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Environmental Compliance and

Enforcement in
India: Rapid Assessment

ThisreportwaspreparedinthecontextoftheOECDProgrammeofEnvironmentalCooperationwithAsiaandthe
OECDworkonenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementinnonmembercountries.Itwasproducedjointlywith
theSecretariatoftheAsianEnvironmentalComplianceandEnforcementNetwork(AECEN)andpresentedatthe
AECENannualforuminHanoi,Vietnamon45December2006.Thekeyfindingsofthereportwerediscussedand
endorsedatastakeholderworkshopinNewDelhion3November2006.
ForfurtherdetailspleasecontactMrEugeneMazuratEugene.mazur@oecd.org

OECD

TABLEOFCONTENTS

ACRONYMS 3
1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1.InstitutionalFrameworkfortheStudy 5
1.2.ObjectiveandMethodologyoftheStudy 6
2.

BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXT
2.1.EnvironmentalChallenges
7
2.2.ConstitutionandNationalPolicies
2.3.LegalFramework
9
2.4.KeyInstitutions 10
2.5 StatusofEnvironmentalCompliance

3.

7
8

11

ASSESSMENTFINDINGS:CURRENTSITUATIONANDKEYCHALLENGES
3.1.LegalEnforcementAuthority 13
3.2.InstitutionalArrangementsandCapacityBuilding
14
3.3.ComplianceMonitoring:Permitting,Inspections,andSelfMonitoring
3.4.EnforcementResponse 18
3.5.ComplianceAssistanceandDataManagement 20
3.6.EconomicandOtherIncentivesbasedInstruments
21
3.7.IndicatorstoEvaluateProgramSuccess 24
3.8.PublicParticipationinEnvironmentalComplianceandEnforcement

4.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13

15

25

27

4.1 ShorttermRecommendations 27
4.2.MediumTermRecommendations

29

ANNEX1.U.S.EPARECOMMENDATIONSONENVIRONMENTALCOMPLIANCEAND
ENFORCEMENTININDIA 30
REFERENCES 31

ACRONYMS

AECEN
CCA

AsianEnvironmentalComplianceandEnforcementNetwork

CommonConsentApplications

CETP CommonEffluentTreatmentPlant
CPCB CentralPollutionControlBoard
CREP CharteronCorporateResponsibilityforEnvironmentalProtection
CTE

ConsenttoEstablish

CTO

ConsenttoOperate

EMS

EnvironmentalManagementSystem

EPA

EnvironmentalProtectionAct(India)

GIS

GeographicInformationSystem

LAEC LocalAreaEnvironmentCommittee
MIDC MaharashtraIndustrialDevelopmentCorporation
MOEF MinistryofEnvironmentandForestsofIndia
NCS/PSEDNationalConservationStrategyandPolicyStatementonEnvironmentandDevelopment
NEP

NationalEnvironmentPolicy

NETA NationalEnvironmentalTribunalAct
NPPA NationalPolicyonPollutionAbatement
PAAC PollutionAwarenessandAssistanceCentre
PCB

PollutionControlBoard

PIL

PublicInterestLitigation

PLIA

PublicLiabilityInsuranceAct

PPP

PublicPrivatePartnership

OECD OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment

SME

SmallandMediumSizedEnterprises

SPCB StatePollutionControlBoard
TERI

TheEnergyandResourcesInstitute

TSDF Treatment,Storage,andDisposalFacilities
USAID U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment
USEPA U.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency

1.

INTRODUCTION

ThisstudyisarapidassessmentofIndiasenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementprogrammes
conducted by the Secretariat of the Asian Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network
(AECEN) with funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It was carried out in close
collaborationwithIndiasMinistryofEnvironmentandForests(MOEF)undertheguidanceoftheCentral
PollutionControlBoard(CPCB).

1.1.

InstitutionalFrameworkfortheStudy

Strengtheningenforcementandcompliancesystemshasbecomeasubjectofparticularinterestinthe
contextofdesigningpoliciesthatcanstimulatesustainabledevelopmentandeconomicgrowth.Recent
discussionshaveshowntheneedtopromotebetterunderstandingoftheincentivestructuresfacingfirms
andtheneedtoprovidegovernmentswithapproachesthatcanoptimizetheirexpenditureonassuring
environmentalcompliance.
AsianEnvironmentalComplianceandEnforcementNetwork.Establishedin2005,AECENworks
to promote improved compliance with environmental legal requirements in Asia through regional
exchange of innovative policies and practices. Composed of national and subnational environmental
agencies,theobjectivesoftheNetworkareto:

1 Promote the development and implementation of improved environmental policies, laws,


regulationsandinstitutionalarrangements;

2 Strengthenpractitionercapacitythroughspecializedtrainingandskillsdevelopment;and
3 Facilitate regional sharing of best practices and information on strategies for strengthening
complianceandenforcement.

OneprincipalactivityofAECENistopilotinnovativepoliciesandpracticesatthecountryleveland
facilitatefurtheradoptionanddisseminationthroughregionalcooperation.
OECD Compliance Assurance Program. A Conference on Economic Aspects of Environmental
ComplianceAssuranceorganizedinDecember2004inPariswithintheframeworkoftheOECDGlobal
ForumonSustainableDevelopmentfacilitatedadialoguebetweenOECDcountriesandtransitionand
developing economies on designing optimal enforcement strategies and tools that can maximize
environmental benefits and minimize costs to the regulators and regulated community. Participants
requestedtheOECDanditspartnerslikeAECENtoextendthedialogueandtohelp,inparticular,non
membercountries,todesignpolicyapproachesthatensureenvironmentalcomplianceandthatarecost
effectivefortheadministrationandtheregulatedcommunity.SinceIndiaisoneofprioritytargetsfor
OECDsglobalrelationsasanimportantemergingeconomy,theOECDhasconductedthisstudyjointly
withtheAECENSecretariat.

U.S.EPAandWorldBankStudies. TheMOEFrequestedthatthisrapidassessmentcomplement
recentcomprehensiveeffortsbytheU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(U.S.EPA) 1 andtheWorld
Bank2 inevaluatingenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementandinstitutionalreformsinIndia.The
presentreportattemptstoprovidefurtherinsightsintochallengesinensuringeffectiveenvironmental
complianceandenforcement,andcorroborateorreinforcerecommendationsidentifiedinthoseimportant
studies.BothU.S.EPAandtheWorldBankareAECENpartnerorganizations,andcontributeexpertise
andresourcesinsupportingmembersindevelopingandimplementingpilotactivities.

1.2.

ObjectiveandMethodologyoftheStudy

TheobjectiveofthisrapidassessmentistohelpIndiatodefineprioritiestoaddressitskeychallenges
inenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementandlaythegroundworkforpotentialpilotactivitiesthat
couldbecarriedoutundertheaegisofAECEN.
The study followed the AECEN methodology which was also used to prepare similar rapid
assessments for Vietnam, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. In preparing the assessment, a team of
consultants,includingexpertsfromTheEnergyandResourcesInstitute(TERI,India)workedwiththe
CPCBandselectedstatepollutioncontrolboard(SPCB)officialstoassembletheinformationviaasurvey
questionnaireandfollowupinterviews.
Thequestionnairewasdesignedtoidentifyprogramstrengthsandweaknesses,priorityreformareas
andopportunitiesforstrategicinterventionsineightprincipalareas:

1 Legalenforcementauthority;
2 Institutionalarrangementsandcapacitybuilding;
3 Compliancemonitoring:policiesandproceduresoninspections,selfmonitoringandpermitting;
4 Enforcementresponse;
5 Complianceassistanceanddatamanagement;
6 Economicandotherincentivebasedinstruments;
7 Indicatorstoevaluateprogramsuccess;and
8 Publicparticipationinenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcement.
Participating states were Gujarat, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh,
HimachalPradesh,JammuandKashmir,andChattisgarh.Adraftsummaryoffindingswaspresentedfor
considerationbyMOEFandCPCBdecisionmakersandotherrelevantstakeholdersataworkshopinNew
DelhionNovember3,2006.

ReportonEnvironmentalComplianceAndEnforcementInIndia,UnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,
December2005.

2 India: Strengthening Institutions for Sustainable Growth, Country Environmental Analysis, The World Bank,
October2006.

2.

2.1.

BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXT

EnvironmentalChallenges

Indias economic development propelled by rapid industrial growth and urbanization is causing
severe environmental problems that have local, regional and global significance. Deforestation, soil
erosion,waterpollutionandlanddegradationcontinuetoworsenandarehinderingeconomicdevelopment
in rural India, while the rapid industrialization and urbanization in Indias booming metropolises are
strainingthelimitsofmunicipalservicesandcausingseriousenvironmentalproblems.
Morethan20citiesinIndiahavepopulationsofoveronemillion,andsomeofthem,includingNew
Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, and Kolkata, are among the worlds most polluted. Assuming continued
economic liberalization and increased urbanization, the damage to environment and health could be
enormousifprecautionarymeasuresarenottaken.Thechallenge,therefore,istomaintainthequalityof
air, water and land and protect the environment by reconciling environmental, social and economic
imperatives.
AirqualitydatainIndiasmajorcitiesindicatethatambientlevelsofairpollutantsexceedboththe
World Health Organization and Indian standards, particularly for particulate matter. Of the total air
pollution load nationwide, vehicular sources contribute 64 percent, thermal power plants 16 percent,
industries13percent,andthedomesticsector7percent.Environmentaleffectsfromgrowingfossilfuel
usecanonlyworsenasIndiaseekstomeettheenergyneedsofitsgrowingeconomy.Itisestimatedthat
over96percentofIndiastotaldemandforcommercialenergyismetbyfossilfuelwithcoalcontributing
60percentandpetroleumproductsprovidingtheremaining36percent.
Indiasriversandstreamssufferfromhighlevelsofpollutionfromwastegeneratedprimarilyfrom
industrialprocessesandmunicipalactivities.Untreatedsewageandnonindustrialwastesaccountforfour
timesasmuchpollutionasindustrialeffluents.Whileitisestimatedthat75percentofthewastewater
generatedisfrommunicipalsources,industrialwastefromlargeandmediumsizedplantscontributesto
over50percentofthetotalpollutionloads.Inmajorcities,lessthanfivepercentofthetotalwasteis
collectedandlessthan25percentofthistreated.
Toaddresstheseenvironmentalchallengesincoordinationwiththestategovernments,thecentral
governmenthasidentifiedandtargeted17highlypollutingindustriesand24environmentalproblemareas.
Thechemicalandengineeringindustriesareatthetopofthegovernmentslist,sincetheyarethemajor
contributorstoair,water,andwastepollution.Theseindustriesincludeintegratedironandsteelplants,
nonferrous metallurgical units, pharmaceutical and petrochemical complexes, fertilizers andpesticide
plants,thermalpowerplants,textiles,pulpandpaper,tanneriesandchloralkaliunits.
Asdetailedbelow,theGovernmentofIndiahasestablishedanenvironmentallegalandinstitutional
system to meet these challenges within the overall framework of Indias development agenda and
internationalprinciplesandnorms.Mostrecently,theGovernmentputforwardtheNationalEnvironment
Policyof2006whichprovidesaguidetoactioninregulatoryreform,environmentalconservation,and
enactmentoflegislationbygovernmentagenciesatalllevels.

2.2.

ConstitutionandNationalPolicies

IndiatookaboldsteptoincludeenvironmentalprotectionrightsanddutiesinitsConstitution.The
ConstitutionofIndiaspecifiesthattheStateshallendeavortoprotectandimprovetheenvironmentandto
safeguardthenaturalresourcesofthecountry.AccordingtotheConstitution,itisthefundamentaldutyof
everycitizenofIndiatoprotectandimprovethenaturalenvironmentandtohavecompassionforliving
creatures.Byraisingenvironmentalconcernstotheconstitutionallevel,Indiahasprovideditscitizens
withapowerfulpolicytooltoprotecttheenvironment.
NationalPolicies.InadditiontotheConstitutionalmandate,Indiahasanumberofnationalpolicies
governingenvironmental management, includingthe National PolicyonPollution Abatement (NPPA,
1992)andtheNationalConservationStrategyandPolicyStatementonEnvironmentandDevelopment
(NCS/PSED,1992).Whilethesenationalpoliciesarenotjudiciallyenforceable,theyserveasguiding
principlesforthecentralandstategovernmentstofollow.
TheNPPAencouragestheuseofeconomicinstrumentstocomplementtraditionalcommandand
control approaches to pollution abatement. To integrate environmental considerations into decision
makingatalllevels,thepolicyadoptsthefollowingguidingprinciples:

1 preventionofpollutionatsource;
2 adoptionofbestavailabletechnology;
3 thepolluterpaysprinciple;and
4 publicparticipationindecisionmaking.
TheNCS/PSEDprovidesanoverarchingpolicyframeworkonenvironmentalmanagement,including
conservation of natural resources and economic development. Key instruments for promoting
environmental change include conducting environmental impact assessments, developing educational
campaigns, andensuring public participation. As the nodal agency, the Ministry of Environment and
Forests(MOEF)isresponsibleforimplementingtheNPPAandtheNCS/PSED.
NationalEnvironmentPolicyof2006.Buildingonearlierpolicies,theNationalEnvironmentPolicy
(NEP) of 2006 is the most recent pronouncement of the governments commitment to improving
environmental conditions while promoting economic prosperity nationwide. The NEPs key
environmental objectives include conservation of critical environmental resources, intragenerational
equity, livelihood security for poor, integration of environment in economic and social development,
efficiencyin environment resourceuse, environmental governance, andenhancement of resources for
environmental conservation. This policy promotes mainstreaming of environmental concerns into all
development activities, advocating important environmental principles and identifying regulatory and
substantivereforms.
With respect to regulatory reforms, the NEP recommends revisiting the policy and legislative
frameworktodevelopsynergiesamongrelevantstaturesandregulations,eliminateobsolescence,and
amalgamateprovisionswithsimilarobjectives.TheNEPidentifiesanewframeworkforlegalactionthat
includesapplicationofamixofcivilandcriminalsanctions,adoptionofinnovativeeconomicinstruments,
andpublicprivatepartnershipsinstrengtheningenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcement.TheMOEF
isresponsibleforimplementingtheNEP.

2.3.

LegalFramework

India has an elaborate legal framework with over two hundred laws relating to environmental
protection.Keynationallawsforthepreventionandcontrolofindustrialandurbanpollutionincludethe
following:

1 Water(PreventionandControlofPollution)Actof1974,amendedin1988
2 Water(PreventionandControlofPollution)CessActof1977,amendedin1991
3 Air(PreventionandControlofPollution)Actof1981,amendedin1987
4 Environment(Protection)Actof1986(EPA)
5 PublicLiabilityInsuranceActof1991
6 NationalEnvironmentalTribunalActof1995
7 NationalEnvironmentalAppellateAuthorityActof1997
Themediumspecific legislation(theAir Act andthe Water Act) empower the central andstate
pollution control authorities to enforce emission and effluent standards for industries discharging
pollutantsintoairandwater.TheWaterCessAct,amongotherthings,stipulatestheuseoffeesforwater
abstraction.
TheWaterActvestsregulatoryauthorityinStatePollutionControlBoardstoestablishandenforce
effluentstandardsforfacilitiesdischargingpollutantsintowaterbodies.TheCPCBcoordinatesactivities
betweenthestatesandperformsregulatoryfunctionsforunionterritories.Thecentralandstateboards
wereauthorizedtocontroldomesticandindustrialdischargeviaconsentstoestablish(CTE)andconsents
tooperate(CTO)andtoadvisestategovernmentsonsitingofindustrialprojects.
TheAirActprovidesfortheprevention,controlandabatementofairpollution.Withaframework
similartotheWaterAct,theAirActgavethecentralandstateboardsauthoritytoissueconsentsto
industriesoperatingwithindesignatedairpollutioncontrolareas.Statesalsoprescribeemissionstandards
forstationaryandmobilesources.
TheParliamentrespondedtotheBhopaldisasterof1984byenacting theEnvironmentProtection
Actinordertocreateoverarchingnationalenvironmentallegislation.TheEPAbotharticulatesapolicyfor
environmentalprotectioncoveringair,waterandlandandprovidesaframeworkforcentralgovernment
coordinationofcentralandstateauthoritiesestablishedunderpreviouslaws,includingtheWaterActand
Air Act. Under this umbrella law, the central government must set national ambient and emissions
standards,establishproceduresformanaginghazardoussubstances,regulateindustrialsiting,investigate
andresearchpollutionissues,andestablishlaboratoriesandcollectanddisseminateinformation.
Amongotherrelevantlegislation, thePublicLiabilityInsuranceAct(PLIA) of1991mandatesthat
business owners operating with hazardous substances take out insurance policies covering potential
liability from an accident and establish Environmental Relief Funds to deal with accidents involving
hazardoussubstances. TheNationalEnvironmentalAppellateAuthorityAct of1997requiresthecentral
governmenttoestablishanauthoritytohearappealsonarearestrictionswhereindustrialoperationswill
notbecarriedoutorwillbecarriedoutwithcertainsafeguardmeasures.In2005,Parliamentenactedthe
9

RighttoInformationActdesignedtopromotegreatertransparencyandaccountabilityofthegovernment
andpublicparticipationindecisionmaking.

2.4.

KeyInstitutions

Theprimaryinstitutionsresponsiblefortheformulationandenforcementofenvironmentalactsand
rules include the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF), the Central Pollution Control Board
(CPCB), State Departments of Environment, State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs) and Municipal
Corporations.
MinistryofEnvironmentandForests. Establishedin1985,theMOEFisthecentralgovernment
nodal agency responsible for planning, promotion and coordination of all environmental activities,
includingformulationofnationalpolicies,standardsandregulations.TheobjectivesoftheMOEFare:

1 conservationandsurveyofflora,fauna,forestsandwildlife;
2 preventionandcontrolofpollution;
3 afforestationandregenerationofdegradedareas;
4 protectionoftheenvironment;and
5 welfareofanimals.
CentralPollutionControlBoard.UnderMOEF,theCentralPollutionControlBoard(CPCB)isthe
national boardwithoversight powers over state boards. The CPCB has a central office as well as a
networkofzonalofficeslocatedinNewDelhi,Calcutta,Shillong,Kanpur,BangaloreandVadodara.
Establishedin1977undertheWaterAct,theCPCBhaswiderangingpowersandresponsibilitiesto:

1 advisethecentralgovernmentonanymatterrelatedtopreventionandcontrolofwaterandair
pollutionandimprovementofairquality;

2 plannationwideprogramsfortheprevention,controlandabatementofwaterandairpollution;
3 coordinatetheactivitiesofSPCBsandresolvedisputesamongthem;
4 providetechnicalassistanceandguidancetotheStateBoards,
5 carryoutandsponsorinvestigationsandresearchrelatingtoproblemsofwaterandairpollution
andfortheirprevention,controlandabatement;

6 prosecutepollutingindustriespursuanttotheWaterAct;
7 collect, compile and publish technical data on air and water pollution and measures
recommendedfortheirprevention,controlandabatement;

8 organizetrainingofstaffengagedinenvironmentalprograms;
9 preparemanuals,codesandguidelinesrelatingtoindustrialemissionsandeffluents;
10 organizemassmediaawarenessprogramsonenvironmentalprotection;

10

1 disseminateinformationonwaterandairpollutionandtheirpreventionandcontrol;and
2 performsuchotherfunctionsasprescribedbythecentralgovernment.
ThetotalnumberofemployeesintheCPCBisapproximately500,100ofwhichhavetechnical
training.TheCPCBhasapproximately60inspectorsnationwide.
State Pollution Control Boards. The SPCBs were established following the State Legislatures
adoptionoftheWaterActof1974andthentheAirActof1981.AttheStatelevel,theSPCBsareattached
either to the Environment Department, or to the Forest and Wildlife Department. In general, SPCBs
performthefollowingfunctions:

1 advisethestategovernmentsonpollutionrelatedissues;
2 planacomprehensivestatelevelpollutioncontrol/prevention/abatementprogram;
3 implementandenforcenationalstandards,makingthemmorestringentifwarrantedbylocal
conditions;

4 grantconsentstoestablishandtooperateundertheAirandWaterActsandauthorizehazardous
wastedisposalperrulesundertheEPA;and

5 collectwatercessfortheuseofwater.
In the SPCBs, staffing numbers range widely between 10 and 800 (4 to around 300 technical)
dependingonthegeographicarea,numberofindustriesandfinancialstatusoftheboard.
RoleoftheJudiciary.Overthelasttwentyyears,theSupremeCourtofIndiaandsomeHighCourts
ofthestateshaveledthewayintheenforcementofenvironmentallawsthroughcitizenledpublicinterest
litigation(PIL)thathasitslegalbasisintheconstitutionalrighttoahealthyenvironment.Throughthis
judicialactivism,thecourtshaveissuedorderswithspecificimplementationrequirementsthatnotonly
remedythecaseathand,butalsosetnewpoliciesandpracticeswithwidespreadimplicationsforthe
regulatedcommunityaswellasregulatoryagencies.
Inaddition,allenvironmentrelatedpenalties(finesandimprisonment)areprovidedundercriminal
lawandmustbeimposedbylowercourts.

2.5

StatusofEnvironmentalCompliance

AccordingtotheCPCB,asofJune2006,73percentofthe2672unitsunder17categoriesofhighly
pollutingindustrieswereincompliance,whichisadecreasefrom2004,whentheratewas84percent.
Table2.1providesasummaryofthecompliancestatusbyindustrialsector.Themajornoncomplying
sectors are chloralkali (29%), thermal power (27%), copper (25%), iron and steel (24%), and
pharmaceuticals(23%).

11

Table 1. Sector-wise Compliance Status of 17 Categories of Highly Polluting Industries (June 2006)

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

IndustrialCategory
Aluminium
Cement
ChlorAlkali
Copper
Distillery
Dyes&DI
Fertilizer
Iron&Steel
OilRefineries
Pesticides
Petrochemicals
Pharmaceuticals
Pulp&Paper
Sugar
Tannery
ThermalPower
Zinc
Total

Complying
6
198
24
3
191
87
104
28
17
95
73
351
118
438
97
129
4
1963

Defaulting
1
16
10
1
35
9
10
9
3
9
7
124
32
49
13
51
1
380

Closed1
0
20
0
0
36
25
21
1
1
11
1
59
37
91
17
8
1
329

Total
7
234
34
4
262
121
135
38
21
115
81
534
187
578
127
188
6
2672

Some of the industries may have been shut down temporarily, often until corrective actions have been agreed upon. Source: CPCB

ThedatainTable1shouldbeconsideredwithcautionasthetablelistsundercomplyingthose
industries that have installed pollution controls after having been initially found in violation of the
environmentalrequirements.AccordingtotheU.S.EPA(2005),therewere1551initiallynoncomplying
facilitieswithinthesame17categories,ofwhich1351facilitiescompliedwithsubsequentSPCBorders
and178wereshutdown,with22unitsdefaulting.Thisactuallyshowsanegativecompliancetrendin
largeindustryinIndiainrecentyears.Inaddition,therealcomplianceratesarelikelytobelower,since
inspectionsusuallydonotevaluatecompliancewithallenvironmentalrequirements(e.g.,stacktestsare
rarelyconductedtocheckairemissionsforcompliance).
Thesituationwithsmallandmediumsizedenterprises(SMEs)ismuchworse.Accordingtothe
MOEF, SMEs account for 40 percent of industrial production employ limited pollution control
technologies and are responsible for an estimated 70 percent of the total industrial pollution load
nationwide.

12

3.

3.1.

ASSESSMENTFINDINGS:CURRENTSITUATIONANDKEYCHALLENGES

LegalEnforcementAuthority

MostofcompliancemonitoringandenforcementisdonebySPCBs.Thefewdirectenforcement
actionstakenbytheCPCBaregenerallydonebythezonaloffices.UndertheWaterAct,theAirActand
theEPA,thepollutioncontrolboardshavetheauthoritytoissueandrevokeconsentstooperate,require
selfmonitoringandreporting,conductsampling,inspectfacilities,requirecorrectiveactionandprescribe
complianceschedules.The enforcementpowers includeemergencymeasuresofdisconnectingwateror
powersupplyandfacilityclosure,whicharewidelyusedinsomestates 3.AccordingtotheHazardous
Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules of 1989, SPCBs can, with CPCB approval, impose
administrativefinesforanyviolationofthoserules.Maharashtraisoneoftheveryfewstateswhichhave
usedthisprovisiontoimposepenaltiesforunauthorizedstorageofhazardouswaste.
Othersanctions(finesandimprisonment)mustbepursuedunderthecriminalauthorityofthecourts.
TheEPAstipulatessteeperpenaltiesthantheWaterActandtheAirActbutatthesametimedefersto
them(Section24oftheEPA)incaseswherethesametypeofviolationsiscoveredundertheEPAandthe
otherlaw.Inaddition,criminalcasesbroughtbySPCBsaredifficulttoprosecute,havealowconviction
rate(althoughthatvariesgreatlybetweenthestates),andconsumepreciousgovernmentresourcesand
time.
Allthreelawsalsoincludeprovisionsforcitizenstobringlegalactions.Citizensmustprovidethe
Central Government with 60 days advance notice of their intention to file a complaint to give the
government an opportunity to take remedial action. Under the public interest litigation process, the
SupremeCourtofIndiaandtheHighCourtshaverelaxedstandingandotherproceduralrequirementsso
that citizens may filesuits bya simpleletter without the use of a lawyer, and appear before green
benches(speciallyassignedjudges).
The186thReportofIndiasLawCommission(September2003)recommendedtheestablishmentof
environmentaltribunalswithexclusivejurisdictionwithregardtoenvironmentalcases.TheReportstated
thatenvironmentcourtsmustbeestablishedtoreducethepressureandburdenontheHighCourtandthe
SupremeCourt.Suchenvironmentaltribunalswouldexerciseallpowersofacivilcourtinitsoriginal
jurisdiction. They would also have appellate judicial powers against orders passed by the concerned
authoritiesundertheWaterAct,theAirAct,theEPA,andotherenvironmentrelatedacts.Atthenational
level,therewouldbeaNationalEnvironmentalTribunal,withcorrespondingtribunalsatthestatelevel.
TheproposalisstillunderconsiderationoftheGovernment.

Forexample,theWestBengalPCBusedclosure230timesandelectricitycutoff222timesbetweenApril2005
andMarch2006.

13

KeyChallenge
Thelackof civil administrativeauthority(particularly,toimpose administrative fines) limits the
effectivenessofPCBsenforcementeffortsandleadstooverrelianceonthejudiciaryforenforcement.
FilingcriminalcasesagainstviolatorsintrialcourtsorreactingtoPILsisatimeconsuming,unpredictable
andineffectiveenforcementmechanism.

3.2.

InstitutionalArrangementsandCapacityBuilding

SPCBs have primary enforcement authority in the states, while the CPCB performs the same
functionsforunionterritories.TheSPCBshavefurtherdelegatedsomeenforcementresponsibilitiesto
theirregionalandsubregionaloffices.TheCPCBsroleistoprovidetechnicalassistanceandguidanceto
theSPCBsandtocoordinateactivitiesamongthestates.Inaddition,theCPCBexercisesgeneraloversight
and,ifaStateBoardfailstocomplywithaCPCBdirection,maytemporarilyassumeSPCBfunctions.
ThereisalsoanissuetocoordinationbetweenSPCBsandotherstatelevelgovernmentagenciesthat
havesomeenvironmentrelatedresponsibilities,includingdepartmentsoftransport(withrespecttomobile
sourcepollution),ofurbandevelopment(municipalwaste),ofindustries(sitingofindustrialfacilities),
etc.Atpresent,suchinteragencycollaborationisveryweak.
DualLineofCommand.SPCBsreceiveadministrativedirectionsandsomefundingfromtheirstate
governments.ThisduallineofcommandwiththeCPCBcancreateproblems,sinceattimestheCPCBs
proposedactionsarenoteffectivelyimplementedduetoastategovernmentsinactionorindifference.
WiththeexceptionoftheNationalWaterQualityAssessmentAuthority,thereisnoformalinstitutional
mechanismforinteragencycoordinationonformulatingandimplementingenvironmentalregulations.The
interagencytaskforcesandworkinggroupsestablishedfromtimetotimetotacklespecificenvironmental
issuesdonotadequatelyaddresslongtermcoordinationonenvironmentalmanagementandenforcement.
Accordingtotheassessment,theSPCBsareinterestedinstrengtheningcoordinationwithCPCBandother
statesthroughacommunicationnetwork,andannualactionplanningefforts.
HumanResources.Thisrapidassessmentidentifiedhumanandinstitutionalcapacitylimitationsat
boththecentralandstatelevels.ThehumanresourcesstructureinmostSPCBsisheavilydominatedby
nontechnicalstaff.Forexample,intheAndhraPradeshPCB,thereareonly88technicalstaffoutofthe
totalof355(25percent),resultinginasituationwhereonetechnicalpersonisrequiredtomonitor100
pollutinginstallations.Amongtheprofessionals,therearemostlyengineers,withveryfewlegalorpolicy
experts.Inanextremecase,theArunachalStatePCBhasnostaffofitsownandisrunbythepersonnelof
theStateDepartmentofEnvironmentandForests.Thevacancyratioisashighas65%attheSPCBof
Karnataka,54%inPunjab,46%inGoa,and43%inAndhraPradesh(PlanningCommission,20012002).
OftenSPCBshirecontractemployees(e.g.,inManipur,Sikkim,Kerala,MadhyaPradesh)whodonotget
standardcivilservicebenefitsand,therefore,havelowworkmotivation.
PartofthereasonforsuchseverestaffshortagesisthattheCentralGovernmenthasnotlaiddown
anynormsfordeterminingthestaffingstructureoftheStateBoardsintermsoftheshareoftechnicalstaff
orthecoverageofpollutionunits.ThepayscalesforPCBstaffalsovarygreatlyacrossthestates.While
financialresourcesareoftenaconstraintinfillingthevacancies(seebelow),inmanystateswherePCBs
aredoingwellfinancially(e.g.,Maharashtra,UttarPradesh,TamilNadu)theycannotgetapprovalsfrom
therespectivestategovernmentstohiremorestaff.Frequentchangeofchairmenhasalsohamperedthe
workofPCBs:forexample,theUttarPradeshPCBhaschanged24chairmeninthelast24years(Gupta
andPriyandarshini,2003).

14

Finally,thelowlevelofprofessionaltrainingcontributestothelackofinstitutionalcapacity.Thereis
noformalproceduralortechnicaltraininginanySPCB.Neitherarethereminimumtrainingrequirements
specifiedbytheCentralBoard.LessthanonepercentofthetotalSPCBexpendituregoestostafftraining.
TheseissuesareaddressedindetailintheU.S.EPAreportEnvironmentalComplianceandEnforcement
TrainingInstitutionsinIndiaandTrainingRecommendations(2005).
Financial Resources. The staff costs and compliance monitoring and enforcement activities of
SPCBsarefundedbygrantsfromthestategovernments,verylimitedprogrambasedallocationsfromthe
central budget and, for the most part, by revenues from the water cess (80 percent of the total cess
collectedinthestateisreimbursedtotherespectiveSPCB),administrativefeesforconsentprocessingand
laboratoryanalysisservices(differentratesapplyindifferentstates),aswellasfundsforfeitedthrough
bankguaranteeprograms(wherethoseexist).
TherearevastvariationsinthefinancialpositionsofSPCBs:someofthemareheavilydependenton
state government funding while others rely on their own resources. Some SPCBs like those of
Maharashtra,Karnataka,andUttarPradeshhavelargeownresourcesandevensurpluses(duetothehigh
revenuesfromthewatercess).Ontheotherhand,PCBsofstateslikeKeralaandJammuandKashmir
receiveover80percentoftheirfundingingovernmentgrants(PlanningCommission,20012002).Even
those few SPCBs that are selfsufficient are faced with spending restrictions imposed by the state
governments.
Theexpenditurepatternsarealsoquitedifferentfromstatetostate.Inmoststates,amajorshareof
thebudget(6070percentonaverage)isallocatedtoadministrativeexpenses,primarilysalaries.Dueto
theshortageoffunds,thePCBslackadequateinfrastructure(monitoringequipment,laboratories,etc.)to
executetheirresponsibilities.AnexampleofthisistheBiharPCBthatdoesnothaveasinglelaboratoryto
testeffluentsamples(GuptaandPriyadarshini,2003).
KeyChallenges

1 ThereisinsufficientcoordinationbetweentheCPCBandSPCBsduetothedoublesubordination
of SPCBs (and the administrative influence of state governments) as well as tothe lack of
comprehensivestandardcomplianceandenforcementpoliciesandprocedures.

2 Significanthumanandtechnicalcapacityconstraintsareanobviousfactorthatimpactseffective
executionofallcomplianceandenforcementfunctionsatthecentral,stateandlocallevels.

3 Intheabsenceofstrongpoliticalwilltoaddressenvironmentalchallenges,fundinglimitations
remain a significant challenge facing all environmental institutions. The variations in the
financialstatusandsourcesoffundingofthePCBsleadtohorizontallyinequitabletreatmentof
theregulatedcommunity.Anoverdependenceonfeescanalsoleadtomixedincentivesand
prioritiesforstaff.

3.3.

ComplianceMonitoring:Permitting,Inspections,andSelfMonitoring

Permitting. AllpollutingfacilitiesarelegallyrequiredtoobtainfromarespectiveSPCBaconsent
(permits)toestablish(CTE)andaconsenttooperate(CTO).InaccordancewithaNotificationissuedby
the MOEF in September 2006, certain new industrial projects/activities or those planning major
notificationsalsorequireaPriorEnvironmentalClearance(fromtheCPCBforCategoryAorfroman
SPCBforCategoryB)basedonanenvironmentalimpactassessment(EIA)report.

15

ACTEisgrantedafteranevaluationofthepotentialenvironmentalimpactandofthedesignof
pollution control installations. Conditions for pollution control measures are part of a CTE. Upon
verificationofcompliancewiththeseconditions,aCTOisissuedwithemissionandeffluentlimitsbased
on industrial sectorspecific standards4, as well as selfmonitoring and reporting schedules. Industries
involvedinhandlinghazardous,biomedical,ormunicipalwastesmustalsoobtainanauthorization.Some
states(e.g.,Gujarat)issueconsolidatedconsentsforairandwaterpollutionandhazardouswastebasedon
CommonConsentApplications(CCA).Others,likeChattisgarh,issuewaterandairconsentsaswellas
wastemanagementauthorizationsseparately.Inpractice,onlylargeandmediumsizedfacilitieshavethe
requiredpermits.Mostsmallscaleindustriesoperatewithoutanyconsents.
TheCPCBhasrecentlydraftedGuidelinesforManagementofConsentandAuthorization 5whichtry
tostreamlinethepermittingprocessacrossthestatesandstipulateconsentvalidityperiodsfordifferent
categoriesofindustry(red,orangeorgreen 6)basedontheirpotentialenvironmentalimpact.Currently,
each statesets its own rules, and consent validity periods varybetween one or twoyears for highly
pollutingindustriesto15yearsforSMEs.
Centralandstateofficialsspendasignificantamountoftimeandresourcesonpermittingdueinpart
tocontinuingindustrialgrowth.InAndhraPradesh,thenumberofnewfacilitiesapplyingforconsent
permitsincreasedfrom611in2005to970in2006.Casesofconsentdenialsarerare:inAndhraPradesh,
theyconstitutedameretwopercentofthetotalapplicationsreceived.
Inspection.MonitoringandinspectionareakeyfunctionofSPCBs.Thefrequencyofonsitevisitsto
verifycomplianceisdeterminedbythepollutionpotential(red/orange/green)andsize(basedonthevalue
ofcapitalinvestment)oftheindustry.TheCPCBguidanceonthefrequencyofregularinspectionsis
presentedinTable2.However,individualstatesseemtohavedifferinginterpretationoftheguidanceand
didnotregarditasbinding.Forexample,redcategoryfacilitiesaresupposedtobeinspectedonceamonth
inGujarat,onceperquarterinOrissa,andonceeverytwoyearsinWestBengal.
Table 2. Minimum Frequency of Inspections: CPCB Guidance

SizeofIndustry
Largeandmediumsized
Smallscale(capitalinvestment
below10,000rupees)

CategoryofPollutionPotential
Red
Orange
Green
Red
Orange
Green

InspectionFrequency
Onceevery3months
Onceayear
Onceintwoyears
Onceayear
Oncein3years
Oncein5years

In addition to inspections to evaluate compliance, SPCBs conduct inspections in response to


complaints and sometimes as part of the consent renewal process. Most inspections are multimedia
(coveringair,waterandwaste)andunannounced.Afterinspection,inspectingteamspreparewritten
4

TheMinimumNationalStandardsareestablishedbytheCPCBbutSPCBshavetherighttomakethemmore
stringent under their jurisdiction. The emission/effluent standards are based on studies undertaken by technical
institutions,andmanyofthemhaveproventobeunrealisticallystringentandeconomicallyunfeasible(WorldBank,
2006).
5
AtthetimeofthisrapidassessmenttheauthorswereunabletosecureacopyoftheseGuidelines,anditisunclear
whethertheyhaveindeedbeenadopted.

Theredcategoryincludes64typesofindustry,theorange25sectors,andgreen55sectors.

16

reports.Tobestdeployresources,someSPCBsarealsoworkingtosetprioritiesinkeepingwithannual
plansthatprioritizehighlypollutingsectors,projectsoractivities.
TherearenostandardinspectionandsamplingproceduresprescribedeitherintheWaterAct,AirAct
orEPA,ortheirregulations,andtheCPCBandSPCBshavenotissueduniformguidelines.Asaresult,
boardsdevelopandapplytheirownapproachesandmethods,whichisaninefficientwaytouselimited
agencyresources.Forexample,thedeficiencyofthesamplingprocedureisquotedasoneofthemain
reasonswhycourtsoftenruleagainstthegovernment.
While the number of inspections conducted by different SPCBs is impressive (for example, in
AndhraPradesh,24,565inspectionswerecarriedoutoverthelastthreeyears),mostSMEsareinspected
veryrarelyorneveratall.Inaddition,giventhenumberoffacilitiestheveryfewSPCBinspectorshaveto
visit, there is tremendous pressure to complete inspections as quickly as possible, which limits their
effectivenessandleadstopoordetectionofviolations.SeveralSPCBsrotateinspectorswithinthestatein
order to reduce favoritism, but the need to relocate tends to demoralize staff which is already
overstretched.
CPCBzonalofficesalsohavearighttoconductinspectionsassociatedwithanationalstrategy,a
specialprojectwithinazonalarea,theEnvironmentalSurveillanceSquadprogram,oracourtobligation.
ZonalofficeinspectionsareusuallymoreextensivethanSPCBinspectionsandoftentakeseveraldaysto
complete(U.S.EPA,2005).
SelfmonitoringandReporting.AccordingtothenationalEnvironmental(Protection)Rulesof1986,
eachpollutingfacilitymustsubmitanEnvironmentalStatementattheendofeachfinancialyear(April
throughMarch).TheEnvironmentalStatementshouldincludethefollowinginformation:

1 waterandrawmaterialconsumption;
2 airandwaterpollutiondischargedbyparameter(averagedailyquantityandconcentrationas
wellaspercentageofvariationfromtheprescribedlimits);

3 hazardouswastegeneration(totalquantityfromtheproductionprocessandpollutioncontrol
installations)andmethodsofdisposal;

4 solidwastegeneration,reuse,recycling,anddisposal;and
5 pollutionabatementmeasuresimplemented.
Theconsentsprescribeparametersandrespectiveselfmonitoringfrequencies,althoughprocedures
andrequirementsacrossstatesarenotuniform.Lackofreportingorfalsereportingmayleadtocriminalor
administrativepenalties.Theexistinglegalframework,however,doesnotauthorizeenforcementactions
throughthecourtsbasedonselfdisclosedreports.Rather,governmentagenciescanonlypursuelegal
actiononthebasisoflegalsamplestakenbyinspectorswhoarecertifiedtoconductinspectionsin
accordancewithspecifiedprocedures.Asaresult,notusingselfreportedinformationisasignificant
constraintinpromotingcomplianceandenforcement.
ThirdParty Audit in Gujarat. To support monitoring and enforcement efforts, Gujarat has
introduced an Environmental Audit Scheme aiming at ascertaining the performance of environmental
managementsystemsinvariousindustriesinthestate.OneobjectiveoftheprogramistoarmtheGujarat
PCBandtheassociationofindustries withnecessaryperformanceinformationtosupport compliance
monitoring.

17

IntroducedunderthedirectionsoftheHighCourtofGujaratandimplementedunderthedirectionof
atechnicalcommitteeconsistingofexpertsfromtheNationalInstituteofOccupationalHealth,CPCBand
theGovernmentofGujarat,theschemerequiresindustriestosubmitanannualenvironmentalauditreport
throughdesignatedauditorsrecognizedbytheBoard.Ifaspecifiedindustrydoesnotsubmititsaudit
reportaccordingtotheprescribedtimeschedule,theBoardissuesanoticeofdirectiontothedefaulting
unit,failingwhich,theGujaratPCBcanrequesttheconcernedauthoritytodisconnectwaterorelectricity
services.
According to the Gujarat PCB, the Environmental Audit Scheme has resulted in improved
complianceandenforcementofenvironmentallaws,creatinganeffectivemechanismforsupplementing
legalmonitoringofindustrieswithathirdpartyaudit.
AreaBased Environmental Management Programs. The areabased approach to environmental
regulationhasbeentriedinIndiasince1991throughdifferentCPCBandSPCBprograms.Forexample,
theCPCBandconcernedSPCBsidentified24criticallypolluted/problemareas,actionplansforwhich
(including compliance monitoring measures) have been developed and are in various stages of
implementation.Similarly,UrbanAirActionPlanshavebeendesignedin17cities(outof53identifiedby
theCPCB)whereairqualityexceedsthenationalambientstandards(WorldBank,2006).Whilearea
based programs have an advantage of focusing regulatory and compliance monitoring efforts of the
concernedSPCBs,theysofarhavehadmixedsuccessinIndia,mostlyduetothelackofcoordinationof
effortstargetingindustry,municipal,mobile,andnonpointpollutionsources.
KeyChallenges

1 Thelackofnationwideimplementingguidanceonpermittingandcompliancemonitoringfrom
the CPCB on such issues as definition of compliance, consent conditions, reporting format,
samplingrequirements,aswellasinterpretationofdifferentregulationssignificantlyimpairsthe
qualityofSPCBimplementingprogramsandlimitstheexchangeofexperiencesbetweenthe
states.

2 Legallimitationsontheuseofselfmonitoringdataasevidenceincourtandotherproceedings
puts an additional monitoring burden on SPCBs and serve as a disincentive for industry to
conductaccurateselfmonitoringandreporting.

3 Overemphasisofpermitting,monitoringandinspectionactivitiesonindustryingeneraland

largeindustryinparticularlimitsSPCBregulatoryprogramstoanimportantbutnotdominant
pollutionsource,whilethesignificantcumulativepollutionimpactsfromSMEs(contributing
roughly70percentoftheindustrialpollutionload),municipalsources,transportandagriculture
arevirtuallydisregarded.

4 SPCBstaffspendadisproportionatelyhighamountoftimeonissuingconsents(whosevalidity
periods are often unjustifiably short) at the expense of their compliance monitoring and
enforcementresponsibilities.

3.4.

EnforcementResponse

Whilepollutioncontrolboardsmaycloseanoffendingfacilityororderthewithdrawalofitspoweror
watersupply,itmayonlyimposepenaltiesbyfilingcasesundertheWaterandAirActsandtheEPA,
whichmayincludefinesand/orimprisonment.Pursuingcasesthroughtrialandappellatecourts,however,
has proven to be an ineffective enforcement response, since courts are overburdened, procedures are
cumbersome,andresourcesofstateboardsareoverstretched.

18

Therearenouniformpoliciesorproceduresatthenationalorstatelevelsguidingenforcement
responses.Basedonthesurvey,however,itispossibletoidentifyageneralenforcementsequence:

1) gatherinformationonnoncompliancebasedonsitevisitsandcompliancemonitoring;
2) analyzelegalsamplesatacertifiedlaboratory;
3) issueashowcausenotice(warningletter)and,oftheviolationcontinues,alegalnoticeof
violation;

4) review(inahearingattheSPCB)evidenceprovidedbythesuspectedviolatorinitsdefense;
5) issueanoticeofproposeddirectivedetailingenforcementresponse(whichmayincludeutilities
cutofforclosure)and/orcorrectiveactionandcomplianceschedules;

6) afterreviewofpossibleobjectionbytheviolator,issueafinaldirective;and
7) incaseofnoncompliancewiththedirective,initiateprosecutionincriminalcourt.
AdministrativeResponse. Theuseofemergencyordersbyaboardtocutoffthepowerorwater
supplyofanindustrialplantinviolationofaneffluentoremissionstandardhasprovedtobeaneffective
deterrent.BetweenJanuary2005andSeptember2006,forexample,theWestBengalPCBdisconnected
theelectricityfor373facilities,thoughreconnected257overthesametimeperiod.Between1997and
2002,theMaharashtraPCBdisconnectedservicesfor858forviolationoftheWaterAct,and145for
violationoftheAirAct.Closureisalsousedfairlyofteninsomestates.InMarch2006,forexample,the
WestBengalPCBissued74closureorders,althoughmostofthemweretemporary.TheSPCBmayalso
revoketheviolatingfacilitysconsent,whichdoesnotguaranteethattheoperationswouldactuallycease,
soboardofficialsconsiderclosuretobeamoreeffectiveinstrument.
CriminalResponse.Acourtcanimposestringentcriminalpenalties,includingimprisonmentof18
monthsto6yearsplusfines.Thegovernmentmayalsoseekcompensationfordamagecausedbythe
violation.However,theproblemoflongdelaysingettingatrialrendersthisinstrumentineffective.In
addition,theconvictionratesarelow.Since1989,theMaharashtraPCBhashada35percentsuccessrate
inprosecutions under the Water Act, whichit attributes to reluctance by courts tohand down harsh
sentencesforenvironmentalviolationsandtotheweaklegalexpertiseoftheboardsthemselves.Many
casesaredismissedonthegroundsthatthesamplesarenotproperlycollectedinstrictaccordancewith
mandatoryprovisionsintheAct.Monetaryfines,eveniforderedbythecourt,aretoolowtocreate
effective deterrence. As a result, PCBs resort to courts less and less and prefer to use emergency
administrativeordersandforfeitureofbankguarantees(seeSection3.6).
Enforcementactions,likecompliancemonitoringprograms,focusprimarilyonlargeindustry.Small
scaleindustriesaremostoftenignoredbyPCBs.Insomecases,evenlargepollutersareleftoffthehook
becauseofthepressureexertedbypowerfulpoliticalgroupsandindustriallobbies.
KeyChallenges

1 Thereisalackofregulatorytoolsandflexibilitytoprovideproportionateenforcementresponse
withappropriatedeterrenteffectagainstviolationsthatdonothaveanimmediatesevereimpact
ontheenvironmentbutrepresentcontinuousnoncompliancewithregulatoryrequirements(e.g.,
small but routine exceedance of emission/effluent limits, failure to do selfmonitoring and
reporting).

19

1 Availablepunitivetoolsfornoncompliancehaveprovenineffectivebecauseproceduresarerigid
and timeconsumingwhilepenalties are toolow andfail to consider the full economic and
environmentalimpactsoftheviolation.

3.5.

ComplianceAssistanceandDataManagement
Tohelpindustryachievecompliance,PCBsundertakearangeofactivities,including:

1 organizingtrainingandtechnicalassistance;
2 developing industryspecific reports outlining problems, compliance status and
preventive/controloptions;

3 disseminatingthecharteronCorporateResponsibilityforEnvironmentalProtectioninthe17

categories of highly polluting industries, which seek voluntary compliance beyond the
prescribedstandards;and

4 awarenesscampaigns.
TrainingandTechnicalAssistance.MostoftheSPCBsprovidegeneraltechnicalassistance,suchas
trainingprogramsorconferencesandalmostallhavewebsitescontaininginformationontheiractivities
andregulations.SomeofthelargeSPCBsprovidetechnicalassistancetoindividualfacilities,particularly
inidentifyingthereasonsfornoncomplianceanddevelopingcorrectiveactionsandmonitoringprograms.
Tofacilitatecomplianceinthewastesector,CPCBhasdevelopedwasteminimizationcirclestoencourage
industriestoreducewaste.Inaddition,thepollutioncontrolboardsarepromotingcleanerfueltoreduce
emissionsandensuringcomplianceovertime,sincethequalityoffuelplaysanimportantroleinthe
natureandextentofairpollutionfromthesesources.Despitetheseinitiatives,complianceinsmallscale
industrycontinuestoposeamajorchallengefortheregulatoryagencies.
Compliance Assistance Information. A National Action Plan for Cleaner Production has been
adoptedbytheMOEFtohelpindustriesdevelopandadoptcleanerproductiontechnologies.TheCPCB
providestargetedtechnicalassistancetotheregulatedcommunitybydevelopinganddistributingindustry
specifictechnicaldocumentsformajorindustries,includingtheComprehensiveIndustryDocumentSeries
(COINDS),ResourceRecyclingSeries(RERES),andInformationManualonPollutionAbatementand
CleanerTechnologiesSeries(IMPACTS).Thesedocumentsprovideindustryspecificdescriptions,best
practicesandopportunitiesforpollutionpreventionandwasteminimization.AccordingtothePCBs,the
CPCB technical documents target primarily large industry and do not address compliance promotion
amongSMEs.Noneofthesedocumentsprovidetheregulatedcommunitywithsummaryinformation
aboutregulatoryrequirements.
CharteronCorporateResponsibilityforEnvironmentalProtection.Onevoluntaryinitiativeaimed
atreducingindustrialpollutionistheCharteronCorporateResponsibilityforEnvironmentalProtection
(CREP).In2003,MOEFandCPCB,inconsultationwithindustry,launchedtheChartertopromotewaste
minimization and adoption of clean technologies. Eight task forces comprising representatives of the
MOEF,CPCB,SPCBs,industryassociationsandexpertsmonitorimplementationoftheCharter.The
Charterrecognizesthatsomeofthe17categorysourceswerenotincompliancewithallrequirementsand
set new industry sectorspecific compliance dates. As part of this process, noncomplying facilities
submittedbankguarantees(seeSection3.6)withtheiractionplans.
AwarenessCampaigns. TheMOEF,theCPCBandSPCBsareincreasinglypostingenvironmental
informationontheirwebsites.TheSPCBarenowundertakinggreaternumberofenvironmentalawareness

20

programs.TheAndhraPradeshPCBconductsenvironmentalmobileexhibitionprogramsforindustries,
educationalorganizationsandgeneralpublic.InGujarat,forexample,communityoutreachprogramslike
PollutionAwarenessandAssistanceCenter(PAAC)aredesignedtobuildpublicsupport.
DataManagement.TheCPCBandsomeSPCBs(e.g.,inGujarat,AndhraPradesh,Maharashtraand
WestBengal)maintaindatabasestorage,retrievalandarchivesystemsinpaperaswellaselectronicform.
Thesedatabasesincludeinformationonindividualfacilities,consents,andinspectionreports.Afewstates
like Andhra Pradesh started using advanced tools like Management Information System (MIS) and
GeographicInformationSystem(GIS).DevelopedbytheNationalInstituteofInformationTechnology,
theMISattheAndhraPradeshPCBaimstocapturecompleteinformationonconsents,authorizations,fee
payments,inspections,violationsanddirectivesforcorrectiveactions,etc.throughdifferentmodulesand
thedatabase,andfacilitatecommunicationbetweentheofficesoftheBoard.Thissoftwarealsoseeksto
integratethedatawithGISforeffectivespatialenvironmentalmanagement.TheAndhraPradeshPCBhas
recentlyabandonedpaperfilingandshiftedcompletelytoelectronicdatamanagement.
TheCPCBinassociationwithSPCBshasrecentlyinitiatedthecreationofanEnvironmentalData
Bank.Itwillcollectdatafrom215airqualitymonitoringstationsin23statesundertheNationalAir
MonitoringProgramand444waterqualitymonitoringstationsin20statesundertheMonitoringofIndian
NationalAquaticResourcesSystem.ThedatawouldbeenteredbyrespectiveSPCBs,verifiedbythe
CPCBanduploadedtotheCPCBwebsite.
KeyChallenges

1 SPCBs have limitedcapabilitiesforprovidingtargetedtechnicalassistance tothe regulated


community.WhiletheCPCBandSPCBshavedevelopedsomeoutreachtools(e.g.,websites),
informationalandtrainingmaterials,theseneedtobeupgradedandexpanded,includingmaking
moreresourcesavailableinlocallanguagesratherthaninEnglish.

2 Existinginformationmanagementsystemsarefarfromsatisfactoryinmoststates,andthereare
nonationalguidelinesaimedatuniformcollection,managementandsharingofenvironmental
informationthatwouldenableimprovedcollaborationonenforcementactions.SPCBsalsolack
trainedstafftostoreandanalyzedataatboththenationalandstatelevels.

3.6.

EconomicandOtherIncentivesbasedInstruments

TheNEPrecommendsajudiciousmixofincentivesandregulatoryinstrumentsandemphasizesthe
useofeconomicprinciplesinenvironmentaldecisionmaking.Italsorecommendsthepreparationand
implementationofanactionplanontheuseofeconomicinstrumentsforenvironmentalregulationin
specified contexts, including those relating to unsustainable production and consumption. Currently,
economicinstrumentsplayaverylimitedsupplementalroleinpromotingenvironmentalcompliancein
India.Principaleconomicinstrumentsincluderebateonthewatercess,bankguarantees,subsidiesfor
pollutioncontrolequipment,andotherfiscalincentives.
RebateonWaterCess.ThecessrateisspecifiedbytheGovernmentandthesameinallthestates:it
variesforindustryfrom0.5Rs/m3to3Rs/m3dependingonthepurposeofwateruseandthepresenceof
biodegradableortoxicpollutantsintheeventualeffluent.Thecessamountiscalculatedbasedonmetered
waterconsumption.OutofthecesscollectedandcreditedtotheConsolidatedFundofIndia,80percentis
reimbursedtorespectiveSPCBstoaugmenttheresourcesoftheBoards(seeSection3.2).Duetothe
unevendistributionofwaterresourceavailabilityandwaterconsumptioninIndia,cessrevenuesarealso
varydramaticallyamongthestates.

21

Industriesthatcomplywitheffluentstandards,areconnectedtoawastewatertreatmentplant,anddo
notconsumewaterinexcessoftheprescribedlimitareentitledtoa25percentrebateinthewatercess.
Therebateschemetherebyencouragescompliance.
BankGuarantees. Somestates(e.g.,Maharashtra,AndhraPradesh,WestBengal)employabank
guaranteeschemeasameansofensuringcompliancewithSPCBdirectives.Underthisscheme,astate
boardrequiresthenoncomplyingfirmtopostabankguaranteetoensuretheimplementationofcorrective
actions inaccordancewith thenegotiatedcompliance schedule. Renewal of a CTOisconditional on
posting the guarantee. Normally, 10% of the estimated total compliance cost is required as a bank
guarantee.Ifthenoncomplyingfirmfailstocomplyintime,theSPCBforfeitsaportionorallofthebank
guaranteeforitsdiscretionaryuse.Thereisnoofficialproceduretodeterminetheamountofforfeiture,
and the decision is made by the SPCB Chairman and Member Secretary (in principle, it should be
proportionatetotheextentofviolation).
BetweenJanuary2005andAugust2006,theWestBengalPCBimposed92bankguaranteesworth
USD3.5million,ofwhichtwowereforfeited.Since2003,theWestBengalPCBreallocates50percentof
revenues from forfeitedbank guarantees for environmental improvements inthe area where the non
complyingfacilityislocated.
Theforfeitureisapowerfulmonetarypenaltyforaviolatorandasignificantdeterrentagainstfuture
noncompliance.However,thisinstrumentmaynotbeapplicabletoSMEswhichoperateonsmallprofit
marginsandcannotaffordsuchadeposit.Inaddition,manyissuesrelatedtotheapplicationofbank
guaranteesremaintobeclarified:howtheguaranteeshouldbecalculated,howforfeitures shouldbe
calculated and revenues used, whether supplementary collateral should be required if the compliance
scheduleisextended.
SubsidiesforPollutionControlInstallations.Thecentralandstategovernmentshaveintroduceda
numberofsubsidiesforpollutioncontrolequipmentandtreatmentinstallations.TheCommonEffluent
TreatmentPlant(CETP)subsidyschemeisundertakenbytheMOEFtoenableclustersofsmallscale
industriestoestablishorupgradeCETPs.Thecentralandstategovernmentssubsidizeeach25percentof
totalprojectcosts,30percentissecuredthroughloansfromfinancialinstitutions,andtheremaining20
percentiscoveredbytheparticipatingsmallindustriesthemselves.
Duringfiscalyear20052006,ongoingandnewCETPprojectsreceivedapproximatelyUSDone
millionworthoffinancialassistance.Theentireinitiativehashelpedsetupmorethan90CETPs,currently
operatingwithmixedresults.AccordingtotheMOEFannualreport,onlyaquarteroftheassessedCETPs
compliedwiththeprescribedlimitsforsuchbasicparametersasBODandCOD,andmere6.4percent
compliedwithstandardsforallgeneralparameters.Pooroperationsandmaintenanceandinsufficient
treatmentcapacitywerequotedasreasonsforthismediocreperformance.
UndertheCreditLinkedCapitalSubsidyScheme,theMinistryofSmallScaleIndustryisproviding
assistancetosmallindustrialunitsforadoptionofcleanerproductiontechnologiesandinstallationof
pollutioncontrols.ThefinancialsupportofuptoUSD225,000includesa15percentsubsidyfromthe
SmallIndustryDevelopmentBankofIndiaandtheNationalBankforRuralDevelopment(WorldBank,
2006).
To promote environmental compliance among smallscale industries, some states like Andhra
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Maharashtra have initiated innovative economic incentive
schemes that promote compliance with environmental requirements. For example, in Kolkata (West
Bengal),themajorityofsmallindustriescontinuetouseenergyinefficientcoalfiredheatinginstallations
withoutanypollutioncontrolsystems.TheWestBengalPCBadoptedstrictparticulateemissionstandards

22

andintensifiedenforcementeffortstargetingthesepollutionsources.Inordertofacilitatefuelconversion
fromcoaltooilorgasinsmallboilersandceramickilns,thePCBlaunchedin2001aprojecttoprovide
financialassistancetotheseindustrieswithsupportoftheIndiaCanadaEnvironmentFacility(ICEF).
Underthescheme,25percentofthecapitalcostsofconversionarereimbursedaftertheimplementationas
amatchinggrantbytheWestBengalPCB,andfurther25percentbytheICEF.AsofDecember2004,a
totalof228smallboilersand18ceramickilnshadbeenconvertedtocleanerfuel.Thishasledtoadrastic
reductionofemissionsofparticulatematterfromtheseindustrialunits.Thesameintegratedapproachof
regulation, enforcement, technical and financial assistance, including support with providing the gas
infrastructure,hasbeenappliedinAgra(UttarPradesh),reportedlyalsowithsuccess(WorldBank,2006).
PublicPrivatePartnerships. Througheconomicincentives,boththecentralandstategovernments
arepromotingpublicprivatepartnerships(PPPs)forthedevelopmentofinfrastructureforenvironmental
services.Forexample,inGujarat,10percentofthetotalinvestmentofUSD1,644millionforcontrolling
pollutionhascomethroughapublicprivatepartnership.CETPs,TSDF,andconveyancepipelinesfor
treatedwastewaterdisposalintodeepseaareeligiblefora25percentstatesubsidy.Thisisinadditionto
the25percentcentralgovernmentsubsidiesdesignatedforCETP,TSDFandcommonhazardouswaste
incinerators.Somestates,includingWestBengal,AndhraPradesh,andMaharashtra,areapplyingPPPsto
addressbiomedicalandhazardouswastemanagement.
OtherIncentiveInitiatives.Somestatesareintroducinginitiativestoencouragegoodenvironmental
behaviorthroughpackagesofeconomicandregulatoryincentives.Forexample,theGujaratPCBprovides
incentives to industries implementing environmental management systems (EMS) by issuing them
consentsonaprioritybasisandoflongervalidity(sixyears),providing25percentrebatesinwatercess
and50percentdiscountsonfeesforenvironmentalaudits(seeSection3.3).Somestateshaveeventriedto
makeISO14001certificationapreconditionforconsentrenewalforthe17mostpollutingcategoriesof
industries.However,turningEMSintoasectorwiderequirementcreatesadisincentiveforcompaniesto
adheretovoluntaryinitiativesinthefuture.
India has also started to experiment with environmental information disclosure and performance
ratingschemestoexertpublicpressureonnoncomplyingindustries.TheGreenRatingProjectforthe
pulpandpaperindustrywaslaunchedin1999bytheCentreforScienceandEnvironmentwithsupport
fromtheConfederationofIndianIndustries.Theexercisehasachievedimpressiveresultsintermsof
motivating industries to adopt environmental policies but did not get widely replicated (Gupta and
Priyadarshini,2003).

23

KeyChallenges

1 Theuseofeconomicinstrumentsforpromotingregulatorycomplianceremainsquitelimitedin
India.AlbeitemphasizedinthenewNEP,economicinstrumentsarenotexplicitlyauthorizedby
thelawandremainconfinedtopilotinitiatives.Theirpositiveexperiencesaredisseminatedvery
slowlyacrossthestatesintheabsenceofnationalleadershipandguidance.

2 Despiteanumberofpromisinginitiatives,financialincentivepackagesforsmallscaleindustries

thatareoftenunabletobearthecostofcleanertechnologiesareunderdeveloped.Intheabsence
of a wellstructured and needsbased grant or loan system, these industries will continue to
violateenvironmentalrequirements.

3 Theexistingstructureofuserfeesforwater/wastewaterandhazardousandmunicipalsolidwaste

managementisamajorimpedimentforbroaderimplementationofpublicprivatepartnershipsin
providingenvironmentalinfrastructureservices.Untilprivateoperatorscanrecovertheircostsin
areasonabletimeframe,theywillnotbeinterestedininvestinginsuchprojects.

3.7.

IndicatorstoEvaluateProgramSuccess

As indicators of program success, presently some SPCBs track activity levels: the numbers of
inspections,correctiveactions,closures,bankguaranteesimposed,courtcasesfiledandwon,monetary
valueoffinesperyear,eventheamountoffundscollectedthroughwatercessandadministrativefees.At
the same time, CPCB reports try to measure success against a few critical environmental quality
indicators,whicharenottiedtoanyenforcementactivity.
Overall,SPCBslackastandardsetofindicatorstoevaluatetheirrespectiveprograms.However,ina
recentpositivedevelopment,theMaharashtraPCBhasdraftedacomprehensivesetofindicatorstoassess
theperformanceoftheboardthatcouldbepotentiallyreplicatedinotherstates.Itcomprisesthefollowing
fivecomponents:

1 Approvals:numberofdifferentconsentsandauthorizationsissuedandrenewed,environmental
clearancesgranted,andpublichearingsheld;

2 Pollution:totalemission/effluentloadsperkeyparameters,wastegenerationandmanagement;
3 EnvironmentandMonitoring: numberoflocationsmonitored,ambientqualityofair,surface
freshwater,groundwater,andsurfacewaters,andnoiselevels;

4 Enforcement:numberofcomplaintsfiles,showcausenotices,noticesofviolationanddirectives
issued,prosecutionslaunchedandconvictionssecured;and

5 Infrastructure: staff numbers and breakdown, training, laboratory equipment, number of


environmentalinfrastructureprojects.

Indicatorsarealsoaninstrumenttofacilitateshortandlongtermplanning.TheGujaratPCBwasone
ofthefirsttoprepareavisiondocumententitledVision20102015andStrategyPlanningwhichwas
releasedinJune2006.Thevisiondocumentisapositivesteptowardsaproactive,integrated,target
orientedframeworkforenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementactivities.

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KeyChallenges

1 ThereisnoCPCBguidanceonhowtoestablishaccountabilityandmeasureSPCBperformance

andnouniformityindatacollectionandcompilationacrossthestates. Thelackofstandard
nationalindicatorstoassessandcompareeffectivenessofenforcementagenciesisanimportant
constraintforimprovedpolicymakingandprioritysetting.

2 Theabsenceofperformanceindicatorsreflectsthepresentreactiveapproachtocomplianceand
enforcement and the lack of priority setting and strategic thinking in Indias environmental
agencies.

3.8.

PublicParticipationinEnvironmentalComplianceandEnforcement

The NEP emphasizes the importance of public participation for strengthening environmental
institutionsandimprovedimplementationandenforcement.Indeed,thepublicisplayinganincreasingly
importantroleinsupportingenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementinIndia.
Public Interest Litigation. Indian citizens benefit from a unique approach for enforcing
environmentallawbyexercisingaconstitutionalrighttoahealthyenvironmentbeforetheSupremeCourt
andtheHighCourts.AsdetailedinSection3.1,althoughPILhasadvancedIndiasenvironmentalagenda
andresultedinsomeenvironmentalimprovements,ithasresultedinmoreworkforPCBsbecauseof
courtordereddirectivesandultimatelycontributedtotheconfusionoftheircomplianceandenforcement
efforts.
Citizen Complaints. Citizen complaints to the PCBs are an important mechanism for triggering
compliancemonitoringandenforcementresponse.InMaharashtra,forexample,betweenApril2004and
March2005,citizensfiled761complaintswithrespecttoair(306),water(292),solidwaste(31)andnoise
pollution(132).
SPCBs adoptdifferent approachestorespondeffectivelytocitizencomplaints.For example,the
AndhraPradeshPCBcreatedin1995aTaskForcecelltorespondtopubliccomplaints,conductsurprise
inspectionsandrequirecorrectiveaction.InWestBengal,thepubliccanlodgeacompliantbydirectly
approaching the Board office or by submitting a complaint on the Boards website along with the
necessaryaccompanyinginformation.Thecomplaintsareacknowledged,investigatedandsubsequently
redressedduringahearingatthePCBinthepresenceofbothparties.
Public Participation in EIA. As part of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process
stipulatedintheMOEFnotificationof14September2006,publicconsultation(includingaprocedurefor
written comments and a public hearing) is mandatory for certain categories of projects that have
significantenvironmentalimpacts.Thismechanismprovidesanopportunitytotheaffectedpeopletoraise
theirconcernsabouttheprojectandgetthemaddressedaccordingly.Involvingthepublicduringproject
preparationfacilitatesdecisionmakingonprojectdevelopment,raisespublicawarenessoftheprojectand
itspotentialimpacts,andhelpseffectivemonitoringintheoperationalphase.
Stakeholder Consultative Bodies. Some state boards are now involving stakeholders in the
compliance monitoring process. For example, in Maharashtra, the Board appointed Local Area
EnvironmentCommittees(LAEC)intheTarapurandDombivaliindustrialareastomonitorcompliance
withcourtandPCBdirectivesandbringthedefaulterstothenoticeoftheBoard.ComprisedofBoard
officials and representatives from the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC),
industries, and technical experts. The Andhra Pradesh PCB involves NGOs and communitybased
organizationsinenvironmentalaudits,wasteminimizationprojects,etc.

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AccesstoInformation. TheRighttoInformationActof2005isamajormilestoneforenhanced
public involvement through information disclosure. Under this Act, PCBs must make information
availabletothepublicregardingtheeffectsofpollution,theneedtopreventandcontrolpollutionandto
protecttheenvironment.Indiascommitmenttoimprovingaccesstoinformationisalsoreinforcedinthe
NEP, which recognizes that access to environmental information is the principal means by which
stakeholdersmayevaluatecompliancebytheregulatedcommunitywithenvironmentalrequirements.
KeyChallenges

1 SPCBs face serious resource limitations to deal effectively with citizen complaints as their
numberhasgoneoverathousandperyearinsomestates.

2 AccesstoenvironmentalinformationguaranteedbytheRighttoInformationActisnoteasyfor

citizens,asPCBseitherdonothavetheinformationisausableform(andhavenoresourcesto
systematizeit)orarereluctanttoprovideittothegeneralpublic.Examplesofthelatterare
consentapplications,consentsandauthorizationsthemselves,andinspectionreports.

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4.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings from the rapid assessment, a number of shortterm and mediumterm
recommendationsareproposedinconjunctionwiththosealreadyadvancedintherecentU.SEPA(see
Annex1)andWorldBankreports.TheywerediscussedataconsultationworkshophostedbyMOEFon
November3,2006inNewDelhi.
Theshorttermrecommendations(withatimehorizonof23years)dealprimarilywithurgently
neededmeasurestoimprovetheapplicationofanumberofcomplianceandenforcementinstruments(self
monitoring,fines,bankguarantees)andtobuildPCBcapacitybyestablishingstandardizedpoliciesand
proceduresandconductingextensivetrainingprograms.Anothermajordirectionforimprovementinthe
shorttermperspectiveistofocusmoreattentiononSMEs,bothintermsofcompliancemonitoringand
financialassistance.
Themediumtermrecommendations(ina57yearperspective)targetimprovementsintheoverall
managementcapacityofPCBswhichwillrequiremoresubstantialprogrammaticdevelopmenteffortsand
resources.

4.1

ShorttermRecommendations

Establishasystemofadministrativefinesandstreamlinethesystemofcriminalfines
Introducing civil administrative penalties imposable directly by SPCBs for certain categories of
violationsnotleadingtoasevereimmediateenvironmentalimpactwouldprovideanflexible,effective
enforcementtoolthatwouldalsogeneraterevenuesforSPCBs.AccordingtotheU.S.EPAreport,the
existingstatutes(EPA,AirandWaterActs)canbeinterpretedtogiveauthoritytodevelopacivilpenalty
program. Administrative fines set at an appropriately high level to serve as a deterrent and PCB
enforcementpoliciestoimplementthemwouldallowmoretimely,costeffectiveenforcementandwould
reducetheenvironmentalworkloadofthecourts.
Inparallel,theprovisionoftheEPAdeferringtootherapplicablelegislationforpenalties(Section
24)shouldberepealedsoastoallowtheimpositionofcriminalpenaltiesundertheEPA.Inthefuture,the
maximum rate of criminal fines should be further increased because after the introduction of
administrativefines,criminalfineswouldbeappliedonlytograveviolations.
Overcome legal limitations on using selfmonitoring information as evidence in court or other
proceedings
Reinterpretingexistinglawsormodifyinglegislationtoenablingpollutioncontrolboardstouseself
reported information (rather than only legal samples) as legal evidence would greatly facilitate
compliancemonitoringandenforcement.TheU.S.EPAreportarguesthatIndiaalreadyhasthelegal
authoritytoimplementthischange.Theuseofselfmonitoringdataasevidenceofnoncompliancewould
not onlymakeenforcement easier but wouldput pressure on industry to ensure selfmonitoringdata
integrity,therebyprovidinganincentivetoenhancetheuseandimprovethequalityofselfmonitoringand
selfreporting.

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Establishanddisseminatecomprehensivestandardcompliancemonitoringandenforcementpolicies
andprocedures,anddevelopanddeliverrelatedtrainingprograms
To overcome institutional coordination challenges and enable a more effective compliance and
enforcement programs, the CPCB should develop in partnership with state boards and set forth
comprehensive national policies, procedures (mandatory at least in key aspects), and guidelines for
complianceandenforcement(includingconsentissuance,monitoring,inspections,andsanctions).Such
national guidance, disseminated in a timely manner, would allow SPCBs to increase consistency,
transparency,effectiveness,andcostefficiencyof theiractivities.Itwouldalsopromoteexchangeof
practicalexperiencesandlessonslearnedamongthestateboards.Tosupportimplementation,theCPCB
shoulddevelopandorganizedeliveryinthestatesofanacrosstheboardtrainingprogramforSPCBstaff.
Minimum training requirements under the new procedures and guidelines would provide greater
nationwideuniformityinthestaffqualificationsandwillraisetheSPCBprofilebothinrelationtothe
regulatedcommunityandincourtproceedings.
Increasetheemphasisoncompliancemonitoringandenforcementandprioritizeinspectionefforts
basedonenvironmentalrisk
SPCBsshouldimprovetheirstrategicplanninginordertobetterbalanceresourcesbetweenconsent
management (which currently absorbs most of the staff time) and compliance monitoring and
enforcement.Thiscanbedoneextendingthevalidityperiodsofconsentsandauthorizationsbasedon
environmental risk and compliance record of industrial facilities. Inspections and enforcement efforts
should also be prioritized across the regulated community based on relative potential environmental
impact.TheCPCBcanhelpestablishamethodologyandmechanismforthestatestoidentifypriority
targetsthatwouldtakeintoaccountlocalneedsandpractices.
Develop more balanced compliance monitoring and compliance promotion programs by extending
themtoSMEs
ByexpandingtargetedmonitoringandcomplianceassistanceeffortstoSMEsandclustersofsmall
scaleindustries,centralandstateboardswouldaddressasignificantandgrowingpollutionsource.As
stronglyadvocatedbytheWorldBankinitsIndiaCountryEnvironmentAnalysis,awholeregulatory
packageshouldbeputtogetherbytheCPCBandSPCBstotargetSMEsatthestatelevelandlocallevels,
includingacomprehensiveinventory(toidentifyunitsthatcurrentlyoperatewithoutconsents),simplified
monitoringprocedure,environmentalawarenessraising,andtechnicalandfinancialassistanceprograms.
Closecooperationwithindustryassociationsisessentialindevelopinguserfriendlytechnicalguidance
documents(andmakingthemavailableonwebsites)andsettingupeconomicincentiveschemes,basedon
bestpracticeswhichalreadyexistinsomestates.However,complianceassistancewouldbeeffectiveonly
ifthereisacrediblethreatofdetectionandenforcementactionagainstviolators.
Developauniform,effectivebankguaranteesystem
TheMOEFandtheCPCBshouldbuildonsuccesses of bankguaranteeinitiatives pioneeredby
selectedstatestodevelopacoherentnationalsystemwithpoliciesandguidancethatwouldmakedeposits
proportionatetodamagefrompotentialviolationsandestablishtransparentproceduresfortheirpartialor
fullforfeitureincaseofnoncompliance.mechanismstoensureeffective.Makingtheamountofrequired
bankguaranteecommensuratetothefacilityscompliancehistorymayfurtheramplifytheincentiveeffect
ofthisinstrument.

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4.2.

MediumTermRecommendations

IncreasedirectcentralandstategovernmentfundinglevelstoPCBs
Thegovernmentshouldincreasedirectbudgetfundingforenvironmentalagenciestofillexisting
vacancieswithhighlyqualifiedandraisetheshareoftechnicalstaffinSPCBs,aswellasbuildupthe
technicalcapacity(laboratory,computerhardwareandsoftware,transport)oftheboards.Creatingastable
sourceoffundingwouldalsocorrectanoverdependenceonfeesthatcanleadtomixedincentivesand
prioritiesforPCBstaff.
Establishapublicinformationdisclosureprogram
The PCBs should leverage public pressure against violators by developing a public disclosure
programthatwouldpublicizecomplianceinformationofindividualpolluters.Basedontheexperienceof
publicdisclosureprogramsinotherAsiancountries(Indonesia,thePhilippines,China,andVietnam),the
CPCB,workingtogetherwithSPCBsandindustryassociations,shouldintroducearatingsystemformost
important industrial polluters based on selfreported and inspection data. Such a system would be a
complianceincentiveandbenchmarkingtoolforindustry,informationsourceandaccountabilityvehicle
forthepublic,andprioritysettingaideforenvironmentalagencies.
Upgradeandexpandcapabilitiesandcapacityininformationmanagement
TheCPCBandSPCBsshouldestablishauniformsystemofcollection,managementandsharingof
complianceandenforcementinformationatthenationalandstatelevels.Thecurrentpositiveexperiences
of some states (e.g., Andhra Pradesh) should be used to design and disseminate standardized data
requirements and formats, as well as appropriate software with an objective to gradually convert to
electronicinformationmanagementsystemthatwouldlinkallPCBs.Itshouldalsobeconsideredwhether
theCPCBsEnvironmentalDataBankonenvironmentalcouldbeexpandedtoincludecomplianceand
enforcement data. The government should also provide extensive staff training on information
management. The new system would save administrative costs, improve data quality, and increase
transparencyofPCBactivitiesbyenablingpublicaccesstotheinformation.
Createperformancemanagementsystemsandnationwideperformanceindicators
Withalinkagetoimprovedinformationmanagement,theCPCBshouldworkwithstatestoestablish
a performance management system for priority setting, planning and performance evaluation of
complianceandenforcementprograms,includingestablishingasetofnationalperformanceindicators.
TheemergingexperienceinMaharashtramayserveasapilotinestablishingsuchasystem.Apropermix
ofactivity(output)andresults(outcome)indicatorswouldenhancetheaccountabilityofPCBsontheone
handandhelptheboardsdesignproactivecomplianceandenforcementstrategiesontheother.

29

ANNEX1.U.S.EPARECOMMENDATIONSONENVIRONMENTALCOMPLIANCEAND
ENFORCEMENTININDIA

SummaryofRecommendations
Recommendation 1: Advocate for more resources, and streamline current practices to
maximizecurrentlyavailableresources.
Recommendation2:Developpoliciesandimplementingguidancetoassistthezonaloffices
andSPCBsinimplementingcomplianceandenforcementprograms.Asthesepoliciesand
guidancearedeveloped,effectiveorganizationwillnecessitatethatasystemforcataloguing
anddistributingtheguidanceinatimelymanneralsobedeveloped.
Recommendation 3: Establish the authority touseselfmonitoring, selfrecordkeeping, and
selfreportingasdirectevidenceofaviolationinthecourts(andadministrativelyshouldsucha
process be established); develop and distribute the necessary policies and implementing
guidance;andprovidetrainingtoSPCBs.
Recommendation4:Establishopacitystandardsandtestmethodsforemissionsfromstacks;
develop implementing policies and guidance; and establish the necessary training
infrastructure.
Recommendation5:Developnationalguidanceonminimuminspectortrainingrequirements;
develop and fund a compliance and enforcement training program to implement the
requirements;andensurethatallSPCBsareawareoftheprogramandthescheduleofcourses.
Recommendation 6: Develop a policy and provide implementing guidance that requires
regulated industries to provide bank guarantees for negotiated compliance schedules
incorporatedindirectivesissuedbytheBoards.
Recommendation 7: Utilize current statutory provisions to establish civil administrative
authority;establishtheinfrastructureformanagingadministrativecases;developthenecessary
enforcementresponseandpenaltypolicies;andprovidetrainingforthestates.
Recommendation8:Developeducationalmaterialsandcomplianceassistancetoolsforthe
regulatedcommunity,especiallysmallbusinesses,anddistributethematerialstoallregulated
sources.
Recommendation 9: Develop measures of success for the compliance and enforcement
programutilizingavarietyofparameters,andcommunicatethesemeasuresandtherationale
forwhytheyareneededtoSPCBs,theregulatedcommunity,andthepublic.
Recommendation10:Developauniformcomputerizedsystemforcollecting,maintainingand
utilizingcomplianceandenforcementdataatthenationalaswellasthestatelevel;developthe
necessaryimplementingpoliciesandguidance;andensurethattheSPCBsareawareofthem.
Recommendation 11: Establish a support organization to facilitate communication among
SPCBsonimportantenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementissues,andbetweenCPCB
andtheBoards.
Source: U.S. EPA, 2005.

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REFERENCES

GuptaO.K.andK.Priyadarshini(2003):CompliancetoEnvironmentalRegulations:TheIndianContext,
InternationalJournalofBusinessandEconomics,Vol.2,No.1,926
PlanningCommission,GovernmentofIndia(20012002):EvaluationStudyontheFunctioningofState
PollutionControlBoards,NewDelhi,http://planningcommission.gov.in/reports/peoreport/peof.htm

U.S.EPA(2005):ReportonEnvironmentalComplianceAndEnforcementInIndia,December2005
TheWorldBank(2006):India:StrengtheningInstitutionsforSustainableGrowth,Country
EnvironmentalAnalysis,October2006

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