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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Qualifying Circumstances; Evident
premeditation, proof of.There is evident premeditation
when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender,
when he prepared beforehand the means which he deemed
suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had
sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan. It
has also been held that evident premeditation requires proof
of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow
_______________
* EN BANC.
689
VOL. 115, JULY 30, 1982
689
People vs. Camano
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evident premeditation, not
present when killing was not a preconceived plan and not
proof of planning or preparation in the killing and persistence
to accomplish the plan.In the instant case, it cannot be
stated that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was a
preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when the
plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time
had elapsed before the plan was carried out.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery; Attack from behind by the
accused upon the victim is treachery.Amado Payago
categorically declared that Filomeno Camano attacked
Godofredo Pascua from behind, a method which has ensured
the accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to
the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may
put up.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of superior
strength, absorbed in treachery.The rule is already settled
that abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery.
Same; Same; Alternative Circumstances; Intoxication; When
drunkenness or intoxication mitigating and when
aggravating.Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if
accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating
if habitual or intentional. To be mitigating, it must be
indubitably proved. A habitual drunkard is one given to
intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit
should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a
matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to
evil thought and undermines will-power making its victim a
potential evildoer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intoxication considered mitigating
as intoxication was not habitual and accused was in a state of
intoxication at the time of commission of felony.The
intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and
considering that the said appellant was in a state of
intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the
alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered
as a mitigating circumstance.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Death penalty, not cruel,
unjust or excessive punishment.The death penalty is not
cruel, unjust or excessive.
690
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Camano
MANDATORY REVIEW from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Deogracias Eufemio for defendant-appellant.
691
People vs. Camano
Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a
kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his
head stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo,
first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the
ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he
lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave
him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the chest
above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side a
little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back, of
one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit B) causing instant death. The
victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained eight wounds, which
were specifically described by Dr. Tan in his Autopsy Report
(Exhibit B dated February 17, 1970, as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest
above the nipple, running to the right side a little posteriorly
and superiorly with an exit at the back of one (1) inch
opening. Penetrating the skin, subcutaneous tissues,
pericardium the suricles of the heart, the left lung towards
the right side of back.
2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches
deep three-fourth (3/4) inch long penetrating the skin and the
sternum.
3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long
one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep.
4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches
long.
5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting
skin and bone of anterior side.
6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.
7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at
the back near spinal column.
8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head
cutting skin and bone.
CAUSE OF DEATHWound number one (1) causing instant
death due to severe hemorrhage from the heart. Out of the
eight (8) wounds, two (2) are mortal wounds, namely, wound
Number one (1) and wound Number Three (3), (Exhibit B)
(t.s.n., pp. 18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The two
victims Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together
with the accused are neighbors, residing at the same street
of Barrio Nato, Sagay, Camarines Sur (t.s.n., pp. 31,
692
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Camano
Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident was not
preceded or precipitated by any altercation between the
victims and the accused (t.s.n. p. 60, Nov. 22, 1971).
Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this
incident, the two victims had a misundertanding with the
accused while fishing along Sagay River. During this
occasion it appears that the accused requested Godofredo
Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by
Mariano Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This
refusal greatly offended and embittered the accused against
the victims. From this time on, the accused begrudged the
two, and entertained personal resentment against them. And
although on several occasions, the accused was seen at the
same table with Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the
friendly attitude towards Pascua, seems to be merely artificial
than real, more so, with respect to Mariano Buenaflor whom
he openly detested. He consistently refused to associate
since then with the two victims, especially, Mariano
Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten attempts were made by
Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for
reconciliation with the victims but were refused. Instead,
defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge
Mariano Buenaflor to a fight, and announce his evil intention
to kill them. (t.s.n., pp. 50-53, Session November 22, 1971.)
Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or palas
belongs to the accused. That after killing the two victims, he
returned to his house, where he subsequently surrendered to
Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, and Erasmo Valencia,
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What was this altercation about?
A
It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his
boat was refused by Godofredo Pascua because that
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 408-409.
701
VOL. 115, JULY 30, 1982
701
People vs. Camano
boat used by Godofredo Pascua is owned by Mariano
Buenaflor.
Q
How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic)
this Buenaflor?
A
Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano
Buenaflor.
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
Q
Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink
liquor immediately prior to the incident?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Where?
A
In his house.
Q
When you saw him where were you?
A
I was also in my house because I can just see his house from
our window.
Q
About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno
Camano so that you can see from your house?
A
More or less 30 meters.
Q
With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?
A
Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons
(who) are living far from our house.
Q
According to your personal knowledge do you know whether
or not the accused was drunk when this incident happened?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
But the truth is that, you still affirm that you dont know of
any incident immediately prior that has precipitated this
stabbing incident between the accused and the victim
A
None, sir.
ATTY. TRIA:
Q
How about you, did you now drink that time?
No, sir.18
The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and
considering that the said appellant was in a state of
intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the
alternative cir_______________
18 pp. 51-53 and 60-61, t.s.n., taken by E. Nastor.
702
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
51
50
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lud Chu and Uy Se Tieng
11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a
quantity of dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated
amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo
approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who
was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows:
"Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not
going to answer them. The only thing I will say is that
whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such
a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those"
pointing towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had
obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to
order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from
P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20,
and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in
a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng,
furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and
the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng
went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if
Somson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after
he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the
name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000;
that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent
cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium
had already been loaded and the captain of the Kolambugan
refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived,
Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy
Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on
the night of December 14th, and proposed that he
participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy
Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000
when the opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu
went to Samson's house on the night of
and that they probably would not give him this position if
they learned that he was an opium
442
442
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Phelps.
smoker; that he again asked to have the Chinaman assist
him, and he (the accused) believing that he (Smith) was
acting in good faith and was really sick, told the Chinaman to
do so; that by agreement he and the witness Smith went to
the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the Chinaman
prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the
Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the
accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the
accused) was arrested about forty minutes later, and that he
called for the doctor to examine him about one and one-half
hours after he left the Chinaman's house.
The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on
every material point, stating that he, after repeated demands
made by Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it
to Smith.
The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States
Cavalry, who arrested the accused and the Chinaman,
testified that when he made these arrests the Chinaman and
the accused did not have an opportunity to talk together
before they went to the justice of the peace where the
preliminary investigation was held.
Doctor De Krafft, of the United States Army, was called by
the accused himself and made an examination of the
accused about an hour and a half or two hours after he left
the Chinaman's house. The doctor testified that the accused
was a strong, robust man, and a man presenting no
appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by the court
whether or not he could state positively if the accused had
used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I am
sure that he did not use any opium on that day."
The court below in its decision said:
"I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not
appear to be a person who uses daily a large amount of
opium. The accused is a strong, robust man, in good physical
condition, and from a casual examination of his person no
one would accuse him of being a habitual user of opium."
The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold
443
VOL. 16, AUGUST 11, 1910.
443
United States vs. Phelps.
or had in his possession any opium, neither does it contend
that he had in his possession any of the prohibited
paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged
with having smoked opium this one time in the house of the
Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the
testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in
Jolo.
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to
hide his true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for
the same purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having
visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose
of making arrangements for himself and the accused to
smoke opium. He stated to the accused that he (Smith) was
desirous of smoking. He urged the accused to have the
Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. He
went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and
paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1
for the preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means,
induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his
possession either opium or any of the prohibited
.paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable,
since the mere possession of the drug or any of the
prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused
had in his possession any of these things. According to the
statements made by the witness Smith, he not only
suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also
This court has repeatedly held that one who shares th guilty
purpose and aids and abets the commission of crime by his
presence at the time of its perpetration, eve though he may
not have taken an active part in its materi; execution, is
guilty as a principal. We have also held tha one who stands
as guard near the place where a crime committed to keep
others away or to warn his companion and fellow
conspirators of danger of discovery, takes direct part in the
commission of the crime and is therefore. guilty as a principal
under article 13 of the Penal Cod (U. S. vs. Reogilon and
Dingle, 22 Phil. Rep., 127; U. S. vs. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep.,
545; U. S. vs. Ramos, 4 Phil. Rep 555.)
137
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 17, 1913.
137
United States vs. Diris.
Under all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that
Siaga was properly convicted as a principal.
It appears that the trial court treated the stolen receipts for
P100 as being of that value. The actual money stolen
amounted to only P353.
While we have held that checks, warrants and similar
instruments, payable to order and evidencing an obligation to
pay money, may under certain circumstances be treated as
worth their face value in fixing the value of the stolen
property for the purpose of grading the crime and the penalty
to be imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the penalty
prescribed in the Code is made to depend on the value of the
property taken (U. S. vs. Raboy, 25 Phil. Rep., 1; U. S. vs.
Wickersham, 20 Phil. Rep., 440), we are of opinion that a
mere receipt such as that under consideration, especially in
the absence of any proof as to its value, cannot be held to
have anything more than a mere nominal value in fixing the
penalty and assessing the civil indemnity to be imposed on
one convicted of its theft.
The record further shows that Anselmo Diris is a recidivist,
having been previously convicted of the crime of robbery by
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in the case of the
the robbery, at the same time telling them the place where
they were to be found, does not constitute inducement to
210
210
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Indanan.
commit the robbery because the proposal to commit the
robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause of the
crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been
committed without it; nor was the indication of the place
where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to
induce the robbery."
The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose
of showing concrete cases in which the acts of the accused
were not sufficient, as matter of law, to constitute
inducement. They not only lay down the legal principles
which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also
illustrate in the most valuable way the application of those
principles to actual cases.
The following decisions of the same court present instances
in which the acts of the accused constitute inducement under
the law and illustrate the application of the principles to
concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by
the court were: "It appeared that Lulu, who was living with
Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the town of X, gave birth
to a child on the morning of the 28th of March, the offspring
of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously
agreed upon by the first three named to deliver the child to
William as soon as it was born, with instructions to deposit it
in some frequented place so that it might be found and taken
up; but Joe changed his mind and handed the child over to
the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it whatever
you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to/ which the
latter actually did." Under the facts the accused was held
guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22d of January, 1873, it
was held that "a woman who, living with a man in scandalous
voice to his sons who were fighting with others to kill those
with whom they were fighting before they were killed
themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big
thing as a little, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by
inducement by reason of the injuries inflicted under such
orders."
In a decision of the 22d day of December, 1883, the court
said, "that the inducement and the commission of a crime
whereby the inducer becomes a principal to the same extent
and effect as if he had physically committed the crime
212
212
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Indanan.
exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or
agreement for a consideration, or through influence so
effective that it alone determines the commission of the
crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid
down the proposition that the secretary of the ayuntamiento
who induced certain persons to form new lists of
compromisarios five days prior to the election of senators
was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists,
saying: "It appearing and it being a fact proved that the
secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio Dura,
induced the members of the council to commit the act
stated, his participation as principal in the commission of the
act is well established according to the provisions of
paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code, because such
inducement coming f from a person of such influence as the
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be
considered sufficiently dominant to turn the mind of those
induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was
held that a woman who was at enmity with an uncle for
having refused to renounce in her favor a donation which a
relative had given to him, who made frequent threats to kill
the uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum
little; it is better to kill this man and take his carabao and the
P40 which was received f from the sale of the house in town."
They having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of
the proposed victim and having returned and explained why
they had not been able to kill him, the accused said to them:
"Why did you eat my chickens if you are not going to do what
I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in Cambaguio
because I thought you were going to kill him." The Igorrotes
then spent three days clearing some land for another person
from whom they received P2.25. About noon of the third day
of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now
you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply with our
agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill
Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and conceal
yourselves in the same place you were concealed before."
The murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts
the court held that the accused was the instigator and
inducer of the crime, and that he was liable as principal.
(Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of
January, 1887, 12th of January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep.,
230) it appeared that the accused had a conversation with
Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked him if he
knew Antonio Gavato and his associates, to which he replied
in the negative. The defendant then said: "I
216
216
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Indanan.
wish to confer upon you a commission, which is as follows:
Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of Gavato, and when
you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was
reluctant to obey this order, but defendant gave him
something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and
then gave him a bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I
have ordered and in case you incur any responsibility I will be
responsible to the court, and as soon as you wound any
person or persons, return to me and I will defend you." The
220
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Montilla vs. Augustinian, Corporation.
that such commands may be considered the moving cause of
the crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the
representation that the accused had in his possession an
order from the Government commanding the death of Sariol
was also of material influence in effecting the death; and
where two fundamental causes work together for the
production of a single result and one of those causes would
lead to a conviction upon one theory and the other upon
another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as
murder. There were present, also, the aggravating
circumstances of despoblado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court
below is well founded, and we accordingly affirm the same,
with costs. United States vs. Indanan., 24 Phil. 203, No. 8187
January 29, 1913
614
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Kiichi Omine
killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!",
it not appearing that he did anything more than say these
words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the
crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of
Spain said: "Considering that, although the phrases
pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were
not so to the extent that they may be considered the
principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as
inducement must precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that without it the
act' would not have been performed." Another decision cited
was that of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a
father who simply said to his son who was at the time
engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not
responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was
given.
Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code,
which has been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
without change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order
that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be
considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such
advice or such words have great dominance and great
influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that
they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or
moral coercion or as violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th
Edition.)
We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of
Eduardo Autor are not responsible for the injury inflicted by
him on Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and
location of the wound of the offended party, found that it was
the intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the
offended party, and accordingly found said defendant guilty
701
People vs. Montealegre
Same; Same: Same; Same; Contention that although there
was no evidence of a prior agreement between Capalad and
Montealegre, their subsequent acts proved the presence of
such conspiracy.The prosecution contends that although
there was no evidence of a prior agreement between Capalad
and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view,
which conforms to our consistent holding on this matter:
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can
be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that,
at the time the offense was committed, participants had the
same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be
inferred from the attendant circumstances.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the
accused, who is constitutionally presumed innocent, depends
upon the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of
the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in
authority, undoubtedly already strong, was made even
stronger by the defense itself.
As the trial court** which convicted him saw it, the crime
imputed to Napoleon Montealegre was committed as follows:
At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while
Edmundo Abadilla was eating at the Medings Restaurant in
Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table, Intending to call a policeman, he
quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his
car whom he hailed to report the matter. After parking his
vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and
soon thereafter the two smelled marijuana smoke from the
A.
While Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun
but Montealegre held his hand.
Q.
Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun?
A.
They slammed down on the floor and when they were already
on the floor, I ran away because I was already frightened.18
_______________
17 Id., pp. 111112.
18 Id., pp. 123424,
705
VOL. 161, MAY 31, 1988
705
People vs. Montealegre
The cause of the defense did not improve when on crossexamination, he insisted:
A.
When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre
suddenly held the hand of Camantigue,
Q.
And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of
Camantigue, what happened to Camantigue?
A.
He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was
holding his hand, Capalad was stabbing him at the back.19
And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as
follows:
Q.
So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while
Montealegre was holding the right hand of the policeman to
prevent him from drawing his gun?
A.
Yes, sir.20
The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only
succeeded in confirming his own guilt. He claimed he ran
away before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of
denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of ignorance and
forgetfulness and protestations of innocence, does not have
the ring of truth. The following excerpts are reflective of the
kind of defense he offered to exculpate himself from the
charge established against him by the prosecution.
Q.
Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad.
what happened if any?
A.
Camantigue pulled his gun.
Q.
What happened after that?
A.
Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened.21
xxx
A.
I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really
happened.
Q.
Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A.
I did not see.22
_______________
19 Id., pp. 137138.
20 Id., pp. 142143.
21 Id., Feb. 28,1984, p. 187.
22
706
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Montealegre
xxx
Q.
From whom did you come to know that Pfc. Camantigue shot
and killed Vicente Capalad?
A.
From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that
Camantigue killed Capalad.23
xxx
Q.
Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc. Camantigue was
holding both of you, did you notice that Vicente Capalad
stabbed Pfc. Camantigue?
A.
I did not see anything.24
xxx
Q.
And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue
while Capalad was on the left side?
A
I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the
left.
Q.
But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of
Camantigue?
A.
I am not sure if that is the right side.
Q.
But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster
were placed?
A.
I cannot remember.25
It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not
know what was happening on that evening of March 11,
1983. As one of the principal figures of the stabbing incident,
he could not have not known, nor could he later not
remember, that startling event that even more onlookers
could not forget. The evidence has established that the
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a coprincipal for having collaborated-with Capalad in the killing of
the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad
actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accusedappellant holding on to the victims hands to prevent him
from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true
that the accused-appellant did not himself commit the act of
stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for
having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack
against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the
Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are:
"(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is
either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention immediately before the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it would not
have been accomplished."28
The prosecution contends that although there was no evi_______________
26 Id., June 27,1983, p. 143; Id., July 29, 1983, p. 158; Id.,
March 5, 1984, pp. 231234.
27 Id., Feb. 28,1984, pp. 210211, 219220.
28 Luis B. Reyes, Criminal Law, 1977 ed., p. 506.
708
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Montealegre
dence of a prior agreement between Capalad and
Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy, The Court sustains this view,
which conforms to our consistent holding on this matter:
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can
be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that,
at the time the offense was committed, participants had the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
243
VOL. 117, SEPTEMBER 30. 1982
243
People vs. Simbra
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Butuan City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Actg. Solicitor
General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz
for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel V. Montilla for accused-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
Charged with rape committed according to the information,
as follows:
"That in or about the evening of May 24, 1972, in Langihan,
Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually, helping one another by
means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, and forcibly feloniously and successively have carnal
knowledge with the complainant, one Gresilda Gonzales, a
girl of 16 years old."
Sergio Tolibas was found guilty and sentenced "to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessories of the
law; to indemnify the offended party, Gresilda Gonzales, in
the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay
the costs. In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be
credited with the period of his preventive detention conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Rep. Act 6127, it appearing that on 6 June 1972 he signed a
voluntary agreement to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners."
home to his own house which was about 150 meters away.
The following morning, complainant spent the whole day in
Ernanita's house doing nothing except sat in the sala, ate and
slept. At about 8:30 in the evening, complainant was fetched
by her aunt and a policeman.
Thus, appellant admits that he had carnal knowledge with
complainant but claims that he did so with her consent.
The testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by
his sister Ernanita Tolibas Jusay.
The issue in this case is whether appellant had sexual
intercourse with complainant against the will of the latter and
through the use of force and intimidation. Appellant claims
that the court erred "in giving too much credence to the
testimony of the offended party Gresilda Gonzales."
The above pretentions of appellant are not true. Complainant
did not for a moment tolerate the indecent acts of appellant
and Simbra. She was going to the artesian well at the public
market in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water, when she
was seized by Berto Simbra and appellant. Simbra held her
arms and dragged her towards the "serin." Her mouth was
covered with a handkerchief by appellant. She struggled and
even kicked Berto Simbra and appellant. Upon reaching the
"serin," Simbra threw complainant on the ground while appellant held her arms as Simbra forcibly took-off her pants
and panties and had sexual intercourse with her, twice.
Thereafter, Simbra also held complainant when appellant had
sexual intercourse with her, thrice.
After she was raped, complainant was threatened by Simbra
and appellant with death if she would reveal what happened
to her. Appellant emphasized the threat by pretending to
choke her.
247
VOL. 117, SEPTEMBER 30, 1982
247
People vs. Simbra
Appellant contends that if violence was employed upon
complainant, there would be abrasions and contusions on her
body. While it is true that Dr. Tupaz found no injuries on her
body, except the lacerations on her hymen, the fact is, the
rapists did not really employ violence upon her but only used
force by holding her arms, covering her mouth, dragging and
throwing her to the ground and pinning her down. She was
not boxed, beaten or injured in any way. The force coming as
it did from two big men and applied on a 15-year old girl was
enough to overcome whatever resistance there was, without
necessity for violence. This explains the lack of contusions,
hematoma, and other injuries on complainant's body, except
the lacerations on her hymen.
Further, complainant denied the truth of the testimony of
appellant that she was the girlfriend of Simbra. She has seen
her rapists passing her house before the date of the incident
but the fact is, she came to know their names at the Police
Station only when she was investigated.
The version of the appellant is hard to believe. Complainant
was not a woman of loose morals that after her alleged
sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to have
sexual intercourse with appellant and with the blessings of
Simbra. Even a woman of loose morals would not agree to
allow two men to successively take, advantage of her in the
presence of the other. In the case of People vs. Soriano, 35
SCRA 633, this Court said:
"To begin with, their version is inherently incredible. Indeed,
no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse
with two men-or-three, according to Antonio Gallardoin the
presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as
morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us
contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year
high school student, can be so characterized. On the
contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and
candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not
even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute
to them the commission of the crime charged.
Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with
complainant against her will by employing force and
intimidation,
248
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simbra
the crime committed is rape through direct participation.
And, when he aided Berto Simbra and made it possible for
the latter to have carnal knowledge of complainant also
against her will and through force and intimidation, appellant
committed another crime of rape through indispensable
cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty of two crimes of
consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED but
modified in the sense that appellant Sergio Tolibas is hereby
sentenced twice to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. With
costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed with modification.
Notes.Conviction or acquittal of accused in rape depends
almost entirely on credibility of testimony of offended party.
(People vs. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513.)
The defense that complainant consented to the sexual act
with the accused on two occasions even if true cannot
exculpate the accused considering her testimony despite
intensive cross-examination, that rape as herein chartered
was actually committed. (People vs. Equac, 80 SCRA 665.)
Unless motivated by a desire to bring to justice the culprit
who had grievously wrong her, it is hard that a woman of unsullied reputation to publicly disclose that she has been
raped. (People vs. Gargoles, 83 SCRA 282.) People vs.
Simbra, 117 SCRA 242, No. L-39401 September 30, 1982
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front
of Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the
houses of Tony Desinorio and Francisco Desinorio, emerged
at the back of the Esso Gas Station, crossed the creek or
canal on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the gun
into the dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded
to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his mind
and returned to the beach near the victims house.
The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing
through the alley between the house of the victim and the
Desinorio houses, which alley separated the building of the
Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas
Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which
intersects Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia
resided. Their residence was about two hundred meters away
from the scene of the crime.
A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be
at the Villa Bus Terminal at around eight-thirty in the evening
of July 8, 1969, when the killing was perpetrated, testified
that she saw Paciano Nierra wearing an underwear and
striped T-short running from Saguing Street to Barrio Tinago.
About five minutes later, she saw Paciano crossing the
boulevard and running towards Saguing Street. He was
wearing long pants. The witness made a statement to the
police about what she had seen.
7
VOL. 96, FEBRUARY 12, 1980
7
People vs. Nierra
Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound
for Tupi and alighted near the municipal building. Paciano
Nierra arrived in that place and gave him four hundred pesos.
Misa returned to General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to
Rojas, and proceeded to the victims house where he mingled
with the persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil
there, staying there for four nights.
He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the
buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He received a commission
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Nierra
In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is
cumulative in character. As already stated, the crucial and
decisive evidence consists of Misas testimony and
confessions
Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted
at the preliminary investigation as counsel of appellant
Doblen, having been allegedly hired by the offended party,
Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he acted as counsel de
oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for
Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as
having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as already
noted, were convicted on the basis of Misas confessions and
testimony. The appellants have not successfully overthrown
or rebutted Misas evidence.
It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of
Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed as a friend on
Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no hand in the
assassination of Anicetos wife.
We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the night of the
The fact that the witness is related to the deceased does not
disqualify him from testifying nor does it render his testimony
utterly devoid of merit or belief, in the absence of an
improper motive actuating him to testify falsely against the
accused. (People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503).
A co-accused is merely an accomplice where his participation
was merely a show-off or expression of sympathy or feeling
of camaraderie. (People vs. Vicente, 28 SCRA 247).
Where the trauma inflicted by the appellant hastened the
death of the victim, she is also criminally liable as a principal.
(People vs. Gensola, 29 SCRA 483).
As accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor
cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with
knowledge of the commission of the crime. He subsequently
takes part in the three ways: (a) by profiting from the effects
of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or
instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery;
and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the
principal of the crime, provided he acts with of his public
functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive,
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
(People vs. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600.)
Positive identification of the accused by several eyewitness
that he killed the victim establishes accuseds guilty to a
moral certainty. (People vs. Cunanan, 75 SCRA 15). People vs.
Nierra, 96 SCRA 1, No. L-32624 February 12, 1980
real malefactors, who actually robbed the bank and killed and
injured several persons, including peace officers. The failure
to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a
crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the
outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose
participation has not been shown to be as abominable as
those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme
punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in meting
out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly
deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Teehankee, J.:
I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos.
Barredo, J.:
For the reasons given by Justice Abad Santos I vote that
Romaquin and Doble should be sentenced for robbery with
homicide as accomplices. As to Simeon Doble my conclusion
is that he is at least an accessory after the fact.
Aquino, J.:
Took no part.
Concepcion Jr., J.:
Previously voted to concur with the main opinion.
Abad Santos, J., concurring and dissenting.
Criminal Law; While Doble and Romaquin should be held as
accomplices, their liability should not be limited to robbery
only as they
136
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Doble
received guns showing they were prepared to kill also.For it
must be remembered that the principal malefactors were
each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines and
Kailan ka hinuli?
S
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Doble
tionality. It is only that portion in which is cited Simeons
statement made before the Navotas Police Department (Exh,
I pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that he has not yet received
his share that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor
Generals recommendation, for it gives the impression that
Simeon had given material or moral support or
encouragement to the malefactors (referring to those still at
Pagkatapos?
S
Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usapusap silang lahat at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at
nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi na ako na lamang ang
maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at
maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at mahuli lamang.
19. T
Wala na po.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house
having been used as the meeting place of the malefactors for
their final conference before proceeding to Navotas to rob the
Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them because
of a 5-year old foot injury which would make him only a
liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the
malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they met
at his house it was only because it was near the landing
place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while
waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his
house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling
them that he could not join them because of his foot injury,
and will just wait for them, evidently as a mere gesture of
politeness in not being
143
VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
143
People vs. Doble
able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not
be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid
being suspected that he was against their vicious plan for
which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a coconspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks
among the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable
participation of Simeon Doble in the commission of the crime,
for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he could not in
145
People vs. Doble
into revealing the names of their companions in the robbery,
again negating the claim of torture and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and
Cresencio virtually confirmed their extra-judicial statements
when they testified in court. By all the proofs as cited,
persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their
custodial statements plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson,
the only one named among the alleged torturers, that any
violence was practiced by the investigators, specifically, the
alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18,
t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged involuntariness of the
extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while
allegedly attempting to escape could have instilled fear in
the minds of the appellants which affected their freedom of
will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellants Brief).
This is a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the
giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after
their interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July
5, 1966 (Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin
pointed to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore,
took place long after appellants have given their main
statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had
only bothered to check the dates of the main statements of
both appellants which were given not later than just past the
middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary
statement of Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he would not
have probably come forth with this argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case,
Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the
inadmissibility of appellants custodial statements, for their
having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right
thereto during the interrogation. There might be merit in this
contention were the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation one of constitutional grant as is provided in our
1973 Constitution, before which the right was given only to
an accused, not to a mere suspect during in-custody police
coming down from the house, going towards the road where
they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several
638
638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Doctolero
times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also
struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening,
Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and
Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who
was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the
latters wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brotherin-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria
Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera).
Marcial Sagun and company were on their way home. (p. 8,
ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: Where have you been
cousin. (p. 8, ibid) He noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo
holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial
Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter
unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward
swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but
he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and
Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. They watched
each others step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de
Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with
a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were
towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo
(p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun
and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing
Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and
then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo
throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother,
Virgilio, participated as accomplices in the slaying of the
women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree
with its findings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General
with its evidentiary substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants
were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house of
Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women
thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back
at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146,
tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went
up the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both
appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not
know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was
brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo
inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature,
number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the
two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-l), it could not
have been possible for Ludovicos two brothers Virgilio and
Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not
to hear either the screams of pain of their brothers victims or
the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies
when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them
several times, x x x Under these circumstances, it is obvious
that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves
knew what was going on inside the room of the house at the
time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their
brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women
victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that
the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as
their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two
deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is
no question that the presence of these two appellants
upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother
_______________
21 Original Record, 228-229.
645
and to beg her to return each time she left the family abode
for the embrace of her lover
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
bra.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the
sentence of life imprisonment, with indemnity to the
offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag,
in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the
accused therein, namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma,
the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who,
because no certificate nor any other proof of their marriage
could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged
with parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night
of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and
their children, lived together in their house at Sobosob,
Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the
municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for
Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and
each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2)
different occasions, appellant Nemesio Talingdan had visited
Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and
during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12year old daughter living with them, go down the house and
leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit
relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and
during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged
the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not
be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed,
Teresa had again left their house
23
after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and
proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went
under an avocado tree nearby. As supper was tben ready, the
child called her parents to eat; Bernardo who was in
24
24
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Talingdan
the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his daughters
call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa
also excused herself by saying she would first put her small
baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as
she was through she again called her parents to eat. This
time, she informed her father about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He
proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near
the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that
moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of
the batalan. The four accused then climbed the stairs of the
batalan carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo
was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides
and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but
when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying
You call for help and I will kill you, so she kept silent. The
assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazons male
teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came out of her silid later;
she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when
Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers of her
father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to
reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she
ever did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and helped fix
and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy
on which was performed in his own house by the Municipal
Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours
after death; burial took place on the same day. The victims
brother who came from Manila arrived one day after the
burial, followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra
where she resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the
identities of the killers of her father because she was afraid
of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the
circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate
relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter
executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of
the information for murder against the herein five (5)
appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the
defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with Bernardo, was a
resident of
25
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
25
People vs. Talingdan
the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two
(2) brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said
brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending
her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she
was still single up to the time of her husbands violent death
on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they
moved to and resided in her husbands place in Sallapadan,
Abra, bringing with them three (3) carabaos and two (2)
horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of
land in said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of
land worked on by Bernardos parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which
was about 4-5 meters away from the house of her parents-inlaw. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and
her husband never maltreated her; although sometimes she
had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his own
mother who wanted that Bernardos earnings be given to her,
(the mother) which Bernardo never did, and at those times,
Bernardo would admonish Teresa You leave me alone. Her
in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not
get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of her other son,
Juanito, in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her
because she did not give him any of the carpentry tools
which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She
never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as
charged by her mother-in-law, and if she ever did leave the
house to go to other places they were only during those
times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar
checks with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips,
she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had
to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode
in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to Bangued
in the morning and always rode back with them to
Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the
weapons carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who
waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the
latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of
the carabaos and horses they brought from Manabo to
Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report
the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to
his policemen, one of whom is Tal26
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Talingdan
ingdan, so that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa
knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the latters
home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But
illicit relationship had never existed between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the
kitchen of their house cooking their food for supper. Two of
the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband,
Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a plow. He
had to make the plow at that time of the night because at
daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as
the food was ready, she and the children moved over to the
adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper,
and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the
two children were about to follow him to the kitchen when
suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive
gun shots coming from near their batalan. They were all so
terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did
not know yet at that precise time that her husband was shot,
as she and the children were still in the other room on their
way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from
Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain,
and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her
arms. She did not see the killers of her1 husband, as the
night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was in
her arms when the first group of people who responded to
their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of
police, some members of the municipal council and appellant
Tobias who even advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body
of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6) months
pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation
of the surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot
prints on the ground some meters away from the batalan.
He also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said
batalan and on the nothern waitings of the kitchen. Later,
Teresa requested some persons to relay the information
about the death of her husband to her relatives in Manabo,
Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardos
mother and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then
residing, as they have left their house in Sallapadan about
two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to
till there in a case with the natives called Tingians. Two
27
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
27
People vs. Talingdan
(2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and
after Bernardos remains was autopsied and he was buried
under their house, they conducted an investigation, but she
did not give them any information relative to the identity of
the persons who shot her husband because she did not really
see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, Juanito
Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz,
Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after the usual nine (9)
days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresas
children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her
29
People vs. Talingdan
approach. You tell your father we will kill him. If it were true
that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered
why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when
she again saw the said appellants on the very night in
question shortly before the shooting talking together in
subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms.
Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could
have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related
above and which We have carefully reviewed that appellants
Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and
Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as
charged, and that they committed the said offense in
conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and
in the dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it was
committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of
Corazon suffered from vital contradictions and
inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently
unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As
the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the
witness varied on cross-examination the exact time of some
of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was
before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot;
(2) whether it was before or after seeing her mothers
meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June
23, 1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or
not the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs
when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of
her having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and
coldbloodedly shooting her father to death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing
inherently unnatural in the circumstances related by her. We
agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:
time, he never saw the mayor until after they went home to
Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he
could have returned anytime on the evening of June 22 or
anytime before the commission of the offense to Sallapadan
and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then returned to
Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to
Sallapadan on the 26th.
34
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Talingdan
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was
alleged to have been accompanied by witness-accused is still
living and very much alive. As a matter of fact, Mayor
Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and
also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who
accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and
still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not the mayor and
the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the
testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia, Abra, and
a member of the Cursillo Movement, was presented as
rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the witness stand, he
stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of
Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to
23, 1966, at the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan, Abra,
and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact, Mayor
Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on
October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen in his Guide Book
where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears because
they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if
not in full, the testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp.
29A-30A, Annex of Appellants Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa
Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General has submitted a
recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as
her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting,
she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the
assailants of her father. When Corazon identified appellants
Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did
not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to
anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, Dont tell it
to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody. Later,
when the peace officers who repaired to their house to
investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the
information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no
suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual
shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her
attitude regarding her co-appellants conspiracy, known to
her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute concealing or assisting in
the escape of the principal in the crime which makes her
liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by
appellants was murder qualified by treachery. It being
obvious
36
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Talingdan
that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and
without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of
their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed
treachery to insure success in attaining their malevolent
objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted
with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill
Bernardo Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to
work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday
evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they
had motiveTalingdans taking up the cudgels for his
paramour, Teresaand enough time to meditate, and desist,
if they were not resolved to proceed with their objective.
owned by her father some 300 to 400 meters away from the
latters house near the creek where she was then washing
clothes; that she heard one of the conspirators say Could he
elude a bullet?; that when her mother noticed her presence,
her mother shoved her away saying, You tell your father that
we will kill him; that in the evening of the following day,
Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in
their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet
the other appellants in the yard about 3 to 4 meters from
where she was in the batalan; that she heard them
conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to recognize
all of them by the light coming from the kitchen lamp through
the open batalan; that she knows all of them very well as
they are all residents of their barrio and she used to see them
almost everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed
with long guns; that their meeting did not last long; that after
about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up the
house and proceed to her room while the other appellants hid
under an avocado tree nearby; that when supper was ready
she called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her
call but continued working on a plow while her mother
excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby
to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after which she again
called her parents to eat; that about this time she informed
her father about the presence of persons downstairs but her
father paid no heed to what she said; that her father
proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door
while Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at the that
moment her father was shot from below the stairs of the
batalan; that the four accused then went up the stairs of
the batalan with their long guns and, upon seeing that her
father was still alive, appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired at
him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help,
appellant Bides warned her saying You call for help and I will
kill you; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the
east.
39
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
39
People vs. Talingdan
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be
accorded belief in the same way that credence was given to
her statement that, upon her mothers inquiry immediately
after the shooting as to whether she recognized the
assailants of her father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother
that she identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and
Bides as the culprits; for which reason her mother warned her
Dont tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to
somebody.
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and
Teresa had a quarrel during which Bernardo slapped Teresa
several times by reason of which Teresa left the house and
sought the help of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant
Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come down. When
Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman
and was then armed, appellant Talingdan left after warning
Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active
cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against the life of her
husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa was a
paramour of appellant Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom
from her husband, the victim, so that she could enjoy the
company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral
compunction in deserting her family and her children for the
company of her lover. As heretofore stated, she did this
several times and continued to do so until the violent death
of her husband even as she was carrying a six-month old
baby in her womb, the paternity of which her husband
denied.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.An assail on the credibility of witnesses which gives
detailed reasons therefor with page references to the oral
evidence in the record deserves more consideration by the
trial court and may not simply be cast aside by a sweeping
statement of a general principle of evidence. (Tagoranao vs.
Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 490).
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vino vs. People
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having
been denied, he interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming
the judgment of the lower court.3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following
grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN
ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED
IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING
CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR
THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL TO BE
CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED
UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE
VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE
STATE AND THAT THE ESCAPE MUST BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL
OF THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS.4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals,
the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to the
civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He
was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial
Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In
a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988,
petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was
acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on
August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition.
The comment was submitted by the Solicitor General in
behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court
resolved to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to
sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
* EN BANC.
683
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which
latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance
of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the
crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that
Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Same; Same; Definition of Heinous Crimes.In the second
whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the
definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause
provides that: x x x crimes punishable by death under this
Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist
movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was
trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting
against racial discrimination. x x x Furman, thus, did not
outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual
per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all
discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so
because the discretion which these statutes vested in the
trial-judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to
lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of
personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the
part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
SEPARATE OPINION:
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
upon the legislative action. It was effectively ignored by
Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme
Court.
689
People vs. Echegaray
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted
since the pardon by the offended party and her mother
before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to his
criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the
commission of the offense in the Complaint and throughout
trial prevented the accused-appellant from preparing an
adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
690
690
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony
given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge."5
II
693
694
696
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the
crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during
times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity,
robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The list
of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to
the emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at
the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the AntiSubversion Law, which carried the death penalty for leaders
of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses
were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking
Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law.
During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was
enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes
involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the
Marcos regime and led to the nullification of the 1973
Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened
following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was
catapulted to power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found
freedom of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional
Commissioners grouped themselves into working committees
among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B.
Laurel, Jr. as Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as
Vice-Chairman.
_______________
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee
draft of the proposed bill of rights to the rest of the
commission. What is now Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was
originally worded as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death
penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion
perpetua.
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the
result of a consensus among the members of the Bill of
Rights Committee that the death penalty should be
abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they
proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be done
whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution or
by the legislatureand the majority voted for a constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on
whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but
rather on whether the abolition should be done by the
Constitutionin which case it cannot be restored by the
legislatureor left to the legislature. The majority voted for
the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the
reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict
________________
697
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it
to do what is needed for the sake of the common good, but
the issue at stake is whether or not under the present
circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be
denied.
_______________
17 Id., p. 678.
18 Id., p. 680.
698
698
20 Id., p. 744
21 155 SCRA 327 [1987].
22 Id., p. 335.
________________
700
700
701
27 Id., p. 121.
702
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Echegaray
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body
would first decide the question whether or not death penalty
should be reimposed, and thereafter, a seven-man
committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill in
accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides
in favor of the death penalty, the Chair said that the
committee would specify the crimes on which death penalty
xxx
703
703
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not
death as a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of
penalties provided by the Revised Penal Code. However, he
pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death penalty,
the Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the
crime for which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the
constitutional provision that our Special Committee had to
consider the Revised Penal Code itself in making this
compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the
proposed draft now under consideration which we are
sponsoring, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code
are actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because
by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were totally
repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions
could be retained. And some of them had to be amended
because the Committee thought that amendments were
proper."29
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
tino explained that the statement in the preamble is a
general one and refers to all the crimes covered by the bill
and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may not
have the same degree of increase in incidence as the other
crimes and that the public demand to impose the death
penalty is enough compelling reason.33
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom
the battle lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two
things: first, the definition of heinous crimes as provided for
in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of
compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His
interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his
objections to the bill:
Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous,
Mr. President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements
as they are described in the bill or are crimes heinous
because they are punished by death, as bribery and
malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
Under these provisions of the Constitution, paragraph 1,
Section 13, does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that
Congress is bound to state clearly the compelling reasons for
the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as well
as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous
included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion
already. I believe that whether we state the compelling
reasons or not, whether we state why a certain offense is
heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in the
Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be
controlling but what the Supreme Court will feel as a
sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous nature
whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can
certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go
into the matter of due process. It will go into the very power
of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So
that would be entirely separate from the matter of due
process."34
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the
death penalty bill violated our international commitment in
support of the worldwide abolition of capital punishment, the
Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol.
710
xxx
xxx
711
xxx
xxx
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to
suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it
the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez
on the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes
enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L.
Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the
hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt
as to their cause:
My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death
penalty not only for the importation, manufacture and sale of
dangerous drugs, but also for other heinous crimes such as
treason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as
defined by the Revised Penal Code with or without
additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in
R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532;
carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the
owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in x x
x RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies
them to the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one
which, by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards of decency and
morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of
allegiance to a government, committed by a person who
owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad, 1 Phil. 437). By the
allegiance is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience
which individuals owe to the government under which they
live or to their sovereign in return for the protection which
they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the thought alone of ones loved one being
held against his or her own will in some unidentified x x x
house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers is enough
714
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes, took effect.39
715
_______________
716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill,
Senators Lina and Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as
regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of
capital crimes without a specification of the elements that
make them heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that
there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: first,
there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death;
and second, there were crimes penalized by mandatory
capital punishment upon the attendance of certain specified
qualifying circumstances.
717
People vs, Echegaray
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
tendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which
the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on
his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of
significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on
the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize
the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently
or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory
penalty of death is imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary, the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be
imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to
use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death
of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the
maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary. (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution
and transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a
minor or the victim dies
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should
a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section
be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed. (Sec. 14)
(8.) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated
drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
Sections 14, 14A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity
of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the
same penalty as therein provided. (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in R.A. No. 7659 in their qualified form
When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken
by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be
imposed shall be in its maximum [of death] regardless of
mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the
offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two
or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission
of any crime. (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the
test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes
that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal
course of his or her growth as a human being. The right of a
person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this
means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or
her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his
or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his
or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
722
722
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
ranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing
danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to. nil the
possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but
not heinously criminal, R.A. No. 7659 is replete with both
procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the
correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the
constitutional requirement that the death penalty be reimposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we
note that the main objection to the death penalty bill
revolved around the persistent demand of the abolitionists
for a statement of the compelling reason in each and every
heinous crime and statistical proof that such compelling
reason actually exists.
726
727
________________
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
capital punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with
the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves
the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court to
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any
bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of
our own culture.
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
tegrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not
involve the taking of life.
________________
731
732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.); Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
SEPARATE OPINION
Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and
civilized, as well as, I wish to believe, a humane and
compassionate, being. The ancient edict of an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth has since been abandoned by a
society that recognizes the good in every man and gives a
transgressor an opportunity to reform. Somehow, however,
certain vestiges of savage retribution still remain; indeed, the
taking of a human life continues, at least in some penal
systems, to be an acceptable punishment
733
734
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
SEPARATE OPINION
736
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of
the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction
of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty
ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our
Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed,6 "(t)he majority
voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty.
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the
distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina
MelencioHerrera emphasized,7 It is thus clear that when Fr.
Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition
of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total
xxx
xxx
737
738
738
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
awkward"10): the authority of Congress to provide for it is
not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
(1) by compelling reasons that may arise after the
Constitution became effective; and
(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or define or
characterize as heinous.
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden
of determining the existence of compelling reasons and of
defining what crimes are heinous before it could exercise
its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
claritys sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law,
prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and courts,
by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
nous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain
crimes to be heinous without adequately justifying its
bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and
unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness
can be determined. Calling the crimes grievous, odious and
hateful is not a substitute for an objective juridical
definition. Neither is the description inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity. Describing
blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact;
and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less
prevail over its text.15 In this case, it cannot be the
authoritative source to show compliance with the
Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws
to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once
the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating
circumstances.16 Theres nothing really new that Congress
did which it could not have otherwise done had such
provision not been included in our fundamental law. In other
words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which
were already punishable with death prior to the
________________
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President, and from existing special laws which, before
abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the
maximum penalty.
742
________________
________________
744
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Echegaray
is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 765922
made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such
effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is
sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons
745
xxx
xxx
xxx
746
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the
statistics supplied by the PC.
746
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will
confirm it.
MR. LAGMAN. No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime
rate was 40 percent.
________________
747
748
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as
the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a
downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time
from, 1988 to 1991."
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the
proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition
would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes."26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof,
empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with
any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription
of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission
or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be
debated on and on,27 in the same manner that another
proposition
_______________
749
People vs. Echegaray
750
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Echegaray
lously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
people, particularly where the right pertains to persons
accused of crimes.30 Here the issue is not just crimesbut
capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one
ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."31 This primary right of the people to enjoy lifelife at
its fullest, life in dignity and honoris not only reiterated by
the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life
and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights,32 expressly prohibits any form of
torture33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death,
emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to
the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception34 and establishes the peoples rights to health, a
balanced ecology and education.35
752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn
between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to
P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P
15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately
thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while
approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with
another five percent (5%) earning variable income.
Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they
earn in a month.
(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112
of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum
monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the
official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn
between P4,500.00 and P11,000.00 monthly, indicating they
belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00
monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a
percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not
know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22)
convicts earn nothing at all.
(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent
(21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry\ of these, thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof,
are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport
754
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
erty, lack of educational attainment and employment
opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working
and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst lessthangenteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and
are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as
victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from
that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither
improves or worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more
precise, such law may even be said to help improve their
situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger
deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic
differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the
non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what
they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of
protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution,
and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be empowered to rise above
themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such
a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants
to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves
individually to any significant degree if we are unable to
advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor
provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we
are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate
punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged
in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so
obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life),40 punishment
must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not
_______________
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of
human life over and above even the state which man created
precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution
reluctantly allows capital punishment only for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes just as the Church
grudgingly permits it only for reasons of absolute necessity
* EN BANC.
462
462
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gallo
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The next crucial point is whether the Court must now apply
retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction of accusedappellant.
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of
cases that the tribunal retains control over a case until the
full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend
the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification
thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.5
The doctrine declared in People vs. Garcia, and its reiteration
in People vs. Ramos,6 People vs. Ilao,7 and People vs.
Medina,8 came only after almost a year from the
promulgation of the instant case.
The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to
comment on the aforesaid 24th August 1999 motion of
accused-appellant, had this to state:
_______________
SO ORDERED.
464
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gallo
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the land
(Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has
the force and effect of law, forms part of our penal statutes
and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable to an
accused who is not a habitual criminal, and notwithstanding
that final sentence has already been pronounced against him
(Article 22, Revised Penal Code).
Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to
the beneficial application of Medina. Accordingly, the Office
of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellants prayer for
reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its
above observations and sees merit in its stand to join
accused-appellant in praying for a modification of the
sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the motion to re-open the case is GRANTED and
the decision sought to be reconsidered is MODIFIED by
imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and ordering him to
indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00.
Considering that the records of all cases where the death
penalty is imposed are forwarded to the Office of the
President in accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, the
Court directs the Clerk of Court to furnish the Office of the
President with a copy of this resolution for appropriate
guidance.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
340
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; A proper court may order the
return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.According to the Rules of Court, personal
property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense
either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue
of a search warrant, the personal property that may be
seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or
that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds,
or fruits of the offense; or that which has been used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be
made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been
used or may constitute proof in the commission of an
offense. Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in
which the personal property seized is used as evidence, its
return to the person from whom it was taken, or to the
person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of
course, except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper
court may order the return of property held solely as
evidence should the Government be unreasonably delayed in
bringing a criminal prosecution. The order for the disposition
of such property can be made only when the case is finally
terminated.
Same; Same; The text of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9165
relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
342
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, charged Richard Brodett
(Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Sec343
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
b.Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
containing white powdery substance with total recorded net
weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of
COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c.Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow folded
paper, with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive
results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of
this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra
S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not
appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett
has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the
subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We
therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda
Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and
forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioners submission that the
subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis.
The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so,
there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so
that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here.
More so that the required literal interpretation is consistent
with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
Issues
_______________
347
348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car
belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal
drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of
the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other
criminal proceedings.
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the
offense and all the assets and properties of the accused
either owned or held by him or in the name of some other
persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of
proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That
if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be
auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of
confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court,
no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be
confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or
transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no
bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property
confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to
pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the
confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the
property pending disposition, as well as expenses for
publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
was the instrument in the commission of the violation of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in
accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the
framers of R.A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the car should
not be released from the custody of the law because it had
been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate antiillegal operation. It argues that the Motion to Return NonDrug Evidence did not intimate or allege that the car had
belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had
belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did
not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under
the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge
of the commission of the crime. It insists that the car is a
property in custodia legis and may not be released during the
pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accused Brodetts Motion To
Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the
criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet
to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that point
of the proceedings was premature, considering that the third
paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the
disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income
derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the
accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of
the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further
expressly requires that such property or income derived
therefrom should remain in custodia legis in all that time and
that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
GE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged
in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust
money and the genuine money are ordered returned to the
accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as
the genuine money confiscated from both accused are
ordered escheated in favor of the government and
accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper
disposition. (emphasis supplied)33
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, petitioner, vs. GLASGOW
CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE
SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondents.
* FIRST DIVISION.
96
96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Lilian E. Elepao and Edward G. Gan for respondent City
State Savings Bank, Inc.
SEDALAW for Glasgow Credit & Collection Services Inc.
CORONA, J.:
99
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive
writ was issued on August 8, 2003.
Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned unserved as
it could no longer be found at its last known address.
On October 8, 2003, the Republic filed a verified omnibus
motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of
court to serve summons by publication. In an order dated
October 15, 2003, the trial court directed the issuance of
alias summons. However, no mention was made of the
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived
the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to serve the alias
summons. The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to
(a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion for
leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the
reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to serve
the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days.
However, it did not resolve the Republics motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication declaring:
Until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any
action on [the Republics] motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication would be untenable if not
premature.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the
Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriffs
return dated June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons
was returned unserved as Glasgow was no longer holding
office at the given address since July 2002 and left no
forwarding address.
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgows
Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance) dated
August 11, 2005. It alleged that (1) the court had no
jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been
served on it; (2) the complaint was premature and stated no
cause of action as there was still no conviction for estafa or
other criminal violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there
was failure to prosecute on the part of the Republic.
The Republic opposed Glasgows motion to dismiss. It
contended that its suit was an action quasi in rem where
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It asserted
that prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a
precondition to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its
complaint alleged ultimate facts sufficient to establish a
cause of action. It denied that it failed to prosecute the case.
On October 27, 2005, the trial court issued the assailed order.
It dismissed the case on the following grounds: (1) improper
venue as it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where
CSBI, the depository bank of the account sought to be
forfeited, was located; (2) insufficiency of the complaint in
form and substance and (3) failure to prosecute. It lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction and directed CSBI to release to
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument,
Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to
an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under RA
9160, as amended (Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture). The order dismissing the Republics complaint for
civil forfeiture of Glasgows account in CSBI has not yet
104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
Floor, Citystate Center [Building], No. 709 Shaw Boulevard[,]
Pasig City;
(b) [CSBI] is a corporation existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at Citystate Center Building,
No. 709 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City;
(c) Glasgow has funds in the amount of P21,301,430.28
deposited with [CSBI], under CA 005-10-000121-5;
(d) As events have proved, aforestated bank account is
related to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of
Securities Regulation Code;
_______________
xxx
xxx
xxx
106
106
_______________
107
107
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered
the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole
or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.
It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which
brings it within the reach of the judicial process.16 It is
actually within the courts possession when it is submitted to
the process of the court.17 The injunctive writ issued on
August 8, 2003 removed account no. CA-005-10-000121-5
from the effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their
repre_______________
108
109
110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
Meanwhile, after due hearing, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining Glasgow from removing,
dissipating or disposing of the subject bank deposits and
CSBI from allowing any transaction on, withdrawal, transfer,
removal, dissipation or disposition thereof.
As the summons on Glasgow was returned unserved, and
considering that its whereabouts could not be ascertained
despite diligent inquiry, the Republic filed a verified omnibus
motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of
court to serve summons by publication on October 8, 2003.
While the trial court issued an alias summons in its order
dated October 15, 2003, it kept quiet on the prayer for leave
of court to serve summons by publication.
Subsequently, in an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial
court archived the case for failure of the Republic to cause
the service of alias summons. The Republic filed an ex parte
omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its
pending motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the
reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to cause
the service of the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within
15 days. However, it deferred its action on the Republics
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication
until a return was made on the alias summons.
Meanwhile, the Republic continued to exert efforts to obtain
information from other government agencies on the
whereabouts or current status of respondent Glasgow if only
to save on expenses of publication of summons. Its efforts,
however, proved futile. The records on file with the Securities
111
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the
Republics complaint.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS MAY BE BY PUBLICATION
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,19 this Court declared that the
rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem.
While that case involved forfeiture proceedings under RA
114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
State Land Investment Corporation vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
Petition granted, order of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 47
set aside.
Notes.It is logically congruent that violations of R.A. No.
1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
penalty. (Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 460 SCRA 600 [2005])
In civil cases to recover or for restitution, reparation of
damages, or indemnification for consequential and other
damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or
other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al., the Sandiganbayan is not to look
for proof beyond reasonable doubt, but to determine, based
on the evidence presented, in light of common human
experience, which of the theories proffered by the parties is
more worthy of credence. (Yuchengco vs. Sandiganbayan,
479 SCRA 1 [2006])
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.,
542 SCRA 95, G.R. No. 170281 January 18, 2008
* EN BANC.
218
218
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
LOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 103, respondents.
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine prohibits
complexing of rebellion with any other offense.The
rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary
ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding
219
220
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
FERNAN, C.J., Dissenting and Concurring:
221
221
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Statutes; The
rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed.While
litigants, should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial
ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance
of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional
issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The rules on
habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v.
Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and
flexibility of the writits capacity to reach all manner of
illegal detentionits ability to cut through barriers of form
and procedural mazeshave always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v.
Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [italics ours].
FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder,
arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand,
the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the
Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No.
187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as
NARVASA, J.:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in
the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for
which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause.4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5,
1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990.5 On
March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
return6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No.
92164,7 which had been
_______________
225
Enrile vs. Salazar
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enriles co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio,
and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the
petitioners case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
becauseand this is putting it very simplythe information
in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated
otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between
the complex crime (delito complejo) arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another, which is
referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal
Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the
compound crime (delito compuesto) arising from a single
act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses
referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore,
it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on
March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of
the same date8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view
expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said
case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and
that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may
properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el
caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o
cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al
delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que
represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
________________
_______________
13 Id., at 551.
230
230
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no
differ* ence that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant
of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply
following the prosecutors recommendation regarding bail,
though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge
motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is
charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as
to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the
right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength
or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has
triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar
situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or
contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the
regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas
pleaded20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as coaccused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941,
that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in
the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody
and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in
violationthey claimof their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of
rebellion has lost that quitessentially quixotic quality that
justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by
love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the
sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash
of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and
assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often
perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military,
but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called
rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pauseand the Court is no
exceptionthat not even the crowded streets of our capital
City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is
disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at
national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal
activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to
effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it
stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is
properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
_______________
234
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as
charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
The Courts earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are
ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is
fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond filed with this Court shall become
functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED, Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217, G.R. No.
92163, .R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
13 Rule 107, sec. l(c) of the old Rules, now Rule 111, sec. 3(b)
of the Revised Rules of Court.
302
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
Remedial law; Exceptions to conclusiveness of factual
findings of the Court of Appeals.On appeal from a decision
of the Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made in said
decision are final, except(1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went bey ond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
Criminal law; Characterization of crime of robbery with force
upon things where robber lays his hands upon a person.The
doctrine laid down in previous cases whereby in case of
robbery inside an inhabited house, the thief, in addition, lays
his hands upon any person without committing any of the
crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty decreedunder paragraph (15)
304
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
305
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
on October 1, 1956, he was in his house in Olongapo,
Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr.
Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony
and that of his wife Engracia Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to
be innocent of the crime charged and said that, although
reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon,
upon the advice of his wife Engracia Mendozawho sought
to corroborate himand Mayor Guillermo Arcenas of
Hermosa, in order that he may not be implicated in a robbery
that took place in Balamja, Bataan, and that he could be sent
back to his hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of
Bataan dismissed the case as against defendants Flores,
Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio
Malana and Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated. Said
defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however,
dismissed Malanas appeal, and affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are
concerned, Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of the
Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court has
erred
Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor and investigated them; that based upon
the description given by Mrs. Peaflor, one individual was
apprehended and then presented to Mrs. Peaflor, who said
that he was not one of the thieves; that another person
subsequently arrested and taken to Mrs. Peaflor was,
similarly, exonerated by her; that in the course of the
investigation conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt.
Sacramento later brought Mrs. Peaflor to the offices of the
police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures of
police characters on file therein; that among those pictures,
she noticed that of appellant herein, who, she believed, was
one of the culprits; and that appellant was, therefore,
arrested and brought to Mrs. Peaflor, who positively
identified him as one of the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs.
Peaflor, through the aforementioned picture of appellant,
that he was one of the thieves. It was she who told Lt.
Sacramento that said picture was that of one of the thieves.
Besides, the fact that Mrs. Peaflor readily exonerated the
first two suspects, arrested by the authorities, shows that
appellant herein would not have been identified by her if she
were not reasonably certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize
appellant herein because it was he who demanded money
from her and to whom she delivered P2,000 in cash and two
(2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and
ransacked her wardrobe; and it was he who tied her hands
and those of her two sons. These series of acts, performed in
308
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the
foregoing-exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory
that the evidence for the prosecution is contradictory and,
hence, unworthy of credence. Counsel for the defense alleges
that, whereas Ignacio Peaflor said that the thieves had
entered his house by forcing its door open, Mrs. Peaflor
testified that their entry was effected through an excavation
by the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed that
the malefactors had removed a piece of wood and an adobe
stone to get into said house. No such contradictions,
however, exist. The house of Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor consisted
of two (2) parts, one of which was a store and the other the
dwelling proper, adjoining the store, which had a doorleading
thereto (to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peaflor testified that
the culprits had entered the store by removing an adobe
stone from a wall thereof, and
_______________
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
this was corroborated by the chief of police, although he
added that the malefactors had, also, removed a piece of
wood from said wall. Upon the other hand, the testimony of
Mr. Peaflor referred to a door, inside the store, leading to the
dwelling proper, as distingu ished from the store.
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
of violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one.
It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294
applies only where robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person takes place without entering an
inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of
the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do,
when the elements of both provisions are present, that the
crime is a complex one, calling for the impositionas
provided in Art. 48 of said Codeof the penalty for the most
Serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at
bar, is reclusin temporal in its maximu m period. This
penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period
from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11)
days to twenty (20) years of reclusin temporal.owing to
* EN BANC.
18
18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
Same; Same; Same; Accused theory that they were held up
by two or more persons while on the coach of the train
without this being noticed by other passengers is incredible.
On the other hand, the twins theory of self-defense is
highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was
lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could
AQUINO, J.:
20
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman
was Corazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred
twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were
standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two
men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head
resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). On the twopassenger seat
21
escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with
which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade
entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm.
Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers
scurried away for
_______________
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone
whom they encountered inside the coach.2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary
Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that
occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and
children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining ear
to drink coffee when someone informed him that there was a
stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He
immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon
reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor
near the toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a
man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9,
holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his
right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the
man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in
authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh.
A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
_______________
5.
4.
S:
5.
T: Bakit naman ninyo namukhaan itong sumaksak sa inyong
ito?
S:
Kahelera po namin iyan sa upuan.
6.
T: Maaari po ba ninyong isalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag
na pananalita. ang buong pangyayaring inyong nasaksihan?
S:
Opo. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak. nang walang
ano-ano ay nakita ko na lamang iyong nakasaksak sa akin na
biglang tumayo sa kanyang kinauupuan at biglang sinaksak
iyong kaharap niyang sa upuan na babae na natutulog. Itong
katabi nang nanaksak na ito ay tumayo rin at nanaksak din
nang nanaksak at ang lahat nang makitang tao ay hinahabol
at sinasaksak. Bata, matanda ay sinasaksak nang dalawang
ito at madaanan. Nang bigla kong tayo ay natamaan iyong
aking kanang kamay nang kabig niya nang saksak. Nagtuloy
ako sa kubeta sa tren at doon ako sumiksik. Nang payapa
naang lahat ay dinala ako sa Calamba sa ospital doon, at
akoy ginamot nang pangunang lunas.
7.
T: Itong katabi na lalaking sinasabi ninyong nanaksak din ay
kung makita ninyong muli ay makikilala pa ninyo?
S:
Makikilala ko rin po. Magkahawig po sila nang nakasaksak sa
akin.
9.
S:
S:
5.
T: Bakit naman ninyo natiyak na ang sumaksak sa inyo ay
iyong kasama ninyo sa ambulancia na nagdala sa inyo sa
ospital na ito?
S:
Malapit po lamang ang kanyang inuupuan sa aking inuupuan
sa loob nang tren kaya namukhaan ko siya.
6.
S:
S:
Dalawang beses po.
7.
24
24
S:
8.
T: Bakit po naman kayo sinaksak nang taong ito?
S:
Hindi ko po alam. Primero nanaksak siya sa kanyang kaharap
sa upuan at saksak nang saksak sa mga taong kanyang
makita.
S:
Opo. Nakaupo po ako nuon kaharap papuntang Bicol. Walang
ano-ano ay bigla na lamang nakita ko na may sinaksak at
pagkatapos nakita ko na lahat nang makita babae o lalaki at
sinasaksak. Nang akoy tumayo para tumakbo ay nilapitan
ako at ako naman ang sinaksak. Sumigaw ako at humingi
nang saklolo at nakiusap sa isang tao na tagpan nang tualya
iyong tinamo kong saksak sa kaliwang puson na tumama sa
buto. Makalipas ang ilang sandali ay dinala na ako sa ospital.
5.
T: Nakikilala ba ninyo iyong sumaksak sa inyo?
S:
Kilala ko po sa mukha at kasama ko pa kahapon nang dalhin
ako sa ospital na ito.
6.
T: Ilan po itong nakita ninyong nanaksak?
S:
12.
25
S:
Para pong punyal na ang haba ay kumulang humigit sa isang
dangkal.
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves
behind them. Some old women were near them. When the
train was already running, the man sitting near the aisle
allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed a
balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was
sitting near the window and who was holding also a balisong
knife attempted to pick Antonio s right pocket, threatening
him with death if he would not hand over the money. Antonio
answered that he would give only one-half of his money
provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his
(Antonios) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew
out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long
including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and
stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with
his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his
pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed
as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh.
L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and 5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1
and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the
second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed
him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and
to fall on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and
a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained
consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him.
His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with
the scissors the man who had wounded his brother. Jose hit
the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by
somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part
of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men
whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. He fell
down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the
knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he
himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a
Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a
physician of the North General Hospital who treated them
during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified
that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2
inches each, mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and
29
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
32
32
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend
themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons
on their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins diabolical objective to butcher
their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced
conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were
perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot
35
Judgment modified.
35
36
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
wounded another, or where a person plants a bomb in an
airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a
number of persons are killed. (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA
748).
(b) Conspiracy.Conspiracy arises from the very instant the
plotters agree to commit the felony and pursue it (People vs.
Indic, 10 SCRA 130). Conspiracy to exist does not require a
definite agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence or commission of the offense; in law, conspiracy
exists, if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same criminal purpose and were united in
its execution (People vs. Cadag, 2 SCRA 388). Consequently,
conspiracy need not be established by direct proof (People
vs. Bersalona, 1 SCRA 1110; People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA 1403;
* SECOND DIVISION.
672
672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but
they refused until only much later when they could no longer
do otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they
were completely surrounded and there was no chance of
escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be
mitigating as when he gave up only after he was surrounded
by the constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan, et
al., G.R., No. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People
vs. Mationg, G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA
167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was
motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. And while
it is claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that
they did not despite several opportunities to do so. There is
no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs. Dimdiman,
106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The crime of serious illegal
detention was such a necessary means as it was selected by
appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out their
evil design to stage a robbery.Under Article 48, a complex
crime arises when an offense is a necessary means for
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused
at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan
was hatched about two days before. The accused were
armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they
entered the establishment, they met Rodita Habiero, an
employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break
and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to
go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his
gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters,
Mary and Mimie, the latter being a minor 15 years of age,
and told the former that all they needed was money. Hearing
this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag
wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to
the defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino
pleaded with the four accused to leave the premises as they
already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead,
accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch
of Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and
Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio, and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal to the accused to surrender
peacefully but they refused. Ultimatums were given but the
accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military
authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the
place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary
Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo
Canasares. Mary suffered a macerated right lower extremity
just below the knee so that her right leg had to be
amputated. The medical certificate described her condition
as in a state of hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in
to the hospital and had to undergo several major operations
during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to
May 30, 1986.
For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon
time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-accused entered the
lumber yard and demanded money from the owner Severino
Choco. He demanded P100,000.00 but was given only
P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the office of the
lumber yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused kept
Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office. He
maintained, however, that he stopped his co-accused from
getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the
P5,000.00 were all left on the counter, and were never
touched by them. He claimed further that they had never
fired on the military because they intended to surrender.
Appellants version also was that during the gunfire,
Severinos daughter stood up and went outside; he wanted to
stop her but he himself was hit by a bullet and could not
prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to
them to surrender but that they gave themselves up only
much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of
conviction and sentenced each of the accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law and to pay the costs.
676
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
Appellant Salvillas present appeal is predicated on the
following Assignments of Error:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged
was consummated and in not holding that the same was
merely attempted.
2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.
The defense contends that The complete crime of larceny
(theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt requires
asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking. In
other words, the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive
stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away
or asportation. And without asportation the crime committed
is only attempted (Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla,
Records, p. 317).
There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there
be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is
known as the element of asportation, the essence of which is
the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner
without his privity and consent and without the animus
revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing 5 C.J.
607). In fact, if there is no actual taking, there can be no
robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an
essential part of the crime of robbery.
Appellant insists that while the giving has been proven, the
taking has not. And this is because neither he nor his three
co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the
latters wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
and another for Serious Illegal Detention. In the present case,
only one Information was filed charging the complex offense.
For another, in Astor, the robbery had already been
consummated and the detention was merely to forestall the
capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case,
where the detention was availed of as a means of insuring
the consummation of the robbery. Further, in Astor, the
detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery so
that it was held therein:
Judgment affirmed.
681
612
* EN BANC.
612
613
614
614
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
tion 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
detat under Section 3).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Insofar as the use of an
unlicensed firearm, as a special aggravating circumstance,
unduly raises the penalty for the four counts of murder from
four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death, Republic
617
People vs. Valdez
The Information against accused-appellant, Bernardo Castro,
and one John Doe for the complex crime of Multiple Murder
with Double Frustrated Murder charged:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September
17, 1995, at Sitio Cabaoangan, barangay Nalsian,
municipality of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan, and within
and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
with intent to kill, and each armed with caliber .30 carbines
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
treachery, simultaneously attacked and fired their caliber .30
carbines at Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta,
Sandra Montano, William Montano and Randy Tibule while
they were on board a tricycle, on their way to a dance party,
hitting them in the different parts of their bodies which
caused the instantaneous death of Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean
Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta and Sandra Montano, to the
damage and prejudice of their respective heirs, and inflicting
fatal injuries to William Montano and Randy Tibule, in the
different parts of their bodies, having thus performed all the
acts which would have produced the crime of murder with
respect to both but which did not by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, namely, the able and
timely medical assistance given the said victims William
Montano and Randy Tibule, which prevented their death.
Contrary to Article 248 in Relation to Article 48 and Article 6
of the RPC.
(pp. 1-2, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8747)
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions pertinently averred:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September
17, 1995 at Sitio Cabaoangan, Barangay Nalsian, Municipality
618
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
Contrary to Presidential Decree 1866.
(p. 1, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8749)
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial
are succinctly summarized in the Peoples brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening,
William Montano (16 years old), Randy Tibule (17 years old),
Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon
Garcia, Jr. were at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag,
Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the wedding
party of Jean Maries cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN, June
11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18, 1996, pp. 23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon
Garcia going to Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and
Willie. Jean was seated inside the side car with Sandra and
William Montano (TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN, June 18,
1996, pp. 23-25). After making a turn along the barangay
road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan, they met appellant
Rolando Valdez and his companions who were armed with
guns. The tricycles headlight flashed on their faces. Without
warning, they pointed their guns and fired at Montanos
group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, nataydan,
mapan tayon (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and
companions left (TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 11-14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia,
Sandra Montano and Willie Acosta dead (TSN, June 11, 1996,
pp. 14-16). They sustained the following injuries:
Jean Marie Garcia:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral of the
nipple right through and through trajecting the middle lobe of
the lungs, rt ventricle of the heart, middle lobe of the lung,
left with point of exit 1 inch in diameter 1 inch lateral of the
nipple, left.
(Exhibit B)
Ramon Garcia:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance ear
canal left thru and thru trajecting the skull brain substance
with point of exit temporal area right.
619
(Exhibit D)
Willie Acosta:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point
of entrance trajecting the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and
thru trajecting the upper third of the stomach of thoracic vein
with the point of exit 1 cm. in diameter at the level of the 7th
thorasic vertebrae.
(Exhibit E)
On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule
survived the attack. They suffered serious gunshot injuries
that could have caused their death were it not for the timely
medical attention given them (TSN, July 3, 1996, p. 6).
Montano sustained several gunshot wounds on the left arm,
two on the left upper back, another on the left shoulder and
middle right finger (TSN, June 25, 1996, p. 608). Tibule
sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper
quadrant (stomach) and the other at the left periumbelical
(TSN, July 3, 1996, pp. 7-8).
(pp. 215-219, Rollo.)
619
Sandra Montano:
620
620
Q.
No, sir.
A.
Q.
622
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies in court.
Accused-appellant points to the Statement of William
Montano, taken by SPO1 Mario Suratos on September 20,
1995 (Exhibit 1: p. 238, Record), and the Statement taken on
Q.
Why?
Q.
Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately
recognized?
A.
That one, sir.
ACTG. INTERPRETER:
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
626
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive
or retaliatory act which the victim might make (People vs.
Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that
treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden
and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it
or defend himself against such attack. What is decisive is
that the execution of the attack, without the slightest
provocation from the victim who is unarmed, made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate
(People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise
present. After reviewing the evidence, however, we do not
find any showing of evident premeditation on the part of
accused-appellant. While there may be testimonial evidence
pointing to an altercation between Bernard Castro and a
certain Capistrano, it does not sufficiently prove the
628
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the four victims in this case. In the same manner, accusedappellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated
murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of
murder. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the medium
penalty is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant, being guilty of four
separate counts of murder, the proper penalty should be four
sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty
of two counts of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must
be meted out an indeterminate sentence ranging from a
mini630
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
mum of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to a maximum of
12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal for each offense.
Now, to the matter of accused-appellants conviction for
illegal possession of unlicensed firearm under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. It was recently held in the case entitled
People vs. Molina (G.R. Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and
reiterated in People vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September
17, 1998), that there can be no separate conviction of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken
as an aggravating circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 8294, which in part, provides:
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and GonzagaReyes, JJ.,
concur.
Mendoza and Panganiban, JJ., In the result.
632
632
438
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Leon
VlLLAMOR, J.:
440
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Leon
agraph, and the third also considers theft a series of acts
with similar characteristics to the general type, with the
exceptions therein noted.
Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
"ART. 517. The following are guilty of theft:
"1. Any person who, with intent to gain, but without the use
of violence or intimidation against any person or the use of
force upon anything, shall take anything which is the
personal property of another without the latter's consent.
"2. Any person who, having found anything which has been
lost, shall with knowledge of its ownership appropriate the
same with intent of gain.
"3. Any person guilty of malicious damage who shall remove
or make use of the things damaged, subject to the
exceptions established by paragraphs one, two, and three of
article five hundred and ninety-two; paragraph one of article
five hundred and ninety-three; paragraph one of article five
hundred and ninety-five, and articles five hundred and
ninety-six, five hundred and ninety-eight, and six hundred
and three."
As may be seen, the act of taking another's property without
violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon
things, with intent to gain and without the consent of its
owner, is what constitutes the crime of theft, as described in
the first paragraph of article 517.
The crime of theft is an offense against personal property and
what is punished is the alarm caused in the community by
the perpetration of the act which is violative of the individual
rights guaranteed by the law, as well as the damage that
said act may occasion to the members of the community.
Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in
response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on
one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the
accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully taken
belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts
here for the accomplish441
441
People vs. De Leon
ment of different purposes, but only of one which was
consummated, and which determines the existence of only
one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place
and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes
having an independent existence of their own, because there
are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13, 1894,
said:
"The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two cows and two
calves on one night, belonging to four owners, which
livestock was found in various adjacent and open meadows,
constitutes only one crime of theft, because the fact that the
persons injured by the taking of the cattle by the accused
were several, said accused knowing that the meadows in
which this livestock was found were open and adjacent, it
being easy to pass from one to the other, does not authorize
the legal conception that the said accused committed four
thefts on said night, but only one as found by the lower court,
which did not commit an error of law by holding that the acts
were committed on a single occasion."
It is not an element of the crime of theft that the culprit know
the owner of the thing stolen, the crime being consummated
provided the thing stolen belongs to another and the same is
taken with intent to gain. (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of November 22, 1898.) Neither is it necessary for the
existence of the crime of theft that it should appear in a
specific manner who the owner is of the thing stolen,
because the law does not require it nor does it affect the
criminal liability, but only the restitution or indemnification of
damages, which are merely of a civil nature. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, October 4, 1905.) What constitutes
the crime of theft is the taking of another's property with
intent to gain, without the consent of the owner, so that after
442
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Leon
agraph of article 517 of the Penal Code exist. Therefore, we
are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a
thing belonging to another on one occasion and in the same
place, constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft;
and the fact that the things taken belong to different persons
does not produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be
punished separately.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of the
doctrine laid down in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260),
according to which, where the accused made no objection to
the information on the ground that it charged more than one
offense, the prosecution properly submitted evidence as to
the commission of each and all of the offenses charged; and
the trial court also properly entered judgment of conviction of
each and all of these offenses which were established by the
introduction of competent evidence at the trial and should,
therefore, have imposed the prescribed penalties for each
and all of the offenses of which the accused was convicted in
accordance with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal
Code. This doctrine, however, is not applicable to the present
case as two separate complaints have been filed herein
against the accused, but the trial court convicted the
accused in the two cases, considering the facts alleged in the
said complaints as constituting but one crime.
In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as in
Spanish decisions in regard to the question which is here
debated:
444
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bretaa
732; Addison vs. State, 3 Tex. A., 40 Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23
Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.-State vs. Blay, 77 Vt., 56; 58 Atl.
Rep., 794; State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl. Rep., 432; 54
Am. St, 878; State vs. Newton, 42 Vt., 537; Va.-Alexander vs.
Com., 90 Va., 809; 20 South East, 782; Wash.-State vs. Laws,
61 Wash., 533; 112 Pac., 488; State vs. Butts, 42 Wash., 455;
85 Pac., 33; Terr. vs. Heywood, 2 Wash., 180; 2 Pac., 189;
Wyo.-Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo., 504; 54 Pac., 228; Eng.Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K, 765; 61 Eng. C. L., 765.)
For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as is
hereby, modified and the accused Vicente de Leon y Flora is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and three months
presidio mayor, with the accessories of the law, and to pay
the costs. So ordered. People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, Nos.
25375, 25376 October 8, 1926
aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly
performed their official duty. Such lack of dubious motive
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over
the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of
having been framed, erected as it is upon the mere shifting
sands of an alibi.
Same; Same; Same; The corpus delicti of the crime has been
fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.When the
drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service
of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
(PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn
Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, confirmed in her
Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four
tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and
had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. Thus, the
corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with
certainty and conclusiveness.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Minor error or discrepancy
neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution
evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witness honesty.
Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an
error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant,
such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter
and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the
witnesses honesty.
Same; Same; Same; No law or jurisprudence requires that an
arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a
barangay official or any other civilian or be accompanied by
the taking of pictures.Again, appellant contends that there
was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or
civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures
taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was
not reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay
official or police authorities. These are absurd disputations.
No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to
be valid,
557
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
557
People vs. Simon
be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other
civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Court finds and
declares the exhibits inadmissible in evidence.However, we
find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits
inadmissible in evidence. Appellants conformance to these
documents are declarations against interest and tacit
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in
violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that
he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in
writing and in the presence of counsel, hence whatever
incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from
him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction.Notwithstanding
the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant
cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his
criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been
sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal
sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of
the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. In the present case, and in
light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been
ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Drug-pushing when done on a small
scale belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed
at any time, and in any place.Appellant then asseverates
that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total
stranger. We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the
doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale
_________________
8 Ibid., June 14, 1989, 3-22.
9 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 5-26.
10 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 8-16.
562
562
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,
declared that she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause
for this ailment was appellants peptic ulcer. She did not see
any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence
presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in
favor of the Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned
judgment of the lower court, contending in his assignment of
errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of
frame-up, (2) not declaring Exhibit G (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3)
convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the Peoples real
theory and evidence is to the effect that appellant actually
sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the
other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently
from his possession,14 the latter not being in any way
connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold
and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In
view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal
is merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly
565
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
565
People vs. Simon
thereof as the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso
bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for
finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in
buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily
explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q
Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in
conducting such operation you do not anymore provide a
powder (sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark
or identity of the persons taking hold of the object?
A
We were not able to put powder on these denominations
because we are lacking that kind of material in our office
since that item can be purchased only in Manila and only few
are producing that, sir.
xxx
Q
Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime
Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A
Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot
make a request for that powder because they, themselves,
are using that in their own work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to
mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can
under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the
prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in
any of such transactions.30 The dusting of said bills with
phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for
568
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence
that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in
xxx
5.750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx
_________________
52 Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides that it shall
take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation, and it was so
published in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila
Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal.
570
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional
to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
1.Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for
the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of
only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the
sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be
whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the
lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law,
albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the
previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it
has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code
the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and
shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by
special laws.54 The exception in said article would not apply
to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual
delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of
the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in
577
People vs. Simon
(Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the AntiCattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the
prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein
that
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a
special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised
Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is
in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for
penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent
seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment
of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft
of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to
applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code x x x. Article 64 of the same Code should,
likewise, be applicable, x x x. (Italics supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the
rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act
No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we
have this more recent pronouncement:
x x x. Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, this Court held that where
the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in
applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no
roomfor the application of the provisions of the Code. x x x
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No.
1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in
the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such
case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties
which distill the deep legal thought and centuries of
experience in the administration of criminal laws.
(Emphasis ours.)66
________________
P5,000.00
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997
585
People vs. Gabres
DATE OF PAYMENT
NAME OF PAYOR
AMOUNT
1. April 26,1992
Oreta Nisperos
P5,000.00
Joel Panida
P5,000.00
Joel Panida
P5,000.00
Julius Aoay
P5,000.00
Oreta Nisperos
Q
The two accused?
A
Yes, maam.
Q
Now, when the two accused came to your residence on April
26, what happened?
A
My son paid an amount of P5,000.00.
Q
Who particularly paid for your son?
A
I paid for my son, maam.
Q
Aside from you and your son who else were present?
A
Also present were Joel Panida, Tarcisio Dacsig.
Q
How about Julius Aoay?
A
He was also present, maam.
Q
You said a while ago, Madam witness, that on April 26 you
paid P5,000.00 for your son, what is your basis in saying that
you paid P5,000.00 on that day?
A
They issued us a receipt, maam.
591
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997
591
People vs. Gabres
Q
Who received the payment?
A
It was Mona Gabres, maam.
Q
Who issued the receipt?
A
xxx
x x x.
I would like to show to you this receipt dated July 31, 1992
previously marked as Exhibit B-1' for Crim. Case No. 92-CR1803 and Exhibit I-1' in Crim. Case No. 92C R-1805, is this
the receipt you are referring to?
A
Yes, Maam.
Q
Now, who issued you this receipt?
A
Lito Gabres, Maam.
Q
Now, if this receipt was issued by Lito Gabres what was the
participation of Mona Gabres?
A
I handed this P25,000.00 to Lito Gabres, he counted it and
then handed it to Mona Gabres, Maam."12
________________
11 TSN, 05 April 1994, pp. 611.
12 TSN, 10 May 1994, pp. 56.
592
592
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
Testimony of Julius Aoay:
Q
I would like to show you a receipt dated June 7, 1992 which
has been previously marked as Exhibit A' in Criminal Case
1801, as Exhibit B' in Criminal Case 1805, as Exhibit B' in
Criminal Case 1800, as Exhibit C' in Criminal Case 1803 and
as Exhibit B' in Criminal Case 1802, is this the receipt issued
to you?
A
Yes, it is.
Q
Could you tell us who wrote this receipt?
A
It was Mona Gabres, maam.
Q
How about Lito Gabres what was his participation?
A
He was the one counting the money."13
In the scheduled meeting on 12 April 1992, it was only
accused-appellant who, in fact, showed up to meet with the
applicants for overseas work. Joel Panida testified:
Q
On April 12,1992 were you present in that meeting?
A
Yes, I was also there, maam.
Q
Who else were present on that day, April 12,1992?
A
Mrs. Nisperos, Tarcisio Dacsig, Ramil Nisperos and Julius Aoay.
Q
Who from the side of the accused came to see you?
A
It was Mona Gabres only, maam.
Q
How about Lito Gabres, was he also present?
A
He was not there, maam.
Q
On April 12,1992 what transpired in that meeting?
A
She introduced herself as a recruiter for workers going to
Korea. She also asked us that if we are interested then we
will give P5,000.00 each as down payment."14
The Court finds it hard to accept the claim that private
complainants have prevaricated the evidence to implicate
Mona Gabres only because the authorities have yet to
succeed in arresting her husband. It is, of course, unfortunate
that the husband, at least momentarily, is able to ward off
the long arm of the law; nevertheless, it should, in the end,
still catch up with him.
________________
13 TSN, 23 May 1994, p. 6.
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
"(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits.
16 Rollo, p. 49.
594
594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Gabres
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the
first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
x x x
xxx
x x x.
ART. 39. Penalties.(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage
as defined herein.
Quite appropriately, the trial court has observed:
"(T)here are two elements of the crime (of illegal
recruitment), namely: (1) that the offender is a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the
offender undertakes any of the recruitment activities defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same
code. (PEOPLE vs. CORAL, G.R. Nos. 9784954, March 1,
1994, 230 SCRA 499). Without any doubt, this Court finds the
two elements of the crime present in the case at bar. That
the accused are nonlicensees or non-holders of authority to
lawfully recruit is evident in the certification issued by Atty.
Justinian Lichnacban of the POEACAR Regional Extension
Office of Baguio City (Exhibit D', 93-CR1800). Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be;
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,
if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of
the following means.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term
of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the
________________
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense.19 The penalty next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime.20 The determination of the
minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the
court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided.21 The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence.22
from two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of from two (2)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
All other aspects of the dispositive portion of the decision
appealed from are AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.Illegal recruitment carries with it the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine which varies by degrees in
accordance with the enumeration made in Article 39 of the
Labor Code as amended. (People vs. Cabacang, 246 SCRA
530 [1995]) People vs. Gabres, 267 SCRA 581, G.R. Nos.
11895054 February 6, 1997
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
sudden accused came from behind her and twisted both her
arms. Then accused lifted her and brought her to a nipa hut
which was uninhabited. Victim struggled to set herself free,
to no avail despite kicking, shouting and struggling to be free
from the hold of the accused. (pp. 18-23, TSN, id.)
Accused dropped [the] victim to the floor of the nipa hut;
pinned both her legs including her right hand with [his] knees
[and took] off his pants. The accused ha[d] his bolo beside
him with which he threatened the victim. Victim testified that
accused raped her then, explaining in detail the commission
of the said act. (pp. 23-29, TSN, id.)
Witness informed her husband and her mother about the
rape that evening. (pp. 31-32, TSN, id.)
During cross-examination, defense counsel tried to impeach
the testimony of the witness by eliciting the information that
accused and victim were close neighbors; that during the
incident
119
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999
119
People vs. Lampaza
private offended party passed by accused who was cutting
bamboo poles, on her way to the grazing area of the farm lot.
(pp. 3-4, TSN, November 7, 1989) She described again the
force and intimidation emanating from the accused in
committing the act complained of. Private offended party
informed the Court of the great fear she felt that she was
trembling and almost speechless when the incident
happened. (pp. 5-7; 11-22, TSN, Ibid.)
Witness was never attracted to the accused as she testified
on cross[-]examination. (p. 19, TSN, id.)
When queried by the Court as to the length of the sexual
intercourse she stated that it lasted only three minutes,
although the acts of force, intimidation and the struggle
lasted for more than ten minutes. (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.)
During the hearing of January 4, 1990, prosecution
presented another witness in the person of the husband of
the offended party (p. 32), who testified that the latter
taking off his pants and shirt. They made love consensually.
He did not threaten complainant; neither did he use force [or]
violence in consummating the sexual act because the same
was with the consent of complainant (t.s.n., August 6, 1991).
Filomena Lampaza, the lawfully-wedded wife of the accused,
testified that complainant is the mistress of her husband, the
accused. Because of her husbands extra-marital relationship,
they were always quarreling. To avoid further trouble she
went to Iloilo to work as a housemaid for Judge Amelia K. Del
Rosario (pp. 49-50, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1991). The latter testified
that Filomena had worked for her family as a housemaid, and
during the course of her employment she had confided to her
employer that her (Filomenas) husband was maltreating her
and ha[d] a querida (t.s.n., Jan. 30, 1992).
Ruling of the RTC and the CA
Debunking the claim that the sexual intercourse was
consensual, the trial court held that appellant used force
against the victim by twisting her arm and bodily lifting her
from the farm lot to the nipa hut. He also threatened and
intimidated her by placing a bolo beside her during the actual
rape. The trial court ruled:14
Our assessment and appraisal of the facts of the case show
that there was force committed on the victim when her arms
were twisted and she was bodily lifted from the farm lot to
the nipa hut. She was intimidated or there was a threat to
intimidate her, when the bolo was placed beside her during
the rape.
___________________
14 RTC Decision, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 15-16.
121
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999
121
People vs. Lampaza
This court finds that the incident complained of which
occurred on March 20, 1988 was x x x done without the
consent [or] approval of the victim.
xxx
xxx
While you were being lifted by the accused and being carried
to the nipa hut, what did you do if you did anything?
A.
I struggled to set myself free.
Q.
Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you
struggled?
A.
(At this juncture, Julie Magbanua takes the place of the
accused while the witness takes the place of the victim and
from the position previously described, with the x x x arms
[of the accused] around the victim, the victim struggle[s] to
set herself free by moving her body towards the left and right
and trie[s] to push her head downward away from the arms
of the accused [who is] embracing her. The witness further
states that since her feet were off the ground, it [was] hard to
set herself free).
Q.
Now, aside from struggling hard to free yourself from the
clutches of the accused, what else did you do if any?
A.
I kicked both my legs. (Witness demonstrates a movement as
if she were pedalling an unseen bicycle).
Q.
Did you make any statement while you were trying to
struggle from the hold of the accused?
A.
I did not say anything. I only struggled.
Q.
Why did you not say anything?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A.
Because I was afraid, Sir.
125
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999
125
People vs. Lampaza
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q.
Was the accused able to reach the nipa hut with you?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
While you were already at the nipa hut, what did the accused
do, if any?
A.
He dumped me on the floor of the nipa hut.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
After the accused dumped you on the floor of the nipa hut,
what happened to you?
A.
The accused pinned both my legs as well as my right hand,
Sir, with both of his knees.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q.
Now, Madam Witness, while in this position, what next did
the accused do?
A.
The accused took off his pants.
Q.
While the accused was doing that, was the accused saying
anything?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
What did he say?
A.
If you do not allow me to have sexual intercourse with you, I
am going to kill you.
Q.
Did you notice if there was any weapon carried by the
accused with him?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
What was he carrying?
A.
He was carrying a bolo, Sir.
Q.
Where was the bolo of the accused at that time?
A.
It was beside me, Sir.
Appellant further argues that if there was any resistance [by
the victim], it was couched in general terms.21 The
argument is bereft of merit. We must stress that the law does
not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving
resistance.22 Indeed, physical resistance need not be
established when the
____________________
21 Appellants Brief, p. 10; rollo, p. 56.
22 People v. Penero, 276 SCRA 564, July 31, 1997.
126
126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
culprit employed intimidation,23 which, insofar as it was
directed at the mind of the victim, must be viewed in the
light of the latters perception and judgment at the time.24 In
the present case, the victim was terrified because the threat
of the appellant to kill her was substantiated by the bolo he
placed beside her. Furthermore, she could not have
successfully resisted because, according to her, he was husky
and strong.
Neither are we persuaded by his contention that complainant
did not undergo medical examination to show signs of
physical struggle or assault.25 The fact that the victim had
no visible signs of injury did not by itself disprove rape.26 We
reiterate that she was too intimidated to offer serious
resistance to the advances of appellant.
to her nephew when she saw him right after the incident;39
(b) she did not immediately tell her husband that she had
been raped;40 (c) she did not report the outrage to the police
or to the barangay officials.41
These arguments are puerile. Complainants testimony was
not weakened by her failure to immediately narrate the
incident to her nephew or to her husband. There is no code of
conduct prescribing the correct reaction of a rape victim to
the sexual assault. When placed under a great deal of
emotional stress, the workings of the human mind are
unpredictable.42 Some may immediately relay the incident
to authorities and close relatives, but others need time to
compose themselves before deciding on a course of
action.43 Although she did not immediately inform her
nephew about the incident, she told her husband about it
after he arrived from another town, when they were about to
sleep. That same night, she and her husband decided to
report the outrage to the authorities. In this light, her account
is far from incredible. Even assuming that there was a delay
in reporting the incident to the police, this fact is not
necessarily an indication of fabrication.44
Crime and Punishment
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is
committed when carnal knowledge of a woman is obtained
under any of the following circumstances: (1) force or
intimidation is used, (2) the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (3) the woman is under twelve
years of
_____________________
39 Ibid., p. 14; rollo, p. 60.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 17; rollo, p. 62.
42 People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713, April 4, 1997; People v.
San Juan, 270 SCRA 693, April 4, 1997; People v. Cabel, 282
SCRA 410, December 14, 1995.
43 People v. Malunes, 247 SCRA 317, August 14, 1995;
People v. Roncal, 272 SCRA 242, May 6, 1997.
P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T.
Oyanib.4
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V.
Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2)
separate
_______________
1 In Criminal Cases Nos. 11-6012 and 11-6018, Judge Maximo
B. Ratunil, presiding. Rollo, pp. 18-29.
2 Regretfully, the trial court judge did not know how to apply
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. He imposed indefinite
minimum and maximum penalties He must impose a specific
penalty in both the minimum and maximum periods (Cf.
People v. Herbias, 333 Phil. 422; 265 SCRA 571 [1996]).
3 In Criminal Case No. 11-6012.
4 In Criminal Case No. 11-6018.
198
198
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Oyanib
informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
with murder and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit:
a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill
and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby
inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
197910 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They
lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita
separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2)
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house
of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place
where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while
Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the sala located
at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan,
Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second
floor rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise, lasted for
quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs
to check.11
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and
sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus
Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latters
stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When
Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told
Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police.
Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She
died on the way to the hospital.12
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation
Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion,
Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of
September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an
information regarding a stab_______________
9 Ibid., p. 39.
10 TSN, April 17, 1996, p. 13.
11 TSN, April 10, 1996, p. 6.
12 Ibid., pp. 7-10.
200
200
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Oyanib
18 Ibid., p. 20.
19 Criminal Case No. 11-6018, RTC Record, Exhibit E, p. 6.
20 TSN, March 6, 1997, pp. 11-18.
201
VOL. 354, MARCH 12, 2001
201
People vs. Oyanib
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and
exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito.21 In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One
time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy.
Tambacan, Iligan City.22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus
about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she
was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even
threatened to kill him.23
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his
daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius
failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting
at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning
until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to
Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his
behalf.24
Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of
romance (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the
door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and
Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and
his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek.
Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 59
in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the
assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down.
Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed
Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito,
only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit
MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge28
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court
to the Supreme Court.29
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them
both under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to
the basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the
exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.30 He questioned the trial courts appreciation of the
facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored and
overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the
defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless
body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph
graphically showed that Jesus pants were wide open,
unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing
any underwear, lending credence
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 18-29, at p. 29.
29 Criminal Case No. II-6081, RTC Record, p. 112.
30 Rollo, pp. 56-57.
204
204
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Oyanib
to his defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor
General submitted that accused-appellant failed to discharge
the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that
he killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the trial court did not err in denying him the
exempting privilege under the Article.31
We find the appeal meritorious.
court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and
the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have
acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant
surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual
intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that
accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw
his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse.
Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his
wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support
of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the
police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording
the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of
Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People
v. Wagas:35
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the
scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so
severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful
spouse is caught in flagrante delicto, and it must be resorted
to only with great caution so much so that the law requires
that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal
Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4)
months of des_______________
35 People v. Wagas, supra, Note 33, at p. 74.
206
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Oyanib
tierro.36 He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor
within a radius, of one hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan
City.37
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed.
Notes.American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes
in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. (Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA
653 [1989])
Under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, the killing of the
wife by the husband (or vice versa) is justified if the husband
kills her while engaged in sexual intercourse with another
man or immediately thereafter. (People vs. Cabalhin, 231
SCRA 486 [1994])
The kind of attitude of a husband allegedly merely standing
still and endure the illicit sexual congress between his wife
and her supposed paramour from beginning to end, and of
just going after his wifes lover when the latter is through
with his lovemaking and only after he would have put on his
clothes and started to flee, defies human naturetruly, there
is no real test of truth in the testimony of a witness except
gauge it consonantly with human knowledge, observation,
and experience. (People vs. Velasco, 351 SCRA 539 [2001])
People vs. Oyanib, 354 SCRA 196, G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March
12, 2001
The penalty for the crime of murder, under article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, is reclusin temporal in its maximum
period to death. Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated
felony is the one next lower in degree to that prescribed for
the consummated felony, which in the present case is prisin
mayor in its maximum period to reclusin temporal in its
medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen
years and four months. The
114
114
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating
circumstance, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, fixes the penalty within the minimum period,
that is to say, from ten years and one day to twelve years,
leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to be
served within said range, i. e., not less than ten years and
one day nor more than.twelve years. The penalty imposed by
the trial judge being within this range is correct and therefore
is the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense which this accused has committed.
As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was
enacted after this appeal was lodged in this court, we are
now required to revise the sentence imposed upon the
appellant and to bring the same into conformity with Act No.
4103.
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court
must now, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two
penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as
the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must serve the
minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the
provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between
the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the
sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act,
-be released from serving said period in whole or in part. He
must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period
which is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the
imprisoned for not less than five years nor more than ten
years or for not less than seven years nor more than ten
years and eight months, etc."
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the
"maximum" is determined in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code. In the example given reference is
made to article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that the defendant shall suffer the penalty of
prisin mayor in its medium and maximum period. The
penalty is placed in the medium degree because of the
absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to
say, anywhere between nine years, four months and one day
and ten years and eight months in the discretion of the court.
In the case on appeal here the
116
116
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty
under the Revised Penal Code because of the plea of guilty,
that is to say, between ten years and one day and twelve
years in the discretion of the court. This discretion is in
nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in
conformity with the discretion conferred upon it by the
Revised Penal Code, might have assessed the penalty at, let
us say, eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act No.
4103 does not require this court to assess the said penalty at
12 years, which is the longest time of imprisonment within
the minimum degree.
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of
imprisonment conforms to the provisions and rules of the
Revised Penal Code and is therefore fixed and established as
the maximum of the sentence which shall be imposed upon
the appellant.
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment
period" referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act
provides that this "minimum which shall not be less than the
minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to
within the range from four years, two months and one day to
ten years of prisin correccional in its maximum period to
prisin mayor in its medium period. We repeat that Act No.
4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of
imprisonment in the minimum period of the degree next
lower to the maximum penalty.
The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent:
that the defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a
maximum penalty of ten years and one day of prisin mayor
in its maximum degree, and to a minimum imprisonment
period of seven years, and as thus modified, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed. With costs de oficio. People vs.
Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, No. 38332 December 14, 1933
person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which
clearly mandates that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction, nor Llamado v.
Court of Appeals12 which interprets the quoted provision,
offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application
of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of
petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not
bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit
may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this
interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence.
Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the
Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals
x x x we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal
statute. We, however, understand petitioners argument to
be really that any statutory language that appears to favor
the accused in a criminal case should be given a liberal
interpretation. Courts x x x have no authority to invoke
liberal interpretation or the spirit of the law where the
words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the
history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or
interpretation. We do not believe that the spirit of the law
may legitimately be invoked
_______________
10 34 Words and Phrases 111.
11 Bala v. Martinez, G.R. No. 67301, 29 January 1990, 181
SCRA 459.
12 G.R. No. 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566.
391
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
391
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
to set at naught words which have a clear and definite
meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The true
are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the
multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should
not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms
are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more
than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he
is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses
is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken
separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9,
par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum, not
total, when it says that [t]he benefits of this Decree shall not
be extended to those xxxx sentenced to serve a
maximumterm of imprisonment of more than six years.
Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties
imposed but to take each penalty separately and
_______________
14 No. L-35910, 21 July 1978, 84 SCRA 176, citing McGee v.
Republic, 94 Phil. 820 (1954).
393
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
393
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner
was supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year
and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced
to serve the prison term for each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s), and in
each of the four (4) informations, he was charged with having
defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4)
different, separate days, he was still eligible for probation, as
each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years
imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that
those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for
395
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
395
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times,
considering that the RTC merely affirmedthe MeTC as regards
the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases
and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed
therein. Thus
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by
the trial court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C.
Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the
above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in
each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law; and to pay the costs.17
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at
that the accused was acquitted or absolved in any of the four
(4) counts under each of the four (4) Informations, or that
any part of the judgment of conviction was reversed, or that
any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed.
Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other
penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that
the judgment of conviction rendered by the MeTC was
affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the
penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not
be summed up but taken separately as the totality of all the
penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately
filed an application for probation as he was already qualified
after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt
humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of
the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing
the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
x x x the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out
of time. The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended,
provides thus:
SEC.4. Grant of Probation.Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal x x x x
place the defendant on probation x x x x
399
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he
filed an application for probation outside the period for
perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for
probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384,
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
_____________
* THIRD DIVISION.
524
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cal vs. Court of Appeals
cancellation of his bail bond.Thus, in this case, the
petitioners application for probation had the effect of a final
determination of his case, and the cancellation of his bail
bond. Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals could not
have done otherwise than to affirm the trial courts order of
July 15, 1992 for petitioners immediate confinement after
promulgation of judgment, in view of the subsequent
application for probation which rendered the said judgment
final and immediately executory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A trial courts order
denying an accuseds motion to withdraw his application for
probation and rejecting his notice of appeal partakes of the
nature of an order granting probation, which is not
appealable.As for the second issue, although petitioner
insists on faulting the courts a quo for denying his motion to
withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice
of appeal, his position is nonetheless untenable. The
respondent Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial
courts order of November 20, 1992, denying the petitioners
motion to withdraw his application for probation and rejecting
his notice of appeal, partook of the nature of an order
granting probation, which is not appealable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Bengzon &
Jimenez for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
once and for all without suffering incarceration. But after his
employer induced him to appeal, helped him to post his
bailbond and perhaps even provided him with another
counsel, the accused changed his mind. He was fully aware
and he knew what he was doing. He was properly advised by
his lawyer who told him that if he will file his application for
probation, he would lost his right to appeal although of
course he was given contrary advice by his employer in
Manila. It would be a dangerous precedent to allow the
accused to make a mockery of the Probation Law. The case of
Yusi vs. Morales2 cannot apply to him.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
the appeal is DENIED. The convict Angelo Cal is directed to
make manifest
_______________
2 No. L-61958, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 853. The sole issue
in this case was, in the light of Sec. 4 of P.D. 968 as
amended, treating the application for probation as amounting
to a waiver of the right to appeal, whether such waiver is
irrevocable, and whether persons who have applied for the
benefits of the Probation Law may still withdraw their
application during the period for filing an appeal and ask that
their appeal from the judgment of conviction be given due
course. The Supreme Court in this case ruled that such
waiver is not irrevocable, given the peculiar circumstances of
this case, particularly the fact that petitioners counsel of
record was not present when petitioners applied for
probation. Although at that point in time they were
represented by counsel de oficio appointed by the court on
the spot, nevertheless the said counsel de oficio was not fully
acquainted with their case and could not have properly
evaluated the strength of a possible appeal when he advised
them about the effects of the application for probation. After
having filed for probation, the accused subsequently changed
their minds when they were advised by a relative who
happened to be an MTC judge to appeal instead.
527
And that is only right since the legal positions behind appeal
and probation, respectively, are diametrically opposed. This
is because an accused applying for probation is deemed to
have accepted the judgment. In fact, x x x the application
for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction and x x x the application for probation is
considered a waiver upon his part to
_____________
3 Bernardo vs. Balagot, G.R. No. 86561, November 10, 1992,
215 SCRA 526; J. Isagani A. Cruz, ponente. See also Salgado
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89606, August 30, 1990, 189
SCRA 304.
529
VOL. 251, DECEMBER 28, 1995
529
Cal vs. Court of Appeals
file an appeal, x x x4
Thus, in this case, the petitioners application for probation
had the effect of a final determination of his case, and the
cancellation of his bail bond. Therefore, the respondent Court
of Appeals could not have done otherwise than to affirm the
trial courts order of July 15, 1992 for petitioners immediate
confinement after promulgation of judgment, in view of the
subsequent application for probation which rendered the said
judgment final and immediately executory.
As for the second issue, although petitioner insists on faulting
the courts a quo for denying his motion to withdraw his
application for probation and rejecting his notice of appeal,
his position is nonetheless untenable. The respondent Court
of Appeals correctly held that the trial courts order of
November 20, 1992, denying the petitioners motion to
withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice
of appeal, partook of the nature of an order granting
probation, which is not appealable.
Inasmuch as (P)robation is a mere privilege and its grant
rests upon the discretion of the court x x x (and) the grant of
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Llamado vs. Court of Appeals
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted
the petitioner alone, since jurisdiction over the person of
Pascual, who had thoughtfully fled the country, had not been
obtained. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay a fine
of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Petitioner was also required to reimburse
respondent Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of
suit.
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was
read to him, petitioner through counsel orally manifested that
he was taking an appeal. Having been so notified, the trial
court on the same day ordered the forwarding of the records
of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July 1987, petitioner
through his counsel received from the Court of Appeals a
notice to file his Appellants Brief within thirty (30) days.
Petitioner managed to secure several extensions of time
within which to file his brief, the last extension expiring on 18
November 1987.1
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellants Brief was
being finalized by his then counsel of record, sought advice
from another counselor. On 30 November 1987, petitioner,
with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in the Regional
Trial Court a Petition for Probation invoking Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not, however,
accepted by the lower court, since the records of the case
had already been forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a
Manifestation and Petition for Probation dated 16
November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition for
Probation that he had submitted to the trial court. Petitioner
asked the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation
or, in the alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial
court, together with the records of the criminal case, for
consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
At the same time, petitioner prayed that the running of the
the probationer develop into a law-abiding and selfrespecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with
flexibility in their application and each case should be judged
on its own meritson the basis of the problems, needs and
capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the
probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to
stipulate instead unrealistic terms.
Same; Same; Court may not impose as a condition for grant
of probation that probationer should not continue her
teaching profession.Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is
the only profession she knows and as such she possesses
special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was designated as
District Guidance Coordinator and always designated as
District-in-Charge whenever the District Supervisor is out of
town. She is usually selected to represent her district in
seminars, meetings and conferences. She also excelled in her
study of Child Study and Development. It also appears that
she is an outstanding member of the Misamis Occidental Girl
Scout Council, having served as Physical Education & Girl
Scout Field Advisor of the District, Adviser of the District Girl
Scout Leaders Association, Adviser of the District Federated
Girl Scout Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource
person in District and Division Level Girl Scout encampments
and re-elected Board Member of the Misamis Occidental Girl
Scout Council. To order the petitioner to refrain from teaching
would deprive the students and the school in general the
benefits that may be derived from her training and expertise.
While it is true that probation is a mere privilege and its grant
rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Equal
regard to the demands of justice and public interest must be
observed. In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and
only calling and profession of petitioner. The law requires that
she devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation during
probation. Yet, to prohibit
150
150
________________
1 He has since been appointed as and is now the incumbent
City Fiscal of Oroquieta City.
151
VOL. 129, APRIL 30, 1984
151
Baclayon vs. Mutia
condition in granting probation to petitioner Florentina L.
Baclayon that she refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of
Serious Oral Defamation by the then Municipal Court of
Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, then presided by respondent
Pacito G. Mutia for having quarrelled with and uttered
insulting and defamatory words against Remedios Estillore,
principal of the Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate
Court) and the appellate court, taking into account the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of her rank and age and the fact
that the crime was committed in the office of the
complainant in the public school building of Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties during office hours, increased the
penalty imposed by respondent judge and sentenced
petitioner to one year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional in its minimum period.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981. On
the same date petitioner applied for probation with
respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation
Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation Report favorably
recommended the granting of petitioners probation for a
period of three (3) years.
On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order
granting petitioners probation, but modified the Probation
Officers recommendation by increasing the period of
Petition granted.
Notes.A preliminary investigation is necessary to determine
whether probation would serve the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public and the applicant. (Cabatingan vs.
Sandiganbayan, 102 SCRA 187).
Where the application for probation was denied below and on
petition for review in the Supreme Court, the petitioner was
granted parole, his petition for grant of probation becomes
moot and academic. (Sasi vs. People, 108 SCRA 725).
The grant or denial of application for probation does not rest
solely on offenders potentiality to reform, but also on the
observance of demands of justice and public interest.
(Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92).
Withdrawal of application for probation by accused and his
option instead to pursue his appeal from judgment of
conviction should be granted. Withdrawal or waiver of appeal
from conviction after an application for probation is not an
irrevocable matter. (Yusi vs. Morals, 121 SCRA 853).
Denial of probation to an offender for being allegedly not a
penitent offender for his protestation of innocence even after
his conviction by the trial court and the Court of Appeals is
not justified. (To vs. Cruz-Pao, 120 SCRA 8). Baclayon vs.
Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, No. L-59298 April 30, 1984
the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by the
court of an order of final discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such
issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed
terminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probation period may be
shortened or made longer but not to exceed the period set in
the law.The period of probation may either be shortened or
made longer, but not to exceed the period set in the law. This
is so because the period of probation, like the period of
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the
rehabilitation of the probationer. In the instant case, a review
of the records compels a revocation of the probation without
the need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after
all, would only be an exercise in futility. If we render justice
now, why should we allow the petitioner to further delay it.
Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible
society. Precisely he was granted probation in order to give
him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him
hope___hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately,
he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He
thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Revocation of Probation; An order
revoking probation or modifying the terms thereof is
unappealable.At any time during the probation, the court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for
violation of any of the conditions of proba-tion. The
probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately
be brought before the court for a hearing which may be
informal and summary, of the violation charged. x x x If the
violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his
probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the
court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence
originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of proba461
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
461
465
Bala vs. Martinez
tion.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1990, which amends section 4 of P.D. 968, clearly states that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D.
1990 which went in force on January 15, 1985 can not be
given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial to the
accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and
denied was the motion to dismiss and/or strike out the
motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the issue
of the petitioners transfer of residence. The motion did not
touch on the issue of the timeliness to revoke probation. The
respondent judge has not yet heard and received evidence,
much less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor
General submits that the present petition is premature.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the
probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioners
submission.
Section 16 of PD 9688 is clear on this score:
Sec. 16. Termination of Probation.After the period of
probation and upon consideration of the report and
recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order
the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he
has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and
thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not
automatically terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto
termination of probation found in the provisions of the
probation law. Probation is not co-terminous with its period.
There must first be issued by the court of an order of final
21 Rollo, 137.
471
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
471
Bala vs. Martinez
(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Pias and not to change said
address nor leave the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila
for more than twenty-four (24) hours without first securing
prior written approval of his Probation Officer.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the
expeditious administration of justice, we revoke the probation
of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his
probation, instead of remanding the case to the trial court
and having the parties start all over again in needless
protracted proceedings.22
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of
the petitioner is hereby REVOKED. Further, the trial court is
ORDERED to issue a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner
and for him to serve the sentence originally imposed without
any deduction. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Note.Grant or denial of an application for probation does
not rest solely on offenders potentiality to reform but also on
the observance of demands of justice and public interest.
(Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92.)
o0o Bala vs. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459, G.R. No. 67301
January 29, 1990
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salgado vs. Court of Appeals
On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order
granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was
denied on December 22, 1987. After the denial of his motion
for reconsideration, the petitioner filed directly with this
Court a petition for review of the trial courts order granting
the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. We referred
the petition to the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April
13, 1988 (p. 18, Rollo).
On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming the order of the trial court granting the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but respondent Court
of Appeals denied the motion in a resolution dated August 3,
1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review
which was filed on September 26, 1989 and raised the
following assignment of errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ORDER DATED APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE
DECISION OF OCTOBER 16, 1986 AS FAR AS THE CIVIL
ASPECT IS CONCERNED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONDITION IN THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR
ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE OFFENDER IS
UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. (p. 10,
Rollo)
In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting
private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, respondent Court of Appeals advanced three (3)
reasons: 1) that the decision dated October 16, 1986 had
become final and executory and the judge who rendered the
decision cannot lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear
245
People vs. Bayotas
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings
were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of
the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
x x x
xxx
xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its
only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before
final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Italics ours)
xxx
xxx
x x x.
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: Consequently, while the death
of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability
including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains.
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and
People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
249
In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made
the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor.
Hence, the Courts conclusion:
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued
on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
x x x
xxx
x x x.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Courts judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
252
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayotas
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil
256
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayotas
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
xxx
xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., On leave.
_______________
c)Quasi-contracts
d). . .
e)Quasi-delicts
xxx
There is no civil liability involved in violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.12 No private
offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to
civil liability in the decision of the trial court.
The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of
his criminal liability does not have any effect on his coaccused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. The
Rules on Criminal Procedure on the matter states:
RULE 122 Appeal
Section11.Effect of appeal by any of several accused.
(a)An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter; (emphasis ours)
xxx
The extinguishment of Brillantes criminal and pecuniary
liabilities is predicated on his death and not on his acquittal.
Following the provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and
subsequent extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable
to De la Cruz.
_______________
12 R.A. No. 9165.
395
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012
395
People vs. Brillantes
WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the
appeal of accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30897 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11557
and 11558 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC,
4 Ibid., p. 63.
5 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
6 Ibid., p. 89.
472
472
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pariarca, Jr.
shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for
personal ends.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for
their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations.7 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.8
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty,
which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
In the case of People vs. Casido,9 the difference between
pardon and amnesty is given:
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of
an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and wellestablished principle is considered that it is not within the
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of
legislative or executive action. Where therefore, discretionary
powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the
manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to
judicial review. The courts, therefore concern themselves only
with the question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and
executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases
their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public
or political policy. These considerations of public or political
policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate
constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise
authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute,
but, within these limits, they do permit the departments,
separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts
exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations,
together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not
be traversed in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution
of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).
xxx
xxx
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or
that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. x x x x x x Thus, the Legislature
may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or
submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people.
The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not
merely because they involve political question, but because
they are matters which the people have by the Constitution
delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the
powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as
he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power
conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not
not by the pardon which was void for having been extended
during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by
final judgment.Accordingly, while the pardon in this case
was void for having been extended during the pendency of
the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and,
therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for
which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid.
This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of
Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June
1994. The release then of accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but
not by the pardon.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bais
City, Br. 45.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellants.
362
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Casido
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our Resolution of 30 July 1996, we ruled that the
conditional pardons granted in this case to accusedappellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for
having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the
pendency of their instant appeal, and disposed of the
incident as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused-appellants Urgent Motion To
Withdraw Appeal is hereby DENIED and the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to effect, with the support and
assistance of the Philippine National Police, the re-arrest of
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin who
S.W., 52, 61; Burdick vs. United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267;
271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we- are of the opinion and so hold
that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine
qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense
with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a
defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation
of the benefits of amnesty is-in the nature of a plea of
648
648
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez et al.
confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not
confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by
the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the
benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested
by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the
witnesses both f or the complainants and the accused, on
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero
who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not,
in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as
well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should
take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the
benefits granted therein to cases coming within their
province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the
person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by theevidence presented, either by the complainant or
prosecution, or by the def ense, can not be waived, because
it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the
Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of a law, not only
as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had
never committed any punishable offense because of the
amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punished as a
criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person
who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not
punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty
thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person
considered by law not a criminal, but a patriot and, hero, for
having rendered invaluable services to the nation in
committing such an act.
649
VOL. 82, JANUARY 21, 1949
649
Barrioquinto et al vs. Fernandez et al
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense
charged was not against chastity and was committed in
furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for
otherwise, it is to be naturally presumed that it has been
committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true
that though the motive as a mental impulse is a state of mind
or subjective, it need not be testified to by the defendant
himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally
the motive for the commission of an offense is established by
the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of the
offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his
motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The
statement or testimony of a defendant at the time of
arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive,
can not generally be considered and relied on, specially if
there is evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of
the reason or motive he had at the time of committing the
offense. Because such statement or testimony may be an
allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the
action. It is a rank inconsistency for one to justify an act, or
seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is
not responsible. It is impossible for a court or commission to
verify the presence of the essential conditions which should
entitle the applicants to exemption from punishment, when
the accused and his witnesses say that he did not commit a
crime. In the nature of things, only the accused and his
witnesses could prove that the victim collaborated with the
enemy; that the killing was perpetrated in furtherance of the
resistance movements; that no personal motive intervened in
the commission of the murder, etc., etc. These, or some of
these, are matters of belief and intention which only the
accused and his witnesses could explain.
As a matter of procedure, certiorari or mandamus, whatever
the present proceeding may be, does not lie because there is
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The
decision of the Commission has not closed the avenue for the
petitioners to invoke the provisions of the Amnesty
Proclamation before the courts. I invite attention to the
provision of the proclamation which I have quoted. In the
case of Jimenez, he could ask for a new trial, as he in effect
would have the Commission grant him; and in the case of
Barrioquinto, he could set up the proclamation in his plea
when his trial comes up.
PABLO, M.: Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez et al., 82 Phil.
642, No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4
of the Election Code f or assuming office. We see no reason
for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial
interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief
Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action
and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concur.
444
444
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pelobello vs. Palatino
HORRILLENO, M., disidente:
A modo de preliminar, y para evitar que se me entienda
equivocadamente, es preciso hacer constar que no discuto la
prerrogativa constitucional del Jefe Ejecutivo de otorgar
indultos. Tal poder est para m fuera de toda discusin.
Los hechos en este asunto son como los expone la mayora
en su decision.
Parceme errnea la aplicacin del caso de Cristbal contra
Labrador y otros (R. G. No. 47941) al presente. No existe
paridad entre uno y otro. En el primero, el recurrido principal,
Tefilo C. Santos, obtuvo indulto condicional mucho antes de
las elecciones en que se inscribi como elector y se present
como candidato a un cargo municipal. Admitiendo como
buena la opinin de la mayora en dicho asunto, Santos, al
registrarse como elector, ya haba recobrado sus derechos
civiles y polticos; ya no estaba incapacitado para votar,
segn el artculo 94 del Cdigo Electoral. En el presente,
Gregorio Palatino, el apelado, cuando se inscribi como
elector, no posea las condiciones que requiere el
mencionado cdigo. Pues est admitido que l fu convicto
del delito de atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes, en
virtud de una sentencia firme y definitiva, el ao 1912; y que,
si bien consigui indulto del entonces Gobernador General de
128
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chua vs. Court of Appeals
employees of the petitioner in relation to certain activities
since they all worked either as masons, carpenters and fine
graders in petitioners various construction projects for at
least one year, and that their work was necessary and
desirable to petitioners business which involved the
construction of roads and bridges.27 It cited the case of
Mehitabel Furniture Company, Inc. v. NLRC,28 particularly the
ruling therein which states:
By petitioners own admission, the private respondents have
been hired to work on certain special orders that as a matter
of business policy it cannot decline. These projects are
necessary or desirable in its usual business or trade,
otherwise they would not have accepted . . . . Significantly,
such special orders are not really seasonal but more or less
regular, requiring the virtually continuous services of the
temporary workers. The NLRC also correctly observed that
if we were to accept respondents theory, it would have no
regular workers because all of its orders would be special
undertakings or projects. The petitioner could then hire all
its workers on a contract basis only and prevent them from
attaining permanent status. . . .
_______________
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except when the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph; Provided That, any
29 Id., at p. 605.
30 Rollo, p. 37, Sec. 22 (b) of the Social Security Act, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 22(b). The right to institute the necessary action against
the employer (for non-remittance of contributions) may be
commenced within 20 years from the time the delinquency is
known or the assessment is made by the SSS, as the case
may be.
31 Rollo, p. 37.
32 Id., at pp. 98-103.
33 Id., at p. 39; Resolution promulgated on 30 July 1996.
130
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chua vs. Court of Appeals
good faith, or his honest belief that project employees are
not regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Petitioners arguments are mere reiterations of his arguments
submitted before the SSC and the Court of Appeals. More
importantly, petitioner wants this Court to review factual
questions already passed upon by the SSC and the Court of
Appeals which are not cognizable by a petition for review
under Rule 45. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme
Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to
reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court, the findings of fact being generally
conclusive on the Court and it is not for the Court to weigh
evidence all over again.34
Stripped of the lengthy, if not repetitive, disquisition of the
private parties in the case, and also of the public
respondents, on the nature of private respondents
employment, the controversy boils down to one issue: the
entitlement of private respondents to compulsory SSS
coverage.
The Social Security Act was enacted pursuant to the policy of
the government to develop, establish gradually and perfect
a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chua vs. Court of Appeals
interruption.47 The Court likewise takes note of the fact that,
as cited by the SSC, even the National Labor Relations
Commission in a labor case involving the same parties, found
that private respondents were regular employees of the
petitioner.48
Another cogent factor militates against the allegations of the
petitioner. In the proceedings before the SSC and the Court of
Appeals, petitioner was unable to show that private
respondents were appraised of the project nature of their
employment, the specific projects themselves or any phase
thereof undertaken by petitioner and for which private
respondents were hired. He failed to show any document
such as private respondents employment contracts and
employment records that would indicate the dates of hiring
and termination in relation to the particular construction
project or phases in which they were employed.49 Moreover,
it is peculiar that petitioner did not show proof that he
submitted reports of termination after the completion of his
construction projects, considering that he alleges that private
respondents were hired and rehired for various projects or
phases of work therein.
Anent the issue of prescription, this Court rules that private
respondents right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at
the time of the filing of their petition, considering that a mere
eight (8) years had passed from the time delinquency was
discovered or the proper assessment was made. Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended, prescribes a period of twenty (20)
years, from the time the delinquency is known or assessment
is made by the SSS, within which to file a claim for nonremittance against employers.50
_______________
47 Ibid.
to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100
of the Revised Penal Code. In
7
VOL. 180, DECEMBER 5, 1989
7
Carpio vs. Doroja
no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary
liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for
the employees civil liability in the criminal action, it should
be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind
of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in
the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa
Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary
liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction
of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites
present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable
upon the employees conviction and upon proof of the latters
insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator
has been deprived of his day in court, because the case
before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a
primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the
subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employees criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.
Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the
employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to
the criminal case. Ergo, the employers subsidiary liability
may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part
of the execution proceedings against the employee. This
Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra,
that The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary
civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for
the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution
has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.
aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack
of merit on September 16, 1991.7 Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal8 on September 25, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for
Execution of the subsidiary civil liability9 of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders.
One denied due course and dismissed Basilios appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.10 The
other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him
for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil
indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari12 under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1)
the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated
February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the
petitioner was concerned,
_______________
6 Id. at 41-47.
7 Id. at 52-53.
8 Id. at 54.
9 Id. at 55-56.
10 Id. at 561.
11 Id. at 66-68.
12 Id. at 2-21.
346
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Basilio vs. Court of Appeals
and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance
of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the
appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not afforded due
process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
23 Id. at 13.
24 Id. at 28.
25 Rollo, pp. 101-109.
26 Records, pp. 253-254.
350
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Basilio vs. Court of Appeals
set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for
petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in
open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was
only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a
counter-manifestation27 that belatedly attempted to contest
the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the
civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the
Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary
liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree
with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of
law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for
sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the
enforcement of the employers subsidiary liability in the
same criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty, execution against the employer must not
issue as just a matter of courseit behooves the court, as a
measure of due process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employers liability. (Yonaha
vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 [1996]) Basilio vs. Court
of Appeals, 328 SCRA 341, G.R. No. 113433 March 17, 2000
only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but
also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise: x x x.
When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his
arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia
proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
457
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
457
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure]. x x x
Same; Same; Same; An accused who has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities is deemed to
have abandoned his appeal rendering the judgment against
him final and executory.As to when a judgment of
conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule
120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation. In the case before us, the accusedemployee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become
final and executory.
Same; Same; Independent Civil Actions; The 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its
notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April
29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners]
notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8,
1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority
to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal.
The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May
31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor
filed the instant motion to dismiss.6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied
the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense.
Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the
accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as
set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to
dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal
case against the accused-employee would be to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal
filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil
liability became final and executory. Included in the civil
liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
_______________
6 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 31-33.
7 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 24,
2002, upon this Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
512
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quinto vs. Andres
crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of
the private complainant against the accused for damages
and/or restitution.
Same; Same; Judgments; The civil action based on delict
shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist.The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in
a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission
from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A person committing a
felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intendednatural
refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life
or events, while logical means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting
injury or damage.A person committing a felony is criminally
liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. Natural refers to an occurrence in
the ordinary course of human life or events, while logical
means that there is a rational connection between the act of
the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting
injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that
521
Quinto vs. Andres
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the
felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active
force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the
felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the
victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a
manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a
consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature
or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes
cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim.28 A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to
crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:
. . . Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons
guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment. . .30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
. . . The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3,
1879, said in a case similar to the present, the following:
Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his
actand in this case, the physical condition and
temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil,
the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence
of the means employed, but by the result actually produced;
_______________
27
28
29
30
Q
So when the victim was submerged under water while
unconscious, it is possible that he might have taken in some
mud or what?
A
Yes, Sir.
Q
So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still
breathing?
A
Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also
would indicate that the victim was still alive when he was
placed under water.37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side
of the victims face could have been caused by rubbing
against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q
The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face,
would it be caused by the face rubbing against a concrete
wall or pavement?
_______________
37 TSN, 17 September 1997, pp. 10-11.
525
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
525
Quinto vs. Andres
A
Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a
rough surface.
Q
Rough surface?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
Q
When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were
there no signs that the victim was strangled?
A
245
People vs. Bayotas
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings
were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of
the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
x x x
xxx
xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its
only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before
final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Italics ours)
xxx
xxx
x x x.
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: Consequently, while the death
of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability
including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains.
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and
People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
249
In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made
the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor.
Hence, the Courts conclusion:
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued
on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
x x x
xxx
x x x.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Courts judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
252
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayotas
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil
256
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bayotas
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
xxx
xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., On leave.
_______________