e of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession,
but murder or homicide, as the case may be.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed onl
y where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of murder
, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Otherwis
e, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an essential in
gredient in the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'
etat; or (2) as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.
82 | P a g e

Mark Vergara 2008-0323


Art. 249: Homicide
Navarro vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121087)
Facts:
Petitioner Navarro and Lingan had a heated altercation. As Lingan was about to t
urn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the lef
t eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to ge
t up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored
him.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office,
while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manag
er of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the
hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an intention to kill on the part of the accused?
Decision:
The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constit
uted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso, we appreciated this mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after th
e latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating c
ircumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro. Furthermore, th
e mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The
frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle, that it was Linga
n who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mi
tigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty th
at should be imposed on petitioner Navarro.
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The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that c
riminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although t
he wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In People v. Cast
ro, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty
of homicide.
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Mark Vergara 2008-0323


People vs Ullep (G.R. No. 132547)
Facts:
Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy, kept on running without any
particular direction. Leydan asked for police assistance. SPO1 Ulep together wit
h SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo arrived at the scene on board an Anfra police ser
vice jeep. The three (3) police officers, all armed with M-16 rifles, alighted f
rom the jeep when they saw the naked Wapili approaching them. The kind of weapon
Wapili was armed with is disputed. The police claimed that he was armed with a
bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he had no b
olo, but only a rattan stool. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told
Wapili to put down his weapons or they would shoot him. But Wapili retorted "pu
sila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards the police officers. When Wapil
i was only about two (2) to three (3) meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the
victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the vic
tim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into
his head and literally blew his brains out
Issue:
Whether or not the killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of trea
chery for the crime of murder?
Decision:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Considering the rule that treachery
cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the crime it
self, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of accusedappellan
t. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the
killing to murder, accused-appellant may only be convicted of homicide.
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Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence him to death under
the circumstances would certainly have the effect of demoralizing other police
officers who may be called upon to discharge official functions under similar or
identical conditions. We would then have a dispirited police force who may be h
alf-hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their assigned duties for fear
that they would suffer the same fate as that of accused-appellant.
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Mark Vergara 2008-0323


People vs Antonio (G.R. No. 128900)
Facts:
Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right
between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm calibe
r Beretta pistol of appellant Antonio.
Prior to the shooting, appellant and the victim spent several hours having fun p
laying "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could not p
ay to appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with appellant
Antonio and Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other.
According SG Bobis who witnessed the said crime; Tuadles and Antonio were arguin
g. Antonio even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis
heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka kasi.
Issue:
Whether or not the shooting was attended with the qualifying circumstance of tre
achery for the crime of murder? Decision:
If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there was
no reason to call for a Sergeant (Sarge) or any eyewitness for that matter.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack
was arrived at on the spur of the moment.
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing
a murder because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of this Cour
t.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar, where we held that t
here was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercati
on. More recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
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There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a
heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to fac
e with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen.
Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal code.
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Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021


Art. 251: Death Caused in a Tumultous Affray
People v. Anecito Unlagada y Suanque (G.R. No. 141080)
Facts:
On January 27, 1989 at around 9:00 in the evening Danilo Laurel left his house t
ogether with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance
at Negros Occidental. After two hours, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break
from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall. Onc
e outside, they decided to have a drink and bought beer.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to
relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three meters from Danilo
who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, appro
ached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assa
ilant with half- filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men nu
mbering of seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons. Edw
in, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being mauled an
d overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he co
uld be given medical attention.
Edwin Selda confirmed the identity of the suspect who was then in the custody of
the police. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the police au
thorities, that the man under detention, Anecito Unlagada, was the same man who
stabbed his friend Danilo. The accused assails his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder instea
d of tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code?
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Decision:
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity
of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitnes
s because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification . A tumultuous a
ffray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a
confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wou
nded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant ca
se is between a distinct group of individuals , one of whom was sufficiently ide
ntified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular
victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a tumultuous affray within the meaning
of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free- for- all, wher
e several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one anot
her in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of o
ne or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himsel
f, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked pa
st witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There
was hardly any risk at all to accused- appellant; the attack was completely wit
hout warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up a
ny defense.
Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.
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Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021


Sison vs. People (G.R. No. 108280-83)
Facts:
Tension and animosity between Cory loyalists and Marcos loyalists broke into vio
lence. On July 27, 198, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known Cor
yista.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be h
eld at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a rally
but it was denied. Despite this setback, three thousand gathered at the Rizal Mo
nument led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. No ticket could be produced. Col
onel Dula Torres gave them ten minutes to disperse. Atty. Lozano turned towards
his group and said gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators. The police p
ushed the crowds and used tear gas to disperse them.
At about 4:00 pm, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. An
nie Ferrer was there and they informed her of the dispersal and Ferrer angrily o
rdered them gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers! A few minutes later, she was arr
ested by the police. Somebody then shouted kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon! a commot
ion ensued and Renato Banculo, cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking the
persons in yellow. The man in yellow t- shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appe
ared to be Marcos loyalists. Thay caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled
him. He was hit on various parts of his body. Sumilang tried to pacify the maul
ers so he could extricate Salcedo from them but the maulers pursued Salcedo. Sum
ilang was able to tow Salcedo but Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as anoth
er man boxed Salcedo on the head. De Los Santas, Tan boxed Salcedo while Pacadar
. Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw, Sision repeatedly boxed him.
Salcedo managed to get away but accused Tan, Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumila
ng in the process. Salcedo pleadfed for his life. The mauling resumed at the Riz
al monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collap[sed and los
t consciousness. Sumilang with a help of traffic enforcer brought Salcedo to Med
ical Center Manila but was refused admission. So they took him to PGH where he d
ied upon arrival.
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The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, R
ichard De Los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of mu
rder qualified by treachery. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Ferr
er but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo. The
court convicts Tamayo of homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is
murder and not death caused in a tumultuous affray?
Decision:
For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that:
(1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized fo
r the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) th
ese several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumult
uous manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or person
s who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be identif
ied.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons an
d they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some p
erson is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one
distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the po
lice dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after th
e loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dis
persal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless
individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kic
ks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, no
r was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
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As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as much as fift
y in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took
advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any att
empt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they i
gnored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolo
nged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing of m
urder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.
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Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021


People v. Cresenciano Maramara (G.R. No. 110994)
Facts:
The evidence shows that a benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School
PTA of which accused- appellant is the president, was held in the yard of accus
ed- appellants house in Brgy. Calpi, Claveria Masbate in the evening of November
18, 1991. At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo Donato was dancing with certain Ro
wena Del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of the accused- appellant, approached
Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened, Rowena ran away while Ri
cardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about t
wo meters away from where Ricardo stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused- ap
pellant took his hand- gun tucked in his waist and fired at the victim Miguelito
Donato, hitting the latter at the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his
fallen brother Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardos head with an iron bar whic
h knocked him out for about 3 minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he h
urried home and informed his parents of what happened.
Their father immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Pio
Duran Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day. Befo
re Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato, the father, asked who shot him and Miguel
ito replied that it was accused- appellant.
The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of Miguelito bore
lacerated wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more than two persons.
The trial court ruled against the accused- appellant and was held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Maramara should be held liable for tumultuous affray instead of m
urder?
94 | P a g e

Held: There is no merit in the accused- appellants position that he should be hel
d liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the R
evised Penal Code. It was in such situation that accused came at the scene and j
oined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked hi
m causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body- two on the stomac
h, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused- appellant with
his hand- gun shot Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit dance,
Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witness R
icardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused- appellant as Miguelitos
killer.
While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first b
lush, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelit
o inflicted upon him these wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider them as
a mitigating circumstance because the defenses version stands discredited in ligh
t of the more credible version of the prosecution as to the circumstances surrou
nding Miguelitos death.
Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court finds Cresen
ciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
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Jasmine Calaycay 2005-0049


Art. 254: Discharge of Firearms
Dado v. People (G.R. No. 131421)
Facts:
On May 25, 1992, in order to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding,
Sultan Kudarat, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams
, which composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Er
aso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga. Alfredo
Balinas and Rufo Alga were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, while petitioner
was armed with a caliber .45 pistol and accused Francisco Eraso was carrying an
M16 armalite rifle. The team saw somebody approaching who was halfnaked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Balinas told Eraso to wait
, but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite ri
fle at the approaching man. Thereafter, petitioner fired a single shot from his
.45 caliber pistol. Petitioner admitted that when he heard the rapid gun burst,
he did not turn to face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pis
tol in front of him purposely to demoralize their enemy.
The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Ba
linas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Accused Era
so embraced Alfredo Balinas and told him that it was not intentionally done and
it was merely an accident. Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wou
nds he sustained.
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver
of Silvestre Balinas testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of th
e victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced throug
h and injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found three irregularly
shaped metallic fragments. She added that the position of the victim at that tim
e of the shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the trajectory
of the bullets was upwards.
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic
fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be
96 | P a g e

fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet. However, on cross-examination, he declar


ed that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments recovered from the
fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56
mm. jacketed bullet.
The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the other han
d petitioner, filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the pet
itioner guilty of homicide?
Decision:
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45
caliber pistol towards the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence
to prove that petitioner had intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witness
es did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill canno
t be
automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to
life. Intent to kill must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill sho
uld not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should
be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254
of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender
discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender ha
s no intention to kill that person . The Decision of the Court of Appeals in aff
irming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is set aside and p
etitioner is acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
97 | P a g e

However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of


firearm.
98 | P a g e

Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316


Art. 257: Unintentional Abortion
People v. Salufrania (G.R. No. L-50884)
Facts:
Filomeno Salufrania by boxing and strangling MARCIANA ABUYOSALUFRANIA, his lawfu
lly wedded wife and who was at the time 8 months on the family way, caused upon
her injuries resulting in her instantaneous death and the death of the child who
was still in its maternal womb. Thus Filomeno was charged with the complex crim
e of parricide with intentional abortion committed. The lower court found Filome
no guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, th
e automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court. Filomeno alleges that the t
rial court erred in finding him guilty of the complex crime of parricide with in
tentional abortion, as there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to
cause an abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the complex crime of parricide
with intentional abortion is proper?
Decision:
No. Filomeno Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of parric
ide with intentional abortion but of the complex crime of parricide with uninten
tional abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows: 1. That there is a pregna
nt woman. 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion. 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of
the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled t
herefrom.
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It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (
8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerte
d upon her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said violence,
Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion was caused
by the same violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana Abuyo, such vi
olence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However, the intent to ca
use the abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stoma
ch, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is no
t sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact, Filomeno must h
ave merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
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Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316


People v. Genoves (G.R. No. L-42819)
Facts:
Soledad Rivera tried to take back by force from Genoves a yoke of a plow she cla
ims she owned. Genoves however, repeatedly struck Soledad with his fist causing
her to fall to the ground several times. During which time, Soledad was heavy wi
th child. Soledad by such fall suffered pains in the abdomen.
According to testimony deceased was in good health the day before. From the time
of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain, which were symptoms of premature
delivery. Soledad remained in said condition for days until it culminated in th
e painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she wa
y carrying, but the other baby could not be delivered. Soledad and both babies d
ied. Genoves was then charged and convicted by CFI Occidental Negros of the comp
lex crime of homicide with abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the complex crime of homicide with abortion is
proper?
Held:
No, the abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257
of the Revised Penal Code. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause
premature delivery, and the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the
assault to Soledads death. Genoves must be held responsible for the natural cons
equences of his act.
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Ozelle Dedicatoria 2006-0406


Art 266: Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment
Kingston(e) Li v. People and CA (G.R. No. 127962)
Facts:
Petitioner Li was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of homicide fo
r the death of Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that Arugay was watch
ing television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend del
a Camara and Baby Janes boyfriend, Tan. They suddenly heard a noise outside. Peer
ing through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo Sangalang taking a bat
h completely naked. The two were facing the house of the Arugays. Enraged, the d
eceased shouted something to Li and Sangalang. Then petitioner Li shouted back.
An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by petitioner carrying a
baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall.
Li ran back to his house. The witnesses Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and
were trying to drag him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a
knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once. Immediately thereafter, they were able to se
e Sangalang stab Arugay at least once.
Petitioner Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit first with a baseba
ll bat Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right ar
m which is near the shoulder. The deceased who is armed with a bolo, retaliated
by hacking Li on the head, causing him to lose his hold on the baseball bat and
fell semi-unconscious or unconscious. In such a condition, it is highly improbab
le that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay.
After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and o
ne (1) day of Reclusion Temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Ap
peals. Aggrieved, Li filed a petition for review, seeking the reversal of his co
nviction for the crime of homicide.
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Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical i
njury instead of homicide?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury attrib
utable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li stri
king Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from in
juries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of
the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm
of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended p
arty for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight
physical injuries.
What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street figh
t devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any lo
ng-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actor
s were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless thi
s lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the circumstances must be made
to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that th
e criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was not established beyond r
easonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death appa
rently remains at large.
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Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz 2005-0048


Art. 266-A: Rape
People v. Hermocilla (G.R. No. 175830)
Facts:
Hermocilla was charged with two counts of rape. The records show that M was born
out of wedlock on May 30, 1989 to S and L. After they separated, M stayed with
her mother L who subsequently cohabited with appellant Hermocilla. Sometime in 1
999, while M was preparing dinner, appellant suddenly grabbed and pulled her to
the bed. He ripped off her shorts and underwear and made her lie on the bed. Aft
er undressing himself, appellant inserted his finger into Ms vagina and penetrate
d her with his penis. M cried and begged appellant to stop. Thereafter, appellan
t would insert his finger into Ms vagina whenever her mother is out of the house.
Such abuse temporarily ceased when M lived with her father S in Baguio City. Bu
t when he left t work abroad, M went back to live with her mother and appellant.
The abuse resumed and culminated in second rape
incident which took place sometime 2002. On said day, while M was cleaning their
house, appellant suddenly grabbed her and pulled her towards the bed. He took o
ff her clothes, undressed himself and inserted his finger into her vagina.
Appellant denied the charges against him, he claimed that he treated M like his
own daughter. The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
Issue: Whether or not the insertion of the appellants fingers into the victims vag
ina constituted the crime of rape trough sexual assault?
Whether or not relationship could be considered in the proper imposition of pena
lty?
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Decision:
The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant inserted his fingers int
o Ms vagina likewise constitute rape through sexual assault. In People v. Palma,
we held that the insertion of the appellants finger into the victims vagina consti
tuted the crime of rape through sexual assault under Republic Act No. 8252 or th
e Anti-Rape Law of 1997 .
Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if committed with any
aggravating or qualifying circumstances. year old minor. The Information in Fam
ily Case No. A-436 mentioned the victim as appellants stepdaughter and an 11A ste
pdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by previous marriage, while a stepfather i
s the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which
the person spoken of is the offspring. In the instant case, appellant and Ms moth
er were never married. Appellant is the common law spouse of Ms mother. Hence, ap
pellant is not Ms stepfather; vice-versa, M is not appellants stepdaughter. Howeve
r, since the
relationship was not specifically pleaded in the information, it cannot be consi
dered in the imposition of the proper penalty.
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Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz 2005-0048


People v. Basquez (G.R No. 144035)
Facts: The prosecutions evidence disclose that on November 4, 1998 while herein 6
-year-old victim was on her way home from school, appellant waylaid her, dragged
her to an unoccupied house, tied her, and then forced himself inside her. After
consummating his vile, he left her with her body tied. When she was able to let
loose, she went home and told her grandmother of the incident, which led to the
arrest of appellant. After trial, appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced
to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay civil indemnity and moral damages in th
e amount of P50,000 each.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of penetration still constitute the crime of rape?
Decision: Although there had been no complete penetration of the victims vagina b
y appellants penis, contact between them was not ruled out by the doctor who test
ified in this case. In fact, he found the victims vagina positive for
spermatozoa. Existing rulings on rape do not require complete or full penetratio
n of the victims private organ. Neither is the rupture of the hymen necessary. Th
e mere introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victims genitalia e
ngenders the crime of rape. Hence, it is the touching or entry of the penis into the
labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victims genitalia that c
onsummates rape. Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the
labia. Even the briefest of contacts, without lacerations of the hymen, is deeme
d to be rape.
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Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz 2005-0048


People v. Oga (G.R. No. 152302)
Facts:
At around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were awakened by th
e loud banging of corrugated GI sheet coming from the barracks of his co-constru
ction worker which was about 3 meters away. Ignacio and his wife proceeded in ha
ste to investigate but they were surprised and disarrayed to see his co-worker,
herein appellant, naked on top of their daughter, Irene, who was also naked.
Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the appellant summo
ned her to his barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she approached
him. However, appellant suddenly pulled her and laid her on a
wooden bed (papag). The appellant then took off her pants and panty, as well as
his clothes. He inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around 2:00 a
.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron sheet that enclosed th
e appellants barracks.
Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but interposed
sweetheart story .
Issue:
Whether or not force and intimidation are attendant in this case?
Decision:
Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled down to th
e bed, she was not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife, bolo or a
ny object or instrument that the appellant could have employed so as to create a
real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm . Irenes overall
deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and the reasonable standard o
f human conduct when faced with a similar situation. It is unnatural for an inte
nded rape victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a
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feeble attempt to free herself despite a myriad of opportunities to do so. This


constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the appellant.
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Maricris Ella 2007-0030


Title 9: Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security
Art. 267: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
People v. Ejandra (G.R. No. 134203)
Facts:
Ed Henderson Tan, the nine-year old son of the spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan, w
as a Grade III student at the Philippine Institute of Quezon City, located at Ki
tanlad, Quezon City. At about 4:00 p.m. on July 2, 1997, Ed
Henderson was dismissed from his classes and proceeded to the nearby house of hi
s tutor in Chinese language, Huang Lao Shih. Ed Henderson and his father, Eddie
Tan, had earlier agreed that after the tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., Ed H
enderson would phone his father, who would then fetch him from his mentors house.
The tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., as scheduled, and Ed Henderson then pr
oceeded to the store near the gate of the school to have his periodic test paper
s photocopied. He left the store and was on his way back to the house of his tut
or to wait for his father.
Suddenly, Ed Tampos, armed with a revolver, chased and overtook Ed Henderson at
the Royalty canteen near the school. Tampos ordered the boy to proceed to a moto
rcyle parked nearby and warned the latter that if he refused, he would be shot.
Petrified, Ed Henderson approached the motorcycle where
appellants Elvie Ejandra and Roel Revilla were waiting. Ejandra had no legs (pil
ay), while Revilla had curly hair. There was no lamp post outside the school pre
mises but the lights inside the school were still on. Ejandra covered Ed Henders
ons mouth with his hand, pointed his gun at the boy and warned the latter not to
shout. Revilla boarded the motorcycle and took the drivers seat. Ejandra sat behi
nd him, and Tampos sat behind Ejandra. Tampos ordered Ed Henderson to board the
motorcyle, or else, he would be shot. The boy was then ordered to sit behind Tam
pos.
Ed was brought to a one-storey house with cemented flooring and whitecolored wal
ls. Once inside, he saw a man who was drinking, who turned out to be Antonio Hue
ra, and a female, who turned out to be Magdalena Calunod. Ed Henderson also saw
a cell phone. The was ordered to write down his fathers
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telephone number, as well as that of their house and their store. Ed Henderson d
id as he was told, and wrote down the telephone number of his father, Eddie Tan.
At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing him that
his son had been kidnapped. The caller demanded P10,000,000.00 for the safe rele
ase of his son which was reduce to P5,000,000.00. Thereafter, Eddie received sev
eral calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom they demanded, t
he kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and thereafter kill the boy
and dump his body in an isolated place. Eddie pleaded for mercy but the caller
would simply hang up the telephone.
At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers came
through, and Eddie reiterated that he could no longer raise any additional amoun
t. The caller hung up, but called again and informed Eddie that the kidnappers h
ad agreed to accept a ransom of P548,000.00. At about noon, the caller contacted
Eddie and instructed him to place the money in a newspaper and to bring the mon
ey to the parking lot in front of the Sto. Domingo Church in Quezon City within
ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the doors and windows o
f his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was also told that a man w
ould approach him and call him "Eddie."
Eddie did as he was told. Suddenly, a man approached him and called him Eddie, so
he immdiately he handed over the plastic bag which contained the money. He asked
her how his son was, she told him not to worry because she would bring the boy
home. Shortly after his arrival at their house, Eddie received two telephone cal
ls from a male and a female, respectively, who informed him of his sons impending
release.
Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he would b
e brought back home. The boy then called up his mother and told her that he woul
d be back soon. Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in a taxi. Calunod order
ed the boy to pretend that she was his aunt. The taxi
stopped near the Imperial Drugstore at E. Rodriguez Avenue, where Calunod instru
cted Ed Henderson to get down. She gave the boy P50.00 for his fare back home. T
he boy took a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family.
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Issue:
Whether or not the accused could be held liable for the crime of kidnapping?
Decision:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manne
r deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death; (1) If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days
; (2) If it shall have committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious
physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detain
ed, or if threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapp
ed or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from t
he victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned
were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies
as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture dehum
anizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the
prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or deta
ins another, or in any manner deprives the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act o
f detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offe
nse any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detenti
on lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public auth
ority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and se
rious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and se
rious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following bey
ond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the
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victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and,
(c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for t
he release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a
qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before,
during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual
demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committ
ed. Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense; me
aning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or d
emanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that release
s from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may ac
crue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release.
In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the
release of the victim.
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Maricris Ella 2007-0030


People v. Silongan y Linandang (G.R. No. 137182)
Facts:
On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaa went to Barangay Laguilayan, Isul
an, Sultan Kudarat with Americo Rejuso, Jr., Ervin Tormis, and Victor Cinco to m
eet with a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada to talk to Macapag
al concerning the gold nuggets that were purportedly being sold by the latter. D
uring the meeting Macapagal told them that someone in his family has just died a
nd that he has to pick up an elder brother in Cotabato City, hence, they had bet
ter transact business in the afternoon.
In the afternoon, Alexander's group and Macapagal, with a certain Teddy Silongan
and another person named Oteng Silongan, traveled to Cotabato City to fetch Mac
apagal's brother. At 8:30 p.m., they neared the highway. Macapagal ordered the d
river to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companio
ns were ordered to go out of the vehicle, tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal an
d Teddy were also tied up and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Th
e four victims were taken to a mountain hideout in
Maganoy, Maguindanao, where a certain Salik Karem, Hadji Kutang Omar alias Comma
nder Palito, and Jumbrah Manap met them. Initially, the three demanded P15,000,0
00 from Alexander Saldaa for his release which was subsequently reduced to P12,00
0,000.00. They made Alexander write a letter to his wife to pay the ransom. The
letter was hand-carried by a certain Armand Jafar, alias Dante, and two of the v
ictims, Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco, who both later managed to escape. No rans
om was obtained so Commander Palito and Jumbrah Manap sent other persons and one
of the victims, Americo Rejuso, Jr., to renegotiate with Alexander's wife. No a
greement was likewise reached.
Seven days later, Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr., were transferred to t
he town proper of Maganoy. Commander Palito, Jumbrah Manap, Sacaria Alon alias J
ack Moro, Ramon Pasawilan, guarded them. When the kidnappers learned that the mi
litary was looking for Alexander, they returned to the mountain hideout and stay
ed there for two weeks.
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On September 24, 1996, Mayangkang released Alexander Saldaa to the military in ex


change for a relative who was caught delivering a ransom note to Alexander's fam
ily.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused the guilt of the appellants has been proven by credib
le evidence beyond reasonable doubt?
Decision:
The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined
and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation
of the victim's liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent
of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be e
stablished by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his li
berty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the co
mmission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267
be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the fourth element is no longer necessary.
There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the appellants abduc
ted Alexander Saldaa and his companions at gunpoint and deprived them of their fr
eedom. That the appellants took shifts guarding the victims until only Alexander
was left to be guarded and in transferring Alexander from one hideout to anothe
r to prevent him from being rescued by the military establish that they acted in
concert in executing their common criminal design.
Macapagal's participation is clearly evident from the records. Aside from being
one of Alexander's armed guards in Kabuntalan, and having been part of a party w
hich brought Alexander from the river hideout of Commander Kugta to Mayangkang S
aguile's lair in Talayan, indirect evidence also support Macapagal's participati
on in the criminal design. First, Macapagal made several postponements of their
trip on March 16, 1996 until it was already 7:30 in the evening. His reason that
someone in his family died is not corroborated at all. Teddy, his cousin, never
mentioned it, and his other relative, co-accused Abdila Silongan, was reticent
about it. In fact, nobody told the trial court the name of the
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deceased relative. Secondly, Americo testified that when they stopped over at Ma
capagal's house, he heard the wife of Macapagal utter the words "kawawa naman si
la" as they were leaving. Thirdly, it was established that Macapagal ordered the
driver to proceed slowly towards the highway. During this time, he was busy tal
king on his handheld radio with someone and the victims heard him say "ok." When
they were near the highway, he ordered the driver to stop whereupon 15 armed me
n appeared and blocked their vehicle. Finally, while the 15 men took away Alexan
der Saldaa and his three companions, nothing was done to Macapagal or to Teddy Si
longan. By their own admission, they were just left behind after being hogtied.
How they managed to escape was not explained. All these taken together give rise
to the reasonable inference that Macapagal had concocted the funeral for a supp
osed recently deceased relative purposely to afford his co-conspirators time to
stage the kidnapping. Then, also, it was through Macapagal's indispensable contr
ibution that the armed men were able to stop the vehicle at a precise location n
ear the highway.
Likewise, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the kidna
pping was committed "for the purpose of extorting ransom" from Alexander, as to
warrant the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. For the crime to be commi
tted, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessa
ry that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merel
y the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records ar
e replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At
the mountain hideout in Maganoy where Alexander was first taken, he was made to
write a letter to his wife asking her to pay the ransom of twelve million pesos
. Among those who demanded ransom were the appellants Ramon Pasawilan, Sacaria A
lon, and Jumbrah Manap. Then, when Alexander was in the custody of Mayangkang Sa
guile, not only was he made to write more letters to his family, Mayangkang hims
elf wrote ransom notes. In those letters, Mayangkang even threatened to kill Ale
xander if the ransom was not paid.
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Maricris Ella 2007-0030


People v. Castro (G.R. No. 132726)
Facts: On January 17, 1997, at about six oclock in the afternoon, Alfonso Saez ca
me home. He was informed by his siblings that Jesse Castro called up to say that
he (Castro) wanted to speak with Saez. Subsequently, Saez repaired to Castro's
residence. Just as Castro opened the gate for Saez, Castro pointed and fired his
9 mm. handgun at Saez, its bullet whizzing by his right ear. Saez was thrown ag
ainst the concrete wall of the house. He was then taken inside the house. Two me
n, identified to be Edgardo Reyes and Jesus de los Angeles, joined Castro in mau
ling Saez. Castro hit Saez with an iron club.
At around nine o'clock in the evening, Castro handed over to him a phone and ord
ered him to tell his family to raise P20,000.00 and intstruct them to bring the
money to a place near Bautista Hospital. About half an hour later, another call
was placed to follow-up the demand. Turning to de los Angeles and Reyes, Castro
instructed the two to go to the "drop-off point." Nobody showed up. After an hou
r, Saez was ordered to call again, this time to designate another place where th
e money was to be delivered. Castro told Saez to have his relatives bring the mo
ney to the vicinity of the Aglipay Church in Caridad. Again, no meeting material
ized.
Around midnight, Castro, de los Angeles and Reyes left the house and stayed by t
he gate conversing with one another. The victim took the opportunity to flee. He
was able to untie his legs and tackle the stairs towards the second storey. He
jumped out through the window but the noise he created caught the attention of C
astro. The latter fired his gun, hitting the fleeing victim and planting a bulle
t in his buttocks. His plea for help alarmed some barangay officials who immedia
tely came to his rescue and brought him to the nearest hospital.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be held liable for the crime of kidnapping even i
f detention was made to merely compel Saez to pay his debt?
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Decision: Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his li
berty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; (1) If the kidna
pping or detention shall have lasted more than three days; (2) If it shall have
been committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious physical injuries
shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats
to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapped or detained sha
ll be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public
officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was commi
tted for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, ev
en if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of
the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detentio
n or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum pena
lty shall be imposed."
The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an ind
ividual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extort
ing ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom is act
ually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment.
In People vs. Salimbago, the Court stressed: "x x x No specific form of ransom i
s required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it was i
ntended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. In municipal
criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demande
d for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from c
aptivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary fo
r the crime to be committed."
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Maria Criselda Fojas 2010-0226


Art. 268: Slight Illegal Detention
People v. Dadles (G.R. Nos. 118620-21)
Facts:
The accused Dadles was charged with kidnapping two farmers, Tehidor and Alipan,
along with their sons, in Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. The a
ccused denied the charges stating that on the night of the alleged kidnapping, h
e had fallen asleep at the home of one of the defense witness after a night of d
rinking. The RTC rendered a decision conviction the accused of 2 counts of kidna
pping and serious detention.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred on convicting Dadles of 2 counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention?
Decision:
The accused argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses fail to mak
e out a case for kidnapping, referring to particular witness testimony that he b
elieved showed that the victims were not deprived of their liberty because they
went with the Dadles and his companions peacefully without being subjected to th
reats and coercion. The SC disagreed, stating that the victims hands were not tie
d nor guns poked at their sides when they were taken by the appellants group do
not conclusively preclude the deprivation of their liberty. The circumstances su
rrounding the taking of Salvador and Antonio, particularly the appellant and his
companions previous conduct in kidnapping victims Alipio and Dionisio, plainly
demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive Salvador and Antonio of their liber
ty . The Court likewise added that the general rule is that evidence is not admiss
ible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal case has commi
tted a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is n
ot competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the pu
rpose of showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged in the indi
ctment . Where a person is charged with the commission of a
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specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed at ab


out the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of t
he accused. The Court found that both incidents of kidnapping were related in th
at proof of one kidnapping tends to prove the other, thereby establishing the ac
cuseds intent to deprive the victims of their liberty.
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Maria Criselda Fojas 2010-0226


People v. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262)
Facts:
Accused Llaguno, along with several others, were charged with Kidnapping with Mu
rder when they allegedly kidnapped and detained Bienvenido Mercado, and while un
der detention, shot and killed said victim. Although charged with kidnapping wit
h murder, the accused was only convicted for murder and not for serious illegal
detention.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was guilty of Kidnapping with murder?
Decision:
The Court found the accused guilty only for serious illegal detention and not fo
r murder. It held that the Trial Court erred in convicting the accused for murde
r when the circumstances do not clearly and sufficiently prove beyond a reasonab
le doubt that accused was guilty of murder. Parenthetically, when the prosecutions
case is anchored only on circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime sought t
o be proven, and no other. In addition, the circumstances under consideration mu
st not support any rational hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accu
sed. Consequently, appellant may not be held criminally liable for killing the v
ictim . The TC also erred in finding the accused not guilty of serious illegal det
ention as the period of detention was less that 5 days. The evidence presented b
y the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court, clearly established t
hat appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so. At this
juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court merely made
a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal detention for
the sole reason that the victims detention did not exceed five days. The court a
quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least o
ne day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the t
rial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualif
ying circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no
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proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records in
disputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention.
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Maria Criselda Fojas 2010-0226


People v. Roluna (G.R. No. 101797)
Facts:
Eight person, including accused Roluna were charged with kidnapping with murder.
Witnesses claimed that they saw victim Anatalio Moronia stopped by accussed and
several others. The victim was alleged to have been threatened with firearms an
dhand bound behin his back. The accused claimed that he was taking care of an il
l relative at the time of the kidnapping. The RTC found Roluna guilty beyond rea
sonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping with murder. The accused raised
that the body of the victim has not surfaced and that the unexplained disappear
ance cannot be blamed on him as there is all possibility that the victim may sti
ll be alive.
Issue:
Was the death of the victim sufficiently proved and may the accused be held liab
le or it?
Decision:
The Rules of Court provides that the death shall be presumed if a person who has
been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not bee
n known for four years. However, the SC decided that there were insufficient cir
cumstances to hold the accused responsible for the death of the victim. The test
imony of the witnesses stating that the victims hands were bound by a companion o
f the accused is not enough to prove that the accused killed him. The conviction
of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be a
llowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. A
s discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the e
vents of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liab
ility of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia . The SC thus decided that Sinc
e none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (
kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidna
pping of Anatalio Moronia was established, we
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find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of t
he Revised Penal Code.
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Maria Garalde 2008-0326


Art. 270: Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
People v. Rubi-Rosa Pastrana (G.R. No. 143644)
Facts:
Erma Postejo, a domestic helper in Canada, is the mother of Jenny, Doroteo, Ares
ola and 9-year old Willy Garpen, Jr. her son by a common-law relationship. She w
as introduced to accused-appellant Rubi-Rose who offered to work on the processi
ng of Willys travel documents to Canada. Rubi-Rose asked for P 18,300.00 as proce
ssing fee. Later on, accused-appellant informed Erma that Willy was suffering fr
om bronchitis. Erma sent P 5,610.00, P 3,000.00 to be given to Doroteo and the r
emaining balance should pay for Willys medical treatment. Then on March 16, 1997,
accused-appellant fetched Willy and
Aresola from their home in Caloocan and brought them in Tondo. Aresola went home
and Willy was left in Tondo. Accused-appellant was asking Erma for sums of mone
y which Erma refused to transmit.
March 27, 1997, accused-appellant informed Doroteo that Willy was missing and th
at he was last seen playing inside her apartment. Erma returned to the Philippin
es to look for her son. Erma found out that Willy was never treated for any illn
ess. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charges
against her but the trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revis
ed Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of kidn
apping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code
?
Decision:
No, the Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1)
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the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offend
er deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. Wha
t is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the d
eliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his par
ents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply somethi
ng more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly da
ring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As
consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlook
ed or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Factual findings of the
trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great wei
ght and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observi
ng the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood.
In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial courts find
ing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith
and credit.
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Maria Garalde 2008-0326


People v. Teresa Bernardo (G.R. No. 144316)
Facts:
On May 13, 1999, around 11:30 in the morning, Rosita Tolibas brought with her in
Fabella Memorial Hospital her two daughters, 12-year old Roselle and 15-day old
Rosalyn. Rosita went to the hospital for medical check-up and tooth extraction.
While the mother, Rosita, was undergoing a medical check-up, her two daughters
waited for her in the lobby. Roselle sat on a bench carrying on her lap her 15-d
ay old sister. Accused-appellant sat beside them and befriended Roselle. After a
while, accused-appellant asked Roselle to buy ice water and the latter entruste
d her sister with the accused. Roselle didnt see any ice water being sold so she
returned to the bench. Upon returning, she saw accusedappellant running away wit
h her sister. Roselle ran after the accused and clung on to the leg of the accus
ed.
The commotion caught the attention of the Kagawad of Barangay, Emerento. He saw
the accused and Roselle struggling and the latter shouting akina ang kapatid ko,
akina ang kapatid ko. Emerento approached them and asked what was happening. Accu
sed told the kagawad that she was running after the mother of the baby but Rosel
le asked for help and informed the kagawad that her mother was undergoing a medi
cal check-up. Kagawad
Emerento took the baby and handed it to his wife. They looked for the mother of
the two children and when they found her, she confirmed that the baby was indeed
her daughter. The kagawad requested the hospital security guard to blotter the
incident. After trial, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Articl
e 270 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the accused-appellant, Teres
a Bernardo, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and fai
lure to return a minor under article 270 of the Revised Penal Code?
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Decision:
No, the Court ruled that a person whose only intention is to look for the childs
mother would generally return the child to the person who entrusted the child to
her. This did not happen in the present case. The only logical conclusion we ca
n derive from appellants actions is that her intention was really to kidnap the c
hild not to look for the childs mother.
The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor i
s that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actu
ally being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate
failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or g
uardians. It has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted w
ith the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to re
store the said minor to his parents or guardians (People vs. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 47
8 [1997]). In People vs. Ty (263 SCRA 745 [1996]), we stated that the essential
element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the off
ender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being pun
ished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of th
e custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Inde
ed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must im
ply something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong, foo
lishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
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Maria Garalde 2008-0326


People v. Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty (G.R. No. 121519)
Facts:
On November 8, 1987, Johanna Sombong brought her seven-month old daughter, Arabe
lla, to Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic. The clinic was owned and operated
by the accused-appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis an
d diarrhea and was confined for three days. After which, Sombong was not around
to pick up her daughter and she only appeared after a week. Sombong couldnt pay t
he hospital bills and since no one could take care of her daughter at home, she
left her at the nursery of the hospital, which she will be charged P50.00 per da
y. Arabella was transferred to the clinic extension and she was taken cared of b
y a yaya hired by her mother. Nothing was heard of the complainant so Dr. Ty not
ified the barangay captain of the childs abandonment. After two years, Arabella w
as entrusted to a guardian, Lilibeth Neri. Then after five years, Sombong came b
ack to claim her daughter.
Sombong filed a petition for habeas corpus against accused-appellant with the RT
C of Quezon City but was summarily dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdicti
on since the alleged detention was perpetrated in Kalookan City. Then, a crimina
l case was filed against accused-appellants and an administrative case was filed
against Dr. Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of PRC. The case was subsequ
ently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Then on October 13, 1992, Sombong file
a petition for habeas corpus against the alleged guardians of her daughter and
the petition was granted and ordered the immediate delivery of Cristina Grace Ne
ri having found that she was the daughter of Sombong. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, said decision was reversed on the ground that Cristina and complainants
daughter are not one and the same person.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused appellants are guilty of kidnapping and failure to re
turn a minor?
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Decision:
No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to retur
n a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements m
ust concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the
minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his pare
nts or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted
with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnap
ping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the
deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latt
er to his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only
be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardi
ans of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something mor
e than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishl
y daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is evide
nt that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-ap
pellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her.
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Lourizza Genabe 2008-0154


Art. 287: Light Coercions
Baleros v. People (G.R. No. 138099)
Facts:
Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou) a medical student of University of Sto. Tomas, wa
s a tenant of Room 307, with Marvilou Bebania, at the Celestial Marie Building,
Sampaloc, Manila. On December 13, 1991, she was attacked by someone while she wa
s sleeping. A piece of cloth that smelled of a chemical was pressed on her face,
thus awakening her from her sleep. The person pinned her down preventing her es
cape. She was finally able to fight off her attacker and reported the incident t
o the security guard. She was not able to identify her attacker but she felt the
attackers clothes describing it to be made of cotton and the lower garment to be
smooth and satin-like.
The security guard testified that on the same day, at around 1:30 am, Renato Bal
eros, Jr. (Chito) arrived at the building wearing a white shirt with Greek lette
rs and the words and a black Adidas shorts. He went to room 306 where Joseph Afr
ica was. Africa was awakened by another knocking at around 3pm by Bernard Baptis
ta, occupant of room 310, and was told of the incident that happened that mornin
g. At around 6-6.30am, Chito was told that they cannot leave the building due to
the incident.
Other occupants of room 310, Christian Alcala and Rommel Montes were asked by th
e CIS to inspect their room (310) for any object not belonging to them. Montes f
ound a grey bag not belonging to them and surrendered it to the authorities. Upo
n seeing the bag, they knew that the bag belonged to Chito.
When the bag was opened by the authorities, they found a white shirt with Greek
letters, black Adidas shorts, a handkerchief, 3 white shirts, socks and underwea
r. Alcala identified the items belonged to Chito. The items were examined and it
was found that the handkerchief contained chloroform, the same chemical found i
n the salmon pink night dress owned by Malou.
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Trial Court convicted Chito of attempted rape. Petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision. The case was elevated to t
he Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether or not the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth while on top of the vic
tim constitutes the crime of attempted rape?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held the acquittal of Chito from the crime of attempted rape.
There was no overt act of rape in this case. Overt act is some physical activity
or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime. It is more than
a mere planning or preparation. Considering the facts of the case, it cannot be
construed that the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth on the face of Malou co
nstitutes an overt act of rape when there was no commencement of any act indicat
ing the intent to rape the victim.
The acts committed by Chito are not indicative of rape but rather of unjust vexa
tion under Article 287, second paragraph. Unjust vexation exists when an act cau
ses annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the o
ffended. Unjust vexation includes any conduct which would unjustly annoy or irri
tate a person.
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Lourizza Genabe 2008-0154


Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006)
Facts:
Crazy Feet is a business establishment owned by Mildred Ong. On April 24, 1990,
Wilfredo Infante was ordered by Ong Chiu Kwan to relocate Crazy Feet's telephone
, electric and water lines without a permit from appropriate authorities. Mildre
d Ong filed a case against Ong Chiu Kwan for unjust vexation and the Trial Court
found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation under Article 287, second paragra
ph. The Court declared Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation hence this petiti
on. Issue:
Whether or not Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation?
Decision:
The court ruled that petitioner is liable for unjust vexation. Having admitted t
hat he ordered the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines without the pe
rmit to relocate such, he caused the annoyance and vexation of Mildred Ong. To a
dd, the electric, water and telephone interruption happened during the operation
of the business.
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Kristine Gonzales 2008-0192


Title 10: Crimes Aganst Property
Art. 293: Robbery
People v. Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera (G.R. No. 97426)
Facts:
Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera by means of force entered the house of husba
nd and wife Simon and Restituta Hibaler through their window. Armed with bolos,
they were able to carry away property amounting to Php18,250 through use of viol
ence and intimidation.
According to the wife's testimony, they were awakened during the breaking. Simon
was able to get his flashlight and point its light at the intruders, allowing t
hem to identify the three and causing him to exclaim "It's you guys!" in the ver
nacular. The husband was attacked first while the wife pleaded for his life, one
of the intruders then struck her on the face which caused her to lose conscious
ness. When she regained consciousness she found the intruders taking clothes and
ransacking a trunk, after which they went downstairs and had coffee. After they
left, Restituta called out for help. When their son Pedro and a neighbor arrive
d, they found Simon bleeding, and when asked what happened the victim named Rome
o, Antonio and Mario as the culprits who attacked him. Simon died before they co
uld take him to the hospital.
Pedro testified that when he first reported the crime he withheld the identity o
f the three assailants because an Anacleto Habana whose stepson was married to t
he daughter of one of the assailants, Romeo Apolinario, was present at the polic
e station. He was afraid that if he had named the three at the presence of Patro
lman Habana, they would be warned and could flee.
The Regional TrialCourt of Capiz City found the appellants guilty beyond reasona
ble doubt for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
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Issue:
Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of robbery with homicide were
proven by the prosecution? Decision: Yes, the essential elements of the crime o
f robbery with homicide was proven by the prosecution. Add to that that the homi
cide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, appellants are g
uilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code. The element of taking or asportation was completed when
the apellants took the personal property of spouses Hibaler. The wife Restituta
testified that after the incident, she made an inventory and found out that som
e of their personal belongings were missing. It is of no moment that the propert
y taken was not disposed of in so far as the characterization of the crime as ro
bbery is concerned.
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Kristine Gonzales 2008-0192


People v. Calixto Zinampan, Artemio Apostol, Roger Allan (at large), and Elvis D
oca (G.R. No. 126781)
Facts: Elvis Doca, Artemio Apostol, Calixto Zinampan and Roger Allan entered the
sari-sari store of Henry and Gaspara Narag of Linao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan and fo
rced their way into the house adjacent to the store. The housekeeper, Marlyn Cal
aycay was pulled back to the store by Elvis Doca as Henry was taken to the sala.
Henry was repeatedly ordered to produce his gun and money and when he refused A
rtemio hit him in the head with his gun. Henry gave them money but insisted that
he did not have a gun for which Calixto hit him with the butt of a gun at the b
ack of his head while Gaspara pleaded for their lives. The intruders then carrie
d away property and money that they had obtained from the couple. Henry died fiv
e days later due to the injuries suffered from the robbery. Gaspara Narag passed
away while the criminal case was pending with the trial court leaving Marlyn as
the lone witness left. The trial court found Elvis Doca guilty of robbery with
homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not the guil
t of the accused for the crime of robbery with homicide was proven by the testim
ony of the single witness? Decision: Yes, the guilt of the accused was sufficien
tly proven by the sole prosecution witness for the crime of robbery. The accused
was positively identified by the prosecution witness who has no motive whatsoev
er against him that would cause her to fabricate evidence. It is clear from the
facts of the case that there exist a conspiracy between the appellant and his co
-accused as can be inferred from their acts. The court found the testimony of th
e sole prosecution eyewitness as honest and credible and further holds that a cr
edible and positive testimony of a
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single eyewitness is sufficient. A conviction for the truth is determined by the


quality of the testimony and not by the number of witnesses.
136 | P a g e

Kristine Gonzales 2008-0192


People v. Donato Del Rosario (G.R. No. 13106)
Facts: Emelita Paraguas house was set on fire, some of her jewelries were missing
and niece Raquel Lopez was found dead at the kitchen. The police received infor
mation that Donato Del Rosario was seen outside the house of Paragua before the
incident happened and disappeared since then.
A few days later, Del Rosario surrendered himself to a police officer and volunt
eered that he will accompany them in recovering the stolen jewelries from where
he sold them. After the jewelries were recovered, with the assistance of his law
yer, the suspect signed a waiver and confession for killing Raquel Lopez, robber
y and setting the house of Paragua on fire.
Del Rosario was charged for Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Cour
t of Olongapo City. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty for t
he crime charged. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable dou
bt hence, an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the essential requisites of the crime of Robbery with Homicide ar
e present?
Decision:
Yes, the essential requisites of the crime of robbery with homicide are present.
Case law has it that when a stolen property is found in the possession of a pers
on who is not the owner thereof, will be presumed the thief if he can not satisf
actorily explain his possession. The accused knew exactly where he can recover t
he stolen jewelries and was positively identified by witnesses.
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Intent to gain is assumed in an information where it is alleged that there was u


nlawful taking and appropriation by the offender of the properties stolen. The j
ewelries recovered were pawned and sold by the accused and was positively identi
fied by the owner of the establishments.
Homicide may occur before or after robbery, what is important is there is an int
imate connection between the killing and the robbery.
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Divina Gracia Maramba 2007-0321


Art. 308: Theft
Laurel v. Abrogar (G.R. No. 155076)
Facts:
PLDT sued petitioner for violation of Art. 308 of the RPC, or theft, for alleged
ly using, without its previous knowledge and consent, the international long dis
tance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), w
hich is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls usi
ng lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to t
he local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destin
ed, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in t
he estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in th
e said amount. Petitioners special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by t
he Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with
this Court. In his petition for review petitioner argued that the Revised Penal
Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Codes definition of real
and personal property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the
Civil Code is exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal pr
operties. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words "personal p
roperty" without qualification, it follows that all "personal properties" as und
erstood in the context of the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Arti
cle 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the international calls and
business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal prope
rties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
In his Comment, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation
on the phone or a communication carried out using the telephone. It is not syno
nymous to electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as perso
nal property susceptible of appropriation. He also insists that "business" is no
t personal property. It is not the "business" that is protected but the "right t
o carry on a business." This right is what is considered as property.
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Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not
be subject of theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the international calls as well as the business of providing tele
communication or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriat
ion and can be objects of theft.
Held: The court granted PLDTs petition but remanded the case to the trial court w
ith direction to the Public Prosecutor of Makati City to amend the Amended Infor
mation to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business
of the private offended party because the international calls, although conside
red as personal properties, are not owned by PLDT hence petitioner cannot be lia
ble for theft on that matter; but the business of providing telecommunication is
a personal property which is capable of being appropriated hence subject to the
ft.
This Court adhering the decisions in United States v. Genato, United States v. C
arlos, and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal pro
perty, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriatio
n can be the object of theft.
Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the t
erm "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In
Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anyt
hing susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not
real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code s
hould be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in accordance w
ith the rule on statutory construction that where words have been long used in a
technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, a
nd have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a p
articular statute, in which they are used, the words used in such statute should
be construed according to the sense in which they have been previously used. In
fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of
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"personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in Uni
ted States v. Carlos.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the
penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "a
sportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that
to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportati
on or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" i
n the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which,
as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through the use of the offen
ders own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as an access device or car
d as in the instant case. This includes controlling the destination of the prope
rty stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tamp
ering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10 use of a device to fraudulent
ly obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper t
o divert electricity, as held in the cases of United States v. Genato, United St
ates v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas.
As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which are b
rought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by tam
pering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature
, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any
device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. In the instant case, petit
ioner was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unau
thorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines
, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directl
y to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.
The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by Articles 517 and 51
8 of the Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of subtraction o
f gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some respects resembling electricity, i
s confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain
of January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing the provisions
of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of that country, articles 517 and 518
of the code in force in these islands.
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The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other
apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring
electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfull
y deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other appa
ratus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which on
e may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telepho
ne service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connectin
g various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, th
rough which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance
calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtractio
n mentioned above.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise per
sonal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk
Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft. Interest in business was not specif
ically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time th
e above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared to be pers
onal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the enume
ration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all thing
s which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real pro
perty or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal prop
erty under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be ap
propriated.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human voice is
converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to
the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was als
o held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as electrical ener
gy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. Electri
city is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumera
tes "forces of nature which are brought under control by science."
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the m
atter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical ener
gy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal
142 | P a g e

properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership
over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits
said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT
not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim tha
t such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these co
mmunications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime o
f theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.
143 | P a g e

Divina Gracia Maramba 2007-0321


Alfonso D. Gaviola v. People G.R. No. 163297
Facts:
The RTC convicted Alfonso Gaviola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft. On September 6, 1997 at 7:00 AM, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew o
f Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay councilman saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola
and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees and deliberately took, harvested
and gathered 1500 coconuts thru the supervision of Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola
from the plantation of Cleto Mejarito without his authority and consent. The sai
d accused admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instruction but insiste
d that the trees were planted from the lot he inherited from his father.
Issue:
Whether or not the said accused is guilty of the crime of qualified theft?
Decision:
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states that theft is committed by any pers
on, who with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of nei
ther persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another with
out the latters consent. Theft is likewise committed by: (1.) Any person who, hav
ing found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner; (2.) Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the prop
erty of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and (3.) Any person who shall enter an enclosed state or a field
where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent
of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals
or other forest or farm products. Thus, the elements of theft are: 1). That ther
e be taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) t
hat the taking be done without the consent of the owner and 5) that the taking b
e accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. According to Article 310: Qualified theft - The crime of the
ft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degree than those
144 | P a g e

respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic


servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the prem
ises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is ta
ken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any othe
r calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. For one to be guilty of the
ft, the accused must have intent to steal (animu furandi) personal property, mea
ning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of persona
l property which intent is apart from but concurrent with the general criminal i
ntent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo. Thus, petitioners claim
of good faith in taking the coconuts from private complainants land is a mere pre
tense to escape criminal liability.
145 | P a g e

Divina Gracia Maramba 2007-0321


Santos v. People (G.R. No. 77429)
Facts:
Sometime in November 1980, the complaining witness, Encarnacion Pealosa, entruste
d her car, a 1976 Ford Escort, to herein petitioner Lauro Santos for repair of t
he carburetor. The work was to cost P300.00. A week later, Santos persuaded her
to have her car repainted by him for P6,500.00, within a period of two months.
After two months, Pealosa went to the petitioner's repair shop at MacArthur Highw
ay, Malabon, to retrieve her car. Santos refused to deliver the vehicle unless s
he paid him P634.60 for the repairs. As she did not have the money then, she lef
t the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return, she could not find Santos
although she waited five hours for him. She went back to the shop several times
thereafter but to no avail.
Pealosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in Malabon. Unable
to recover her car, she filed a complaint for carnapping against Santos with the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp Crame. The case was dismissed when th
e petitioner convinced the military authorities that the complainant had sold th
e vehicle to him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed of Sale with Right of Rep
urchase in his favor.
This notwithstanding, an information for estafa on Pealosa's complaint was filed
against Santos in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on October 26,1982. Af
ter trial, the accused was found guilty as charged and sentenced to "an indeterm
inate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to four (4) yea
rs and two (2) months as maximum, both of prision correccional, to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of P38,000.00 which is the value of the car withou
t subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and with costs."
Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of qualified theft?
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Decision:
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed
was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offen
se but the description thereof as alleged in the information. And as described t
herein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of the
ft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said prope
rty belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) tha
t the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking b
e accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or fo
rce upon things.
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aq
uino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction between t
he two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused re
ceives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there ma
y be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrust
ed only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the th
ing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the jurid
ical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlemen
t or estafa."
The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking
of the vehicle and so no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, we held that
the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier delivered to hi
m supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead of estafa.
Illustrating, the Court declared: ... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Pro
vince of Bulacan, agrees to sell B a certain quantity of rice at a certain price
per picul. A ships several sacks of the grain which B receives in his warehouse
. If, prior to the measuring required before the payment of the agreed price, B
takes a certain quantity of rice from the different sacks, there can be no doubt
that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now, it may be asked: Did not B receiv
e the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes. And did A voluntarily deliver the
sacks of rice which he owned by shipping them to B?-Yes Was the taking of the ri
ce by B from the different sacks done with A's consent?- No.
147 | P a g e

This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable, according
to which, when the thing is received and then appropriated or converted to one's
own use without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is not that of th
eft.
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of quali
fied theft because the fact that the object of the crime was a car was not alleg
ed in the information as a qualifying circumstance. Santos would have had reason
to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance
may be considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial. Hence the impos
able penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying circumstances, should
be in the maximum degree.
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Cheryl Navarro 2007-0026


Art. 310: Qualified Theft
People v. Salonga (G.R. No. 131131)
Facts:
This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Ru
les of Court from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR NO.
18551 which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, B
ranch 142 in Criminal Case No. 33127, by increasing the penalty imposed on the a
ccused to reclusion perpetua.
Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charg
ed with the crime of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Documen
t in an information alleging that on or before 23 October 1986, in the Municipal
ity of Makati, Metro Manila, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederati
ng with one another and mutually helping and aiding one another, and as such had
access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company (Me
trobank), with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the knowled
ge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully an
d feloniously take, steal and carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forgi
ng the signature of officers authorized to sign the said check and have the said
check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed pa
yee when in truth and in fact there is no such transaction between Firebrake and
Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a simulated check describ
ed as Check No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and
authorized, through which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gai
n for themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Met
robank and Trust Company in the total amount of P36,480.30.
On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty beyond re
asonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document.
149 | P a g e

Issues:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft?
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper?
Decsion:
The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accused
-appellant in the crime charged.
It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the blank Metroba
nk cashiers check which was processed and encashed.
Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of acco
unts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not tally
with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check was issued witho
ut any transaction.
Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of
bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other specimens
he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing therein w
as not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appear
ing in the cashiers check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a let
ter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accused-a
ppellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial confession and offered t
o return the amount of P8,500.00.
The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Documen
t. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the fel
ony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and 1 year of ea
ch additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the R
PC. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified
theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that specifi
ed in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than prision may
or in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and max
imum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the bank
150 | P a g e

officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order
to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused.
Falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the
crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 4
8 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that, where an offense is a necessar
y means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its
maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified Theft is more seriou
s than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under Artic
le 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its minimum period, t
he correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maxi
mum.
151 | P a g e

Cheryl Navarro 2007-0026


Roque v. People (G.R. No. 138954)
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rul
es of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. C
R No. 20411, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Asuncion Galang Roque, which a
ffirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampan
ga, Branch 49, where petitioner was found guilty of the crime of qualified theft
.
0It was alleged that on or about 16 November 1989, in the municipality of Florid
ablanca, Pampanga, accused Asuncion Galang Roque, being employed as teller of th
e Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) and as such was autho
rized and reposed with the responsibility to receive and collect capital contrib
utions from its member/contributors of said corporation, and having collected an
d received in her capacity as teller of the BABSLA the sum of PHP 10,000.00, sai
d accused, with intent of gain, with grave abuse of confidence and without the k
nowledge and consent of said corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawful
ly and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of P10,000.00, by makin
g it appear that a certain depositor by the name of Antonio Salazar withdrew fro
m his Savings Account, when in truth and in fact said Antonio Salazar did not wi
thdraw the said amount to the damage and prejudice of BABSLA.
Issues:
Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in
the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged fel
ony?
Whether or not the elements of qualified theft were proven?
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Decision:
When the defendant, with a grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appr
opriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking
or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft.
In the case of the United States vs. De Vera (43 Phil., 1000, 1003), Justice Vil
lamor enumerated the essential elements of the crime of theft, which are as foll
ows:
The taking of personal property;
The property belongs to another; The takin
g away be done with intent of gain;
The taking away be done without the consent
of the owner; and The taking away be accomplished without violence or intimidati
on against persons or force upon things.
In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity
of a bank teller.
In People v. Locson, this Court considered deposits received by a teller in beha
lf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interp
retation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the begi
nning of a business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only m
aterial possession. Juridical possession remains with the bank.
If the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed
is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of confi
dence, and the bank places money in the tellers possession due to the confidence
reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed. The ele
ments of qualified theft include the elements of theft and any of the circumstan
ces enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC. The elements of theft, which is define
d in Article 308 of the RPC, are the following:
1. Taking of personal property; 2. That said property belongs to another;
153 | P a g e

3. That said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the
owners consent; and 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or int
imidation against persons, nor of force upon things.
The specific qualifying circumstance in Article 310 of the RPC which the informa
tion indicated was that the felony was committed with grave abuse of confidence.
Hence, to warrant a conviction, the prosecution should have also proven the fac
t that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In the case at bar, regarding the first element, the taking of personal property
, the prosecution was not able to present direct evidence that petitioner took t
he PHP 10,000 on November 16, 1989. The prosecution attempted to prove the takin
g through circumstantial evidence. One of the pieces of evidence that the prosec
ution adduced was the withdrawal slip for PHP 10,000 dated November 16, 1989.
Antonio Salazar disowned the signature on the withdrawal slip. However, he also
indicated that he did not know who made the withdrawal. Rosalina de Lazo testifi
ed that the initial on the withdrawal slip, written after the figure 11-17-89, w
as the customary signature of petitioner. She, however, did not intimate the sig
nificance of petitioners initial on the withdrawal slip.
A careful inspection of all the withdrawal slips including the withdrawal slip s
tated above shows that the date and the initial of petitioner were written acros
s the stamped word paid. This indicates that petitioners initial was placed in her
capacity as a teller which, therefore, only proves that this transaction passed
through her hands in such capacity. It does not in any manner show that petition
er prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds of the withdrawal increased
her patrimony.
The presumption that being in possession of said withdrawal slip before its deli
very to Reynaldo Manlulu, the accused is the one who prepared the said withdrawa
l slip is without basis in law. The presumption under paragraph (j), Section 3 o
f Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which reads: That a person found in possession
of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer
of the whole act; otherwise, that things
154 | P a g e

which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
Thas always applied to a situation where property has been stolen and the stolen
property is found in the possession of the accused. In these cases the possessi
on of the accused gives rise to the presumption that the accused is the taker of
the stolen property.
In the case at bar, the withdrawal slip, is not stolen property.
The presumption used by the lower court and the one found in paragraph (j), Sect
ion 3 of Rule 131 are different. The lower court presumed that the petitioner wa
s the maker of the withdrawal slip and not that the petitioner stole anything. I
t is plain that there is no basis for the finding that the withdrawal slip was p
repared by the petitioner. Another piece of evidence offered to prove petitioners
taking is her extrajudicial confession that she allegedly admitted taking money
from the accounts of several members of the BABSLA and the list of people from
whose accounts she took money.
However, it cannot be deduced from the alleged verbal confession of petitioner t
hat she was confessing a specific taking of P10,000 from the account of Sgt. Sal
azar on November 16, 1989. And a perusal of the handwritten list allegedly prepa
red by petitioner does not disclose any relation to the specific taking alleged
in the information. All that was written on the list, among other names and figu
res, was the name Salazar, Antonio and the number fifteen (15) to the right of t
he name. The list does not mention the date on which the money was taken. Neithe
r does it disclose the precise amount that was taken. The other pieces of eviden
ce such as the Tellers Daily Report and Abstract of Payment merely reveal that on
16 November 1989, a withdrawal was made on the account of Sgt. Antonio Salazar
and that this withdrawal passed through the hands of petitioner in her capacity
as a teller of the BABSLA. Again, they prove neither that petitioner prepared th
e subject withdrawal slip nor that she took the P10,000 on that date.
155 | P a g e

It is plain that the prosecution failed to prove by direct or sufficient circums


tantial evidence that there was a taking of personal property by petitioner.
156 | P a g e

Cheryl Navarro 2007-0026


People v. Bustinera (G. R. No. 148233)
Facts: From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City fi
nding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
theft for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
In an information dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:
The undersigned accuses Luisito D. Bustinera of the crime of Qualified Theft, co
mmitted as follows:
That on or about 25 December up to the 9 January 1997 in Quezon City, the said a
ccused being then employed as one of the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an O
perator of several taxi cabs in Diliman, Quezon City, and as such has free acces
s to the taxi he drives, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniousl
y with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his em
ployer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal a
nd carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth PHP 303,000.0
0 belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said offend
ed party in the amount of PHP 303,000.00.
ISSUES: Whether or not the accused-appellant had intent to gain when he failed t
o return the taxi to its garage? Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft?
Decision:
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Pena
l Code (RPC), as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
157 | P a g e

However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Rep
ublic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALI
ZING CARNAPPING.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the RPC are
:
1.that there be taking of personal property; 2.that said property belongs to ano
ther; 3.that the taking be done with intent to gain; 4.that the taking be done w
ithout the consent of the owner; and, 5.that the taking be accomplished without
the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present:
the theft
is committed by a domestic servant; the theft is committed with grave abuse of
confidence;
the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a pl
antation; the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and
the
property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic erupti
on, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which bel
ongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; an
d (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.
158 | P a g e

Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the conce


pt of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.
The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law
and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
The anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery an
d theft included in the RPC. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent t
o gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and thef
t readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful ta
king, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken w
ithout the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals
with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to
have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the own
er's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon
things.
Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would f
all within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case b
efore the enactment of said statute.
While the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, i
t excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, stre
etsweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on
public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trai
lers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purp
oses. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be co
vered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on
robbery, respectively.
Since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is
the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would a
pply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in
the anti-carnapping law.
159 | P a g e

The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one


for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the cri
me of carnapping.For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be sta
ted in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating
the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designat
ion that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determine
s the real nature of the crime.
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain,
took the taxi owned by Cipriano without the latters consent. Thus, the indictmen
t alleges every element of the crime of carnapping, and the prosecution proved t
he same. Appellants appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it o
n the same day as he was supposed to is admitted.
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without th
e consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of perso
ns, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the off
ender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of
the same. While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially la
wful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his
act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and
against the owners consent transformed the character of the possession into an un
lawful one. Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of th
e taxi was no longer with Ciprianos consent as the latter was already demanding i
ts return. Appellant assails the trial courts conclusion that there was intent to
gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the owners consent. Appellants posi
tion does not persuade.
160 | P a g e

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important conside
ration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary ben
efit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or ex
pected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which wa
s taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.
161 | P a g e

Christine Perez 2006-0104


Art. 312: Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property
Quinao v. People (335 SCRA 741)
Facts:
Both accused (Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases) and private complainant Franci
sco Del Monte are claiming ownership over the land in question. Accused-appellan
t presented a tax declaration and alleged that the land being claimed by the com
plainant is different from the land litigated in Civil Cases No. 3561. Trial Cou
rt finds accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property. C
ourt of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land in ques
tion could be held liable of usurpation of her own property?
Decision:
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court co
nvicting her of the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on "specu
lations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record and in
accordance with the applicable law under Article 312 of Revised Penal Code.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's r
eal property or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession o
r usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that the accused ha
d animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho re
ales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped belongs, n
ot to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession
of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the pe
rson ousted of possession of the property.
162 | P a g e

In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (
1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging
to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessin
g the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be
animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for
this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.
163 | P a g e

Bernadette Remalla 2007-0392


Art. 315: Estafa
Ong v. People (G.R. No. 165275)
Facts:
Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is owned and o
perated by the family of private complainant Rosa Cabuso. While she normally bou
ght jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks to cover th
e jewelry she bought in December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance th
at the checks would be funded on their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks
were deposited, they were returned with the stamp "Account Closed."
Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10 coun
ts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court o
f Appeals affirmed the conviction. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
the petition.
Issue:
Whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of th
e Revised Penal Code when she was, in the Information, charged of Estafa under A
rticle 315, paragraph 2(d) of the same Code?
Held:
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to enable the ac
cused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be convicted
of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
164 | P a g e

From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged is
determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued t
he questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fu
nd them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations clearly cons
titute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under p
aragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph
2(d) of Article 315 have a common element false pretenses or fraudulent acts the
law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bounc
ing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check des
pite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation of par
agraph 2(a).
Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of i
nsufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, w
hich is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply wi
th a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of dishonor being then an
element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charge
d, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder.
In the case at bar, as priorly stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(
d), but there is no evidence that petitioner received notice of dishonor of all,
except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of the questioned check
s. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the prima facie presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This leaves it unnecessar
y to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that petitioners d
efenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se lik
e Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of sufficient
funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner offered to
pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the amount covered
by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the prosecution s
tipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250, which amount is
almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount c
overed by the P76,654 Allied Bank check.
165 | P a g e

In fine, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa u
nder Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her
acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, howe
ver.
166 | P a g e

Bernadette Remalla 2007-0392


Chua v. People (G.R. Nos. 150926 and 30)
Facts:
Private complainant Araceli Estigoy was engaged in the buy and sell of imported
goods from 1982 to 1984 when she met appellant (Anita Chua) who transacted twice
with her. n November 25, 1982, appellant issued to complainant in payment of im
ported (PX) items postdated checks drawn against Pacific Bank, Tarlac branch. On
December 4, 1982, appellant again went to complainants house, purchased some imp
orted items and issued another set of postdated checks drawn against the same ba
nk in Tarlac. On their due dates, complainant deposited the checks in the bank b
ut they were dishonored, as evidenced by the check return slips with annotations
as follows: "drawn against insufficient funds" and/or "account closed". Complai
nant notified appellant of the dishonor and
demanded payment of the checks. Appellant failed to redeem or pay the amounts of
the checks despite several demands. Appellant admitted issuing the checks but i
nterposed the defense that she issued the checks as collateral and by way of acc
ommodation of the complainant who requested for the checks. The Regional Trial C
ourt found appellant guilty of violation of Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Pe
nal Code (RPC). The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of conviction rendered
by the court a quo, with a slight modification as to the penalty imposed. Hence,
the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Anita Chua is guilty of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the RP
C?
Decision:
Article 315 (2)(d) of the RPC penalizes any person who defrauds another by postd
ating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender h
as no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cov
er the amount of the check.
167 | P a g e

The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as amended
by RA 4885, are:
(1) that the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation co
ntracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) that the at the time of
the issuance of the check, the offender had no funds in the bank or the funds de
posited were insufficient to cover the amount of the check; and, (3) that the pa
yee has been defrauded.
All the elements of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d) of Art. 315, RPC are pre
sent in this case. The evidence showed and petitioner Chua admitted issuing the
questioned checks in favor of private respondent in exchange for the imported go
ods she obtained from the latter. It is likewise not disputed that the checks sh
e issued bounced or were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and/or because
her bank account had already been closed by the bank due to lack of funds. As a
result, private respondent suffered damage. She had to close down her business
because she could not recoup her losses due to the huge amount petitioner owed h
er. Petitioners defense that she issued the unfunded checks as collateral or secu
rity for the goods she got from private respondent was not worthy of credence. t
he amounts of the checks issued by petitioner clearly showed that they were inte
nded as payments for the items she obtained from private respondent. Private res
pondent would not have parted with her goods in exchange for bum checks. It was
likewise contrary to ordinary human experience and to sound business practice fo
r petitioner to issue so many unfunded checks as "collateral" or "by way of acco
mmodation." As an experienced
businesswoman, petitioner could not have been so nave as not to know that she cou
ld be held criminally liable for issuing unfunded checks.
Ergo, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
168 | P a g e

Bernadette Remalla 2007-0392


Gonzaludo v. People (G.R. No. 150910)
Facts:
Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the Bacolod City
Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita Manlangit in Bacolod
City. Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulyssess mother at the latters house at B
acolod City. Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City. Meanwhile, his wife A
nita secured a teaching job in Catubig, Samar prompting her to leave Bacolod Cit
y and live in Samar.
After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned to Bacolod City
. And, in December of 1978, he was able to buy for P1,500.00 a small house locat
ed near that of his mother at Purok 5, Mansungay, Bacolod City. Then, in 1985, U
lysses took one Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress and brought her into the house.
In time, improvements were made on the house and the house was transformed into
a 2-storey structure. After Ulyssess demise in January of 1992, his mistress Ros
emarie Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey house for P80,000.00 to herein petiti
oner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben Gonzaludo, who lives just nearby. Since th
e house was being sold for a cheap price, petitioner convinced the spouses Gregg
Canlas and Melba Canlas, to whom he is related by affinity, to buy the same. He
rein, petitioner introduced the Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo. In the Deed of Sal
e, Rosemarie Gelogo signed as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to
be the lawful owner of the 2storey house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gre
gg Canlas acquired all of Rosemaries rights and interest on the subject house. La
ter, upon complaint of Ulyssess widow Anita Manlangit, an Information dated May 3
1, 1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City charging Rosemar
ie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas
and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document. T
he trial court acquitted the Canlas spouses but convicted petitioner of the crim
e charged. The appellate affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction.
169 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru Falsifi
cation of Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article
315, Revised Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime of Estaf
a is not present?
Decision:
The petition is partly impressed with merit.
For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsificat
ion of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsifi
cation of public document must exist.
There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are present: the
re was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo when she used t
he fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false pretense was m
ade prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and private compl
ainant Anita Manlangits right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the ve
ry least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases. It is petitioners the
sis, however, that there is here an absence of the third element contending that
private complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the offended party in this case, w
as never induced to part with any money or property by means of fraud, committed
simultaneously with the false pretense or fraudulent representation by Rosemari
e. The Court find merit in petitioners submission.
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that the d
eceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of defrau
dation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the o
ffended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the pre
sent case.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in th
is case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authorit
y to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit
170 | P a g e

was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their mon
ey when they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of es
tafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses,
but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not
the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her propert
y in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more re
ason must this be for herein petitioner.
The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve
petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of
public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.
It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses
included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the fail
ure of evidence to hold the accused of the other charge is legally feasible. As
correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsi
fy, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the dee
d of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such s
ale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gel
ogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by evide
nce beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification
of public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduce
d to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brother-in
-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house in this case.
Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Docume
nt.
171 | P a g e

Michelle Ricaza 2008-0040


Art. 318: Other Deceits
Jaime Guinhawa vs. People (G.R. No. 162822)
Facts:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged
including Mitsubishi vans,
ffice and display room for
He employed Gil Azotea as

in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles,


under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. His o
cars were located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City.
his sales manager.

Spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo purchased a, what would seem as a brand new Mit
subishi L-300 Versa Van that was displayed in the show room of the petitioner. T
hey were not informed that said van was damaged due to a vehicular accident that
occurred when Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan, suffered a heart attack while t
raveling from Manila to Naga City On March 17, 1995 when said van was initially
purchased by petitioner from Union Motors Corporation in Paco, Manila. A day aft
er Spouses Silos purchase of the van, they heard a squeaking sound which seemed t
o be coming from underneath the van. Believing that the van merely needed grease
, they stopped at a Shell gasoline station where it was examined. The mechanic d
iscovered that some parts underneath the van had been welded. When they complain
ed to Guinhawa, the latter told them that the defects were mere factory defects.
As the defects persisted, the spouses Silo requested that Guinhawa change the v
an with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles. Guinhawa initially agreed to the couples p
roposal, but later changed his mind and told them that he had to sell the van fi
rst. The spouses then brought the vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for
examination. The mechanic discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that
was producing the annoying sound, and that it had been repaired.
Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund o
f their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the conf
rontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had bought t
he van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in
172 | P a g e

the vehicular accident. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint
from the DTI.
On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of
paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa.
Issue:
Whether or not Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318 of the RPC covering other dec
eits?
Decision:
Yes, Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318.
Petitioner insists that the private complainant merely assumed that the van was
brand new, and that he did not make any misrepresentation to that effect. He ave
rs that deceit cannot be committed by concealment, the absence of any notice to
the public that the van was not brand new does not amount to deceit.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that he made
no personal representation that the herein subject van was brand new for the si
mple reason that nowhere in the records did he ever refute the allegation in the
complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It has thus become
admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new vehicles a fact which,
up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied. Therefore, when private comp
lainant went to petitioners showroom, the former had every right to assume that s
he was being sold brand new vehicles there being nothing to indicate otherwise.
But as it turned out, not only did private complainant get a defective and used
van, the vehicle had also earlier figured in a road accident when driven by no l
ess than petitioners own driver.
It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment which the
law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the
other party sought to know. Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in go
od faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due t
o its inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party
is
173 | P a g e

bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreove


r, a representation is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may cons
ist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead anothe
r and thus allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage.
The petitioner knew that the van had figured in an accident, was damaged and had
to be repaired. Nevertheless, the van was placed in the showroom, thus making i
t appear to the public that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was mandated
to reveal the foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the petitioner ev
en obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the vehicle d
id not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained that the
van was brand new. Thus, the private complainant bought the van, believing it w
as brand new. Hence, petitioner Guinhawa is guilty of the crime of Other Deceits
unishable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
174 | P a g e

Sheryll Tablico 2008-0341


Title 11: Crimes against Chastity
Art. 333, 334: Adultery and Concubinage
Beltran v. People (G.R. No. 137567)
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran herein petitioner and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on J
une 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
After twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petiti
on for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Artic
le 36 of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In her
Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it w
as petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman nam
ed Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concu
binage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his pa
ramour.
In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion t
o Defer Proceedings including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the crimi
nal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration
of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of
the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the petition for the declaration of nullity of pe
titioners marriage is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife?
Decision:
No. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage
is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to
175 | P a g e

be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the


latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not on
ly that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal pros
ecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues r
aised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need
not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evide
nce in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a fi
nal judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to petitioner's argument t
hat he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be de
clared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement t
hat his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Therefore, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must b
e submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judic
ial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Order
s of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil a
ction for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal
case for concubinage.
176 | P a g e

Sheryll Tablico 2008-0341


Vera Neri v. People (G.R. No. 96602)
Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Tr
ial Court (RTC) of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo
in the City of Baguio.
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda S
are and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11
:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at C
rystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of th
e Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo a
rrived at the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the door for Arroyo who entered
, he went down to and knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Ne
ri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda
Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two ac
cused. About forty-five minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare th
at she could already come down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala t
hen left the condominium.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' De
cision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial,
contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complainant
Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later on traded marriage with anothe
r woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the C
ourt of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Neris alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from f
iling the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto.
177 | P a g e

Decision:
The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in
Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil C
ode relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does n
ot involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now s
eeking to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining hu
sband, by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to liv
e separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a
year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced
in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore,
not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings." In fine,
the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to consent as a b
ar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such
acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with D
r. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons and Dr. Neri
promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides
that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's c
omplaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to t
he public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor
even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended
spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such en
forcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social instituti
ons of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the st
rongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kin
d.
178 | P a g e

Anna May Vallejos 2007-0140


Art. 338: Simple Seduction
People v. Pascua (GR No. 128159-62)
Facts:
On four separate incidents and as early as August 1995, accusedappelant Hipolito
Pascua, a 65-year old man, had succeeded in having sexual intercourse twice wit
h Liza Paragas and also twice with her twin sister Anna, both of whom were of 12
years of age then.
On said four separate incidents, accused-appellant would always call on the twin
s while they were playing in front of his house; instruct them to go inside his
house; and once inside order them to take off their pants and insert his penis i
nside their vaginas, while threatening them not to scream for he would kill them
. After his sexual advances, he would give them money from P5 to P10 and threate
n them again not to tell their mother about what happened or he would kill them.
Fearing for their lives, the twins did not tell their mother about what happened
. It was only when their older sister, Rosalina, had told their mother about it,
based on the confession of accused-appellants granddaughter who saw him rape Liz
a, had she learned of the incidents.
Wasting no time and propelled by her rage of what she had learned, their mother
filed four separate complaints for rape against accused-appellant. This was afte
r she had her twins physically examined by a doctor who, based on his findings,
confirmed that the twins were indeed sexually-abused.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of all the charges, sentenced him
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay each twin with P1
00,000 as indemnity for moral damages.
On appeal, appellant, maintained and consistently argued that the intercourse he
had with twins were all consensual and that the complainants in fact, would alw
ays visit him at his house asking for money and sexual
179 | P a g e

satisfaction. He further argued that if any, he would, be only held liable for s
imple seduction.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant may be held liable for the crime of rape even i
f allegedly he did not employ force in order to have sexual intercourse with the
twins?
Whether or not he is liable for simple seduction?
Decision:
Yes. It is clear from the foregoing testimony that private complainants tried to
scream but the appellant prevented them by threatening to kill them. Also, afte
r each rape incident, private complainants were warned by the appellant not to t
ell their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is not
required to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need n
ot be irresistible; it need only be present and so long as it brings about the d
esired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is
beside the point. Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape w
hen, as in this case, intimidation was used on the victim and she submitted to t
he rapists lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence holds
that even though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical
forces, he so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resista
nce through fear of greater harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by th
e man is rape. Without question, the prosecution was able to prove that force or
intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on the two victims to satis
fy his lust.
No. Equally untenable is the argument of the appellant that, if he is at all lia
ble for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338 of t
he Revised Penal Code, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some
deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this p
romise or inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of sexual
intercourse with the private complainants were in exchange for money. He declar
ed that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would promise
them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant
180 | P a g e

presented no proof that private complainants consent was secured by means of such
promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the appellant t
o private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him. Rathe
r, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody discover
ed his dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than enough to
show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private complainants was t
otally absent. Liza and Annas respective testimonies established that the appella
nt had sexual intercourse with them without their consent and against their will
. Considering that the victims accounts of what the appellant did to them were ab
solutely credible and believable, the trial court correctly convicted the appell
ant of several crimes of rape against the 12-yearold twins, Liza and Anna Paraga
s.
181 | P a g e

Anna May Vallejos 2007-0140


People v. Teodosio (GR. No. 97496)
Facts:
In a complaint filed against defendant-appellant Fernando Carreon, who was a 4th
year college student, Elaine Cesar, who was then only 12 years and 6 months old
, alleged therein that on December 19, 1985 Fernando raped her against her will.
According to her, she did not gave her consent to said incident as Fernando gav
e her softdrinks which made her unconscious and thus enable him to succeed in ha
ving carnal knowledge with her at the Champion Lodge Inn at Sta. Cruz Manila whe
re she was dragged forcefully by Fernando.
Fernando for his part denied in his answer that she forced her in having sexual
intercourse with him because according to him she agreed to go and stay with him
at Champion Lodge Inn.
Based on the record, it was undisputed that prior to the said incident, Fernando
and Elaine were together. Earlier that day he accompanied her to her Christmas
party at her school in Manila Central University in the morning; went to Luneta
Park and took a stroll; thereafter went to Cubao and ate at a fastfood restauran
t; then she accompanied him to his school at Lyceum where he took his examinatio
n; and then finally they went to Champion Lodge Inn where said incident took pla
ce.
After said incident, Elaine told it to her mother who, without wasting time, bro
ught her to PC Crime Laboratory for a physical examination, the result of which
revealed that she had a fresh laceration on her hymen. Based on said findings, a
complaint was filed against Fernando.
After arraignment, Fernando pleaded not guilty. In the meantime during her testi
mony before the court, Elaine admitted that she knew Fernando because they were
neighbors. She even admitted that they were sweethearts and that she had given h
im her photo, at the back of which, she had her personal message for him.
182 | P a g e

The trial court rendered a decision convicting accused of the offense charged. O
n appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision and imposed upon d
efendant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The case was brought to the Supreme
court through an automatic review.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court had proven the guilt of defendant for the crime o
f rape beyond reasonable doubt?
Whether or not defendant may be held liable for the crime of simple seduction?
Decision:
NO. The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to prove t
hat their coition was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the prosecutio
n, served to demolish the same.
Firstly, while Elaine claimed she was dragged to the hotel, her medical examinat
ion did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of any force on her. I
ndeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped during the
many hours they were together going from one place to another, but she did not.
She was enjoying their tryst.
Secondly, if she was really drugged she should have been given at least a blood
and urine test to determine if there were any remaining chemicals in her system.
This was not done.
Thirdly, after the incident, Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all. S
he did not show any sign of having had a traumatic experience. It was only when
her mother scolded her that she contrived her story.
Fourthly, in one part of her Sagot Salaysay submitted to the fiscal's office, sh
e said she did not accept the invitation of appellant for them to go to the Lune
ta. In another part thereof, she said she accepted the same. 6 In court, she sai
d she agreed to go to the Luneta and thereafter she said she was forced.
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She also stated in her Sagot Salaysay that she was only persuaded to give appell
ant her photograph and appellant dictated what she wrote thereon. In court she a
dmitted she gave the photograph to appellant and that appellant did not ask her
to write the dedication thereon.
Verily, the foregoing circumstances effectively disprove the theory of force and
involuntariness in the sexual interlude of the two.
What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their mutua
l desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and thus co
nsummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held liab
le for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair.
NO. Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Simple seduction. The seduct
ion of a woman who is
Art. 338.
single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of ag
e, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor. All the ele
ments of the offense are present. Frankly 1. 2. 3. 4. Elaine was over 12 and und
er 18 years of age. She is single and of good reputation. The offender had sexua
l intercourse with her. It was committed by deceit.
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully pe
rsuaded her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law tha
t attended the commission of the offense.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 4. Ju
dgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necess
arily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in
that which is proved.
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Unfortunately, the essential ingredients of simple seduction are not alleged nor
necessarily included in the offense charged in the information. The only elemen
ts of the offense alleged in the sworn complaint of the offended party are that
she is over 12 years of age when appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Thus, ap
pellant cannot be convicted even for simple seduction either.
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Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388


Art. 344: Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abducti
on, Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness
Beltran v. People (334 SCRA 106)
Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were legally married. After
24 years of marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity und
er Art. 36 of the Family Code. In her answer to said petition, Charmaine Felix a
lleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and cohabited with
a woman named Milagros. Felix then filed a criminal complaint for concubinage u
nder Art. 344 of the RPC against petitioner and his paramour. The City prosecuto
r of Makati found probable cause and ordered the filing of an information agains
t petitioner.
On the other hand, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of warrant of
arrest, filed a motion to defer proceedings. He argued that the pendency of the
civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage posed a prejudicial question t
o the determination of the criminal case of concubinage against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case of concubinage should be suspended on the groun
d of a prejudicial question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of marr
iage?
Decision:
The pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a p
rejudicial question to the concubinage case. Article 40 of the Civil Code provid
es that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purpo
ses of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previou
s marriage void. In view of this provision, it follows that for purposes other t
han remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. Therefore in a case for
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concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner, need not present a final j
udgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal c
ase of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declarin
g his marriage void.
A subsequent pronouncement that marriage is void from the beginning is not a def
ense in a concubinage case. He who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prose
cuted for concubinage.
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Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388


People v. Tipay (329 SCRA 52)
Facts:
Susan Pelaez, 15 years old, suffering from mild mental retardation and transient
psychotic illness, was assisted by her grandmother Flora Deguino to file a crim
inal complaint for the crime of rape against her stepfather named Romeo Tipay.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that the accused raped his stepdaughter S
usan several times whenever the latters mother and siblings were out of the house
. Susan was threatened by the accused that he would kill Susans family member if
she would tell anyone about it. One day, Susan complained to her grandmother tha
t her head was aching. Flora had Susan checked up by a midwife. The midwife foun
d out that Susan is 4-months pregnant and it was at this moment that Susan confi
ded to her grandmother that she was being raped by her stepfather.
Sometime in 1996, the lower court convicted the accused of the crime of rape und
er Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and sentenced the ac
cused to Death Penalty which caused the automatic review by the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave error when it convicted the accus
ed under a fatally defective complaint as it was Susans grandmother who filed the
same, when it should have been Marilyn (Susans mother), in accordance with Sec.
5 of the Rules of Court?
Whether or not the death penalty should be imposed?
Decision:
Under Sec. 5, par. 3 of Rule 110, where the offended party is a minor, her paren
ts, grandparents, or guardian may file the complaint. The right to file the
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action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all ot


her persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided. Ho
wever, with the advent of RA 8353, which reclassified rape as a crime against pe
rson and no longer a private crime, for which reason, the complaint can now be i
nstituted by any person. It is also worthy to note that in the case of People vs
. Estrebella, it was held that any technical defect in a complaint for rape woul
d be remedied by testimony showing the consent and willingness of the family of
the complainant who cannot give her consent (due to minority or mental retardati
on, for instance) to have the private offense publicly tried. In the case at bar
, Marilyn Deguino (complainants mother) herself requested Susans grandmother to ta
ke care of the case.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the trial court erred in imposing death pe
nalty on accused-appellant. In view of RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) applicabi
lity in the crime of rape, which imposes death penalty when the victim is under
18 years of age and the offender is her parent, ascendant, step-parent.. it is r
equired that the prosecution proved with certainty the fact that the victim was
under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposi
tion of death penalty. In the case at bar, the allegation in the complaint that
complainant is under 16 years of age when the crime was committed and that the a
ccused-appellant lack of denial in that regard is not sufficient to excuse the p
rosecution of its burden to prove said qualifying circumstance by competent evid
ence.
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Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388


Alonte v. Savellano (287 SCRA 245)
Facts:
Before the Supreme Court are consolidated petitions filed by Bayani M. Alonte an
d Buenaventura Concepcion which both assails the decision of the respondent Judg
e Maximo Savellano, Jr.., of the Regional Trial Court of Manila finding both pet
itioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
An information for rape was filed on December 5, 1996 against petitioners Alonte
(incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna) and the latters accomplice Concepcion based on
a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. Said information alleged that on or
about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna, accused Concepcion brought
Juvie-lyn to Alontes resthouse and left her to Alonte after receiving P1,000.00.
Alonte gave Juvie-lyn water to drink that made her dizzy and weak and against t
he latters will and consent raped her.
In 1996, Juvie-lyn, through her counsel, Atty. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Peti
tion for Change of Venue to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Re
gional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. The same has been approved on September 20,
1997. On the other hand, during the pendency of the petition for change of venu
e, Juvie-lyn, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desi
stance.
Meanwhile, in 1997, Atty. Casano on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the pet
ition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in vie
w of complainants affidavit of desistance. Upon arraignment on November 07 1997,
petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge. From November 10, 1997 to Decem
ber 10, 1997, petitioners filed five Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail to which the
respondent judge did not act on.
Accused were sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of Reclusion Perpetua f
or having been found guilty of the crime of rape.
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Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance filed by the offended party extinguis
hed the criminal liability of the accused?
Decision:
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the socalled "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case
once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so ear
lier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, li
ke any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation.
Paragraph 3 of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a prosecution for
seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint
made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in an
y case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons,
as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the
offended party pardons the offender after the case has been instituted, nor doe
s it order the dismissal of said case.
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Eileen S. Tan 2007-0027


Art.336: Acts of Lasciviousness
Amployo vs. People (457 SCRA 340)
Facts:
Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 or Child Abuse. Private comp
lainant Kristine Joy alleged that one morning, while she was walking to school,
Alvin approached her and placed his hand on her shoulder where it went down to h
er breast. Kristine Joy told her grandmother about it. Along with her mother and
grandmother, they went to DSWD to report the incident. The latter filed a compl
aint with the RTC. The latter rendered decision finding Alvin Amployo guilty of
the crime charged. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Amployo contends that th
e element of lewd design was not sufficiently proven. Furthermore, he posits tha
t even if lewd design was sufficiently proved, he must only be charged for the o
ffense of Acts of Lasciviousness and not Child Abuse.
Issue:
Whether or not Alvin Ampayo is guilty of Child Abuse under RA 7610?
Decision:
Yes. The term 'lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene. It is
characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is e
ntertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existe
nce of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention. The pres
ence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselv
es and the environmental circumstances.
In the present case it would have been easy to entertain the possibility that wh
at happened was merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is not the cas
e, however, as Alvin Ampayo did the very same act to Kristine Joy in the past. A
s to Alvins argument that human experience negates the presence of lewd design as
Kristine Joy had no developed breasts with which to entice him, human experienc
e has taught us painfully well that sexual misconduct defies
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categorization and what might be an unusual, unlikely or impossible sexual condu


ct for most might very well be the norm for some.
Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7610, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse
through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to
the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610. Thus, Alvi
n Ampayo is guilty for the crime of Child Abuse because the prosecution sufficie
ntly proved the elements of acts of lasciviousness.
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Eileen S. Tan 2007-0027


People vs. Collado (353 SCRA 381)
Facts:
Messeah confronted her mother about the sexual abuses she sustained from her dis
tant cousin, accused Jessie Ventura Collado who also lives with them in one roof
. Since Messeahs father was a seaman, their children were left in the care of Jes
sie. Messeah recounted four occasions where she was
molested. The first of which happened on 27 April 1993 when Jessie tied her on t
he bed and attempted to insert his penis to her vagina. When he was unsuccessful
, he then inserted the same to her anus.
The second instance happened on 5 June 1993 when Messeah was grabbed by Jessie a
nd dragged her upstairs. He told her to take off her shorts and panties, took of
f his shorts, pressed her legs apart with his two (2) legs, and rubbed his penis
against her thighs, until it touched her vagina.
On 7 July 1993, the third molestation occurred when Messeah and her brother Meth
eor were again left home with Jessie. Armed with a knife, Jessie forced Messeah
to sit on a chair. He took off her shorts and underwear and spread her legs. He
inserted and rubbed his penis between her thighs until it touched her vagina.
Another similar incident happened on 17 October 1993. While, Messeah was changin
g her clothes, Jessie entered the room and inserted his smallest finger into her
vagina. He then removed his pants and briefs and went on top of her but his pen
is was not able to touch her vagina because Messeah cried for help and Metheor c
ame and told Jessie to get away. After Messeahs parents learned about their daugh
ters ordeal they decided to file complaints against him for one (1) count of cons
ummated rape and three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness. RTC rendered decisi
on holding Jessie liable for statutory rape and 3 counts of acts of lasciviousne
ss.
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Isue:
Whether or not Jessie should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness and statu
tory rape?
Decision:
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3) cou
nts of acts of lasciviousness. However, RTC erred in sentencing him guilty for s
tatutory rape because he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness.
While Jessie succeeded in touching her genitalia with his private parts there wa
s no indication that it successfully penetrated at least the labia of the victim
.
We recall that during the first incident of 27 April 1993, accused-appellant tri
ed forcing his penis into her vagina, but when he failed in his first attempt, h
e inserted it into her anus instead. This could have been attempted rape, or eve
n consummated rape but the Complaint filed was only for acts of lasciviousness.
By then he must have realized that it was difficult to penetrate his victims sex
organ. Touching of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the penis s
lid into or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will on
ly result in either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
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Eileen S. Tan 2007-0027


Dulla vs. Court of Appeals (326 SCRA 32)
Facts:
An information for rape was filed against Nicanor Dulla. During the trial, it wa
s established that three year old Andrea Ortega came home crying with bruises on
her thighs saying that his uncle showed his penis to her. In her own words she
said inaano ako ni uncle while doing a pumping motion on her lower body. The medic
al report on Andrea showed that her hymen was still intact. Based on the foregoi
ng evidence, the trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness a
nd not of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of acts of lasciviousness and if so, whethe
r or not he should be convicted for the said crime even though the information a
lleged against him is for rape?
Decision:
Yes. The trial court correctly convicted petitioner of acts of lasciviousness. A
ndrea told the court that petitioners penis was never inserted in her vagina, nor
was there even a touching of her external organ by petitioners penis. There coul
d, therefore, be no rape.
Andrea Ortega recounted the event while she was on witness stand and was given f
ull credence by the trial court. The lewd design of petitioner is evident and, a
lthough the information filed was for the crime of rape, he can be convicted of
acts of lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape.
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Marie Joan Tusi 2007-0276


Art. 337: Qualified Seduction
People v. Javier (G.R. No. 126096)
Facts:
Julia Ratunil Javier, a 16-year old girl, was raped three times by her father, A
mado Sandrias Javier, one on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November, 1994 and
December, 1994, which resulted to Julias pregnancy.
Three complaints were filed. The trial court found Amado guilty of the crime of
incestuous rape in the first complaint and sentenced to death. Upon failure of t
he prosecution to prove the use of force by Amado in the second and third compla
ints, he was just convicted of qualified seduction.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction for qualified seduction is proper in the complaint
for the crime of rape?
Decision:
No. Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by accused, t
he latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the compla
int for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may b
e convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of forc
e by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise would
be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be
convicted of qualified seduction under the same information (People vs. Ramirez,
69 SCRA 144 [1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical
offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is carnal knowled
ge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects (Gonzales vs. Court
of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).
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What the trial court should have done was to dismiss the charges for rape in Cri
minal Cases No. 95-147 and 95-148, if indeed, in its opinion, the prosecution fa
iled to sufficiently establish the existence of force and intimidation, and orde
r instead the filing of the appropriate information. Be that as it may, this Cou
rt believes otherwise and is fully convinced that accused-appellant is guilty as
well of these two other counts of rape.
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Marie Joan Tusi 2007-0276


People v. Manansala (G.R. Nos. 110974-81)
Facts:
Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her father, a 4
4-year old taho vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991.
On direct examination, Jennifer testified that she was raped eight times in the t
aho factory in Tondo, the workplace of her father. On cross examination, however,
Jennifer changed her statement that the first rape incident was committed in th
e taho factory in Tondo but the rest of the seven rape incidents were committed in
Tarlac. She also mentioned that her father gave her money every time they had s
exual intercourse.
The trial court found Rodante Manansala guilty of having raped his daughter in M
anila but dismissed those committed in Tarlac on the ground of lack of jurisdict
ion.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly, the
crime of qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the vi
ctims statement?
Decision:
No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified seduction.
The inconsistencies on victims testimony for evidence cannot be dismissed as tri
vial. Trial courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be able to overco
me the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to just
ify the conviction of the accused. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own
evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the def
ense. As SC has said:
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Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categor
ical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribu
tion for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, bein
g interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape
charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and cir
cumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprote
ctive of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding pun
ishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humi
liation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equal
ly bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The prosecutions evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and cont
radictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1,
1991, the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on Nove
mber 2 and stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to ha
ve gone through a harrowing experience at the hands of her father but the follow
ing day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed with him. It is true th
e medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991 showed that she was no
longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact th
at she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime wa
s not rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of compl
ainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is especially true because she said s
he had been given money by her father everytime they had an intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that
it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected t
o sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What
is clear from complainants testimony is that although accusedappellant had had se
xual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or intimidation. Nor was the
rape made possible because of accused-appellants moral ascendancy over her, for
the fact is that accused-appellant was not living with them, having separated fr
om complainants mother in 1986.
Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was comm
itted by means of force, violence and intimidation, accused-appellant
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cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the const


itutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusat
ion against him. That charge does not include qualified seduction. Neither can q
ualified seduction include rape.
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Marie Joan Tusi 2007-0276


People v. Alvarez (G.R. No. L-34644)
Facts:
On June 6, 1969, Loreta T. dela Concepcion, a 13-year old girl, was raped by her
brother-in-law, Nicanor Alvarez.
Loreta narrated that the accused raped her in the presence of her sister (wife o
f the accused) while they were sleeping in the sala. Loreta resisted but she was
not able to shout because she was allegedly weak and tired. She told the incide
nt to her sister the following morning but the latter did not pay heed. She even
tually got pregnant and a child was born.
An Information was filed. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reason
able doubt of the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape or quite possibly, of the crime of
qualified seduction?
Decision:
SC acquitted the accused for the crime of rape but charged him of the crime of q
ualified seduction, the elements of which were included in the facts alleged in
the Information.
Viewed from human observation and experience not even a confirmed sex maniac wou
ld dare do his thing before the eyes of strangers, how much more for a healthy h
usband before the eyes of his very wife? Then, again, testimony that her sister
before whose very eyes the alleged raping incident took place did not lift a fin
ger to her, mocks at human sensibility. In the natural course of things, this pi
ece of evidence is repugnant to common experience and observation in that the na
tural reaction wife would be that of righteous indignation rather than passive [
acquiescence] and the natural response of a sister would be to protect the virtu
e of a younger sister from abuse of her husband.
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Our criminal law is not susceptible to such a reproach, it being clear from the
information that the elements of the crime of qualified seduction were included
in the facts alleged. He cannot be heard to complain thereafter that he is entit
led to complete acquittal. As a matter of fact, in his defense, rightfully given
credence by us, he did admit his having taken advantage of an inexperienced ado
lescent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have been bound by
the closest ties of affinity, considering also, as testified to by him, how clos
e she felt towards him. In the case of People v. Fontanilla, it is said that when
the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tu
tor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the
offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or
deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved. The seducti
on of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of
the persons enumerated in art. 337 is constitutive of the crime of qualified sed
uction, even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were
voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for
granted the existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and
punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple seduction, taking int
o account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse o
f confidence which implies deceit or fraud.
As early as 1908, in the leading case of United States v. Arlante, the penalty f
or qualified seduction was rightfully visited on an accused whose conduct was si
milar to the appellant. The facts, as set forth in the very able opinion of no l
ess than Chief Justice Arellano, reads as follows: "That the accused had carnall
y abused two orphan girls, relatives of his wife, who were sheltered in his hous
e; that they respectively gave birth to a boy and a girl, one of them on the 5th
of November, 1905, this being the one who files the complaint for seduction, an
d the other on the 15th of October of the same year, the latter appearing in the
case as a witness for the prosecution x x x x And even though the accused were
not, as a matter of fact, in charge of the keeping of the offended girl, it is b
eyond doubt that, as she was a domestic, the crime is included within paragraph
1 of said article. 'Upon the word domestic being employed in said legal provisio
n segregating it from that of a servant, the term is applied to persons usually
living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in t
his sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the
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term servant whereby a person serving another on a salary is designated; in this


manner, it has been properly used."
Nothing remains to be added except that in a situation like the present, where,
in keeping with Filipino mores, a younger sister is called upon to be of help to
those ahead of her and to stay, even if intermittently, in the latter's house,
especially so after marital ties are formed and children born, may give rise to
situations of this character considering that among the poorer elements of our s
ociety, all the members of a family are huddled together within briefest confine
s, and insistence on personal modesty and privacy is practically out of the ques
tion. If the ascendancy of a brother-in-law, instead, were used for moral purpos
es, then, certainly, there is more than a justification for adherence to the vie
w first announce in the landmark Arlante decision that thereby the offense quali
fied seduction was in fact committed.
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Katherine Yarte 2011-0296


Art. 342: Forcible Abduction
People vs. Egan (GR No. 139338)
Facts:
Lito Egan, alias Akiao, 36 years old, a Manobo was an avid admirer of a fellow M
anobo, Lenie Camad, 12 years old. Both are residents of Sitio Salaysay, Marilog,
Davao City.
On 6 January 1997, the accused appeared from nowhere and forcibly dragged and pu
shed Lenie towards Sition Dalag, Arakan, Cotabato. He threatened Lenie that he w
ould kill her should the latter resisted.
Jessica, the cousin of Lenie, who witnessed the abduction, informed Palmones Cam
ad, the father of Lenie regarding the incident.
For four (4) months, the datus attempted a customary settlement of the abduction
in accordance with Manobo traditions. In exchange of the hand of Lenie in marri
age, the accused agreed to give 2 horses to the family of Lenie. When the accuse
d failed to fulfill his promise, the father demanded the unconditional return of
his daughter to his custody.
Since the amicable settlement was not realized, Akiao forcibly relocated Lenie t
o Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where the latter was successfully rescued on
15 May 1997.
An Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed against the accused. A
fter several warrants of arrest and attempts to arrest him, he was finally arres
ted at Arakan, Cotabato.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial, accused t
ried to prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together under Manobo r
ites in the house of her father after he has given the family, the dowry. The ac
cused allegedly delivered the horse to the father, but was again refused when th
e
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latter increased the number of horses from one to two. The accused concluded tha
t because he failed to deliver two wild horses, the instant case was filed again
st him.
The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of forcib
le abduction with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Between the accused and the victim, whose version is more credible, more plausib
le and more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime charged?
Decision:
All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim who
is a young girl was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knifepoi
nt, she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her abode
. At her tender age, she could not be expected to physically resist considering
the fact that even her companion, Jessica, had to run home to escape accusedappe
llants wrath as he brandished a haunting knife.
The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will
was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs.
The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. I
t signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or tha
t which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by
the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the vict
im after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that
while Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirtysix (36) years old and although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the worl
d than she
Given the straightforward and candid testimony of Lenie and her father Palmones
as well as the absence of any motive to testify falsely against accusedappellant
, the logical conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part, and
their respective testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy
of full faith and credit
206 | P a g e

Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been engaged under
Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship was willful and vo
luntary. Proof of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two (2)
pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2) wild horses forthcom
ing, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in marriage. In moving fro
m one place to another to look for the horses which the old man Palmones had dem
anded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize his matrimonial aspiration
with Lenie. The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accus
edappellant which in reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If
they were, surely, Lenie would not have jeopardized their relationship by accus
ing him of having held her against her will and molesting her and, on top of it
all, by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could hav
e easily told her father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabo
uts that nothing untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal r
eaction would have been to cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with wh
om she had a passionate affair. But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in deno
uncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the disg
race that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father would
not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the
couple for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from captivity and
seeking the intervention of the datus in resolving the matter. Under the circum
stances, the criminal liability of accused-appellant is only for forcible abduct
ion under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. The sexual abuse which accused-app
ellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible abduct
ion and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot form the other
half of a complex crime since the record does not show that the principal purpo
se of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity and that her
abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the same. Surely it would no
t have been the case that accused-appellant would touch Lenie only once during h
er four (4)-month captivity, as she herself admitted, if his chief or primordial
intention had been to lay with her. Instead, what we discern from the evidence
is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and parcel of her forcible abdu
ction and shares equal importance with the other element of the crime which was
to remove the victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be an
d to take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of
207 | P a g e

accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but al
so to separate her from her family, especially from her father Palmones, clearly
tell-tale signs of forcible abduction
208 | P a g e

Katherine Yarte 2011-0296


People vs. Ablaneda (G.R. No. 131914)
Facts: On or about 7:00 oclock in the morning of February 18, 1993 at Barangay Ca
mambugan, Municipality of Daet, province of Camarines Norte and within the j the
accused-appellant Jaime Ablaneda, also known as Joey Capistrano with lewd desig
n did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct one Magdalena
Salas, a minor, 7 years old by bringing her to a small hut in a grassy place an
d while thereat, said accused, unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally, did then
and there have carnal knowledge of said Magdalena Salas against her will to her
damage and prejudice. At the arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the lower court found the the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable dou
bt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape
Issue:
Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused?
Decision:
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of th
e Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless
of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will
; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is co
mmitted by having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation, or when
the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve y
ears of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was tak
en against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by
accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena could not be ex
pected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of
209 | P a g e

accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical res
istance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. T
he employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especiall
y since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was rainin
g, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose was to
seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the takin
g advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds.
Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her wil
l was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in
forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim In the case
at bar, Magdalena testified in open court that accused-appellant inserted his pe
nis into her private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by th
e medical findings wherein it was found that the victim suffered from complete h
ymenal laceration. Whether or not she consented to the sexual contact is immater
ial considering that at the time thereof, she was below twelve years of age. Sex
with a girl below twelve years, regardless of whether she consented thereto or
not, constitutes statutory rape.
The findings of facts of the trial court, when supported by evidence on record,
are binding on this Court. No significant facts or circumstances were shown to h
ave been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, might substantially aff
ect the outcome of this case. Consequently, the trial courts conclusions and asse
ssments on the credibility of witness must be accorded respect on appeal The imp
osition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the crime of forcible abductio
n with rape committed in 1993, was correct. No qualifying or aggravating circums
tance was proven in this case and there was none alleged in the information.
However, the trial court erred in failing to award civil indemnity to the victim
. Whenever the crime of rape is committed, a civil indemnity is awarded to the v
ictim without necessity of proof or pleading, and the same is automatically gran
ted together with moral damages, generally in the amount of P50,000.00 each. In
this connection, the prayer of the Solicitor General that the civil indemnity be
increased to P75,000.00 cannot be granted, the same being contrary to jurisprud
ence In cases where the death penalty cannot be imposed, the civil indemnity is
reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00
210 | P a g e

Katherine Yarte 2011-0296


People vs. Sabrado (G.R. No. 126114)
Facts: Appellant is the uncle of Judeliza, the complainant. He is the younger br
other of her father.
Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy grabbed
and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her boa
rd a truck for Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuou
sly poked a knife under cover of his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by pa
ssenger motorboat to Placer, Masbate. Thence he brought her to Estampar, Cataing
an, Masbate, where they stayed at the house of Conchita Tipnit, Jimmy's sister a
nd Judeliza's aunt. Though aunt and niece did not know each other. In Estampar,
Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy, who severely mauled her until
she lost consciousness
On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assault
ed Judeliza. He covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. After satisfying
his lust, Jimmy inserted three fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pin
ched it. Judeliza screamed and cried for help. Their host, Roberto, was awakened
but could not do anything to assist her. Later, Jimmy struck Judeliza with a pi
ece of wood, rendering her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to the house
of his sister, Nilda Polloso, also at Cagba.
Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan condition and offered her medicine. Nild
a brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal.
After the initial police investigation, Judeliza was brought to Masbate Provinci
al Hospital, where she was confined for four days. The medico-legal officer exam
ined her.
An information for forcible abduction with rape was filed. The accused pleaded n
ot guilty. During the trial, accused admitted having sexual relations with Judel
iza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed that they were lovers and h
ad been engaging in sexual intimacies for three months before running away. He e
xplained that they had gone to Masbate after Judeliza had
211 | P a g e

revealed to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They then lived t
ogether as husband and wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked her but claimed
that he got mad at her after she confided that she really was his niece, contra
ry to what she earlier told him. He likewise admitted having pinched the victim'
s vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship. He claim
ed the instant case was filed against him because of the maltreatment she receiv
ed. Pedsc The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous
and his defense untenable. |The trial Court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape under Arti
cle 48 in relation to Article[s] 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code and is me
ted the extreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in its evaluation of the honesty of p
rivate complainant, in effect giving full weight and credence to the evidence of
the prosecution than that of the defense?
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in finding the accused appellant guil
ty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?
Decision:
There is no no reason to overturn the trial court's detailed evaluation of the e
vidence for both the prosecution and the defense. Complainant Judeliza's testimo
ny was given in a straightforward, clear, and convincing manner, which remained
consistent even under cross-examination. The trial court found her testimony bel
ievable and convincing, while appellant's version of events incredible and outra
geous. Moreover, as testified by the medico-legal officer, he found that her bod
y bore evidences of physical and sexual assault. Appellant's bare denial could n
ot prevail over said positive evidence
Appellant next insists that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was consens
ual, since they were sweethearts. A "sweetheart defense" should be substantiated
by some documentary and/or other evidence of the relationship .In this case, th
ere is no showing of mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete
212 | P a g e

proof of a romantic nature. Besides, as observed by the trial judge, it is contr


ary to human experience that a naive rural lass like Judeliza, barely nineteen y
ears old, would willingly consent to be her uncle's paramour. Nor, would he if h
e were indeed her sweetheart maltreat her repeatedly for no justifiable cause, w
ithout over-straining our credulity
The elements of forcible abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is any woma
n, regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is aga
inst her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. The prosecution'
s evidence clearly shows that the victim was forcibly taken at knifepoint from B
orbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation brought to various
towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That appellant was mov
ed by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having carnal knowledge of
private complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate
. While it may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and pen
alized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code was also committed, we are not t
otally disposed to convict appellant for the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape. When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is c
harged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecuti
on must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction,
as well as all the elements of the crime of rape. When appellant, using a blade
, forcibly took away complainant for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, as
in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the
crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.
The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as a
mended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape is committed
with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty r
anges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the bladed weapon already qua
lified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the crucial factor
in determining whether appellant should be meted the death penalty is the presen
ce of an aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of the crime. A
perusal of the record shows that none of the aggravating circumstances enumerate
d in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by the prosecut
ion. Where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
213 | P a g e

In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was his
niece, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Section 11 (1)
of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18 yea
rs of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relati
ve by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw
spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made to app
ly in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time the rape was committe
d, private complainant was already more than eighteen years of age. Second, the
information did not allege that offender and offended party were relatives withi
n the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven circumstances i
n R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic imposition of the death penalty part
ake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such should be alleged in t
he information to be appreciated as such. In view of the failure of the informat
ion to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation could not be taken
into account in considering the penalty to be imposed. For these reasons, the se
ntence on appellant should only be reclusion perpetua
214 | P a g e

Jm Sandino Imperial 2007-0297


Art. 349: Bigamy
Diego v. Castillo
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed against Regional Trial Court Judge Silveri
o Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal
case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
Said Administrative complaint stemmed from the Judgment of the aforementioned Ju
dge in the Bigamy case filed against Lucena Escoto by Jorge de Perio, Jr.
Prior that filing of the case, the Family District Court of Texas granted a decr
ee of Divorce on Lucena Escoto and Jorge de Perio, Jr.
Later on, Lucena Escoto (Cresencia Escoto, her adopted name) contracted marriage
with the brother of the complainant, Manuel P. Diego. After trial of the case o
f bigamy, respondent Judge acquitted the accused and stated that his main basis
was the good faith on the part of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Castillo should be administratively held liable for knowing
ly rendering an unjust judgment and for gross ignorance of the law?
Decision:
No, the court applied the case of Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr. which explained that:
a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order o
r decision he renders. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate
or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts
fraudulently or with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are called f
or as an imperative duty of this Court.
215 | P a g e

Jm Sandino Imperial 2007-0297


Abunado v. People
Facts:
Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceno on September 18, 1967. Salvador later co
ntracted a second marriage with Zenaida Binas. On May 18, 1995, a case for bigam
y was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
On May 18, 2001, the Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal convicted Salvador of the cr
ime of bigamy.
On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the ruling of the tri
al court appreciating the mitigating circumstance that the accuse s seventy six
years of age then.
Salvador avers that the information filed against him was defective as it stated
that the alleged bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it shoul
d have been 1989.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him?
Decision:
No, the statement in the information that the crime was committed in January 1995
was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that
petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Abunado on January 10, 1
989. Also, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information
during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before th
e Court of Appeals.
216 | P a g e

Jm Sandino Imperial 2007-0297


Cacho v. People
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete married on August 30, 1990.
On August 19, 1991, a decree of divorce by Ontario Court was granted unto them.
On October 4, 2992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
On September 321, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicail declaration of nu
llity of marriage in the trial court of Bohol, on the ground that no marriage ce
remony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appelant was charged with bigamy filed by the City Prosecut
or of Tagbilaran, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
On August 5, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Bohol convicted Lucio Morigo of t
he crime of bigamy.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals and the same affirmed the d
ecision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy?
Decision:
No, the first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have b
een legally married.
217 | P a g e

The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element
of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense can
not be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing offic
er. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
Under the aforementioned circumstance, the Court held that petitioner has not co
mmitted bigamy.
218 | P a g e

Alvin Ocampo 2011-0386


Title 13: Crimes against Honor
Art. 353: Libel
Fermin v. People (G.R. No. 157643)
Facts:
This is a case for Libel filed by a showbiz couple namely, Annabelle Rama Gutier
rez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C Tugas
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Brach 218. The two (2) cr
iminal informations uniformly read, as follows: That on or about the 14th day of
June, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused CRISTENELLI
SALAZAR FERMIN, publisher, and BOGS C. TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid
with offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas District, Quezon City, an
d circulated in Quezon City and other parts of Metro Manila and the whole countr
y, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, publ
icly and acting with malice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloni
ously print and circulate in the headline and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABL
OID issue of June 14, 1995 the following material, to wit:
MAS
MALAKING
HALAGA
ANG
NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI
ANNABELLE
IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA
DUN, BUKOD PA SA
NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA
219 | P a g e

ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHAN
AP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTO
S AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely
false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose sai
d ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to be
a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby causing dishonor, discredit and
contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and prejudice of t
he said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ. CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas both pleaded not guilt
y.
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint Deci
sions dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel.
Petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its Decision da
ted September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted Tuga
s on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Re
solution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.
220 | P a g e

Issues:
Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for liable?
Decision: The Supreme Court noted that, in the first issue, the CA erred in acqu
itting Tugas. It said that Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the publi
cation of the questioned article as was evident from his and petitioners Joint C
ounter-Affidavit and as gleaned from his testimony before the trial court, to wi
t: WITNESS: As editor-in-chief, I have no participation
in the writing of the questioned article and my only participation in the public
ation is the handling of the physical lay-outing, indication and allocation of t
ypesize of the body of the article, before the same was printed and published in
GOSSIP Tabloid
Q:
You do not deny the statements in this publication as executed by you in the cou
nteraffidavit and sworn in before the City
Prosecutor, is this correct? A: Yes, that is correct.
ATTY. ALENTAJAN:
That is all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT:
Do we get it right from you, if you were acting as you were, you will not allow
the said publication of this same article or same stories?
A:
If I were, if I was physically present, honestly I will because if you can see t
he article, your Honor, it is according to our source, it is not a direct commen
t.
221 | P a g e

COURT:
So whether you are there or not, [the] same article leading to them (sic) will s
till find its way to come out?
A:
Yes, your honor.
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which
provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or se
rial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in an
y part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were
the author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that acc
used was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that,
as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of
the matter contained in the said libelous article. In People v. Topacio and San
tiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Pena
l Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it was held that Article 360 incl
udes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be publ
ished, but also the person who prints or publishes it. Based on these cases, the
refore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offend
ing article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as
author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petiti
oner and Tugas are in this case. Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual p
articipation in the preparation and publication of the controversial article and
his approval thereof as it was written. Moreover, his alibi, which was consider
ed meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help C
linic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending
physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him from performing his w
ork. However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by the
appellate court in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of
the Supreme Court, But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial co
urt convicting Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afo
ul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy .
222 | P a g e

As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject articl
e in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by th
e mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comm
ent. The Supreme Court disagrees on her arguments by analyzing the libelous arti
cles, to wit: The banner headlines of the offending article read: KUNG TOTOONG NA
KATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA
NAGPUNTA!
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DU
N SI ANNABELLE! On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in
smaller but bold letters, are: HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL NAPAKARAM
I RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E, PIHADONG H
INDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG TAON
NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR
ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA
NOON SA AMERIKA, DUN SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA, SA PILIPINAS NOON. MILYON-MILYON ANG
INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circu
mstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or ju
ridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whet
her the statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
223 | P a g e

entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would n
aturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense. To say that the article, in its entirety,
is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones cons
cience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation (that the compl
ainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipi
nos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or
defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family re
turned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastr
el (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through
irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, consideri
ng that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified
and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants. Neither can pet
itioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of
the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against
public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public
figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fa
ll within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are
false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties or
irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may
give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered pub
lic figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people,
including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as petitioner, do n
ot have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminat
ely airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in p
rint, about their personal lives.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for libel
should be upheld.
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Alvin Ocampo 2011-0386


Magno v. People (G.R. No. 133896)
Facts:
This is a case for Libel committed by Dolores Magno on various occasions against
Cerelito T. Alejandro, the formers neighbor for almost 20 years at PucayVillage,
Marcos Highway, Baguio City.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In the afternoon of March 2, 1991, Cerelito, while at the upper portion of his h
ouse, saw Dolores write on the wall at the back of her garage the following word
s: 'Huag Burahin Bawal Dumaan Dito ang Maniac at Magnanakaw ng Aso katulad ni Ce
re Lito O. Cedring.
Feeling that he was the 'Cere', 'Lito or 'Cedring being alluded to, Cerelito rep
orted the matter to the local police and filed an affidavitcomplaint with the Fi
scal's Office.
Subsequently, or on March 9, 1991, at around 4:00 p.m., Rodelito, Cerelito's 16year old son, while on his way to buy bread at a nearby store, saw Dolores writi
ng something on her garage's extension wall with the use of a paint brush and re
d paint. In full, the writing reads: "HUAG BURAHIN BAWAL DUMAAN ANG SUSPETSOSA B
ASTOS AT
MAKAPAL NA MUKHA DITO LALO NA SA MANIAC AT MAGNANAKAW NG ASO KATULAD NI CERELITO
." After reading what was thus written, Rodelito proceeded with his errand and,
upon reaching home, related what he saw to his father.
Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to, Cerelito
lost no time in filing a complaint with the Baguio City Police (BCP). Pictures w
ere then taken of the aforesaid writing on the wall. Eventually, the Office of t
he City Prosecutor in Baguio, finding, following an investigation, probable caus
e for libel against Dolores, filed the corresponding information giving rise to
Criminal Case No. 8804-R.
225 | P a g e

Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito, Dolore
s, in the morning of March 15, 1991, went to the BCP sub-station to deliver her
3-page letter-answer written in yellow pad and addressed to the station subcomma
nder.
At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to and inst
ructed Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white, long,
ordinary envelope to Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the house
at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who immediately re
ad the three (3) separate letters contained in the envelope. Evelyn followed sui
t afterwards. Fe read the contents of the envelope upon reaching home late in th
e afternoon of March 15, 1991.
The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was addressed
to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the information in Cri
minal Case No. 8806-R, this unsigned letter reads: If your husband can't show any
proof of his makating dila then comply & if your husband can't understand this
simple English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig isang tukang pa
milya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya
kaming idamay sa kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng grasa sa
Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa
siyang marumi at putang ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng
tao.Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa pinangalingan namin.Siya ang
magnanakaw at
mandaraya.Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas ka
yo sa lote ninyo.Pinalakad ninyo ang mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo.Bago kayo
magsalita mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo muna ang sarili ninyo. Ma
s mukha pang magnanakaw ang asawa mo para malinaw.
The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following addendum
written in ink at the back page thereof which reads:
226 | P a g e

Ang tibay mo rin naman Mrs. Alejandro, makapal pa ang mukha mo at ikaw pa ang mag
papablotter sa akin para pagtakpan mo ang maniac mong asawa. Kailan mo masasabi
na pumasok sa bakuran mo para mamirhuesyo sa inyo. Tanga. The third letter, a pho
tocopy of Dolores signed letter dated March 15, 1991, to the Sub-Station 5 Comman
der of BCP purportedly in reply to the statement given by Fe Alejandro to the po
lice station on March 3, 1991, reads, in part, as follows:
The Sub Station Commander Sub-Station 5 Marcos Highway, B.C.
Dear sir:
cralawxxxxxxxxx
Allow me then to explain to you . . . why I call Mr. Alejandro a maniac.Pumasok
siya sa lote ko sa garahe na naging shelter (temporary) namin ng pamilya ko pagk
atapos ng lindol (3 weeks after) ng hatinggabi-lasing na lasing nakapaa, bukas a
ng zipper ng pantaloon nakayapak na walang sapin sa paa.Tulog na kami.We were aw
akened by the constant barking of my dogs.I have 3 native dogs but 1 was slaught
ered by Mr. Cerelito Alejandro '.He is even a dognapper. My Manang Louie can rel
ate the incident since we were out of the country x x x.I don't trust him as my
kapitbahay na bantay salakay.In simple tagalog
magnanakaw ng aso para may malamon dahil takaw na takaw at walang maibili.
It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Dolores was charged with libel un
der four (4) separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8803-R, 8804-R, 8805-R and 8806-R and raff
led to Branch 6 of the court.
227 | P a g e

Upon arraignment, Dolores, as accused, entered a plea of Not Guilty to each of t


he offenses charges in the four informations aforecited. Following a joint trial
, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1993, finding her guilty of
libel in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8804-R and 8806-R and sentencing her to suffe
r imprisonment and ordering her to indemnify the offended party a certain sum as
moral damages. In Criminal Cases Nos. 8803-R and 8805-R, however, she was acqui
tted.
On Appeal, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of th
e RTC. The appellate court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of Dol
ores Magno for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether Magno could be held liable for libel?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that to be liable for libel under Article 353 of the Revi
sed Penal Code, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegatio
n of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
There can be no quibbling about the defamatory nature of the written imputation
or allegations hurled against Cerelito. And the derogatory writings were obvious
ly made out of ill-will or revenge.The issue of defamation, malice or the identi
ty of the person defamed is not even raised in this recourse.
As earlier recited, the information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R arose out of wha
t Dolores wrote about the spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro contained in an unse
aled envelope and delivered, through Evelyn Arcartado, on March 15, 1991. Dolore
s contends that, from the time Evelyn was physically handed the unsealed envelop
e to the time the
228 | P a g e

latter turned it over to Cerelito, no one opened or read the offending letter co
ntained therein. Prescinding therefrom, Dolores argues against the existence of
libel, citing, for the purpose, American jurisprudence holding that "where libel
ous matter is communicated only to a person defamed and he voluntarily discloses
the contents of the libelous communication to others, the originator of the lib
el is not responsible for the
publication."Dolores argues that since the obnoxious letter was addressed to spo
uses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro, Fe was, insofar as Cerelito is concerned, not a
third person for purposes of publication. She further declares that to call the
husband (Cerelito) a thief in connection with a charge that he and his wife had
stolen goods, is not to speak words of defamation of him alone so as to make the
utterance in the presence of his wife a publication.
Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory matter, aft
er it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has be
en written. If the statement is sent straight to a person for whom it is written
there is no publication of it. The reason for this is that 'a communication of
the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though
it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has
of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him.
In People vs. Silvela, the Court ruled that sending an unsealed libelous letter
to the offended party constitutes publication. In the present case, there is no
dispute that the unsealed envelope containing the libelous letter was handed by
Dolores to Evelyn Arcartado. Contextually, there was a reasonable probability th
at the contents of the unsealed envelope, particularly the libelous letter, coul
d have been exposed to be read by Evelyn before delivering the same to Cerelito.
However, Evelyn categorically admitted not reading the letter at the first inst
ance, reading it only after securing Cerelito's permission.
Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute pu
blication, for the person to whom the letter is addressed is a third person in r
elation to its writer and the person defamed therein. Fe, the wife, is, in conte
xt, a third person to whom the publication was made. Finally, the Court cannot g
ive credence to Dolores' allegation that she is not the author of the unsigned l
ibelous letter. It cannot be overstressed that she herself handed the unsigned l
etter to Evelyn Arcartado with specific instructions
229 | P a g e

to give the same to Fe Alejandro. Likewise, the contents of the letters are basi
cally reiteration/elaborations of Dolores' previous writing on the wall and her
letter to the BCP Sub-Station commander. What the Court of Appeals said on this
point is basic common sense and deserving of acceptance.
The Supreme Court finds all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently esta
blished. Accordingly, the ascription of reversible errors on the part of the CA
and the trial court in adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two c
ounts of libel cannot be sustained.
230 | P a g e

Alvin Ocampo 2011-0386


Buatis v. People (G.R. No. 142509)
Facts:
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. JoseJ. Pieraz (Atty. P
ieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The lett
er was open, not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her h
usband's desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out
its content. It reads:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity, Metro Manila August 18, 1995 ATT
Y. JOSE J. PIERAZ Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy #8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subd
ivision Rosario , PasigCity, Metro Manila Subject: Anent your letter dated Augus
t 18, 1995 addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco Atty. Pieraz: This has referen
ce to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed
to our client; using carabao English.
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person
of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity, Metro
Manila--undersigned much to his regrets shall be
constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against you
.
You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the
law. Needless for you to cite specific
231 | P a g e

provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present c
ase. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of
Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all persons behind
these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in
any courts of justice, so as we can prove 'who is who once and for all.
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name; (Signed) JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR. Atty-in- Fact of the pre
sent Court Administrator of the entire Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodrig
uez Y. Reyes. Copy furnished: All concerned.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: 'Satan, senil
e, stupid, [E]nglish carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against a
ccused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only
of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: 'G
inagawa ka lang gago dito.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to
him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization 'Nagkakaisang Sam
ahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that
he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-co
mplainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had sign
ed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither coul
d he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated
232 | P a g e

August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit
which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr.
could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had s
ent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pi
eraz.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 1997 fi
nding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA which, in its Dec
ision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial
court.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated Marc
h 13, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of libel?
Decision:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious im
putation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omis
sion, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredi
t, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it m
ust be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is pu
blication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
233 | P a g e

defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person a
gainst whom it has been written. Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states
that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictate
d the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complai
ned of has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when foun
d in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply w
as addressed to respondent himself.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be const
rued in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense. For the purpose of
determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down
the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had th
e following to say on this point:In determining whether the specified matter is
libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously
applicable:(1)That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter su
ch a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which
the public would naturally understand what was uttered.(2)The published matter a
lleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disr
egard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being call
ed to account.The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the m
inds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanatio
n in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the s
ting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.ry
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August
18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using
234 | P a g e

words such as 'lousy', 'inutile', 'carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', t


he letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and re
putation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence al
iunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitione
r have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him
: 'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the gene
ral rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution nee
d not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law alrea
dy presumes that petitioner's imputation is malicious (malice in law). A reading
of petitioner's subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated res
pondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in t
he said letter which showed petitioner's good intention and justifiable motive f
or writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
Thus, the Supreme Court find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming t
he findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
235 | P a g e

Justiniano Quiza 2008-0290


Art. 358: Slander
Villanueva v. People (G.R. No. 160351)
Facts:
Petitioner Noel Villanueva was a member of the Municipal Council while private c
omplainant Yolanda C. Castro was the Municipal Vice Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac.
Sometime in September 1994, petitioner was filing an application for monetized l
eave for the approval of herein complainant. The application was not immediately
attended to by complainant as she was then busy dictating some important matter
s to her secretary. A heated argument then ensued between the complainant and th
e enraged defendant Villanueva. In the presence of several persons, defendant Vi
llanueva, in a loud voice and within hearing distance of everyone present, unlaw
fully, maliciously and feloniously uttered in a serious and insulting manner the
following words: "Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca man malinis, garapal ca" and "Balamu
mansanas cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat" (You are pret
ending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt;
you are like a red apple, but inside you are worm infested and extremely dirty)
.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty slight or serious oral defamation.
Decision:
Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation.
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The te
rm oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speakin
g of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation
, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. There is grave slander
236 | P a g e

when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation
depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal re
lations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surroun
ding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamator
y words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, g
rammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately,
but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship
between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the inte
ntion of the offender at the time.
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the positi
on of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against
the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vi
ce-Mayor. However, it should be noted that such scathing words were uttered by p
etitioner in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of A
ppeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the mon
etization of accrued leave credits of petitioner.
The rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken
in his favor. The slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight
slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of an
ger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a
light felony.
237 | P a g e

Justiniano Quiza 2008-0290


Caal v. People (G.R. No. 163181)
Facts:
Petitioner is accused of bringing private complainant Daylinda Caal, into discred
it, disrepute and contempt when he unlawfully and publicly speak and utter again
st her the following insulting words and expressions, to wit: AYAW MO KAHADLOK SA
TESTIGOS NI DAYLINDA KAY WALAY BANCA-AGAN, NAHADLOK KAW KANG DAYLINDA, NABUHI I
TON SA PANGAWAT, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT which if translated in English language
will mean (You afraid to the witness of Daylinda who had no how, why you afraid
to Daylinda, she live from stealing, she is a long time thieves) and other words
of similar imports.
Issue:
Whether or not statements of petitioner Caal constitute oral defamation?
Decision:
Yes. To say that Daylinda is a thief is irrefragably grave oral defamation. This
imputes to her a crime that is dishonorable or contemptuous.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicio
us, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making i
t is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication su
bject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar. Indeed, ca
lling Daylinda a thief is defamation against her character and reputation suffic
ient to cause her embarrassment and social humiliation.
238 | P a g e

Justiniano Quiza 2008-0290


Pader v. People (G.R. No. 139157)
Facts:
On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was conversin
g with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when
petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted Putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napaka
walanghiya mo! The latter was dumbfounded and
embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of Mor
ong, Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation?
Decision:
Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation.
In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability th
at defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon th
eir sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to pr
ove the intention of the offender at the time.
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory.
Considering,
however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight.
The parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttere
d the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by wha
t Atty. Escolango did when petitioners father died. In which case, the oral defam
ation was not of serious or insulting nature.
239 | P a g e

Alexander Santos 2006-0205


Title 14: Quasi-Offenses
Art. 365: Imprudence and Negligence
Loney vs. People (G.R. No. 152644)
Facts:
Petitioners are officers of Marcopper, a corporation engaged in mining in the pr
ovince of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the
tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In
a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the
Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B
), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of t
he Philippines ("PD 1067"), Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the Nati
onal Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), Section 108 of Republic Act No
. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), and Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Proper
ty.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the grounds that the Informations
were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense f
or a single act.
Issue:
Whether or not the charge of the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
"absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942?
240 | P a g e

Decision:
The petition has no merit, The Court had continuously ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provi
sions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one of
fense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no per
son shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense.
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established
is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac Ri
ver System without prior permit from the authorities concerned.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the
existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be establish
ed is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abid
e by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 o
f the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, neglig
ence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage t
o property. This element is not required under the previous laws.
The claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to s
ay that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067,
PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) o
r negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.
241 | P a g e

Alexander Santos 2006-0205


Abueva vs. People (G.R. No. 134387)
Facts:
Petitioner Teofilo Abueva y Cagasan was charged before the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, in an information of Reckless Imprudence resulting in homicide fo
r the death of Lourdes Mangruban qualified by petitioners failure to render or le
nd assistance on the spot to the victim such help as may be in the hands of the
accused to give.
The information alleged that petitioner drove and moved a passenger bus out of t
he terminal building even before Lourdes Mangruban, a passenger of said bus, cou
ld properly find and safely take her seat, and that as a direct result of said n
egligence, recklessness and carelessness, LOURDES MANGRUBAN fell down to the cem
ented pavement of the terminal road and sustained the injuries which caused her
death.
The facts showed that the victim, Lourdes Mangruban, fell rather than jumped off
the bus. The claim of the defense that the deceased jumped off the bus is incre
dible and contrary to human experience.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicid
e?
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance, that the offender failed to lend on
the spot to the injured parties such assistance as may be in his hands to give,
should be considered against the petitioner?
Decision:
Yes, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consi
sts in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
242 | P a g e

act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precauti
on on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking i
nto consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligen
ce; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, t
ime and place.
Petitioner herein is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the bus
company for 18 years and has undergone training courses and seminars to improve
his skills as a driver. He is expected to be well aware of his responsibilities
to his passengers. Not only must he make sure that they reach their destination
s on time, he must also ensure their safety while they are boarding, during the
entire trip, and upon disembarking from the vehicle.
Having failed to exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident, pe
titioners liability for the death of passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by th
e lower courts, must be sustained.
No, The records show that petitioner stated under oath that he alighted from the
bus and saw that several people were assisting the injured party and corroborat
ed by other witnesses.
The assistance required by Article 365, Revised Penal Code, is one which may be
in the hands of the offender to give. We must therefore take into consideration
the type and degree of assistance that the offender, at the time and place of th
e incident, is capable of giving.
Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is not a hit-and-run driver
. He exerted efforts to see to it that the victim had been attended to. There we
re several people assisting the victim, including his co-employees working for t
he bus company. The injured party was carried from the terminal, to a vehicle, t
hen to the hospital. Before petitioner was given clearance by the dispatcher to
leave, an hour later, he was assured that the victim was brought already to the
hospital. We note that petitioner had a bus full of passengers requiring also hi
s attention. He could only do so much, so that the burden of helping the injured
party was shared by the bus company personnel and other good Samaritans.
243 | P a g e

Alexander Santos 2006-0205


People v. De los Santos (G.R. No. 131588)
Facts:
GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated M
urder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in only one information filed with the Regi
onal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The information read that the accused d
riving an Isuzu Elf, hit and killed members of the Philippine National Police (P
NP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class 0795), wearing black T-sh
irts and black short pants, performing an "Endurance Run" of 35 kilometers comin
g from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, as a result thereof, some PNP mem
bers were killed on the spot, while another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Min
o, died few days after the incident, while eleven (11) other trainee/victims wer
e seriously wounded, and some sustained minor injuries.
After which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leav
ing behind the victims afore-enumerated helpless.
The trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder, multipl
e frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle
as the qualifying circumstance.
Issue:
Whether or not accused is guilty as charged?
Whether the filing of only one information for the offenses as charged is valid?
Decision:
No, from the convergence of circumstances, the court held that the tragic event
was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on
244 | P a g e

accused part. The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG the accused intention
ally rammed and hit the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that des
pite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of
applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along
the traffic scene. For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement
of accused vehicle to the confluence that the Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, w
as moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the truck would have still p
roceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a reduced speed, and woul
d have stopped only after a certain distance.
It is
more
ty of
ity
d.

a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or


explanations one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liabili
the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibil
the Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accuse

The court is convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the n
umber of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intent
ional felony.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where t
he assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in
determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to
be true.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby i
njury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a pr
udent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, fores
ee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course
or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failur
e to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before n
egligence can be held to exist. GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution a
nd liable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
245 | P a g e

Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather
the result of a single act of reckless driving, accused should be held guilty o
f the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with s
erious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitut
es two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary m
eans for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be i
mposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since
No, The slight physical injuries caused by the accused to the ten other victims
through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted
light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they
should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations shoul
d have, therefore, been filed.
However, It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multip
le frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial cou
rt. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplici
ty of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is
deemed to have waived such defect.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are c
harged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to i
t before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are cha
rged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
246 | P a g e

Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021


Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200)
Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Ester S. Garcia (G.R. No. 93833)
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon Ci
ty alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and fur
ious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrar
y to morals, good customs and public policy. The petitioner produced the verbati
m transcript on which civil case was based culled from a tape recording of the c
onfrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioners recording of the even
t and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illega
l, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for vio
lation of Republic Act 4200, entitled, An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tappi
ng and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Upon arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on the grou
nd that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The RTC granted the moti
on agreeing with petitioner. On February 9, 1990, respondent CA promulgated the
assailed decision declaring the trial courts order null and void. Hence, the inst
ant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of petitioner Ramirez in recording the assailed conversat
ion is covered by R. A. No. 4200?
Held:
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any perso
n, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly re
cord such communication by means of tape recorder. The law makes no
247 | P a g e

distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought


to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communi
cation. The statutes intent is to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recordings is underscored by the use of a qualifier any. Consequently, as responde
nt CA correctly concluded, even a person (privy) to a communication who records h
is private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. No 4200.
The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What
R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or record
ing private communications by means of devices enumerated therein. Mere allegati
on that an individual made a secret recording of private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Sec. 1 of R.A. 4
200. Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Sec.1 of R.A.
4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the wo
rd communication to a point of absurdity.
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and cir
cumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and th
e statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized recording of private communi
cations with the use of tape- recorders as among the acts punishable.
Petition is hereby denied.
248 | P a g e

Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021


Felipe Navarro vs. CA and People (G.R. No. 121087)
Facts:
It appears that, at around 8:40 in evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena
and Enrique Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena Ci
ty, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following rep
orts that it was showing nude dancers.
After the three had seated and ordered beer, a dancer appeared on stage and bega
n to perform a strip act. As the dancer removed her bra, Jalbuena took a picture
.
The floor manager, Dante Liquin, with security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jal
buena and demanded why he took picture. Jalbuena replied: wala kang pakialam, bec
ause this is my job. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun,
he ran out followed by his companions.
Jalbuena and his companion went to the police station to report the matter. Thre
e of the policemen on duty including Navarro, were having drinks in front of the
police station and they asked Jalbuena to join them. Jalbuena declined and went
to the desk officer, Sgt. Anonuevo, to report the incident. Liquin and Sioco ar
rived on a motorcycle.
Sioco and Liquin were met by Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around
fifteen minutes. Navarro turned to Jalbuena and pushing him to the wall, Navarr
o then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena
. At this point, Lingan intervened and said to Navarro: huwag namang ganyan, puma
rito kami para magpa blotter. Navarro replied: walang press, press, mag- sampu pa
kayo. He then turned to Sgt. Anonuevo and told him to make of record the behavio
ur of Jalbuena and Lingan. This angered Lingan, he said, Masyado kang mayabang al
isin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo. As Lingan was about to turn aw
ay, Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan
fell on
249 | P a g e

the floor, blood flowing. He tried to get up, but Navarro gave him a fist blow o
n he forehead which floored him. Unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record
on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
The RTC of Lucena City rendered decision finding Petitioner Navarro guilty beyon
d reasonable doubt of homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of th
e RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the tape recorder recorded by Jalbuena is admissible as evidence
in view of R.A. No. 4200 which prohibits wire tapping?
Held: Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made
. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides: x x
x Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was no
t private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is a
uthenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the c
onversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recor
ding; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speake
rs on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was t
hus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established : (1) that there was a heated e
xchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blott
er of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occu
rred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst
of it.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed.
250 | P a g e

Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021


Edgardo A. Gaanan vs. IAC and People (G.R. No. L- 69809)
Facts:
It appears that in the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pinto
r and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainants residenc
e discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault wh
ich they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his
office and advised him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his
regular lawyer is on a business trip. Appellant went to the said office.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to t
he telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate t
he conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
Complainant called up to ask Laconico if he was agreeable, the latter said yes.
Complainant told him to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. Com
plainant instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife. Laconico alerted his
friend Colonel Zulueta, insisted that complainant himself receive the money. Wh
en complainant received the money he was arrested by agents of the Philippine Co
nstabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard compl
ainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Lacon
ico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complaint for robbery/ extortion
which he filed against complainant. Since the appellant listened to the telephon
e conversation without complainants consent, complainant charged appellant and La
conico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act.
251 | P a g e

The trial court ruled that Gaanan and Laconico violated Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
The petitioner appealed to the appellate court. However the appellate court affi
rmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arr
angement under R.A. 4200?
Decision:
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, di
ctagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 as the use th
ereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of telephone line. The tel
ephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happen
ed to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction t
hat in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular cla
uses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated exp
ressions, but the whole and every part must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts. Hence, the phrase device or arrangement in Section 1 of RA 42
00, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to co
mprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use
of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of the telephone. It refe
rs to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party
or parties overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usag
e and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telep
hone conversation.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly
in favour of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whet
her or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase device or arrangement ,
the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly
be with the use of the enumerated devices in R.A. No. 4200 or others of
252 | P a g e

similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such
devices or arrangements.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The petitioner is Acquitted of the crime of
violation of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti- Wiretapping Act
.
253 | P a g e

Tablico, Sheryll G. 2008-0341


Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. 6539)
People v. Bustinera (G.R. No. 148233)
Facts:
Accused being then employed as one of the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an
Operator of several taxi cabs. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi
from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transports ga
rage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25
, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did no
t return it on the same day as he was supposed to. The following day, Cipriano w
ent to appellants house to ascertain why the taxi was not returned. Arriving at a
ppellants house, he did not find the taxi there, appellants wife telling him that
her husband had not yet arrived. Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the
Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing. The
trial court found appellant Luisito Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified theft for the unlawful taking of Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi. Hence, this ap
peal.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in convicting the accused-appellant for qualif
ied theft?
Decision:
No. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Rev
ised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that sai
d property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the t
aking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of per
sons or force upon things. Theft is qualified when any of the following circumst
ances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the thef
t is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either
a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists
254 | P a g e

of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occ
asion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, ve
hicular accident or civil disturbance.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taki
ng, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the lat
ter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking o
f a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consen
t of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by
using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Carnapp
ing is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of u
nlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. From the foregoi
ng, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, i
t is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which wou
ld apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned
in the anti-carnapping law.
255 | P a g e

Tablico, Sheryll G. 2008-0341


People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)
Facts:
Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, was approached by
Garcia and Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brand new Mitsubishi L300
van for their trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the van was
unavailable. Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purch
ased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX. Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Corte
z for two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe and Garcia, on the other
hand, rented the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.0
0 drivers fee. They agreed to pay the rental fee upon their return from Bicol. Co
rtez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacios Tamaraw FX at his residenc
e in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8
:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol.
However, four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez began t
o worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed
the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. It was later found out that the
two accused attempted to sell the vehicle. They stabbed and dumped Elis him alon
g the highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacan when Elis refused to join t
heir plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. The RTC found Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bern
abe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex crime of carnapping with h
omicide. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the crime charged?
Decision:
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carn
apping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor ve
hicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence a
gainst or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." More specific
ally, the elements of the crime are as follows: 1. That there is an
256 | P a g e

actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gain from the taki
ng of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offend
er himself; 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or t
hat the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of per
sons, or by using force upon things.
A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of c
arnapping were proved in this case. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that
the nature of the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful.
Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of taking the
vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an unlawful
one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the Moncada Pol
ice Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately
admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join t
heir plan to sell the vehicle.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted t
he crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and no
t the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property
through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully
divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required
is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession o
f the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderam
iento of personal property from another against the latter's will through violen
ce or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging
to another is imputable to the offender.
257 | P a g e

Tablico, Sheryll G. 2008-0341


People v. Lobitania (G.R. No. 142380)
Facts:
That on or about December 6, 1998, in the City or Urdaneta and within the jurisd
iction of this Honorable Court, accused SPO1 Danilo Lobitania with grave abuse o
f authority being a member of the Navotas PNP-NPD Command, Navotas, Metro Manila
, together with three still unidentified companions, armed with firearms by mean
s of force and intimidation with intent to gain, conspiring with one another, di
d, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry a
way one Yamaha motorized tricycle with Plate No. 2N-7910 owned by David Sarto an
d driven at the time by Alexander de Guzman against the latters will and without
his consent and on the occasion of the carnapping or by reason thereof, accused
with intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength conspir
ing with one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
box, hogtie, shoot and push out of the moving tricycle which caused the instanta
neous death of said Alexander de Guzman, to the damage and prejudice of his heir
s.
The trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant of the crime of ag
gravated carnapping with murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the cr
ime charged?
Decision:
Yes. After a thorough review of the records, we find that the prosecution was ab
le to prove that accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Based on the f
acts proven, the offense committed by accused-appellant is the special complex c
rime of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form under Section 1
4 of Republic Act No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended by Secti
on 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, the Death Penalty Law, which took effect on 31 D
ecember 1993.
258 | P a g e

In Section 2 of R. A. 6536 as amended, defines the crime of carnapping as the ta


king, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the l
atters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or b
y using force upon things. It becomes qualified when in the course of the commis
sion or on occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant of the carn
apped vehicle is killed or raped. When the carnapping is qualified, the penalty
imposable is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, all the elements w
ere duly proven by the prosecution. Based on the testimony of Sanchez, accused-a
ppellant and his companions shot the driver of the tricycle, abandoned him and t
ook possession of the vehicle. The testimony of Sanchez that the driver was unkn
own to the group clearly establishes the fact that the motive of accused-appella
nt was to steal the tricycle and that the killing of the driver was incidental t
hereto.
259 | P a g e

Ozelle Dedicatoria 2006-0406


Probation Law
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. People (G.R. No. 152044)
Facts:
The Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City rendered a decision against the peti
tioners Lagrosa and Baguin for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended (
The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest products witho
ut the requisite permits. They were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalt
y of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Peti
tioners Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, they appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the app
ellate court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modification a
s to the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of Prision Correccional, as
maximum. Said decision became final and executory. Petitioners filed an Applicat
ion for Probation with the trial court but it was denied. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certior
ari with the Court of Appeals but it the latter only affirmed the decision of th
e trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners should be allowed to apply for probation even if
they had already appealed the decision of the trial court?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that probation may be granted w
hether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
260 | P a g e

application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Under Section 9 (a
)
of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imp
risonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation. In the
case at bar, upon interposing an appeal petitioners should be precluded from se
eking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished
the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which i
s simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, al
though already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only a
fter failing in his appeal.
261 | P a g e

Ozelle Dedicatoria 2006-0406


Lilia Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203)
Facts:
Petitioner Vicoy was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of Tagbilaran City for violation of City Ordinance No. 365-B for peddling fish o
utside the Agora Public Market, and accordingly sentences her to suffer the pena
lty of a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of in
solvency. Also, she was found to be guilty for the crime of Resistance and Serio
us Disobedience to Agents of a Person in Authority, and accordingly sentences he
r to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of Arresto Mayor and to pay a fine o
f two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolve
ncy.
Thereafter, she filed an application for probation but later on, petitioner file
d a motion to withdraw her application for probation and simultaneously filed a
notice of appeal. The MTCC granted petitioners withdrawal of application for prob
ation but denied her notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. Petitio
ner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Consequently, pe
titioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court but it wa
s dismissed. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment rendered by the MTCC became final despite the withdr
awal of the application for probation?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It held that under Section 7, Rule 1
20, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal
case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally
in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976,
as amended), which in part provides that the filing of an application for probat
ion is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more
262 | P a g e

opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having
become final by the filing of an application for probation.
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Ozelle Dedicatoria 2006-0406


Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and People (G.R. No. 125108)
Facts:
Information was filed before the RTC of Dagupan against petitioner Pablo chargin
g her with a violation for BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law) for issuing and delivering
various checks to Nelson Mandap in partial payment of a loan she obtained from
the latter. When Mandap draw those checks from the bank, it was dishonored upon
presentment for payment because the current account of the petitioner had been c
losed. The trial court rendered its judgment convicting petitioner for the crime
charged, sentencing her to pay a fine and to serve a prison term of 30 days.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation. Her application was given due cour
se and was given a favorable evaluation upon recommendation of the local probati
on office. However, such recommendation was overruled by the National Probation
Office and denied petitioners application on the ground that she is disqualified
under Section 9 ( c ) of the Probation Law: c) those who have previously been co
nvicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less tha
n one month and one day and/or fine of not less than two hundred pesos. Responde
nt judge denied petitioners application for probation. Petitioner moved for recon
sideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in deny
ing petitioners application for probation on the ground of disqualification from
probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that Section 9 paragraph (c) is
in clear and plain language, to the effect that a person, who was previously co
nvicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less
264 | P a g e

than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos, is
disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is definitive an
d unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "pre
vious conviction" as referring to a conviction for a crime which is entirely dif
ferent from that for which the offender is applying for probation or a crime whi
ch arose out of a single act or transaction as petitioner would have the court t
o understand. As held in Rura vs. Lopea, the word previous" refers to conviction,
and not to commission of a crime.
It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore,
the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And when the meaning i
s clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for con
struction or interpretation.
265 | P a g e

Anna May Vallejos 2007-0140


Anti-Fencing Law
Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584)
Facts:
The private complainant in this case, Jovita Rodriquez, was the wife of the form
er mayor of Rodriguez Rizal and was engaged in business as a general contractor.
She and her husband own pieces of jewelry which they kept inside a locked cabin
et in a locked room in their main house. Aside from her family, she also had und
er her employ one Macario Linghon and the latters sister, Pacita, who was their h
ousehold helper charged with sweeping and cleaning the room periodically. Pacita
later on left her employ.
Sometime on August 1992, she was surprised to discover that the box where the je
welries were kept inside the cabinet were empty. There appears no indication how
ever that the lock of the cabinet was broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missin
g were one heart-shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet wit
h diamond stones worth P150,000; and a pair of diamond heartshaped earrings wort
h P400,000.
Believing that Pacita, her previous helper, had taken said jewelries, she filed
a complaint for theft against her and her mother Adoracion. When the latter was
invited to the police station, she admitted selling one pair of heart-shaped ear
rings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond ring, and
one ring with big and small stones to petitioner whom she identified as Mang Ernin
g. The amount she obtained from said sale, was, according to her, intended for h
er fathers operation and for food.
To confirm her admission, she accompanied the policemen to said Mang Erning, who
refused to cooperate with them at first when Pacita identified him as the one w
ho purchased the stolen jewelries. Despite his refusal, however, Jovita filed a
complaint for violation of PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law, against him. To strength
en her accusations against petitioner, she obtained the written testimony of the
policemen involved in the case and also convinced Macario to testify against hi
m as Macario had once sold jewelries to him.
266 | P a g e

In the meantime, the trial court found Pacita and her mother guilty beyond reaso
nable doubt of the crime of theft and PD 1612 respectively.
Subsequently, the trial court also rendered judgment in the case of petitioner a
nd found him also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating PD 1612.
Wasting no time, petitioner appealed the adverse decision to the Court of Appeal
s alleging that the lower court erred in not finding that the testimony of prose
cution witnesses are all hearsay evidence and that because of said failure, his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not sufficiently established. The court of App
eals however affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence the present appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Pacita in the crime of theft is sufficient to e
stablish petitioners conviction for violation of PD 1612?
Whether or not the prosecution based on the pieces of evidence presented was abl
e to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Decision:
No. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered t
he requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that
Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of he
r then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss t
hereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces
of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Br
anch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not constitut
e proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. T
here is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already
final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision in the instant ca
se.
267 | P a g e

No. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime o
f robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal o
r accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accuse
d knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of v
alue has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (
4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for anoth
er. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presump
tion of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article,
item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thef
t, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The sto
len property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosec
ution to prove the crime of fencing.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that the
prosecution proved the same beyond reasonable doubt based on the testimony of J
ovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that Pacita had con
fessed to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner; the joint
affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of the comp
laint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said investigation
; the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the testimonies of Paci
ta and her brother Macario during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case
No. 92-13841 before the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the transcripts of the st
enographic notes taken during the proceedings; the supplemental sworn statement
of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and, the testimony of M
acario before the trial court. First. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 19
92 and 2005, that Pacita had confessed to her that she had sold four pieces of j
ewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prov
e the truth of the said admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was no
t a party in the said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only part
ies to a case are bound by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case ar
e not bound by the judgment of said case.34 Jovita did not reiterate her testimo
ny in the said criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo. The prosecuti
on did not present
268 | P a g e

Pacita as witness therein to testify on the admission she purportedly made to Jo


vita; hence, the petitioner was not able to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is th
at the acts or declarations of a person are not admissible in evidence against a
third party.
Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary investigation in Criminal
Case No. 92-13841, as well as her supplemental affidavit, is, likewise, inadmis
sible against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. Th
e petitioner was, thus, deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cro
ssexamine a witness against him.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on August 23, 1992, Pacita pointed
to the petitioner, while the latter was having a drinking spree, as the person
who bought the subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence agains
t the petitioner. It is, likewise, corroborative of the testimony of Macario. Ho
wever, such testimony is admissible only to prove such fact - that Pacita pointe
d to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold the subject jewelry; it is in
admissible to prove the truth of Pacitas declaration to the policemen, that the p
etitioner was the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It must be stressed th
at the policemen had no personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more important
ly, Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. Indeed, the petitioner was depriv
ed of his right to cross-examine Pacita on the truth of what she told the police
men.
Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary inves
tigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 is admissible in evidence against the pet
itioner since he testified for the prosecution and was cross-examined on his tes
timony during the preliminary investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner purch
ased the jewelry from Macario and Pacita are the following: the testimony and af
fidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary
investigation and trial in the court a quo.
It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove fact
s and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have
known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves
269 | P a g e

two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; an
d, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crim
e, since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court
will fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People
v. Dator.
270 | P a g e

Anna May Vallejos 2007-0140


Tan v. People (GR No. 134298)
Facts:
Complainant Rosita Lim is a proprietor engaged in the business of manufacturing
propellers or spare parts for boats. She had under her employ petitioner-accused
, Manuelito Mendez, but later on left and went home to his province in Negros.
After his employment however, Rosita discovered that some of her inventories in
her business, amounting to P48,000, were missing. Suspecting that it was Manueli
to who took them, she informed Victor Sy, her nephew, who was in turn Manuelitos
uncle.
Acting on the matter, Victor had Manuel arrested and brought to Manila. However,
when asked about the incident, Manuel, after admitting the taking of the lost i
tems asked for forgiveness from Rosita and as a result the latter did not file a
complaint against him. Instead, she filed a complaint for violation of PD 1612,
against Ramon Tan, the petitioner, whom Manuel identified as the person with wh
om he had sold the stolen items for P13,000. Despite the filing of said complain
t, Rosita, however, failed to report the incident of theft with the police autho
rities.
In the meantime, Rosita, together with the confessed thief Manuelito, and the la
tters uncle, Victor Sy, all testified for the prosecution. Manuelito testified th
at it was Mr. Tan who had personally accepted the stolen items and paid him P13,
000.
For his part, Ramon Tan, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied all the charges, alleg
ing that while he is engaged in the selling hardware (marine spare parts) he did
not buy the stolen spare parts and that he never talked nor met Manuelito. The
trial court found him guilty of violating PD 1612. When he appealed, the Court o
f Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, hence the present appeal. Petitione
r argued that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable do
ubt hence he should be acquitted.
271 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution had sufficiently established the elements of fenc
ing as against the petitioner?
Decision: No. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or i
n any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he kno
ws, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the cri
me of robbery or theft. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have par
ticipated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved
in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecut
ed as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it was two (
2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal. P. D. No. 1612 was enac
ted to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes
of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft
could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612
. However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but bec
omes a principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robber
y and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distin
ct offenses. The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised
Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem
inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 cre
ates a presumption of fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty based on the va
lue of the property.
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential eleme
nts of the crime of fencing as follows:
272 | P a g e

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a pr
incipal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and s
ells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows
or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value ha
s been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There i
s on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Conseque
ntly, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the exi
stence of all the elements of the crime charged.
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the esse
ntial elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense. It is an
ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of crime
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9)
.
In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of
fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mende
z confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Ros
ita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that a
fter Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of
the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime.
It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private As complainant Rosita
Lim
complainant, but it cannot be without a victim.
reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a cr
ime of robbery or theft has been committed. There was no sufficient proof of the
unlawful taking of anothers property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an extrajudicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant
to petitioner.
273 | P a g e
However, an

admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in eviden


ce only against the person admitting or confessing. Even on this, if given extra
-judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the
admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. Her
e, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assist
ance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such extra
-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused. There must be corro
boration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt. Corpus del
icti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers
to the fact that the crime has been actually committed. The essential elements of
theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to anoth
er; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was do
ne without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished wit
hout violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De
Vera, 43 Phil. 1000). In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) tha
t the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taki
ng. In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did no
t complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. Sh
e sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole c
ertain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitione
r. convict, without evidence of corpus delicti. Such confession is insufficient
to
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have k
nown that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to kn
ow a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereo
f, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts
, or if he has something within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, suc
h knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its exi
stence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, th
e words should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intel
ligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a
mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the min
d of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must dete
rmine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two
equally plausible states of cognition or mental
274 | P a g e

awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional pre
sumption of innocence.
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilt
y of fencing .
275 | P a g e

Gil Acosta 2008-0085


Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405)
Facts:
Respondent herein, Arturo F. Pacificador was then the Chairman of the Board of t
he National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NSSC) , a GOCC and therefore making
respondent a public officer.
On Oct. 27, 1988 Pacificador and a certain Jose Marcelo were charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of R.A. NO. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft a
nd Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleges that on or about Dec. 6, 1975
to Jan. 6, 1976 Pacificador together with Mr. Marcelo who was then chairman of a
private corporation Philippine Smelters Corporation , conspired to cause the tr
ansfer and conveyance of parcels of land owned by the NSSC located in Camarines
Norte to the private corporation Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a
contract of sale. That in relation to that sale the Government was in a serious
disadvantage for the contract price of such land was only P 85, 144.50 compared
to the fairmarket value of P862,150.
The Deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of said province on May
Dec. 29, 1975
Pacificador main defense was that the crime charged had been extinguished by pre
scription.
Petitioner argument on the other hand was that the crime was not extinguished fi
rst on the ground that R.A. 3019 provides for its own prescription of 15 years.
2nd on the ground that the case should have been deemed discovered only on May 1
3, 1987, when a complaint was filed with the PCGG, hence the filing to the Sandi
ganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988 was well within the prescriptive period.Lastly, it is
the petitioners contention that respondent effectively prevented the discovery o
f the offense in such principles of prescription do not apply in this case. way
the ordinary
276 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not the crime has been extinguished by prescription?
Decision:
Yes. The SC answered herein petitioners argument in the negative. First the Sc h
eld that Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of offen
ses defined and penalized by special laws. Wherein it provides that Prescription
should begin from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings. In other words if the commission of the crime is known, th
e prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was discovered, and th
e running of the prescriptive period is tolled by the institution of judicial pr
oceeding.
In the case at bar Pacificador allegedly committed the acts from Dec. of 1975 to
Jan. of 1976. The Highcourt stated that the provision on R.A. 3019 in which cri
mes prescribed in 15 years could not be appreciated in this case because it seem
s to show that prior to the amendment of Sec. 11 of 3019 by B.P. 195 which was a
pproved on March, 1982, the prescriptive period then was only 10 years, wherefor
e it could not be applied on the ground that such amendment is not favourable to
the accused. The SC also held that while petitioners herein allegation of havin
g no knowledge of the crime, well entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that th
e registration of deeds in the public real registry is a notice thereof to the w
hole world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. Henc
e, even If the period of prescription is reckoned from Feb. 18, 1977, the crime
had already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the Sand
iganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988.
277 | P a g e

Gil Acosta 2008-0085


Rosalia M. Dugayon vs. People (G.R. No. 147333)
Facts:
Petitioner herein was the Assistant Regional Director of DSWD in Region 2. On Ju
ly 1989 DSWD Region 2 embarked on a project involving the procurement of 19 type
writer. Respondent herein served as the chairman of the Procurement Board in rel
ation to the abovementioned project. The Board prepared the Requisition for Equi
pment and Supplies (RES) for 19 typewriters, and then after submitted to Regiona
l Director Arafiles for approval which she approved. From the 4 bidders it was S
an Sebastian Marketing represented by Jessie Callangan, won the bid. After San S
ebastian completed its delivery of the 19 machines, supply officer Rogelio Hipol
ito also a member of the abovementioned board inspected and tested the typewrite
rs and certified that the machines are in compliance with the specifications giv
en by them.
However, upon pos-audit it was discovered that all the 19 typewriters were not b
rand new but merely rebuilt and reconditioned and thus failing to comply with th
e specification requirements. The petitioner together with Director Arafiles, Ca
llangan and Hipolito were charged for violation of section 3 ( e ) of the AntiGr
aft and Corrupt Practices Act. The sandiganbayan adjudged herein petitioner as g
uilty of the charge hence this petition to the Supreme Court.
Petitioners main contentions are that the elements of conspiracy were not establ
ished beyond reasonable ground and that there is no sufficient evidence to prove
the alleged crime.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner herein is guilty of the charge?
Decision:
Yes. Petitioners contention is untenable first on the issue of conspiracy, the r
eliance of petitioner to the ARIAS Doctrine must be answered in the
278 | P a g e

negative. Petitioners contention that all heads of offices have to rely to a reas
onable extent on their subordinate and on the good faith of those who prepare bi
ds, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations When however, that infraction c
onsists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on
a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear sense o
f conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail. Petitioner cannot seek
refuge in the cases of Magsuci and Arias when she relied on the recommendations
of her subordinates. Petitioner is an Assistant Regional Director, not the head
of office or the final approving authority whom the Arias doctrine is applicabl
e.
In relation to the second issue of sufficiency of evidence, the Supreme Court el
ucidated the main elements of the crime provided for in sec. 3 R.A. NO. 3019 cor
rupt practices of officers, these are 1. The accused are public officers or priv
ate persons charged in conspiracy with them 2. Said public officers commit the p
rohibited acts during the performance of their official duties as in relation to
their public position. 3. They caused undue injury to any party, whether the go
vernment or a private party 4. Such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benef
its, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. The public officers have ac
ted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
These requisites being attendant in this case, the SC held that indeed Petition
er is guilty with the crime.
279 | P a g e

Gil Acosta 2008-0085


Arturo A. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. L-51065-72)
Facts:
Petitioner herein Arturo Mejorda is a public officer, connected with the Office
of the Highway District Engineer of Pasig. His position in said office was a rig
ht of way agent of which his main duty was to negotiate property owners affected
by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them for damages incur
red by said owners
Sometime in Oct. or Nov. of 1977, Mejorada approached herein private respondents
and informed them that he could work out their claims for the value of their lo
ts and improvements affected by the widening of a certain highway in Pasig oh wh
ich their properties would be damaged in a certain way. Mejorada required said o
wners to sign blank copies of Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Val
ue of the Real Properties and Agreement to Demolish. Remove, and Reconstruct imp
rovements. However Mejorada for his part made it appear that the value of the re
spective properties were much higher than the actual price claimed by the owners
. Furthermore Mejorada , in relation to the improvements made it appear that the
declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as they were
registered in the names of other persons.
On the date on which the claims were to be encashed by herein private respondent
s, Mejorada accompanied them and personally assisted in the process of signing a
nd encashing the checks. Right after the claimants received the cash, accused Me
jorada accompanied them to his car were they were divested of the cash and was g
iven only the sum of P1,000.00 , stating to them that there were many who would
share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they
were afraid o0f the accused and his armed companions. Thus the complainants fil
ed a case against herein Petitioner Mejorada for violation of Section 3 ( e ) of
R.A. 3019 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
For his defense the main contention of the accused is that the element of damage
to the parties must have caused by the public officer in the discharge of
280 | P a g e

his official functions, in as much as when the damage to the complainants, he wa


s no longer discharging his official duties, therefore he is not liable for the
charge. Furthermore it was also the argument of the petitioner herein that the e
vidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of R.A. 3019 but that of
robbery.
Issue:
Whether or not Mejorada could be prosecuted of the crime punishable under Sectio
n 3 ( e ) of R.A. 3019?
Decision:
Yes. The SC Held that the first argument of the petitioner as stated above is de
void of merit. It was clearly established that the petitioner took advantage of
his position as right of way agent by making the claimants sign the aforemention
ed agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declara
tions of the value of the improvements and lots. There was
evident bad faith on the part of Mejorada when he inflated the values of the tru
e claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due
them.
The SC also answered the second argument of herein petitioner in the negative. T
he High Court stated that it was duly proven that through badfaith, petitioner c
ased damage to the claimants and the Government. The Manner by which the petitio
ner divested the private individuals of the compensation they received was part
of the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and i
nformed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of th
eir lots and improvements affected by the widening of the highway. The evidence
clearly establish a violation of Section 3 ( e ) of R.A. 3019
281 | P a g e

Lourizza Genabe 2008-0154


Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. 532)
People v. Pascual (G.R. No. 132870)
Facts:
On January 16, 1992, two men alighted from a taxi cab parked near a dead-end in
Purok Maligaya. Arnold Nuarin, the driver, came out of the cab asking for help a
s he had been stabbed. Nuarin's body was found by Andro Paglinawan's group and t
hey saw two men escaping. They ran after the two men and caught Olegario Pascual
. A bloody balisong knife was found in his
possession. Investigation revealed that Nuarin was robbed by Pascual and another
person identified as Johnny Bonglay. Nuarin was later stabbed who consequently
died.
Pascual was found guilty of the crime of violation of P.D. 532 or the Antihighwa
y Robbery Law. He appealed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Pascual is guilty of the violation of the Anti-Highway Robbery La
w?
Decision:
The court ruled that Pasual is liable for the crime of robbery with homicide and
not of the violation of P.D. 532. For a person to be convicted for highway robb
ery, it is required that there must be an organization of a group of persons for
the purpose of committing indiscriminate robbery. In the present case, no proof
was shown that a group was organized by Pascual and Bonglay to commit the robbe
ry. P.D. 532 punishes the commission of robbery of persons who travel from one p
lace to another, disturbing peace. In this case, there was a single act of robbe
ry and homicide committed by the accused.
282 | P a g e

Lourizza Genabe 2008-0154


People v. Reanzares (G.R. No. 130656)
Facts:
On May 10, 1994, Gregorio and Lilia Tactacan were on board their passenger jeepn
ey on their way to San Roque, Batangas from San Miguel, Batangas. Two unidentifi
ed men climbed their vehicle. One pointed a revolver at Gregorio and the other a
balisong on Lilia's neck. They were asked to pull over. Once they pulled over,
2 more persons, one identified as Armando Reanzares, approached the vehicle. Gre
gorio was gagged and blindfolded by one of the culprits. His hands and feet were
tied and his Seiko watch was taken. While the vehicle was driven by one of the
accused, he heard his wife beg for mercy and cry in pain. After which, he was to
ld not to move, then the culprits left. He untied himself and ran for help. When
he returned to the jeep, he found his wife in the passenger's seat, bloody and
her bag containing their earnings gone.
An Information for violation of P.D. 532 and another Information for violation o
f R.A. 6539 were filed against Reanzares. The Trial court found him guilty of Hi
ghway Robbery with homicide and Reanzares appealed.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
accused
is
liable
for
highway
robbery?
Decision:
The court held that the accused is not liable for highway robbery but of the spe
cial complex crime of robbery with homicide. For conviction under P.D. 532 to pr
osper, proof that several accused organized for the purpose of committing indisc
riminate robbery must be established. There was no proof, in this case, showing
that there was organization by several persons to commit this purpose. There was
only the establishment of a single act of robbery which is not contemplated und
er the law.
283 | P a g e

Lourizza Genabe 2008-0154


People v. Cerbito (G.R. No. 126397)
Facts:
On September 3, 1992, four men identified to be Daniel Mendoza Cerbito, Vicente
Mendoza Acedera, Jimboy Cerbito Morales, and John Doe boarded a Philippine Rabbi
t Bus at Eurobake. Daniel Cerbito, armed with a gun,
announced the hold-up. The four armed men proceeded to seize the passengers of t
heir money and belongings. A passenger, who happened to be a policeman, was shot
by one of the accused and, as a consequence, died.
The Trial Court found the accused guilty of violation of P.D. 532 and of homicid
e. It was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of violation of the Anti-Highway Robbery L
aw?
Decision:
The Court ruled that accused are guilty of highway robbery/brigandage under Sect
ion 2(e) of P.D. 532. As defined by law, brigandage is the taking of the propert
y of another using violence against or intimidation of persons or other unlawful
means. It is committed by any person against another on any Philippine Highway.
It must also be directed against any prospective victims and not only against s
pecific victims. In this case, the elements of highway robbery were proven and p
resent thus the accused are guilty of violation of P.D. 532.
284 | P a g e

Christine Perez 2006-0104


Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
People v. Bongcarawan (384 SCRA 525)
Facts:
Basher Bongcarawan was charged in violation of Sec. 16, Art. III of RA 6425 othe
rwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by RA 7659. On march 1
1, 1999 in M/V Ferry 5, a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin
no. 106 together with 5 members of the vessel security force came and told him t
hat he was suspected of stealing jewelry and was requested by the security to op
en his suitcase. Thereafter, a brown bag and small plastic packs containing whit
e crystalline substance was found inside his suitcase. When asked about the arti
cles, the accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alex Macapud
i to bring the suitcase to the latters brother in Iligan City. Trial Court held t
hat accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposes the penalty of Reclusi
on Perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against the accuse
d-appelant?
Decision:
The accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the metham
phetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his
consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonabl
e search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and
seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends t
hatPeople v. Marti is not applicable in this case because a vessel security pers
onnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possessi
on of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that
285 | P a g e

such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and co
nsciously possessed the said drug.
It has been ruled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evi
dence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of e
vidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To
overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evide
nce to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex"
Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support h
is claim.
286 | P a g e

Christine Perez 2006-0104


Suson v. People (494 SCRA 691)
Facts:
After conducting a surveillance, the Narcotic Team together with the Danao City
Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation on Teresita Susons house, Fortich w
as arrested and on the same date police authorities were able to apprehend Suson
and recovered the marked bills used in the said buy-bust operation.
3 cases were tried jointly in Branch 25, RTC of Danao City. Petitioners Suson an
d Fortich were charged with violation of sec.15, Art. 3 in relation to Sec. 21,
Art. 4 of RA 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also, Peti
tioner Suson together with Andres Camargo were charged with Illegal Possession o
f Shabu and Illegal Possession of Firearm.
Petitioners contend that there was no buy0bust and evidence of shabu and firearm
s allegedly confiscated in their house was planted. Trial court rendered a decis
ion that Petitioners Suson and Fortich is guilty of the crime of illegal sale of
shabu. However, acquits Suson and Andres Camargo of the crime of illegal posses
sion of shabu and firearms due to lack of sufficient evidence. CA affirmed the R
TCs decision. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime charged?
Decision:
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted
to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In every
prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs, the following ele
ments must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment t
herefor.
287 | P a g e

The recording of marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the ele
ments for the prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. The recording or nonrecordin
g thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as lon
g as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven. In the case at bar, S
PO2 Patio, the poseur-buyer, testified on the circumstances regarding the sale of
the shabu for which petitioners were charged and convicted.
Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the
absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosec
ution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug s
ubject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurispr
udence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation Wha
t is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the instant case, both were suffi
ciently shown by the prosecution.
Petitioners deny that a buy-bust operation took place and claim that the evidenc
e against them is planted evidence. Denial is a weak form of defense, particular
ly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence just like in th
e case before us.
288 | P a g e

Christine Perez 2006-0104


People v. Lagata (404 SCRA 671)
Facts:
Edelma Lagata was accused of having in her possession and control of shabu. Upon
arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. Accused-Appellant does not deny the fact t
hat at the time of her arrest she was in possession of the package which turned
out to contain shabu. But she denied knowledge of the contents of the package ha
nded to her by the unidentified man. Trial Court rendered accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659.
Issue:
Whether appellant is guilty of the crime charged against her?
Decision:
For one to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs,
the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is no
t authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the sa
id drug.
The prosecution failed to prove that she had knowledge of the contents of the pa
ckage. Thus, it cannot be said that she was caught in flagrante delicto, since s
he was not consciously committing a crime when the NBI agents accosted her.
We have held that possession of illegal drugs must be with knowledge of the accu
sed or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of
said articles. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Animu
s possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-tocase basis by ta
king into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as wel
l as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferr
ed from the attendant events in each particular case.
289 | P a g e

Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that appellant
s explanation of how she came into possession of the package without knowing tha
t it contained shabu is credible and sufficient to rebut the prima facie presump
tion of animus possidendi.
290 | P a g e

Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316


Illegal Possession of Firearms/Explosives Law (R.A. 8294)
Sayco v. People (G.R. No. 159703)
Facts:
Sayco a confidential civilian agent of the AFP was found guilty of illegal posse
ssion of firearms and ammunitions under the provisions of PD 1866 as amended by
RA 8294. Sayco committed the crime by possessing and carrying a 9MM caliber with
14 live ammunitions while in Bais City visiting and attending to a family emerg
ency. The court found him guilty as charged on the ground that that the possessi
on and carrying of the aforementioned firearm and ammunitions was without proper
license and authority. Sayco, without denying possession of the same, insisted
that he had the requisite permits for having been issued a Memorandum Receipt an
d a Mission Order by the Commanding Officer of the Philippine Army. However, the
court said that Memorandum Receipts and
Mission Orders do not constitute the license required by law for these were not
issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit, who is the one authorized by law
to issue the required license. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Saycos
reliance in good faith on the said documents is not a valid defense in the crime
of illegal possession of firearms.
RTC affirmed the conviction but lowered the penalty imposed.
CA
likewise denied Saycos petition for review as well as its Motion for Reconsiderat
ion, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute sufficient au
thority to possess and carry firearms and ammunitions required by PD 1866 as ame
nded by RA 8294.
Decision:
No, they are not, for it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum receipt an
d mission order cannot take the place of a duly issued firearms license
291 | P a g e

and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke good faith as a defens
e against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms as this is a malum pr
ohibitum. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is t
he accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as posse
ssion itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the pros
ecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused w
ho owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to po
ssess or carry the same.
Sayco, a mere confidential civilian agent (as defined under Section 6(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866) is not authorized to receiv
e the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The
memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did not l
egitimize his possession thereof. Neither was Sayco authorized to bear the subje
ct firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission order issued to
petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a mer
e confidential civilian agent. Worse, he was not even acting as such confidentia
l civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject firearm and ammunitions
. While this Court sustains the conviction for illegal possession of firearms, a
further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision i
n the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to crimes penalized by a special law
. RA 8294, amending PD 1866, lowered the penalty to be imposed provided no other
crime was committed.
There being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and considering
that Sayco accepted the subject firearm and ammunitions from the government und
er the erroneous notion that the memorandum receipt and mission order issued to
him legitimized the possession thereof, Sayco is sentenced to serve an indetermi
nate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correc
cional as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days o
f prision correccional as maximum.
292 | P a g e

Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316


People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)
Facts:
Comadre et al. were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder through
conspiracy, treachery, and use of an explosive . The accused
committed the crime by lobbing a hand grenade over the roof of the house of the
Agbanlogs that eventually exploded, killing Robert Agbanlog and injuring 6 others
. After trial, the court a quo convicted Comadre et al. of the complex crime of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder sentencing them to suffer the penalty of d
eath, hence this automatic review.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the l
atter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprude
nce support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mod
e of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the
offense instead of treachery, which will then be relegated merely as a generic
aggravating circumstance.
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No. 8294 which
also considers the use of explosives as an aggravating circumstance, there is a
need to make the necessary clarification insofar as the legal implications of th
e said amendatory law vis--vis the qualifying circumstance of by means of explosio
n under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code are concerned. Corollary thereto is
the issue of which law should be applied in the instant case. R.A. 8294 was ena
cted, to lower their penalties (as conspicuously reflected in the reduction of t
he corresponding penalties for illegal possession of firearms, or ammunitions an
d other related crimes under the amendatory law including the penalties for unla
wful possession of explosives) in order to rationalize them into more acceptable
and realistic levels, and this is therefore favorable to the accused. Specifica
lly, when the illegally possessed explosives are used to commit any of the crime
s under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the death of a person, the penal
ty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only
as an aggravating circumstance. Congress likewise clearly intended RA No. 8294 t
o consider as aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal p
ossession of firearms and
293 | P a g e

explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised
Penal Code. It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the
definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an
aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing any of the crimes define
d in the Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is to do away with the use o
f explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating circ
umstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Cod
e. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the
aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Li
ke the aggravating circumstance of explosion in paragraph 12, evident premeditation
in paragraph 13, or treachery in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating c
ircumstance added by RA No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Art
icle 248.
Issue:
Whether or not the killing be qualified by explosion under Art. 248 of the Revis
ed Penal Code or by the use of an explosive under the provisions of RA 8294?
Decision:
R.A. 8294 is inapplicable in the instant case and thus what may be properly cons
idered, the accused-appellant having been sufficiently informed of the nature of
the accusation against them, the crime is Murder committed by means of explosion
in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.
R.A. No. 8294, even though favorable to the accused, cannot be made applicable i
n this case because before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be pro
perly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately establis
hed that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without th
e corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows the same requisites
in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, which is
a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not ob
tain in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the information, no evi
dence was also adduced by the prosecution to show that the possession by Comadre
of the explosive was unlawful. What the
294 | P a g e

law emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. What is per se aggravating is the u
se of unlawfully manufactured or possessed explosives. The mere use of explosives
is not.
295 | P a g e

Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316


People v. Tadeo (G.R. Nos. 127660 & 144011-12)
Facts: Michael Tadeo was charged of 3 distinct and separate crimes of 1) murder
for the fatal shooting of Mayolito Cabatu, 2) frustrated murder for the injury s
ustained by Florencia, and 3) qualified illegal possession of firearm, same fire
arm having been used in the two (2) formerly mentioned crimes.
After trial, the court a quo convicted Tadeo of the crimes charged and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua for murder; an indeterminate prison term of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (
10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum, for frustrated
murder; reclusion perpetua for qualified illegal possession of firearms.
Tadeo appealed not to challenge the finding of the trial court that he killed Ma
yolito Cabatu and injured his mother Florencia Cabatu, nor that he was the posse
ssor of the .38 cal. revolver, but questions among others his conviction of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms despite the absence of any evidence indi
cating that the gun he used was unlicensed.
The Solicitor General agrees with Tadeo that his verdict in the qualified illega
l possession of firearm is incorrect hence must be reversed and set aside.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction for qualified illegal possession of firearms is pr
oper?
Decision:
The conviction of Tadeo in the case for qualified illegal possession firearm use
d in perpetrating the homicide and attempted homicide must be reversed and set a
side, as a result of the decriminalization of violations of PD 1866 by RA 8294 w
here the unlicensed firearm is used in carrying out the commission of
296 | P a g e

other crimes. These amendments obviously blur the distinctions between murder an
d homicide on one hand, and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in mur
der or homicide on the other. We have declared that the formulation in RA 8294,
i.e., "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firear
m, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circu
mstance," signifies a legislative intent to treat as a single offense the illega
l possession of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the use o
f an unlicensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in com
mitting homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the
two (2) separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal Code an
d qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under PD 1
866; in other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for ill
egal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a spe
cial aggravating circumstance.
The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be considered however as a special aggra
vating circumstance in the Murder Case and Frustrated Murder Case. For one, it w
as not alleged as an aggravating circumstance in
the Informations for murder and frustrated murder, which is necessary under our
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, even if alleged, the circ
umstance cannot be retroactively applied to prejudice accused-appellant; it must
be stressed that RA 8294 took effect only on 6 July 1994 while the crimes invol
ved herein were committed on 4 November 1993. In any event there is no evidence
proving the illicit character of the .38 cal. revolver used by accusedappellant
in killing Mayolito Cabatu and in trying to kill Florencia Cabatu, as to which r
equisite of the crime the record is eerily silent.
297 | P a g e

Jasmine Calaycay 2005-0049


Anti Fencing Law (P.D. 1612)
Francisco v. People (G.R. No. 146584)
Facts:
Jovita Rodriguez was engaged in business as a general contractor. Macario Lingho
n was one of her workers. She and her husband acquired several pieces of jewelry
which were placed inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house.
Pacita Linghon, Macarios sister, was hired as one of their household helpers som
etime in February 1989. Pacita swept and cleaned the room periodically. However,
she left the employ of the Rodriguez family, sometime in May 1991.
Sometime in October 1991, Pacita contacted her brother Macario and asked him to
sell some pieces of jewelry owned by a friend of hers. Macario agreed and went t
o the shop of petitioner Ernesto "Erning" Francisco in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Maca
rio offered to sell to Ernesto two rings and one bracelet where Ernesto agreed t
o buy the jewelry and paid the amount of P25,000 to Macario. Another transaction
happened in November 199 where Macario offered to sell to Ernesto a pair of ear
rings for P18,000. The latter agreed and paid Macario said amount. After these t
ransactions, Macario saw the petitioner in his shop for about five to six more t
imes and received some amounts.
Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was shocked when she found out that the box co
ntaining her jewelry was empty. She noticed that the lock to the cabinet was not
broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missing were one pair of diamond heart-shap
ed earrings worth P400,000; one heart-shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one wh
ite gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and one ring with a small
diamond stone worth P5,000. She suspected that it was Pacita who stole her jewel
ry.
Jovita filed a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother Adoracion Lingh
on. Police investigators invited Pacita and Adoracion to Camp Crame, Quezon City
, for investigation. Pacita arrived in Camp Crame without counsel
298 | P a g e

and gave a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as the person to whom she
sold Jovitas jewelry. Thus, petitioner was invited for questioning in Camp Crame.
Nonetheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft and Adoracion was also cha
rged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).
A criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1612 was f
iled. During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario testified that th
ey sold pieces of jewelry to the petitioner at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
The court found probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for
his arrest. Thereafter, an Information was filed with the RTC charging the
petitioner with violating P.D. No. 1612.
Judgment was rendered finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty of fen
cing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable doubt.
While the trial court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond rea
sonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1612, which was affirmed by the Court of App
eals.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the pet
itioner guilty for violation of the Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise know
n as the Anti-Fencing Law?
Decision:
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of ro
bbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or ac
complice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, pos
sesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in a
ny manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has bee
n derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused kn
ew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) t
here is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
299 | P a g e

In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelr
y was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from
which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property s
old to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove
one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court
to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on
the value of the property.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption
of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, ite
m, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, a
nd prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The stolen pr
operty subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely
corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution
to prove the crime of fencing.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Decision of the trial cour
t is reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violati
ng P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonabl
e doubt.
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Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204


Anti-Bouning Checks Law (B.P. 22)
Marigomen v. People (G.R. No. 153451)
Facts:
Petitioner was the finance officer of INSURECO, who was granted a credit line to
purchase gasoline and lubricants from Caltex. The latter has agreed to accept p
ost dated checks from INSURECO to pay for its purchases from them. When presente
d to the bank, they were dishonoured by reason of being drawn against insufficien
t funds and account closed , respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. 22
?
Decision:
For violation of B.P. 22 to be committed, the prosecution must prove the followi
ng essential elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to app
ly for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer t
hat at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the dra
wee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
It is difficult for the prosecution to prove the second element of the crime bec
ause the knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time o
f issue he does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such checks in full upon its presentation is a state of the mind. Ho
wever, Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides that if the prosecution proves that the mak
ing, drawing and issuing of a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee b
ank because of insufficiency of funds or credit with the said bank within 90 day
s from the date of the check, such shall be prima facie evidence of the
301 | P a g e

second element of the crime. The drawee or maker of the check may overcome the p
rima facie evidence, either by paying the amount of the check, or by making arra
ngements for its payment in full within five banking days after receipt of notic
e that such check was not paid by the drawee bank.
The ruling of the Court in Lao v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case. I
n acquitting the petitioner therein, the Court explained that this statute actua
lly offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some act, which o
perates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action
is abated. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check w
ithin five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence
of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to precl
ude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on the peti
tioner. The petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairnes
s require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her
to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.
Moreover, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal notice is not enou
gh. This is because while Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state that the notice of
dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the la
w, i.e., that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee b
ank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or re
fusal, a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for co
nviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter o
f the
Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only
that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accus
ed has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The
consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Thus, if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of disho
nor to the said corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew or
issued the check for and in its behalf. The Court explained in Lao v. Court of
Appeals, that there was no obligation to forward the notice addressed to it to t
he employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself incurs no crimi
nal liability under BP 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility u
nder B.P. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice
of
302 | P a g e

dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is n


ot enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it is the petitioner, as an officer
of the corporation, who is the latters agent for purposes of receiving notices an
d other documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice
to the corporation, which has a personality distinct and separate from the peti
tioner, does not constitute notice to the latter.
In this case, the prosecution failed to present any employee of the PT&T to prov
e that the telegrams from the offended party were in fact transmitted to INSUREC
O and that the latter received the same. Furthermore, there is no
evidence on record that the petitioner ever received the said telegrams from INS
URECO, or that separate copies thereof were transmitted to and received by the p
etitioner. In fine, the respondent failed to prove the second element of the cri
me. Hence, the petitioner should be acquitted of the crimes charged.
303 | P a g e

Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204


Sycip v. CA (328 SCRA 447)
Facts:
Petitioner agreed to buy, on installment, from FRC, a townhouse unit in the latt
ers project at Cavite. Upon execution of the contract to sell, as required, issue
d to FRC, 48 postdated checks, each in the amount of Php 9,304.00, covering 48 m
onthly installments.
After moving in his unit, petitioner complained, to FRC regarding defects in the
unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complain
t. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two 2 notorial notices to the effect that h
e was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with th
e project plans and specifications, as approved by the HLURB. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defect, but FRC
was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse pro
ject. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects.
Notwithstanding the notorial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment pe
titioners postdated checks in its possession. Petitioner sent stop payment orders t
o the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank
as the due date fell, the bank advised petitioner to close his checking account
to avoid paying bank charges every time he made a stop payment order on the forth
coming checks. Due to the closure of petitioners checking account, the drawee ban
k dishonored six postdated checks. FRC file a complaint against petitioner for v
iolations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for violation of B.P. 22?
304 | P a g e

Decision:
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an offense is com
mitted when the following elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for va
lue (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the paym
ent of such check in full upon its presentment; and (4) the subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the ba
nk to stop payment.
In this case, the Court found that although the first element of the offense exi
sts, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer a
t the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit i
n the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presu
mption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first an
d third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted.
If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor
of the issue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such k
nowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from th
e dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption canno
t hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the othe
r party has presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosec
ution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merel
y rely on a rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means
that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not
that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this case w
ere issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. Bu
t we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, pet
itioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficie
nt to cover them when presented for encashment. On the contrary, there
305 | P a g e

is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he ha


d P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this
case, would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction under t
he law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense must be proved bey
ond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly c
onstrued against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Boun
cing Checks Law, the punishable act must come clearly within both the spirit and
letter of the statute.
306 | P a g e

Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204


Recuerdo v. People (G.R. No. 133036)
Facts:
Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she i
ssued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonore
d by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments
, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorar
i, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not B.P. 22 is unconstitutional?
Decision:
A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has t
he same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22,
which is explicit that any person who makes or draws and issues any check to appl
y for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not hav
e sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subseq
uently dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment.
B.P. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned
by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability
and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is
a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for wh
ich checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an
appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made
It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the d
rawee banks representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks
because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did in thi
s case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the
307 | P a g e

offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she depo
sited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received from t
he bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation drawn against insufficient fun
ds stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a notice
attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the complainant, and that petit
ioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or make arrangements for
their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.
308 | P a g e

Winny Mahor 2008-0306


Art. 294(B): Robbery with Rape
People v. Moreno
Facts:
Accused Moreno, Deloria and Maniquez robbed the Mohnani spouses. Deloria raped h
ousehelp Narcisa while Maniquez raped househelp Mary Ann. Moreno was convicted o
f robbery while Deloria and Maniquez, robbery with rape.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in ruling that Moreno was guilty of the crime of robbery
only?
Decision:
No, the ruling of the court is correct. Moreno took no part in the rape thus he
is guilty of robbery only.
The special complex crime of robbery with rape defined in Article 293 in relatio
n to paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, employs t
he clause "when the robbery shall have been accompanied with rape." In other wor
ds, to be liable for such crime, the offender must have the intent to take the p
ersonal property of another under circumstances that makes the taking one of rob
bery, and such intent must precede the rape. If the original plan was to commit
rape, but the accused after committing the rape also committed robbery when the
opportunity presented itself, the robbery should be viewed as a separate and dis
tinct crime.
309 | P a g e

Winny Mahor 2008-0306


People v. Domingo (383 SCRA 43)
Facts:
Appellant Domingo Temporal, Pedro, Valdez, and Rivera went to the house of Spous
es Valentin and Clara Gabertan, armed with a piece of bamboo, 2x2 piece of wood,
ipil-ipil posts and bolo, They assaulted and clubbed Valentin with their weapon
s, weakening and injuring him. Eventually they stole from the Gabertan spouses c
ash in the amount of P5,350.00, 1 ladies gold Seiko watch, 9 turkeys, and 2 chic
kens. Thereafter, while Rivera guarded Valentin, the four accused took turns in
raping Carla outside the house where she was forcibly laid on the cogon grass. R
TC found appellant guilty of robbery with multiple rape.
Issue:
Whether accused is guilty of robbery with multiple accounts of rape or just robb
ery with rape under Article 294(b)?
Decision:
The RTC erred in ruling that the accused is guilty of robbery with multiple rape
s. He should have been convicted of the crime under Art. 294(b) that is robbery
with rape.
In the special complex crime of robbery with rape, the true intent of the accuse
d must first be determined, because their intent determines the offense they com
mitted. To sustain a conviction for robbery with rape, it is imperative that the
robbery itself must be conclusively established. To support a conviction theref
or, proof of the rape alone is not sufficient. Robbery with rape occurs when the
following elements are present: (1) personal property is taken with violence or
intimidation against persons, (2) the property taken belongs to another, (3) th
e taking is done with animo lucrandi, and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape
.
In the case at bar, all the foregoing elements are present. The contemporaneous
acts of appellant and his co-accused stress the fact that they
310 | P a g e

were initially motivated by animus lucrandi. They first demanded guns, moneys an
d animals from Valentin Gabertan. Apparently, it was only when they entered the
house and saw his wife when they thought of raping her. The prosecution likewise
established that appellant and his co-accused took chickens, a watch and money
from complainants through violence.
311 | P a g e

Winny Mahor 2008-0306


People v. Verceles (388 SCRA 515)
Facts:
Accused Verceles alias "Baldog", Corpuz, Soriano alias "Merto", Ramos and Sorian
o entered the house of Mrs. Rosita Quilates by forcibly destroying the grills of
the window. Once inside, they took away 1 colored T.V., 1 VHS, assorted jewelri
es, 1 alarm clock and 1 radio cassettes. In the course of the robbery, Soriano,
succumbed to lustful desires and raped Maribeth Bolito while the others just sto
od outside the door and did nothing to prevent Soriano.
Issue:
Whether there exist a conspiracy to commit the crime of rape of individuals who
conspire to commit a robbery.
Decision:
Once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of the crim
e of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one
of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeav
ored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdictio
n is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime
of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. Appellants
are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape punished u
nder Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
312 | P a g e

Luis Celestino 2006-0354


Art. 148: Direct Assault
People vs. Dural (223 SCRA 201)
Facts:
In1998, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal were charged with double murder with a
ssault upon agents of persons in authority for the death of two CAPCOM soldiers.
Positively identified by witnesses, Dural was seen firing upon the two CAPCOM s
oldiers on board a CAPCOM mobile car. Dural and Itucal were convicted by the Cal
oocan RTC, hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not they are liable for double murder with assault upon agents of per
son in authority.
Decision:
Itucal was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt on his part as a co-consp
irator. Durals conviction was affirmed as he was positively identified as one of
the perpetrators of the crime. There was no doubt that they knew that the victim
s were members of the CAPCOM as they were in uniform and riding an official CAPC
OM car. The victims were agents of persons in authority performing an official d
uty as peace officers and law enforcers. Thus, the crime committed are two (2) c
omplex crimes of murder with direct assault upon agents of person in authority,
wherein the maximum penalty for the more serious crime should be imposed.
313 | P a g e

Luis Celestino 2006-0354


People vs. Abalos (258 SCRA 523)
Facts: On or about the 20th day of March, 1983, during the barangay fiesta in Ca
tbalogan, Samar, Tiburcio Abalos struck P/pfc. Sofronio Labine with a piece of w
ood which caused the latters death. According to the witness, Felipe Basal, he no
ticed the accused and his father having an argument when a woman shouted for hel
p. Thereafter, the victim appeared and asked the accuseds father, Major Abalos wh
o is the victims superior officer, on what was going on. He even shouted the accu
seds father. The accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood which he use
d in striking the victim. The accused was convicted by the RTC of Samar for the
complex crime of direct assault with murder. For his defense, the accused allege
d that he had the the notion that his father was being attacked by a member of t
he NPA, hence he could not have committed the felony of direct assault.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for direct assault with murder?
Decision:
As correctly observed by the trial court, there can be no doubt that the accused
knew that the victim is an agent of a person in authority. The lighting in the
area were enough to afford him to identify the victim. He even testified that he
personally knew the victim to be a policeman and in fact, Labine was then weari
ng his uniform. Tiburcio Abalos committed the second form of assault when he att
acked with the use of force an agent of person in authority on the occasion of t
he performance of the latters duty.
314 | P a g e

Luis Celestino 2006-0354


People vs. Tac-an (182 SCRA 201)
Facts:
Renato Tac-an and Francis Escano III were classmates in high School and close fr
iends before their relationship turned sour. In 1984, a fight ensued between the
m in the classroom prompting Tac-an to go home and get a gun which he used to ki
ll Escano in the presence of their classmates and teacher.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with Insult to public a
uthorities?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in applying the provisions of
Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. While a teacher is deemed to be
a person in authority under the last paragraph of Art.152, such teacher is so de
emed only for purposes of application of Art.148, direct assault upon a person i
n authority. In the case at bar, the assault was not directed upon the teacher,
hence, there was no violation of Art.148. The accused is however guilty for the
crime of murder.
315 | P a g e

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