Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176389

January 18, 2011

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN,
HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO
BIONG, Appellants.
RESOLUTION
ABAD, J.:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA)
and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the
charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the
victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due
process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in
the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."1
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the
accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
xxx
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being
punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision
of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If
there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been
acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation
would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:2
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject
the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent
instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents
for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single
criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.3
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But
the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of
such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.4
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to
bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court
"must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion
in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence." 5But he has not specified the violations of due
process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His
claim that "the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious
doubts the validity of the decision"6 is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal
perception.
Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan 7 as authority that
the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government
proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of
acquittal in that case was "dictated, coerced and scripted."8 It was a sham trial. Here, however,
Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has
2

made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices
who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves
did not really go through the process.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of the
evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave error on the
Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court
to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the
evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not
constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The
judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes
motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.
For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to intervene of
Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante
L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice
President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
The Motion for Reconsideration assails the majority for failing to uphold the trial courts
conclusions. The simple fact is that the evidence tends to demonstrate that Hubert Webb is
innocent. The simple fact also is that the evidence demonstrates that not only had Jessica Alfaro
failed to substantiate her testimony, she had contradicted herself and had been contradicted by
other more believable evidence. The other main prosecution witnesses fare no better. This is the
gist of the Decision sought to be reconsidered. While this Court does not make a dispositive
ruling other than a pronouncement of "guilt" or "non-guilt" on the part of the accused, the legal
presumption of innocence must be applied in operative fact. It is unfortunate that statements
were made that sought to dilute the legal import of the majority Decision. A pronouncement of
this Court that the accused has not been proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt cannot be
twisted to mean that this Court does not believe in the innocence of the accused when the
reasoning of the Court demonstrates such belief. A careful reading of the majority Decision, as
well as the concurring opinions, is required to determine whether the accused were
3

acquitted solely becausethere was lingering doubt as to their guilt of the crime charged or
whether the accused were acquitted not only because of doubt as to their guilt but also because
the evidence tends to establish their innocence. In the case of Hubert Webb, the evidence tends to
establish his innocence. On the other hand, the testimony of Jessica Alfaro was wholly rejected
by the majority as not believable.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, private complainant asserts that this Court should
have respected the trial courts resolve to give full credence to the testimony of Jessica Alfaro.
While as a general rule, a trial judges findings as to the credibility of a witness are entitled to
utmost respect as he has had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness stand, this
holds true only in the absence of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
judge.1 The succeeding discussion demonstrates why this Court has no choice but to reject the
trial courts findings.
The mistaken impression that Alfaro was a credible witness was, in significant measure,
perpetrated by the trial courts inappropriate and mismatched attribution of rights to and duties of
the accused vis-a-vis the principal witness in a criminal proceeding. As discussed in the
promulgated Decision of the Court in this case, the trial court failed to recognize the accuseds
right to be presumed innocent. Instead, the trial courts Decision indicated a preconceived belief
in the accuseds guilt, and as a corollary, that witness Alfaro was telling the truth when she
testified to the accuseds guilt. In excessively protecting Alfaro, the trial court improperly
ascribed to her the right reserved for an accused. It also unreasonably imposed severe limitations
on the extent of the right of the defense to cross-examine her.
During Alfaros cross examination, the defense counsel tried to impeach her credibility
by asking her about her 28 April 1995 Affidavit, which markedly differs from her 22 May 1995
Affidavit. The prosecution objected and moved that the questions be expunged from the records
on the basis of the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained allegedly without the assistance of
counsel, pursuant to Article III Section 12(1) and (3) of the 1987 Constitution. 2This
constitutional right, however, is a right reserved solely for the accused or a "person under
investigation for the commission of an offense." The prosecutions objection had no legal basis
because Alfaro was clearly not the accused in the case. Alfaro was a witness who had a legal
duty to "answer questions, although his (her) answer may tend to establish a claim against him
(her)."3 Notwithstanding this, the lower court sustained the prosecutions objection.
The law does not confer any favorable presumption on behalf of a witness. It is precisely
due to the absence of any legal presumption that the witness is telling the truth that he/she is
subjected to cross-examination to "test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest
or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue." 4 The Rules
provide that "the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in
the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom." 5] A
4

witness may be impeached "by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony."6
The right to cross-examine a witness is a matter of procedural due process such that the
testimony or deposition of a witness given in a former case "involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party" provided the adverse party
"had the opportunity to cross-examine him."7
Notwithstanding the right of the accused to fully and freely conduct a thorough cross
examination, the trial court set undue restrictions on the defense counsels cross examination of
Alfaro, effectively denying the accused such right. The length of the cross-examination is not as
material in the determination of the credibility of the witness as much as whether such witness
was fully tested by the defense when demanded to be tested on cross-examination for honesty
by contradictory evidence of a reputation for dishonesty, for inconsistency, or for possible bias or
improper motive.
To establish Alfaros bias and motive for testifying in the case, the defense counsel sought
to ask Alfaro about her brother, Patrick. Alfaro admitted that Patrick was a drug addict and had
been arrested once by the NBI for illegal possession of drugs, but that he was presently in the
United States. The theory of the defense was that Patricks liberty was part of a deal that Alfaro
had struck with the NBI in exchange for her services. When defense counsel inquired about the
circumstances of Patricks departure for the United States, the prosecution objected to the
questions on the ground of irrelevance. Respondent judge sustained the objection, thus
foreclosing a significant avenue for testing Alfaros "freedom from interest or bias."
The defense counsel tried to cross-examine Alfaro regarding her educational attainment
as stated in her sworn statements. The defense presented her college transcript of records to
prove that she only enrolled for a year and earned nine (9) academic units, contrary to her claim
that she finished second year college. Notably, Alfaro misrepresented her educational attainment
in both of her affidavits her 28 April 1995 Affidavit which she claimed was executed without
assistance of counsel, and her subsequent 22 May 1995 Affidavit which was admittedly executed
with the assistance of counsel. Apparently, Alfaros lie under oath about her educational
attainment persisted even after being given counsels assistance in the execution of the second
affidavit, as well as more time to contemplate the matter. Unfortunately, the lower court
sustained the prosecutions objection to the question on the ground of irrelevance when the line
of testing could have tested Alfaro's penchant for "accuracy and truthfulness."
Ironically, notwithstanding the trial courts disallowance of the defenses attempts to
impeach Alfaro's character, and the rule that "(e)vidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached," 8 the trial court allowed the prosecution to
5

present Atty. Pedro Rivera9 to testify positively on Alfaros character. Worse yet, the trial court
disallowed the defense from presenting Atty. Riveras earlier statement to impeach the latters
credibility; again, this was disallowed on the ground of immateriality. When a proffer of
evidence10 was made by the defense following such disallowance, the trial court struck the
proffer from the record on the ground that it was allegedly improper on cross-examination.
The notion that witness Alfaro was able to withstand her cross examination appears
sustainable in large part because her cross examination was so emasculated by the trial courts
inordinate protection of her, which went so far as to improperly accord her the right reserved for
an accused. Taken together with repeated instances of unwarranted exertion of effort to wipe the
record clean of some entries that cast doubt on Alfaros credibility, the trial courts actions show
that it had a bias towards upholding the truthfulness of Alfaros testimony.
The trial courts treatment of documentary evidence also suffered from mismatched
ascription discarding legal presumptions without evidence to the contrary while giving
evidentiary weight to unsubstantiated speculation. For instance, in rejecting
Webbs alibi defense, the trial court used mere speculation that the accuseds family influenced
the production of false entries in official documents to defeat the legal presumption of said
documents accuracy and regularity of issuance. Notably, the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (US INS) Certification, which confirmed that Webb was in the United
States from March 1991 until October 1992, was authenticated by no less than the Office of the
U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. State Department. Furthermore, this official certification of a
sovereign state. having passed through formal diplomatic channels, was authenticated by the
Department of Foreign Affairs. As discussed in the main decision, such official documents as the
authenticated U.S. INS Certification enjoy the presumption of accuracy of the entries
therein.11 Official documents are not infallible, but the presumption that they are accurate can
only be overcome with evidence. Unfortunately, in the mind of the trial court, pure conjecture
and not hard evidence was allowed to defeat a legal presumption.
Clearly, the trial courts decision in this case was, in significant measure, the product of
switched attributions as to who should enjoy certain rights and what should be presumed under
the law. This behavior on the part of the trial court and the effect it had on the factual conclusions
on the credibility of Jessica Alfaro and on the presence of Hubert Webb in the Philippines at the
time of the commission of the crime cannot be upheld.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

The Vizconde Massacre was the multiple homicide of members of the Vizconde family
on June 30, 1991 at their residence in BF Homes, Paraaque City, Metro Manila, Philippines.
[1]
Estrellita, 47, had suffered thirteen stab wounds; Carmela, 18, had suffered seventeen stab
wounds and had been raped before she was killed; and Jennifer, 7, had nineteen stab wounds.
[1]
Lauro Vizconde, Estrellita's husband, and the father of Carmela and Jennifer, was in the United
States on business when the murders took place.
The lead suspect was Hubert Webb, whose father Freddie Webb was famous as an actor,
former basketball player, and former Congressman and Senator. The other defendants were
Antonio Lejano II, Hospicio Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada,
Joey Filart and Artemio Ventura.[2] In the Trial Court (People of the Philippines vs. Hubert
Webb, et al., G.R. No. 176864), it became one of the most sensational cases in the Philippines,
becoming the "trial of the century". The men were convicted by the Paraaque Regional Trial
Court which the Court of Appeals affirmed. Except for Filart and Ventura who had been
convicted in absentia, the men were later acquitted by the Supreme Court on December 14, 2010

for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The reinvistigation
concluded that Hubert Webb was in the Philippines in 1991.
The case remained unsolved for almost four years until eyewitness Jessica Alfaro, a selfconfessed former drug addict, came forward on April 28, 1995 to shed light on the killing of the
Vizcondes. Alfaro implicated the children of wealthy and prominent families including Hubert
Webb, Antonio Lejano II, Hospicio Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter
Estrada, Joey Filart and Artemio Ventura.[4]
Alfaro's testimony coincides with the angle that was being explored by Supt. Rodolfo
Sison, the police investigator originally assigned to the case in 1991. Sison was ordered to desist
from further investigating that angle by then Philippine National Police Capital Region
Commander Marino Filart after six members of akyat bahay gang(burglars) were arrested by
Regional Police Unit in October 1991. [4][5][6] The suspects said they were tortured and forced to
confess to the crime before they were presented by Filart to the media. [7] They were acquitted by
a trial judge in September 1993 for insufficient evidence.
Prosecution
The trial began in August 1995 before Paranaque City RTC Judge Amelita Tolentino.
Alfaro had testified that she knew the suspects and was at the Vizconde house when the crime
was committed. By Alfaro's account, after a drug session with the group, Hubert Webb allegedly
had hatched his plan to rape Carmela Vizconde. Webb wanted Alfaro, the then girlfriend of one
of the accused men, Peter Estrada, to join them because Estrellita Vizconde only allowed her
daughter to go out and entertain female visitors.
Alfaro testified that as Webb followed Carmela into the dining room, she decided to step
outside for a smoke. From there she allegedly saw Lejano and Ventura take a knife from the
kitchen drawer, while the rest of the gang acted as lookouts. Alfaro said Estrellita was killed
before Webb began to rape Carmela. Jennifer woke up and, seeing Webb violating her sister,
jumped on him and bit him. He then hurled the little girl to a wall and started stabbing her.
Alfaro said that when she went back to the house, she saw the bodies of Estrellita and
Jennifer on the bed and Webb raping Carmela on the floor. Lejano and Ventura also took turns
raping Carmela, before finishing her off with numerous stabs. [1] Alfaro said that policeman
Gerardo Biong "was instructed by Webb, in my presence, to take care of the house where the
incident happened". Alfaro also said that she bumped into Biong at the Faces Disco in Makati in
March 1995 and relayed to her the offer of the group to give her a free ticket to the United States
to shut her up. She added that suspect Miguel Rodriguez warned her to "shut up or you're gonna
get killed" in the same disco on April 8, 1995 prompting her to voluntarily submit herself to
the National Bureau of Investigation(NBI) for protection.[8] According to the footage of the trial,
Alfaro had been able to identify all the defendants by their names. The defense questioned
Alfaro's credibility noting that she admitted to being under the influence of drugs when she
allegedly witnessed the crime and had made inconsistent statements on her two affidavits. Alfaro
said she was then having reservations when she first executed the first affidavit and held back
vital information due to her natural reaction of mistrust.[9]
Alfaro's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses including: Lolita Birrer, a former
live-in partner of policeman Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong investigated
8

and tried to cover up the crime. Birrer said she had accompanied Biong to the Vizconde house to
destroy the evidence and to retrieve Webbs jacket and the murder weapon. She also testified that
Biong received money at a house that she later learned belonged to then Paraaque Congressman
Freddie Webb; the Webb family's maids, Mila Gaviola and Nerissa Rosales, who both testified
that Hubert Webb was at home on June 30, 1991. At about 4 a.m. on June 30, 1991, Gaviola
woke up and entered the bedrooms to get the Webb's dirty laundry and wash it as part of her job.
She said that when she entered Huberts room, she saw him wearing only his pants, awake and
smoking in bed. While washing Hubert Webb's clothing, Gaviola said she noticed fresh
bloodstains on his shirt. After she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's quarters. But
feeling uneasy, she decided to go up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what he was
doing. In the said stockroom, there is a small door going to Hubert's room and in that door there
is a small opening where she used to see Hubert and his friends sniffing on something. She
observed Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from inside his room. [1]
[10]
Security guards Justo Cabanacan and Normal White. Cabanacan said Webb had entered the
subdivision(where the Vizconde house was located) a few days before the massacreand that he
even identified himself as the son of then Congressman Webb. White, on the other hand, said he
saw the three cars enter the subdivision on the night of June 29, as Alfaro had testified; White
also testified that policeman Gerardo Biong was the first to arrive at the crime scene.[11][12]
Other prosecution witnesses were: Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991
he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York and who expressed
doubt on whether Hubert Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; NBI medico-legal Dr. Prospero
Cabanayan, Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids; and Manciano
Gatmaitan, an engineer.
Defense
The defense produced documents and presented 95 witnesses, including Hubert Webb
himself and his father, along with other relatives and friends to support Webbs alibi that he was
in the United States from March 9, 1991, to October 26, 1992. On October 1, 1996, Judge
Amelita Tolentino admitted only 10 of the 142 pieces of evidence the defense presented.
[10]
(Under Philippine law, generally, alibi is the weakest defense, especially where there is direct
testimony of an eyewitness, duly corroborated by another. People vs. Bello, G.R. No. 124871,
May 13, 2004.)
Among evidence that was not admitted by Judge Tolentino, was the note verbale from
the United States Embassy in Manila claiming that Webb entered the United States in March
1991 and left in October 1992. This coincided with his passport and Philippine Immigration
records but were dismissed by Tolentino due to belief that these documents can possibly be
falsified.[citation needed].(The Philippine Rules of Evidence require official attestation of the
authenticity of any public document presented in evidence; as per Sec. 24, Rule 134, R. Evid.)
Moreover, Judge Tolentino also denied Webb's request to subject semen samples to DNA
testing on the belief that the samples may no longer be intact. [citation needed] The accused alleged that
by rejecting 132 of the 142 pieces of evidence, Tolentino had set the tone for their conviction.
[10]
On July 24, 1997, the Supreme Court noted that Tolentino erred when she refused to admit the

132 pieces of evidence presented by the defense, although these were later admitted in court
through an order issued by Tolentino.[10][14]
Among the defense witnesses was Artemio Sacaguing, a former, now
deceased NBI official who testified that Alfaro was an NBI asset who only volunteered to
assume the role of the eyewitness when she could not produce the actual witness to the Vizconde
killings.
Former NBI official Pedro Rivera however dismissed as lies the testimony of Sacaguing
saying that Agent Sacaguing had a record of notoriety in the NBI which prompted his transfer
to remote places of assignment until his early retirement. According to Rivera, Sacaguing
was never part of the NBI team assigned to investigate the Vizconde massacre and that his
former colleague took Alfaros statement in April 1995 without the presence of a lawyer.
Sacaguing broke the guidelines in taking affidavits from witnesses. His intention was very, very
dubious, he said.
Decision
On January 6, 2000, Judge Tolentino rendered her decision, finding Hubert Webb, Peter
Estrada, Hospicio Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano II and Miguel Rodriguez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. They were sentenced to life
imprisonment and ordered to indemnify the Vizconde family Php 3 million for the murders.
[1]
Two of the accused remainfugitives from the law: Joey Filart and Artemio Ventura.
Former Paranaque City policeman Gerardo Biong was found guilty as an accessory for burning
bedsheets and tampering with other evidence in the crime. He was sentenced to eleven years in
prison. Biong was released from jail on November 30, 2010 after serving his sentence.[16]
In her decision, Tolentino described the testimony of defense witnesses as full of
inconsistencies and biased. She said the US-based defense witnesses, most of whom are relatives
or friends of the Webb family suffered from "incorrigible and selective memory syndrome". She
cited the testimony of Alex del Toro, husband of Webb's relative, who said he hired Hubert Webb
as an employee at his pesticide company in California. Both Webb and del Toro could not
describe in court what Hubert's work was, Tolentino said. Tolentino also found it hard to believe
that Webb was working with a pesticide company because he was asthmatic and allergic to
various substances. Webb's testimony was also contradicted by other US-based defense witnesses
who said they usually saw him "going to the beach, malling, bar-hopping or playing basketball.
Tolentino also said, the photographs and videotapes purportedly showing Webb in the United
States appeared to be tampered.[1] Tolentino said the certificates issued by the US Immigration
and Naturalization Service and the Philippine Bureau of Immigration "could have easily been
obtained by the powerful Webb family".
Court of Appeal Decision
The Court of Appeals' Third Division voted 3-2 to deny Webb's motion for
reconsideration and upheld the ruling of Judge Tolentino on December 16, 2005.[1][18]

10

The court ruled that the Paraaque RTC was correct in sentencing Webb et. al. due to
"overwhelming evidence that showed Webb and the other accused had conspired to rape Carmela
and, in the process, kill her and the rest of the family." The court also amended the award of
damages from 100,000 pesos to 200,000 pesos, and also upheld the conviction of Biong
as accessory to the crime "by abusing his public functions... to conceal and destroy the physical
evidence in order to prevent the discovery of the crime and by allowing the destruction of the
physical evidence, Biong facilitated the escape of the principal accused."
Supreme Court Decision
In April 2010, the Supreme Court approved DNA testing to be performed on the semen
specimen obtained during autopsy from Carmela Vizconde. This has resulted in the revelation by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that they no longer had the specimens as these were
remanded to the Paraaque courts.[20]
On October 8, 2010, Webb filed an urgent motion for acquittal. [21] On November 26,
2010, Lauro Vizconde voiced his concern to media about the purported lobbying of Senior
Associate Justice Antonio Carpio for the reversal of the guilty verdict. Carpio testified for the
defense during the trial. TheVolunteers Against Crime and Corruption(VACC) asked Justice
Antonio Carpio and his cousin Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales to take a leave while the case is
being decided to avoid undue influence on the court's decision.[22] This was categorically denied
by the Supreme Court as Justice Carpio had in fact inhibited himself from the case and was not
going to take part in the deliberation.[23][24]
On December 14, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the earlier judgment of the lower
court and Court of Appeals and acquitted seven of the nine accused, including Hubert Webb,
finding that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused were guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The High Court put to question the quality of the testamentary evidence furnished by the
witnesses. No acquittal has been made as to the two accused, Filart and Ventura, who remain atlarge. Of the 15 Justices, 7 voted for acquittal while four dissented and four Justices, including
Carpio, did not participate.
Concurring opinion
Seven justices based its decision on the following points:
1. Loss of DNA evidence not a ground for outright acquittal
2. Unreliability of Jessica Alfaro's testimony:

Alfaro had prior knowledge on the facts of the case having been an asset of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

Alfaro was not able to explain why the house was ransacked if robbery was not
the motive of Webb and his group
11

3. Unreliability of testimony from other witnesses

4. Webb's strong alibi that he was in the United States

Alfaro's testimony will fall apart if Webb was not in the crime scene and will
relieve the others accused of the crime.

Loss of DNA evidence

Webb, citing Brady v. Maryland, said "that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the
ground of violation of his right to due process given the States failure to produce on order of the
Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela." The
court argued that the cited case has been superseded by Arizona v. Youngblood, "where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen
although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part
of the prosecution or the police".
The court considered the accused's "lack of interest in having such test done" in which
they concluded that the state "cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be
required to produce the semen specimen at some future time".
Alfaro's testimony
The court ruled that Alfaro was "a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing
with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers." The court also said that it was
"possible for Alfaro to lie" on the details of the case. Alfaro, who had "practically lived" at the
NBI's offices, would have been able to hear about the details, and gain access to the documents,
without difficulty. The court noted the inconsistency between Alfaro's testimony of Webb being
Carmela's girlfriend, who had no reason in breaking the glass panel of the house's front door to
enter the house; Alfaro said that Webb "picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the
glass-paneled front door". Alfaro, upon explaining on how the house was ransacked, (the
Paraaque police had earlier blamed house robbers as suspects), said that Ventura was looking
for the front-door key and the car key.
The court said the "portion of Alfaro's story appears tortured to accommodate the
physical evidence of the ransacked house" adding that "it is a story made to fit in with the crime
scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that
house". The court also said the same for the issue of the garage light: she claimed that Ventura
climbed the car's hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the house robbers, however
the court points out that "Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened
garage."[26] In general, the court said that Alfaro's story "lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies.

12

Corroborating witnesses
The court held that security guard Normal E. White, Jr.'s testimony was unreliable. White
was mistaken in saying that Gatchalian and company went in and out of the gated community
many times, since they only entered once.[26] Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor of the
gated community, said that he saw Webb enter the gated community, although he did not record
Webb entering in his log book.[26]
The court also held that the testimony of the Webb's maid, Mila Gaviola, was also
unreliable since she was not able to distinguish if it was Hubert whom she saw on June 30, 1991,
nor "did she remember any of the details that happened in the household on the other days".
Webb's alibi
The court said that "among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi". The lower
courts, however, reasoned that "Webb's alibi cannot stand against Alfaro's positive identification
of him." The court said that Alfaro was not a credible witness and that her "story of what she
personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived".[26]
For the alibi to be established "the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence... that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime". The lower courts, the
Supreme Court said, held that "Webb was actually in Paraaque when the Vizconde killings took
place". However, the court pointed out that while Webb or his parents may be able to "arrange
for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an
October 27, 1992 arrival stamp", they could not fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest, and
the U.S. Immigrations record system. The court also said that if Webb was in the U.S. when the
crime was committed, the Alfaro's testimony would not hold together: "Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall.
Conclusion
The court maintained that for a person to be convicted there should not be "a reasonable,
lingering doubt as to his guilt." As a result, the court reverses the decision of the Court of
Appeals, and acquits Webb, et al.
Dissenting opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Villarama argued that the claim of Webb that he could
not have committed the crime because he left for the United States on March 9, 1991 and
returned to the Philippines only on October 26, 1992 was correctly rejected by the Regional Trial
Court and Court of Appeals. Given the financial resources and political influence of his family, it
was not unlikely that Webb could have traveled back to the Philippines before June 2930, 1991
and then departed for the US again, and returning to the Philippines in October 1992. Webb's
travel documents and other paper trail of his stay in the US are unreliable proof of his absence in
the Philippines at the time of the commission of the crime charged. Webb's reliance on the
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presumption of regularity of official functions, stressing the fact that the US-INS certifications
are official documents, is misplaced. The presumption leaned on is disputable and can be
overcome by evidence to the contrary. In this case, the existence of an earlier negative report on
the NIIS record on file concerning the entry of appellant Webb into and his exit from the US on
March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, had raised serious doubt on the veracity and
accuracy of the subsequently issued second certification dated August 31, 1995 which is based
merely on a computer print-out of his alleged entry on March 9, 1991 and departure on October
26, 1992. Villarama noted that the alleged Passport, Passenger Manifest of United Airlines Flight
and United Airline ticket of accused Webb offered in evidence were mere photocopies of an
alleged original, which were never presented. He adds, this Court takes judicial notice of
reported irregularities and tampering of passports in the years prior to the recent issuance by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of machine-readable passports.

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