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The Code of Civil Procedure confers a right to appeal, but does not prescribe a

period of limitation for filing an appeal. The Limitation Act, 1963, however,
provides the period of filing up appeals. It states that the appeals against a
decree or order can be filed in a High Court within ninety days and in any other
court in thirty days from the date of the decree or order appealed against.
It is for general welfare that a period be put on litigation. Further, it is a general
principle of law that law is made to protect only diligent and vigilant people.
Equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. Law will not protect people who are
careless about their rights. (Vigilantibus non domientibus jur A subventiunt).
Moreover, there should be certainty in law and matters cannot be kept in
suspense indefinably. It is, therefore, provided that Courts of Law cannot be
approached beyond fixed period. In civil matters, the limit is provided in
Limitation Act, 1963.
The 'Law of Limitation' prescribes the time-limit for different suits within, which
an aggrieved person can approach the court for redress or justice. The suit, if
filed after the exploration of time-limit, is struck by the law of limitation. It's
basically meant to protect the long and established user and to indirectly punish
persons who go into a long slumber over their rights.
The statutory law was established in stages. The very first Limitation Act was
enacted for all courts in India in 1859. And finally took the form of Limitation Act
in 1963.
A citizen is not expected to master the various provisions which provide for
limitation in different matters but certain basic knowledge in this regard is
necessary. For instance, Section 12 of the Limitation Act lays down certain
guidelines regarding computation of limitation period. It says that in computing
the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which
such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.
Further, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the
time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed
from shall be excluded. However, any time taken by the court to prepare the
decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be
excluded.
Section 14 of the act, similarly, says that in computing the period of limitation for
any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting in civil
proceedings, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision against
the defendant shall be excluded where the proceedings relate to the same
matter in a court which is unable to entertain it on account of defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.
Exclusion of Time in Legal Proceedings Section 12 | Limitation Act
Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that:
(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the
day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave
to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the

judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a
copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or
reviewed shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or
reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or
order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the
decree or order is founded shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award,
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
As per explanation given under Section 10, in computing under this section the
time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the
Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is
made shall not be excluded.
The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes periods of limitation for suits, appeals or
applications. The rules as to computation of period of limitation (Sections 12 to
24) not intended to apply only to periods of limitation prescribed by the Schedule
but apply also to periods of limitation provided for by other enactments.
Section 12 of the Limitation Act is first of the sections providing for exclusion of
time in computing the period of limitation. The Section 12 of the Act excludes
from reckoning the day from which the period is to be reckoned and time
requisite for obtaining copies of documents referred to in sub-sections (2) to (4).
The true effect of Section 12 is that the periods referred to in the various subsections have to be added to the period of limitation.
There need not be any prayer or application by a party for the time to be
excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act. This Section 12 confers a
substantive right upon a party and it is the duty of the Court to exclude the time
when the case comes under the purview of any of the sub-sections of Section 12.
According to sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, the first day i.e.
the day from which a period of limitation is to be computed, must be excluded.
And the last day i.e. the day on which the suit is instituted must be included in
the calculation. This rule is applicable whenever time has to be computed from a
day specified whenever such time is fixed performance of contract or is
prescribed by law for the doing of an act or for the institution of the proceedings
in a Court of Law.
In Webb v. Fairmaner, [(1838) 3 M&W 473], when goods were sold on 5th
October to be paid for in two months from the date of sale it was held that in
computing the period of two months 5th day of October shall be excluded and
action for price of goods cannot be started until and after expiration of 5th
December.
In Krishna Bilas v. Sonadhan, (AIR 1961 Tripura 16), it is held that in a suit of
recovery of possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the day of
dispossession is to be excluded.
In Sita Ram v. State, (AIR 1961 All. 151), it has been held that for an offence
under Section 106 of the Factories Act the date on which the offence came to the

notice of the Inspector is to be excluded. In Ram Nandan v. Ramadhar, [AIR 1966


Pt. 297 (FB)], it has been held that in computing the limitation for filing appeal
against the Panchayat election, the date of declaration of the result of the
election is to be excluded.
In R. Hamira v. Bani Mani, [(1976) 17 Guj. L.R. 729], it is held that the day on
which the judgment is pronounced should be excluded in computing the period
of limitation for an appeal. The limitation for filing an appeal commences from
the date of the judgment and not from the date of decree is signed.
In State of Bihar v. Rameshwar Prasad, (AIR 1994 SC 501), the Supreme Court
has held that in the matter of setting aside the award the date on which the filing
of the award was made known to the advocate of the applicant has to be
excluded under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act.
In Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Lt., (AIR 1999 SC 1090), the notice of
returning of the cheque as unpaid was served on the drawer on 29th September,
1995. The period of 15 days for making payment by the drawer under the
proviso (c) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is expired on 14th
October, 1995. Therefore, the cause of action to file a complaint under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arose on 15th October, 1995. In
computing the one month limitation period under Section 142(b) for filing a
complaint against the drawer the date of 15th October, 1995 is to be excluded.
The Court has held that the complaint filed on 15th November, 1995 is within
time as it has been filed on the 30th day excluding 15th October, 1995. This rule
has been consistently followed and has been adopted in General Clauses Act and
in the Limitation Act.
Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals, an
application for leave to appeal, an application for the review of judgment and
also to an application or a petition for revision. Section 12(2) is not of general
application but only applies to specific categories mentioned therein.
In India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani, (AIR 2003 SC 2084), the Supreme Court has
held that no application seeking benefit of Section 12(2) is required and Court is
bound by statute to extend the benefit where applicable and no formal
application is required to be made.
In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Madanlal, (AIR 1977 SC 523), it has been held
that it would be impermissible to read in Section 12(2) a proviso that the time for
obtaining the copy shall be excluded only if such copy has to be filed along with
the memorandum of appeal or application for leave to appeal or for revision or
for review of judgment.
In Punni v. State, (AIR 1971 All. 387), it has been held, following the decision of
the Supreme Court in S.A. Gaffore v. Ayesha Begum, (1970 UJ (SC) 784), that
exclusion of time is allowed even when copy is not required to be filed along with
the memorandum.
In Krishnji v. N.R. Malti, (AIR 1972 Mys. 274), it is held that when the appeal
against the date of signing the decree has to be excluded.

In Jagiri v. Doulat, (AIR 1928 Lah. 755), it has been held that an appellant is
entitled to deduct the time spent in obtaining a copy of the first judgment of the
trial Court as well as of the judgment passed on review.
In Udayan Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali, (AIR 1977 SC 2319), it has been held by the
Supreme Court that under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act read with the
Explanation, the appellant is not entitled to exclude the time that had elapsed
from the date of the judgment till signing of the decree prior to his application for
a copy thereof in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing the
appeal.
In India Home v. Kishan N. Lalwani, (AIR 2003 SC 2084), the Supreme Court has
modified earlier stand and has overruled all the contrary decisions of different
High Courts and has held that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act says that it is
time requisite for obtaining the copy being excluded from computing the period
of limitation or the time requisite for obtaining the copy being added to the
prescribed period of limitation and treating the result of addition as the period
prescribed and that in adopting methodology it does not make any difference
whether the application for certified copy was made within prescribed period of
limitation or beyond it. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Madras
High Court which has held that though the application for certified copy of
judgment and decree was made after the prescribed period of limitation the
period was liable to be excluded in all cases and not depending on whether there
is sufficient cause or not.
In State of U.P. v. Maharaja Narain, (AIR 1968 SC 960), it has been held that the
expression time requisite in sub-section (2) of Section 12 cannot be understood
as the time absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of the order and that
what is deductible under sub-section (2) of Section 12 is not the minimum time
within which a copy of the order appealed against could have been obtained. The
section does not permit the exclusion of the period required for obtaining a
certified copy of the decree for the purpose of exclusion.
The question whether the appeal preferred was in time or not should be
considered on the basis of information available from the copy of the judgment
and decree filed along with the Memorandum of Appeal and not from the other
copies which the party might have got and used for other purposes with which
the Court has nothing to do.
The time spent in obtaining a copy of the judgment also will be excluded under
sub-section (3) of Section 12, because it is generally necessary that the
judgment on which the decree of the High Court is based should be obtained in
order that the parties may ascertain what its terms are, and further filed with the
application for leave to appeal.
In computing the period of limitation for an application for leave to appeal the
time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment complained of must be
excluded. (Baldeo Pershad v. Dwarika, AIR 1957 All. 334). In applying for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court the applicant was not entitled to get any time spent
in obtaining a copy of the judgment deducted in computing the period of
limitation. (Deep Chand v. Bhago, AIR 1965 Punj. 115).

In Biswapati v. Kenington Store, (AIR 1972 Cal. 172), it has been held that
Section 12(3) of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application for execution
of a decree. The period of limitation for an execution application therefore runs
under Article 136 (old 182) from the date of the judgment and not from the date
on which the decree is signed.
According to sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, the period for
obtaining copy of the award to be excluded in computing the period of limitation
for an application to set aside an award.
An appeal for execution does not fall in any of the categories of legal
proceedings mentioned in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows
that this section is not applicable to an application for execution.
In Shahjahan Begum v. Zahirul Hasan, (AIR 1972 All. 511), the Allahabad High
Court has held that the Explanation in Section 12 implies that the time requisite
for obtaining copy is the time taken by the Court in preparing the decree or order
before the application for copy is made as also the time taken in preparing the
copy after the application therefore has been made.
In Udayam Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali, (AIR 1977 SC 2319), the Supreme Court has
held that under Section 12(2) read with the Explanation a person cannot get
exclusion of the period that elapsed between the pronouncement of the
judgment and the signing of the decree if he made the application for copy only
the preparation of the decree. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the time
requisite for obtaining a copy under Section 12(2) must be that time which is
required for getting a copy of the decree.
In State of Assam v. Govinda Chandra Patel, (AIR 1991 Gau. 104), the Gauhati
High Court has held that in view of Section 12(2) read with the Explanation the
appellant is not entitled to exclude the time that had elapsed from the date of
judgment till the signing of the decree prior to the application for a copy thereof
in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal.