Murder Conviction Upheld for Killing Two Neighbors with Bolo

Nos. L-36662-63. July 30, 1982.
*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Qualifying Circumstances; Evident
premeditation, proof of.There is evident premeditation
when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender,
when he prepared beforehand the means which he deemed
suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had
sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan. It
has also been held that evident premeditation requires proof
of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow
_______________
* EN BANC.
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People vs. Camano
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evident premeditation, not
present when killing was not a preconceived plan and not
proof of planning or preparation in the killing and persistence
to accomplish the plan.In the instant case, it cannot be
stated that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was a
preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when the
plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time
had elapsed before the plan was carried out.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery; Attack from behind by the
accused upon the victim is treachery.Amado Payago
categorically declared that Filomeno Camano attacked
Godofredo Pascua from behind, a method which has ensured
the accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to
the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may
put up.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of superior
strength, absorbed in treachery.The rule is already settled
that abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery.
Same; Same; Alternative Circumstances; Intoxication; When
drunkenness or intoxication mitigating and when
aggravating.Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if
accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating
if habitual or intentional. To be mitigating, it must be
indubitably proved. A habitual drunkard is one given to
intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit
should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a
matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to
evil thought and undermines will-power making its victim a
potential evildoer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intoxication considered mitigating
as intoxication was not habitual and accused was in a state of
intoxication at the time of commission of felony.The
intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and
considering that the said appellant was in a state of
intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the
alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered
as a mitigating circumstance.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Death penalty, not cruel,
unjust or excessive punishment.The death penalty is not
cruel, unjust or excessive.
690
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Camano
MANDATORY REVIEW from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Deogracias Eufemio for defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:

MANDATORY REVIEW of the death sentence imposed upon
the accused Filomeno Camano by the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case Nos. T-20 and T-21, for the
killing of Godofredo Pascual and Mariano Buenaflor.
The inculpatory facts as stated by the trial court show that:
On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of
Sagay, Province of Camarines Sur, between the hours of
four and five oclock in the afternoon, after the accused had
been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim Godofredo
Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular Bicol palas
which is a sharp bladed and pointed instrument about two
feet long including the black handle, tapering to the end,
about one and one-half inches in width, (Exhibit C) while
the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost
infront of the store of one Socorro Buates. The victim,
Godofredo Pascua, sustained two mortal wounds for which he
died instantaneously, described by Dr. Constancio A. Tan,
Municipal Health Officer, of Sagay, Camarines Sur, in his
Autopsy Report (Exhibit A, pp. 5, Record Crim. Case No. T21) as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STABthree (3) inches long at left side, three (3)
inches below left axilla, a little bit posteriorly, cutting the
skin, subcutaneous tissues, muscles one (1) rib, pleura of left
lung, pericardium, penetrating the ventricles of the heart,
Media stinum, the right lung and exit to the right chest. One
inch opening.
2. WOUND INCISED, one inch long at the left arm.
CAUSE OF DEATHWound No. 1 causing instant death due
to severe hemorrhage.
After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the
accused proceeded to the seashore of the barrio, and on
finding Mariano
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People vs. Camano
Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a
kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his
head stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo,
first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the
ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he
lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave
him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the chest
above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side a
little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back, of
one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit B) causing instant death. The
victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained eight wounds, which
were specifically described by Dr. Tan in his Autopsy Report
(Exhibit B dated February 17, 1970, as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest
above the nipple, running to the right side a little posteriorly
and superiorly with an exit at the back of one (1) inch
opening. Penetrating the skin, subcutaneous tissues,
pericardium the suricles of the heart, the left lung towards
the right side of back.
2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches
deep three-fourth (3/4) inch long penetrating the skin and the
sternum.
3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long
one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep.
4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches
long.
5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting
skin and bone of anterior side.
6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.
7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at
the back near spinal column.
8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head
cutting skin and bone.
CAUSE OF DEATHWound number one (1) causing instant
death due to severe hemorrhage from the heart. Out of the
eight (8) wounds, two (2) are mortal wounds, namely, wound
Number one (1) and wound Number Three (3), (Exhibit B)
(t.s.n., pp. 18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The two
victims Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together
with the accused are neighbors, residing at the same street
of Barrio Nato, Sagay, Camarines Sur (t.s.n., pp. 31,
692
692
People vs. Camano
Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident was not
preceded or precipitated by any altercation between the
victims and the accused (t.s.n. p. 60, Nov. 22, 1971).
Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this
incident, the two victims had a misundertanding with the
accused while fishing along Sagay River. During this
occasion it appears that the accused requested Godofredo
Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by
Mariano Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This
refusal greatly offended and embittered the accused against
the victims. From this time on, the accused begrudged the
two, and entertained personal resentment against them. And
although on several occasions, the accused was seen at the
same table with Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the
friendly attitude towards Pascua, seems to be merely artificial
than real, more so, with respect to Mariano Buenaflor whom
he openly detested. He consistently refused to associate
since then with the two victims, especially, Mariano
Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten attempts were made by
Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for
reconciliation with the victims but were refused. Instead,
defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge
Mariano Buenaflor to a fight, and announce his evil intention
to kill them. (t.s.n., pp. 50-53, Session November 22, 1971.)
Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or palas
belongs to the accused. That after killing the two victims, he
returned to his house, where he subsequently surrendered to
Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, and Erasmo Valencia,
upon demand by said peace officers for him to surrender.

When brought to the Police Headquarters of the town for
investigation he revealed that the bolo he used in the killing
was hidden by him under the table of his house. Following
this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched, and
recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when
presented to the Chief of Police was still stained with human
blood from the base of the handle to the point of the blade.
And when asked as to who was the owner of said bolo, the
accused admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of
Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. However, when he
was asked to sign a statement, he refused.1
For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor,
Filomeno Camano was charged, under two (2) separate
informations, with the crime of murder attended by evident
premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties,
the two cases were tried jointly.
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1 Decision, pp. 2-6.
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693
People vs. Camano
The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims
that he did so in self-defense. He denied killing Godofredo
Pascua. He also denied holding a grudge against Godofredo
Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and belittled the fist fight he
had with Mariano Buenaflor. He said that while they were
drinking, they had a heated discussion, and because they
were drunk, it resulted in a fist fight, which they had soon
forgotten.2
His version of the incident is that in the early morning of
February 17, 1970, he was fishing in the open sea. He went
ashore at about 7:00 oclock in the morning and was met by
Mariano Buenaflor who, upon seeing that he had a big catch,
demanded a percentage for the fishery commission. When he
refused to give what was asked, Buenaflor remarked that he
was hard-headed. He went home, taking his things along with

him. After eating breakfast, he went to sleep and awoke at
about 3:30 oclock in the afternoon.3 He ate his dinner4 and
prepared to go out to sea again. While he was standing in the
yard of his house, Mariano Buenaflor, Godofredo Pascua,
Gorio Carable, Jesus Carable, Tomas Carable, Abelardo
Bolaye, Amado Payago, and Loreto Payago, who were
drinking at the store of Socorro Buates, went to him and
Godofredo Pascua, without any provocation whatsoever,
boxed him. He recounted what happened next: I defend
myself but inspite of that I was hit on my upperarm. Then
after that I was again boxed by Mariano Buenaflor and I was
hit on my lower jaw. (Witness pointing to the bolo marked
Exhibit C.) And I was able to grab that bolo from him.
When I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing
me but I was able to take hold of his hands and I was able to
grab the bolo. After I have taken the bolo from Godofredo
Pascua, all I know is that he fell on the ground and the rest of
the group except Mariano Buenaflor run away after seeing
that Godofredo Pascua fell already on the ground. Mariano
Buenaflor approached me having also a bolo then
immediately when we meet each other I boloed him and
when he was wound_______________
2 t.s.n., Nastor, p. 102.
3 Id., pp. 97-98.
4 Id., p. 107.
694
694
People vs. Camano
ed he run away and when he was running away I run after
him. After I have boloed Mariano Buenaflor he run away so I
run after him because I know that he has a gun and if he
reach home he will get that gun and he might shoot me.5
Mariano Buenaflor was hit on the head.
The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused,

saying:
Coming to the evidence for the defense, the Court, much to
its regret cannot give credence to the testimony and story of
the accused, and his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, who is
his first cousin. The claim of self-defense does not find
support in the evidence presented. The claim, that a group of
eight (8) men headed by Godofredo Pascua and Mariano
Buenaflor ganged up on him by boxing him one after another
while others were throwing stones at him; that he was
attacked by Godofredo Pascua with a bolo which he
succeeded in wresting from him; that he did not know
Godofredo Pascua was killed; that he killed said Mariano
Buenaflor after a bolo duel, are mere fictions of a desperate
man without evidentiary support. His testimony on these
points, and that of his cousin Nemesio Camano are simply
incredible not only because they are inherently improbable in
themselves, but also because of their cleat inconsistencies on
contradictions against each other. For, conceding in gratia
argumenti that he was really ganged up by eight (8) persons,
some boxing him while others throwing stones at him, and
two of whom were armed with a bolo, and that he was all
alone fighting them, and yet he did not suffer any physical
injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. With eight (8)
persons to contend with, two armed with bolos, it is simply
unbelievable that he should come out of the melee
unscathed.
The Court has carefully examined and verified very carefully
each and every piece of evidence presented by the defense
and has relaxed all technical rules of evidence in favor of the
accused in search for evidentiary support of his claim of selfdefense in vain. Conscious of the enormity of the offense and
the bitterness attached to an adverse decision, the Court has
earnestly searched in vain for facts upon which to lay the
basis at least of a finding of reasonable doubt in favor of the
accused at least just to avoid the ugly and unpleasant task of
signing an adverse court decision. But, the falsity of their
concocted story is so apparent and self-evident to need
further elucidation. This is demonstrated by the record. They
simply cannot stand, as basis of belief. Moreover, the Court

feels very much intrigued by
_______________
5 Id., pp. 100-101.
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VOL. 115, JULY 30, 1982
695
People vs. Camano
the fact that notwithstanding that many people witnessed
the incidents, having occurred in broad daylight, and that the
accused had more sufficient time to look for witnesses
among his friends, relatives, and neighbors in the barrio,
during the long period that this case has been pending trial
since February 17, 1970, that he could not get any witness to
testify in his favor, other than his lone witness, Nemesio
Camano, whose testimony, coming as it is from a very close
relative is naturally very vulnerable to grave doubt and
suspicion for coming from a biased source. Could this mean
lack of public sympathy because the horrible act was in truth
committed by the accused? Is this a sign of public
condemnation? Be it as it may, this unpleasant circumstance
has no bearing or influence in the painful decision of this
case. What impelled and compelled this Court in making this
painful decision, much to his dislike, are the bare and
incontrovertible facts of the case born out by the evidence
presented indicating beyond per adventure of doubt the stark
reality which shows that there exist that moral certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those
who are to act upon it. (People v. Lavarios, L-24339, June 29,
1968, 22 SCRA 1321) For the bitter conclusions herein
reached, is based on the compelling and irresistible facts
born out by the evidence of record found after sleepless night
of study that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged committed with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of
superior strength, and intoxication with no mitigating
circumstance. The accused and his only witness, Nemesio
Camano changed their declarations not only once, twice, or

thrice, but many times, placing the Court in quandary and
confused what theory or testimony is to be believed and
considered among the mess of contradictory, inconsistent,
and diametrically opposed statements. Considering the
manner and tenor they were given,the accused and his
only witness changing stand in every turn, leaves no room for
doubt than that said testimonies are merely concocted and
fabricated as a desperate attempt to salvage a hopeless
case.6
In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and
Mariano Buenaflor and the cause of their deaths are not
disputed. Counsel de oficio merely claims that the accused is
guilty of homicide only in each case, and not murder, as
charged; and prays for the modification of the judgment and
the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed upon the
accused Filomeno Camano.
_______________
6 Decision, pp. 13-16.
696
696
People vs. Camano
(1) Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation
since the acts of the accused, as testified to by the
prosecution witnesses, are all indicative of a spur-of-themoment decision and action.
The contention is well taken. There is evident premeditation
when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender,
when he prepared beforehand the means which he deemed
suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had
sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan.7
It has also been held that evident premeditation requires
proof of the following: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and

the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will.8 In the instant case, it
cannot be stated that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was
a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when
the plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what
time had elapsed before the plan was carried out. The trial
court merely concluded that the killing of Pascua and
Buenaflor was premeditated because the accused has been
nursing the evil design to kill both the victims since three
years prior to the occurrence of the incident on February 18,
1970, when both of them refused the request of the accused
to have his boat towed by the motor boat belonging to
Mariano Buenaflor while fishing along Sagay River, and
from that time on, to the fatal killings, said accused refused
consistently to join his neighbors in their drinking spree
where both the victims especially Mariano Buenaflor were
present; in fact, no less than ten attempts made by witness
Amado Payago inviting the accused to be reconciled with the
victims were rejected; and that on the contrary, it has been
established that whenever the accused was drunk, he
announces his intention to kill the victims, and as a matter of
fact he challenged several times Mariano Buenaflor to a
fight.
_______________
7 U.S. vs. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457.
8 People vs. Verges, G.R. Nos. L-36882-84, July 24, 1981, 105
SCRA 744.
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697
People vs. Camano
The incident referred to, however, does not establish the time
when the appellant decided to commit the crime. If ever, the
aforementioned incident merely established the motive for
the killing of the two victims.9
The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor

to a fight whenever he was drunk and announces his
intention to kill the latter does not reveal a persistence of a
criminal design since there is no showing that in between the
utterances of the threats and the consummation of the crime,
the appellant made plans or sought the deceased to
accomplish the killing.
As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation
in the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor and of the marked
persistence to accomplish that plan, the trial courts
conclusion cannot be sustained.
(2) Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not
present in the commission of the crime.
The contention is without merit. Amado Payago categorically
declared that Filomeno Camano attacked Godofredo Pascua
from behind, a method which has ensured the
accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to the
perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may put
up. His testimony reads, as follows:
Q
At that time and date while you were in front of your house
did you notice whether there is anything unusual incident
that happened?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Can you relate before this Honorable Court?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Please relate it?
A
I saw Filomeno Camano run towards his house and took a
bolo and run after Godofredo Pascua and immediately
stabbed him.
Q
How far more or less were you when Godofredo Pascua was
stabbed by Filomeno Camano?
A
More or less 12 to 15 meters.

_______________
9 People vs. Aide, 158 Phil. 1285.
698
698
People vs. Camano
Q
What was Godofredo Pascua doing when he was stabbed by
Filomeno Camano?
A
He was walking to his house.
Q
In relation to Godofredo Pascua where was Filomeno Camano
at the time that Filomeno Camano stabbed Godofredo
Pascua?
A
From behind sir.
Q
After Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano
what happened to Godofredo Pascua?
A
He fell down and keep on turning.
Q
What about Filomeno Camano, what did he do after
Godofredo Pascua fell down?
A
He run towards the seashore looking after Mariano
Buenaflor.10
His testimony is corroborated by the nature and location of
the wounds sustained by the deceased Godofredo Pascua.
The autopsy report,11 showed that the point of entry of the
stab wound inflicted upon Pascua was three (3) inches long
and three (3) inches below the left armpit, a little bit
posteriorly or toward the hinder end of the body; and the
point of exit was the right chest, one (1) inch lateral to the
right nipple with a one (1) inch opening. If the deceased was
stabbed while he was facing his assailant, as claimed by

counsel for the accused, the entrance wound would have
been in the front part of the body, and its exit wound, if any,
would be at the back. The trial court, therefore, did not
commit an error in finding that the deceased Godofredo
Pascua was assaulted from behind.
With respect to Mariano Buenaflor, the evidence shows that
he was attacked while in a kneeling position, with his arms on
top of the gate of the fence surrounding his hut and his head
was stooping down.12 He was hacked on the head, causing
him to fall to the ground, and then successively hacked and
stabbed without respite, as he lay on the ground, until he
died. The attack was also sudden, unexpected, and lethal,
such as to
_______________
10 t.s.n., Nastor, pp. 45-46.
11 Exhibit A.
12 t.s.n., Nastor, p. 62.
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VOL. 115, JULY 30, 1982
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People vs. Camano
disable and incapacitate the victim from putting up any
defense.
(3) Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the lower
court appreciated in fixing the penalty, is absorbed in
treachery.
This contention is likewise correct. The rule is already settled
that abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery.13
(4) Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance
of intoxication was erroneously appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. Counsel argues thusly:
As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is
respectfully submitted that there was no proof that the
accused was intoxicated at the time of the killing other than
the bare testimony of Payago that from his house he
allegedly saw the accused drinking in his house which is

about 30 meters away. The prosecution did not present any
police report or doctors certification that accused was found
to be intoxicated at the time of the killing. Moreover, it was
not shown by competent evidence that accused purposedly
became drunk to facilitate the commission of the offense.
If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance because it affected accuseds
mental facilities such that it diminished his capacity to know
the injustice of his acts and to comprehend fully the
consequences of his acts.14
There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication
is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is,
not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is
aggravating if habitual or intentional.15 To be mitigating, it
must be indubitably proved.16 A habitual drunkard is one
given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks.
The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary
that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual
_______________
13 People vs. Guarnes, 110 Phil. 379; People vs. Belen, 118
Phil. 880; People vs. Tiongson, 120 Phil. 1197.
14 Appellants Brief, p. 7.
15 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 407.
16 Id., at p. 408.
700
700
People vs. Camano
resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power making
its victim a potential evildoer.17
The records of these cases do not show that the appellant
was given to excessive use of intoxicating drinks although he
used to get drunk every now and then. The testimony of
Amado Payago to this effect, reads as follows:
Q
But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno

Camano are already in good terms because they even go on
drinking spree, is it not?
A
Yes, sir, that is true but Filomeno Camano has an evil plan
against Godofredo Pascua.
Q
And how did you come to know about this plan?
A
He talk(s) (about) that very openly specially when he is
drunk.
Q
During the three years that the incident where Camanos
boat was not towed, could you remember how many times
more or less did you hear him speak about his plan before
the stabbing incident?
A
Whenever he is drunk.
Q
Can you not remember more or less how many times have
you heard him?
A
I cannot remember, sir.
Q
About five times?
FISCAL CLEDERA:
Already answered.
A
Whenever he is drunk.
ATTY. TRIA:
Q
How often does he drunk (sic), if you know?
A
I cannot estimate, sir.
Q
What about Mariano Buenaflor, could you also state that
there had been an altercation between him and Filomeno
Camano prior to the incident, is it not?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What was this altercation about?
A
It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his
boat was refused by Godofredo Pascua because that
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 408-409.
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People vs. Camano
boat used by Godofredo Pascua is owned by Mariano
Buenaflor.
Q
How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic)
this Buenaflor?
A
Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano
Buenaflor.
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
Q
Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink
liquor immediately prior to the incident?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Where?
A
In his house.
Q
When you saw him where were you?
A
I was also in my house because I can just see his house from
our window.
Q
About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno
Camano so that you can see from your house?
A
More or less 30 meters.
Q
With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?
A
Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons
(who) are living far from our house.
Q
According to your personal knowledge do you know whether
or not the accused was drunk when this incident happened?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
But the truth is that, you still affirm that you dont know of
any incident immediately prior that has precipitated this
stabbing incident between the accused and the victim
A
None, sir.
ATTY. TRIA:
Q
How about you, did you now drink that time?
No, sir.18
The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and
considering that the said appellant was in a state of
intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the
alternative cir_______________
18 pp. 51-53 and 60-61, t.s.n., taken by E. Nastor.
702
702
People vs. Camano

cumstance of intoxication should be considered as a
mitigating circumstance.
5. Finally, counsel claims that death is a cruel and unusual
penalty and not proper in the cases at bar, citing Art. IV, Sec.
21 of the Constitution which provides that: Excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment
inflicted.
The contention is without merit. The death penalty is not
cruel, unjust or excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director
of Prisons,19 the Court said:
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-Parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United
States Supreme Court said that punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused
Filomeno Camano guilty of Murder in each of the two cases.
The offense being attended by the mitigating circumstance of
intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to offset
it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided by
law or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion
temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.
WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed
upon the appellant, as above indicated, the judgment
appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED in all
other respects. With costs against the said appellant.
SO ORDERED. People vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688, Nos. L36662-63 July 30, 1982
[No. 34917. September 7, 1931]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and
appellee, vs. LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants and
appellants.
ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF OPIUM; PRETENDED
ACQUIESCENCE OF SECRET SERVICE CHIEF, No OBSTACLE TO
PROSECUTION OF CULPRITS.The mere fact that the chief of
the customs secret service pretended to agree to a plan for
smuggling illegally imported opium through the
customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said
opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the
prosecution and conviction of the latter.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. Vickers, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Gibbs & McDonough, Gullas, Lopez & Tuao, H. Alo and
Manuel C. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu con________________
1 Paragraph corrected in pursuance of a resolution of the
Supreme Court of October 14, 1931.
45
VOL. 56, SEPTEMBER 7, 1931
45
People vs. Lua, Chu and Uy Se Tieng
victing them of the illegal importation of opium, and
sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of
P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay
the proportional costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following

alleged errors as committed by the court below in its
judgment, to wit:
"The lower court erred:
"1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance or the
Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of
the administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad,
collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising
customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have
since been dismissed from service.
"2. In holding it as a fact that 'no doubt many times opium
consignments have passed thru the customhouse without the
knowledge of the customs secret service/
"3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan
Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated by a desire
to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin
Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly instrumental in
the dismissal of Samson from the service.
"4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed
chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is above
reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives
attributed to him by the accused.
"5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to
remain in the court room while other prosecution witnesses
were testifying, despite the previous order of the court
excluding the Government witnesses from the court room,
and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular
Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct
of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service agent
of Cebu.
"6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.
46
46
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs, Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng
"7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the
defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from Hongkong.
"8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct

transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the
appellant Uy Se Tieng.
"9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of
the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant
Lua Chu.
"10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua
Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, and in
sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the presumption
of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the
unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating from a
spirit of revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source."
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the
accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong
to send him a shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs
secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from a
vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of
customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office,
and the latter, after a short conversation, asked him how
much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret
service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of
customs took from a drawer in his table, the amount of P300,
in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for
you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be
able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took
the money, left, and put it into the safe in his office to be
kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A
week later, Natividad called Samson and told him that the
shipment he
47
47
People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng
had referred to consisted of opium, that it was about to

arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's house to
see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house
and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him
about the opium. The said accused informed Samson that the
opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had
agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or P2 a tin, and that the
opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October
awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929,
one Nam Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan, which the
Naviera Filipinaa shipping company in Cebu had had built in
Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.
L. H." About the same date Natividad informed Samson that
the opium had already been put on board the steamship
Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson
would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining
P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the
customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with
Samson. Towards the end of November, Natividad informed
the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on
account of certain engine trouble, and remained there until
December 7th. In view of this, the shipper several times
attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each time
by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the
ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on board.
The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of
December 14, 1929. While he was examining the manifests,
Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After
conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do
everything possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to
require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning
of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se
Tieng already had the papers ready to with48
48

draw the cases marked "U. L. H." from the customhouse.
Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se Tieng
to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went
to Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay
over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the
customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading
and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and see whether
we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day
Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of
all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the
provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the
capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and
Samson agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night.
That afternoon Samson went to the office of the .provincial
fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and asked for a
stenographer to take down the conversation he would have
with Uy Se Tieng that night in the presence of Captain
Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good stenographer
available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of
Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court
stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929, as
agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando/ and the
stenographer went to Samson's house and concealed
themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which
hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house
on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng
arrived, Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He
replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium,
who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then told him to
tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to
Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back
door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the
opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the
cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy
Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied
by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said
49

49
he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from
Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also owners.
Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the
opium, and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take
charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000,
Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the
opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this
conversation, which was taken down in shorthand, Samson
took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old
fellow, why didn't you tell me about this before bringing the
opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you were
not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by
Samson how he had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu
answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector
called me aside and said there was good business, because
opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this
conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was
then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with
him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se
Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se
Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy
Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared
and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned
papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1),
and an invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to
the articles described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se
Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and
notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to
Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a
coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him,
they found five letters written in Chinese characters relating
to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and
Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary headquarters,
and then went to the customhouse to examine the cases
marked "U. L. H." In the cases marked Nos.
50
51
50
People vs. Lud Chu and Uy Se Tieng
11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a
quantity of dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated
amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo
approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who
was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows:
"Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not
going to answer them. The only thing I will say is that
whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such
a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those"
pointing towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had
obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to
order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from
P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20,
and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in
a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng,
furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and
the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng
went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if
Somson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after
he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the
name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000;
that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent
cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium
had already been loaded and the captain of the Kolambugan
refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived,
Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy
Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on
the night of December 14th, and proposed that he
participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy
Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000
when the opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu
went to Samson's house on the night of

51
December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver
the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua
Chu personally promised to pay him that amount.
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed
by the trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the refusal of
the trial judge to permit the presentation of certain
documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson,
the principal witness for the Government, from the court
room during the hearing; others refer to the admission of the
alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and
the others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a
reasonable doubt.
With respect to the presentation of the record of the
administrative proceedings against Joaquin Natividad,
collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising
customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed f
rom the service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it,
for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they cannot
serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of
the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to that end.
With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion
of Juan Samson, the principal witness of the Government,
from the court room during the hearing, it is within the power
of said judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he
has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).
Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence
the transcript of the stenographic notes of the defendants'
statements, since they contain admissions made by
themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand
attested at the trial that they were faithfully taken down.
Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached
witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish

the facts alleged in the information, we find that the
52
52
testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution should
be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and the
chief of the customs secret service, who gave it, only did
their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not deny their
participation in the illegal importation of the opium, though
the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor
to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former
collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for
Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion,
however, is contradicted by his own statement made to Juan
Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was
one of the owners of the opium that had been unlawfully
imported.
But the defendants' principal defense is that they were
induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question.
Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with
the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu,
bears him out. A public official who induces a person to
commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps
necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest
the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in
mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the
introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the
accused had already planned its importation and ordered
said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country
through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did
not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue,
but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the
arrest of the smugglers.
The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and
instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the
United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88,

section 57, as follows:
"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.While it has been said
that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the
purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be de53
53
plored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere
entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was
done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act
were present and apparently assisting in its commission.
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense
is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the
offense was committed by him free from the influence or the
instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an
owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no def
ense to the latter in a prosecution f or larceny, provided the
original design was formed independently of such agent; and
where a person approached by the thief as his confederate
notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being
authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out
the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is
generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an
illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a
'spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are cases
holding the contrary."
As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated
the herein defendants-appellants to import the opium in
question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an
understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin

Natividadwho had promised them that he would remove all
the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the
customhouse was concernednot to gain the P2,000
intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the
better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the
arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly
nothing immoral in this or against the public good
54
54
People vs. Almonte
which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and
punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an
innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to
prosecute him, but it is simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact
that the chief of the customs secret service pretended to
agree to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium
through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the
seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar
to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered. People vs. Lud Chu and Uy Se Tieng,
56 Phil. 44, No. 34917 September 7, 1931
[No. 5728. August 11, 1910.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JAMES O.
PHELPS (alias PHILLIPS), defendant and appellant.
OPIUM LAW; REPREHENSIBLE CONDUCT DESTROYING
PROBATIVE FORCE OF EVIDENCE.When the evidence given
by the witness for the Government in a criminal case shows
that he actually induced the defendant to commit the alleged
crime, the probative force of such testimony is thereby
destroyed, and such conduct is most reprehensible and
should be reproved and not encouraged by the courts.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Jolo.
Powell, J.
P. J. Moore and W. H. Bishop, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The defendant, James O. Phelps, was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Jolo, Moro Province, with having violated the
provisions of Act No. 1761. He was tried, found guilty as
charged, and sentenced to one month's imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P250, Philippine currency, and in case of
insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment at the rate of P2.50 a day, and to pay the
costs. He appealed.
The prosecution presented but one witness in this case,
Homer G. Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. This witness testified that the first time he ever saw
the accused was in the International Saloon in Jolo in the
month of April, 1909; that at that time, while two or three
men were sitting together in the said saloon, he heard the
accused say that he on some occasions liked to smoke
opium; that a few hours after leaving the saloon he asked the
accused if he smoked opium, and the accused answered
"yes," that he smoked sometimes; that he knew then that it
was his duty to watch the accused; that he then asked the
accused what opportunities he had for smoking opium, and
the accused replied, "good opportunities;" that he then said
441
VOL. 16, AUGUST 11, 1910.

441
United States vs. Phelps.
to the accused, "I wish to smoke opium." On the invitation of
the accused he looked him up that night and was told that he
(the accused) was not able to prepare a room for smoking, as
the Chinamen were afraid, and asked the witness to see him
the following night; that he saw him the following night, and
accused again said that he could not find a suitable place;
that they made another agreement to meet and at that time
they went together to a certain house in the barrio of Tulay,
where a certain Chinaman (this Chinaman was charged in
criminal case No. 292 in said court) had prepared the opium
and pipe for smoking; that the accused gave the Chinaman
P2, and he (the witness) gave him P1 in payment for the
preparation of the pipe and opium; that the accused smoked
in the house of this Chinaman two pills of opium, and that
one was prepared for him (the witness) to smoke, and on
receiving the pipe which was prepared for smoking he took
the pipe and the pan containing the opium and went directly
to the justice of the peace and swore out a warrant for the
arrest of the accused and the said Chinaman.
The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified
that Smith, who was then going under the name of
Lockwood, came to his house one night in Jolo and said that
he was accustomed to smoking opium and asked him (the
accused) if he knew of any Chinaman in the town who could
assist him in obtaining opium to smoke; that he answered
Smith that he did not; that Smith then asked him if the
Chinaman (the one charged in criminal case No. 292), who
was the accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish
him (Smith) with a pipe until he became acquainted in town;
that on the following night the witness Smith came again to
his house, and after being there about twenty minutes
became very nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to
have some opium; that he told him (Smith) to go to the
hospital, and received the reply that he (Smith) was working
for the quartermaster and was looking for a position as clerk,
and that they probably would not give him this position if
they learned that he was an opium
442
442
smoker; that he again asked to have the Chinaman assist
him, and he (the accused) believing that he (Smith) was
acting in good faith and was really sick, told the Chinaman to
do so; that by agreement he and the witness Smith went to
the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the Chinaman
prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the
Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the
accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the
accused) was arrested about forty minutes later, and that he
called for the doctor to examine him about one and one-half
hours after he left the Chinaman's house.
The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on
every material point, stating that he, after repeated demands
made by Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it
to Smith.
The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States
Cavalry, who arrested the accused and the Chinaman,
testified that when he made these arrests the Chinaman and
the accused did not have an opportunity to talk together
before they went to the justice of the peace where the
preliminary investigation was held.
Doctor De Krafft, of the United States Army, was called by
the accused himself and made an examination of the
accused about an hour and a half or two hours after he left
the Chinaman's house. The doctor testified that the accused
was a strong, robust man, and a man presenting no
appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by the court
whether or not he could state positively if the accused had
used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I am
sure that he did not use any opium on that day."
The court below in its decision said:
"I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not
appear to be a person who uses daily a large amount of
opium. The accused is a strong, robust man, in good physical
condition, and from a casual examination of his person no
one would accuse him of being a habitual user of opium."
The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold
443
VOL. 16, AUGUST 11, 1910.
443
or had in his possession any opium, neither does it contend
that he had in his possession any of the prohibited
paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged
with having smoked opium this one time in the house of the
Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the
testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in
Jolo.
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to
hide his true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for
the same purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having
visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose
of making arrangements for himself and the accused to
smoke opium. He stated to the accused that he (Smith) was
desirous of smoking. He urged the accused to have the
Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. He
went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and
paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1
for the preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means,
induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his
possession either opium or any of the prohibited
.paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable,
since the mere possession of the drug or any of the
prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused
had in his possession any of these things. According to the
statements made by the witness Smith, he not only
suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also
stated that he desired to commit the same offense and would

pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of
the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a man who is
employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such
steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the
offense and which would tend to the elevation and
improvement of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather
than further his debasement, should be rebuked rather than
444
444
Gulib vs. Bucquio.
encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as those
committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the
positive testimony of the defendant, corroborated by the
Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness
sinks into insignificance and certainly does not deserve
credit. When an employee of the Government, as in this case,
and according to his own testimony, encourages or induces
persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such
conduct is most reprehensible. We desire to be understood
that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness
Smith and the incredibility of his testimony on his own acts
according to his own testimony.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the
appellant is not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the
lower court is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed; defendant acquitted. United States vs.
Phelps., 16 Phil. 440, No. 5728 August 11, 1910
[No. 39086. October 26, 1934]

appellee, vs. ONG CHIAT LAY ET AL., defendants. ONG CHIAT
LAY, appellant.
1.CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; PARTIES CRIMINALLY
LIABLE; PRINCIPALS.In order to convict a defendant as
principal it must be shown either that he took a direct part in
the execution of the criminal act; or that he directly forced or
induced another or others to commit it; or that he cooperated
in the commission of the offense by an act without which it
would not have been accomplished. (Article 17, Revised
Penal Code.)
2.ID.; ID.; ID.They take direct part in the execution of a
criminal act who, participating in the criminal design, proceed
to carry out their plan and personally take part in its
execution by acts which directly tend to the same end.
(Viada, Codigo Pcnal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's Revised
Penal Code Ann., 144.)
3.ID. ; ID. ; PRINCIPAL BY CONSPIRACY.When a defendant is
charged with having set fire to a building, in conspiracy with
others, the allegation of conspiracy must necessarily fail by
the acquittal of his alleged conspirators, since there can be
no conspiracy unless at least two united in criminal design.
4.ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION.When a defendant is
prosecuted on the theory that he induced his codefendants to
set fire to a building, the acquittal of the latter must
necessarily result in his own acquittal; for one can not be
held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime
without its first being shown that the crime has been actually
committed by another.
5.EVIDENCE; CRIMINAL CASES; "CORPUS DELICTI".It is a
well-settled principle of criminal law tbat a conviction for
crime can not be had unless the corpus delicti is first
established.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.To establish the corpus delicti in arson the
proof of two elements is required, namely, (1) the burning of
the house or other thing, and (2) the criminal agency which
caused it.
7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ClRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.The corpus

delicti may be proved by circumstantial evidence. In that
case, the circumstances proven should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion, which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person. It is indispensable that the
evidence be derived from interrelated facts and duly proven
in a manner that will lead to a logical and rational conclusion,
beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused is the author
of the crime. In other words, there must
789
VOL. 60, OCTOBER 26, 1934
789
People vs. Ong Chiat Lay
be, from all the circumstances, a combination of evidence
which, in the ordinary and natural course of things, leaves no
room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
(Moran, The Law of Evidence, 453.)
8.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.It is a reversible error to convict upon
circumstantial evidence, a defendant accused of the
commission of arson, by inducement, if the person or persons
alleged to have been induced by him have been acquitted of
the crime, for such acquittal is not only consistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, but inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is guilty.
Zamboanga. Ocampo, J.
Juan S. Alano, T. de los Santos, Eduardo D. Enriquez and
Gibbs & McDonough for appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were
jointly informed against by the provincial fiscal of
Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a
building in which was located a store belonging to the
appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant and his
codefendants were tried jointly upon said information; and,

after trial, while Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing were acquitted,
appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson and
sentenced to suffer sixteen years and one day of reclusin
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify Francisco Barrios and Mariano Atienza in the sums
of P16,000 and P5,000, respectively, and to pay onethird of
the costs.
In support of this appeal, appellant has assigned the
following errors:
"First. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence
presented against the accused Ong Chiat Lay is suificient to
establish the corpus delicti, namely, that the crime of arson
had been committed.
790
790
"Second. The lower court erred in holding that the evi.dence
presented against the accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to
establish his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt."
In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission
of a crime, it must be shown either (1) that he took a direct
part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly
forced or induced another or others to commit it; or (3) that
he cooperated in the commission of the offense by an act
without which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised
Penal Code, article 17.) They take direct part in the execution
of a criminal act who, participating in the criminal design,
proceed to carry out their plan and personally take part in its
execution by acts which directly tend to the same end.
(Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's Revised
Penal Code Ann., 144.)
In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken
a direct part in the burning of the building. In fact, the
prosecution lays stress on appellant's absence from the
scene of the fire as one of the suspicious circumstances
indicating his guilt. Appellant was prosecuted on the theory

that he induced his said codefendants to set fire to the
building. Hence the three were charged jointly on an
information alleging conspiracy among them. This allegation
of conspiracy, however, has been negatived by the acquittal
of appellant's codefendants. The same may be said with
regard to the theory that appellant had induced his
codefendants to perpetrate the unlawf ul deed; for it seems
clear that one can not be held guilty of having instigated the
commission of a crime without its first being shown that the
crime has been actually committed by another.
In acquitting Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, the lower court said:
"Pero las pruebas de la acusacin, a juicio del Juzgado, no
establecen que los acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing hayan
cooperado directa o indirectamente a su coacusado Ong
Chiat Lay en la comisin del delito. Las pruebas
791
VOL, 60, OCTOBER 26,1934
791
indiciarias presentadas contra los referidos acusados Ong
Ban Hua y Kua Sing no pueden producir ms que mera
sospecha de que dichos acusados tuvieron conocimiento de
lo que haba realizado Ong Chiat Lay, pero esta sospecha no
puede servirse de base para una sentencia condenatoria, y
por ende se debe absolver a los mismos acusados Ong Ban
Hua y Kua Sing de la querella."
While not exactly in point, the principle discussed in State vs.
Tom (13 N. C. [2 Dev. L.], 569), is pertinent to the question
now under consideration. In that case, the court held that
although more than two persons are charged with
conspiracy, the acquittal of all but one of those charged
amounts to the acquittal of that one, since there can be no
conspiracy unless at least two unite. Ruffin, /., therein said:
'"Conspiracy being a crime, requiring the guilty cooperation
of two, at least, to constitute it, in which there is a mutual
dependence of the guilt of each person upon that of the
other, principle would seem to demand that all the accused
should be jointly tried and convicted, or acquitted. In other

cases of dependent crimes, that upon which the rest depends
must be first established. Such is the law between principal
and accessory. The reason is that ttiere may be as full
defence as possible upon the very point of the principal's
guilt, by that principal himself, who is best able to make it. To
make that rule effectual, it became necessary to establish
another that, but by the accessory's own consent, no proof of
the principal's guilt should be heard against him until it was
first established against the principal himself. The rule arises
out of the nature of dependent criminality. Now conspirators
may be said to be co-principals. The guilt of both must
concur to constitute that of either; and it must consist of a
joint act, and it makes one crime in both. As the trial of one
need not precede that of the other, the trial of both ought to
be concurfent. I think it more than probable that anciently
such was the course. But, clearly, now it is otherwise. There
are many precedents of the separate trial of person in792
792
dicted for offences that could not be committed by less than
two. (* * * Rex vs. Kinnersly [1719], 1 Strange, 193; Rex vs.
Niccolls [1745], 2 Strange, 1227.) It is too late now to
question it. But it can never follow from those cases that
where one of the persons, the establishment of whose guilt is
essential to the conviction of the other, has been legally
acquitted, the other does not thereby become discharged. It
cannot be that a man can be held guilty to any purpose who
has, in due course of law, been found not guilty. The analogy
between this case and that of the accessory is strict. The
acquittal of the principal is an immediate and absolute
discharge of the accessory. For there can be no aid given to a
deed when the deed itself was never perpetrated. So, whei'e
guilt consists in the joint act or intent of two, and it is found
that one of them did not join in the act or intent, it is
conclusive as to both. For A could not conspire with B if the
latter did not conspire at all. In all the cases, therefore, a

verdict affirming the guilt of fewer persons than could
commit the crime, and affirming the innocence of all others
charged, has been held to be an acquittal of all." (4 B. K. C.,
930.)
While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy
as a distinct offense, it is clear from the nature of the
evidence presented that appellant alone could not have
committed the unlawful act. As already stated, the theory of
the prosecution was that he conspired with or induced his
codefendants to commit the crime. The gravamen of the
charge was conspiracy, and the acquittal of his codefendants
is clearly inconsistent with appellant's guilt.
This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of this
case. Appellant was convicted wholly on circumstantial
evidence. As stated in the decision of the trial court: "Las
pruebas de la acusacin son todas indiciarias, que son las
que siempre se presentan para probar esta clase de delito,
porque su autor o autores ordinariamente no lo practican en
presencia de un tercero." Continuing, the court further said:
"El traslado de los muebles del acusado Ong Chiat Lay
793
793
a varios sitios antes de ocurrir este incendio, su indiferencia a
todo lo que ocurra en la madrugada de autos, su ausencia
del lugar donde estaba instalado su bazar mientras arda el
edificio ocupado por ste, y el hecho de no haberse negado
que f uera el el autor del incendio ante el teniente Piccio, son
pruebas indiciarias muy fuertes contra este acusado. El
hecho de que se ola a gasolina dentro de la casa ocupada
por el establecimiento 'China Bazaar' en la ocasin en que el
repetido Ong Chiat Lay trasladaba sus muebles y su
residencia a otro sitio, y el haber sido encontradas varias
latas de petrleo o gasolina vacias en el mismo terreno
donde estuvo levantada dicha casa inmediatamente despus
de ocurrir el incendio de esta, son tambien pruebas
indiciarias muy fuertes contra el susodicho acusado Ong

Chiat Lay. Todas estas pruebas apreciadas en su conjunto
constituyen una evidencia clara de la culpabilidad del
acusado Ong Chiat Lay."
It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction
for crime can not be had unless the corpus delicti is first
established. (State vs. Sullivan, 17 L. R. A., 902.) To establish
the corpus delicti in arson the proof of ,two elements is
required, namely, (1) the burning of the house or other thing,
and (2) the criminal agency in causing it. (Spears vs. State,
16 L. R. A. [N. S.], 285.) The corpus delicti may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. (State vs. Sullivan, supra.) However:
"Before a conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proven should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion, which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person. It is indispensable that the
evidence be derived from interrelated facts and duly proven
in a manner that will lead to a logical and rational conclusion,
beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused is the author
of the crime. In other words, there must be, from all the
circumstances, a combination of evidence which, in the
ordinary and natural course of things, leaves no room for
reasonable doubt
794
794
Teng Ching vs. Collector of Customs
as to the guilt of the accused." (Moran, The Law of Evidencej
453; numerous cases cited in support of the texfc.)
While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to
raise grave suspicions against the appellant, they fall far
short of establishing his guilt clearly and satisfactorily, as
required by the well-settled rules of evidence. This court held
in United States vs. Levente (18 Phil., 439), that to warrant a
conviction upon circumstantial evidence, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is

innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt. The chain of circumstances which would have
pointed to the appellant as the guilty person was broken by
the acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing. As already
explained, the acquittal of his said codefendants is not only
consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is innocent,
but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is guilty.
It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed
and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
People vs. Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil. 788, No. 39086 October 26,
1934
[No. 8578. November 17, 1913.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ANSELMO
DIRIS, EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, and TOMAS OLEA, defendants.
ANSELMO DIRIS and EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, appellants.
1.ROBBERY; PRINCIPALS IN CRIME.A, B, and C conspire to
rob a house. B and C go upstairs, break open a trunk and
carry off the contents. A remains downstairs engaging the
wife of the owner of the house in conversation in order to
distract her attention from his coconspirators and at the
same time to act as a guard to warn them and give an alarm
in case of necessity. Held, That A takes "a direct part in the
commission of the crime" and is therefore guilty as a
principal under article 13 of the Penal Code.
2.ID.; VALUE OF STOLEN RECEIPT, IN FIXING PENALTY.
Although this Court has held that checks, warrants, and
similar instruments payable to order and evidencing an
obligation to pay money, may under certain circumstances
be treated as worth their face value in fixing the value of
stolen property for the purpose of grading the crime and the
penalty to be imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the
penalty prescribed in the Code is made to depend on the
value of the property taken: Held, That a mere receipt
evidencing the payment of a debt, in the absence of any
proof as to its value, cannot be said to have anything more
than a mere nominal value in fixing the penalty and
assessing the indemnity to be imposed upon one convicted
of its theft.
Tayabas. Gale, J.
Godofredo Reyes, for appellants.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas convicting the defendants of the crime of
robbery,
During the pendency of the proceedings in this court the

defendant Tomas Olea withdrew his appeal and the judgment
of the lower court is therefore final as to him. The
134
134
United States vs. Diris.
only question now presented for our consideration is the
appeal of the defendants Anselmo .Diris and Eustaquio Siaga.
We are of opinion that the evidence of record fully sustains
the contentions of the prosecution and the findings of the
lower court as to the facts. It will not therefore be necessary
to review the evidence in detail.
It appears that Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of
Calauag, Province of Tayabas, received from the railroad
company on July 7, 1912, more than P400 in payment of
certain land expropriated by that company, and that the
defendant Tomas Olea, a nephew of Fulgencio Seal, was
present when the money was counted and paid over to his
uncle. The record shows that the money was deposited in a
trunk and that this fact was also known to Olea, who had free
access to his uncle's house and was accustomed to come and
go at will.
On the morning of July 12, following the date of the receipt of
the money from the railroad company, Fulgencio Seal left the
house between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning-, leaving his
wife in charge of their tienda. A short time thereafter the
three defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio Siaga
engaged the woman in conversation while the other two
defendants went upstairs, broke open the trunk, and took the
money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for P100. The
record shows that at the time of the robbery part of the
money received from the railroad company had been paid
out and that the balance in the trunk was only P353.
The woman was somewhat deaf and had no knowledge of
what was taking: place upstairs. She stated that she saw the
two defendants go up into the house, but as Tomas Olea was
her husband's nephew and accustomed to come to the house
she thought nothing of it. Upon the return of Fulgencio Seal

later in the morning the robbery was discovered, and when
his wife reported who had been there he immediately went in
search of his nephew. The nephew when found admitted the
theft of the money and promised that if the uncle would not
make any trouble about it he
135
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 17, 1913.
135
would try and recover it from the other defendants. Together
with Olea the uncle then went in search of Diris. The uncle
was told to wait at a certain place until the nephew should
return, and when he failed to come back the uncle went in
search of him and later found him and Diris in a barber shop
in the municipality of Lopez. The matter was reported to the
justice of the peace of that municipality and the two
defendants were arrested. On the person of Tomas Olea were
f ound two bank notes of the denomination of P10 each, P3 in
half-peso denominations, and P4 in 10centavo pieces.
Fulgencio Seal testified that the money in the trunk consisted
of one bank note of the value of P200, P100 in bank notes of
the value of 10 pesos each, and the remainder in currency in
P1, 50-centavo, and 10-centavo denominations, there being
P23 in 10-centavo pieces. It appears that by some error on
the part of the justice of the peace the money was returned
to Olea; however, there can hardly be any doubt that it was a
part of the money which his uncle had in the trunk. At the
trial the defendants denied that they were the authors of the
crime; Olea and Diris denied that they were present at the
house on the morning in question; and Eustaquio Siaga, while
admitting that he was at the tienda stated that he went there
alone. The presence of the defendants at the house on the
morning in question is not only established by the wife of
Fulgencio Seal, but her testimony on this point is
corroborated by that of Conrado Fernandez, a neighbor. In
view of all the facts of record the statements of the
defendants cannot be credited. Their guilt is conclusively

established.
Olea having withdrawn his appeal and the other evidence of
record being sufficient in itself to sustain the conviction of all
the appellants, it is not necessary for us to discuss the
objections set forth in their brief as to the admission of the
alleged confession of guilt of Olea.
It has been suggested by counsel, that the defendant
Eustaquio Siaga, who remained below in the tienda and
engaged the woman in conversation while the other defend136
136
ants went up into the house, should only be held as cmplice
(accessary before the fact) as defined in the Pen Code, and
not as a principal. In support of this view v are cited to Viada
(Vol. I, p. 370), as follows: "The person who entertains the
owner of a house while robbers a assaulting it, so that he will
not return thereto until aft the robbery has been
consummated, is also an accomplice in the crime, inasmuch
as he cooperated therein by a simu taneous act, although not
an indispensable one for its a complishment."
It will be seen however that the case supposed by th noted
commentator clearly implies that the owner of th house was
entertained at some distance from the place where the
robbery was committed; it does not appear ho far away, but
apparently not anywhere in the immedia neighborhood. The
present case offers a different situatio The defendant Siaga
acted concurrently with the other d fendants, and must be
held to have been present with the' aiding and abetting them
in the commission of the crime b remaining below and talking
with the woman in order to distract her attention from what
was going on upstair In doing so he was evidently serving as
a guard to war his companions in case there should arise any
necessity fo giving an alarm. When the other defendants
came dow out of the house he went away with them.
This court has repeatedly held that one who shares th guilty
purpose and aids and abets the commission of crime by his
presence at the time of its perpetration, eve though he may
not have taken an active part in its materi; execution, is
guilty as a principal. We have also held tha one who stands
as guard near the place where a crime committed to keep
others away or to warn his companion and fellow
conspirators of danger of discovery, takes direct part in the
commission of the crime and is therefore. guilty as a principal
under article 13 of the Penal Cod (U. S. vs. Reogilon and
Dingle, 22 Phil. Rep., 127; U. S. vs. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep.,
545; U. S. vs. Ramos, 4 Phil. Rep 555.)
137
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 17, 1913.
137
Under all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that
Siaga was properly convicted as a principal.
It appears that the trial court treated the stolen receipts for
P100 as being of that value. The actual money stolen
amounted to only P353.
While we have held that checks, warrants and similar
instruments, payable to order and evidencing an obligation to
pay money, may under certain circumstances be treated as
worth their face value in fixing the value of the stolen
property for the purpose of grading the crime and the penalty
to be imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the penalty
prescribed in the Code is made to depend on the value of the
property taken (U. S. vs. Raboy, 25 Phil. Rep., 1; U. S. vs.
Wickersham, 20 Phil. Rep., 440), we are of opinion that a
mere receipt such as that under consideration, especially in
the absence of any proof as to its value, cannot be held to
have anything more than a mere nominal value in fixing the
penalty and assessing the civil indemnity to be imposed on
one convicted of its theft.
The record further shows that Anselmo Diris is a recidivist,
having been previously convicted of the crime of robbery by
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in the case of the
United States vs. Anselmo Diris, on April 12, 1904, which

judgment of conviction was affirmed by this Court on May 9,
1905 (4 Phil. Rep., 498).
The judgment of the trial court should be modified, in so far
as it affects these appellants, by reducing the amount of the
civil indemnification from P453 to P353 and by substituting
the words presidio mayor for the words prisin mayor in the
dispositive part thereof, and thus modified the judgment
convicting and sentencing the appellants Diris and Siaga
should be and is hereby affirmed, with a proportionate share
of the costs of this instance against each of the appellants.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment modified. United States vs. Diris., 26 Phil., 133, No.
8578 November 17, 1913
[No. 8187. January 29, 1913.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. PANGLIMA
INDANAN, defendant and appellant.
1.MURDER BY INDUCEMENT; DEATH PENALTY AFFIRMED.
The accused and all of the persons involved in this case were
Moros of the district of Parang, of which district the accused
was headman. He ordered certain of his followers and
dependents to go out, seize and bring before him one S. This
order was obeyed and S. was brought to the house of the
accused and there bound and detained until night. Accused
then ordered
204
204
United States vs. Indanan.
his dependents to take S. to an old Chinese cemetery, an
isolated place, and there kill him. He reinforced his orders as
headman by asserting that he had an order f from the
governor that S. should be executed. In obedience to these
orders and under this representation S. was taken to the
cemetery and killed. Held: That the accused was guilty of the
crime of murder by inducement.
2.ID.; COMMISSION OF CRIME BY INDUCEMENT.In order that
a person may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is
necessary that the inducement be made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that
such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission of the crime.
3.ID.; WHEN A CONVICTION IS WARRANTED UPON TWO
SEPARATE THEORIES, IT MAY BE SUSTAINED UPON EITHER.
While the personal commands of the accused were sufficient,
as shown by the evidence, to produce the effects which
actually resulted, and may be considered the moving cause
of the crime, there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the
representation that the accused had in his possession an
order from the Government commanding the death" of S.
was also of material influence in procuring the death; and
where two fundamental causes work together for the
production of a single result, each one sufficient for the

purpose, and one of those causes would lead to a conviction
upon one theory and the other upon another, a conviction is
sustainable upon either theory.
4.ID. ; PREMEDITATION.The accused having laid plans in the
afternoon to cause the death of S., and having partly carried
out those plans during said afternoon, and having maintained
that intent and that determination until night, when the crime
contemplated and premeditated was committed, the accused
acted with such premeditation, deliberation, reflection, and
fixed purpose as to warrant the finding that premeditation
under the Penal Code existed in the commission of the crime.
5.ID.; "ALEVOSA."The killing of a person by several armed
persons when his hands are bound behind his back and he is
helpless and defenseless has been held by this court many
times to warrant the finding that alevosa was present.
6.ID.; NOCTURNITY.The deceased having been killed in a
lonely and isolated place and under cover of the night,
nighttime having been selected for greater security from
detection, the crime was committed with the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Moro Province. Low, J.
205
VOL. 24, JANUARY 29, 1913.
205
Leo T. Gibbons, for appellant.
Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the
crime of murder, and sentencing him to be hanged.
The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime,
the headman of Parang. He is alleged to have committed the
murder by inducement. The proofs tend to demonstrate that
on the 24th day of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk to
bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The following

day, Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the
house, whereupon the accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran
and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the
presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a
bed in the room. This was about 4.30 in the afternoon. Sariol
remained there with his hands tied behind his back until
night, when the accused, in the presence of several
witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese
cemetery and there killed, the accused asserting at the time
that he had an order to that effect from the governor. He
gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the
time that Sariol was killed, and that he should aid in killing
him. To make sure of the work being well done, the accused
ordered Akiran to take his (the accused's) bolo with which to
assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the cemetery, in an
isolated spot a considerable distance f from the road and
about 200 yards from the nearest house, and there killed.
Kalyakan struck the first blow with his bolo, while Akiran
joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time
he was killed had his hands tied behind his back. On
returning to the house of the accused after the death of
Sariol, Unding told the accused that Sariol had been killed,
whereupon the accused said that it was all right and
appeared to be very much pleased.
The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused
206
206
was the recognized headman of Parang, and it appears from
the testimony of the witnesses, Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran,
that he had a very powerful influence over them, hence his
power over them was such that any order issued by him had
the force and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the
witnesses testified: "He (the accused) knows what is good
and what is bad, and he is the headman of the governor. He
is the headman of Parang." And in answer to the question,
"He is the biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied: "There

is none, only himself." He further said: "The people do not
hesitate to take his orders because he is the headman of the
governor." Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to get
angry with the people, what would he do to them?" this
witness answered: "I do not know; might kill them." Another
witness, answering the question as to why he did not run
away instead of going to the Chinese cemetery as the
accused ordered him, answered: "The reason why I did not
run away, well, take the same thing as the Government
soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they do it." Prior to
this time the same witness had said: "If a chief says anything
to a man like me and tells me it is by order of the governor
and that he has a warrant there, well, a man like me does
what he tells me." Another witness declared: "I am afraid of
him. I did not believe that he would make me do anything
unjust." The same witness afterwards testified in answer to
the question: "Would you have killed this man if any other
person besides Panglima, the headman, had ordered you to?"
' "I would not." Another witness declared: "Well, he was the
headman. It was the headman's orders, and if we did not do
it, he would get angry with us." This witness, answering the
question, "Did Panglima make you think that he was acting
under the orders of the Government in causing this man to
be killed?" testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' " To the
question, "And you thought that it was a legal execution, did
you?" answered, "Yes, because he (the accused) is not afraid
of the governor."
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207
We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused
over the persons who, at his orders, killed the deceased was
such as to make him responsible for whatever they did in
obedience to such orders.
Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to

be principals in a crime "who directly force or induce others
to commit it."
Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:
"They force another to commit a crime who physically, by
actual force or grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand
or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit
the crime. In our commentary on paragraph 9 of article 8
(page 28), we have already said that he who suffers violence
acts without will and against his will, is no more than an
instrument, and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real
culprits in such case, the only guilty persons, are those who
use the violence, those who force the other to commit the
crime.
"One is induced directly to commit a crime either by
command, or for a consideration, or by any other similar act
which constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime and
which was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act
and was sufficient for that purpose. We have already seen in
our commentary on paragraph 12 of article 8 that the one
who physically commits the crime may escape criminal
responsibility by showing that he acted with due obedience
to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls
entirely upon the one who orders, that is, upon him who by
his commands has directly induced the other to commit the
act. But in case the obedience of the inferior is not due to the
superior and therefore not necessary, and does not,
therefore, exempt him from criminal responsibility as the
physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command,
directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by the
law also as a principal in the crime.
"The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a
consideration the hand which commits the crime makes him
who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the
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208
principal in the crime by direct inducement, because without

such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been
committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually
commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration
or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility; on the
contrary, we have already seen in our comments on
paragraph 3 of article 10 that such circumstance constitutes
an aggravation of his crime.
"We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and
the pacto there are similar means by which another may be
induced to commit a crime which also make the one who
offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of
the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2. But it must be borne
in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in
simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed,
or in simple words uttered at the time the act was
committed. Such advice and such words constitute
undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the
moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the
Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is
necessary that such advice or such words have a great
dominance and great influence over the person who acts; it is
necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful
as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself,"
The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain
illustrate the principles involved and their application to
particular cases:
It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that
one who, during a riot in which a person was killed, said to
one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not
appearing that he did anything more than say these words
except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime
of homicide by inducement, the court saying that,
"considering that, although the phrases pronounced were
imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent
that they may be considered the principal and moving cause
of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred
from
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209
such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced
and.must be so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it the act would not have been performed."
In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle
was laid down that "a person who advised a married woman
whose husband was very stingy and treated her badly that
the only thing for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of
the crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason that
imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient."
In a decision of the 22d of December, 1883, it was held that a
f father who simply said to his son who was at the time
engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not
responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was
given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being
held in mind that the inducement to the commission of the
crime by means of which a person may be considered a
principal in the same manner as he who executes the act
itself can only be founded in commands, sometimes in
advice, in considerations, or by inducement ,so powerful that
it alone produces the criminal act. None of these
characteristics pertain to the words of Miguel Perez,
inasmuch as the circumstances which surrounded the event
at the time do not appear in sufficient detail to show with
clearness the effects which the words produced, or the
relative situation of the deceased and of the one who killed
him, or the point to which the fight had progressed at the
time the words were spoken. Moreover, the decision of the
court below does not show sufficient facts upon which to
affirm that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part
of his son when he spoke the words referred to, or, for that
reason, that he thereby induced him to use said weapon."
In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held
that the fact "of having proposed to other persons the
abstraction of the tickets which were the subject matter of
the robbery, at the same time telling them the place where
they were to be found, does not constitute inducement to
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210
commit the robbery because the proposal to commit the
robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause of the
crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been
committed without it; nor was the indication of the place
where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to
induce the robbery."
The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose
of showing concrete cases in which the acts of the accused
were not sufficient, as matter of law, to constitute
inducement. They not only lay down the legal principles
which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also
illustrate in the most valuable way the application of those
principles to actual cases.
The following decisions of the same court present instances
in which the acts of the accused constitute inducement under
the law and illustrate the application of the principles to
concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by
the court were: "It appeared that Lulu, who was living with
Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the town of X, gave birth
to a child on the morning of the 28th of March, the offspring
of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously
agreed upon by the first three named to deliver the child to
William as soon as it was born, with instructions to deposit it
in some frequented place so that it might be found and taken
up; but Joe changed his mind and handed the child over to
the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it whatever
you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to/ which the
latter actually did." Under the facts the accused was held
guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22d of January, 1873, it
was held that "a woman who, living with a man in scandalous
concubinage in the presence of a daughter who continually

manifested her disgust and repugnance for such conduct,
conceived against the daughter the most profound hatred
and conceived the purpose of killing her by most insidious
methods, obtaining for that purpose poison and various
deadly weapons, and contriving that she and her
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211
family and all of the tenants in the house should go to the
theater on an evening during which the daughter was sick
and obliged to remain at home, in order that her lover might
be entirely undisturbed in killing the daughter and that he
might not be surprised in the act, such woman is the author
and principal of the crime the same as her lover who actually
committed the deed."
In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one
who takes advantage of his position as an inspector for the
maintenance of public peace and proposes to a private
citizen the perpetration of a robbery, with the threat that
unless he did commit the robbery he would be arrested as an
escaped prisoner, at the same time offering to withdraw the
officers f from the vicinity of the place to be robbed, and who
after the robbery received a part of the booty, was guilty of
the crime as principal, although he did not take personal part
therein."
In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an
alcalde of a barrio who, accompanied by a number of peace
officers, ordered them to stop certain music that was being
played in the public street, and after the order had been
obeyed and the music stopped one of the persons expressed
his resentment against the act whereupon the alcalde
ordered the peace officers to attack the man, which they did,
inflicting upon him various wounds, was guilty of the crime of
lesiones graves by inducement."
In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a
father who from the balcony of his house cried out in a loud
voice to his sons who were fighting with others to kill those
with whom they were fighting before they were killed
themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big
thing as a little, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by
inducement by reason of the injuries inflicted under such
orders."
In a decision of the 22d day of December, 1883, the court
said, "that the inducement and the commission of a crime
whereby the inducer becomes a principal to the same extent
and effect as if he had physically committed the crime
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212
exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or
agreement for a consideration, or through influence so
effective that it alone determines the commission of the
crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid
down the proposition that the secretary of the ayuntamiento
who induced certain persons to form new lists of
compromisarios five days prior to the election of senators
was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists,
saying: "It appearing and it being a fact proved that the
secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio Dura,
induced the members of the council to commit the act
stated, his participation as principal in the commission of the
act is well established according to the provisions of
paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code, because such
inducement coming f from a person of such influence as the
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be
considered sufficiently dominant to turn the mind of those
induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was
held that a woman who was at enmity with an uncle for
having refused to renounce in her favor a donation which a
relative had given to him, who made frequent threats to kill
the uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum
of money together with the land involved in the donation if

he would kill the uncle, and who told her son that, if they
were unable to get anybody else to kill the uncle, he must do
it himself as he would thus inherit 15,000 pesetas with which
they could flee abroad, and in case he refused to do it he
must leave the house because he was a coward, was guilty
as principal of the crime of murder committed by the son
under such inducement. The court said: "It being borne in
mind that the suggestions with which the mother moved the
mind of her son to kill the uncle had the force of a real
inducement and inclined and decided the will of the son by
means of the relations which she bore to him as well as the
reward which she held up before him."
In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that
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213
finding as principal in a crime, him who, "by direct and
influential means and taking advantage of the inexperience
of a boy of tender age," induces him to commit a crime, was
warranted by law, the court saying that "in view of the f fact
that the inducement exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to
the boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the jewels in question from
his grandmother's house shows such a direct and inducing
cause of the criminal act that without such inducement the
crime would not have been committed."
In a decision of the 9th, of April, 1892, the court held "that
the inducement referred to in paragraph 2, article 13, of the
Penal Code exists whenever the act perf ormed by the
physical author of the crime is determined by the influence of
the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act,
whatever be the source of such influence."
In a decision of the 3d of February, 1897, it was declared that
one was the "principal by inducement in five different
larcenies, it having been proved that the inducer, knowing
that the oil which was brought to her f or sale was stolen by
the persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them
thereupon to continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels

in which to carry it and contributed on five different
occasions to the realization of the larcenies, it appearing that
the physical authors of the crime were boys under 15 years
of age and that they acted upon the suggestions of the
inducer without discernment or judgment of their own," the
court saying that in view of the fact that she knew that the oil
which she first purchased from the boys was stolen oil, that
the boys were less than 15 years of age, and therefore easily
led, that she furnished the vessels in which to carry the
stolen propertyall indicate conclusively that the five crimes
were committed by the influence exercised by the woman,
which inducement was not merely that of favoring the
execution of the crime but was that which determined its
commission."
In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that
the command of a master to his servant, by reason of the
special relations which exist between them, contains
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214
the elements of inducement which makes the master who
orders such servant to cut wood belonging to a third person,
in order that he might benefit thereby, the principal of the
crime committed by such servant," the court saying that "in
view of the f fact that the command of the master to the
servant, made within the sphere and under the ordinary
conditions of domestic life, when they relate to acts simple
and apparently legitimate, contains the necessary elements,
directly and sufficiently efficacious, of inducement according
to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal
Code, it appearing that the master, taking advantage of the
ascendency and authority which he naturally must exercise
over his servant or inferior, ordered him to cut and carry
away wood from land which he knew did not belong to him,
without disclosing to the servant that circumstance, which
concealment gave rise to the influence which the master

exercised over the servant in that particular act."
The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands apply the foregoing principles to particular
cases.
In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep.,
339) it appeared that one of the defendants conceived the
idea of the robbery of a warehouse and assisted in procuring
false keys with which to open it. He took no immediate part
in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion said:
"These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly
show the guilt of the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator of
the crime herein prosecuted. From him came the initiative in
the robbery; he was the first to conceive the idea of its
commission, and, being unable or unwilling to carry it out
himself, he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material
execution of the crime by a promise to pay-him P16 for each
case of whisky that he was able to steal. The better to induce
him to commit the offense, he clearly demonstrated how
easily it could be accomplished, instructed him as to the best
means of carrying it out, and offered him money to pay for
the false key. He thus removed all the difficulties
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VOL. 24, JANUARY 29, 1913.
215
in the way of the determination to execute, and the actual
execution of the robbery in question. These acts constitute a
real inducement made directly for the commission of the said
robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of
principal in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the
Penal Code."
In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep.,
470) it appeared that the accused induced certain Igorrotes
to kill a third person by holding up before them the fact that
by such act they would be able to obtain P40 which was then
in the house of the victim, as well as the carabao which he
owned, saying to them, "If you go to work you only make a
little; it is better to kill this man and take his carabao and the
P40 which was received f from the sale of the house in town."
They having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of
the proposed victim and having returned and explained why
they had not been able to kill him, the accused said to them:
"Why did you eat my chickens if you are not going to do what
I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in Cambaguio
because I thought you were going to kill him." The Igorrotes
then spent three days clearing some land for another person
from whom they received P2.25. About noon of the third day
of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now
you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply with our
agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill
Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and conceal
yourselves in the same place you were concealed before."
The murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts
the court held that the accused was the instigator and
inducer of the crime, and that he was liable as principal.
(Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of
January, 1887, 12th of January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep.,
230) it appeared that the accused had a conversation with
Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked him if he
knew Antonio Gavato and his associates, to which he replied
in the negative. The defendant then said: "I
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216
wish to confer upon you a commission, which is as follows:
Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of Gavato, and when
you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was
reluctant to obey this order, but defendant gave him
something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and
then gave him a bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I
have ordered and in case you incur any responsibility I will be
responsible to the court, and as soon as you wound any
person or persons, return to me and I will defend you." The
court held that these facts constituted sufficient inducement

to bring the accused within the provisions of article 13,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81)
the court said:
"Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant
fisherman, and more or less dependent upon his uncle for
subsistence. On the other hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when
this crime was committed, a man of great influence in
Escalante. He had a great number of people working for him,
one of whom was his nephew Mauricio. He was the local
political leader of his party. One of his nephews was president
of the town. He had two brothersin-law in the municipal
council. Of his nephews, one was chief of police and two
others were members of the police force. He had acquired, as
we have said, a bitter hatred toward the Roman Catholic
Church and the Spanish friars and priests. He called a
meeting in his own house on the afternoon of May 15, where
the question of murdering the priest was discussed. He was
the prime mover in this meeting. He dominated all who were
present. He selected his nephew Mauricio to commit the
crime and directed him to do it. Mauricio, immediately after
murdering the priest, returned to the house of his uncle Gil
and reported the fact. The influence exercised by Gil Gamao
over his nephew was so great and powerful that the latter,
through fear, could not resist it. That Mauricio was directly
induced to murder the priest by his uncle Gil we think there
can be no question."
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VOL. 24, JANUARY 29, 1913.
217
In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil.
Rep., 105) it was held that the "one who employs an innocent
agent to commit a crime is liable as a principal, although he
does nothing himself in the actual commission of the crime."
In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz.,
1888) it appeared that "a married woman suggested to her
paramour, with whom she had been maintaining illicit

relations that he kill her husband in order that thereafter they
might live together freely. The paramour acting upon these
suggestions and actuated by a desire to possess the woman
for himself without the interference of the husband, killed
him. The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their
escape and lived together as man and wif fe until the time of
their arrest." Upon these facts the court said:
"We think that the direct inducement to the commission of
the crime is fully established por pacto (for a consideration);
that is to say, on the understanding that the woman would
live in illicit relations with the murderer after the death of her
husband; and por precepto (by precept) which constituted 'a
real, intentional, direct and efficacious exciting inducement
(excitacin) to commit the crime.' The propositions and
suggestions of the woman constituted something more than
mere counsel or advice which her codefendant was entirely
free to accept or not, in that they were coupled with a
consideration which, in view of the relations existing between
them, furnished a motive strong enough to induce the man to
take the life of her husband; and f or the f urther reason that
due to these illicit relations she had acquired such an
influence over her codefendant that her insistent suggestions
that he commit the crime had a marked and controlling
influence upon his mind."
In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. Rep.,
439) it appeared that the accused proposed to his
companions an assault upon the house of Francisco Tolosa;
that armed with a talibon he accompanied them during the
assault; that, while the assault was being made, he stood
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218
watch at the foot of the stairs of said house so that his
companions would not be caught, and that, finally, he
accompanied them to the place where the deceased was
killed. These facts were held by the court to be sufficient to
make the accused a principal by inducement as well as by

direct participation.
In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the
effect of a command. There does not seem to have existed,
however, any official relation between the accused and the
persons whom he induced to kill Sariol. While he appears to
have been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced
held no official position under him and owed him, legally
speaking, no obedience. According to tradition and custom,
however, the headman seems to have been a person whose
word was law and whose commands were to be obeyed.
Moreover, the accused represented to those who physically
committed the crime that he had a warrant from the
governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts committed,
and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey the
commands of the Government. This representation was false,
but it produced the same effect as if it had been true. It
cannot be doubted that the accused knew the representation
was false and purposely and intentionally made it as an
additional factor going to insure obedience to his orders.
Even if there should happen to be lacking any element
sufficient to bring the acts of the accused within the
definition of inducement by command, and we do not believe
there is, there would still remain all of the elements
necessary to qualify the crime as murder by inducement.
From the authorities heretofore cited and the principles laid
down therein as those which must govern in the
determination of whether or not the acts of an accused
constitute inducement under the law, it may be stated as a
general proposition that, where the inducement offered by
the accused is of such a nature and made in such a way that
it becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such
inducement was offered with the intention of producing that
result, then the ac219
VOL. 24, JANUARY 29, 1913.
219
cused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the

person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be
intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made
directly for the purpose in view.
The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to
cover cases where there exists on the part of the inducer the
most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to
secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind
of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely the
result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with
them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or
temptation. A chance word spoken without reflection, a
wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a
resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent
reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the
word or performed the act having any expectation that his
suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it
produce a result. In such case, while the expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he
would not be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in
applying the principles laid down to concrete cases it is
necessary to remember only that the inducement must be
made directly with the intention of procuring the commission
of the crime and that such inducement must be the
determining cause of the crime.
In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely
represented to the persons who actually committed the crime
that he had an order from the Government requiring the
death of Sariol and that they were under obligation to carry
out that order. It is clear from the evidence that this
inducement was offered by the accused directly to the
persons interested with the intention of moving them to do
his bidding, and that such representation was the moving
cause of the fatal act. While it may be said, and is true, that
the personal commands of the accused were entirely
sufficient to produce the effects which actually resulted and
220
220
Montilla vs. Augustinian, Corporation.
that such commands may be considered the moving cause of
the crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the
representation that the accused had in his possession an
order from the Government commanding the death of Sariol
was also of material influence in effecting the death; and
where two fundamental causes work together for the
production of a single result and one of those causes would
lead to a conviction upon one theory and the other upon
another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as
murder. There were present, also, the aggravating
circumstances of despoblado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court
below is well founded, and we accordingly affirm the same,
with costs. United States vs. Indanan., 24 Phil. 203, No. 8187
January 29, 1913
[No. 42476. July 24, 1935]

appellee, vs. KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, Luis LADION,
and AGAPITO CORTESANO, defendants and appellants.
1.CRIMINAL LAW; INDUCEMENT TO COMMIT A CRIME.In the
leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203),
it was held that in order that a person may be convicted of a
crime by inducement it is necessary that the inducement be
made directly with the intention of procuring the commission
of the crime and that such inducement be the determining
cause of the commission of the crime. In that case various
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain illustrating the
principles involved and their application to particular cases
were cited with approval.
2.ID.; ID.Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal
Code, which has been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
without change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order
that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be
considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such
advice or such words have great dominance and great
influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that
they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or
moral coercion or as violence itself (2 Viada, 386, 5th
Edition).
3.ID.; RULE ON PHYSICAL INJURIES; INTENT TO KILL.It is a
rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be
guided by the result unless the intent to kill is manifest.
"When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to
perform an act
610
610
People vs. Kiichi Omine
which was not realized, the facts from which it is claimed that
intention sprang must be such as to exclude all contrary
supposition. When this intention is not necessarily disclosed
by the acts performed by the defendant, greater importance
should not be given to such acts than that which they in
themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be

extended beyond that which is actually involved in the
material results of his act. Intention may only be deduced
from the external acts performed by the agent, and when
these acts have naturally given a definite result, the courts
cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold that some
other result was intended." (U. S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)
Davao. Hilario, J.
Jose Ma. Capili and Habana & Quimpo for appellants.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao finding them guilty of frustrated homicide,
with the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken
of their superior strength, and sentencing each of them to
suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years of prisin
correccional to twelve years of prisin mayor, to indemnify
Angel Pulido jointly and severally in the sum of P540, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
corresponding costs.
The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the
defendants is that the lower court erred in convicting the
appellants, and in not acquitting them with the costs de
oficio.
The first question to be considered is the participation of the
several defendants in the commission of the crime.
It appears from the evidence that the defendants Eduardo
Autor, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano were working on
the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction
611
VOL. 61, JULY 24, 1935
611
of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer or
manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the gross
receipts. The four defendants lived together in a house on

the plantation.
Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pulido for permission to open a new
road through the plantation. According to the offended party
he refused to grant this request because there was already
an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine on the other hand contends
that Angel Pulido gave him the permission requested and he
began work on December 24, 1933. When Angel Pulido and
his son, Hilario, accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by
the name of Barabadan, were returning home from the
cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable number
of hemp plants had been destroyed for the purpose of
opening a new road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp
plants, Angel Pulido and his party went to the house of the
defendants, who had just finished their supper. There is a
sharp conflict in the evidence as to what followed. The
witnesses for the prosecution contend that while the
offended party was talking with Omine, Eduardo Autor
attempted to intervene, but was prevented by Hilario Pulido;
that Eduardo Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did
not wound him except on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and
Agapito Cortesano then held Angel Pulido by the arms, and
when Eduardo Autor approached, Omine shouted to him
"pgale y mtale", and Autor struck Angel Pulido in the
breast with his bolo.
Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the
other hand maintain that the offended party and his son were
the aggressors; that the first to arrive was Hilario Pulido, who
after applying to Kiichi Omine an offensive epithet and asking
him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants, struck him in
the breast with brass knuckles; that when Eduardo Autor
attempted to intervene, Angel Pulido and his son attacked
him with their fists, Hilario striking him on the right cheek
with brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano
ran away before Angel Pulido
612
612

was wounded by Eduardo Autor; that Kiichi Omine never
uttered the words attributed to him or urged Autor to strike
Angel Pulido.
The only eyewitnesses for the prosecution were the offended
party and his son, and a Bagobo, named Saito, who was their
relative and lived with them. Barabadan was not presented
as a witness. The witnesses for the defense were the four
appellants.
The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow
struck, and it was struck by Eduardo Autor. The anger of
Angel Pulido and his son was, however, directed chiefly
against Kiichi Omine, who was responsible for the destruction
of the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy
among the defendants, but the offended party and his son
and his relative, Saito, narrated the facts of the incident in
such a way that all the four defendants would appear to be
equally responsible for the injury sustained by the offended
party. The evidence does not convince us that Ladion and
Cortesano took any part in the fight; on the contrary it
inclines us to believe that they ran away and were not
present when Angel Pulido was wounded. This impression is
strengthened by the fact that they were not included in the
original complaint subscribed and sworn to by the offended
party on December 29th. They were not included as
defendants until the amended complaint was filed on
February 19, 1934. But if they were present and held the
offended party by the arms, as alleged by him, the evidence
does not show that they held him for the purpose of enabling
Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo. If they did in fact
intervene, it may have been for the purpose of preventing
the offended party and his son from continuing their attack
on Omine. There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to
hold Angel Pulido in order to enable Eduardo Autor to strike
him with his bolo, or for Kiichi Omine to induce him to do so
by shouting "pgale y mtale". According to the witnesses for
the prosecution,
613
VOL. 61, JULY 24, 1935

613
Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor had already struck each
other in the face with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had
received a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario
Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in
the fight between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did
so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him
without the need of any inducement from Omine.
Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, even if it
were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the
words in question, we are of ,the opinion that they would not
be sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it
does not appear that the words uttered by Kiichi Omine
caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the first place,
as we have indicated, Eduardo Autor had already other
reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to
have uttered the words of inducement. In the second place,
the words in question were not in this particular case
sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike the offended party
with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was working under the
direction of Omine, apparently according to the testimony of
Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear
that Omine had any particular influence over Eduardo Autor.
The cases cited by the Solicitor-General of a father giving
orders to his son are obviously different from the case at bar.
In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil.,
203), it was held that in order that a person may be
convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that the
inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring
the commission of the crime and that such inducement be
the determining cause of the commission of the crime. In that
case various decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
illustrating the principles involved and their application to
particular cases were cited with approval. One of the
decisions cited was that of April 14, 1871, where it was held
that one who, during a riot in which a person was
614
614
killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!",
it not appearing that he did anything more than say these
words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the
crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of
Spain said: "Considering that, although the phrases
pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were
not so to the extent that they may be considered the
principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as
inducement must precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that without it the
act' would not have been performed." Another decision cited
was that of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a
father who simply said to his son who was at the time
engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not
responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was
given.
Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code,
which has been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
without change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order
that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be
considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such
advice or such words have great dominance and great
influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that
they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or
moral coercion or as violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th
Edition.)
We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of
Eduardo Autor are not responsible for the injury inflicted by
him on Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and
location of the wound of the offended party, found that it was
the intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the
offended party, and accordingly found said defendant guilty
of frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does

not justify this finding. It is true that the
615
VOL. 61, JULY 24, 1935
615
wound was serious and in a vital part of the body, but judging
from the nature of the wound, which was about eleven inches
in length, extending from the breast to the lower ribs on the
right side, we think it is probable that it was caused by the
point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It was not a stab
wound, and was probably given during a commotion and
without being aimed at any particular part of the body. As we
have already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the offended party
only once. This fact tends to show that it was not his
intention to take the offended party's life. If he had so
intended, he could easily have accomplished his purpose, so
far as the record shows. It might be contended that Eduardo
Autor did not strike the offended party a second time,
because he thought that he had already killed him. This was
apparently the theory of the prosecution, because the
offended party and .his witnesses testified that the offended
party dropped down unconscious when he was wounded, but
the evidence does not seem to us to sustain that contention.
In the first place a cutting wound like that in question would
not ordinarily render the injured man immediately
unconscious.
In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one
of the witnesses for the prosecution, that Angel Pulido did not
fall down unconscious; but swayed and asked for help, while
the blood was flowing from his breast and stomach; that
Saito approached the wounded man to support him and take
him home.
It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be
guided by the result unless the intent to kill is manifest.
"When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to
perform an act which was not realized, the facts from which it
is claimed that intention sprang must be such as to exclude
all contrary supposition. When this intention is not

necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by the
defendant, greater importance should not be given to
616
616
such acts than that which they in themselves import, nor
should the defendant's liability be extended beyond that
which is actually involved in the material results of his act.
Intention may only be deduced from the external acts
performed ormed by the agent, and when these acts have
naturally given a definite result, the courts cannot, without
clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other result was
intended." (U. S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)
There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that
Angel Pulido was accidentally wounded in a struggle for the
possession of the offended party's bolo. That claim is
disproved by the affidavit of Autor, Exhibit E, executed on
December 26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out
his bolo and struck Angel Pulido in the stomach because
Pulido was very aggressive.
We are therefore of the opinon that Eduardo Autor is guilty of
lesiones graves, since the offended party was incapacitated
for the performance of his usual work for a period of more
than ninety days, and not of frustrated homicide.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is
reversed as to Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito
Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the proportionate part
of the costs de oficio. As to the appellant Eduardo Autor, the
'decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted of
lesiones graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight
months, and twenty-one days of prisin correccional, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall
not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the
corresponding costs. In accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by him is

fixed at one year of prisin correccional,
Avancea, C. J., Hull, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and modified. People vs. Kiichi Omine, 61
Phil., 609, No. 42476 July 24, 1935
No. L-67948. May 31, 1988.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; The conviction of the
accused depends upon the strength of the prosecution and
not the weakness of the defense.It is a settled rule in this
jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who is
constitutionally presumed innocent, depends upon the
strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the
defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in
authority, undoubtedly already strong, was made even
stronger by the defense itself.
Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; Principal by indispensable
Cooperation under Art. 17, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code;
Requisites of.The accused-appellant was correctly
considered a co-principal for having collaborated with
Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in
concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven
times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victims
hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending
himself. While it is true that the accused-appellant did not
himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless
equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from
resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a
principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par.
3, of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly interpreted, the
requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the
criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy
or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before
the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in
the commission of the offense by performing another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
701
VOL. 161, MAY 31, 1988
701
People vs. Montealegre
Same; Same: Same; Same; Contention that although there
was no evidence of a prior agreement between Capalad and
Montealegre, their subsequent acts proved the presence of
such conspiracy.The prosecution contends that although
there was no evidence of a prior agreement between Capalad
and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view,
which conforms to our consistent holding on this matter:
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can
be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that,
at the time the offense was committed, participants had the
same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be
inferred from the attendant circumstances.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite City.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the
accused, who is constitutionally presumed innocent, depends
upon the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of
the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in
authority, undoubtedly already strong, was made even
stronger by the defense itself.
As the trial court** which convicted him saw it, the crime
imputed to Napoleon Montealegre was committed as follows:
At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while
Edmundo Abadilla was eating at the Medings Restaurant in
Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table, Intending to call a policeman, he
quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his
car whom he hailed to report the matter. After parking his
vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and
soon thereafter the two smelled marijuana smoke from the
table occupied by Vicente Capalad and the accusedappellant. Camantigue

_______________
** Decision penned by Judge Rolando D. Diaz, RTC, Cavite
City, Branch XVII.
702
702
then approached the two and collared both of them, saying
Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano? Forcing them up, he asked the
waitress if she knew them but the waitress said she did not.1
Then the mayhem began.
While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this
right hand and Capalad with his left hand, Capalad suddenly
and surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a scabbard tucked
in the right side of his waist and started stabbing Camantigue
in the back.2 Camantigue let loose Montealegre to draw the
gun from his holster but Montealegre, thus released,
restrained Camantigues hand to prevent the latter from
defending himself. Montealegre used both his hands for this
purpose,3 as Capalad continued stabbing the victim.4 While
they were thus grappling, the three fell to the floor and
Capalad, freed from Camantigues grip, rose and scampered
toward the door. Camantigue fired and, continuing the
pursuit outside, fired again.5 Capalad fled into a dark alley.
Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked to be brought
to a hospital. Capalad was later found slumped in the alley
with a bullet wound in his chest. Neither Camantigue nor
Capalad survived, both expiring the following day.6
The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the
confusion.7 Having been informed of the incident, Capt.
Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite police immediately organized a
team that went to look for him that very night.8 They did not
find him in his house then but he was apprehended in the
morning of March 12, 1983, on board a vehicle bound for
Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but later admitted he

was the fugitive being sought.9
Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the
Camantigues body, testified that death was caused by
severe
_______________
1 Decision (Rollo, p. 12).
2 Ibid.
3 TSN, May 9, 1983, p. 34.
4 Ibid., pp. 2930.
5 Id., pp. 3540.
6 Id., p. 44; Id, Sept. 20, 1983, p. 165.
7 Id., p. 36.
8 Rollo, p. 13.
9 TSN. Oct. 17, 1983, pp. 172173.
703
VOL. 161, MAY 31, 1988
703
shock due to massive internal hemorrhage caused by seven
wounds affecting the heart, lungs, liver, stomach, panereas,
and diaphragm.10 The weapon used was 6" in length and
about 2 to 2.5 cm. in width and the blood found on it was
analyzed as human.11 The stabbing incident was narrated in
detail at the trial by Abadilla,12 who was corroborated by
Generoso San Juan.13
On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Montealegre
prevented Camantigue from drawing his pistol while he was
being stabbed by Capalad, demonstrating with the aid of
court personnel the relative positions of the three during the
incident.14
On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration
even more emphatically, thus:
Q.
When accused Montealegre held the hand of Pfc. Camantigue
upon drawing his gun, what happened to Camantigue?
A.
He could not move, sir. He could not make any defense

because he was being held by Montealegre and he was being
stabbed at the back.15
He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the
participation of the accused-appellant:
Q.
When accused Capalad started stabbing Pfc. Camantigue at
the back, accused Montealegre was being held by Pfc.
Camantigue at that time?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And in fact Montealegre was very close to the right of
Camantigue at that time?
A.
Yes sir.
Q.
And Montealegre was aware that Capalad was stabbing Pfc.
Camantigue?
A.
Yes, sir, he knew.16
_______________
10 Ibid., July 12, 1983, p, 151,
11 Ibid.; Id., June 1, 1983, p. 70.
12 Id., May 9, 1983, pp. 2530.
13 Id., June 27, 1983, pp. 123124.
14 May 9, 1983, pp. 21, 3134.
15 Id., June 27, 1983, p. 99.
16 Id., pp. 105106.
704
704
In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he
declared:
Q.
And when Montealegre saw that Camantigue was about to

draw his gun, Montealegre grabbed the hand of Camantigue?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
With what hand?
A.
Both hands, sir.
Q.
And was Camantigue able to pull out from his waist the gun?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
Why?
A.
Because Montealegre was holding his hand, Your Honor.
Q.
With both hands?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Montealegre was holding with both hands the right hand of
Camantigue?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And at this moment when Montealegre was holding with both
hands the hand of Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?
A.
Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue, Your Honor.17
San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on
direct examination.
Q.
When Camantigue was being stabbed, where was
Montealegre?
A
He was on the right side.
Q.
What was he doing at that time?
A.
While Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun
but Montealegre held his hand.
Q.
Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun?
A.
They slammed down on the floor and when they were already
on the floor, I ran away because I was already frightened.18
_______________
17 Id., pp. 111112.
18 Id., pp. 123424,
705
VOL. 161, MAY 31, 1988
705
The cause of the defense did not improve when on crossexamination, he insisted:
A.
When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre
suddenly held the hand of Camantigue,
Q.
And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of
Camantigue, what happened to Camantigue?
A.
He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was
holding his hand, Capalad was stabbing him at the back.19
And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as
follows:
Q.
So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while
Montealegre was holding the right hand of the policeman to
prevent him from drawing his gun?
A.
Yes, sir.20
The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only
succeeded in confirming his own guilt. He claimed he ran
away before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of
denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of ignorance and
forgetfulness and protestations of innocence, does not have
the ring of truth. The following excerpts are reflective of the
kind of defense he offered to exculpate himself from the
charge established against him by the prosecution.
Q.
Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad.
what happened if any?
A.
Camantigue pulled his gun.
Q.
What happened after that?
A.
Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened.21
xxx
A.
I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really
happened.
Q.
Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A.
I did not see.22
_______________
19 Id., pp. 137138.
20 Id., pp. 142143.
21 Id., Feb. 28,1984, p. 187.
22
706
706
xxx
Q.
From whom did you come to know that Pfc. Camantigue shot
and killed Vicente Capalad?
A.
From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that
Camantigue killed Capalad.23
xxx
Q.
Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc. Camantigue was
holding both of you, did you notice that Vicente Capalad
stabbed Pfc. Camantigue?
A.
I did not see anything.24
xxx
Q.
And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue
while Capalad was on the left side?
A
I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the
left.
Q.
But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of
Camantigue?
A.
I am not sure if that is the right side.
Q.
But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster
were placed?
A.
I cannot remember.25
It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not
know what was happening on that evening of March 11,
1983. As one of the principal figures of the stabbing incident,
he could not have not known, nor could he later not
remember, that startling event that even more onlookers
could not forget. The evidence has established that the
accused-appellant was directly and personally involved and

was in fact one of the two persons held by the victim when
he was stabbed. Yet Montealegre would now insist, quite
incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that
night.
If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing,
there would have been less likelihood of Capalads attack as
Camantigues attention would have been fully concentrated
on his lone captive. Moreover, there would have been nothing
to restrain the policeman from drawing his pistol and
defending himself against Capalad if the accused-appellant
had, by his own account, already escaped before the
stabbing.
_______________
23 Id., p. 188.
24 Id., pp. 193194.
25 ld., pp. 203204.
707
VOL. 161, MAY 31, 1988
707
It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the
authorities, what the accused-appellant did was attempt to
hide, only to be found the following morning on board a bus
bound for outside Cavite City. When apprehended, he first
gave a false name before he finally admitted his identity,
thus beginning the mesh of contradictions, admissions and
denials, in which he would ensnare himself.
The Court accepts the evidence established by the
prosecution that at the time of the stabbing, the victim was
in uniform and, therefore, could easily be recognized as a
person in authority. Several witnesses testified as to his attire
when he was killed.26 And even assuming that the victim
was in civilian clothes on that tragic night, the record shows
that no less than the accused-appellant himself, replying to
questions put to him by the prosecution, declared twice that
he knew the victim to be a policeman.27
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a coprincipal for having collaborated-with Capalad in the killing of
the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad
actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accusedappellant holding on to the victims hands to prevent him
from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true
that the accused-appellant did not himself commit the act of
stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for
having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack
against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the
Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are:
"(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is
either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention immediately before the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it would not
have been accomplished."28
The prosecution contends that although there was no evi_______________
26 Id., June 27,1983, p. 143; Id., July 29, 1983, p. 158; Id.,
March 5, 1984, pp. 231234.
27 Id., Feb. 28,1984, pp. 210211, 219220.
28 Luis B. Reyes, Criminal Law, 1977 ed., p. 506.
708
708
dence of a prior agreement between Capalad and
Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy, The Court sustains this view,
which conforms to our consistent holding on this matter:
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can
be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that,
at the time the offense was committed, participants had the
same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be

inferred from the attendant circumstances."29
x
x
x
We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan
to kill Regino Bautista. The whole incident happened because
the accused came upon Bautista and Mallabo fishing within
or near the fishpond enclosure of Carlo Aquino which was
under the care of Vicente Cercano.
But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused
to be established, it is not necessary or essential that there
be a previous plan or agreement to commit the assault; it is
sufficient that at the time of the aggression all the accused
by their acts manifested a common intent or desire to attack
Bautista and Mallabo, so that the act of one accused became
the act of all."30
x
x
x
If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert is proven,
A conspiracy may be entered into after the commencement
of overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime."31
As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:
There can be no question that appellants act in holding the
victim from behind when the latter was stabbed by his
cousin, Victor Buduan, was a positive act towards the
realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent
can be classified as instantaneous. It can be safely assumed
that had not appellant held both arms of the victim from
behind, the latter could have parried the thrust or even run
away from his assailant. By immobilizing the two hands of
the victim from behind, and although there was no anterior
conspir
_______________
29 People v. Laganson, 129 SCRA 333, 350.
30 People v. Cercano, 87 SCRA 1, 1112.

31 People v. Garcia y Cabarse, 94 SCRA 14, 26.
709
VOL. 161, MAY 31, 1988
709
acy. the two cousins showed unity of criminal purpose and
intent immmediately before the actual stabbing."32
x
x
x
It has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles
seized the running decedent in such a manner that the latter
could not even move or turn around. This enabled the
pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn bolo and was
barely five meters away from the decedent, to finally
overtake him and stab him at the back with hardly any risk at
all. Cabiles therefore performed another actholding the
decedentwithout which the crime would not have been
accomplished. This makes him a principal by indispensable
cooperation."33
The above requisites having been established, the
accusedappellant was correctly convicted of the complex
crime of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon
a person in authority. Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty
imposed upon him, to wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus the civil
indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00, and the
actual, medical and funeral expenses in the sum of
P37,380.00 as proved at the trial.
Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died
in line of duty while enforcing the law against the abuse of
dangerous drugs. He was struck down with no less than
seven vicious stabs by a man who, by his own admission.
was at the time of the incident burned on marijuana. The
killer also eventually succumbed, and that made the second
life needlessly lost to the wickedness of drug addiction. There
was another life also ruined. this time of the 28 year-old
accusedappellant himself, although, fortunately for him, his
loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever foreclosed. In
the somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the

wrong he has done, he may yet find his ultimate redemption
in rehabilitation and remorse.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above
modified, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered. People vs. Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700, No. L-67948
May 31, 1988
No. L-39401. September 30, 1982.*

BERTO SIMBRA and SERGIO TOLIBAS, accused. SERGIO
TOLIBAS, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape through force and intimidation, proved.
Appellant contends that if violence was employed upon
complainant, there would be abrasions and contusions on her
body. While it is true that Dr. Tupaz found no injuries on her
body, except the lacerations on her hymen, the fact is, the
rapists did not really employ violence upon her but only used
force by holding her arms, covering her mouth, dragging and
throwing her to the ground and pinning her down. She was
not boxed, beaten or injured in any way. The force coming as
it did from two big men and applied on a 15-year old girl was
enough to overcome whatever resistance there was, without
necessity for violence. This explains the lack of contusions,
hematoma, and other injuries on complainant's body, except
the lacerations on her hymen.
Same; Same; Incredibility of version that woman had sexual
intercourse with two men in the presence of each other.The
version of the appellant is hard to believe. Complainant was
not a woman of loose morals that after her alleged
sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to have
sexual intercourse with appellant and with the blessings of
Simbra. Even a woman of loose morals would not agree to
allow two men to successively take advantage of her in the
presence of the other.
Same; Same; Crime of rape gives rise to two crimes of
consummated rape against the accusedrape through direct
participation and rape through indispensable cooperation;
Reason; Case at bar.Considering that appellant had sexual
intercourse with complainant against her will by employing
force and intimidation, the crime committed is rape through
direct participation. And, when he aided Berto Simbra and
made it possible for the latter to have carnal knowledge of
complainant also against her will and through force and
intimidation, appellant committed another crime of rape
through indispensable cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty
of two crimes of consummated rape.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
243
VOL. 117, SEPTEMBER 30. 1982
243
People vs. Simbra
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Butuan City.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Actg. Solicitor
General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz
for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel V. Montilla for accused-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
Charged with rape committed according to the information,
as follows:
"That in or about the evening of May 24, 1972, in Langihan,
Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually, helping one another by
means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, and forcibly feloniously and successively have carnal
knowledge with the complainant, one Gresilda Gonzales, a
girl of 16 years old."
Sergio Tolibas was found guilty and sentenced "to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessories of the
law; to indemnify the offended party, Gresilda Gonzales, in
the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay
the costs. In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be
credited with the period of his preventive detention conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Rep. Act 6127, it appearing that on 6 June 1972 he signed a
voluntary agreement to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners."
Quoting from appellee's brief, the crime was committed as

follows:
"At about 7:30 p.m. on May 24, 1972, complainant Gresilda
Gonzales left her house in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch
water from the artesian well located in the public market. She
carried a pail and a hose. About 36 meters away from her
house, along an unlighted portion of the road leading to the
public market, appellant and Berto
244
244
People vs. Simbra
(Roberto) Simbra, strongly smelling of 'tuba', accused her.
Berto Simbra grabbed her by the arms. She struck him with
the hose she was holding and shouted for help. Appellant
quickly covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Helping each
other, appellant and Berto Simbra dragged her to the 'serin'
(as spelled in appellant's Brief; also spelled 'siren' and 'seren'
in the transcript of stenographic notes). The 'serin' is a pile of
sawdust surrounded by breast-high grasses and big trees,
near the public market. (pp. 48-53, 68-69, 71-75, November
22, 1972; pp. 6, 9-10, TSN, February 6, 1973).
"At the 'serin', Berto Simbra threw complainant to the ground
and, with appellant holding her arms and covering her
mouth, forcibly removed the men's pants and panties that
she was wearing. Then he brought out his penis and went on
top of her. She kicked and stuggled vigorously but he
nevertheless succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina
and having carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and wanted
to shout but she could not do so because appellant covered
her mouth. After a while, Berto Simbra stood up and went to
urinate. When he came back, he had another sexual
intercourse with her. (pp. 53-56, 75-81, TSN, November 22,
1972.)
"With Berto Simbra also holding complainant, appellant also
had carnal knowledge of her although she resisted vigorously
and kicked him. He was able to do so three times. (pp. 56-57,
80-82, TSN, November 22, 1972).
"When Berto Simbra and appellant were finished,

complainant noticed a wet substance and plenty of blood in
her genitals. (pp. 4-5, TSN, December 11, 1972)
"Before leaving the 'serin', appellant and Berto Simbra
instructed complainant not to reveal what happened on pain
of being killed. Appellant emphasized the threat by
pretending to choke her. (p. 57, TSN, November 22, 1972; p.
12, TSN, December 11, 1972)
"Berto Simbra and appellant brought complainant to the
house of Ernanita Jusay, sister of appellant, which was about
250 meters distant from the 'serin'. Although her house was
in the same community, complainant told Ernanita Jusay that
she came from Buenavista because that was the instruction
of appellant and Berto Simbra. Complainant stayed in the
house of Ernanita Jusay until 9:00 p.m. of May 25, 1972 when
her aunt, Alicia Pepito, who lived nearby, and Langihan
policeman Domingo Macuno, Jr. fetched her. She could not
leave until she was fetched because appellant and Berto
Simbra were guarding her. (pp. 58-60, 81-86, TSN, November
22, 1972).
245
245
People vs. Simbra
"Complainant was brought to Alicia Pepito's house, then to
her house and finally to the police station where she was
interrogated. She and her mother gave sworn statements
(Exhibits C and 2) to the police. (pp. 19-22, 60-62, 86, TSN,
November 22, 1972; pp. 6-7, TSN, December 11, 1972).
"Dr. Angelus R. Tupaz, Medico-Legal Officer of the Butuan City
Police Department, examined complainant at 2:30 p.m. on
May 27, 1972. He found still fresh lacerations of her hymen at
3:00 and 6:00 o'clock positions which he said were probably
caused by sexual intercourse. He also found a slimy white
substance at the cul-de-sac of Douglas of complainant's
genitals. The substance turned out to be spermatozoa upon
examination. The spermatozoa was about one (1) cc.,
indicating that it may have come from more than one man.
(pp. 6-7, 11, TSN, November 22, 1972). He prepared a

medical report containing his findings. (Exhibit A/Exhibit 1)
"After the incident, Berto Simbra absconded. He left his
house at Langihan; Butuan City, and was nowhere to be
found at the time of the trial. (p. 14, TSN, February 6, 1973)
Thus, the trial was only against appellant."
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that about 8:30 in the
evening of May 24, 1972, he and Berto Simbra went to the
dance hall at the Emilio Compound in Butuan City to dance.
They met Gresilda Gonzales, the sweetheart of Simbra, and
upon invitation of Simbra the three of them went to the
"serin" (pile of sawdust) at about nine o'clock. In going to the
"serin" they passed through a street where there were many
people. Simbra and complainant were conversing with each
other as they walked side by side, while he (appellant) was
about twelve (12) feet behind them. Upon reaching the
"serin," he (appellant) remained at a place about thirty-five
meters away to watch for people who might come around.
After a while he saw complainant taking off her pants and
panties, spread them on the "serin" and then lay down on
them. Berto Simbra went on top of her and they had sexual
intercourse, twice within one hour. After Simbra was through,
he approached appellant and told him to go to her as she
was still lying down on the "serin." He did go to where
complainant was and asked her if he could also lie down with
her. She consented and three times he had sexual
intercourse with her.
246
246
People vs. Simbra
About 12:00 midnight, the three of them (Simbra,
complainant and appellant) went to the house of Ernanita
Tolibas Jusay (appellant's elder sister). He introduced
complainant to Ernanita as his sweetheart from Buenavista.
However, Simbra told Ernanita that he and appellant had just
had sexual intercourse with complainant. Appellant and
complainant spent the night in that house while Simbra went
home to his own house which was about 150 meters away.
The following morning, complainant spent the whole day in
Ernanita's house doing nothing except sat in the sala, ate and
slept. At about 8:30 in the evening, complainant was fetched
by her aunt and a policeman.
Thus, appellant admits that he had carnal knowledge with
complainant but claims that he did so with her consent.
The testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by
his sister Ernanita Tolibas Jusay.
The issue in this case is whether appellant had sexual
intercourse with complainant against the will of the latter and
through the use of force and intimidation. Appellant claims
that the court erred "in giving too much credence to the
testimony of the offended party Gresilda Gonzales."
The above pretentions of appellant are not true. Complainant
did not for a moment tolerate the indecent acts of appellant
and Simbra. She was going to the artesian well at the public
market in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water, when she
was seized by Berto Simbra and appellant. Simbra held her
arms and dragged her towards the "serin." Her mouth was
covered with a handkerchief by appellant. She struggled and
even kicked Berto Simbra and appellant. Upon reaching the
"serin," Simbra threw complainant on the ground while appellant held her arms as Simbra forcibly took-off her pants
and panties and had sexual intercourse with her, twice.
Thereafter, Simbra also held complainant when appellant had
sexual intercourse with her, thrice.
After she was raped, complainant was threatened by Simbra
and appellant with death if she would reveal what happened
to her. Appellant emphasized the threat by pretending to
choke her.
247
247
People vs. Simbra
Appellant contends that if violence was employed upon
complainant, there would be abrasions and contusions on her
body. While it is true that Dr. Tupaz found no injuries on her
body, except the lacerations on her hymen, the fact is, the
rapists did not really employ violence upon her but only used
force by holding her arms, covering her mouth, dragging and
throwing her to the ground and pinning her down. She was
not boxed, beaten or injured in any way. The force coming as
it did from two big men and applied on a 15-year old girl was
enough to overcome whatever resistance there was, without
necessity for violence. This explains the lack of contusions,
hematoma, and other injuries on complainant's body, except
the lacerations on her hymen.
Further, complainant denied the truth of the testimony of
appellant that she was the girlfriend of Simbra. She has seen
her rapists passing her house before the date of the incident
but the fact is, she came to know their names at the Police
Station only when she was investigated.
The version of the appellant is hard to believe. Complainant
was not a woman of loose morals that after her alleged
sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to have
sexual intercourse with appellant and with the blessings of
Simbra. Even a woman of loose morals would not agree to
allow two men to successively take, advantage of her in the
presence of the other. In the case of People vs. Soriano, 35
SCRA 633, this Court said:
"To begin with, their version is inherently incredible. Indeed,
no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse
with two men-or-three, according to Antonio Gallardoin the
presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as
morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us
contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year
high school student, can be so characterized. On the
contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and
candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not
even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute
to them the commission of the crime charged.
Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with
complainant against her will by employing force and
intimidation,
248
248
People vs. Simbra
the crime committed is rape through direct participation.
And, when he aided Berto Simbra and made it possible for
the latter to have carnal knowledge of complainant also
against her will and through force and intimidation, appellant
committed another crime of rape through indispensable
cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty of two crimes of
consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED but
modified in the sense that appellant Sergio Tolibas is hereby
sentenced twice to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. With
costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed with modification.
Notes.Conviction or acquittal of accused in rape depends
almost entirely on credibility of testimony of offended party.
(People vs. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513.)
The defense that complainant consented to the sexual act
with the accused on two occasions even if true cannot
exculpate the accused considering her testimony despite
intensive cross-examination, that rape as herein chartered
was actually committed. (People vs. Equac, 80 SCRA 665.)
Unless motivated by a desire to bring to justice the culprit
who had grievously wrong her, it is hard that a woman of unsullied reputation to publicly disclose that she has been
raped. (People vs. Gargoles, 83 SCRA 282.) People vs.
Simbra, 117 SCRA 242, No. L-39401 September 30, 1982

PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, GAUDENCIA NIERRA,
FELICISIMO DOBLEN alias Simoy and VICENTE ROJAS,
accused-appellants; GASPAR MISA, accused whose death
sentence is under automatic review.
Criminal Procedure; The facts that the accused is an escaped
convict, executed two confessions and testified against his
co-accused on the killing he had actually perpetrated,
removed all doubt as to his understanding of his plea of
guilty.That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an
escaped prisoner, had acquired some experience in criminal
procedure. Not only that. He executed two extrajudicial
confessions. He reenacted the crime as the triggerman. He
testified at the preliminary investigation, and, after he was
sentenced to death, he was the prosecution star witness
during the trial of his co-accused. His testimony against his
co-accused, delineating their roles in the commission of the
killing, which he had perpetrated, fortified his plea of guilty
and removed any scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and as
to his understanding of the consequences of his mea culpa
(See People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
Evidence; Fact that appellants did not pay the balance due to
their co-accused who was hired to kill the deceased as
evidence of credibility of latters testimony against the
former.And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply
with their contractual commitment to pay Misa the balance of
two thousand six hundred pesos must have impelled him to
unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a
revelation spelled his own destruction.
________________
* EN BANC
2
2
People vs. Nierra
Same; Conspiracy duly established in this case.The
contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among the
accused is belied by the facts shown in the record. Misa had

no personal motive for killing Juliana Nierra. He was induced
to do so because of the monetary consideration promised by
the Nierra spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to Pacianos
cousin, introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses. Before
Julianas assassination, Gaudencia had contracted Misa to kill
Nene Amador, her former housemaid, who was allegedly
Pacianos mistress. That projected killing did not materialize.
Same; The rule that statement of conspirator relating to the
conspiracy is not admissible in evidence unless the
conspiracy is first shown by other independent evidence
applies only to admission to extrajudicial confessions or
declarations not to testimony given directly in court.It is
argued that before Misas testimony could be admitted as
evidence against appellants Nierra, the alleged conspiracy
must first be proven by evidence other than such testimony
and that there is no such independent evidence. This
argument is wrong. It is not supported by Section 27 of Rule
130. Section 27 applies only to extrajudicial acts or
declarations but not to testimony given on the stand at the
trial where the defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant (People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531,
541).
Same; Attorneys; Double role of an attorney not regarded as
unduly prejudicial to the other accused.The alleged double
role of Falgui cannot be regarded as having unduly prejudiced
appellants Nierra who, as already noted, were convicted on
the basis of Misas confessions and testimony. The appellants
have not successfully overthrown or rebutted Misas
evidence. It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was
a tool of Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed as a
friend of Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no hand in
the assassination of Anicetos wife. We are convinced that
the guilt of appellants Nierra was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. On the night of the shooting, Paciano Nierra and
Gaudencia Nierra did not go to the funeral parlor to view the
remains of Juliana.
Same; Affidavit of one of the accused which does not contain
anything connecting him to the murder was properly
admitted in evidence.Like appellants Nierra, Rojas counsel

de oficio contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J) because it was obtained under an
alleged promise of immunity. It should be noted that Rojas
affidavit does not contain anything con3
VOL. 96, FEBRUARY 12, 1980
3
People vs. Nierra
necting him to the murder. In that affidavit, he denied that he
had any participation in the commission of the crime and that
he conspired with Misa. So, the admission in evidence of that
affidavit did not prejudice him at all.
Criminal Law; There is ignominy where killer grabbed the
woman victim by the hair while the latter was defecating,
then inserted his gun on the victims mouth and fired it killing
her.Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority.
The manner in which Misa liquidated Juliana Nierra added
shame, disgrace or obloquy to the material injury caused by
the crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar,
2 Phil. 417).
Criminal Law; Co-conspirators may be adjudged as mere
accomplices where their participation was not indispensable
one acted as lookout and the other merely delivered the
murder weapon to the triggerman.Doblens role was that of
having introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses and delivering
the murder weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene
of the crime. On the other hand, Rojas acted as lookout and
received fifty pesos for his work. After a conscientious
reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have
reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators
they should be punished as co-principals. However, since
their participation was not absolutely indispensable to the
consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should
favor the milder form of liability may be applied to them
(People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and other cases).
Same; Same.In some exceptional situations, having

community of design with the principal does not prevent a
malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role
in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively
speaking, of a minor character (See People vs. Ubia, 97 Phil.
615; U.S. vs. Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89
Phil. 598, People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
South Cotabato. Animas, J.
Jose W. Diokno for appellant Nierra.
Sedfrey A. Ordoez for accused Misa.
4
4
People vs. Nierra
Alberto Cacnio for appellants Doblen and Rojas.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney Lolita C. Dumlao for
appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Paciano
Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra appealed from the decision
dated March 4, 1970 of Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas of the
Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City
Branch II, convicting them of murder, sentencing each of
them to death and ordering them to pay solidarily an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of the
victim, Juliana Nierra (Criminal Case No. 2081).
Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge, was
also sentenced to death and ordered to pay a similar
indemnity (Decision of August 25, 1969, pp. 36-8, Record).
His death sentence is under automatic review.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana
Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Paciano Nierra, 39, her brother-inlaw, were competitors in the businesses of launch
transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago,
General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Paciano sold

pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two motor launches, Elsa
I and II, while Paciano was the owner of two launches,
Sylvania I and II. Juliana was the wife of Aniceto Nierra,
Pacianos elder brother. To mollify Paciano, by diminishing the
competition between their launches, Aniceto sold Elsa II.
Nonetheless, Aniceto and Paciano were not on speaking
terms.
In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality,
Paciano Nierra conceived the idea of liquidating his
competitor, Juliana. For that purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a
cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Pacianos house in
the afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted
murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal
Colony (Exh. E-4 and E-5, pp. 10-11, Folder of Exhibits). Misa
came to Barrio Tinago
5
5
People vs. Nierra
in June, 1969. He resided with his cousin, Silvestre Misa. (See
Pareja vs. Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)
Upstairs in the bedroom of Pacianos house, Misa, in the
presence of Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano,
agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of three thousand
pesos. Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing
he would pay Misa four hundred pesos near the municipal
hall of Tupi, South Cotabato which is about forty kilometers
away from General Santos City. The balance would be paid in
the same place on August 12, 1969.
That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When Misa
scheduled the assassination on July 8, 1969, Paciano said
that it was up to Misa since he was the one who would kill
Juliana.
In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of Paciano
Nierra, delivered to Misa at the beach a package containing a
caliber .38 pistol with five bullets. Misa contacted his friend,
Vicente Rojas, and apprised him that he (Misa) had been
hired to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout on the

night of July 8, 1969 when the killing would be perpetrated.
On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store
near the creek or canal about twenty-seven steps from the
scene of the crime. Gaudencia was stationed near the house
of Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps from the scene of
the crime. Paciano was near the house of Juanito Desinorio
about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. The
houses of the two Desinorios were separated from the house
of Juliana Nierra by an alley.
Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps
from the scene of the crime in close proximity to the back of
Julianas house where, as he had previously observed some
nights before, she used to answer the call of nature. The
house was at the back of the Esso Gas Station near the
beach of Sarangani Bay at Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.
Between seven and eight oclock that night, the unwary
Juliana went to the beach where she was accustomed to void
and when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared behind
her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that
6
6
People vs. Nierra
posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol
and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the
beach, witnessed the actual killing.
The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana sustained
a gunshot wound in the tongue. The bullet passed through
the buccal cavity down to the spinal column where the slug
was extracted.
Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing
commotion, went down from the house and saw his prostrate
wife with blood oozing from her mouth and nose. Her panty
was pulled down, her dress was raised up to her waist, and
her genital organ was exposed. At the hospital, the doctor
pronounced her dead.
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front
of Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the
houses of Tony Desinorio and Francisco Desinorio, emerged
at the back of the Esso Gas Station, crossed the creek or
canal on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the gun
into the dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded
to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his mind
and returned to the beach near the victims house.
The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing
through the alley between the house of the victim and the
Desinorio houses, which alley separated the building of the
Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas
Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which
intersects Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia
resided. Their residence was about two hundred meters away
from the scene of the crime.
A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be
at the Villa Bus Terminal at around eight-thirty in the evening
of July 8, 1969, when the killing was perpetrated, testified
that she saw Paciano Nierra wearing an underwear and
striped T-short running from Saguing Street to Barrio Tinago.
About five minutes later, she saw Paciano crossing the
boulevard and running towards Saguing Street. He was
wearing long pants. The witness made a statement to the
police about what she had seen.
7
7
People vs. Nierra
Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound
for Tupi and alighted near the municipal building. Paciano
Nierra arrived in that place and gave him four hundred pesos.
Misa returned to General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to
Rojas, and proceeded to the victims house where he mingled
with the persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil
there, staying there for four nights.
He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the
buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He received a commission
of one peso per passenger. Policemen arrested him and Rojas

for questioning but they were later released. He left the city
and brought his family to Barrio Luan, Maitum, South
Cotabato. There, he was arrested again, this time by
Constabulary soldiers.
On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B.
Vencer, Jr. of the city police department. He signed a
confession admitting the killing of Juliana Nierra and
implicating the other accused therein. The statement was
sworn to before the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted the
killing. Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A sketch
of the scene of the crime was prepared.
On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary
investigation. In his testimony, he admitted again the killing
and confirmed his confession implicating Paciano Nierra, his
wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed another
confession on August 12, 1969 which was sworn to before the
city judge.
Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969,
Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra spouses, as
coconspirators, were charged with murder aggravated by
reward, treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity,
ignominy and abuse of superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism,
since he had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the
murder of Antonio Abad Tormis in Cebu City.
As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his
coaccused, his confessions and testimony were offered by
the prosecution and were the main bases of the judgment of
conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.
8
8
People vs. Nierra
As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their
individual cases will be separately reviewed.
Misas case.His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made
an improvident plea because the trial court allegedly failed to
explain thoroughly to him the gravity of the offense and the

consequences of his plea of guilty.
That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped
prisoner, had acquired some experience in criminal
procedure. Not only that. He executed two extrajudicial
confessions. He reenacted the crime as the triggerman. He
testified at the preliminary investigation, and, after he was
sentenced to death, he was the prosecution star witness
during the trial of his co-accused. His testimony against his
co-accused, delineating their roles in the commission of the
killing, which he had perpetrated, fortified his plea of guilty
and removed any scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and as
to his understanding of the consequences of his mea culpa
(See People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de oficios
prayer that the judgment of conviction be set aside and that
the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. To hold
a new trial, wherein Misa himself would again be the star
prosecution witness, would be a repetitious and preposterous
ceremony.
The case of the Nierra spouses.They denied any complicity
in the killing of Juliana Nierra. Their version is that in the
evening of July 8, 1969, at about eight oclock in the evening,
Paciano Nierra was inside a room of his house. Gaudencia
Nierras was in her room, writing something. Eduardo Nierra,
the couples son, was alone in the sala while Encarnacion
Sabihon, a housemaid, was somewhere in the house
premises.
Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he
came out of the room, he met Nolasco Docallos who said that
Juliana Nierra was shot. Paciano Nierra asked who shot her.
Docallos answered that he did not know.
Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latters
motorcycle in going to the hospital. Paciano instructed his
son
9
9
People vs. Nierra

Eduardo to render assistance. Paciano could not go out
because two years before he had undergone a surgical
operation in Cebu City. Gaudencia could not leave the
children alone in the house. Eduardo phoned from the funeral
parlor that Juliana was already dead.
At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day,
Gaudencia went to the funeral parlor. She talked with
Rodelio, the son of Juliana. Aniceto Nierra, her brother-in-law
and husband of the victim, did not answer when she tried to
talk with him.
Paciano woke up at six oclock that morning. He and his wife
and their Muslim friend Pandita E. Saguil and Fernando Erro,
the uncle of Paciano, boarded a bus and went to Tupi
ostensibly to buy bamboos for the outrigger of a vinta, a trip
which the Nierra spouses had previously agreed upon with
Saguil. They arrived in Tupi at past ten oclock. They were not
able to buy bamboos. They ate lunch at the Fernandez
Restaurant.
The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there at
two oclock in the afternoon. They went to the funeral parlor.
They were not able to talk with Aniceto Nierra. In the evening
of that day, Gaudencia led the prayers for the repose of the
soul of Juliana and she performed that task on the second,
third and fourth nights. She did not lead the prayers on the
succeeding nights because she was advised that it was bad
for her to do so. Their child attended the novena. Paciano
could not attend the novena because he had kidney trouble.
They gave one hundred pesos to Julianas family as
contribution to the funeral expenses.
The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the burial,
Aniceto lost consciousness and collapsed. Paciano revived
him by pressing his abdomen. After the coffin was placed in
the tomb, Paciano closed the niche. The Nierra spouses gave
to Aniceto an additional two hundred pesos (Pars. 5-6 and 915, pp. 6-11, Appellants Brief).
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible
witness because he was a recidivist and his testimony is
riddled with inconsistencies. That contention is devoid of

merit.
10
10
People vs. Nierra
Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic point
in his confessions and testimony was that he was hired by
the Nierra spouses, through Doblen, to kill Juliana for the
price of three thousand pesos. That is sufficient for the
conviction of the Nierra spouses as the inducers of the
assassination of Juliana. The discrepancies in his testimony
refer to minor details.
And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their
contractual commitment to pay Misa the balance of two
thousand six hundred pesos must have impelled him to
unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a
revelation speeled his own destruction
The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among
the accused is belied by the facts shown in the record. Misa
had no personal motive for killing Juliana Nierra. He was
induced to do so because of the monetary consideration
promised by the Niera spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to
Pacianos cousin, introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses.
Before Julianas assassination, Gaudencia had contracted
Misa to kill Nene Amador, her former housemaid, who was
allegedly Pacianos mistress. That projected killing did not
materialize.
Appellants Nierra contend that Misas testimony as to the
alleged conspiracy is inadmissible in view of the rule that
the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration (Sec.
27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
It is argued that before Misas testimony could be admitted
as evidence against appellants Nierra, the alleged conspiracy
must first be proven by evidence other than such testimony
and that there is no such independent evidence. This

argument is wrong. It is not supported by section 27 of Rule
130 Section 27 applies only to extrajudicial acts or
declarations but not to testimony given on the stand at the
trial where the defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant (People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531,
541).
11
11
People vs. Nierra
Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in finding
that the motive for the killing was to stifle business
competition. This argument is refuted by the testimonies of
Aniceto Nierra and his son Rodelio which show that Paciano
Nierra was antagonistic to his sister-in-law, Juliana, the
manager or brains of Aniecetos transportation and
cocacola distribution businesses.
In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Anicetos launch, Elsa
II, while it was under construction. Aniceto had to sell that
launch because of Pacianos threat that somebody would be
hurt if its operation was continued Paciano told Rodelio that
the latters mother, Juliana, who was pockmarked, was bad
and dominated her husband Aniceto. On two occasions,
Paciano even challenged his brother to a fight.
Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court
convicted them on the basis of the hearsay testimonies of
Guillermo Sanchez and Jose Samoya. This argument is
misleading. The judgment of conviction was anchored
principally on the confessions and testimony of Misa, the tool
used by the Nierra spouses in encompassing Julianas death.
Misas evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.
The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved that
Misa, Rojas and Doblen were implicated in the killing of
Juliana Nierra. It was the affidavit of Sanchez, linking Misa to
the killing, that gave the police a breakthrough in the solution
of the case. After the connection of Misa with the crime was
established, the police arrested him and obtained his
confessions which implicated appellants Nierra as the

instigators.
The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that the
trial court erred in admitting as evidence the affidavit of
appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J) which was obtained through
an alleged promise of immunity. The record is not clear as to
that promise of immunity. Rojas statement was taken on
August 1, 1969. On August 12, he testified at the preliminary
investigation. The record of his testimony before the fiscal
was signed by him. He was assisted by counsel at that
preliminary investigation. (Exh. K et seq.) No promise of
immunity was shown to have been made by the fiscal to
Rojas.
12
shooting, Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra did not go to

the funeral parlor to view the remains of Juliana.
After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder,
there was a confrontation between the said spouses and
Aniceto Nierra in the house of their brother, Alonso, in the
presence of their other brother, Gerundio. The following
dialogue took place between Paciano and Aniceto:
Paciano: Noy, why did you suspect us to be the killers of
your wife?
Aniceto: Will you still deny when Gaspar Misa pointed to you
that you were standing by the post and Paciano (Gaudencia)
was also standing in another post when he (Misa) killed my
wife. From now on I have no brother by the name of Pacing.
Paciano did not comment on his brothers accusation.
12
People vs. Nierra
In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is
cumulative in character. As already stated, the crucial and
decisive evidence consists of Misas testimony and
confessions
Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted
at the preliminary investigation as counsel of appellant
Doblen, having been allegedly hired by the offended party,
Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he acted as counsel de
oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for
Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as
having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as already
noted, were convicted on the basis of Misas confessions and
testimony. The appellants have not successfully overthrown
or rebutted Misas evidence.
It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of
Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed as a friend on
Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no hand in the
assassination of Anicetos wife.
We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the night of the
Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when

they were confined in the city jail (translation):
13
13
People vs. Nierra
My companion Pacing (Paciano):
I am directly telling you and you could be sure that I will do
my best that you will be free. Before the trial of (in) court, I
would like that you give me the sum of P600 even if you give
the cash advance of P500 before Sunday. OK and you give
the same thru the hole
Your companion,
(Sgd.) Gaspar Misa
Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately.
(Exh. 1)
The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were coconspirators. The Nierras were co-principals by inducement.
By acting as lookouts during the perpetration of the killing,
they became co-principals by cooperation as well.
Appeal of Doblen and Rojas.Doblens alibi was that on the
night of the killing, he was stranded at Margos, Glan, South
Cotabato. He returned to General Santos City at ten oclock in

the morning of the following day. He denied that he
accompanied Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on July 4,
1969 and that he delivered to Misa the package containing
the murder weapon.
Rojas alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in his
pumpboat at Lions Beach, General Santos City. However,
that could not have precluded him from having acted as
lookout on that same beach.
These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that Misas
confessions and testimony have no probative value because
there was no other evidence proving the alleged conspiracy.
As already stated, that rule does not apply to testimony
given on the witness stand where the defendants have the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (People vs.
Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).
It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator because
he was not present when Misa and the Nierra spouses
discussed the liquidation of Juliana Nierra and that when
Doblen delivered the package to Misa, he (Doblen) did not
know that it contained the murder weapon. As to Rojas, it is
14
14
People vs. Nierra
contended that he was not present at the said conference
between Misa and the Nierra spouses.
These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of Doblen
and Rojas indubitably show that they had community of
design with the Nierra spouses and Misa in the assassination
of Juliana Nierra.
Like appellants Nierra, Rojas counsel de oficio contends that
the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J)
because it was obtained under an alleged promise of
immunity.
It should be noted that Rojas affidavit does not contain
anything connecting him to the murder. In that affidavit, he
denied that he had any participation in the commission of the
crime and that he conspired with Misa. So, the admission in

evidence of that affidavit did not prejudice him at all.
The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as
murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by
premeditation and price or reward. As to the Nierras,
relationship is an additional aggravating circumstance.
Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The
manner in which Misa liquidated Juliana Nierra added shame,
disgrace or obloquy to the material injury caused by the
crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar, 2
Phil. 417).
In Misas case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance
offset his plea of guilty. That did not preclude the imposition
of the death penalty upon him.
Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death
penalty imposed on the Nierra spouses is in accordance with
law. However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the death
penalty imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted
to reclusion perpetua.
Doblens role was that of having introduced Misa to the
Nierra spouses and delivering the murder weapon to Misa. He
was not present at the scene of the crime. On the other hand,
Rojas acted as lookout and received fifty pesos for his work.
15
15
People vs. Nierra
After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen
and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should
be held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking,
that as co-conspirators they should be punished as coprincipals. However, since their participation was not
absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder,
the rule that the court should favor the milder form of liability
may be applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and
other cases).
In some exceptional situations, having community of design
with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being
regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of

the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor
character (See People vs. Ubia, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs.
Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598;
People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower courts judgment is affirmed with
respect to Gaspar Misa and Paciano Nierra.
(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is
communited to reclusion perpetua. The civil liability imposed
upon her by the trial court is affirmed.
(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are
convicted as accomplices. They are each sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor medium
as minimum to seventeen years of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum and to pay solidarily with the principals
an indemnity of six thousand pesos (as their quota) to the
heirs of Juliana Nierra. They are each subsidiarily liable to the
extent of six thousand pesos for the principals civil liability.
Costs against the accused.
Fernando (C.J.), Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., no part.
Judgment affirmed.
16
16
People vs. Nierra
Notes.The penalty of death is amply justified where the
accused, aside from the murder committed in the case at bar
had been found guilty of several other crimes some of which
were grave in character. (People vs. Llanto, 88 SCRA 22).
An allegation of conspiracy, without more, cannot be equated
with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
Thus, that two or more persons allegedly conspired and
confederated together and mutually helped one another in
committing an offense does not necessarily imply evident
premeditation. (People vs. Pardilla, 92 SCRA 591).
The fact that the witness is related to the deceased does not
disqualify him from testifying nor does it render his testimony
utterly devoid of merit or belief, in the absence of an
improper motive actuating him to testify falsely against the
accused. (People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503).
A co-accused is merely an accomplice where his participation
was merely a show-off or expression of sympathy or feeling
of camaraderie. (People vs. Vicente, 28 SCRA 247).
Where the trauma inflicted by the appellant hastened the
death of the victim, she is also criminally liable as a principal.
(People vs. Gensola, 29 SCRA 483).
As accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor
cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with
knowledge of the commission of the crime. He subsequently
takes part in the three ways: (a) by profiting from the effects
of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or
instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery;
and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the
principal of the crime, provided he acts with of his public
functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive,
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
(People vs. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600.)
Positive identification of the accused by several eyewitness
that he killed the victim establishes accuseds guilty to a
moral certainty. (People vs. Cunanan, 75 SCRA 15). People vs.
Nierra, 96 SCRA 1, No. L-32624 February 12, 1980
No. L-30028. May 31, 1982.*

CRESENCIO DOBLE., ET AL., defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE,
SIMEON DOBLE and ANTONIO ROMAQUIN, defendantsappellants.
Criminal Law; Mere fact that appellant was present when the
other accused met in his house to plan a bank robbery and
that he told them he cannot join the latter because of a foot
injury will not make said appellant a co-conspirator.The
only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having
been used as the meeting place of the malefactors for their
final conference before proceeding to Navotas to rob the
Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them because
of a 5-year old foot injury which would make him only a
liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the
malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they met
at his house it was only because it was near the landing
place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while
waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his
house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling
them that he could not join them because of his foot injury,
and will just wait for them, evidently as a mere gesture of
politeness
________________
* EN BANC.
132
132
People vs. Doble
in not being able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he
could not be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also
to avoid being suspected that he was against their vicious
plan for which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a
co-conspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks
among the malefactors in his house.
Same; Evidence; Attempt to exculpate negates existence of
undue pressure to obtain confession.The statement of
Romaquin as just cited is an attempt to exculpate himself

which is generally taken as an indication of lack of undue
pressure exerted on one while giving his statement on
custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia,71 SCRA 679).
Same; Non-presentation of medical certificate, admission by
one appellant that no violence was applied to him, and others
have remained as John Does negate use of force in
obtaining confession of accused while in custody.The
Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of
violent maltreatment to which appellants were subjected to,
that neither one of the appellants presented medical
certificate to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted (p. 3,
Appellees Brief) which disproves the claim (People vs.
Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He
also points to the fact that in his extrajudicial statement
(Exhibit 1, p. 100, Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of
the accused, made no admission of his participation in the
bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court, he admitted
that no violence was applied to him when he gave his
statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12, 1967; p. 4, Appellees Brief).
This is evidence enough that the appellants could not have
been dealt with differently as their co-accused Aquino who
was allowed to give his statement freely without the
employment of force or intimidation upon him. The evidence
also discloses a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to
Romaquin asking the latter not to reveal the names of their
companions. This means that the names of the members of
the band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to both
appellants. That the identity of five of those charged in this
case has remained only as John Does indicate the nonemployment of any coercive means with which to force them
into revealing the names of their companions in the robbery,
again negating the claim of torture and violence.
Same; Extrajudicial confession confirmed in court is given
credence.It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants
Romaquin and Cresencio virtually confirmed their extrajudicial statements when they testified in court. By all the
proofs as cited, persuasive enough
133
VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982

133
People vs. Doble
to show the voluntariness of their custodial statements plus
the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one named among
the alleged torturers, that any violence was practiced by the
investigators, specifically, the alleged delivery of fist blows
on Cresencio (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the
alleged involuntariness of the extrajudicial statements is fully
discredited.
Same; Killing by the authorities of one of the robbery
suspects while allegedly attempting to escape not sufficient
to instill fear for others to give an extrajudicial confession
where killing occurred after confession was given.It is
hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while
allegedly attempting to escape could have instilled fear in
the minds of the appellants which affected their freedom of
will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellants Brief).
This is a farfetched argument to prove involuntariness in the
giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after
their interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July
5, 1966 (Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin
pointed to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore,
took place long after appellants have given their main
statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had
only bothered to check the dates of the main statements of
both appellants which were given not later than just past the
middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary
statement of Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he would not
have probably come forth with this argument.
Same; Constitutional Law; Right against self-incrimination
cannot be invoked where confession was given voluntarily.
The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants,
can neither be appreciated to impair the admissibility of their
extra-judicial statements. It is the voluntariness of an
admission or confession that determines its admissibility, for
no principle of law or constitutional precept should stand on
the way of allowing voluntary admission of ones guilt, the
only requisite justly demanded being that ample safeguards

be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the element
of voluntariness is convincingly established, which,
incidentally, is even presumed, the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession, admission or statement becomes
unquestionable.
Same; Where participation of two accused ware limited to
looking for a banca, providing one to a gang of bank robbers,
transporting them to the scene of the crime and getting away
therefrom, and receiving money for their efforts, their ability
is only that of an
134
134
People vs. Doble
accomplice.The circumstances pointed out would not make
appellants liable as co-principals in the crime charged. At the
most, their liability would be that of mere accomplices. They
joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to
look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the
gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to
the scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil
purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca
that brought the malefactors to the bank to be robbed and
carried them away from the scene after the robbery to
prevent their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but
not in an indispensable manner. Even without appellants
providing the banca, the robbery could have been
committed, specially with the boldness and determination
shown by the robbers in committing the crime.
Same; Same.As to Romaquin, while he testified that the
malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with which the latter
would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away from the scene,
evidently to show that he never joined in the criminal
purpose, and that all his acts were in fear of bodily harm and
therefore, not voluntary, the measure taken by the
malefactors to prevent his escape, could have been just an
extra precaution, lest he would be stricken with fear in the
course of the commission of the crime specially if attended

by shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he never
voluntarily made the trip with knowledge of the planned
robbery, and with Cresencio saying that he returned the gun
given him with which to prevent Romaquin from speeding
away, Romaquin could have tried a getaway, as should have
been his natural impulse had he not joined in the criminal
design. His act of hiding the money he received from the
malefactors, and repainting his boat, all attest to his guilty
conscience arising from the act of cooperation he knowingly
extended to the principal culprits to achieve their criminal
purpose.
Same; Where appellants knew merely that a gang which took
them as banca drivers would stage a robbery and they were
left at the beach by the gangmen, the fact that the latter
killed several people in escaping will not make said
appellants liable for the homicides.It is however, not
established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the
house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if
necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. What
appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal design
to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity
must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the
killing, Having been left in the banca, they could not have
tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seek135
VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
135
People vs. Doble
ing relief from liability for assaults committed during the
robbery (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code).
Same; Courts; Courts must impose only the penalty for which
some accused are liable even if the crime committed by the
others are very grave and heinous.The finding that
appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too
lenient considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense
with which they were charged. The evidence, however, fails
to establish their complicity by a previous conspiracy with the
real malefactors, who actually robbed the bank and killed and
injured several persons, including peace officers. The failure
to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a
crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the
outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose
participation has not been shown to be as abominable as
those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme
punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in meting
out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly
deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Teehankee, J.:
I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos.
Barredo, J.:
For the reasons given by Justice Abad Santos I vote that
Romaquin and Doble should be sentenced for robbery with
homicide as accomplices. As to Simeon Doble my conclusion
is that he is at least an accessory after the fact.
Aquino, J.:
Took no part.
Concepcion Jr., J.:
Previously voted to concur with the main opinion.
Abad Santos, J., concurring and dissenting.
Criminal Law; While Doble and Romaquin should be held as
accomplices, their liability should not be limited to robbery
only as they
136
136
People vs. Doble
received guns showing they were prepared to kill also.For it
must be remembered that the principal malefactors were
each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines and
Thompson sub-machine guns. This fact was known to the

appellants. In fact the principal malefactors had so many
guns that one was given to Cresencio with which to cover
Antonio in case he tried to escape. This shows that the
principal malefactors were prepared to kill even an
accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal
objective. How then can it be said that there was no criminal
design to kill but only to rob among the principal malefactors
as suggested in the main opinion. And I cannot believe that
under the circumstances the appellants were unaware of the
criminal design to kill and that they gave their cooperationalbeit not indispensable-only to the robbery. Accordingly, I
believe that the appellants should be held guilty as
accomplices in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Plana, J.:
I vote with Justice Abad Santos. Under the circumstances why
should the two appellants be held civilly liable for the killing if
they absolutely not criminally liable therefor?
Escolin, J.:
Took no part.
Relova, J.:
I concur in the dissent of Justice Abad Santos.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with
multiple homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault
upon agents of persons in authority, on June 14, 1966, in
Navotas, Rizal. Only five of ten accused were brought to trial,
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137
People vs. Doble

the other five named only as John Does in the information
having remained at large. Two of the five accused who stood
trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino were acquitted, while the
trial court, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, imposed the
death penalty on the appellants herein, Cresencio Doble,
Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin. The decision of the
trial court is now before Us for review for having imposed the
death penalty.
Both the de oficio counsel for appellants and the then
Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, a retired Justice of
this Court, agree that as so narrated in the appealed
decision, and as quoted in appellants brief, the relevant and
material facts accurately reflect the evidence presented,
except only as to the fact that there were eight malefactors,
with respect to which appellants are not in full conformity (p.
2, Appellants Brief).
As stated in the decision under review, the crime was
committed as follows:
Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all
of them heavily armed with pistols, carbines and thompsons,
left the shores of Manila in a motor banca and proceeded to
Navotas, Rizal. Their mission: to rob the Navotas Branch of
the Prudential Bank and Trust Company. Once in Navotas and
taking advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men
disembarked from the banca and proceeded to the beach in
the direction of the branch bank. Within a few minutes, shots
were heard throwing the people around in panic. As confusion
reigned, the people ran in different directions scampering for
safety. As time went on, the shots grew in intensity. As the
commotion died down, the eight men returned to their banca,
still fully armed and some of them carrying what looked like
bayongs. They boarded the waiting motor banca and sped
away. As a result of the shooting, many people got killed and
some injured. Among those who were killed were agents of
the law, like Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine
Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl Teofilo
Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department. Dominador
Estrella, a market collector, was also killed. Those who were
injured were Pat Armando Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus, Jose

Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and Pedro de la Cruz.
The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office
located at the North Bay Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object
of the bloody
138
138
People vs. Doble
mission, has an unusual banking hours. It opens at midnight
and closes at 8:00 in the morning. The bank has ten
employees, more or less, including a security guard. It has
two cages or compartments for tellers. One cage was under
the care of Melvin Domingo and the other one under the care
of Alejandro San Juan. At around 12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966,
Cesar Reyes, assistant cashier of the bank, was near the
cage of Domingo when two men entered the bank asking that
their money be changed. Domingo refused, saying that they
had no small denominations. Suddenly, three men armed
with long guns barged in and fired at the ceiling and the walls
of the bank. They ordered the employees to lie down, face
downward and then demanded the key to the vault. When
Reyes answered that they do not have the key, the armed
men aimed their guns at the vault and fired upon it until its
doors were opened. They entered the vault and found that
they could not get anything as the compartments inside the
said vault were locked. Not being able to get anything from
the vault, the armed men went to the two teller cages and
took whatever they could lay their hands on. Not long
afterwards, the men left, carrying with them the sum of
P10,439.95.
Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in
question, Pat. Nicolas Antonio was in the outpost, together
with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats. Pangan, Burgos, Rosal, Ocampo and
Cpl Evangelista. They were on duty watching the fish landing.
Suddenly, Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he heard a burst
which he believed came from a thompson. He said he saw a
man pointing a thompson upwards while he was in front of
the bank. Afterwards, Antonio said, he heard another burst

coming from the same direction. Antonio and his companions
then went to the middle of the road and again they heard
shots, and this time they were successive, coming from their
left. Antonio could not see who was firing the shots.
Suddenly, he said, he saw one of this companions Cpl.
Evangelista topple down. He saw also Dominador Estrella
sitting down folding his stomach. They were both felled by
the shots coming from the left side of the bank. Antonio told
Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt. Aguilos by
the arm. Sgt. Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell down. He
was hit. Later on, Antonio said, he went to the outpost and
told Pat. Ocampo to go too. He said that from the outpost he
heard some more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in the
thigh. After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his wounded
companions placed in a vehicle, together with Evangelista
and Aguilos who were already dead. Later on, he said he saw
Sgt. Alcala, a member of the PC, lying prostrate in the ground
already dead. (pp. 83-85, Rollo).
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VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
139
People vs. Doble
It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the
robbery and the killing that followed in its wake were actually
committed, the three appellants had no participation. It is not
surprising that the Solicitor General has recommended the
acquittal of one of the appellants, Simeon Doble. With this
recommendation, it might be well to take up the case of this
appellant ahead of the other two, appellants Antonio
Romaquin and Cresencio Doble.
In recommending Simeon Dobles acquittal, the Solicitor
General made the following observation:
As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the
malefactors met in his house to discuss the plan to rob the
Prudential Bank. This circumstance, standing alone, does not
conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts do not
show that he performed any act tending to the perpetration
of the robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or

induced other persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its
consummation by some act without which it would not have
been committed. It could be that Simeon was present at the
meeting held in his house and entered no opposition to the
nefarious scheme but, aside from this, he did not cooperate
in the commission of the robbery perpetrated by the others.
At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is
not punishable. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval
of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that
there must be intentional participation in the transaction with
a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose
(15 CJS 1062).
We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the
lower court that Simeon was a principal both by agreement
and encouragement, despite his non-participation in the
commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved that
Simeon received a part of the looted money as to make him
an accessory. Romaquins testimony that the day after the
robbery he gave P2.00 to Simeon who had asked for
cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967) could hardly be
considered as the latters share of the loot. It is significant
that in his statement he claimed he had not yet received his
share. (pp. 10-11, Appellees Brief; p. 146, Rollo).
A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing
observation of the Solicitor General to be with convincing ra140
large as the principal culprits) as to entitle him to a share in

the loot. However, a reading of his whole extrajudicial
statement would erase that impression, and reveals the true
import of that statement as intended only to show that
Simeon had nothing to do with commission of the crime and
therefore did not receive any share of the fruits thereof. Thus,
to quote pertinent portions of his statement on custodial
investigation:
3. T
Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?

S
Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang

Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng
M.P.D.
4. T
Kailan ka hinuli?
S
Noon pong Miyerkoles ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang

petsa pero nito pong buwan na ito.
5. T
Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng

isang bangko dito sa Navotas?
S
140
People vs. Doble
tionality. It is only that portion in which is cited Simeons
statement made before the Navotas Police Department (Exh,
I pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that he has not yet received
his share that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor
Generals recommendation, for it gives the impression that
Simeon had given material or moral support or
encouragement to the malefactors (referring to those still at
Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang

mga taong nangholdap dito sa Navotas.
6. T
Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?

S
Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na

dalawa pa at ang mga kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na
may ari ng bangka, si Joe Rondina, Cresencio Doble at narinig
kong may tinawag pang Erning. lyon pong iba ay hindi ko

alam ang pangalan pero makikilala ko pag aking nakitang
muli.
7. T
Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong

ito?
S
Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras, pero hatinggabi na nong

Lunes ng gabi (June 13, 1966).
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VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
141
People vs. Doble
8. T
Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?

S
Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa

Navotas.
9. T
Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?

S
Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon,

after being shown five (5) other pictures).
10. T
Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?

S
Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko

sa Navotas, Rizal.
11. T
Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S
Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat

ako ay nakikinig lamang.
12. T
Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan,

ano pa ang iba mong mga narinig?
S
Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon)

at ni Jose Rondina na MALAKING KUARTA TO. PERO
MASYADONG MAPANGANIB, AT KAILANGAN AY HANDA TAYO.
13. T
Ano pa ang sumunod?

S
Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing

paglaban.
14. T
Ano pa ang nangyari?

S
Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.

15. T
Pagkatapos?
S
Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang

lahat.
16. T
Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na sila?

S
Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming bahay

ay nagmamadali na silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa
sa kanila. At noon pong umaga ng araw na iyon ay nagpunta
ako kay Tony
142
142
People vs. Doble
(Antonio Romaquin) at kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00)

dahil iyong aking parte ay hindi pa naibibigay sa akin.
Pagkatapos po ay umuwi na ako sa amin.
17. T
Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito.

Ikaw ba ay mayroong nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa
salaysay mong ito?
S
Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.

18. T
Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?

S
Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usapusap silang lahat at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at
nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi na ako na lamang ang
maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at
maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at mahuli lamang.
19. T
Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?

S
Opo, may limang (5) taon na.

20. T
Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?

S
Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.

21. T
Ano pa ang masasabi mo?

S
Wala na po.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house
having been used as the meeting place of the malefactors for
their final conference before proceeding to Navotas to rob the
Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them because
of a 5-year old foot injury which would make him only a
liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the
malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they met
at his house it was only because it was near the landing
place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while
waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his
house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling
them that he could not join them because of his foot injury,
and will just wait for them, evidently as a mere gesture of
politeness in not being
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VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
143
People vs. Doble
able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not
be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid
being suspected that he was against their vicious plan for
which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a coconspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks
among the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable
participation of Simeon Doble in the commission of the crime,
for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he could not in
any way be of help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their

criminal design, nor could he have been desired by the latter
to be one of them.
Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and
Cresencio Doble, their main contention is that their
extrajudicial statements upon which their conviction was
principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been
allegedly obtained by force and intimidation, and in violation
of basic constitutional rights to counsel and against selfincrimination. In support of this contention, appellants have
only their own self-serving testimony to rely upon.
Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas
police department someone he could not name boxed him on
the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson hit him on the left side with
the butt of a gun causing him to lose consciousness; that he
was made to lie on a narrow table and peppery liquid was
poured over his face, his eyesight then becoming dim, and it
was then that he was made to sign a piece of paper which he
could not read because of his blurred eyesight.
Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in
order to force him to admit culpable participation in the heist.
The inquiry must, accordingly, be whether the claim of
violence and involuntariness of their statements is true as to
render said statements inadmissible in evidence.
Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of
the custodial statements (Exhibits E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the
Solicitor General argues that the same is negated by how the
details as given by both appellants in their respective
statements fit into each other, at least as to the part played
by
144
144
People vs. Doble
each from the time Cresencio went to Romaquins place to
procure the latters banca up to their get-away from the
scene of the crime. Thus, while Romaquin claimed in his
statement that although he wanted to escape from the scene
after his passengers have disembarked for their evil mission,

he could not do so because Cresencio had a gun pointed at
him to prevent his escape, as was the order given Cresencio
by the rest of the gang. The latter denied this allegation
when he testified that he returned the gun given him
because he did not know how to use or manipulate it,
although in his extra-judicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35,
Record of Exhibits), he stated that he accepted the gun.
The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to
exculpate himself which is generally taken as an indication of
lack of undue pressure exerted on one while giving his
statement on custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71
SCRA 679).
The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of
violent maltreatment to which appellants were subjected to,
that neither one of the appellants presented medical
certificate to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted (p. 3,
Appellees Brief) which disproves the claim (People vs.
Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He
also points to the fact that in his extrajudicial statement
(Exhibit l, p. 100, Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of
the accused, made no admission of his participation in the
bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court, he admitted
that no violence was applied to him when he gave his
statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12, 1967; p. 4, Appellees Brief).
This is evidence enough that the appellants could not have
been dealt with differently as their co-accused Aquino who
was allowed to give his statement freely without the
employment of force or intimidation upon him. The evidence
also disclosed a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to
Romaquin asking the latter not to reveal the names of their
companions. This means that the names of the members of
the band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to both
appellants. That the identity of five of those charged in this
case has remained only as John Does indicate the nonemployment of any coercive means with which to force them
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VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
145
People vs. Doble
into revealing the names of their companions in the robbery,
again negating the claim of torture and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and
Cresencio virtually confirmed their extra-judicial statements
when they testified in court. By all the proofs as cited,
persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their
custodial statements plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson,
the only one named among the alleged torturers, that any
violence was practiced by the investigators, specifically, the
alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18,
t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged involuntariness of the
extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while
allegedly attempting to escape could have instilled fear in
the minds of the appellants which affected their freedom of
will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellants Brief).
This is a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the
giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after
their interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July
5, 1966 (Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin
pointed to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore,
took place long after appellants have given their main
statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had
only bothered to check the dates of the main statements of
both appellants which were given not later than just past the
middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary
statement of Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he would not
have probably come forth with this argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case,
Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the
inadmissibility of appellants custodial statements, for their
having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right
thereto during the interrogation. There might be merit in this
contention were the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation one of constitutional grant as is provided in our
1973 Constitution, before which the right was given only to
an accused, not to a mere suspect during in-custody police
interrogation (Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4; People vs.

Dumdum, Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the time of
their
146
146
People vs. Doble
custodial Interrogation in 1966, however, the requisite of
assistance of counsel was not yet made a matter of
constitutional right, as it has been granted only by the new
1973 Constitution.
The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants,
can neither be appreciated to impair the admissibility of their
extra-judicial statements. It is the voluntariness of an
admission or confession that determines its admissibility, for
no principle of law or constitutional precept should stand on
the way of allowing voluntary admission of ones guilt, the
only requisite justly demanded being that ample safeguard
be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the element
of voluntariness is convincingly established, which,
incidentally, is even presumed, the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession, admission or statement becomes
unquestionable.1
The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when
evaluated with the testimony they gave in court, would
convince Us that their liability is less than that of a coprincipal by conspiracy or by actual participation, as was the
holding of the trial court. The most damaging admission
made in the extra-judicial statements of Cresencio is that he
was asked by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 oclock in
the evening of June 13, 1966, if he could procure a banca for
his use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked by Cresencio,
allegedly told him that the banca would be used for robbery.
Cresencio gave an affirmative answer to Joe Intsiks query,
having in mind Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio
accompanied Joe Intsik to Romaquin at 12:00 in the evening.
In Romaquins statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1, Romaquin, p.
15, Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked him to
bring his friends in his banca, to board a launch for a trip to

Palawan. The discrepancy between the statements of
Crasencio and Romaquin as to the intended use of the banca
is at once apparent, for while according to the former, it was
for the commission of robbery, according to the latter, it was
to bring Cresencios friends to board a
________________
1 People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 667; People vs. Dorado, 30
SCRA 53; People vs. Narciso, 23 SCRA 844.
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VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
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People vs. Doble
launch for a trip to Palawan. What is demonstrated thereby is
the full freedom with which both appellants were allowed to
give their respective statements while in custodial
interrogation.
Cresencios consenting to look for a banca, however, did not
necessarily make him a co-conspirator. Neither would it
appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Cresencio into his band
of malefactors that would commit the robbery more than just
asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough
men all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the
commission of which needed planning and men to execute
the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which is
not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were
asked to look and provide for a banca just a few hours before
the actual robbery.
Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the
principal malefactors still at large, to be asked to join actively
in the conspiracy. The amount received by Romaquin who
alone was given money by the malefactors in the sum of
P441.00, indicate that the latter did not consider appellant as
their confederate in the same character as those constituting
the band of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin could very
well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the
cooperation he extended to the malefactors, which, by no
means, is an indispensable one. Cresencio, on the other

hand, was not given any part of the loot. It was only
Romaquin who gave him P41.00, clearly not what should
represent his share if he were a full-fledged ally or
confederate.
The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the
full impact of their vicious misdeeds, Romaquin might speed
away from the scene in fear of being implicated, as shown by
the measure they had taken to prevent his escape, is further
proof that Romaquin was not considered a co-conspirator,
who is one who should not be looked upon with mistrust. For
his part, Cresencio testified that while he was given a gun
with which to cover Romaquin who might escape, he returned
the gun because he did not know how to use it, and so one of
the malefactors was left near the beach to prevent appellants
fleeing from me scene of the crime with banca. In his
statement,
148
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People vs. Doble
however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he refused to
accept the gun, but they gave it just the same, and he
received it.
The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants
liable as co-principals in the crime charged. At the most their
liability would be that of mere accomplices. They joined in
the criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a
banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang
leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the
scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose
for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that
brought the malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried
them away from the scene after the robbery to prevent their
apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an
indispensable manner. Even without appellants providing the
banca, the robbery could have been committed, specially
with the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in

committing the crime.
The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his
note (Exhibit H, p. 26, Record of Exhibits) addressed to
Romaquin asking him not to reveal to the police the names of
their companions. He went to Romaquin and asked for money
which the latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to show that
he had helped in some material way to deserve a share in
the loot.
As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave
a gun to Cresencio with which the latter would prevent
Romaquin from fleeing away from the scene, evidently to
show that he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that
all his acts were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not
voluntary, the measure taken by the malefactors to prevent
his escape, could have been just an extra precaution, lest he
would be stricken with fear in the course of the commission
of the crime specially if attended by shootings as it was really
so. If it is true that he never voluntarily made the trip with
knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio saying
that he returned the gun given him with which to prevent
Romaquin from speeding away, Romaquin could have tried a
getaway, as should have been his natural impulse had he not
joined in the criminal design. His act of hiding the money he
received from the malefactors, and repainting his boat, all
attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of
cooperation he knowingly ex149
VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982
149
People vs. Doble
tended to the principal culprits to achieve their criminal
purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts
(Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a community of
unlawful purpose between the principal and accomplice and
assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco,

11 Phil. 526), to supply material and moral aid in the
consummation of the offense and in as efficacious way
(People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this case, appellants
cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction
which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as held in People
vs. Batalan, 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay,
G.R. No. L-15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the
meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors
had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out successfully the
plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is
the criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices.
Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery,
not with the killing. Having been left in the banca, they could
not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one
seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the
robbery (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code).2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices
may appear too lenient considering the gravity and
viciousness of the offense with which they were charged. The
evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a
previous conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually
robbed the bank and killed and injured several persons,
including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the
real and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring
the wrath of the victims nor of the outraged public, upon the
heads of appellants whose participation has not been shown
to be as abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The
desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits
should not blind
_________________
2 People vs. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225.
150
150
People vs. Doble
Us in meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they

justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio
Romaquin guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but only as
accomplices for the crime of robbery in band.3 As discussed
earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as so
recommended by the Solicitor General who finds no sufficient
evidence, to which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and
Antonio Romaquin, as accomplices for the crime of robbery in
band is prision mayor minimum which has a range of 6 years,
1 day to 8 years as provided in Article 295 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of the same
code. The commission of the crime was aggravated by
nighttime and the use of a motorized banca. There being no
mitigating circumstance, both appellants should each be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years,
four (4) months, twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional
to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of
P12,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. The
immediate release of Simeon Doble who is hereby acquitted
is ordered, unless he should be continued in confinement for
some other legal cause. Proportionate costs against
Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Vasquez,
and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos.
_________________
3 People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679; People vs. Geronimo, 53
SCRA 246; People vs. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498.
151
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151
People vs. Doble
Barredo, J., For the reasons given by Justice Abad Santos, I
vote that Doble and Romaquin should be sentenced for
robbery with homicide, as accomplices. As to Simeon Doble,
my conclusion is that he is at least accessory after the fact.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the
main opinion.
Abad Santos, J., I concur and dissent in a separate opinion.
Plana, J., I vote with Justice Abad Santos. Under the
circumstances of the case, why should the two appellants be
held civilly liable for the killing if they are absolutely not
criminally liable therefor? But then, if appellants Cresencio
Doble and Antonio Romaquin are to be convicted as
accomplices in the crime of robbery with homicide, in which
case, the civil liability for death would have a basis, their civil
liability must be modified so as to conform with the rules
prescribed in articles 109 and 110 of Revised Penal Code.
Escolin, J., no part.
Relova, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Abad Santos.
ABAD SANTOS, J.; concurring and dissenting
Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the benefit
of a lenient attitude, I can agree that they were not principals
but merely accomplices as stated in the main opinion.
However, I cannot persuade myself that their complicity must
be limited to the robbery only and should not include the
killing. For it must be remembered that the principal
malefactors were each fully armed; the arms consisted of
pistols, carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns. This fact
was known to the appellants. In fact the principal malefactors
has so many guns that one was given to Cresencio with
which to cover Antonio in case he tried to escape. This shows
that the
152
152

People vs. Doble
principal malefactors were prepared to kill even an
accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal
objective. How then can it be said that there was no criminal
design to kill but only to rob among the principal malefactors
as suggested in the main opinion. And I cannot believe that
under the circumstances the appellants were unaware of the
criminal design to kill and that they gave their cooperation
albeit not indispensableonlyto the robbery. Accordingly, I
believe that the appellants should be held guilty as
accomplices in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.Entering a plea of guilty for the 3rd time constitutes
already a carefully considered acceptance of guilt by the
accused. (People vs. Daeng, 109 SCRA 166).
Supporting the voluntary extrajudicial confession, Exh. H
executed by appellant, are the interlocking circumstantial
evidence adduced by prosecution witnesses. (People vs.
Adorna, 109 SCRA 129).
Admission by appellant of his ownership of the shotgun and
his threat tighten your belt to the victim show that the
appellant is the author of the crime. (People vs. Agbot, 106
SCRA 325).
After a Municipal Judge had issued a warrant of arrest for the
charge of Robbery with Frustrated Homicide, she should
proceed to hear the case on preliminary investigation and, if
warranted, elevate the case of the CFI instead of ordering the
charge quashed on the ground that there is no complex
crime of Robbery with Frustrated Homicide and directing the
amendment of the information. (Daplas vs. Arquiza, 99 SCRA
141).
Knowledge by the accused of the plan to rob and
participation in its commission by previous and simultaneous
acts proves conspiracy. (People vs. Garillo, 84 SCRA 537.)
When homicide takes place as a consequence or on occasion
of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty
as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless
153
VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982

153
Edillon vs. Ferandos
proof is presented that the accused tried to prevent the
killing. (People vs. Garillo, 84 SCRA 537.)
In robbery with homicide the presence of an armed band
shall be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance.
(People vs. Damaso, 86 SCRA 370.)
Where robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the
offense is still robbery with homicide aggravated by band and
not robbery in band with homicide. (People vs. Navasca, 76
SCRA 70.)
For robbery with homicide to exist, it is enough that a
homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery. (People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427.)
In robbery with homicide the presence of an armed band
shall be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance.
(People vs. Damaso, 86 SCRA 370.) People vs. Doble, 114
SCRA 131, No. L-30028 May 31, 1982
G.R. No. 34386. February 7, 1991.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUDOVICO
C. DOCTOLERO alias ECOY, CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias
CONDRING, and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias VERGEL,
accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Credibility of
witnesses; As between the positive declarations of the
prosecution witness and the negative statement of the
accused the former deserves more credence.The trial court
correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated
as an accomplice in the commission of the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
633
633
People vs. Doctolero
crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having
participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete
defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place
where the crimes were committed. Appellants pretension,
however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than
the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the
testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible,
such testimony comes from a polluted source and must be
scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to grave
suspicion. This uncorroborated denial of his participation
cannot overthrow the positive and categorical testimony of
the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the
positive declarations of the prosecution witness and the
negative statements of the accused, the former deserves
more credence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When there is no evidence and
nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony
is entitled to full faith and credit.When there is nothing in
the records which would show a motive or reason on the part

of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused,
identification should be given full credit. And when there is no
evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness
for the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony
is entitled to full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contradictions and
inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the details of an
incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute
evidence of good faith.As correctly explained by the People,
the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out by the
appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential variations
on the part of each observer in relating his own observation
of the same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of
witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far from
demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith.
Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed by it in
the same manner and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses
should disagree on minor details.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
which refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses.In fact, inconsistences and
contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
which refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. And where the prosecution
634
634
witnesses were able to positively identify the appellants as
the authors of the crime and the testimonies were, on the
whole, consistent on material points, the contradictions
become insignificant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Credence is accorded to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers
for it is presumed that they have regularly performed their

duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt.
Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the investigation himself and
personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings.
Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary. Appellants have not shown
that this prosecution witness was motivated by an improper
motive other than that of accomplishing his mission.
Same; Accomplices; Where one goes with the principals and
in staying outside of the house while the others went inside
to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the
criminals with material and moral aid making him guilty as an
accomplice.We have held that where one goes with the
principals and in staying outside of the house while the
others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former
effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid,
making him guilty as an accomplice.
Same; Same; Same; One can be an accomplice even if he did
not know of the actual crime intended by the principal
provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.Appellants
contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a
sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a common criminal
design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since
one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the
actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware
that it was an illicit act. This is a doctrine that dates back to
the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus that where the accomplices
therein consented to help in the commission of forcible
abduction, they were responsible for the resulting homicide
even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was
unknown to the accomplices.
APPEAL from the decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Br. 2.
Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.

635
635
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers,
Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, charged with and convicted in
the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the
crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries,
appealed from the decision of the court a quo the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the
accused Ludovico Doctolero guilty as principal, and his coaccused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as
accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder, which
caused the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury
on the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the
absence of other circumstances to mitigate the penalty, the
accused Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA
PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional
penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto mayor,
for inflicting slight physical injury to (sic) the minor child,
Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio
Doctolero, as accomplices, are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years
and 4 months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania
Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor
to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death
of Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1
Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion
temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the
additional penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of
arresto mayor for the slight physical injury suffered by the
minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused Ludovico, Conrado

and Virgilio all surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of
P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00; and the heirs of the
deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and
to pay three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio
Doctolero is acquitted, with one-fourth (1/4) cost de oficio.1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the
_______________
1 Original Record, 239-240.
636
636
crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio
Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with bolos, went up
the house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat, conspiring
together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill
and with evident premeditation and treachery, with abuse of
superior strength and with extreme cruelty, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
hack, stab and strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania
Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter, the
same accused while already on the road, conspiring together
and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, hack
and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting upon him
multiple mortal wounds which caused his death.2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to
the crimes charged. In its decision, the trial court made the
following findings and a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution thus:
It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970,

Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman were killed in the
house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San
Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they were living.
Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman,
was on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on
the breast of his mother. On the road, a few meters from the
house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was
fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital but he died on the way. x x x
The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the
three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all
surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the death(s) of
Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting
physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately
thereafter, with their father and co-accused, Antonio
Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos
which caused the death of the latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial
Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy.
According to
_______________
2 Ibid., 50.
637
637
Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening on November 8,
1970, he and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de
Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were
on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came from the field
where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing
of the road in Bo. Binday they met the accused Ludovico
Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or reason,
held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and
struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow
and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the
bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became

frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were
wrestling for the possession of the bolo of the former, so she
ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified
that while she was cleaning palay in the yard of her uncle,
the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused,
Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero)
throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing
stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house
to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the
house of Marcial Sagun and saw the three accused, Ludovico,
Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going
towards her. She told them: Why cant you be patient and
forget? But she was asked not to interfere. At about that
time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero,
and uncle of the three accused was going towards the house
of Marcial Sagun, when he met the three accused, Ludovico,
Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why they
cant be patient and forget, but the three accused replied
Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you. Then they struck
Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when
their father Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo
Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and
then all the accused ran away.
The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be
corroborated by the testimony of Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of
Marcial Sagun) who declared that while she was in the house
of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported the incident
between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she saw the
three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones
at their house and called to all the men in the house to come
out. She was about to go to their house to get her children
but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio
going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few meters
away from their house. While there, she heard Epifania
Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying
Enieng, your children. Then she saw the three accused
coming down from the house, going towards the road where
they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several
638
638
times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also
struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening,
Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and
Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who
was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the
latters wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brotherin-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria
Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera).
Marcial Sagun and company were on their way home. (p. 8,
ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: Where have you been
cousin. (p. 8, ibid) He noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo
holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial
Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter
unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward
swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but
he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and
Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. They watched
each others step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de
Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with
a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were
towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo
(p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun
and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing
Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and
then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo
throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero.

The latter was eating his meal, together with his small
children upstairs, while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero
was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his meal, when
Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971Salazar).
He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to
look after his children as he might meet something bad that
night. He did not enter the house anymore: he was only until
the door. Then he ran away. His father asked him what
happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4,
Salazar).
He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing
through the house of his cousins, Juanito and Cresencia
Doctolero. As he came
_______________
3 Ibid., 215-218.
639
639
near his house, he saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was
also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to
Marcials house calling him to get down. When Marcial did not
get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial Sagun was not
there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told
him that Marcial Sagun went towards the South. He was
about to leave when the old woman hit him at the back of his
neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her
several times (p. 13-19, tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He
stayed a while at the trunk of the buri tree, thinking that he
might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice anyone coming
from the south or the east. So he tried to move, but as he did
so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from the
yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize
the man and thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him.
It turned out however, that the man was Marcelo Doctolero.

So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He
asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but
Marcelo Doctolero answered him, because of your
foolishness and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process of
evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As
Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time he took a
side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it away,
causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to
get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed his bolo.
When the latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico
Doctolero boloed him many times. (pp. 19-26, ibid).4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well
as the injury caused to the child. A doctor and a
photographer went to the scene of the crime and pictures
were then taken.5
Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San
Fabian, the court below established that
x x x nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo
Doctolero, namely:
xxx
(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left
ear to the side of the forehead. There is fracture of the
underlying skull.
(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the
_______________
4 Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 3-6; Rollo; 110.
640
640
lst wound with fracture of the underlying skull.
(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd
wound with fracture of the underlying skull.
(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border

of the left eyebrow to the right eyebrow. There is also
fracture of the underlying skull.
(5) Incised wound3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the
angle of the mouth towards the lower border of the right ear.
The lower lobe of the ear is detached.
(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand.
There is a severance from the level of the middle finger.
(8) Incised wound1 1/2 inches long at the median portion
and distal 3rd of the forearm, left.
(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.
xxx
One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman,
namely, stab wound around 3 cms. long and 4 inches in
depth at the 2nd intercostal space just at the left border of
the sternal bone. (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds were
inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
xxx
(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches
deep penetrating the sternal bone at the level of the 2nd
intercostal space.
(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the
level of the right clavicular region.
(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch
below the second wound.
(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture
of the underlying skull at the right frontal portion of the head.
(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal
portion of the head.
(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the
shoulder joint, exposing the bony portion, left.
(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth
wound.
(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh
wound.
(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and
lateral portion of the hand right. There was fracture of some
641

641
of the underlying bones. 6
Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the
resident physician at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr.
Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows: Stab
wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral
aspect of the dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was
another about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right
forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2 inch,
temporal right. He further testified that the child was
admitted to the hospital on November 8, 1970 and was
discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later.7
During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of
appellant Ludovico Doctolero, on May 17, 1976 the Court
resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal8 and entry of
judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same
day.9 In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the
manifestation of counsel for accused-appellants, dated May
9, 1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero died on October 22,
1983 as per death certificate attached thereto as Annex
A.10 Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability
of appellant Conrado Doctolero.
The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado
Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the commission of
the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having
participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete
defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place
where the crimes were committed. Appellants pretension,
however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than
the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the
testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible,
such testimony comes from a polluted source and must be
scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to grave
suspicion.11 This uncorroborated denial of his
_______________

7 TSN, January 12, 1971, 5-7.
8 Rollo, 149.
9 Ibid., 150.
10 Ibid., 171.
11 People vs. Aquino, 57 SCRA 43 (1974).
642
642
participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical
testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and
between the positive declarations of the prosecution witness
and the negative statements of the accused, the former
deserves more credence.12
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to
testify falsely against appellants. The only imputed grudge
that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had against
appellants occurred years ago and she was, at the time she
testified, on good terms with appellants as shown by the
following testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:
Q
And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of
the prosecution witness (sic) your relationship with her was
harmonious and rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit
her relatives she did not fail to see you in your house?
A
Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it
held that Maria Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) pointed to the
three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed
Doctolero, as the persons who went up her house that night
of November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a grudge
against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that
previous incident at the crossing yet, no reason or motive is

shown why Maria Sagun should also implicate Conrado and
Virgilio Doctolero in the commission of the crime.14
When there is nothing in the records which would show a
motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely
implicate the accused, identification should be given full
credit.15 And when there is no evidence and nothing to
indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was
moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was
not so moved, and his
_______________
12 People vs. Macabenta, 170 SCRA 203 (1989).
13 TSN, February 18, 1971, 58.
14 Original Record, 228.
15 People vs. Samson, 176 SCRA 710 (1989).
643
643
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court,
appellant points to certain inconsistencies that allegedly
render the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
incredible. These inconsistencies, however, are not so
substantial as to destroy their credibility. As correctly
explained by the People, the seeming contradictions and
minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witness pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere
inconsequential variations on the part of each observer in
relating his own observation of the same incident.
Contradictions and inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to
the details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood
constitute evidence of good faith. Not all persons who
witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner
and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree
on minor details.17
In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of

the prosecution witnesses which refer to minor details cannot
destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.18 And
where the prosecution witnesses were able to positively
identify the appellants as the authors of the crime and the
testimonies were, on the whole, consistent on material
points, the contradictions become insignificant.19
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt.
Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the investigation himself and
personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings.
Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary. Appellants have not shown
that this prosecution witness was motivated by an improper
motive other than that of accomplishing his mission.20
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were
received at the police department of San Fabian, Pangasinan
_______________
16 People vs. Perez, 175 SCRA 203 (1989).
17 Brief for the Appellee, 39; Rollo, 135.
18 People vs. Lamosa, 173 SCRA 518 (1989).
19 People vs. Baysa, et al., 172 SCRA 706 (1989).
20 People vs. Mahumanding, 174 SCRA 237 (1989).
644
644
shortly after the crimes were committed were to the effect
that the Doctoleros were involved. He further testified that
when he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime
and investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that
the accused Doctoleros came with bolos from the house of
Marcial Sagun.21 In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified
objectively on the results of his investigation and the weight
to be accorded to his findings was properly addressed to the
trial court.
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother,
Virgilio, participated as accomplices in the slaying of the
women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree
with its findings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General
with its evidentiary substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants
were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house of
Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women
thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back
at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146,
tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went
up the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both
appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not
know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was
brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo
inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature,
number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the
two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-l), it could not
have been possible for Ludovicos two brothers Virgilio and
Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not
to hear either the screams of pain of their brothers victims or
the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies
when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them
several times, x x x Under these circumstances, it is obvious
that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves
knew what was going on inside the room of the house at the
time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their
brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women
victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that
the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as
their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two
deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is
no question that the presence of these two appellants
upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother
_______________
645

645
Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to
proceed as he did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes
against two defenseless women and a child.22
We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in
staying outside of the house while the others went inside to
rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the
criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as
an accomplice.23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a
consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus negating
a common criminal design in their minds. This pretension
must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he
did not know of the actual crime intended by the principal
provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.24 This is a
doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25
that where the accomplices therein consented to help in the
commission of forcible abduction, they were responsible for
the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to
commit homicide was unknown to the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal
responsibility of appellants Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did
not refer to whether or not they were liable but only with
regard to the extent of their participation. There, being ample
evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on
the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder
form of liability or responsibility which is that of being mere
accomplices,26 no evidence of conspiracy among the
appellants having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for
the physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child
required medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the
liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical
injuries pun_______________
22 Brief for the Appellee, 42-44; Rollo, 135.

23 People vs. Balili, et al., 17 SCRA 892 (1966).
24 People vs. Largo, et al., 99 Phil. 1061 (1956).
25 2 Phil. 514 (1903).
26 People vs. Torejar, 43 SCRA 158 (1972); People vs. Irenea,
164 SCRA 481 (1988).
646
646
ished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the Revised
Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor should be
imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as
an accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency
of this appeal terminated only his criminal liability but not his
civil liability.27 Also, while the death indemnity has been
increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same
should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore
withdrawn his appeal and the judgment rendered by the trial
court having long since become final and executory with
respect to him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and
judgment is hereby rendered IMPOSING on appellant Conrado
Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences often (10) years
of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal each for the death of Epifania Escosio,
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less
serious physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo.
Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio
Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of
P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the respective
heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and
Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and

Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Decision modified.
Note.Certain flaws in the prosecution evidence do not
impair its essential credibility. (People vs. Marnita Jr., 180
SCRA 723.) People vs. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632, G.R. No.
34386 February 7, 1991
No. L-32126. July 6, 1978.*

NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS.
PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.
Evidence; Minor discrepancies in testimony, as those relative
to the time where certain acts were done, will not affect the
credibility of a witness.Appellants insist in their brief that
the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital
contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood
because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged by her.
We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed
out, the fact that the witness varied on cross-examination the
exact time of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such
as, (1) whether it was before or after Bernardo had began
eating when he was shot; (2) whether it was before or after
seeing her mothers meeting with her co-accused in the
morning of Friday, June 23, 1967, that she went to wash
clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already
upstairs or still downstairs when they first fired their guns,
cannot alter the veracity of her having seen appellants in the
act of mercilessly and coldbloodedly shooting her father to
death. Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was
nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances related by
her.
Same; It is hardly conceivable that a 13-year old girl will
concoct a false narration of the killing of her father
particularly where she implicates her mother thereto.Why
and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the
killing of her father, if it were not basically true, is hardly
conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years
old when she testified, an age when according to Moore, a
child is, as a rule, but little influenced by the suggestion of
others because he has already got some principles, lying is
distasteful to him because he thinks it is mean, he is no
stranger to the sentiment of self-respect, and he never loses
an opportunity of being right in what he affirms. (II Moore on
Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation has been
offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to
three other men aside from Talingdan whom she knew had
relations with her mother, were she merely making-up her

account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so
having been shown.
_______________
* EN BANC.
20
20
People vs. Talingdan
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony
was taught to her by her uncle, His Honor pointed out that
said testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she
was constant, firm and steady in her answers to questions
directed to her.
Same; Testimony of 13-year old girl in the case at bar is
worthy of belief.We feel Corazon was too young to be
affected by the infidelity of her mother in the manner the
defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her
whole testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On
the whole, it is too consistent for a child of thirteen years to
be able to substantially maintain throughout her stay on the
witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe
and long cross-interrogations, if she had not actually
witnessed the event she had described. We reject the
possibility of her having been brain-washed or coached to
testify as she did.
Same; Conspiracy; Where there is no sufficient proof of
conspiracy as to one accused, she cannot be held to the
same liability as her co-appellants.True it is that the proof
of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond
reasonable doubt, for which reason, she cannot have the
same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand
at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear
that she helped directly in the planning and preparation
thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going
to bo done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408,
411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it
either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant

Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain surmise,
suspicion and conjecture, not really ineludi-ble.
Same; Criminal law; One who conceals or assists in the
escape of the principal in the crime, as where she says to
police investigators that she does not have anybody in mind
as who killed her husband although she knew the assailants,
can be held guilty as an accessory.But this is not saying
that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the
record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least
an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused.
She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she
came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she
was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When
Corazon identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and
Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter
not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the
extent of warning her, Dont tell it to
21
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
21
anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody. Later,
when the peace officers who repaired to their house to
investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the
information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no
suspects in mind. In other words, whereas before the actual
shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her
attitude regarding her co-appellants conspiracy, known to
her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute concealing or assisting in
the escape of the principal in the crime which makes her
liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Treachery; Murder; Circumstances showing that
killing of the victim in the case at bar is murder.As already
indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was
murder qualified by treachery. It being obvious that

appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and
without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of
their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed
treachery to insure success in attaining their malevolent
objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted
with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill
Bernardo Thursday night, then he met his co-accused to work
out their conspiracy Friday and again in Saturday evening
just before the actual shooting. In other words, they had
motiveTalingdans taking up the cudgels for his paramour,
Teresaand enough time to meditate, and desist, if they
were not resolved to proceed with their objective. Finally,
they committed the offense in the dwelling of the offended
party.
Makasiar, J., dissenting in part:
Criminal law; Evidence; Majority opinion erred in holding that
wife of the victim was a mere accessory and not a coconspirator in the commission of the crime in the case at bar.
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an
accessory after the fact has been clearly demonstrated by
the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who declared
categorically that she plotted with her co-appellants the
assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed time
and time again by her repeated illicit relations with her coaccused Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman and their
neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that Teresa,
without a feeling pf shame and unnaturally lacking any
concern for her minor children of their tender age, deserted
several times their family home of live
22
22
with and continue with her immoral relations with appellant
Talingdan with whom at one time she cohabited for more
than three (3) weeks. Her patient husband had to look for her
and to beg her to return each time she left the family abode
for the embrace of her lover
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
bra.
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the
sentence of life imprisonment, with indemnity to the
offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag,
in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the
accused therein, namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma,
the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who,
because no certificate nor any other proof of their marriage
could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged
with parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night
of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and
their children, lived together in their house at Sobosob,
Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the
municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for
Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and
each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2)
different occasions, appellant Nemesio Talingdan had visited
Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and
during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12year old daughter living with them, go down the house and
leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit
relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and
during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged
the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not
be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed,
Teresa had again left their house
23
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978

23
and did not come back for a period of more than three (3)
weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and
Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum, Abra
during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days
before he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a
violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the
latter went down the house and sought the help of the police,
and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity
of Bernardos house and called him to come down; but
Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a
policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the
place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he
would kill him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 oclock the
following Friday morning, Bernardos daughter, Corazon, who
was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa,
meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned
by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latters
house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say
Could he elude a bullet; and when accused Teresa
Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she shoved
her away saying You tell your father that we will kill him.
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a
Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-year old
daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the
kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go down the
house through the stairs and go to the yard where she again
met with the other appellants. As they were barely 3-4
meters from the place where the child was in the batalan,
she heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she
could not discern what they were saying. She was able to
recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp
in the kitchen through the open batalan and she knows
them well for they are all residents of Sobosob and she used
to see them almost everytime. She noted that the appellants
had long guns at the time. Their meeting did not last long;
after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and
proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went
under an avocado tree nearby. As supper was tben ready, the
child called her parents to eat; Bernardo who was in
24
24
the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his daughters
call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa
also excused herself by saying she would first put her small
baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as
she was through she again called her parents to eat. This
time, she informed her father about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He
proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near
the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that
moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of
the batalan. The four accused then climbed the stairs of the
batalan carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo
was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides
and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but
when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying
You call for help and I will kill you, so she kept silent. The
assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazons male
teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came out of her silid later;
she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when
Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers of her
father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to
reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she
ever did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and helped fix
and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy
on which was performed in his own house by the Municipal
Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours
after death; burial took place on the same day. The victims
brother who came from Manila arrived one day after the
burial, followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra
where she resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the
identities of the killers of her father because she was afraid
of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the
circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate
relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter
executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of
the information for murder against the herein five (5)
appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the
defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with Bernardo, was a
resident of
25
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
25
the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two
(2) brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said
brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending
her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she
was still single up to the time of her husbands violent death
on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they
moved to and resided in her husbands place in Sallapadan,
Abra, bringing with them three (3) carabaos and two (2)
horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of
land in said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of
land worked on by Bernardos parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which
was about 4-5 meters away from the house of her parents-inlaw. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and
her husband never maltreated her; although sometimes she
had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his own
mother who wanted that Bernardos earnings be given to her,
(the mother) which Bernardo never did, and at those times,
Bernardo would admonish Teresa You leave me alone. Her
in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not
get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of her other son,
Juanito, in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her
because she did not give him any of the carpentry tools
which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She
never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as
charged by her mother-in-law, and if she ever did leave the
house to go to other places they were only during those
times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar
checks with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips,
she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had
to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode
in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to Bangued
in the morning and always rode back with them to
Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the
weapons carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who
waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the
latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of
the carabaos and horses they brought from Manabo to
Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report
the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to
his policemen, one of whom is Tal26
26
ingdan, so that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa
knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the latters
home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But
illicit relationship had never existed between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the
kitchen of their house cooking their food for supper. Two of
the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband,
Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a plow. He
had to make the plow at that time of the night because at
daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as
the food was ready, she and the children moved over to the
adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper,
and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the
two children were about to follow him to the kitchen when
suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive
gun shots coming from near their batalan. They were all so
terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did
not know yet at that precise time that her husband was shot,
as she and the children were still in the other room on their
way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from
Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain,
and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her
arms. She did not see the killers of her1 husband, as the
night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was in
her arms when the first group of people who responded to
their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of
police, some members of the municipal council and appellant
Tobias who even advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body
of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6) months
pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation
of the surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot
prints on the ground some meters away from the batalan.
He also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said
batalan and on the nothern waitings of the kitchen. Later,
Teresa requested some persons to relay the information
about the death of her husband to her relatives in Manabo,
Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardos
mother and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then
residing, as they have left their house in Sallapadan about
two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to
till there in a case with the natives called Tingians. Two
27
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
27
(2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and
after Bernardos remains was autopsied and he was buried
under their house, they conducted an investigation, but she
did not give them any information relative to the identity of
the persons who shot her husband because she did not really
see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, Juanito
Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz,
Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after the usual nine (9)
days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresas
children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her
mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes to grind

against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their
custody, they had forced the said child to testify against her.
She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had
enemies during his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some
people over the land they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect
that: Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the
killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a policeman of the
place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen who
escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the
latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving
Sallapadan on June 22 and returning thereto four (4) days
later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do
with the said killing. On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be
in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date
of said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called
upon by the chief of police of the place to accompany him in
answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The other
two appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were
in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on that date; they are
tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and had been staying
in her house for a long time. They were sleeping when the
chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who was
then municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of
the shooting. They did not join them, but continued sleeping.
They never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is
about 250-300 meters away from the place of the killing, that
evening of June 24, 1967.
28
28
After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of
the prosecution and defense, We have no doubt in Our mind
that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967, appellants
Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and
Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting in
conspiracy with each other gunned down Bernardo as the

latter was sitting by the supper table in their house at
Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen
committing the offense by the witness Corazon. She was the
one who prepared the food and was watching her father
nearby. They were all known to her, for they were all
residents of Sobosob and she used to see them often before
that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued
firing at her father after they had climbed the stairs of the
batalan, it was Bides who threatened her that he would kill
her if she called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then.
But even before the four appellants went up the batalan,
they already fired shots from downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazons testimony that two nights
before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the deceased
Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel during
which he slapped her several times. She went to seek the
help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a
policeman of their town, who went to the vicinity of their
house and challenged her father to come down, but the latter
refused because the former was a policeman and was armed.
And so, Talingdan left after shouting to her father that If I
will find you someday, I will kill you.
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazons declaration
regarding the amorous relationship between her mother and
appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier above. So also
her testimony that in the morning following the quarrel
between her father and her mother and the threat made by
Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 oclock,
she saw all the herein four male accused-appellants meeting
with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters away
from their house, near where she was then washing clothes,
and that on said occasion she overheard one of them ask
Could (sic) he elude a bullet?, We have our doubts,
however, as to whether or not her mother did say to her in
shoving her away upon seeing her
29
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
29
approach. You tell your father we will kill him. If it were true
that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered
why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when
she again saw the said appellants on the very night in
question shortly before the shooting talking together in
subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms.
Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could
have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related
above and which We have carefully reviewed that appellants
Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and
Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as
charged, and that they committed the said offense in
conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and
in the dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it was
committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of
Corazon suffered from vital contradictions and
inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently
unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As
the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the
witness varied on cross-examination the exact time of some
of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was
before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot;
(2) whether it was before or after seeing her mothers
meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June
23, 1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or
not the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs
when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of
her having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and
coldbloodedly shooting her father to death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing
inherently unnatural in the circumstances related by her. We
agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:
Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the

credibility of Corazon Bagabag by pointing out five supposed
un30
30
natural declarations in her testimony; First, she said that her
father, appeared unconcerned when she informed him of the
presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed by
the prosecuting fiscal, the witness does not know then the
mentality of her father (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March 29,
1968). Second, Corazon also declared that the accused
conversed that Saturday night preceding the day the crime
charged was committed in a lighted place although there was
a place which was unlighted in the same premises. But this
only proves that the accused were too engrossed in their
conversation, unmindful of whether the place where they
were talking was lighted or not, and unmindful even of the
risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides
and Augusto Berras did not fire their guns. Even if these
accused did withhold their fire, however, since they were
privies to the same criminal design, would this alter their
culpability? Should the witness Corazon Bagabag be
discredited for merely stating an observation on her part
which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also
declared that only three bullets from the guns of the four
male accused found their mark on the body of her father. But
would this not merely prove that not all the accused were
good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her father
was still able to talk after he was shot, yet Dr. Jose Dalisan
declared that his death was instantaneous. It is respectfully
submitted, however, that the doctors opinion could yield to
the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag in this regard
without in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as
regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus
viewed, there are no evident badges of falsehood in the
whole breadth and length of Corazon Bagabags testimony.

(Pp. 9-10, Peoples Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of
the killing of her father, if it were not basically true, is hardly
conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years
old when she testified, an age when according to Moore, a
child is, as a rule, but little influenced by the suggestion of
others because he has already got some principles, lying is
distasteful to him, because he thinks it is mean, he is no
stranger to the sentiment of self-respect, and he never loses
an opportunity of being right in what he affirms. (II Moore on
Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation has been
offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to
three other men, aside from Telingdan whom she knew had
relations
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VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
31
with her mother, were she merely making-up her account of
how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been
shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony
was taught to her by her uncle, His Honor pointed out that
said testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she
was constant, firm and steady in her answers to questions
directed to her. We have Ourselves read said testimony and
We are convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the
witness. We cannot, therefore, share appellants
apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the
grave imputation of a mothers infidelity and her suggested
participation in the killing of her husband, would if
consistently impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a
vicious poison enough to make the child, right or wrong, a
willing instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked
mother. We feel Corazon was too young to be affected by the
infidelity of her mother in the manner the defense suggests.
We are convinced from a reading of her whole testimony that
it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too

consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to
substantially maintain throughout her stay on the witness
stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long
cross-interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the
event she had described. We reject the possibility of her
having been brainwashed or coached to testify as she did.
The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal
brief do not merit serious consideration. Anent these alleged
errors, suffice it to say that the following refutations of the
Solicitor General are well taken:
Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to
consider the testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the distance
between the assailants and the deceased could have been 4
to 5 meters when the shots were fired. But the appellants
overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the
first shot was fired, the gunman was about 3-1/2 meters from
her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968), which
disproves the theory of the defense that the killers fired from
a stonepile under an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away
from the deceaseds house. Appellants also insist that the
Court a quo ignored the testimonies of defense witness Cpl.
Bonifacio Hall and
32
32
Chief of Police Rafael Berras on their having found bullet
marks on the southern walling of the house of the deceased,
as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the
aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however, made
the following apt observations on the testimony of defense
witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:
This witness stated that we went to the house of the
deceased to investigate the crime after the deceased had
already been buried; that he investigated the widow as well
as the surroundings of the house where the deceased was
shot. He found empty shells of carbine under the avocado
tree. He stated that the batalan of the house of the

deceased has a siding of about 1-1/2 meters high and that he
saw bullet holes on the top portion of the wall directly
pointing to the open door of the batalan of the house of the
deceased. When the court asked the witness what could have
been the position of the assailant in shooting the deceased,
he stated that the assailant might have been standing. The
assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the top
portion of the sidings of the batalan because the batalan is
only 1-1/2 meters high, and further, when asked as to the
level of the ground in relation to the top sidings of the
batalan, he answered that it is in the same level with the
ground. If this is true, it is impossible for the assailant to
make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the batalan,
hence, the testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of
no consequence and without merit. The court is puzzled to
find a PC corporal testifying for the defense in this case,
which case was filed by another PC sergeant belonging to the
same unit and assigned in the same province of Abra (pp.
324-325, rec.).
As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the
shooting, suffice it to state that no testimony has been
presented, expert or otherwise, linking said shells to the
bullets that were fired during the shooting incident. Surmises
in this respect surely would not overcome the positive
testimony of Corazon Bagabag that the accused shot her
father as they came up the batalan of their house. (Pp. 1112, Peoples Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they
were not at the scene of the crime when it happened. This
defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial court, but it
was properly brushed aside as untenable. In their brief, no
mention thereof is made, which goes to show that in the
mind
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VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
33
of the defense itself, it cannot be successfully maintained

and they do not, therefore, insist on it. Nonetheless, it would
do well for this Court to specifically affirm the apt pertinent
ratiocination of His Honor in reference thereto thus:
This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the
court, can not stand firmly in the face of a positive and
unwavering testimony of the prosecution witness who
pointed out to the accused as the authors of the crime. This
is so because, first, according to the three accusedBides,
Tobias and Berrasthey were sleeping at 8:00 oclock that
night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only 250 meters
away from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the sake of
argument, but without admitting, that they were already
sleeping at 8:00 oclock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan,
Corazon Bagabag clearly stated that her father was gunned
down at sunset which is approximately between 6:00 and
6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and
Bides could have committed the crime and went home to
sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of
the crime. According to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs.
Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the
victim. Second, the three accused have failed miserably to
present the testimony of Mrs. Bayongan the owner of the
house where they slept that night to corroborate or bolster
their defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants
Brief.)
x
x
x
Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused,
also in his defense of alibi, stated that on June 22, 1967, he
accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of Sallapadan to
Bangued, together with policeman Cresencio Martinez for the
purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued. They started in
Sallapadan in the early morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived
in Bangued the same day. According to him, he went to
accompany the mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued
Cathedral and after conducting the mayor to the cursillo
house, he went to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor
Banawa near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra. From that
time, he never saw the mayor until after they went home to
Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he
could have returned anytime on the evening of June 22 or
anytime before the commission of the offense to Sallapadan
and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then returned to
Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to
Sallapadan on the 26th.
34
34
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was
alleged to have been accompanied by witness-accused is still
living and very much alive. As a matter of fact, Mayor
Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and
also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who
accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and
still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not the mayor and
the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the
testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia, Abra, and
a member of the Cursillo Movement, was presented as
rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the witness stand, he
stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of
Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to
23, 1966, at the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan, Abra,
and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact, Mayor
Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on
October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen in his Guide Book
where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears because
they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if
not in full, the testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp.
29A-30A, Annex of Appellants Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa
Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General has submitted a
recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as
wholly innocent in law as she appears to the Counsel of the

People. It is contended that there is no evidence proving that
she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband
because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her
part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to
his death. If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is mere
cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof on her part,
which it is argued is less than what is required for her
conviction as a co-conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil.
1068. We do not see it exactly that way.
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the
conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason,
she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants.
Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her
husband Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the
planning and
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VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
35
preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it
was going to be done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15
Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it either by herself alone or together with her coappellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain
surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really ineludible. After
all, she had been having her own unworthy ways with him for
quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his
complete elimination. Why go to so much trouble for
something she was already enjoying, and not even very
surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had
occasion to make to Teresa one time was If you become
pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child. The worst
he did to her for all her faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal
liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that
she is at the very least an accessory to the offense
committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when
her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting,
she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the
assailants of her father. When Corazon identified appellants
Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did
not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to
anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, Dont tell it
to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody. Later,
when the peace officers who repaired to their house to
investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the
information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no
suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual
shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her
attitude regarding her co-appellants conspiracy, known to
her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute concealing or assisting in
the escape of the principal in the crime which makes her
liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by
appellants was murder qualified by treachery. It being
obvious
36
36
that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and
without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of
their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed
treachery to insure success in attaining their malevolent
objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted
with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill
Bernardo Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to
work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday
evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they
had motiveTalingdans taking up the cudgels for his
paramour, Teresaand enough time to meditate, and desist,
if they were not resolved to proceed with their objective.
Finally, they committed the offense in the dwelling of the

offended party.
In these premises, the crime committed by the male
appellants being murder, qualified by treachery, and
attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and that the offense was committed in
the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no
alternative under the law but to impose upon them the
capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is
hereby found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond
reasonable, doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan,
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime
of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any
mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby
sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same
murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor
as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed,
with costs against appellants.
Barredo, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C. J., concurs, with the observations, however, that
the evidence points to the appellant Teresa Domogma as a
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VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
37
co-principal and that she should therefore also be held guilty
of murder and sentenced to death.
Fernando, J., no part.
Teehankee, J., concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr.
Justice Makasiar insofar as the penal liability of the accused
Teresa Domogma is concerned.
Makasiar, J., dissenting in part in a separate opinion.
Antonio, J., did not take part.

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting in part:
I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa
Domogma who should be convicted, not merely as an
accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted the death
penalty, is concerned. A marriage certificate is not
indispensable to establish the fact of marriage; because the
presumption that the deceased and the accused Teresa were
married subsists by reason of the fact that they had been
living together for about thirteen (13) years as evidenced by
the birth of the child-witness Corazon, who was 12 years old
at the time her father was killed on June 24, 1967 by the
accused-appellants, and who was 13 years of age when she
testified. They have other children aside from Corazon.
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an
accessory after the fact has been clearly demonstrated by
the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who declared
categorically that she plotted with her co-appellants the
assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed time
and time again by her repeated illicit relations with her coaccused Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman and their
neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that Teresa,
without a feeling for shame and unnaturally lacking any
concern for her minor children of tender age, deserted
several times their family home to live with and continue with
her immoral relations with appellant Talingdan with whom at
one time she cohabited for more than three (3) weeks. Her
patient husband had to look for her and to beg her to return
each time she left the family abode for the embrace of her
lover.
38
38
We should believe Corazons statement that between 10 and
11 oclock Friday morning, she saw her mother, appellant
Teresa, meeting with her other co-appellants in a small hut
owned by her father some 300 to 400 meters away from the
latters house near the creek where she was then washing
clothes; that she heard one of the conspirators say Could he
elude a bullet?; that when her mother noticed her presence,
her mother shoved her away saying, You tell your father that
we will kill him; that in the evening of the following day,
Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in
their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet
the other appellants in the yard about 3 to 4 meters from
where she was in the batalan; that she heard them
conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to recognize
all of them by the light coming from the kitchen lamp through
the open batalan; that she knows all of them very well as
they are all residents of their barrio and she used to see them
almost everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed
with long guns; that their meeting did not last long; that after
about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up the
house and proceed to her room while the other appellants hid
under an avocado tree nearby; that when supper was ready
she called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her
call but continued working on a plow while her mother
excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby
to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after which she again
called her parents to eat; that about this time she informed
her father about the presence of persons downstairs but her
father paid no heed to what she said; that her father
proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door
while Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at the that
moment her father was shot from below the stairs of the
batalan; that the four accused then went up the stairs of
the batalan with their long guns and, upon seeing that her
father was still alive, appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired at
him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help,
appellant Bides warned her saying You call for help and I will
kill you; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the
east.
39
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978
39
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be
accorded belief in the same way that credence was given to
her statement that, upon her mothers inquiry immediately
after the shooting as to whether she recognized the
assailants of her father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother
that she identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and
Bides as the culprits; for which reason her mother warned her
Dont tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to
somebody.
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and
Teresa had a quarrel during which Bernardo slapped Teresa
several times by reason of which Teresa left the house and
sought the help of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant
Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come down. When
Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman
and was then armed, appellant Talingdan left after warning
Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active
cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against the life of her
husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa was a
paramour of appellant Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom
from her husband, the victim, so that she could enjoy the
company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral
compunction in deserting her family and her children for the
company of her lover. As heretofore stated, she did this
several times and continued to do so until the violent death
of her husband even as she was carrying a six-month old
baby in her womb, the paternity of which her husband
denied.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.An assail on the credibility of witnesses which gives
detailed reasons therefor with page references to the oral
evidence in the record deserves more consideration by the
trial court and may not simply be cast aside by a sweeping
statement of a general principle of evidence. (Tagoranao vs.
Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 490).
In the absence of improper motives, the testimonies of

40
40
witnesses may be given full faith and credit. (People vs.
Mercado, 38 SCRA 168).
The general initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to
volunteer information about a criminal case, and their
unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into a criminal
investigation is common and has been judicially declared not
to affect credibility. (People vs. Kipte, 42 SCRA 199).
Direct testimony as to the fact of stabbing of the victim
overcomes the absence of real evidence as to the resulting
wounds. (People vs. Jovellano, 56 SCRA 156).
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses may be considered
suspicious not only where there is absolute concurrence and
dovetailing as to principal points and paucity of particulars
and details, but also where there was evidence that they
were paid and taught what they should testify to. (People vs.
Alviar, 59 SCRA 136).
An admission by an accused made to his friend that he
committed the crime charged is evidence against him.
(People vs. Villar, Jr., 58 SCRA 512).
The circumstance that the deceased victim failed to mention
the name of the accused in her dying declaration is of no
moment. (People vs. Genoguin, 56 SCRA 181).
Killing is qualified by abuse of superiority when unarmed and
defenseless victim was liquidated by three armed persons.
(People vs. Cunanan, 75 SCRA 15.)
The aggravating circumstance of the abuse of disguise in the
perpetration of a crime should be considered against the
accused who used a mask to hide his identity. (People vs.
Ragas, 44 SCRA 152.)
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute
alevosia where the aggressor did not adopt a mode of attack
intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself.
(People vs. Satorre, 74 SCRA 106.)
Where different acts of hacking were performed by different

persons, the crimes committed cannot be considered
complex. (People vs. Bakang, 36 SCRA 840.)
Positive identification of the accused by several eyewitnesses
that he killed the victim established accuseds guilt to a
moral certainty. (People vs. Cunanan, 75 SCRA 15.)
The killing is murder because of the presence of abuse of
discretion, the killing may be regarded also as treacherous
(as concluded by the trial court), treachery, which was not
alleged in the information, cannot be separately appreciated
as generic aggravating circumstance. It is merged with abuse
of superiority. x x x The manner in which abuse of superiority
was alleged in the information is sufficient to qualify the
killing as murder. What is essential is that it was alleged, and,
having been alleged, it could be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance. (People vs. Cagod, 81 SCRA 110.) People vs.
Talingdan, 84 SCRA 19, No. L-32126 July 6, 1978
G.R. No. 84163. October 19, 1989. *

LITO VINO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Evidence is clear that
petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape hence his
liability is that of an accessory.Petitioner was charged as a
principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under
Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other
categories of the persons responsible for the commission of
the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory.
There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been
committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie
Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present
during its commission or must have known its commission is
the only logical conclusion considering that immediately
thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding
an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly
thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada,
attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively
assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioners liability is that of
an accessory.
Same; Same; There is no variance between the offense
charged and the offense proved; Case at bar.This is not a
case of a variance between the offense charged and the
offense proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is
charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved.
Same; Same; Same; Neither an instance where after trial has
begun, it appears that there was a mistake in charging the
proper offense.In the same light, this is not an instance
where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a
mistake in charging the proper offense, and the defendant
cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other
offense necessarily included therein, in which case the
defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a
good cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be

charged and made to answer for the proper offense.
Same; Same; Accomplice; An accused can be validly
convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an
information charging him as a
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
627
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 19, 1989
627
Vino vs. People
principal.In this case, the correct offense of murder was
charged in the information. The commission of the said crime
was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to
the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or
complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being
held responsible as a principal in the information, the
evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is
merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility
necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly
information charging him as a principal.
Same; Same; Same; As long as the commission of the offense
can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal.The next issue that
must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory
can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate
charge against the principal. The answer is also in the
affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the
principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each
other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence the determination of the liability of
the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of
that of the principal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The commission of the crime of
murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an
accessory was established; Case at bar.In the present case,

the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility
of the petitioner as an accessory was established. By the
same token there is no doubt that the commission of the
same offense had been proven in the separate case against
Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same
judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court
held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly
established. It observed that only Julius Tejada identified
Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by
Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other
witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian, who were
listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony
of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The identity of the assailant is of
no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of
the accessory.Although in this case involving Vino the
evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as
two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven
by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above
discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court
628
628
Vino vs. People
was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the
man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the
trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even
adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an
accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that
he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of
the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material
significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the
accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner of the resolution of this Court dated January 18,
1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding
of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of
the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate
proceeding.
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of March 21, 1985,
Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion,
Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to
watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the
father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots.
Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying
that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away
so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from
Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were
also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was
crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The
neighbors responded by turning on their lights and the street
lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting
Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar
riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one
driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite.
Upon reaching Ernestos house, they stopped to watch
Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his
companions. Thereafter, the two left.
629
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 19, 1989
629
Vino vs. People
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of
Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-mortem
statement. In the said statement which the victim signed
with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was identified as his

assailant.
The autopsy report of his body shows the following
Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6- ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left.
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax1
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in
a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordoo in the
Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on
March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of
Salazar to the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAG0)
inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case
against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to
the fiscals office who then filed an information charging Vino
of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales,
Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence
in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an
answer. On January 21, 1986,2 a decision was rendered by
the trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime
of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional
as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. He
was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and
to pay the costs.
_______________
1 Exhibits A and A-1.
2 Page 13, Rollo.
630
630
Vino vs. People
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having
been denied, he interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming
the judgment of the lower court.3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following
grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN
ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED
IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING
CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR
THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL TO BE
CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED
UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE
VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE
STATE AND THAT THE ESCAPE MUST BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL
OF THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS.4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals,
the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to the
civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He
was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial
Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In
a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988,
petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was
acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on
August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition.
The comment was submitted by the Solicitor General in
behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court
resolved to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to
sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the

present motion for reconsid_______________
3 Justice Bonifacio A. Cacdac, Jr., was the ponente, concurred
in by Justices Floreliana Castro-Bartolome and Ricardo L.
Pronove, Jr.
4 Pages 18 to 19, Rollo.
631
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 19, 1989
631
Vino vs. People
eration to which the respondents were again required to
comment. The required comment having been submitted, the
motion is now due for resolution.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner
was charged in the information as a principal for the crime of
murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The
answer is in the affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of
the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal
Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for
the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and
the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder
had been committed and that the evidence tended to show
that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was
present during its commission or must have known its
commission is the only logical conclusion considering that
immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with
Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when
they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto
and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that
petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioners
liability is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged
and the offense proved or established by the evidence, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is

charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved.5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has
begun, it appears that there was a mistake in charging the
proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the
offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included
therein, in which case the defendant must not be discharged
if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody,
so that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper
offense.6
_______________
5 Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
632
632
Vino vs. People
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the
information. The commission of the said crime was
established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the
offense committed. The variance is in the participation or
complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being
held responsible as a principal in the information, the
evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is
merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility
necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly
information charging him as a principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the
petitioner as an accessory right then and there. The degree
of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the
evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the
substantial rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the
trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result
of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is
also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of

the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from
each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be
duly established in evidence the determination of the liability
of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of
that of the principal.
The third question is thisconsidering that the alleged
principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction of the
petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo,7 a case involving
the crime of theft, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the
acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance
of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the
accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in
fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza,8 where this
Court held in an arson case that the acquittal of the principal
must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it
was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire
was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for
the
_______________
7 32 Phil. 377 (1915).
8 23 Phil. 194 (1912).
633
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 19, 1989
633
Vino vs. People
conviction of the accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder
and the responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory was
established. By the same token there is no doubt that the
commission of the same offense had been proven in the
separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal.
However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an
accessory. The trial court held that the identity of the
assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only

Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on
the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is
uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada
and Renato Parvian, who were listed in the information, who
can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not
presented by the prosecution.
The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying
declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as his assailant
on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the
identity of Salazar to his father and brother who came to his
aid immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also
deplored the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement
agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug
recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty
armalite bullet empty shells recovered at the crime scene
and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of
Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following observation:
There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due
to the ineptitude of the law enforcement agencies to gather
material and important evidence and the seeming lack of
concern of the public prosecutor to direct the production of
such evidence for the successful prosecution of the case.9
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is
predicated on the failure of the prosecution to adduce the
quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he
was not positively identified as the person who was seen
holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
_______________
9 Pages 71 to 74, Rollo.
634
634
Vino vs. People
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen
driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as passenger
holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime
immediately after the commission of the crime of murder.

The commission of the crime and the participation of the
principal or assailant, although not identified, was
established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory
can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the
assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal
died or escaped before he could be tried and sentenced.
Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the
commission of the offense and the responsibility of the
accused as an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no,
he should be held criminally liable as an accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to
show that the assailant was Salazar, as two witnesses saw
him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the
separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he
was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he
was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on
the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against
Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his
defense, his liability as such an accessory was established
beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of
the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the
assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the
prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be
identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is
indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and
this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., See dissent.
Grio-Aquino, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person
may be held liable as an accessory for helping in the escape
of
635
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 19, 1989

635
Vino vs. People
the principal even if the latter is himself found not guilty. The
examples given are quite convincing. However, I do not think
they apply in the case at bar, which is sui generis and not
covered by the general principle. As Justice Aquino points
out, Vio was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who
was named as the principal at Vios trial. At his own trial,
the same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient
identification. Vio was convicted of helping in the escape
not of an unnamed principal but, specifically, of Jessie
Salazar. As Salazar himself has been exonerated, the effect is
that Vio is now being held liable for helping an innocent
man, which is not a crime. Vios conviction should therefore
be reversed.
GRIO-AQUINO, J., Dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponentes opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of
the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories.Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any
of the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit
by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the
crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to
take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted

even if the principal is acquitted, as where the principal was
found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil.
377) or the son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84
Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or
destroyed the body of the crime or the effects or instruments
636
636
Vino vs. People
may be convicted if the commission of the crime has been
proven, even if the principal has not been apprehended and
convicted.
But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored,
concealed the principal or assisted in his escape, may not be
convicted unless the principal, whom he allegedly harbored,
concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified and
convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev. Penal Code, for
allegedly having assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar,
the alleged killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar
(who faced trial separately and subsequently) was acquitted,
ironically by the same court that convicted Vino earlier. The
basis for Vinos conviction as accessory in the crime of
murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in his
tricycle after Tejada was killed. Since the trial court acquitted
Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to prove that he
was the killer of Tejada, then Vinos having driven him in his
tricycle did not constitute the act of assisting in the escape of
a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and
U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in the ponencia are not
in point. In the Villaluz case the charge against accused as an
accessory to theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code, for having concealed the
effects of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen
watch. Although the principal, a young housegirl, was

acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of
discernment, the accessory was nevertheless convicted.
In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was
charged as an accessory under paragraph 2 for not reporting
the fire to the authorities, was acquitted because the crime
of arson was not proven, the fire being accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 is directly linked to and inseparable from that of
the principal. Even if as in this case, the crime (murder) was
proven but the identity of the murderer was not (for the
principal accused was acquitted by the trial court), the
petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his
tricycle to escape from the scene of the crime, may not be
convicted as an accessory to the
637
VOL. 178, OCTOBER 19, 1989
637
Licup vs. University of San Carlos
murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger was not
proven to be the murderer. The accessory may not be
convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this
instance, the principle that the accessory follows the
principal appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.
Motion for reconsideration denied.
Notes.In case of doubt as to the participation of an
accused, the lesser liability should prevail. (People vs.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498; People vs. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514;
People vs. Bongo, 55 SCRA 547.)
Lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the
doubt whether they had acted as principals or accomplices in
the perpetration of the offense, impels the Court to resolve in
their favor the question, by holding that they were guilty of
the milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilty as mere
accomplices. (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158.) Vino vs.
People, 178 SCRA 626, G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO
ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Appeal; Matters neither alleged in the
pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be
ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme
Court.It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters
neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the
proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on
appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have
stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v.
Court of Appeals: If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes
raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with
more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded
when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the appellate court.
Criminal Procedure; Affidavits; An affidavit of desistance is
merely an additional ground to buttress the accuseds
defenses not the sole consideration that can result in
acquittal.It must be stressed that during the trial
proceedings of the rape case against the ac_______________
* EN BANC.
683

683
People vs. Echegaray
cused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission

made by the victim herself in open court that she had signed
an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, strongly
pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against
the accused because the latter might do the same sexual
assaults to other women. Thus, this is one occasion where
an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor
inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in
court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the
accusedappellant. We have explained in the case of People v.
Gerry Ballabare, that: As pointed out in People v. Lim (190
SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the accusedappellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional
ground to buttress the accuseds defenses, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be
other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction
or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony
given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge.
Constitutional Law; Death Penalty; Our courts are not the fora
for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in
specific and welldefined criminal acts.Consequently, we
have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the
fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of
the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in
specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in
the 1951 case of Limaco that: x x x there are quite a
number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute
books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions. and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of
People v. Veneracion.
Same; Same; Congress has the power to re-impose the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests

in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. This power is
not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress,
for it is subject to a clear showing of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. The constitutional exercise of this
limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails: (1) that
Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous
crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only
crimes
684
684
that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which
latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance
of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the
crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that
Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Same; Same; Definition of Heinous Crimes.In the second
whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the
definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause
provides that: x x x crimes punishable by death under this
Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society. Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion

in People v. Alicando, traced the etymological root of the
word heinous to the Early Spartans word, haineus,
meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from
the Greek prefix haton, denoting acts so hatefully or
shockingly evil.
Same; Same; R.A. No. 7659; Insofar as the element of
heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death.
As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable
than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time
to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is
when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death
sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out
the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion, This is
not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as
establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to
validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No.
7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.
685

685
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and
yardstick for the determination of the legal situation
warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or
repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to

aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No, 7659, while it
specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime
provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of
death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
construing R.A. No, 7659 in pari materia with the Revised
Penal Code, death may be imposed when: (1) aggravating
circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to
make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code
regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2)
other circumstances attend the commission of the crime
which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of
death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the
guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize
circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime
as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that
may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent
that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The
legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law
each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is
sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and
yardstick for the determination of the legal situation
warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing
danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the
possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but
not heinously criminal, R.A. No. 7659 is replete with both
procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the
correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
Same; Same; Same; Furman did not outlaw the death penalty
because it was cruel and unusual per se.The issue in
Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death
penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury.
Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on

the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on
the discrimination against the black accused who is meted
out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the
unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to
impose the death
686
686
penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist
movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was
trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting
against racial discrimination. x x x Furman, thus, did not
outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual
per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all
discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so
because the discretion which these statutes vested in the
trial-judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to
lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of
personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the
part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Remedial Law; Appeal; Same; Same; Determination of when

to prescribe the death penalty now lies with the sound
discretion of the law-making authority, the Congress of the
Philippines subject to the conditions that the fundamental law
has set forth.The determination of when to prescribe the
death penalty now lies with the sound discretion of the law-
making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to

the conditions that the fundamental law has set forth; viz: (1)
That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital
offense must involve a heinous crime.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Remedial Law; Appeal; The automatic commutation or

reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant
as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that
while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains
death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus
may no longer be carried out.Section 19, Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall
not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Italics supplied) The
second and third sentences of the above provision are new
and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the
1986 Freedom Constitution. They proscribe the imposition
of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, Congress provides for
687

687
it, and reduced any death penalty already imposed to
reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective
aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a
retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the

lesser penalty of imprisonment). This two-fold aspect is
significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely
suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact
completely abolished it from the statute books. The
automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of
any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the
Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of
an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty
ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our
Constitution.
Same; Same; R.A. No. 7659 did not change the nature or the
elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the
special laws.But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the
elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the
special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe.
Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which
was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for
the more severe sanction, either collectively for all the
offenses or individually for each of them. Generally, it merely
reinstated the concept of and the method by .which the
death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987,
when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is
convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of
which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not
outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
Same; Same; R.A. 7659 merely amended certain laws to
prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the
court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating
circumstances.As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely
amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum
imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence
or absence of aggravating circumstances. Theres nothing
really new that Congress did which it could not have
otherwise done had such provision not been included in our
fundamental law. In other words, it just reinstated capital
punishment for crimes which were already punishable with
death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With

the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, no
new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses
punished by death under said law were already so punishable
by the Revised Penal Code and by special laws. In short, Sec.
19, Article III of the Constitution did not have any impact
688
688
upon the legislative action. It was effectively ignored by
Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme
Court.
Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was

inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victims grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find
no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb
our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the
defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of
accused-appellant. The motion raises the following grounds
for the reversal of the death sentence;
689

Free Legal Assistance Group, Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force for accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant

case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having
been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death
689
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted
since the pardon by the offended party and her mother
before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to his
criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the
commission of the offense in the Complaint and throughout
trial prevented the accused-appellant from preparing an
adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the

accusedappellant was the father or stepfather of the
complainant and in affirming the sentence of death against
him on this basis.
690
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due

process and manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right

to effective assistance of counsel and to due process, due to
the incompetence of counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the
death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation
of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises
three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters
relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellants former counsel; and (3)
purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
I
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither

alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings
below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before
the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our
Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:1
________________
1 249 SCRA 303, 307308.
690

If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue
only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason
should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially
raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the appellate court.
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the
rape case against the accused-appellant before the sala of
then presiding judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, the defense
attempted to prove that:
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere
concoction of the alleged victims maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly
penetrated the alleged victims private part; and
d) the accused was in Paraaque during the time of the
alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for
automatic review, the accused-appellant reiterated as
grounds for exculpation:
a) the ill-motive of the victims maternal grandmother in
prompting her grandchild to file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which
could not have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the
victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new

counsel of the accused-appellant reveals that in their
messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment of conviction,
we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the following
matters:
a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which
acted as a bar to the criminal prosecution for rape against
the accused-appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of
the offense in the Complaint which deprived the accusedappellant from adequately defending himself;
691

691
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying
circumstance that placed the accused-appellant within the
coverage of the Death Penalty Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited
by the trial court during the trial of the rape case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for
reconsideration, the only legitimate issue that We can tackle
relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which touches on the
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with
the prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the
issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any time, even during appeal.2
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the
rape case against the accused-appellant, it appeared that
despite the admission made by the victim herself in open
court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she,

nevertheless, strongly pointed out that she is not
withdrawing the charge against the accused because the
latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women."3
Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance
must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in
her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing
the rape charges against the accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,4
that:
As pointed out in People v. Lim (190 SCRA 706 [1990], which
is also cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of
desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the
accuseds defenses, not the sole consideration that can result
in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when
coupled with the retraction or
________________
2 See Amigo v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 382, 390 [1996];

De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 166, 172 [1995].
3 RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 19.
4 G.R. No. 108871 promulgated on November 19, 1996.
692
692
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony
given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge."5
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as

defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot
outweigh the positive identification and convincing
testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of
desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as
earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal
prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on
the trial courts jurisdiction over the case.
Arambulo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 589, 601 [1993];

Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980].
II
693
7 Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 274, 279280 [1993].

693

The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence
or mistakes of his counsel.6 One of the recognized exceptions
to this rule is gross incompetency in a way that the
defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from
having his day in court to defend himself.7
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the
accused-appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute
incompetency had amply exercised the required ordinary
diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected
of him relative to his clients defense. As the rape case was
being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time he was
assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings
thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the
AccusedAppellants Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration
of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in
support of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross
incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to
present any
________________
5 People v. Pimentel, 118 SCRA 695 [1982]; citing People v.

Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469 [1960].
6 Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 245 SCRA 384, 389 [1995];
argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he

acted haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the
prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to
exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The alleged
errors committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by
the new counsel could not have overturned the judgment of
conviction against the accused-appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of

death as punishment for violation of law or custom, religious
or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that our
forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and
that initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a
wrong done to a private party or his family, not to punish in
the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing
sensitization throughout the later generations against past
barbarity and the institutionalization of state power under the
rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual
person with inherent human rights recognized and protected
by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve the common
weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to

secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant
to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal
laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be
committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies
enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the
criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped
debating on the causes of criminal behavior and the
purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws have
been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the
enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932,
this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death
penalty pro694
694
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor

excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United
States Supreme Court said that punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life. 13
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our
courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the
morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law
itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal
acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that:
x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly
believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or
unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty
remains in the statute
________________

visions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified
crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886,
though, capital punishment had entered our legal system
through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of
the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form
of a constitutional question of whether or not the death
penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and
unusual punishments. We unchangingly answered this
question in the negative in the cases of Harden v. Director of
Prisons,8 People v. Limaco,9 People v. Camano,10 People v.
Puda11 and People v. Marcos.12 In Harden, we ruled:
8 81 Phil. 741 [1948].

9 88 Phil. 36 [1951].
10 115 SCRA 688 [1982].
11 133 SCRA 1 [1984].
12 147 SCRA 204 [1987].
13 81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948].
695

695
People us. Echegaray
books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its

imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions."14
14 88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951].
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v.

Veneracion.15
696
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the
crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during
times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity,
robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The list
of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to
the emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at
the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the AntiSubversion Law, which carried the death penalty for leaders
of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses
were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking
Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law.
During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was
enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes
involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the
Marcos regime and led to the nullification of the 1973
Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened
following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was
catapulted to power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found
freedom of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional
Commissioners grouped themselves into working committees
among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B.
Laurel, Jr. as Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as
Vice-Chairman.
_______________
15 249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].
696
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee
draft of the proposed bill of rights to the rest of the
commission. What is now Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was
originally worded as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death
penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion
perpetua.
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the
result of a consensus among the members of the Bill of
Rights Committee that the death penalty should be
abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they
proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be done
whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution or
by the legislatureand the majority voted for a constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on
whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but
rather on whether the abolition should be done by the
Constitutionin which case it cannot be restored by the
legislatureor left to the legislature. The majority voted for
the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the
reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict
and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it

is never carried out. There is no evidence that the death
penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be
destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved.
Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too
presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty
as an institution has been there from time immemorial should
not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable
than an institution intended precisely to serve human life. So,
basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were
presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the
death penalty."16
The original wording of Article III, Section 19(1), however, did
not survive the debate that it instigated. Commissioner
Lugum L. Uka, Commissioner and now Associate Justice

Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro,
Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian
Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and
Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it
succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner
Teodoro C. Bacani:
BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it
clear that the church has never condemned the right of the
state to inflict capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not
deprived of the right even from a moral standpoint of
imposing or prescribing capital punishment.
________________
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the

Catholic point of view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
16 Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p. 676.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state

has the delegated authority from the Creator to impose the
death penalty under certain circumstances.
697

697
Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that never in our history
has there been a higher incidence of crime and that
criminality was at its zenith during the last decade."17
Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an unwillingness to
absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system
and leave society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of
crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner
Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, although we abolish
the death penalty in the Constitution, we should afford some
amount of flexibility to future legislation,"18 and his concern
was amplified by the interpellatory remarks of Commissioner
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it
to do what is needed for the sake of the common good, but
the issue at stake is whether or not under the present
circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be
denied.
_______________
17 Id., p. 678.
18 Id., p. 680.
698
698

BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a
particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not
that delegation is forever under all circumstances.
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature
to determine, under certain specified conditions or
circumstances, whether the retention of the death penalty or
its abolition would be for the common good. I do not believe
this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a
few days or even a month, determine a positive provision in
the Constitution that would prohibit even the legislature to
prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous crimes, the
most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and
aggravating circumstances."19
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the
beleaguered provision. The move to add the phrase, unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the national
assembly provides for the death penalty, came from
Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes.
Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations
even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide
this matter in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of
our legislature. Arguments pro and con have been given x x
x. But my stand is, we should leave this to the discretion of
the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward
because we will, in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece
of legislation and after repealing this piece of legislation, tell
the legislature that we have repealed the law and that the
legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not
worthy of a constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the
matter of the death penalty to the legislature, let us leave it
completely to the discretion of the legislature, but let us not
have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in

the Revised Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We will
now revoke or repeal these pieces of legislation by means of
the Constitution, but at the same time say that it is up to the
legislature to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and
so we, I think we should leave this matter to the legislature to
enact
________________
19 Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p. 712.

699

699
statutes depending on the changing needs of the times. Let
us entrust this completely to the legislature composed of
representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit
the fact that we are not elected by the people and if we are
going to entrust this to the legislature, let us not be halfbaked nor halfhearted about it. Let us entrust it to the
legislature 100 percent.20
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with
twenty-three (23) commissioners voting in favor of the
amendment and twelve (12) voting against it, followed by
more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III,
Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous

crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity
of the death penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and
certain special criminal laws and the state of the scale of
penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty
for what used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,21
we stated that in view of the abolition of the death penalty
under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua"22
thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period.
The constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed,
limited the penalty for murder to only the remaining periods,
to wit, the minimum and the medium, which we then, in
People v.
_______________
20 Id., p. 744
21 155 SCRA 327 [1987].
22 Id., p. 335.
reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half

of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and
reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the
three-grade scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People
v. Muoz,26 however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases
and after extended discussion, we concluded that the
doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of
the framers. The crux of the issue was whether or not Article
III, Section 19(1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if
it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty
should replace the old one where the death penalty
constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition can
be read from said constitutional provision and the death
penalty is only suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the
institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total
inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We
thus ruled in Muoz:
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the
Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited
the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the
minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into
three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme
intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that
Article III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion
perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining
penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that

there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that
the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already
________________
Masangkay,23 People v. Atencio 24 and People v. Intino 25

divided into three new periods, to wit, the lower half of
23 155 SCRA 113 [1987].
700
700
24 156 SCRA 242 [1987].

25 165 SCRA 637 [1988].
26 170 SCRA 107 [1989].
upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the

Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the
policy issue of death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
701

701
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough."27
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III,
Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which
the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death
penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the
Constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate
proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the
decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third
reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of
arguments for and against capital punishment, the Members
of the Senate voted on the policy issue of death penalty. The
vote was explained, thus:
SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection,

the Body suspended the Rules of the Senate. Thereafter,
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the

Senate would vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo
stated that a vote of Yes would mean a vote in favor of death
as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would
be a vote against the reincorporation of death penalty in the
scale of penalties in the Revised Penal Code.
________________
27 Id., p. 121.
702
702
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body
would first decide the question whether or not death penalty
should be reimposed, and thereafter, a seven-man
committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill in
accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides
in favor of the death penalty, the Chair said that the
committee would specify the crimes on which death penalty
would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the

nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty
on at least one crime, and that certain refinements on how
the penalty would be imposed would be left to the discretion
of the seven-man committee.
heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if

so, is there a compelling reason to impose the
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA
703
703

In reply to Senator Taadas query, the Chair affirmed that
even if a senator would vote yes on the basic policy issue,
he could still vote no on the imposition of the death penalty
on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on

the basic policy issue of whether or not the death penalty
would be included in the scale of penalties found in Article 27
of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted down, the
Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891
pursuant to the Rules, but if approved, a special committee,
as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be appointed and
whatever course it will take will depend upon the mandate
given to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentinos observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not
death as a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of
penalties provided by the Revised Penal Code. However, he
pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death penalty,
the Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the
crime for which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed
death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot

be imposed simply because the crime is heinous. 28
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative
votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate
has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A
nineperson committee was subsequently created to draft the
compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate of the
committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main
debate in the committee would be the determination of the
crime to be considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the
Special Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his
Sponsorship Speech. He began with an explanation as to why
the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by
amending the Revised Penal Code and other special penal
laws and includes provisions that do not define or punish
crimes but serve purposes allied to the re-imposition of the
death penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:
x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing
the death penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the
Special Committee the work of drafting a bill, a compromise
bill that would be the subject for future deliberations of this
Body, the Committee had to consider that the death penalty
was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away

with the death penalty, unless Congress should, for
compelling reasons reimpose that penalty on heinous crimes,
it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code that was
affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death
penalty, as provided in the Revised Penal Code, would be
considered as having been repealedall provisions on the
death penalty would be considered as having been repealed
by the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling
reasons, reimpose such penalty on heinous crimes.
Therefore, it was not only one article but many articles of the
Revised Penal Code that were actually affected by the
Constitution.
________________
28 Journal, Senate, February 15, 1993, Vol. 2, p. 1246.

704
704
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the
constitutional provision that our Special Committee had to
consider the Revised Penal Code itself in making this
compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the
proposed draft now under consideration which we are
sponsoring, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code
are actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because
by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were totally
repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions
could be retained. And some of them had to be amended
because the Committee thought that amendments were
proper."29
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as

to whether or not it would have been better if the Senate
were to enact a special law which merely defined and
imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator
Tolentino explicated, thus:
x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must
bear in mind that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised
Penal Code. Therefore, when the Constitution abolished the
death penalty, it actually was amending the Revised Penal
Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that
where the death penalty has already been imposed but not
yet carried out, then the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua,
that is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code. So we thought
that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some
crimes that may be considered as heinous. That is why the
bill is in this form amending the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . .
the whole trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we
want to punish in the special bill the case of murder, for
instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime
for which the death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want
to impose the death penalty in the case of kidnapping which
is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the same
merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed
the simpler method of keeping the definition of the crime as
the same and merely adding some aggravating
circumstances and
________________
29 Record, Senate, March 17, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 77.

705

705
reimposing the death penalty in these offenses originally
punished in the Revised Penal Code."30
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was
presented for discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members
of the Senate debated on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina
who kept prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the
compelling reason for each and every crime for which the
supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the
statement in the preamble of the death penalty bill that the
same is warranted in the face of the alarming upsurge of
[heinous] crimes, Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics
showing that in the case of each and every crime in the
death penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence
of each crime after the suspension of the death penalty on
February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by
the majority of the Filipino people, than before such
ratification.31 Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not
satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the
latter to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a
compelling reason justifying the re-imposition of the death
penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no
compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina
argued that the compelling reason required by the
constitution was that the State has done everything in its
command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman
punishment called death penalty."32 The problem, Senator
Lina emphasized, was that even the re-impositionists admit
that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice
system that may and must be put in place, and so clearly,
the recourse to the enactment of a death penalty bill was not
in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the
absence of compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to

Senator Linas contentions, Senator Tolen_______________
30 Id., May 18, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 596.

31 Record, Senate, March 18, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 106112.
32 Journal, February 10 & 11, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1223.
706
706
tino explained that the statement in the preamble is a
general one and refers to all the crimes covered by the bill
and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may not
have the same degree of increase in incidence as the other
crimes and that the public demand to impose the death
penalty is enough compelling reason.33
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom
the battle lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two
things: first, the definition of heinous crimes as provided for
in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of
compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His
interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his
objections to the bill:
Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous,
Mr. President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements
as they are described in the bill or are crimes heinous
because they are punished by death, as bribery and
malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr.

President, but that is not supposed to be the exclusive
criterion. The nature of the offense is the most important
element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we
should consider the relation of the offense to society in order
to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these
offenses. In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance,
these offenses by themselves connected with the effect upon
society and the government have made them fall under the
classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for
imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of
malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious
as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a
compelling reason for the death penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr.
President, does the Gentleman believe that these compelling
reasons, which would call for the reimposition of the death
penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly stated for
each crime so that it will be very clear to one and all that not
only are these crimes
________________
33 Journal, Senate, March 22, 1993, Vol. II, pp. 15741575.

707

707
heinous but also one can see the compelling reasons for the
reimposition of the death penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually
considered by the Committee. But the decision of the
Committee was to avoid stating the compelling reason for

each and every offense that is included in the substitute
measure. That is why in the preamble, general statements
were made to show these compelling reasons. And that, we
believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would
be sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling
reasons by the Congress, in providing the death penalty for
these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I
would suppose that with the preamble already in general
terms, the Supreme Court would feel that it was the sense of
Congress that this preamble would be applicable to each and
every offense described or punishable in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these
compelling reasons for each and every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the
constitutional limitations upon the power of Congress to
enact criminal legislation, especially the provisions on the Bill
of Rights, particularly the one which says that no person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that
the compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill,
when it becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the
omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as
substantive law, this is sufficient. The question of whether
there is due process will more or less be a matter of
procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution with respect to due process itself which is a
separate matter from the substantive law as to the definition
and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it
appears that the reimposition of the death penalty is subject
to three conditions and these are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death

penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and
3. These involve heinous crimes.
708
708
Under these provisions of the Constitution, paragraph 1,
Section 13, does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that
Congress is bound to state clearly the compelling reasons for
the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as well
as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous
included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion
already. I believe that whether we state the compelling
reasons or not, whether we state why a certain offense is
heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in the
Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be
controlling but what the Supreme Court will feel as a
sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous nature
whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can
certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go
into the matter of due process. It will go into the very power
of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So
that would be entirely separate from the matter of due
process."34
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the
death penalty bill violated our international commitment in
support of the worldwide abolition of capital punishment, the
Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol.
Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in the United

Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different
committees which vote on them for consideration in the
plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the
plenary session, a declaration would have no binding effect
on signatory countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot
be deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol
considering that these agreements have reached only the
committee level.35
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate
voted on Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen
(17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and one
abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third
reading on August 16, 1993.
_______________
34 Record, Senate, May 11, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 500501.

35 Journal, Senate, February 2, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1161.
709

709
The Senates vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third
reading on August 16, 1993 was a vindication of the House of
Representatives. The House had, in the Eight Congress,
earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the
restoration of the death penalty for certain heinous crimes.
The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when the
Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming
from the House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during
the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was
introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of

Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a
merger of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506; 781, 955,
1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various
Members of the Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez
of Rizal ably essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of
the power to re-impose the death penalty for compelling
reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this
constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.
Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution
reads, as I quote:
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
shall thereafter provide for it. . .'
The phrase unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it was
introduced as an amendment by then Comm. Christian
Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this
amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished
by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the
death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it
at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine
provision, Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
The people should have the final say on the subject,
because, at some future time, the people might want to
restore death penalty through initiative and referendum.
710
710

Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages.
Therefore, it is entirely possible in the future that
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today.
xxx
xxx
xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that

merit the reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent
manner and the viciousness in which crimes are now
committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a
patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace
and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the
victims of heinous crimesthe Hultmans, the Maguans, the
Vizcondes, the Castaoses, and many more, and they are all
crying for justice. We ought to listen to them because their
lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen
asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of a few who put
their selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the
flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed
or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent
disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or
public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a
civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and
her two lovely daughters, will stand in the peoples memory
for many long years as the epitome of viciousness and
atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, an up-and-coming

young business executive, was and still is an outrage that
shocks the moral self of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16
year-old high school student who dreamt of becoming a
commercial model someday, at the hands of a crazed man
was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities of
Christians and nonChristians alike.
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and
Beebom Castaos, the lovely and promising couple from the
University
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they

could rely on for justice. A law that will exact retribution for
the victims. A law that will deter future animalistic behavior
of the criminal who take their selfish interest over and above
that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all
heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the
preservation of all that we hold dear and sacred, let us
restore the death penalty."36
711

711
of the Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses of our
minds and still makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively,

we ought to listen to our constituents and heed their pleaa
plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness under a
regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that
their loved ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.
xxx
xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical

action is taken by this body in restoring death penalty as a
positive response to the overwhelming clamor of the people,
then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine Law
Center said, and I quote:
When people begin to believe that organized society is
unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the
punishment they deserve, there are sown the seeds of
anarchyof self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The
people will take the law upon their hands and exact
vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and
support House Bill No. 62.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the

Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that,
while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the
death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome
about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law
specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the
perception
________________
36 Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9,

1992, pp. 417418.
712
712
of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to
suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it
the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez
on the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes
enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L.
Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the
hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt
as to their cause:
My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death
penalty not only for the importation, manufacture and sale of
dangerous drugs, but also for other heinous crimes such as
treason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as
defined by the Revised Penal Code with or without
additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in
R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532;
carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the
owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in x x
x RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies
them to the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one
which, by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards of decency and
morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of
allegiance to a government, committed by a person who
owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad, 1 Phil. 437). By the
allegiance is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience
which individuals owe to the government under which they
live or to their sovereign in return for the protection which
they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the thought alone of ones loved one being
held against his or her own will in some unidentified x x x
house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers is enough
to terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of any

person, even scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or
arson, what is being punished by death is the fact that the
perpetrator, at the time of the commission of the crime,
thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and sees it
merely as a form of selfamusement. When a homicide is
committed by reason of the rob713

713
bery, the culprits are perceived as willing to take human life
in exchange for money or other personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and
agony of the parents over the personal shock and suffering of
their child but the stigma of the traumatic and degrading
incident which has shattered the victims life and
permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention the
ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience of
police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished
for the universal hostility of the perpetrators against their
victims who are passengers and complement of the vessel,
and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no one may be
expected to be able to come to the rescue of the helpless
victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the crime of air
piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in
making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an
entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant
circumstance of subjecting the passengers to terrorism."37
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27,

1992 to February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the
Members of the House of Representatives overwhelmingly
approved the death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the
Members of the House of Representatives cast their vote on
House Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration on third
reading.38 The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes
against, and 2 abstentions.
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on
February 23, 1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16,
1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee convened to
incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
entitled, An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised
Penal Code,
________________
37 Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9,

1992, pp. 419420.
38 Record, House of Representatives, Vol. V, February 23,
1993, p. 98.
714
714
as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes, took effect.39
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took

effect, and the present time, criminal offenders have been
prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein
accusedappellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out
the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old
daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on
automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his
conviction and the death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this
courts affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the
first time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His
thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is
unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the
absence of compelling reasons therefor, and (2) that the
death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription
against punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellants proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with
accused-appellants view that Congress enacted R.A. No.
7659 without complying with the twin requirements of
compelling reasons and heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment
of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this
disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the following
analysis.
Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests
in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. This power is
not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress,
for it is subject to a clear showing of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.
________________
39 People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994]; People v. Timple,

237 SCRA 52 [1994].
hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek

prefix haton, denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.
715
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a

sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous
crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the
circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the
manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences
and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the
sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his
discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where
R.A. No. 7659

715
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to reimpose
the death penalty entails: (1) that Congress define or
describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress
specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in
the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can
only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly
proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death
penalty bill be singularly motivated by compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No.
7659, we find the definition or description of heinous crimes.
Said clause provides that:
x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People
v. Alicando,40 traced the etymological root of the word
heinous to the Early Spartans word, haineus, meaning,
_______________
40 251 SCRA 293 [1995].

716
716
imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill,
Senators Lina and Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as
regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of
capital crimes without a specification of the elements that
make them heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that
there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: first,
there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death;
and second, there were crimes penalized by mandatory
capital punishment upon the attendance of certain specified
qualifying circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by

reclusion perpetua to death:
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
717
People vs, Echegaray
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
ted by two or more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or

frustrated and committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and

transportation of prohibited drugs (id.);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by

any of the following four circumstances: (a) the victim was
detained for more than three days; (b) it was committed
simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made; and
(d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited

drugs (id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified
amounts (id.);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation

(Sec. 9);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited

drugs (id.);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is; (a) one or more

buildings or edifice; (b) a building where people usually
gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public use; (d) a
building or factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a
building for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence
of a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or government
museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive
materials located in an inhabited place; or regardless of what
is burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons
(Sec. 10);
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a)

the rape is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is
commit
717
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);

(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery,
transportation, and distribution of regulated drugs (id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated
drugs (Sec. 15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified
amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account
dangerous drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec.
17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or
immediate vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec.
19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the

carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the
uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death
but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In
other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of
the heinous elements in each of the foregoing crimes
because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with
death. The elements that call for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would only be
relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose
reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death
penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence
proferred before it, found the at718
718
tendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which
the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on
his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of
significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on
the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize
the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently
or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be
society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory
penalty of death is imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and

be refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or
death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present,
he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not
prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or
present, he shall suffer the penalty of death. (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed.
(Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed. (Sec. 10)
719

719
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with
homicide and qualified rape
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim

has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or
military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband,
parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third
degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7)
years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
has suffered permanent physical mutilation. (Sec. 11)
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor
or the victim
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be

the proximate cause of the death of victim thereof, the
maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed. (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited
drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
720
720
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary, the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be
imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to
use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death
of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the
maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary. (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution
and transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a
minor or the victim dies
the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should
a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section
be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed. (Sec. 14)
(8.) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated
drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

the contrary, the maximum penalty [of death] herein
provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated
drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is
allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a
person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the
maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary. (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials,
employees or officers including members of police agencies
and armed forces
The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Sections
3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15-A(1), 16, and 19 of Article III [of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those
found guilty of any of the same offenses are government
officials,
721

721
employees or officers including members of police agencies
and the armed forces. (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug
offenses with the mandatory death penalty if convicted are
government officials, employees or officers
Any such above government official, employee or officer
who is found guilty of planting any dangerous drugs
punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity
of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the
same penalty as therein provided. (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in R.A. No. 7659 in their qualified form
When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken
by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be
imposed shall be in its maximum [of death] regardless of
mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the
offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two
or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission
of any crime. (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the
test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes
that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal
course of his or her growth as a human being. The right of a
person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this
means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or
her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his
or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his
or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
722
722

resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive
arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors
or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries
were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made
or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping
where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle
is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua
to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in
the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts
in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic
context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply
entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche
of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even
the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of

identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death,
As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
per723

723
petua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than
those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to
determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when
on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death
sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out
the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is
not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as
establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to
validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No.
7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or
repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to
aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it
specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime
provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of
death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
construing R.A. No. 7659 in pari materia with the Revised
Penal Code, death may be imposed when: (1) aggravating
circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to
make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code
regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2)
other circumstances attend the commission of the crime

which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of
death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the
guided discretion granted in the trial court to recognize
circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime
as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that
may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent
that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The
legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law
each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is
sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and
yardstick for the determination of the legal situation war724
724
ranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing
danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to. nil the
possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but
not heinously criminal, R.A. No. 7659 is replete with both
procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the
correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the
constitutional requirement that the death penalty be reimposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we
note that the main objection to the death penalty bill
revolved around the persistent demand of the abolitionists
for a statement of the compelling reason in each and every
heinous crime and statistical proof that such compelling
reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and

compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with
each other. Because the subject crimes are either so
revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the
human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions,
implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing,
debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our sociopolitical and economic agenda as a developing nation, these
crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether
eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and
we cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before
grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its demission.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms
first be pursued and implemented before the death penalty
be re-imposed in case such reforms prove unsuccessful. They
claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by
the constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is
left for the government to resort to that could check the
chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled
criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that
the compelling reason required by the constitution is that
there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the
sociocultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty
on
725

725
February 2, 1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the
incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations
only of the phrase compelling reasons but not of the
conjunctive phrase compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. The imposition of the requirement that there be a
rise in the incidence of criminality because of the suspension
of the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced

demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that
the death penalty first proves itself to be a truly deterrent
factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher
incidence of criminality during the time that the death
penalty was suspended, that would have proven that the
death penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before
its suspension. Suffice it to say-that the constitution in the
first place did not require that the death penalty be first
proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there be
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution simply
states that Congress, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in
the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death
penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of
a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death
penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the
death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It
is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that
there has been an alarming upsurge of such crimes, for the
same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to
determine the existence of compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is
that the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and
rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons
to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
We now proceed to answer accused-appellants other ground
for attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659,
726
726

i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per
se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the
United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.41
To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman,
categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but
the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the
death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing
jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so
much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal
sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused
who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is
given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or
not to impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the
American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark
case of Furman was trekked by American civil rights
advocates zealously fighting against racial discrimination.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:
We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that
these defendants were sentenced to death because they
were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to divine
what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal
with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination
whether defendants committing these crimes should die x x
x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is

no permissible caste aspect of law enforcement. Yet we
know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the
death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied,
feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and
despised x x x.
xxx
________________
Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of

the new death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v.
Georgia,42 Jurek v. Texas,43 and Profitt v. Florida44
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty
is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of
rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not
involve the taking of life. In support of his contention,
accusedappellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.45 In Coker, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably

cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an
unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it
always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed.
It is also established that imposing
727
________________
41 408 US 238, 33 L Ed 2d 346, 92 S Ct 2726.

727

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in
their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea
of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on
cruel and unusual punishments.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it
was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court
nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it
did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in
the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to
lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of
personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the
part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the
states re-enacted their death penalty statutes now bearing
the procedural checks that were required by the U.S.
42 428 US 153, 49 L Ed 2d 859, 96 S Ct 2909.

43 428 US 262, 49 L Ed 2d 929, 96 S Ct 2950.
44 428 US 242, 49 L Ed 2d 913, 96 S Ct 2960.
45 433 US 584, 53 L Ed 2d 982, 97 S Ct 286.
728
728
capital punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with
the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves
the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court to
invalidate the prior Georgia capital punishment statute in

Furman v. Georgia x x x
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Courts judgment was that the
death penalty for deliberate murder was neither the
purposeless imposition of severe punishment nor a
punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the
Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of the
death penalty when imposed for other crimes. x x x
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now
before us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected
in the statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has
been dramatically different. In reviving death penalty laws to
satisfy Furmans mandate, none of the States that had not
previously authorized death for rape chose to include rape
among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had
been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty
for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes
Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana. In the latter two
States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found
guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and
Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina, respondent to
those decisions, again revised their capital punishment laws,
they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape;
none of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge
have amended or replaced their death penalty statutes since
July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to Louisiana
and North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence
for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with
mandatory statutes, included rape among the crimes for
which death was an authorized punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee

also authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but
only where the victim was a child and the rapist an adult, the
Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the
death sentence was mandatory. x x x The upshot is that
Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the
present time that authorizes a sentence
729

729
of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only
two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the
victim is a child.
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for
rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it
obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative r ejection of capital punishment for
rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death
is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping
an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is
highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost
total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the
female victim and for the latters privilege of choosing those
with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short
of homicide, it is the ultimate violation of self. It is also a
violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat
of force. or intimidation, to overcome the will and the
capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often
accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also
inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it

undermines the communitys sense of security, there is
public injury as well.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any
bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of
our own culture.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but

in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person
and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which
does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it
may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition
does not include the death of or even the serious injury to
another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so
happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death
penalty, which is unique in its severity and irrevocability x x
x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does
not take human life.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the courts

predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants
the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a
premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of
retributive justice of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.
We have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of
heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply because life
was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty
in the context of our legal history and cultural experience;
rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses
from abject poverty through organized governmental
strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and
because they have so caused irreparable and substantial
injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of
their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of
individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court
has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of
rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal:46
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two

grounds: first, that the public has manifested its rejection of
the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of
rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to
include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the
aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape, while
concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a womans
spiritual in730
730
tegrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not
involve the taking of life.
Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of

another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape
deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave
damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an
intrinsically evil act x x x an outrage upon decency and
dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.
________________
46 G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996.
________________
731

731
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have
so essayed here, at the heart of the issue of capital
punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death
question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer,
life, of course, over death. But dealing with the
fundamental question of death provides a context for
struggling with even more basic questions, for to grapple
with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to ask the
meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are of
the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.
Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely
because it is substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive
than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its
abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized
hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society
all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve
the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength
of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that
tranquility and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems
very likely that capital punishment is a x x x necessary, if
limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and
ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to
indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to
reign over the necessity of social survival."47
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby DENIED48 for LACK OF MERIT.
47 Donald Atwell Zoll, A Wistful Goodbye to Capital

Punishment, National Review, December 3, 1971, pp. 1351
1354.
48 Three members of the Court voted to declare R.A. 7659
unconstitutional insofar as it reimposes the death penalty.
Two of them wrote Separate Opinions, which are attached as
annexes hereto, without indicating the names of the authors
consistent with the Courts policy that, in death cases,
ponentes of opinionswhether majority or minorityare not
to be indicated.
732
732
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.); Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
SEPARATE OPINION
Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and
civilized, as well as, I wish to believe, a humane and
compassionate, being. The ancient edict of an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth has since been abandoned by a
society that recognizes the good in every man and gives a
transgressor an opportunity to reform. Somehow, however,
certain vestiges of savage retribution still remain; indeed, the
taking of a human life continues, at least in some penal
systems, to be an acceptable punishment
In this country, the issue of whether or not the State should

impose the death penalty has recently been resolved with
the ratification, on 02 February 1987, of the Constitution by
76.29% of the electorate. Section 19, Article III, thereof,
states:
Sec. 19.(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua
Ours is a rule of law. The Supreme Court is not a political
entity; it can merely apply and interpret the law. It cannot,
and it will not, spare itself from this constitutionallymandated
duty. Death penalty cases are not excepted. In the discharge
of its grave responsibility, nevertheless, the Court must act
with greatest caution and strictest circumspection for there
can be no stake that can be higher, and no penalty that can
be graver, than the extinction by the State of human life.
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty
now lies with the sound discretion of the law-making author733
It appears to me that the Constitution did not contemplate a

simple reimposition of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or
just because of it.
The term compelling reasons should be enough to indicate
that there must be a marked change in the milieu from that
which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987
Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the
enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon
the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to
mandate the death penalty. That milieu must have turned
from bad to worse.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize
the heinous nature of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must
be spelled out with great clarity in the law. To venture, in the
case of murder, the crime could become heinous within the
Constitutional concept when, to exemplify, the victim is
unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death,
or in the crime of rape when the offended party is callously
humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.
I submit that, given the circumstances and the law before us,
the Constitutional fiat (now being raised for the first time in
the instant Motion for Reconsideration) in the imposition of
the death penalty has not been satisfied.
733
I, therefore, vote for imposing instead the penalty of

reclusion perpetua (the next lower penalty than death).
734
ity, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions

that the fundamental law has set forth; viz:
(1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and
(2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.
734
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration1 dated
August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel,2 the
accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his
defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposing the
death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original)
Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel,3 this
transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not
passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial
courts sentence of death.4
________________
1 It is called Supplemental because there was a (main)

Motion for Reconsideration filed by the previous counsel of
the accused, which this Court already denied.
2 The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance GroupPablito V. Sanidad, Jose Manuel I. Diokno,
Arno V. Sanidad, Efren Moncupa, Eduardo R. Abaya and Ma.
Victoria I. Dioknofiled its Notice of Appearance dated
August 22, 1996 only on August 23, 1996, after the Per
Curiam Decision of this Court was promulgated on June 25,
1996.
3 Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr.
4 The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the
first time only on appeal. See, for instance, Manila Bay Club
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 303, October 13,
1995; Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245
SCRA 715, July 11, 1995; Securities and Exchange
Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July 21,
1995. However, the Court resolved to tackle the question of
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 in this case,
anticipating that the same question would be raised anyway
in many other subsequent instances. The Court resolved to
determine and dispose of the issue once and for all, at the
first opportunity. To let the issue pass unresolved just
because it was raised after the promulgation of the decision

affirming conviction may result in grave injustice.
735

735
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua (Italics supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are
new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in
the 1986 Freedom Constitution. They proscribe the
imposition5 of the death penalty unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it,
and reduced any death penalty already imposed to
reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective
aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a
retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the
lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the
Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the
death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the
statute
________________
5 In People vs. Muoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989; the

Court, prior to the enactment and effectivity of RA 7659,
ruled by a vote of 96 (J. Cruz, ponente, C.J. Fernan, JJ.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino
and Medialdea, concurring) that the death penalty was not
abolished but only prohibited from being imposed. But see
also the persuasive Dissenting Opinion of Mme. Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera (joined by JJ. Narvasa, Paras,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Regalado) who contended that the
Constitution totally abolished the death penalty and removed
it from the statute books. People vs. Muoz reversed the
earlier abolition doctrine uniformly held in People v.
Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327, October 30, 1987, (per C.J. Yap);
People vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113, October 27, 1987, (per
J. Melencio-Herrera) and People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242,
December 10, 1987 (per C.J. Narvasa). It is time that these
cases are revisited by this Court.
736
736
books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of
the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction
of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty
ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our
Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed,6 "(t)he majority
voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty.
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the
distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina
MelencioHerrera emphasized,7 It is thus clear that when Fr.
Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition
of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total
abolition and removal from the statute books of the death

penalty. This
_______________
6 This quote is taken from I Record of the Constitutional

Commission, p. 676 (July 17, 1986) as follows:
Fr. Bernas:
xxx
xxx
xxx
My Collection on this is that there was a division in the

Committee not on whether the death penalty should be
abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should
be done by the Constitutionin which case it cannot be
restored by the legislatureor left to the legislature. The
majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is
inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized
by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no
evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that
other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of
another man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact
that the death penalty as an institution has been there from
time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it.
Human life is more valuable than an institution intended
precisely to serve human life. So basically, this is the
summary of the reasons which were presented in support of
the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. (italics
supplied)
7 Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 129.
737
737
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Arts, 14 and 15 of the Revised Penal Code, (c) the

accompanying aggravating circumstance must be one which
can be characterized by the court as making the crime
heinous, and (d) that the execution of the offender is
demanded by compelling reasons related to the offense. In
other words, according to him, it is the courtsnot Congress
that have the responsibility of determining the heinousness
of a crime and the compelling reason for its imposition upon
a particular offender, depending on the facts of each case. I
cannot however subscribe to this view. The Constitution
clearly identifies Congress as the sovereign entity which is
given the onus of fulfilling these two constitutional
limitations.
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
738

became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when
they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of
Rights. With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof
becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must
then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in
favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no
presumption of constitutionality.
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively

removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes
but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time
to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that
it (Congress)9 finds compelling reasons, involving heinous
crimes. The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even
if
________________
8 Thus in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986,

we held that a statute which allows an exception to a
constitutional right (against warrantless arrests) should be
strictly construed.
9 In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as
amicus curiae in People vs. Pedro V. Malabago (G.R. No.
115686, December 2, 1996), vigorously argues that RA 7659
has validly restored the death penalty which may now be
imposed provided that the prosecution proves, and the court
is convinced, that (a) the accused is guilty of a crime
designated by RA 7659 as capital, (b) whose commission is
accompanied by aggravating circumstances as defined by
738
awkward"10): the authority of Congress to provide for it is
not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
(1) by compelling reasons that may arise after the
Constitution became effective; and
(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or define or
characterize as heinous.
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden
of determining the existence of compelling reasons and of
defining what crimes are heinous before it could exercise
its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
claritys sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law,
prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and courts,
by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress

enacted RA 765911 to provide for it (the death penalty) (1)
by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code;12
(2) by incorporating a new article therein;13 and (3) by
amending certain special laws.14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the
crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It
merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provi________________
10 People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 121.

11 Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per
People vs. Burgos, 234 SCRA 555, 569, July 29, 1994; People
vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, December 6, 1995; People vs.
Albert, 251 SCRA 136, December 11, 1995.
12 Art. 114Treason; Art. 123Qualified Piracy; Art. 246
Parricide; Art. 248Murder; Art. 255Infanticide; Art. 267
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Art. 294Robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons; Art. 320
Destructive Arson; Art. 335Rape.
13 Art. 211-A on Qualified Bribery.
14 Section 2, RA 7080Plunder; Secs, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of
Article II of RA 6425Prohibited Drugs; Secs. 14, 14-A and 15
of Article III of said RA 6425Carnapping.
739

739
sions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general
terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe
sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually

for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the
method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as
follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2)
the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating
circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress
exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution?
More legally put: In reviving the death penalty, did Congress
act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very
limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec.
19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of
Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to heinous
crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of
heinous. Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659
itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it
prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a
standard or a characterization by which courts may be able
to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that
Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally
limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph
in the preambular or whereas clauses of RA 7659, as
follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act
are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses
and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly

an insufficient definition or characterization of what a hei740
740
nous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain
crimes to be heinous without adequately justifying its
bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and
unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness
can be determined. Calling the crimes grievous, odious and
hateful is not a substitute for an objective juridical
definition. Neither is the description inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity. Describing
blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact;
and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less
prevail over its text.15 In this case, it cannot be the
authoritative source to show compliance with the
Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws
to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once
the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating
circumstances.16 Theres nothing really new that Congress
did which it could not have otherwise done had such
provision not been included in our fundamental law. In other
words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which
were already punishable with death prior to the
________________
15 A preamble is not an essential part of a statute. (Agpalo,

Statutory Construction, Second Edition 1990; Martin,
Statutory Construction, Sixth Edition, 1984). The function of
the preamble is to supply reasons and explanation and not to
confer power or determine rights. Hence it cannot be given
the effect of enlarging the scope or effect of a statute. (C.
Dallas Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Fourth
Edition, Volume IA, 20.03).
16 Under Sec. 11, RA 7659, it appears that death is the
mandatory penalty for rape, regardless of the presence or
absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, "(w)hen
by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, or when it is committed with any of the
attendant circumstances enumerated in said section.
741

741
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible
exception of plunder and qualified bribery,17 no new crimes
were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death
under said law were already so punishable by the Revised
Penal Code18 and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III
of the Constitution did not have any impact upon the
legislative action. It was effectively ignored by Congress in
enacting the capital punishment law.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became
RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen.
Ernesto Maceda, wryly said:19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President, and from existing special laws which, before
abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the
maximum penalty.
742
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same

crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the
charters effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its
specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe
death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the
stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the
death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its
restoration possible only under and subject to stringent
conditions is evident not only from the language of the
Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase unless for compelling reasons involving

heinous crimes was an amendment introduced by Comm.
Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could
qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
organized murder or brutal murder of a rape victim."20
Note
________________
MR. SUAREZ. The Gentleman advisedly used the words

heinous crimes, whatever is the pronunciation. Will the
Gentleman give examples of heinous crimes? For example,
would the head of an organized syndicate in dope distribution
or dope smuggling fall within the qualification of a heinous
offender such as to preclude the application of the principle
of abolition of death penalty?
17 While plunder and qualified bribery are new capital

offenses, RA 7659 nonetheless fails to justify why they are
considered heinous. In addition, the specific compelling
reasons for the prescribed penalty of death are not laid out
by the statute.
18 In the case of rape, RA 7659 provided certain attendant
circumstances which the prosecution must prove before
courts can impose the extreme penalty. Just the same
however, the law did not explain why said circumstances
would make the crimes heinous. Neither did it set forth the
compelling reasons therefor.
19 Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to
March 11, 1993, Volume III, No. 48, January 25, 1993, p. 122.
742

________________
20 I Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 18, 1986,

pp. 742743:
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President. That is one of the

possible crimes that would qualify for a heinous crime.
Another would be organized murder. In other words,
yesterday there were many arguments for and against, and
they all had merit. But in the contemporary society, we
recognize the sacredness of human life andI think it was
Honorable Laurel who said this yesterdayit is only God who
gives and takes life. However, the voice of the people is also
the voice of God, and we cannot presume to have the
wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in the
future that circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today. We know that this is a very difficult question.
The fact that the arguments yesterday were quite
impassioned and meritorious merely tell us that this is far
from a well-settled issue. At least in my personal opinion, we

would like the death penalty to be abolished. However, in the
future we should allow the National Assembly, in its wisdom
and as representatives of the people, to still impose the
death penalty for the common good, in specific cases.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. I would like to pursue some more
the Gentlemans defi-nition of heinous crimes. Would the
brutal murder of a rape victim be considered as falling within
that classification?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, yes, particularly, if it is a
person in authority. He would, therefore, add as an ag
743
violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate

its heinousness.21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as heinous, in the same
manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide
aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty
is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of
heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine compelling reasons for the revival of the capital
penalty. It
________________

743
that the honorable commissioners did not just say murder
but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a
rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather
scanty, I believe that the available information shows that,
when deliberating on heinousness, the Constitutional
Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that
the heinousness clause requires that:
1) the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements
of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
2) even existing crimes, provided some new element or
essential ingredient like organized or brutal is added to
show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or
old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme
gravating circumstance to the crime the abuse of his position

in authority.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
21 Some examples of this may be taken by Congress from
Richmond vs. Lewis, 506 US 40, like gratuitous violence or
needless mutilation of the victim.
744
744
is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 765922
made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such
effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is
sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons
and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done

wholesale but must be shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.
23 Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular

Session, 19921993, Volume IV, February 10, 1993, p. 674,
italics supplied.
The words compelling reasons were included in the Charter

because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today
x x x and that the conditions and the situation (during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change
for very specific reasons requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
745
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved

into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to
explain these compelling reasons:23
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in

the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.

Speaker? x x x
________________
22 Paragraph 3 & 4 of the preamble reads:

WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes
which has resulted not only in the loss of human lives and
wanton destruction of property but has also affected the
nations efforts towards sustainable economic development
and prosperity while at the same time has undermined the
peoples faith in the Government and the latters ability to
maintain peace and order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public
order and the rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said
crimes;

745
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the

distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an
anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death
penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation.
The Gentleman claims that that is one of the compelling
reasons. But before we dissect this particular compelling
reason, may we know what are the other compelling
reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker?
Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is
justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at
the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any
compelling reason should be a supervening circumstance
after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again
and again that if one lives in an organized society governed
by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the
penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense
committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when

the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify
the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which
would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987
Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept
of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed, was
not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the
death penalty and the people ratified it?
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker. Now, can we go to

1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume
of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that

now, under present conditions, because of the seriousness of
the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands
that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those
who have committed heinous crimes.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
xxx
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
xxx
xxx
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987

is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21
percent.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the

distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in
1988?
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular

justifications of worsening peace and order and justice.
With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not
compelling enough to
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to

10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very
year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced
from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
746
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the
statistics supplied by the PC.
746
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the

Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know from
the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say
that these reasons were even non-existent. Statistics from
the Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and
crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did
not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when
the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA
7659 was enacted.
Witness the following debate24 also between
Representatives Garcia and Lagman:
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will
confirm it.
MR. LAGMAN. No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime
rate was 40 percent.
________________
24 Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular

Session, 19921993, Vol. III, November 10, 1992, p. 448;
italics supplied.
747

747
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the
abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us
the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
In 1987this was the year when the death penalty was

abolishedthe persons arrested in drug-related cases were
3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of
this report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a
bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it
increased again to 2,862 in 1991.
________________
MR. GARCIA (P). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with
me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined
from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or
a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm
that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say. I understand
we are reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume in 1987
was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in
1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from
the same document and I would not want to say that the
Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina
gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in
regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared
to 1991:25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drugs
Board.
25 Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to

March 11, 1993, Volume III, No. 50, January 27, 1993, pp.
176177.
748
748
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as
the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a
downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time
from, 1988 to 1991."
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the
proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition
would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes."26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof,
empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with
any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription
of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission
or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be
debated on and on,27 in the same manner that another
proposition
_______________
749
26 See Sponsorship Remarks of Rep. Manuel Sanchez,

Record of the House of Representatives, November 9,1992,
pp. 4042.
27 Witness, for instance, this interesting exchange between
Commissioners Joaquin Bernas and Napoleon Rama (I Record
of the Constitutional Commission, p. 678):
FR. BERNAS. When some experts appeared before us and we
asked them if there was evidence to show that the death
penalty had deterred the commission of deadly crimes, none
of them was able to say that there was evidence, conclusive
evidence, for that.
MR. RAMA. I am curious. Who are these experts thensocial
scientists or penologists or what?
FR. BERNAS. Penologists.
MR. RAMA. Of course, we are aware that there is also another
school of thought here, another set of experts, who would
swear that the death penalty discourages crimes or
criminality. Of course, Commissioner Bernas knows that
never in our history has there been a higher incidence of
crime. I say that criminality was at its zenith during the last
decade.
FR. BERNAS. Correct, in spite of the existence of the death
penalty.
MR. RAMA. Yes, but not necessarily in spite of the existence of
the death penalty. At any rate, does the sponsor think that in
removing the death penalty, it would not affect, one way or
another, the crime rate of the country?
749
that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate

arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim,
his heirs or his witnessescan be argued indefinitely.28 This
debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken
word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed
burden of Congress to act within the heinousness and
compelling reasons limits of its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against
the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it
should.like any other guarantee in favor of the accusedbe
zealously protected,29 and any exception thereto meticu________________
FR. BERNAS. The position taken by the majority of those who

voted in favor of this provision is that means other than the
death penalty should be used for the prevention of crime.
28 Cf. Report to the United Nations Committee on Crime
Prosecution and Control, United Nations Social Affairs
Division, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch,
Vienna, 1988, p. 110.
29 Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his book The
Bill of Rights, (Second Edition, 1972, p. 4) states: A regime of
constitutionalism is thus unthinkable without an assurance of
the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a constitution exists
to assure that in the discharge of the governmental
functions, the dignity that is the birthright of every human
being is duly safeguarded. x x x In the context of the role of
a bill of rights the vast powers of govern-ment are clearly to
be exercised within the limits set by the constitution,

particularly the bill of rights. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators vs. City Mayor of Manila, (L-24693, July 31, 1967),
it was held that the exercise of police power, insofar as it
may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is
subject to judicial inquiry. The guarantee in Sec. 1 of Article III
of the Constitution embraces life, liberty and property. In the
words of Justice Roberto Concepcion in People vs. Hernandez,
(99 Phil. 515, 5512 [1956]), x x x individual freedom is too
basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like
ours, to be denied upon mere general princi
750
750
lously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
people, particularly where the right pertains to persons
accused of crimes.30 Here the issue is not just crimesbut
capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one
ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."31 This primary right of the people to enjoy lifelife at
its fullest, life in dignity and honoris not only reiterated by
the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life
and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights,32 expressly prohibits any form of
torture33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death,
emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to
the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception34 and establishes the peoples rights to health, a
balanced ecology and education.35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than

property, for people more than the state, and for life more
than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of
the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty
________________
ples and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the

preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our
political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its
enjoyment in the very first paragraph of Section (1) of the Bill
of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs
(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
(18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several
aspects of freedom. x x x These guarantees are preserved in
the 1987 Constitution, according to Fr. Bernas.
30 See, for instance, People vs. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554, 571,
October 25, 1995, and People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687, 702
703, November 10, 1995.
31 Art. III, Sec. 1.
32 Art. III, Sec. 11.
33 Art. II, Sec. 12(2).
34 Art. II, Sec. 12.
35Art. II, Secs. 15, 16 & 17.
751

751
as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its
perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to

free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic
and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without
life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and
expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the
wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the
poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The Profile of 165
Death Row Convicts submitted by the Free Legal Assistance
Group36 highlights this sad fact:
"(1) Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186
persons37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of
1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of
1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7)
convicts per month, double the monthly average of capital
sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996,
the number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an
average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly
average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one
percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between
P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000
monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn
between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%)
________________
36 For details, see Annex A of the Memorandum for the

Accused-Appellant dated September 26, 1996 filed by the
Free Legal Assistance Group in People vs. Malabago, G.R. No.
115686, December 2, 1996.
37 The FLAG-submitted Profile states that 186 have been
sentenced to death by trial courts since the effectivity of RA
7659. The Philippine Star issue of December 9, 1996, page
17, however reports that, quoting Sen. Ernesto Herrera, the
total number of death row inmates has gone up to 267, as of

November, 1996, of whom more than one half (139) are rape
convicts. Some major dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Philippine Star, Manila Standard) in their February 3, 1997
issue up the death row figure to 300, as of the end of January
1997, with 450 as the probable number at the end of 1997.
752
752
earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn
between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to
P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P
15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately
thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while
approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with
another five percent (5%) earning variable income.
Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they
earn in a month.
(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112
of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum
monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the
official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn
between P4,500.00 and P11,000.00 monthly, indicating they
belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00
monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a
percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not
know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22)
convicts earn nothing at all.
(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent
(21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry\ of these, thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof,
are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport
and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction

workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting,
welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers
(delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with
sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in
clerical, sales and services industries, with fourteen (14)
sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or
rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers,
beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides,
computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks
(janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk). About four percent
(4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging
to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU).
Professionals, administrative employee and executives
comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are
unemployed.
(5)None of the DRCs use English as their medium of
communication, About forty four percent (44%), or slightly
less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six
percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand
Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano,
Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1)
convict is a foreign national and speaks and understand
Niponggo.
(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from
college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying
levels of ele
753

753
mentary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from
elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more

than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2)
convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did
not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and
socioeconomic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA
7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in
societythose who cannot afford the legal services
necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation,
investigation, research and presentation are required. The
best example to show the sad plight of the underprivileged is
this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was
woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and
even before this Court until the Free Legal Assistance Group
belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is
complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible
language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves
complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of
having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not
upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the
latter, a senseunfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy
neverthelessof the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing
arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in
a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless
of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving
capital punishment does not in any way single out or
discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the
underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the
disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex
and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and
judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether
the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death.
Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever
the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always
be a certain class or classes of people in our society who, by

reason of their pov-
of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no

place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.
754
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
754
erty, lack of educational attainment and employment
opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working
and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst lessthangenteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and
are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as
victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from
that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither
improves or worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more
precise, such law may even be said to help improve their
situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger
deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic
differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the
non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what
they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of
protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution,
and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be empowered to rise above
themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such
a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants
to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves
individually to any significant degree if we are unable to
advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor
provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we
are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate
punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged
in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so
obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from

our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its
imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the
constitutional right against the death penalty, which is really
a species of the right to life.
755

755
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused because such a statute denigrates the Constitution,
impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to
the underprivileged.
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
(5) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited
by two concurrent requirements:
(a)First, Congress must provide a set of attendant
circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and
itself. Congress must explain why and how these
circumstances define or characterize the crime as heinous.
(b)Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and
specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the
Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears

repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They
must both be present in view of the specific constitutional
mandatefor compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of
the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness
and compelling reasons must be set out for each and every
crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
Thou shall not kill is a fundamental commandment to all
Christians, as well as to the rest of the sovereign Filipino
people who believe in Almighty God.38 While the Catholic
Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the
death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
cases of extreme gravity."39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his
________________
38 The preamble of the Constitution is theistic. It declares the

sovereign Filipino peoples imploration of the aid of
Almighty God.
39 Catechism of the Catholic Church, p. 512, Word and Life
Publications:
756
756
encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life),40 punishment
must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not
_______________
2266. Preserving the common good of society requires

rendering the aggressor unable to inflict harm. For this
reason the traditional teaching of the Church has
acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of
legitimate public authority to punish malefactors by means of
penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not
excluding, in cases of extreme gravity, the death penalty. For
analogous reasons those holding authority have the right to
repel by armed force aggressors against the community in
their charge.
40 Evangelium Vitae, items Nos. 55 and 56, states:
55. This should not cause surprise: to kill a human being, in
whom the image of God is present, is a particularly serious
sin. Only God is the master of life! Yet from the beginning,
faced with the many and often tragic cases which occur in
the life of individuals and society, Christian reflection has
sought a fuller and deeper understanding of what Gods
commandment prohibits and prescribes. There are, in fact,
situations in which values proposed by Gods Law seem to
involve a genuine paradox. This happens for example in the
case of legitimate defense, in which the right to protect ones
own life and the duty not to harm someone elses life are
difficult to reconcile in practice. Certainly, the intrinsic value
of life and the duty to love oneself no less than others are the
basis of a true right to self-defense. The demanding
commandment of love of neighbor, set forth in the Old
Testament and confirmed by Jesus, itself presupposes love of
oneself as the basis of comparison: You shall love your
neighbor as yourself (Mk 12:31). Consequently, no one can
renounce the right to self-defense out of lack of love for life
or for self. This can only be done in virtue of a heroic love
which deepens and transfigures the love of self into a radical
self-offering, according to the spirit of the Gospel Beatitudes
(cf. Mt. 5:3840). The sublime example of this self-offering is
the Lord Jesus himself.
Moreover, legitimate defense can be not only a right but a

grave duty for someone responsible for anothers life, the
common good of the family or of the State. Unfortunately it
happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of
causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case,
757

757
go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases
of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be
possible otherwise to defend society x x x (which is) very
rare, if not practically non-existent.
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and
the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty, Both are
________________
the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor whose

action brought it about, even though he may not be morally
responsible because of a lack of the use of reason.
56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the
death penalty. On this matter there is a growing tendency,
both in the Church and in civil society, to demand that it be
applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished
completely. The problem must be viewed in the context of a
system of penal justice even more in line with human dignity
and thus, in the end, with Gods plan for man and society.
The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts
is to redress the disorder caused by the offense. Public
authority must redress the violation of personal and social
rights by im posing on the offender an adequate punishment
for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the

exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also
fulfills the purpose of defending public order and ensuring
peoples safety, while at the same time offering the offender
an incentive and help to change his or her behavior and be
rehabilitated.
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature
and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated
and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of
executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity:
in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to
defend society. Today however, as a result of steady
improvements in the organization of the penal system, such
cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.
In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of
the Catholic Church remains valid: lf bloodless means are
sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to
protect public order and the safety of persons, public
authority must limit itself to such means, because they better
correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good
and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human
person,
758
758
pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of
human life over and above even the state which man created
precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution
reluctantly allows capital punishment only for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes just as the Church
grudgingly permits it only for reasons of absolute necessity
involving crimes of extreme gravity, which are very rare

and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in
enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden
of proving the existence of compelling reasons to prescribe
death against well-defined heinous crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to
grant partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the
trial court by deleting the words DEATH, as provided for
under RA 7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua. I
further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in
its text.
Motion for reconsideration denied.
Note.If capital punishment is justified, it serves as a
deterrent but if injudiciously imposed, it generates
resentment. (People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 [1995]) People
vs. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682, G.R. No. 117472 February 7,
1997
G.R. No. 124736. September 29, 1999.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO
GALLO y IGLOSO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Procedure; Information; The additional attendant
circumstances introduced by Republic Act 7659 should be
considered as special qualifying circumstances distinctly
applicable to the crime of rape and if not pleaded as such
could only be appreciated as generic aggravating
circumstances.The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia,
speaking through then, Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
ratiocinated that the additional attendant circumstances
introduced by R.A. 7659 should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of
rape and, if not pleaded as such, could only be appreciated
as generic aggravating circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Accused-appellants relationship to the
victim although proven but not alleged in the information,
cannot be considered to be a qualifying circumstance.The
above indictment has not specifically alleged that accusedappellant is the victims father; accordingly, accusedappellants relationship to the victim, although proven during
the trial, cannot be considered to be a qualifying
circumstance.
Same; Same; Court has the authority to suspend the
execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification
thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of
cases that the tribunal retains control over a case until the
full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend
the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Binangonan, Rizal, Br. 68.

_______________
* EN BANC.
462
462
People vs. Gallo
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The penalty of death imposed upon accused-appellant

Romeo Gallo y Igloso by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68,
of Binangonan, Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed
by this Court in its decision promulgated on 22 January 1998.
On 24 August 1999, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Reopen Case (with Leave of Court) seeking a modification of
the death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
proffers that the reduction sought by him would be in line
with the new Court rulings which annunciate that the seven
attendant circumstances introduced in Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying
circumstances that must be pleaded in the indicment in order
to warrant the imposition of the penalty.
The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia,1 speaking through

then, Justice Florenz D. Regalado, ratiocinated that the
additional attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. 7659
should be considered as special qualifying circumstances
distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and, if not pleaded
as such, could only be appreciated as generic aggravating
circumstances.2
The Information filed against accused-appellant reads:
That on or sometime in the period of May, 1994 in the
Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force or
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13 year old girl,
Marites Gallo y Segovia.3
_______________
1 281 SCRA 463, 484-489.
The next crucial point is whether the Court must now apply
retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction of accusedappellant.
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of
cases that the tribunal retains control over a case until the
full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend
the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.5
The doctrine declared in People vs. Garcia, and its reiteration
in People vs. Ramos,6 People vs. Ilao,7 and People vs.
Medina,8 came only after almost a year from the
promulgation of the instant case.
The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to
comment on the aforesaid 24th August 1999 motion of
accused-appellant, had this to state:
_______________
2 People vs. Rodico, 249 SCRA 309.

3 Rollo, p. 7.
463

463
People vs. Gallo
The above indictment has not specifically alleged that
accused-appellant is the victims father; accordingly,
accused-appellants relationship to the victim, although
proven during the trial, cannot be considered to be a
qualifying circumstance.4
4 ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed. (Revised Penal Code)
5 Candelaria vs. Caizares, 4 SCRA 738; Philippine Veterans
Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 645; Lipana
vs. Development Bank of Rizal, 154 SCRA 257; Lee vs. De
Guzman, 187 SCRA 276; Bachrach Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128349, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA
487; Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, 19
January 1999, 301 SCRA 96.
6 G.R. No. 129349, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 559.
7 G.R. No. 129529; 29 September 1998, 296 SCRA 658.
8 G.R. No. 126575, 11 December 1998, 300 SCRA 98.
SO ORDERED.
464
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
464
People vs. Gallo
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the land
(Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has
the force and effect of law, forms part of our penal statutes
and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable to an
accused who is not a habitual criminal, and notwithstanding
that final sentence has already been pronounced against him
(Article 22, Revised Penal Code).
Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to
the beneficial application of Medina. Accordingly, the Office
of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellants prayer for
reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its
above observations and sees merit in its stand to join
accused-appellant in praying for a modification of the
sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the motion to re-open the case is GRANTED and
the decision sought to be reconsidered is MODIFIED by
imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and ordering him to
indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00.
Considering that the records of all cases where the death
penalty is imposed are forwarded to the Office of the
President in accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, the
Court directs the Clerk of Court to furnish the Office of the
President with a copy of this resolution for appropriate
guidance.
Motion to re-open case granted; Decision sought to be

reconsidered modified.
Note.Republic Act No. 7659 provides the test and yardstick
for the determination of the legal situation warranting
465

465
People vs. Tahop
the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. (People vs.
Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682 [1997]) People vs. Gallo, 315 SCRA
461, G.R. No. 124736 September 29, 1999
G.R. No. 196390.September 28, 2011.*
_______________
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), petitioner,

vs. RICHARD BRODETT and JORGE JOSEPH, respondents.
* FIRST DIVISION.
Forfeiture Proceedings; In a criminal proceeding, the court

having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order
upon conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the
instruments to commit the crime, including documents,
papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to
commit the crime, and (b) contraband, the ownership or
possession of which is not permitted for being illegal; In case
of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the
convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the
Government, but it is required that the property to be
forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can
be said to be within its jurisdiction.It is not open to question
that in a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction
over the offense has the power to order upon conviction of an
accused the seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the
crime, including documents, papers, and other effects that
are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b)
contraband, the ownership or possession of which is not
permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the
accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire
property or the right to possession of property through his
unlawful act. As justification for the second, to return to the
convict from whom the contraband was taken, in one way or
another, is not prudent or proper, because doing so will give
rise to a violation of the law for possessing the contraband
again. Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense
has the right to dispose of property used in the commission
of the crime, such disposition being an accessory penalty to
be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a
third person not liable for the offense that it was used as the
instrument to commit. In case of forfeiture of property for
crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely
divested and shall pass to the Government. But it is required
that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in
such manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction.
340
340
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs. Brodett
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; A proper court may order the
return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.According to the Rules of Court, personal
property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense
either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue
of a search warrant, the personal property that may be
seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or
that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds,
or fruits of the offense; or that which has been used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be
made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been
used or may constitute proof in the commission of an
offense. Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in
which the personal property seized is used as evidence, its
return to the person from whom it was taken, or to the
person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of
course, except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper
court may order the return of property held solely as
evidence should the Government be unreasonably delayed in
bringing a criminal prosecution. The order for the disposition
of such property can be made only when the case is finally
terminated.
Same; Same; The text of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9165
relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45

of the Revised Penal Code, and the interpretation of the latter
is extended by analogy to the former.There is no question,
for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section
20 of R.A. No. 9165 relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture
of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar
to that of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 45. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime.Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed. Such proceeds and instruments or
tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, unless they be the property of a third person
not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not
subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed. The Court has
interpreted and applied Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code
in People v. Jose, 37 SCRA 450 (1971), concerning the
341

341
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four
accused when they committed the forcible abduction with
rape, although the car did not belong to any of them,
holding: xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the
confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in
the commission of the crime if such be the property of a
third person not liable for the offense, it is the sense of this
Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of
the car in question should be set aside and that the said car
should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure
as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in replevin case. xxx Such interpretation is extended

by analogy to Section 20.
Same; Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; The
determination of whether or not any article confiscated in
relation to the unlawful act would be subject of forfeiture
could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered
in the proceedings.We note that the RTC granted accused
Brodetts Motion To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November
4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings were still going on,
and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of
the car at that point of the proceedings was premature,
considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra,
expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of
any property, or income derived therefrom, that has been
confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165
during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial
Court. Section 20 further expressly requires that such
property or income derived therefrom should remain in
custodia legis in all that time and that no bond shall be
admitted for the release of it. Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted
pursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to
be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car
(or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful
act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when
the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section
20 is also clear as to this.
Same; Same; Same; The Court rules that henceforth the
Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions
of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9165, and should not
release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration
of the trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even if
owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
The directive to return the non-drug
342
342
Antecedents

evidence has overtaken the petition for review as to render
further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the
opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the
matter of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles,
including those belonging to third persons not liable for the
offense, in order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial
court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165. This the Court must
now do in view of the question about the confiscation and
forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of repetition
in the future. We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial
Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20
of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether
drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before
the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third
person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Alvaro Bernabe Lazaro for petitioner.
Verano Law Firm for respondent Brodett.
Fornier, Fornier, Sao & Lagumbay Law Firm for respondent
Joseph.
BERSAMIN,J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an
enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 (Republic Act No. 9165) that are the property of a third
person are subject to be returned to the lawful owner who is
not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not
release such objects pending trial and before judgment.
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, charged Richard Brodett
(Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Sec343

343
tion 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 91651
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 09-208, the accusatory portion of the
information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the
City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
each other, they not being authorized by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver
and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored
tablets with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) selfsealing transparent plastic sachets with recorded total net
weight of 9.8388 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of
METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another
information charging only Brodett with a violation of Section
11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-209,
with the information alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the

City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
the following:
a.Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10)
transparent capsules containing white powdery substance
contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet
having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when subjected
to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHYLENE DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA),
commonly known as Ecstasy, a dangerous drug;
_______________
1 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
2 Rollo, p. 51.
344
344
b.Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
containing white powdery substance with total recorded net
weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c.Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow folded
paper, with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive
results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d.Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets

containing dried leaves with total recorded net weight of
54.5331 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009,
Brodett filed a Motion To Return Non-Drug Evidence. He
averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal non-drug effects
from him, including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license
plate no. XPF-551; and that PDEA refused to return his
personal effects despite repeated demands for their return.
He prayed that his personal effects be tendered to the trial
court to be returned to him upon verification.4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor
submitted its Comment and Objection,5 proposing thereby
that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for
safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the
trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to
exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the
City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it
appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the
violation
_______________
3 Id., pp. 54-55.

4 Id., pp. 58-61.
5 Id., pp. 63-64.
345

345

of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used
in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directed the release of the
car, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized
officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the
abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to
its rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return should be
fully documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as
listed in this Order of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and
Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as
needed.
SO ORDERED.6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its
motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order
of the Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of
Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the
orders of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8
dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:
_______________
6 Id., p. 107.
7 Id., p. 110.
8 Id., pp. 37-46; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E.

Veloso, with Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and
Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.
346
346
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of
this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra
S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not
appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett
has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the
subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We
therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda
Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and
forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioners submission that the
subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis.
The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so,
there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so
that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here.
More so that the required literal interpretation is consistent
with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
Issues
Essentially, PDEA asserts that the decision of the CA was not

in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the
framers of R.A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely
erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car, registered
under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms. Brodett), had been
seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal
operation and should not be released from the custody of the
law; that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence did
favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such

proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person
not liable for the unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken
in its reading that the third person must still prove in the trial
court that he has no knowledge of the commission of the
crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before
filing the petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming
the order for the release of the car to Ms. Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
_______________
9 Id., pp. 44-46.
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
10 Id., pp. 2-32.
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
347

347
not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third
person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett,
a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its
release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the
RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the
crime.
In his Comment,11 Brodett counters that the petitioner failed
to present any question of law that warranted a review by the
Court; that Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165 clearly and
unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in
It is not open to question that in a criminal proceeding, the

court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to
order upon conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the
instruments to commit the crime, including documents,
papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to
commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
posses_______________
11 Id., pp. 158-177.
348
348
14 United States v. Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305 (1914).
sion of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification

for the first, the accused must not profit from his crime, or
must not acquire property or the right to possession of
property through his unlawful act.12 As justification for the
second, to return to the convict from whom the contraband
was taken, in one way or another, is not prudent or proper,
because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for
possessing the contraband again.13 Indeed, the court having
jurisdiction over the offense has the right to dispose of
property used in the commission of the crime, such
disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the
accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not
liable for the offense that it was used as the instrument to
commit.14
15 United States v. Surla, 20 Phil. 163 (1911).
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership

of the convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the
Government.15 But it is required that the property to be
forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can
be said to be within its jurisdiction.16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be
seized in connection with a criminal offense either by
authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a
search warrant, the personal property that may be seized
may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which
has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of
the offense; or that which has been used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense.17 If the search
is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of
dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or
may consti_______________
12 24 CJS, Criminal Law, 1733.
13 Villaruz v. Court of First Instance, 71 Phil. 72 (1940).
16 United States v. Filart and Singson, 30 Phil. 80 (1915).

349

349
tute proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there
be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal
property seized is used as evidence, its return to the person
from whom it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to
its possession is but a matter of course,19 except if it is
contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order the
return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such property
can be made only when the case is finally terminated.21
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal
discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed as
evidence,22 and this discretion extends even to the manner
of proceeding in the event the accused claims the property
was wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial court
has the power to return property held as evidence to its
rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally
seized by the Government.24 Property used as evidence
must be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it
relates have terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture
or other proceedings.25
_______________
19 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, G.R. No. 164605, October 27,

2006, 505 SCRA 704, 711.
20 24 CJS, Criminal Law, 1733, c., citing United States v.
Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
21 Padilla v. United States, C.A. Cal., 267 F. 2d 351.
22 24 CJS, Criminal Law, 1733, c., citing State v. Allen, 66
N.W. 2d 830, 159 Neb. 314.
23 Id., citing Hutchinson v. Rosetti, 205 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 24
Misc. 2d 949.
24 Id., citing United States v. Estep, C.A. 10(Okl.), 760 F. 2d
1060.
25 Id., citing United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor
Ave., Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584
F. 2d 1297.
350
350
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car
belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal
drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of
the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other
criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:

A careful reading of the above provision shows that
confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to
all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful
act, including but not limited to, money and other assets
obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which
the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are
the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act.
Simply put, the law exempts from the effects of confiscation
and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third person
who is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of
this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra
S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not
appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett
has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the
subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We
therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda
Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and
forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is
clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to
apply the same according to its clear language. The Supreme
Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law according
to its express terms, interpretation being called only when
such literal application is impossible. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a
provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
351

351

We thus cannot sustain petitioners submission that the
subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis.
The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so,
there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so
that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here.
More so that the required literal interpretation is not
consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person
may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act,
including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential
chemicals, is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently
provides as follows:
Section20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or
Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals.Every
penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution,
transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or
culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and
the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other
laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and
forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds
derived from unlawful act, including, but not limited to,
money and other assets obtained thereby, and the
instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act
was committed, unless they are the property of a third
person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not
of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay

pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate
criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a
hearing
_______________
26 Rollo, pp. 44-45.
352
352
for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the
offense and all the assets and properties of the accused
either owned or held by him or in the name of some other
persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of
proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That
if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be
auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of
confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court,
no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be
confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or
transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no
bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property
confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to
pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the
confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the
property pending disposition, as well as expenses for
publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the
above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its

campaign against illegal drugs.27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out,
that the text of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165 relevant to the
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of
the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of the Revised
Penal Code, which states:
Article45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime.Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those
articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.
_______________
27 Emphasis supplied.
353

353
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code in People v. Jose,28 concerning the
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four
accused when they committed the forcible abduction with
rape, although the car did not belong to any of them,
holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the
confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in
the commission of the crime if such be the property of a

third person not liable for the offense, it is the sense of this
Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of
the car in question should be set aside and that the said car
should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure
as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in replevin case. xxx29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20,
supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments
belonging to a third person, therefore, there must be an
indictment charging such third person either as a principal,
accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to
prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third
person, for a mere suspicion of that persons participation is
not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of
the goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutor proposed through
its Comment and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in
the RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal
effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the
duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and
the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The
Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of
the car because it appeared to be the vehicle used in the
transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such,
_______________
28 No. L-28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450.
29 Id., p. 482.
30 I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 15th Edition, pp. 638639.
31 Rollo, pp. 63-64.
354
354
was the instrument in the commission of the violation of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in
accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the
framers of R.A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the car should
not be released from the custody of the law because it had
been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate antiillegal operation. It argues that the Motion to Return NonDrug Evidence did not intimate or allege that the car had
belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had
belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did
not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under
the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge
of the commission of the crime. It insists that the car is a
property in custodia legis and may not be released during the
pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accused Brodetts Motion To
Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the
criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet
to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that point
of the proceedings was premature, considering that the third
paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the
disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income
derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the
accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of
the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further
expressly requires that such property or income derived
therefrom should remain in custodia legis in all that time and
that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45

of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165,
would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determi_______________
32 Id., pp. 2-32.
355

355
nation of whether or not the car (or any other article
confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject
of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to
be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to
this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in
relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the
RTC as being in custodia legis is primarily intended to
preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such.
To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the
trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.
Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of
the car was not enough, for mere photographs might not fill
in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the
RTCs assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
being in contravention with the express language of Section
20 of R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of
the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It appears that on
August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the
merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09209, acquitting both Brodett and Joseph and further ordering
the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence except the

buy-bust money and the genuine money, because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the
links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The
Court cannot merely rely on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official function in view of the glaring
blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these cases.
The presumption of regularity should bow down to the
presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2)
accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling
and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JOR356
356
GE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged
in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust
money and the genuine money are ordered returned to the
accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as
the genuine money confiscated from both accused are
ordered escheated in favor of the government and
accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper
disposition. (emphasis supplied)33
The directive to return the non-drug evidence has overtaken

the petition for review as to render further action upon it
superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform
its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation
and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging
to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify
the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165.34 This the Court must now do in view of the
question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug
objects being susceptible of repetition in the future.35
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply
strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and
should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for
the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the
judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable
for the unlawful act.
_______________
33 Judgment dated August 26, 2011 rendered in Criminal
Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209.
34 Salonga v. Cruz Pao, No. L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438, 463; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 215.
35 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006,
489 SCRA 160, 215; Albaa v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona,
Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421
SCRA 656.
357

357
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is

DENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to
disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro (Actg. Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez**
and Mendoza,*** JJ., concur.
Petition for review denied.
Notes.Some might argue that the evidentiary requirement
in civil forfeiture cases has an even higher standard, that is,
proof beyond reasonable doubtforfeiture of property is in
substance a criminal proceeding, and such forfeiture has
been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. (Yuchengo vs.
Sandiganbayan, 479 SCRA 1 [2006])
Forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of the
offense. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Appeals, 481
SCRA 109 [2006]) Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) vs. Brodett, 658 SCRA 339, G.R. No. 196390
September 28, 2011
G.R. No. 170281. January 18, 2008.*
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, petitioner, vs. GLASGOW
CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE
SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondents.
or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful

activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig
City, where the account sought to be forfeited in this case is
situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR).
Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may
be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of
the RTCs of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republics
complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgows account.
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (R.A. No. 9160); Civil

Forfeiture; Actions; Venue; Motions to Dismiss; The motu
proprio dismissal of a complaint by the trial court on the
ground of improper venue is plain error.Inasmuch as
Glasgow never questioned the venue of the Republics
complaint for civil forfeiture against it, how could the trial
court have dismissed the complaint for improper venue? In
Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 641
(1991), (reiterated in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of
Deeds of Paraaque City, 344 SCRA 680 (2000)], this Court
ruled: The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by
[the] trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain
error . (emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; The venue of civil forfeiture cases
is any Regional Trial Court of the judicial region where the
monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing,
involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money
laundering offense are located.Under Section 3, Title II of
the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore,
the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial
region where the monetary instrument, property
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
96
96
Same; Same; Two Conditions When Applying for Civil

Forfeiture; It is the preliminary seizure of the property in
question which brings it within the reach of judicial process.
RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and
regulations lay down two conditions when applying for civil
forfeiture: (1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or
a covered transaction report deemed suspicious after
investigation by the AMLC and (2) the court has, in a petition
filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary
instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or
indirectly, related to said report. It is the preliminary seizure
of the property in question which brings it within the reach of
the judicial process. It is actually within the courts
possession when it is submitted to the process of the court.
The injunctive writ issued on August 8, 2003 removed
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 from the effective control of
either Glasgow or CSBI or their representatives or agents and
subjected it to the process of the court.
Same; Same; A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is
not a prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture
proceedinga finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is not
an essential element of civil forfeiture.Whether or not there
is truth in the allegation that account no. CA-005-10-0001215 contains the proceeds of unlawful activities is an
evidentiary matter that may be proven during trial. The
complaint, however, did not even have to show or allege that
Glasgow had been implicated in a conviction for, or the
commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and violation
of the Securities Regulation Code. A criminal conviction for an

unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the institution of a
civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt
for an unlawful activity is not an essential element of civil
forfeiture.
97
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008

97
Same; Same; Dismissal of Cases; While a court can dismiss a
case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the
exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances,
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to
proceed with reasonable promptitude.In Marahay v.
Melicor, 181 SCRA 811 (1990), this Court ruled: While a court
can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real
test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due
diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the
disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the
plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
(emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem
service may be made by publication; The same principle in
forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379 applies in cases for civil
forfeiture under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do
not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the
forfeiture of the properties either acquired illegally or related
to unlawful activities in favor of the State.In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190 (2003), this Court declared
that the rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions
in rem. While that case involved forfeiture proceedings under

RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil
forfeiture under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do
not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the
to unlawful activities in favor of the State. As an action in
rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of
against the person. In actions in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless,
summons must be served upon the defendant in order to
satisfy the requirements of due process. For this purpose,
service may be made by publication as such mode of service
is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.
PETITION for review on certiorari of an order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Br. 47.

98
98
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Lilian E. Elepao and Edward G. Gan for respondent City
State Savings Bank, Inc.
SEDALAW for Glasgow Credit & Collection Services Inc.
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the order2 dated October 27,

2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47,
dismissing the complaint for forfeiture3 filed by the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) against respondents Glasgow Credit and
Collection Services, Inc. (Glasgow) and Citystate Savings
Bank, Inc. (CSBI).
On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC
Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for
issuance of temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or writ of
preliminary injunction) against the bank deposits in account
number CA-005-10-000121-5 maintained by Glasgow in CSBI.
The case, filed pursuant to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001), as amended, was docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-107319.
Acting on the Republics urgent plea for the issuance of a
TRO, the executive judge4 of RTC Manila issued a 72-hour
TRO dated July 21, 2003. The case was thereafter raffled to
Branch 47 and the hearing on the application for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction was set on August 4, 2003.
After hearing, the trial court (through then Presiding Judge
Marivic T. Balisi-Umali) issued an order granting the
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Penned by Judge Augusto T. Gutierrez. Rollo, pp. 49-58.
3 Docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107319.
4 Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas.
99
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008
99
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive
writ was issued on August 8, 2003.
Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned unserved as
it could no longer be found at its last known address.
On October 8, 2003, the Republic filed a verified omnibus
motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of
court to serve summons by publication. In an order dated
October 15, 2003, the trial court directed the issuance of
alias summons. However, no mention was made of the
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived
the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to serve the alias
summons. The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to
(a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion for
leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the
reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to serve
the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days.
However, it did not resolve the Republics motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication declaring:
Until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any
action on [the Republics] motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication would be untenable if not
premature.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the
Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriffs
return dated June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons
was returned unserved as Glasgow was no longer holding
office at the given address since July 2002 and left no
forwarding address.
Meanwhile, the Republics motion for leave of court to serve

summons by publication remained unresolved. Thus, on
August 11, 2005, the Republic filed a manifestation and ex
parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication.
100
100
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgows
Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance) dated
August 11, 2005. It alleged that (1) the court had no
jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been
served on it; (2) the complaint was premature and stated no
cause of action as there was still no conviction for estafa or
other criminal violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there
was failure to prosecute on the part of the Republic.
The Republic opposed Glasgows motion to dismiss. It
contended that its suit was an action quasi in rem where
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It asserted
that prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a
precondition to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its
complaint alleged ultimate facts sufficient to establish a
cause of action. It denied that it failed to prosecute the case.
On October 27, 2005, the trial court issued the assailed order.
It dismissed the case on the following grounds: (1) improper
venue as it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where
CSBI, the depository bank of the account sought to be
forfeited, was located; (2) insufficiency of the complaint in
form and substance and (3) failure to prosecute. It lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction and directed CSBI to release to
Glasgow or its authorized representative the funds in CA00510-000121-5.

Raising questions of law, the Republic filed this petition. On
November 23, 2005, this Court issued a TRO restraining
Glasgow and CSBI, their agents, representatives and/or
persons acting upon their orders from implementing the
assailed October 27, 2005 order. It restrained Glasgow from
removing, dissipating or disposing of the funds in account no.
CA-005-10-000121-5 and CSBI from allowing any transaction
on the said account.
The petition essentially presents the following issue: whether
the complaint for civil forfeiture was correctly dis101
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008

101
missed on grounds of improper venue, insufficiency in form
and substance and failure to prosecute.
The Court agrees with the Republic.
THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED IN THE PROPER VENUE
In its assailed order, the trial court cited the grounds raised
by Glasgow in support of its motion to dismiss:
1. That this [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the person of
Glasgow considering that no [s]ummons has been served
upon it, and it has not entered its appearance voluntarily;
2. That the [c]omplaint for forfeiture is premature because of
the absence of a prior finding by any tribunal that Glasgow
was engaged in unlawful activity: [i]n connection therewith[,]
Glasgow argues that the [c]omplaint states no cause of
action; and
3. That there is failure to prosecute, in that, up to now,

summons has yet to be served upon Glasgow.5
But inasmuch as Glasgow never questioned the venue of the
Republics complaint for civil forfeiture against it, how could
the trial court have dismissed the complaint for improper
venue? In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 6
(reiterated in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds
of Paraaque City),7 this Court ruled:
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by [the]
trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error.
(emphasis supplied)
At any rate, the trial court was a proper venue.
On November 15, 2005, this Court issued A.M. No. 05-1104SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture,
_______________
5 Order dated October 27, 2005, supra note 2, p. 49.

6 G.R. No. 74854, 02 April 1991, 195 SCRA 641.
7 398 Phil. 626; 344 SCRA 680 (2000).
102
102
Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument,
Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to
an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under RA
9160, as amended (Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture). The order dismissing the Republics complaint for
civil forfeiture of Glasgows account in CSBI has not yet
attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal.

Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies
to the Republics complaint.8 Moreover, Glasgow itself
judicially admitted that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture is applicable to the instant case.9
Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court)
of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court.
A petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional
trial court of the judicial region where the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or
relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering
offense are located; Provided, however, That where all or any
portion of the monetary instrument, property or proceeds is
located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in
the regional trial court in Manila or of the judicial region
where any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or
proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of
Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is
any RTC of the judicial region where the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or
_______________
8 Section 59, Title IX (Common Provisions) of the Rule of

Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 59. Transitory provision.This Rule shall apply to all
pending civil forfeiture cases or petitions for freeze order.
9 Memorandum dated January 11, 2007 for Glasgow. Rollo,
pp. 329-347.
103
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008

103
relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering
offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to
be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National
Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil
forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR.
Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR,10 it was
a proper venue of the Republics complaint for civil forfeiture
of Glasgows account.
THE COMPLAINT WAS SUFFICIENT INFORM AND SUBSTANCE
In the assailed order, the trial court evaluated the Republics
complaint to determine its sufficiency in form and substance:
At the outset, this [c]ourt, before it proceeds, takes the
opportunity to examine the [c]omplaint and determine
whether it is sufficient in form and substance.
Before this [c]ourt is a [c]omplaint for Civil Forfeiture of
Assets filed by the [AMLC], represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General[,] against Glasgow and [CSBI] as necessary
party. The [c]omplaint principally alleges the following:
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of

Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the
municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig,
Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa,
and Valenzuela[.] (emphasis supplied)
104
104
Floor, Citystate Center [Building], No. 709 Shaw Boulevard[,]
Pasig City;
(b) [CSBI] is a corporation existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at Citystate Center Building,
No. 709 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City;
(c) Glasgow has funds in the amount of P21,301,430.28
deposited with [CSBI], under CA 005-10-000121-5;
(d) As events have proved, aforestated bank account is
related to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of
Securities Regulation Code;
(a) Glasgow is a corporation existing under the laws of the

Philippines, with principal office address at Unit 703, 7th
(e) The deposit has been subject of Suspicious Transaction

Reports;
_______________
10 Section 3 of BP 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

1980, as amended) provides:
(f) After appropriate investigation, the AMLC issued

Resolutions No. 094 (dated July 10, 2002), 096 (dated July 12,
2002), 101 (dated July 23, 2002), and 108 (dated August 2,
2002), directing the issuance of freeze orders against the
bank accounts of Glasgow;
Section 13.Creation of Regional Trial Courts.There are

hereby created thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, one for
each of the following judicial regions:
(g) Pursuant to said AMLC Resolutions, Freeze Orders Nos.

008-010, 011 and 013 were issued on different dates,
addressed to the concerned banks;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(h) The facts and circumstances plainly showing that

defendant Glasgows bank account and deposit are related to
the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of Securities
Regulation Code, as well as to a money laundering offense
[which] [has] been summarized by the AMLC in its Resolution
No. 094; and
(i) Because defendant Glasgows bank account and deposits
are related to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of
Securities Regulation Code, as well as [to] money laundering
offense as aforestated, and being the subject of covered
transaction reports and eventual freeze orders, the same
should properly be forfeited in favor of the government in
accordance with Section 12, R.A. 9160, as amended.11
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action,
the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material
_______________
11 Order dated October 27, 2005, supra note 2, pp. 52-53.

105
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008

105
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the

complaint.
The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint.14 (emphasis
ours)
In this connection, Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 4. Contents of the petition for civil forfeiture.The
petition for civil forfeiture shall be verified and contain the
following allegations:
(a) The name and address of the respondent;
(b) A description with reasonable particularity of the
monetary instrument, property, or proceeds, and their
location; and
(c) The acts or omissions prohibited by and the specific
provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended,
which are alleged to be the grounds relied upon for the
forfeiture of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds;
and
[(d)] The reliefs prayed for.
Here, the verified complaint of the Republic contained the
following allegations:
_______________
allegations.12 The determination is confined to the four

corners of the complaint and nowhere else.13
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of
action, the question submitted to the court for determination
is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action and not whether those
allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
12 Malicdem v. Flores, G.R. No. 151001, 08 September 2006,

501 SCRA 248.
13 Id.
14 Id., citing Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, 30
September 2005, 471 SCRA 227.
106
106
(a) Civil Forfeiture.When there is a covered transaction

report made, and the court has, in a petition filed for the
purpose ordered seizure of any monetary instrument or
property, in whole or
_______________

(a) the name and address of the primary defendant therein,
Glasgow;15
15 With CSBI impleaded as a co-defendant for being a

necessary party.
(b) a description of the proceeds of Glasgows unlawful

activities with particularity, as well as the location thereof,
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 in the amount of
P21,301,430.28 maintained with CSBI;
107
(c) the acts prohibited by and the specific provisions of RA

9160, as amended, constituting the grounds for the forfeiture
of the said proceeds. In particular, suspicious transaction
reports showed that Glasgow engaged in unlawful activities
of estafa and violation of the Securities Regulation Code
(under Section 3(i)(9) and (13), RA 9160, as amended); the
proceeds of the unlawful activities were transacted and
deposited with CSBI in account no. CA-005-10-000121-5
thereby making them appear to have originated from
legitimate sources; as such, Glasgow engaged in money
laundering (under Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the
AMLC subjected the account to freeze order and
107
(d) the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance of a TRO or

writ of preliminary injunction and the forfeiture of the account
in favor of the government as well as other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises.
The form and substance of the Republics complaint
substantially conformed with Section 4, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture.
Moreover, Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Forfeiture Provisions.
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008

in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report, the
Revised Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall apply.
In relation thereto, Rule 12.2 of the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:
RULE 12
Forfeiture Provisions
xxx
xxx
xxx
Rule 12.2. When Civil Forfeiture May be Applied.When there

is a SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORT OR A COVERED
TRANSACTION REPORT DEEMED SUSPICIOUS AFTER
INVESTIGATION BY THE AMLC, and the court has, in a petition
filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary
instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or
indirectly, related to said report, the Revised Rules of Court
on civil forfeiture shall apply.
RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and

regulations lay down two conditions when applying for civil
forfeiture:
provided in Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, were

satisfied. Hence, the Republic, represented by the AMLC,
properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.
(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered

transaction report deemed suspicious after investigation by
the AMLC and
Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that account

no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the proceeds of unlawful
activities is an evidentiary matter that may be proven during
trial. The complaint, however, did not even have to show or
allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a conviction for,
or the commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and
violation of the Securities Regulation Code.
(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered
the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole
or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.
It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which
brings it within the reach of the judicial process.16 It is
actually within the courts possession when it is submitted to
the process of the court.17 The injunctive writ issued on
August 8, 2003 removed account no. CA-005-10-000121-5
from the effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their
repre_______________
16 36 Am Jur 2d, Forfeiture, Section 30.

17 Id., Section 28.
108
A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a

prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding.
Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is
not an essential element of civil forfeiture.
Section 6 of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering.
(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both
the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as
herein defined.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be
given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or
violation under this Act without prejudice to the freezing and
other remedies provided. (emphasis supplied)
108
Rule 6.1 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations

of RA 9160, as amended, states:
109

sentatives or agents and subjected it to the process of the
court.
Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI
was (1) covered by several suspicious transaction reports and
(2) placed under the control of the trial court upon the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008

109
Rule 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering
(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both

the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as
defined under Rule 3(i) of the AMLA.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be
given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or
violation under the AMLA without prejudice to the application
ex-parte by the AMLC to the Court of Appeals for a freeze
order with respect to the monetary instrument or property
involved therein and resort to other remedies provided under
the AMLA, the Rules of Court and other pertinent laws and
rules. (emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 27 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 27. No prior charge, pendency or conviction necessary.
No prior criminal charge, pendency of or conviction for an
unlawful activity or money laundering offense is necessary
for the commencement or the resolution of a petition for civil
forfeiture. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a
criminal prosecution for the unlawful activity or for money
laundering, an action for civil forfeiture may be separately
and independently prosecuted and resolved.
THERE WAS NO FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
The trial court faulted the Republic for its alleged failure to
prosecute the case. Nothing could be more erroneous.
Immediately after the complaint was filed, the trial court
ordered its deputy sheriff/process server to serve summons
and notice of the hearing on the application for issuance of
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The subpoena to
Glasgow was, however, returned unserved as Glasgow could
no longer be found at its given address and had moved out
of the building since August 1, 2002.
110
110
Meanwhile, after due hearing, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining Glasgow from removing,
dissipating or disposing of the subject bank deposits and
CSBI from allowing any transaction on, withdrawal, transfer,
removal, dissipation or disposition thereof.
As the summons on Glasgow was returned unserved, and
considering that its whereabouts could not be ascertained
despite diligent inquiry, the Republic filed a verified omnibus
motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of
court to serve summons by publication on October 8, 2003.
While the trial court issued an alias summons in its order
dated October 15, 2003, it kept quiet on the prayer for leave
of court to serve summons by publication.
Subsequently, in an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial
court archived the case for failure of the Republic to cause
the service of alias summons. The Republic filed an ex parte
omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its
pending motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the
reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to cause
the service of the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within
15 days. However, it deferred its action on the Republics
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication
until a return was made on the alias summons.
Meanwhile, the Republic continued to exert efforts to obtain
information from other government agencies on the
whereabouts or current status of respondent Glasgow if only
to save on expenses of publication of summons. Its efforts,
however, proved futile. The records on file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission provided no information. Other

inquiries yielded negative results.
Republic was already seeking leave of court to serve

summons by publication.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic received a copy of the sheriffs

return dated June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons
had been returned unserved as Glasgow was no longer
holding office at the given address since July 2002 and left no
forwarding address. Still, no action was taken by the trial
In Marahay v. Melicor,18 this Court ruled:
111
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008

111
court on the Republics motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication. Thus, on August 11, 2005, the
Republic filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve
its motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
It was at that point that Glasgow filed a motion to dismiss by
way of special appearance which the Republic vigorously
opposed. Strangely, to say the least, the trial court issued the
assailed order granting Glasgows motion.
Given these circumstances, how could the Republic be
faulted for failure to prosecute the complaint for civil
forfeiture? While there was admittedly a delay in the
proceeding, it could not be entirely or primarily ascribed to
the Republic. That Glasgows whereabouts could not be
ascertained was not only beyond the Republics control, it
was also attributable to Glasgow which left its principal office
address without informing the Securities and Exchange
Commission or any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of
Internal Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry) of
its new address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non

prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is
whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay
the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the
plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
(emphasis supplied)
We see no pattern or scheme on the part of the Republic to
delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to
observe the mandatory requirement of the rules. The trial
court
_______________
18 G.R. No. 44980, 06 February 1990, 181 SCRA 811.

112
112
should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the
Republics complaint.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS MAY BE BY PUBLICATION
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,19 this Court declared that the
rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem.
While that case involved forfeiture proceedings under RA
1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture

under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the
to unlawful activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself
instead of against the person.20 In actions in rem or quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.21
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant
in order to satisfy the requirements of due process.22 For this
purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode
of service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.23
In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 8. Notice and manner of service.(a) The respondent
shall be given notice of the petition in the same manner as
service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and
the following rules:
_______________
19 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 461 Phil. 598; 406 SCRA 190

(2003).
20 Id.
21 Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, 10 March
2004, 425 SCRA 98.
22 Id.
23 Sps. Jose v. Sps. Boyon, 460 Phil. 354; 414 SCRA 216
(2003).
113
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008

113
1. The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by
any other means prescribed in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;
2. The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the
docket number; (iii) the cause of action; and (iv) the relief
prayed for; and
3. The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no
comment or opposition is filed within the reglementary
period, the court shall hear the case ex parte and render
such judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the petition and its supporting evidence.
(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown
owner or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication of the notice of
the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order. In the event
that the cost of publication exceeds the value or amount of
the property to be forfeited by ten percent, publication shall
not be required. (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The October
27, 2005 order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
47, in Civil Case No. 03-107319 is SET ASIDE. The August 11,
2005 motion to dismiss of Glasgow Credit and Collection
Services, Inc. is DENIED. And the complaint for forfeiture of
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the AntiMoney Laundering Council, is REINSTATED.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 47 which shall forthwith proceed with the
case pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 05-11-04SC.
Pending final determination of the case, the November 23,
2005 temporary restraining order issued by this Court is

hereby MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and
Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
114
114
State Land Investment Corporation vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
Petition granted, order of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 47
set aside.
Notes.It is logically congruent that violations of R.A. No.
1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
penalty. (Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 460 SCRA 600 [2005])
In civil cases to recover or for restitution, reparation of
damages, or indemnification for consequential and other
damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or
other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al., the Sandiganbayan is not to look
for proof beyond reasonable doubt, but to determine, based
on the evidence presented, in light of common human
experience, which of the theories proffered by the parties is
more worthy of credence. (Yuchengco vs. Sandiganbayan,
479 SCRA 1 [2006])
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.,
542 SCRA 95, G.R. No. 170281 January 18, 2008
G.R. No. 92163. June 5, 1990.*

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR
(Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT
CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN.
EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police
District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE
ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164. June 5, 1990.*
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO ANDERLINDA E. PANLILIO,
petitioners, vs. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO
C. TRAMPE, FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EU_______________
* EN BANC.
218
218
Enrile vs. Salazar
LOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 103, respondents.
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine prohibits
complexing of rebellion with any other offense.The
rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary
ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion

with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Personal evaluation of
report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor, sufficient to determine probable cause.It is also
contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for
petitioners arrest without first personally determining the
existence of probable cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of
Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. This Court has already
ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the
judge to make such a personal examination, it being
sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally
evaluating the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor. Petitioner claims that the
warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes
after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which
hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over
the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation.
Merely because said respondent had what some might
consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply
with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or
could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Same; Same; Same; Bail; Courts; Respondent Court has
jurisdiction to deny or grant bail to petitioner.The criminal
case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for
invoking the petitioners right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant
or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course
was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a
petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se
or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him.
Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should
the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and

even then, not without first apply-
hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of

the evidence against him.
219
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court has no power to

change, but only to interpret the law as it stands at any given
time.It is enough to give anyone pauseand the Court is
no exceptionthat not even the crowded streets of our
capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is
disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at
national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal
activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to
effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it
stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly the initiative in this matter, which is properly within
its province.
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990

219
Enrile vs. Salazar
ing to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incumbent on the accused, to
whom no bail is recommended, to claim the right to bail
hearing to prove the reason or weakness of evidence against
him.There was and is no reason to assume that the
resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or
competence of the respondent Judgeindeed such an
assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our
trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such
complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in
short that would justify bypassing established judicial
processes designed to orderly move litigation through the
hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically, this is the reason
behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the
grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail and, if it erred in that matter, denied an
opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that
the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing
no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutors recommendation regarding bail, though it may
be perceived as the better course for the judge motu propio
to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. It is,
in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail
has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail
220
220
Enrile vs. Salazar
FERNAN, C.J., Dissenting and Concurring:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine should not be

interpreted as an all embracing authority; Reasons.To my
mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an
all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes
committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in
connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that
extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the
instant case that Hernandez remains binding doctrine

operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the

date that the law was originally
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990
221
221
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Statutes; The
rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed.While
litigants, should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial
ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance
of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional
issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The rules on
habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v.
Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and
flexibility of the writits capacity to reach all manner of
illegal detentionits ability to cut through barriers of form
and procedural mazeshave always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v.
Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [italics ours].
FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Statutes; Non-retroactivity rule

applies to statutes principally; Expost facto law.The nonretroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes
do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of
people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing
statutory norms give specific shape and content to such
norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with
the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses
become integral with the norms (Cf. Caltex v. Palomar, 18
SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial
Enrile vs. Salazar

enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one
overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here,
36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed
is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for
the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607 [19741; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975];
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]).
Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of
legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional
implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a
judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or
enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an
offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon
the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process
clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347, 12 L. Ed. 2d
894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260
[1977]; Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections,
866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Rebellion consists of many acts;

Case at bar.The crime of rebellion consists of many acts.
The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate
crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one
hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun
bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate

offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the
destruction of life and property. The same act cannot be
punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes
the fancy of prosecutorspunishment for the killing of
soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The
prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in
total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent
people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other acts
of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We
cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for
each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the
rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
in lieu of still-to-be-enacted legislation. The killing of civilians
during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex yCrime; Crime of Rebellion complexed

with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was
ground- breaking on
222
222
Enrile vs. Salazar
the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder,
arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand,
the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the
Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No.
187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as
statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the

crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.
Same; Same; Same; Case at bar; The reformation is clearly a
nullity and plainly void ab initio.And yet, notwithstanding
these unmistakable and controlling beacon lightsabsent
when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrinethe
prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners
with rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void
ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a
nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are
as null and void as the information on which they are
anchored. And, since the entire question of the informations
validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I
venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1)
offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Bail; Habeas Corpus is the proper

remedy to petitioner as an accused; Case at bar.I submit
that the proceedings need not be remanded to the
respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have
construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion,
an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is
the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who
had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense
but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent
judge in violation of the petitioners constitutional right to
bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of
bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if
complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant
proceedings.
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Bail; No useful

purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when
the Supreme Court has been satisfied that petitioner is
entitled to temporary
223
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990

223
Enrile vs. Salazar
freedom.I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders
the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it
that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted
the petitioner provisional liberty upon the filing of a bond of
P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him
provisional liberty is in my view, of no moment, because
bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose
to have the trial court hear the incident again when we
ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to
temporary freedom.
of similar cases2 that took issue with the rulingall with a

marked lack of successbut none, it would seem, where
season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to
attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate,
even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite
the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to
bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27,
1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo
Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of
a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and
earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
_______________
1 99 Phil. 515 (1956).

2 People vs. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 (1956); People vs. Geronimo,
100 Phil. 90 (1956); People vs. Romagosa, 103 Phil. 20
(1958); and People vs. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 (1960).
224
PETITION for Habeas Corpus.

224
NARVASA, J.:
Enrile vs. Salazar
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal

jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez1 once more takes center
stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would
reexamine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its
applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor

Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio
Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator

Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the information and none fixed
in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28,
1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres.3
5 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, p. 26.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile,

through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein
(which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on
March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights in being, or having been:
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in
the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for
which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause.4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5,
1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990.5 On
March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
return6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No.
92164,7 which had been
_______________
3 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 32-34.

4 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 34 et seq.
6 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 305-359.

7 Originally a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the
Court, upon motion of the petitioners, resolved to treat as a
petition
225
225
Enrile vs. Salazar
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enriles co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio,
and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the
petitioners case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
becauseand this is putting it very simplythe information
in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated
otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between
the complex crime (delito complejo) arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another, which is
referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal
Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the
compound crime (delito compuesto) arising from a single
act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses
referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore,
it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on
March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of
the same date8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio
spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing,

within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of
P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the
Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was
issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on
the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and
stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised
in both cases. Four Members of the Court9 voted against
granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two10 against granting
bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are
raised and litigated in Senator Enriles petition, G.R. No.
92163.
The parties oral and written pleas presented the Court with
the following options:
_______________
for habeas corpus; Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 128-129.

8 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 407-411.
9 Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, Corts and Grio-Aquino, JJ.
10 Fernan, C.J. and Narvasa, J.
226
226
Enrile vs. Salazar
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view
expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said
case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and
that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may
properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this
option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral

argument although it is not offered in Ms written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a
rebellion which also constitute common crimes of grave or
less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb
all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted
against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that
the doctrine should be re-exainined.10-a In the view of the
majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and
logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to
warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the
fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution,
saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942
of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that (w)hen by
reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in
this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion),
acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties
are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon
the offender.11 In thus acting, the President in effect by
legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with
the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the
same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason
against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject
________________
10-a Two Members are on leave.

11 Executive Order No. 187 issued June 5, 1987.
227
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990

227
Enrile vs. Salazar
the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its
application to offenses committed as a necessary means for
the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be
interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof While four Members of the Court felt that
the proponents arguments were not entirely devoid of merit,
the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed
in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article
48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reasonand a fundamental one at that
why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and
the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this
could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a
fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of
prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon
the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty

could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48
said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the
several acts performed toy Mm were punished separately. In
the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de eoncmrso de delitos
a que hace referenda este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932),
esta basado franeamente en el principio pro reo. (II Doctrina
Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to
Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the
counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then
in 1932, reading:
228
228
Enrile vs. Salazar
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el
caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o
cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al
delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que
represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se

sancionaran los delitos por sparado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification
inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the
penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the
case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties
imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The
absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our
mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed,
if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no
reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for
each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the
penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason
for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing
him for each crime independently from the other, he must
suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one,
on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of
the separate penalties for each offense.12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the
primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioners
guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less
adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time.
The Courts ruling merely provides a take-off point for the
disposition of
________________
12 People vs. Hernandez, supra at 541-543.

229
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990

229
Enrile vs. Salazar
other questions relevant to the petitioners complaints about
the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he
has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the
information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an
offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would
complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple
rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the
amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion
allegedly committed by said defendants, as means
necessary (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and
a fine of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of
this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a
similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.13
The plaint of petitioners counsel that he is charged with a

crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion
may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the
occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere
flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the
information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been
initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The
record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner
for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said
complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the ques_______________
under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses,

in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution.15 This Court
has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable
duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established procedure by
personally evaluating the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims
that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty
minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent
Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation.17 Merely because said respondent had what
some might consider only a relatively brief period within
which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume
that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does
that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail.

In the light of the Courts reaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioners case, and of the logical an.d
necessary corollary that the information against him should
be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion,
which is bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains:
Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for
habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for
asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
Enrile vs. Salazar
_______________
13 Id., at 551.
230
230
tioned information.14 There is nothing inherently irregular or

contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment
for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory
complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the
preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the
warrant for petitioners arrest without first personally
determining the existence of probable cause by examining
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp, 78-79 and 73-76.

15 Supra, footnote 4.
16 Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394.
17 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 46-47.
231
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990

231
Enrile vs. Salazar
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the
normal venue for invoking the petitioners right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent.
The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming
a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by
the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court
have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying
to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available
there.
Even acceptance of petitioners premise that going by the
Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent
crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it
charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify
his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought
in the criminal action before the respondent Judge.18
There thus seems to be no question that all the grounds upon
which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether
these went into the substance of what is charged in the
information or imputed error or omission on the part of the
prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with
the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the
criminal case before said Judge and should have been
brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of
any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence
of the respondent Judgeindeed such an assumption would
be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none
whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or

transcendental importance as to disqualify every court,
except this Court, irom deciding them; none, in short that
would justify by-passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of
our courts. Parenthetically, this is the reason behind the vote
of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to
petitioner: the view that the trial
_______________
18 Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court.

232
232
Enrile vs. Salazar
court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no
differ* ence that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant
of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply
following the prosecutors recommendation regarding bail,
though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge
motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is
charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as
to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the
right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength
or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has
triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar
situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or
contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the
regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas
has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may

have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the
outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash
the Courts hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only
compound the delay that it has already gone through, the
Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing,
the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said
petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of
proceedings that should have started with the trial court and
reached this Court only if the relief applied for was denied by
the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no
longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the
present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and
burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the
original competence of the lower courts.
What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and
decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually identical to that of petitioner Enrile
in factual
_______________
19 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55.

233
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990

233
Enrile vs. Salazar
milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles
already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as coaccused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941,
that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in
the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody
and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in
violationthey claimof their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of
rebellion has lost that quitessentially quixotic quality that
justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by
love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the
sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash
of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and
assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often
perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military,
but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called
rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pauseand the Court is no
exceptionthat not even the crowded streets of our capital
City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is
disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at
national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal
activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to
effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it
stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is
properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
_______________
20 Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 124-125.

234
234
Enrile vs. Salazar
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as
charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
The Courts earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are
ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is
fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond filed with this Court shall become
functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED, Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217, G.R. No.
92163, .R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
No. L-28865. February 28, 1972.

NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
_______________
13 Rule 107, sec. l(c) of the old Rules, now Rule 111, sec. 3(b)
of the Revised Rules of Court.
302
thereofis much lighter defies logic and reason and is now

expressly abandoned. It is more plausible to believe that Art.
294 applies only where robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person takes place without entering an
inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of
the Revised Penal Code, When tie elements of both provisions
are present, the crime is a complex one, calling for the
impositionas provided in Art. 48 of the Codeof the
penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period,
which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. Lucero, J.
302
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
Remedial law; Exceptions to conclusiveness of factual
findings of the Court of Appeals.On appeal from a decision
of the Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made in said
decision are final, except(1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went bey ond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
Criminal law; Characterization of crime of robbery with force
upon things where robber lays his hands upon a person.The
doctrine laid down in previous cases whereby in case of
robbery inside an inhabited house, the thief, in addition, lays
his hands upon any person without committing any of the
crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty decreedunder paragraph (15)

Victor Arichea for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix V. Maka siar, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco
for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court

of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
303

303
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court
hereby finds the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis
and Apolinario Satimbre guilty bey ond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery in band and sentences Bonifacio Malana

as an accessory after the fact to suffer imprisonment of from
six (6) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to six (6) years,
prision correccional, as maximum and to indemnify the
offended party, Ignacio Peaflor in the sum of P80.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to
exceed one-third (1/3) of the principal penalty and the
accused Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre to suffer
imprisonment of from ten (10) y ears and one (1) day, prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day, reclusion temporal, as maximum,
both to indemnify the spouses Ignacio Peaflor and Casimira
Lagman in the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Seven
Pesos (P2,557.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and all three to pay the proportionate part of the
costs.
worth P350.00 and delivered them to the robber. Thereupon,

that robber opened and ransacked the wardrobe. Then they
tied the hands of Mrs Casimira L. Peaflor and those of her
two sons. After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered
them with blankets and left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued
at P150.00, was taken by the robbers. The spouses thereafter
called for help and Councilor Almario, a neighbor, came and
untied Ignacio
The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in

the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
Peaflor. The robbery was reported to the Chief of Police of

Hermosa and to the Philippine Constabulary.
At about 1:00 oclock in the early morning of October 1,

1956, Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peaflor, 47-y ear old wife of
Ignacio Peaflor, the owner of a store located at the new
highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after answering a minor call of
nature, heard the barkings of the dog nearby indicating the
presence of strangers around the vicinity. Acting on instinct,
she woke up husband Ignacio Peaflor who, after getting his
flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down the store to
take a look. As he approached the door of the store, it
suddenly gave way having been forcibly pushed and opened
by 4 men, one of them holding and pointing a machinegun.
Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peaflor fired his revolver
but missed. Upon receiving from someone a stunning blow on
the head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to be dead. He
was hogtied by the men. The fact, however, was that he did
not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men then went up the
house. One of the robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peaflor for
money saying that they are people from the mountain. Mrs.
Casimira L. Peaflor, realizing the danger, took from under
the mat the bag containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings
Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the

premises upon receiving the report of Councilor Almario and
found owner Ignacio Peaflor with a wound on the head (tsn.
23, I). The wardrobe was ransacked and things scattered
around. It appears that the robbers bore a hole on the
sidewall of the ground floor of the store and passed through it
to gain entrance. According to Chief of Police Delfin Lapid,
they removed the adobe stone and that is the place where
they passed through (tsn. 24, I). In that same morning,
policeman Melquiadea Samaniego reported seeing suspicious
characters passing through a nearby field and when the field
was inspected, the authorities were able to locate a
greasegun with 5 bullets and a pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I,
testimony of Chief of Police). x x x.
304
304
It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal

complaint for robbery in hand was filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Hermosa, Bataan. Named as defendants in
the complaint, as subsequently amended, were Nicanor
Napolis, Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila,
alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias

Toning, John Doe, alias Somray Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre,
Paul Doe, et al. Napolis, Malana, Anila and Casimiro having
waived their right to a preliminary investigation, the case,
insofar as they are concerned, was forwarded to the Court of
First Instance of Bataan, where the corresponding information
was filed. As subsequently amended, by the inclusion, as
defendants therein, of Antonio Bededia alias Toning, Domingo
Flores alias Eko, Ben de la Cruz, Jose Escabel alias Pepe,
Apolinario Satimbre, Oarlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is alleged
in said information:
threatened her at gun point and demanded money; that the

same accused while inside the said house searched and
ransacked the place and take and carry away the following
cash money and articles belonging to said spouses Ignacio
Peaflor and Casimira L. Peaflor, to wit: P2,000.00 in cash,
Philippine Currency, One (1) ring (Brillante) valued at
P350.00, One (1) licensed Commando Colt Revolver, Serial
No. 532132 and One (1) Flashlight, valued at P7.00, to the
damage and prejudice of said spouses in the total sum of
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN PESOS,
(P2,557.00) Philippine Cur-rency.
That on or about 1:00 oclock in the early morning of

October 1, 1956, in the Municipality of Hermosa, Province of
Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused Bonifacio Malana,
Nicanor Napolis. Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori,
Jose Escabel, Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John
Doe, Alias Sammy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito
Veloso, Domingo Flores, Alias Eko, and Paul Doe, by
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with the
intent to gain and armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3) caliber
.45 pistols and two (2) revolvers, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, entered the dwelling of the
spouses IGNACIO PEAFLOR and CASIMIRA L. PEAFLOR by
boring a hole under
At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila,

Casimiro and Flores,1 the evidence for the prosecution
consisted of the testimo ny of the offended parties, Ignacio
Peaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman Peaflor, Provincial
Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea, Deputy
Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina, Delfin Lapid, the Chief of
Police of Hermosa, Bataan , and Lt. Luis Sacra-mento of the
Constabulary and the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of
defendants Napolis, Satimbre and Malana, respectively,
admitting their participation in the commission of the crime
charged.
305

305
the sidewall of the ground floor of the house and once inside,
attack, assault and hit Ignacio Peaflor with the handle of the
Grease Gun causing him to fall on the ground and rendering
him unconscious, tied his hands and feet and then leave him;
that the same accused approached Casimira L. Peaflor,
Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor testified mainly on the robbery involved

in the charge, whereas Fiscal Kahayon narrated the
circumstances under which the affidavit Exhibit A was
subscribed and sworn to before him by appellant Napolis;
Police Chief Lapid and Lt. Sacramen to dwelt on the
investigations conducted by them and the circumstances
under which said defendants made their aforementioned
affida-vits; and Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk
of Court Eulogio C. Mina explained how Exhibits B and C were
subscribed and sworn to before them by defendants Satimbre
and Malana, respectively.
Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi.
Testifying in his own defense, he would have Us believe that
_______________
1 Other defendants were granted a separate trial, whereas

still others had not been apprehended as yet.
306
I. In affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of

the crime charged based upon a lurking error of identity.
II. In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an
extra-judicial confession extracted through duress.
III. In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon
the evidence on record adduced during the trial.
306
on October 1, 1956, he was in his house in Olongapo,
Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr.
Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony
and that of his wife Engracia Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to
be innocent of the crime charged and said that, although
reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon,
upon the advice of his wife Engracia Mendozawho sought
to corroborate himand Mayor Guillermo Arcenas of
Hermosa, in order that he may not be implicated in a robbery
that took place in Balamja, Bataan, and that he could be sent
back to his hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of
Bataan dismissed the case as against defendants Flores,
Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio
Malana and Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated. Said
defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however,
dismissed Malanas appeal, and affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are
concerned, Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of the
Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court has
erred
IV. In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision

of law and jurisprudence on the matter.
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant
has not been sufficiently identified as one of those who
perpetrated the crime charged. In support of this contention,
it is argued that the identification made by Mrs. Peaflor was
due to a picture of appellant taken by Lt. Sacramento from
the files of the police in Olongapo, Zambales, and then shown
to her, before he (appellant) was appre307

307
hended and then brought to her presence for identification, It
is thus implied that Mrs. Peaflor identified him in
consequence of the suggestion resulting from the picture she
had seen before he was taken to her for said purpose. The
defense further alleges that she could not have recognized
appellant herein, in the evening of the occurrence, because
the same was dark, and the flashlight used by the malefactors was then focused downward.
Appellants pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The
record shows that the authorities were notified immediately
after the occurrence; that, soon after, peace officersPolice
Chief Lapid and PC Lt. Sacramentorepaired to the house of
Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor and investigated them; that based upon
the description given by Mrs. Peaflor, one individual was
apprehended and then presented to Mrs. Peaflor, who said
that he was not one of the thieves; that another person
subsequently arrested and taken to Mrs. Peaflor was,
similarly, exonerated by her; that in the course of the
investigation conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt.
Sacramento later brought Mrs. Peaflor to the offices of the
police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures of
police characters on file therein; that among those pictures,
she noticed that of appellant herein, who, she believed, was
one of the culprits; and that appellant was, therefore,
arrested and brought to Mrs. Peaflor, who positively
identified him as one of the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs.
Peaflor, through the aforementioned picture of appellant,
that he was one of the thieves. It was she who told Lt.
Sacramento that said picture was that of one of the thieves.
Besides, the fact that Mrs. Peaflor readily exonerated the
first two suspects, arrested by the authorities, shows that
appellant herein would not have been identified by her if she
were not reasonably certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize
appellant herein because it was he who demanded money
from her and to whom she delivered P2,000 in cash and two
(2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and
ransacked her wardrobe; and it was he who tied her hands
and those of her two sons. These series of acts, performed in
308
308
her presence, consumed sufficient timefrom 10 to 20

minutesto allow her eyesight to be adjusted to existing
conditions, and, hence, to reco gnize some of the robbers.
The night was dark; but, there were two flashlights switched
on, namely, that of her husband, and the one used by the
thieves. Although the latter was, at times, focussed
downward, it had to be aimed, sometimes, in another
direction, particularly when the money and rings were
delivered to appellant herein, and when he opened and
ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peaflor. Lastly, her
testimony was confirmed by other circumstances presently to
be mentioned, in connection with the consideration of the
other alleged errors pointed out by appellant herein.
The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong
premisethat appellants co nviction was based upon his
extrajudicial confession and that the same had been made
under duress.
Said extrajudicial confession was merely one of the tors
considered by His Honor, the trial Judge, and the Court of
Appeals in concluding that the evidence for the defense
cannot be relied upon and that the witnesses for the
prosecution had told the truth. Besides, appellants
confession was not tainted with duress. In this connection,
the Court of Appeals had the following to say:
Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimiro Lagman Peaflors
identification, we have the extrajudicial confession of
appellant Nicanor Napolis, marked Exh. A, subscribed and
sworn to by said accused on October 26, 1956, 25 day s after
the occurrence, before Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, the
64-y ear old prosecutor who, since July 18, 1946, was the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to the present. His testimony
shows that he read the confession, Exh. A, to said accused in
the Tagalog dialect; asked him whether he understood it to
which appellant Napolis answered yes; inquired whether he
was coerced to which he replied No; and then, required him
to raise his hand in affirmation which he did (tsn. 14-15, I).
Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the confession in his
(Fiscals) presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahay on further

testified that he saw no signs of phy sical violence on the
person of the appellant who appeared normal in his
appearance tsn. 15, I). In this confession, Exh. A, appellant
Napolis related that it was co-accused Antonio Bededia (stillat-large) who pointed the greasegun to husband Ignacio
Peaflor and who
309

309
hit him (Peaflor) on the head and that it was co-accused Ben
de la Cruz (whose case was dismissed) who wrested
Peaflors revolver. For his part, appellant Napolis admitted
that it was he who talked to Mrs. Casimira L. Peaflor and it
was he who got the money bag. The loot, according to him,
was split from which he received a share of P237.00 (Answer
to Q, A, Exh. A). Among others, he mentioned appellant
Bonifacio Malana as the owner of the greasegun and the one
who got Peaflors revolver from the hands of co-accused
Ben de la Cruz. x x x.
It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from
a decision of the Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made
in said decision are final, except
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there
is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went bey ond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee.2
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the
foregoing-exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory
that the evidence for the prosecution is contradictory and,
hence, unworthy of credence. Counsel for the defense alleges
that, whereas Ignacio Peaflor said that the thieves had
entered his house by forcing its door open, Mrs. Peaflor
testified that their entry was effected through an excavation
by the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed that
the malefactors had removed a piece of wood and an adobe
stone to get into said house. No such contradictions,
however, exist. The house of Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor consisted
of two (2) parts, one of which was a store and the other the
dwelling proper, adjoining the store, which had a doorleading
thereto (to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peaflor testified that
the culprits had entered the store by removing an adobe
stone from a wall thereof, and
_______________
2 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, L-26490, June 30, 1970, citing

Roque v. Buan, et al., L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos v. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co., L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilario, Jr. v. City of
Manila, L-19570, Sept. 14, 1967.
310
310
this was corroborated by the chief of police, although he
added that the malefactors had, also, removed a piece of
wood from said wall. Upon the other hand, the testimony of
Mr. Peaflor referred to a door, inside the store, leading to the
dwelling proper, as distingu ished from the store.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the findings

of fact made by the Court of Appeals are supported by those
of His Honor, the trial Judge, who had observed the behaviour
of the witnesses during the trial, it is clear to Us that the first
three (3) assignments of error are untenable.
The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization
of the crime co mmitted and the proper penalty therefor. It
should be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial cou rt convicting Napolis, Malana and
Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by armed
persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been
made by breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and
Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as ma x i mu m, wh ic h is in accordance
with said legal provision.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used violence against Ignacio Peaflor, and
intimidation against his wife, thereby infringing Article 294 of
the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph
(5) of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said
Article 299, although, factually, the crime co mmitted is more
serious than that covered by the latter provision. This Court
had previously ruled
x x x that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited
house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor supplies
the controlling qualification, so that the law to apply is article
294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on
the theory that robbery which is characterized by violence or
intimidation against the person is evidently graver than or311

311
dinary robbery committed by force upon things, because
where violence or intimidation against the person is present
there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the
security of the individual. (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People
vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.) And this view is followed even
where, as in the present case, the penalty to be applied
under article 294 is lighter than that which would result from
the application of article 299. x x x.3
Upon mature deliberation, W e find ourselves unable to share
the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall,
enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals
therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or
intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of
the Revised Penal Code with reclusin temporal.4 Pursuant to
the above view, adhered to in previous decisions,5 if, aside
from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any
person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any
of, the injuries, mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art.
294 of the same Code, the imposable penaltyunder
paragraph (5) thereofshall be much lighter.6 To our mind,
this result and the process of reasoning that has brought it
about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or
intimidation of a person supplies the controlling
qualification, Is far from sufficient to justify said result. We
agree with, the proposition that robbery with violence or
intimidation against the person is evidently graver than
ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, but,
precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion
deduced therefrom in the cases above citedreduction of the
penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence
_______________
3 People v. Sebastian, 85 Phil. 601, 603. See, also, Manahan

v. People, 73 Phil. 691; U.S. v. Manansala, 9 Phil. 529, 530;
U.S. v. De los Santos, 6 Phil. 411, 412.
4 From twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years of reclusin temporal.
5 People v. Sebastian, 85 Phil. 601; Manahan v. People, 73
Phil. 691; People v. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89; U.S. v. Turla, 38 Phil.
346; U.S. v. Manansala, 9 Phil. 529; U.S. v. De los Santos, 6
Phil. 411.
6 From four (4) y ears, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prisin correccional to ten (10) years of prisn mayor.
312
312
of violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one.
It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294
applies only where robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person takes place without entering an
inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of
the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do,
when the elements of both provisions are present, that the
crime is a complex one, calling for the impositionas
provided in Art. 48 of said Codeof the penalty for the most
Serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at
bar, is reclusin temporal in its maximu m period. This
penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period
from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11)
days to twenty (20) years of reclusin temporal.owing to
the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime.

In short, the doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos7 and
applied in U.S. v. Manansala,8 U.S. v. Turla,9 People v.
Baluyot,10 Manahan v. People,11 and People v. Sebastian,12
is hereby abandoned and appellant herein should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10)
years, and one (1) day of prisin mayor to nineteen (19)
years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusin
temporal.
Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs
against herein appellant, Nicanor Napolis. It is so ordered.
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals, 43 SCRA 301, No. L-28865
February 28, 1972

ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO,
defendants-appellants.
Criminal law; Evidence; Witnesses; Where events transpired
in rapid succession in a train coach, it is not surprising that
witnesses would not give identical testimonies.Where, as in
this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the
coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is not surprising
that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies.
There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of
the acts of the twins but they did not observe the same
events and their powers of perception and recollection are
not the same. x x x On the other hand, the defense failed to
prove that persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted
the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti.
And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own
admissions and their testimonies, not to mention the
testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS
Investigators, were the authors of the killings.
________________
* EN BANC.
18
18
People vs. Toling
Same; Same; Same; Accused theory that they were held up
by two or more persons while on the coach of the train
without this being noticed by other passengers is incredible.
On the other hand, the twins theory of self-defense is
highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was
lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could
have held up the twins without being readily perceived by the

other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had
there really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which
they sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the
other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous
rampage.
Same; Same; Same; Where there is no eyewitness-testimony
as to the jumping from the train of the four victims, same
should preclude imputation of their death on accused who
went on a rampage inside the train.No one testified that
those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy
reports been reinforced by testimony showing that the
proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and
murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be
criminally responsible for their deaths. x x x The absence of
eyewitnesstestimony as to the jumping from the train of the
four victims already named precludes the imputation of
criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly
deaths of the said victims. The same observation applies to
the injuries suffered by the other victims x x x Unlike Mrs.
Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the
injuries inflicted on them.
Same; Under the criminal statutes, the presumption is that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
act.The rule is that if a man creates in another mans mind
an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to
try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person
who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the
injuries which result.
Same; Murder; Conspiracy; Complex crime; Where eight
killings and an attempted killing were considered not
constituting a complex crime.The eight killings and the
attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of
murder and attempted murder qualified by treachery. The
unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrate by the twins upon
their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins
would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend
themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons

on their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins diabolical objective to butcher
their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced
conspiracy and community of design. The eight killings and
the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of
different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as
constituting a complex crime
19
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975

19
People vs. Toling
under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to
cases where a single act constitutes two or more grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.
Same; Murder; Penalty where no generic aggravating or
mitigating circumstances proved.As no generic aggravating
and mitigating circumstances were proven in this case, the
penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period
or reclusion perpetua. The death penalty imposed by the trial
court was not warranted.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna. Arsenio Naawa, J.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador
L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio (Counsel de Oficio) for defendantsappellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the

decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding them
guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing
them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set of
heirs of (1) Teresita B, Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3)
Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio, (5) Modesta R.
Brondial, (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the
sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500
(Criminal Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was
based on the following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are
natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine)
kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are
illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight
years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being
twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a
distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonios daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a
laundrywoman since September, 1964. Joses three children
one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from
Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To have
money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the
meat
20
20
People vs. Toling
to Joses wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio

in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five
pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and
shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen.
From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From
Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus,
and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco
railroad station in Manila at about seven oclock in the
morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought
them to Tondo. By means of a letter which Aniano Espenola, a
labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an
employment agency where they learned the address of the
Eng Heng Glassware. Antonios daughter was working in that
store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency,
they proceeded to her employers establishment. Leonora
gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis, Antonios grandson,
gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the
right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The
twins returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at
Juans expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the
Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for their
homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol
express train at about five oclock in the afternoon. The train
left at six oclock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the
rear of the dining car. The coach had one row of twopassenger seats and another row of three-passenger seats.
Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two
rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth
three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door.
Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the window,
and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman
breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman
was Corazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred
twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were
standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two
men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head
resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). On the twopassenger seat
21

21
People vs. Toling
across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were
sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the
window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On
the opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and
Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in
front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped
at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos which
they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started
moving. It was around eight oclock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed,
Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed
the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up
but soon collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping
old woman who was seated opposite him. She was not able
to get up anymore.1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her
baby, attempted to leave her seat, but before she could
escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with
which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade
entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm.
Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers
scurried away for
_______________
1That initial stabbing was described by Corazon

BernalAstrolavio in her statement dated January 9, 1965 in
this manner (page 16 of the Record):
4.
T: May nasaksihan ba kayong hindi pangkaraniwang
pangyayari na naganap nang gabing iyon at kung mayroon
maaari ba ninyong maisalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag
na pananalita?
S:
Mayruon po. Nakaupo ako nuon sa bandang hulihan nang
tren. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak nang biglang
nagkagulo. Iyong katabi kong lalaki na may katandaan na ay
biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap kong babae sa upuan.
Nabuwal iyong kanyang sinaksak, at ako naman ay
nagtatakbo na dala ko iyong dalawa kong anak. Sumiksik
kami doon sa may kubeta nang tren na nang mangyari iyon
ay lumalakad. Hindi ko alam na iyong aking kanan sintido ay
nagdurugo. Nang tahimik na ay dinala kami sa ospital sa
Calamba at doon ay ginamot ako roon.
Hindi ko na po napansin dahil sa aking takot.

22
22
People vs. Toling
safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone
whom they encountered inside the coach.2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary
Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that
occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and
children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining ear
to drink coffee when someone informed him that there was a
stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He
immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon
reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor
near the toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a
man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9,
holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his
right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the
man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in
authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh.
A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
_______________
5.
2Mrs. Mapas statement (Exh. E) reads:
T: Sinabi ninyo na nang biglang magkagulo samantalang

lumalakad ang tren ay iyong katabi ninyong lalaki na may
katandaan na ay biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap ninyong
babae sa upuan, nakita ba ninyo kung ano ang ipinanaksak
nang lalaking ito?
4.
S:
T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo?

S:
Iyon pong lalaking mataas na payat na bisaya. Hindi ko po
kilala pero kung makikita ko ay makikilala ko. Ito pong
sumaksak sa akin na ito ay dinala rin sa ospital sa Calamba,

Laguna. Nauna po lamang ako at nakita kong siya ang
isinunod na may saksak din.
The statement of Cipriano Reganet who was wounded (Exh.

D-4), in
23
5.
T: Bakit naman ninyo namukhaan itong sumaksak sa inyong
ito?
S:
Kahelera po namin iyan sa upuan.
6.
T: Maaari po ba ninyong isalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag
na pananalita. ang buong pangyayaring inyong nasaksihan?
S:
Opo. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak. nang walang
ano-ano ay nakita ko na lamang iyong nakasaksak sa akin na
biglang tumayo sa kanyang kinauupuan at biglang sinaksak
iyong kaharap niyang sa upuan na babae na natutulog. Itong
katabi nang nanaksak na ito ay tumayo rin at nanaksak din
nang nanaksak at ang lahat nang makitang tao ay hinahabol
at sinasaksak. Bata, matanda ay sinasaksak nang dalawang
ito at madaanan. Nang bigla kong tayo ay natamaan iyong
aking kanang kamay nang kabig niya nang saksak. Nagtuloy
ako sa kubeta sa tren at doon ako sumiksik. Nang payapa
naang lahat ay dinala ako sa Calamba sa ospital doon, at
akoy ginamot nang pangunang lunas.
7.
T: Itong katabi na lalaking sinasabi ninyong nanaksak din ay
kung makita ninyong muli ay makikilala pa ninyo?
S:
Makikilala ko rin po. Magkahawig po sila nang nakasaksak sa
akin.

23
People vs. Toling
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by
clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the blade
pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself
on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was
prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen,
Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He
retreated to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel
armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her
was stabbed to death.
_______________
a way corroborates Mrs. Mapas statement. Reganets

statement reads in part as follows (Exh. F):
3.
T: Maaari po ba ninyong masabi kung bakit kayo naririto
ngayon sa PNR Hospital dito sa Caloocan City?
S:
Dahil po sa mga saksak na tinamo ko nang magkaroon nang
gulo sa loob nang tren kagabing humigit kumulang sa mga
alas nueve (9:00 P.M.) petcha 8 nitong Enero 1965.
4.
T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo kung inyong nakikilala?
9.
S:
T: Ilan ang nakita ninyong nananaksak?
Hindi ko po alam ang pangalan pero mamumukhaan ko kung

ihaharap sa akin. Ang sumaksak po sa akin ay iyong kasama
ko sa ambulancia na nagdala sa amin dito sa ospital na ito.
S:
5.
T: Bakit naman ninyo natiyak na ang sumaksak sa inyo ay
iyong kasama ninyo sa ambulancia na nagdala sa inyo sa
ospital na ito?
S:
Malapit po lamang ang kanyang inuupuan sa aking inuupuan
sa loob nang tren kaya namukhaan ko siya.
Dalawa pong magkatabi na magkahawig ang mukha.

10.
T: Nang mangyari po ba ito ay tumatakbo ang tren?
S:
Tumatakbo po.
10.
T: Papaano kayo nakaligtas?
6.
S:
T: Ilan beses kayong sinaksak nang taong ito?
Tumakbo po ako at kumabit sa rampa at nang medyo tahimik

na balak kong magbalik sa loob nang tren. Nakita ko na
maraming sugatan at sa wari ko ay patay na. Sa mga nakita
ko sa loob
S:
Dalawang beses po.
7.
24
T: Saan-saan panig nang katawan kayo nagtamo nang

saksak?
24
S:
Sa aking noo at sa kanang kamay nang sangahin ko ang

kanyang pangalawang saksak.
People vs. Toling
8.
T: Bakit po naman kayo sinaksak nang taong ito?
S:
Hindi ko po alam. Primero nanaksak siya sa kanyang kaharap
sa upuan at saksak nang saksak sa mga taong kanyang
makita.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train.

He was in the dining car when he received the information
that there were killings in the third coach. He immediately
went there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs.
Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his
scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who was
later identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio
was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats
of the coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a

thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about to
stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly
struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol,
knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on
Antonios buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him.
Antonio offered resistance despite the blows administered to
him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four
Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train and
turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police.
Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained
______________
S:
Opo. Nakaupo po ako nuon kaharap papuntang Bicol. Walang
ano-ano ay bigla na lamang nakita ko na may sinaksak at
pagkatapos nakita ko na lahat nang makita babae o lalaki at
sinasaksak. Nang akoy tumayo para tumakbo ay nilapitan
ako at ako naman ang sinaksak. Sumigaw ako at humingi
nang saklolo at nakiusap sa isang tao na tagpan nang tualya
iyong tinamo kong saksak sa kaliwang puson na tumama sa
buto. Makalipas ang ilang sandali ay dinala na ako sa ospital.
5.
T: Nakikilala ba ninyo iyong sumaksak sa inyo?
S:
Kilala ko po sa mukha at kasama ko pa kahapon nang dalhin
ako sa ospital na ito.
nang tren ay iyong sumaksak sa akin, na nakasandal at nang

makita ako ay tinanganan iyong kanyang panaksak at
tinangka akong habulin. Tumakbo ako at tumalon sa lupa. Sa
pagtalon kong iyon ay napinsala ang aking kaliwang balikat.
6.
T: Ilan po itong nakita ninyong nanaksak?
S:
12.
Dalawa po sila na magkahawig ang mukha.
T: Ano po ang ipinanaksak sa inyo?
25
S:
Para pong punyal na ang haba ay kumulang humigit sa isang
dangkal.

25
People vs. Toling
Mrs. Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, who was also wounded (Exh.

D-3) executed a statement which reads in part as follows
(page 20, Record):
4.
T: Maaari po ba ninyong maisalaysay sa maikli ngunit
maliwanag na pananalita ang buong pangyayari?
scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary

Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while
others were picked up along the railroad tracks between
Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were
brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The
dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria

Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were
autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer
took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies
were found in the train, died from stab wounds, namely:
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D

Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4, C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K
to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs.
Amanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano
26
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.

(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan,
Quezon.
26
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
People vs. Toling
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose

Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs.

Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San

Juan, Rizal.
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted

upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was first brought to
the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred
to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan
City where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge.
As a result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her
occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby losing an
expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran
for safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at
three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a
paper bag which was lost.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial, 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi

City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio, 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street,
Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N2, O to O-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2).
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks.
Apparently, they jumped from the moving train to avoid
being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo IL Dimaano, 53, married, carpenter, Miguelin,
Sampaloc, Manila.
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda, 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon
and
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation

Service of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965
Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs.
Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de
Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements
of the Toling brothers were taken at the North General
Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he
was stabbed by a person from the station who wanted to
get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He

said that he stabbed somebody who might have died and
others that might not. He clarified that in the train four
persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of
them. It was a holdup.
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to
rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as he
was already bound to die, he wanted to kill everybody
(Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded
because he was stabbed by a person from Camarines who
was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant
with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who
were demanding money from him and who were armed with
knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due
to the stabbing, he commented that everybody was trying
to kill each other (Exh. 1-A).
27

27
People vs. Toling
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in
his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the scissors and
then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from
his back, gave them to him and told him to avenge himself
with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against
the Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna
a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the

Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling
brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims),
multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide
(as to three persons who died after jumping from the running
train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Naawa
rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The
Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants counsel de oficio assails the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues that the
appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the
alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two
homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished
from appellants statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the
Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the
afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket
counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the
tickets, he took out his money from the right pocket of his
pants and later put back the remainder in the same pocket.
The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance
from them were allegedly observing them, whispering among
themselves and making signs. The twins suspected that the
four men harbored evil intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed
them. They were facing the twins. They were talking in a low
voice. The twins sat on a two-passenger seat facing the front
door of the coach, the window being on the right of Antonio
and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they
were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat
on the
28
28
People vs. Toling
seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves
behind them. Some old women were near them. When the
train was already running, the man sitting near the aisle
allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed a
balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was
sitting near the window and who was holding also a balisong
knife attempted to pick Antonio s right pocket, threatening
him with death if he would not hand over the money. Antonio
answered that he would give only one-half of his money
provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his
(Antonios) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew
out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long
including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and
stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with
his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his
pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed
as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh.
L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and 5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1
and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the
second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed
him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and
to fall on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and
a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained
consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him.
His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with
the scissors the man who had wounded his brother. Jose hit
the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by
somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part
of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men
whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. He fell
down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the
knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he
himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a
Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a
physician of the North General Hospital who treated them
during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified
that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2
inches each, mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and
29

29
People vs. Toling
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary
line level of 3rd ICS, right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest
wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the
paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the
thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal
column in line with the armpit or about one inch from the
midline to the left (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from
the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the
twins rampageous behavior, which resulted in the macabre
deaths of several innocent persons, made the following
observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the
accused to run amuck? It appears that the accused travelled
long over land and sea spending their hard-earned money

and suffering privations, even to the extent of foregoing their
breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to
Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his daughter and P30
from his grandson and with respect to Jose to receive nothing
at all from any of his three children whom he could not locate
in Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly
alike, a fact which could easily invite some people to stare or
gaze at them and wonder at their very close resemblance.
Like some persons who easily get angry when stared at,
however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front
of them, immediately suspected them as having evil
intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the
part of the accused coupled with their unfounded suspicion of
evil intention on the part of those who happened to stare at
them that broke the limit of their self-control and actuated
them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the
spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited
space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to
notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic
or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that
their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and
making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble
persons. In their parochial minds, they might have
entertained the notion or suspicion that their male
companions, taking advantage of their ignorance and
naivete, might victimize them by stealing their little money.
Hence, they became hostile to their co30
30
People vs. Toling

passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and
murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the
conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution witnesses
confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was
unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary
investigator, are very identical. Thus, on the witness stand
CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong,
after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of
identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They
confessed that they might be mistaken in making such a
specific identification (28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn
November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose,
the reliable guides would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1
and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own
testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11).
Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was
armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who was
armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses
and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with the
scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. A).
That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was
armed with a knife, while Jose declared that he was armed
with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban
station, before he boarded the train and which he gave to
Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors
was already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom
Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to commit
suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on
the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is
confirmed by the medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is
attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the
person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former had
stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a

knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That fact is contained in his
statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio
for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their credibility.
The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the
admission of the twins that they stabbed several passengers.
31

31
People vs. Toling
Appellants counsel based his arguments on the summaries
of the evidence found in the trial courts decision. He argues
that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are
contradictory but he does not particularize on the supposed
contradictions.
testimonies (See 6 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court,

1970 Ed. 139-140: People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December
26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and
Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did
not observe the same events and their powers of perception
and recollection are not the same.
Appellants counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He
contends that no one corroborated her testimony that one of
the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the
seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The truth is
that Mrs. Mapas testimony was confirmed by the necropsy
reports and by the twins themselves who admitted that they
stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons,
other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds.
There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be
no doubt that the twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1
and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies
of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were
the authors of the killings.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each

other. The main point of Rayels testimony is that he saw one
of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently
trying to commit suicide. Aldeas testimony is that he
knocked down the other twin, disabled him and prevented
him from committing other killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins

culpability, since they were caught in flagrante delicto, the
CIS
It may be admitted that Rayels testimony that Aldea took

the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea.
Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the
platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render
Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea
and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not
compare notes.
32
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid

succession in the coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is
not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical
32

People vs. Toling
investigators did not bother to get the statements of the
other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one
actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end
because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in
order to save his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion
prevented the passengers from having a full personal

knowledge of how the twins consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins theory of self-defense is highly
incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it
was improbable that two or more persons could have held up
the twins without being readily perceived by the other
passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there
really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they
sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other
passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous
rampage.
Appellants view is that they should be held liable only for
two homicides, because they admittedly killed Antonio B.
Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries
because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs.
Mapa. We have to reject that view.
Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing
judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the
Samar hinterland, who reached manhood without coming into
contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we
exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the
evidence. We are convinced that the record conclusively
establishes appellants responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be
indemnified, according to the trial court, because they died
due to stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C.
Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in
the trial courts judgment was probably due to inadvertence.
According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely,
Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte
and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic
injuries consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and
fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2 K to
K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving train to

avoid being killed but in so doing they met their untimely and
horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as
victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As to three of
them, the
33

33
People vs. Toling
information charges that the accused committed homicide.
The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the
train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony
showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the
violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter
would be criminally responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. The presumption is that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act (Sec.
5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that if a man creates in another mans mind an
immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try
to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries
which result (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited
in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497, 500).
Following that rule, it was held that if a person against
whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes
himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in
order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct
of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide

in case death results by drowning (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez,
supra. See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from
the train of the four victims already named precludes the
imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the
ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the
other victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder
based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna
Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to
D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence.
Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not
testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated
as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder
qualified by treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal
Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the
twins upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that
the twins
34
34
People vs. Toling
would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend
themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons
on their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins diabolical objective to butcher
their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced
conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were
perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot
be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48

of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where a
single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called concurso formal o
ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho
constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto);
(b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer
otro (el llamado delito complejo). (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed.
650).
On the other hand, en al concurso real de delitos, the rule,
when there is acumulacin material de las penas, is that si
son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, est
conforme con la lgica y con la justicia que el agente soporte
la carga de cada uno de los delitos (Ibid, p. 652, People vs.
Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted
murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the
accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and
wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders,
one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People
vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case,
where six defendants were convicted of fourteen separate
murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person
who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six
separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving
four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving
eleven murders; U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba,
37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 82, 102103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61
Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan,
94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu
Unjieng, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Peas, 66 Phil. 682; People
vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by
means of separate acts were held to be complex on the
theory that they were the
35
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., did not take part.
Judgment modified.
35
Notes.(a) Complex crimes.An accused cannot be

convicted of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder where the grave offenses committed by
him were not caused by one single act. (People vs. Bernal, 28
SCRA 25). Thus, where the killing is not shown to have been
committed by a single discharge of firearms, the crime
cannot be considered complex (People vs. Tilos, 30 SCRA
734). A complex crime, therefore, will arise where one shot
from a gun results in the death of two or more persons, or
where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the
latters body and
People vs. Toling

product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances
were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be
imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts.
64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty
imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed
on the appellants, No modifying circumstances can be
appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial courts judgment is modified by setting
aside the death sentence. Defendants-appellants Antonio
Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as coprincipals, of
eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder. Each
one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for
the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (I)
year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the attempted
murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each
set of heirs of the seven victims named in the dispositive part
of the trial courts decision and of the eighth victim, Susana
C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an
indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the
penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate
paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be
observed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Esguerra, Fernandez and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
36
36
People vs. Toling
wounded another, or where a person plants a bomb in an
airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a
number of persons are killed. (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA
748).
(b) Conspiracy.Conspiracy arises from the very instant the
plotters agree to commit the felony and pursue it (People vs.
Indic, 10 SCRA 130). Conspiracy to exist does not require a
definite agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence or commission of the offense; in law, conspiracy
exists, if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same criminal purpose and were united in
its execution (People vs. Cadag, 2 SCRA 388). Consequently,
conspiracy need not be established by direct proof (People
vs. Bersalona, 1 SCRA 1110; People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA 1403;
People vs. Cabiltes, 25 SCRA 112). However, conspiracy must

be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of
the defense itself (People vs. Vicente, 28 SCRA 247). Thus,
although some of the accused might have intended to cause
harm or injury to the offended victim as their action of
running after him, holding his arm and pointing a revolver at
the said victim after the latter stumbled on the ground quite
clearly indicated, no conspiracy will be appreciated between
them and a third accused who later hacked the victim to
death, where the evidence shows that the former did not
carry their intent and instead desisted entirely and fled from
the scene when the latter suddenly appeared and attacked
the victim. Under the circumstances, the former will not even
be considered as accomplices of the actual assailant and are
entitled to an acquittal. (People vs. Cajandab, 52 SCRA 165).
People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA 17, No. L-27097 January 17, 1975
G.R. No. 86163. April 26, 1990.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO
CANASARES, AND SIMPLICIO CANASARES, BIENVENIDO
SALVILLA, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Robbery; From the moment the offender gained
possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity
to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.It is
no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no
opportunity to dispose of the personalties taken. That fact
does not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the
offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit
had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful
taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated,
Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).
Same; Same; Failure to mention the taking in a sworn
statement would not militate against the credibility of the
witness.It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could
not have seen the taking because the place was dark since
the doors were closed and there were no windows. It will be
recalled, however, that Rodita was one of the hostages
herself and could observe the unfolding of events. Her failure
to mention the taking in her sworn statement would not
militate against her credibility, it being settled that an
affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate and
does not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries or
suggestions.
Same; Same; Same; Findings of the trial court, as to the
credibility of the witness, are entitled to great weight.In the
last analysis, the basic consideration centers around the
credibility of witnesses in respect of which the findings of the
Trial Court are entitled to great weight as it was in a superior
position to assess the same in the course of the trial (see
People vs. Ornoza, G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA
495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-38042, 30 June 1987,
151 SCRA 326).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Surrender of the accused was not

to be mitigating when he gave up only after he was
surrounded by the constabulary and police forces.The
surrender by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly
meets these requirements. They were, indeed,
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
672
672
People vs. Salvilla
asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but
they refused until only much later when they could no longer
do otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they
were completely surrounded and there was no chance of
escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be
mitigating as when he gave up only after he was surrounded
by the constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan, et
al., G.R., No. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People
vs. Mationg, G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA
167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was
motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. And while
it is claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that
they did not despite several opportunities to do so. There is
no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs. Dimdiman,
106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The crime of serious illegal
detention was such a necessary means as it was selected by
appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out their
evil design to stage a robbery.Under Article 48, a complex
crime arises when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The term necessary means does not

connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense as
a necessary means to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an
ingredient thereof. The phrase necessary means merely
signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure
the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code,
Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J.,
Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the crime of
Serious Illegal Detention was such a necessary means as it
was selected by Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate
and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a
robbery.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Br. 28. Gustilo, J.

Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the Decision

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City,** dated 29
_______________
** Penned by Judge Edgar D. Gustilo.

673
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990

673
People vs. Salvilla

August 1988, in Criminal Case No. 20092, finding him and his
co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed
Canasares, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal
Detention and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The Information filed against them reads:
The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA,
REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and
SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose maternal surnames, dated and
places of birth cannot be ascertained of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION (Art. 294, paragraph 3, in conjunction
with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code), committed as
follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of
Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said
accused, conspiring and confederating among themselves,
working together and helping one another, armed with guns
and handgrenade and with the use of violence or intimidation
employed on the person of Severino Choco, Mary Choco,
Mimia Choco and Rodita Hablero, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally take and carry away, with intent of
gain, cash in the amount of P20,000.00, two (2) Mens wrist
watches, one (1) Ladys Seiko quartz wrist watch and one (1)
Ladys Citizen wrist watch and assorted jewelries, all valued
at P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said
robbery, Mary Choco suffered serious physical injuries under
paragraph 2 of Article 263, Bienvenido Salvilla likewise
suffered serious physical injuries and Reynaldo Canasares
also suffered physical injuries; that the said accused also
illegally detained, at the compound of the New Iloilo Lumber
Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City, Severino Choco, owner/
proprietor of said Lumber Company, Mary Choco, Mimie
Choco, who is a minor, being 15 years of age, and Rodita
Hablero, who is a salesgirl at said Company; that likewise on

the occasion of the robbery, the accused also asked and were
given a ransom money of P50,000.00; that the said crime
was attended by aggravating circumstances of band, and
illegal possession of firearms and explosives; that the amount
of P20,000.00, the ransom money of P50,000.00, two (2)
Mens wrist watches, two (2) Ladys wrist watches, one (1) .
38 caliber revolver and one (1) live grenade were recovered
from the accused; to the damage and prejudice of the New
Iloilo Lumber Company in the amount of P120,000.00.
674
674
People vs. Salvilla
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused
at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan
was hatched about two days before. The accused were
armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they
entered the establishment, they met Rodita Habiero, an
employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break
and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to
go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his
gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters,
Mary and Mimie, the latter being a minor 15 years of age,
and told the former that all they needed was money. Hearing
this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag
wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to
the defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino
pleaded with the four accused to leave the premises as they
already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead,
accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch
of Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and
Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.
At about 2:00 oclock of the same day, the hostages were

allowed to eat. The four accused also took turns eating while
the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told Severino to
produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be
released. Severino answered that he could not do so because
it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had
surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. Major
Melquiades B. Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo
City, negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and
appealed to them to surrender with the assurance that no
harm would befall them as he would accompany them
personally to the police station. The accused refused to
surrender or to release the hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and
joined the negotiations. In her dialogue with the accused,
which lasted for about four hours, Appellant demanded
P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered
them P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty of raising
more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to
receive the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by
Mary Choco in going
675
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990

675
People vs. Salvilla
out of the office. When they were out of the door, one of the
accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief, gave a
key to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the
padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which
the latter, in turn, gave to one of the accused. Rodita was
later set free but Mary was herded back to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio, and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal to the accused to surrender
peacefully but they refused. Ultimatums were given but the
accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military
authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the
place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary
Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo
Canasares. Mary suffered a macerated right lower extremity
just below the knee so that her right leg had to be
amputated. The medical certificate described her condition
as in a state of hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in
to the hospital and had to undergo several major operations
during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to
May 30, 1986.
For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon
time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-accused entered the
lumber yard and demanded money from the owner Severino
Choco. He demanded P100,000.00 but was given only
P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the office of the
lumber yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused kept
Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office. He
maintained, however, that he stopped his co-accused from
getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the
P5,000.00 were all left on the counter, and were never
touched by them. He claimed further that they had never
fired on the military because they intended to surrender.
Appellants version also was that during the gunfire,
Severinos daughter stood up and went outside; he wanted to
stop her but he himself was hit by a bullet and could not
prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to
them to surrender but that they gave themselves up only
much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of
conviction and sentenced each of the accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law and to pay the costs.
676
676
People vs. Salvilla
Appellant Salvillas present appeal is predicated on the
following Assignments of Error:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged
was consummated and in not holding that the same was
merely attempted.
2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.
The defense contends that The complete crime of larceny
(theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt requires
asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking. In
other words, the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive
stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away
or asportation. And without asportation the crime committed
is only attempted (Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla,
Records, p. 317).
There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there
be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is
known as the element of asportation, the essence of which is
the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner
without his privity and consent and without the animus
revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing 5 C.J.
607). In fact, if there is no actual taking, there can be no
robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an
essential part of the crime of robbery.
Appellant insists that while the giving has been proven, the
taking has not. And this is because neither he nor his three
co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the
latters wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of
which is that none of those items were recovered from their

persons.
Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence.
Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified that upon
demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a
paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn,
accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch
of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram,
Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her
after she (the Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and
that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the
holduppers. The taking was, therefore,
677
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990

677
People vs. Salvilla
sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 2731). The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch
were within the dominion and control of the Appellant and his
co-accused and completed the taking.
The State established a taking sufficient to support a
conviction of robbery even though the perpetrators were
interrupted by police and so did not pick up the money
offered by the victim, where the defendant and an
accomplice, armed with a knife and a club respectively, had
demanded the money from the female clerk of a convenience
store, and the clerk had complied with their instructions and
placed money from the register in a paper bag and then
placed the bag on the counter in front of the two men; these
actions brought the money within the dominion and control of
defendant and completed the taking. (Johnson vs. State, 432
So 2d 758).
Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner

and absolute control of the property by the taker, even for an
instant, constitutes asportation. (Adams vs. Commonwealth,
154 SW 381; State vs. Murray 280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs.
Commonwealth, 105 SE 2d 149) [italics supplied].
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had
no opportunity to dispose of the personalties taken. That fact
does not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the
offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit
had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful
taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated,
Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).
The crime is consummated when the robber acquires
possession of the property, even if for a short time, and it is
not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of
the robber, or that he should have actually carried the
property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful
possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it
(People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220 SW 2d
644; People vs. Beal, 39 P 2d 504; People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d
553).
Contrary to Appellants submission, therefore, a conviction
for consummated and not merely attempted Robbery is in
order.
It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have
seen the taking because the place was dark since the doors
were
678
678
People vs. Salvilla
closed and there were no windows. It will be recalled,

however, that Rodita was one of the hostages herself and
could observe the unfolding of events. Her failure to mention
the taking in her sworn statement would not militate against
her credibility, it being settled that an affidavit is almost
always incomplete and inaccurate and does not disclose the
complete facts for want of inquiries or suggestions (People
vs. Andaya, G.R. No. L-63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570;
People vs. Tan, et al., 89 Phil. 337 [1951]).
The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino would
not lessen her credibility. The defense has not proven that
she was actuated by any improper motive in testifying
against the accused.
In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers around
the credibility of witnesses in respect of which the findings of
the Trial Court are entitled to great weight as it was in a
superior position to assess the same in the course of the trial
(see People vs. Ornoza, G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151
SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-38042, 30 June
1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Anent the second assignment of error, the surrender of the
Appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in their
favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a surrender
must have the following requisites: (a) that the offender had
not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that
the surrender was voluntary (People vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).
The surrender by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly
meets these requirements. They were, indeed, asked to
surrender by the police and military authorities but they
refused until only much later when they could no longer do
otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they
were completely surrounded and there was no chance of
escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be
mitigating as when he gave up only after he was surrounded
by the constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan, et

al., G.R., No. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People
vs. Mationg, G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA
167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was
motivated more by an intent to insure their
679
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990

679
People vs. Salvilla
safety. And while it is claimed that they intended to
surrender, the fact is that they did not despite several
opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to
speak of (People vs. Dimdiman, 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we
find the guilt of the accused-appellant, Bienvenido Salvilla,
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary to
turn now to the nature of the linked offenses involved and the
penalty imposed by the Trial Court.
Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the
Information with Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and
Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 295, par. 3, in conjunction with
Art. 267, RPC), and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We
agree with the Trial Court that a complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code has been committed such that
the penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal
Detention (Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or reclusion
perpetua to death, is to be imposed instead of the penalty
prescribed for Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294
(3), which is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises when an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other. The term
necessary means does not connote indispensable means

for if it did then the offense as a necessary means to
commit another would be an indispensable element of the
latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase
necessary means merely signifies that one crime is
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the
other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624,
citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515). In this case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was
such a necessary means as it was selected by Appellant
and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively
their evil design to stage a robbery.
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et
als. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 325)
where the accused were convicted of Robbery but acquitted
in the case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was held
that the detention is absorbed in the crime of robbery. For
one, in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations filed,
one for Robbery
680
680
People vs. Salvilla
and another for Serious Illegal Detention. In the present case,
only one Information was filed charging the complex offense.
For another, in Astor, the robbery had already been
consummated and the detention was merely to forestall the
capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case,
where the detention was availed of as a means of insuring
the consummation of the robbery. Further, in Astor, the
detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery so
that it was held therein:
x x x were appellants themselves not trapped by the early

arrival of the police at the scene of the crime, they would
have not anymore detained the people inside since they have
already completed their job. Obviously, appellants were left
with no choice but to resort to detention of these people as
security, until arrangements for their safe passage were
made. This is not the crime of illegal detention punishable
under the penal laws but an act of restraint in order to delay
the pursuit of the criminals by peace officers (People v. Sol, 9
Phil. 265; People v. Uday, 55 Phil. 167, cited in the Revised
Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed., p. 1337). Where the
victims in a robbery case were detained in the course of
robbery, the detention is absorbed by the crime of robbery (P.
v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008, id.). In the case at bar, the detention
was only incidental to the main crime of robbery, and
although in the course thereof women and children were also
held, that threats to kill were made, the act should not be
considered as a separate offense. Appellants should only be
held guilty of robbery.
In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not only
incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to
commit the same. After the amount of P20,000.00 was
handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still
refused to leave. The victims were then taken as hostages
and the demand to produce an additional P100,000.00 was
made as a prerequisite for their release. The detention was
not because the accused were trapped by the police nor were
the victims held as security against the latter. The detention
was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the
malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a means of extortion
for an additional amount. The police and other authorities
arrived only much later after several hours of detention had
already passed. And, despite appeals to appellant and his coaccused to surrender, they adamantly refused until the
amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be turned over
to
681
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990
Judgment affirmed.
681
Note.Detention is absorbed if it is incidental to the crime of

robbery. (People vs. Astor, 149 SCRA 325.) People vs. Salvilla,
184 SCRA 671, G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990
People vs. Salvilla

them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being
handed to them, as inadequate.
The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those
of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 [1907] where the restraint was for
no other purpose than to prevent the victims from reporting
the crime to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil.
1085 [1953] where the victims were taken to a place one
kilometer away and shot in order to liquidate the witnesses
to the robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 [1953];
People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all of which cases
were cited in Astor, and where the victims were only
incidentally detained so that the detention was deemed
absorbed in robbery.
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of the
offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case.
The victims were illegally deprived of their liberty. Two
females (Mary and Minnie), and a minor (Minnie), a specified
circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those detained.
The continuing detention was also for the purpose of
extorting ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267
(last parag.), not only from the detained persons themselves
but even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not
merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary means
employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial
Court is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127663. March 11, 1999.*
612
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO

VALDEZ, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; The lack of precision with which a

witness distinguished between the person who flagged down
the tricycle and the other person whom he recognized
because of the headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered
as inconsistency at all.In his Statements dated September
20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4),
William Montano pointed to Bernard Castro as the person
who flagged down the motorized tricycle ridden by the
victims. On November 8, 1995, William and his covictim/survivor Randy Tibule executed a Pinagsamang
Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Demanda where they disclaimed
having seen Bernard Castro at the scene of the crime. They
declared that after a more thorough consideration of what
transpired, they have realized that the filing of the complaint
against Bernard Castro was a mistake and the result of
misunderstanding or misapprehension of what actually
happened. In his testimony in court, William, however,
identified accused-appellant as the person illuminated by the
headlight of the tricycle, for which reason William readily
recognized him. We, therefore, find nothing inconsistent
between his declarations during the investigation and his
testimony in court. The lack of precision with which he
distinguished between the person who flagged down the
tricycle and the other person whom he recognized because of
the headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered as
inconsistency at all. The same holds
_______________
* EN BANC.
612
People vs. Valdez

true with claimed discrepancies between the statements of
Randy Tibule during the investigation and his testimony in
court.
Same; Motive; Judicial Notice; Lack of motive for committing
the crime does not preclude conviction, considering that,
nowadays, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons
have killed or committed serious offense for no reason at all.
It is basic and fundamental rule that proof of motive is
necessary for conviction only when there is doubt as to the
identity of the accused, not when accused has been
positively identified as in the present case (People vs.
Caggauan, 94 Phil. 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA
422 [1980]; People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides,
it is also to be noted that lack of motive for committing the
crime does not preclude conviction, considering that,
nowadays, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons
have killed or committed serious offense for no reason at all
(People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187 [1996]).
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; The
settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is
frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no
opportunity to repel it or defend himself against such attack.
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the
offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution
of the crime which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive
or retaliatory act which the victim might make (People vs.
Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that
treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden
and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it
or defend himself against such attack. What is decisive is
that the execution of the attack, without the slightest
provocation from the victim who is unarmed, made it

impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate
(People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
lapse of time between the determination and the execution

to allow the offender to reflect on the consequences of his
act (People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA 478 [1996]).
Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; It is not enough

that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but
criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts
evidencing determination to commit the crimein order to
be considered an aggravation of the offense, the
circumstance must not merely be premeditation but must
be evident premeditation.The trial court ruled that
evident premeditation is likewise present. After reviewing the
evidence, however, we do not find any showing of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Establishing a basis or motive for

the commission of the crime does not constitute sufficient
ground to consider the existence of evident premeditation.
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the
crime does not constitute sufficient ground to consider the
existence of evident premeditation. At best, it may indicate
the time when the offenders determined to commit the crime
(the first element). Their act of arming themselves with
caliber .30 carbines and thereafter waiting for their supposed
victims at ambush positions may have also indicated that
they clung to their determination to commit the crime (the
second element). More important than these two elements is
the proof that a sufficient period of time had elapsed
between the outward act evidencing intent and actual
commission of the offense (the third element). There must
have been enough opportunity for the initial impulse to
subside. This element is indispensable for circumstance of
evident premeditation to aggravate the crime. In People vs.
Canial, 46 SCRA 134 [1972], this Court reiterates: In other
words, this circumstance can be taken into account only
when there had been a cold and deep meditation, and a
tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal
act. There must be an opportunity to coolly and serenely
think and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences
of what they had planned to do, an interval long enough for
the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil
desire and scheme.
613
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999

613
People vs. Valdez
evident premeditation on the part of accused-appellant.
While there may be testimonial evidence pointing to an
altercation between Bernard Castro and a certain Capistrano,
it does not sufficiently prove the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. It is not
enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised,
but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward
acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order
to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the
circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be
evident premeditation (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158
[1972]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites.To establish the
existence of evident premeditation, the following have to be
proved: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
614
614
People vs. Valdez
Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Superior Strength; The

aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery.The other aggravating circumstance
considered by the trial court is that of abuse of superior
strength. This contravenes the very basic and elementary
doctrine in our jurisdiction that the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery (People
vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1
[1980]; People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
Same; Same; Complex Crimes; Where there was more than
one gunman and several victims, each act by each gunman
pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and
individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of
multiple murder.The case at bar does not fall under any of
the two instances defined above. The Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as
falling under the first. It is clear from the evidence on record,
however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a
single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For
one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than
one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct
from that of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there
is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There were also
several empty bullet shells recovered from the scene of the
crime. This confirms the fact that several shots were fired.
Furthermore, considering the relative positions of the
gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding the
motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside
the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four
victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each
act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise
to the complex crime of multiple murder. We therefore rule
that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of
multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of
the four victims in this case. In the same manner, accused-
appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated

murder.
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Aggravating
Circumstances; There can be no separate conviction of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 8294, illegal posses615
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999

615
People vs. Valdez
sion being merely taken as an aggravating circumstance to
the other crime committed.Now, to the matter of accusedappellants conviction for illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866. It was recently
held in the case entitled People vs. Molina (G.R. Nos. 11583536, July 22, 1998), and reiterated in People vs. Feloteo (G.R.
No. 124212, September 17, 1998), that there can be no
separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294. Instead,
illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act No.
8294, which in part, provides: If homicide or murder is
committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 8294; Ex Post Facto Laws;
Insofar as Republic Act 8294 will spare the accused from a
separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms, it may be given retroactive application.Republic
Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its
publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in the case
at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the

case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No.
8294 will generally have prospective application. In cases,
however, where the new law will be advantageous to the
accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article
22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accusedappellant in the case at bar from a separate conviction for
the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No.
8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case
No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm) subject of this
present review.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In general, all pending
cases involving illegal possession of firearms should continue
to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly
indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved.As a word
of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case for
illegal possession of firearm should not be misinterpreted as
meaning that there can no longer be any prosecution for the
crime of illegal possession of firearm. In general, all pending
cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue
to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly
indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved (murder or
homicide under Sec616
616
People vs. Valdez
tion 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
detat under Section 3).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Insofar as the use of an
unlicensed firearm, as a special aggravating circumstance,
unduly raises the penalty for the four counts of murder from
four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death, Republic
Act No. 8294 will not be given retroactive application, lest it

might acquire the character of an expost facto law.The use
of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be
considered as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal
Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also
under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty
for the four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to
that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of
Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant
because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not
be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the
character of an ex-post facto law.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Br. 45.

The Solicitor General for plaitniff-appellee.
Fernando P. Cabrera for accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the

judgment of conviction promulgated by Branch 45 of the
Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region stationed in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on October 24, 1996 sentencing him
to death for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with
Double Frustrated Murder, and likewise separately sentencing
him to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions
(Presidential Decree No. 1866).
617
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999
617
People vs. Valdez
The Information against accused-appellant, Bernardo Castro,
and one John Doe for the complex crime of Multiple Murder
with Double Frustrated Murder charged:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September
17, 1995, at Sitio Cabaoangan, barangay Nalsian,
municipality of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan, and within
and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
with intent to kill, and each armed with caliber .30 carbines
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
treachery, simultaneously attacked and fired their caliber .30
carbines at Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta,
Sandra Montano, William Montano and Randy Tibule while
they were on board a tricycle, on their way to a dance party,
hitting them in the different parts of their bodies which
caused the instantaneous death of Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean
Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta and Sandra Montano, to the
damage and prejudice of their respective heirs, and inflicting
fatal injuries to William Montano and Randy Tibule, in the
different parts of their bodies, having thus performed all the
acts which would have produced the crime of murder with
respect to both but which did not by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, namely, the able and
timely medical assistance given the said victims William
Montano and Randy Tibule, which prevented their death.
Contrary to Article 248 in Relation to Article 48 and Article 6
of the RPC.
(pp. 1-2, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8747)
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions pertinently averred:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September
17, 1995 at Sitio Cabaoangan, Barangay Nalsian, Municipality
of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan and within and

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his
possession, custody and control, a firearm, to wit: Caliber .30
carbine without first having secured the proper license
thereof from the authorities and which he used in committing
the offense of multiple murder and double frustrated murder.
618
618
People vs. Valdez
Contrary to Presidential Decree 1866.
(p. 1, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8749)
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial
are succinctly summarized in the Peoples brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening,
William Montano (16 years old), Randy Tibule (17 years old),
Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon
Garcia, Jr. were at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag,
Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the wedding
party of Jean Maries cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN, June
11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18, 1996, pp. 23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon
Garcia going to Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and
Willie. Jean was seated inside the side car with Sandra and
William Montano (TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN, June 18,
1996, pp. 23-25). After making a turn along the barangay
road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan, they met appellant
Rolando Valdez and his companions who were armed with
guns. The tricycles headlight flashed on their faces. Without
warning, they pointed their guns and fired at Montanos
group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, nataydan,
mapan tayon (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and
companions left (TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 11-14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia,
Sandra Montano and Willie Acosta dead (TSN, June 11, 1996,
pp. 14-16). They sustained the following injuries:
Jean Marie Garcia:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral of the
nipple right through and through trajecting the middle lobe of
the lungs, rt ventricle of the heart, middle lobe of the lung,
left with point of exit 1 inch in diameter 1 inch lateral of the
nipple, left.
(Exhibit B)
Ramon Garcia:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance ear
canal left thru and thru trajecting the skull brain substance
with point of exit temporal area right.
619
(Exhibit D)
Willie Acosta:
gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point
of entrance trajecting the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and
thru trajecting the upper third of the stomach of thoracic vein
with the point of exit 1 cm. in diameter at the level of the 7th
thorasic vertebrae.
(Exhibit E)
On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule
survived the attack. They suffered serious gunshot injuries
that could have caused their death were it not for the timely
medical attention given them (TSN, July 3, 1996, p. 6).
Montano sustained several gunshot wounds on the left arm,
two on the left upper back, another on the left shoulder and
middle right finger (TSN, June 25, 1996, p. 608). Tibule
sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper
quadrant (stomach) and the other at the left periumbelical
(TSN, July 3, 1996, pp. 7-8).
(pp. 215-219, Rollo.)
619
In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court

rendered a judgment of conviction in the two cases, finding
and disposing:
People vs. Valdez
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8747:
another gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter point of

entrance anterior axilliary line left at the lable nipple
trajecting the lung (left) heart ventricle and lung (right) with
point of exit 1 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral the nipple right.
(Exhibit C)
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA, GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH
DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under
Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime
Law, the offense having been a complex crime the penalty of
which is in
Sandra Montano:
620
gunshot wound, .6 cm. in diameter, point of entrance at the

temporal area left, penetrating the skin, skull minigas, brain
substance (right) (tempral regis) where the slug lodge.
620
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999
b) P100,000.00 as moral damages
People vs. Valdez
6)To the victim RANDY TIBULE:
the maximum, and with the attendant aggravating

circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, hereby sentences him the ultimum
supplicum of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law, to pay the heirs
of the deceased RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE ACOSTA, JEMARIE
GARCIA and SANDRA MONTANO and the injured victims
WILLIAM MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE, as follows:
a) P36,233.65 as actual damages
1)To the heirs of the deceased Ramon Garcia, Jr.:

a) P50,000 as indemnity
b) P52,116.00 as actual damages
b) P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8749:the accused
ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND
AMMUNITIONS (Presidential Decree No. 1866) and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
Finally, it is said: Dura lex, sed lex, translated as: The law
is harsh, but that is the law!
621
c) P500,000.00 as moral damages

2)To the heirs of the deceased WILLIE ACOSTA:
3)To the heirs of the deceased JEMARIE GARCIA:
b) P500,000.00 as moral damages
4)To the heirs of the deceased Sandra Montano:
5)To the victim WILLIAM MONTANO:
a) P39,133.92 as actual damages
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999

621
People vs. Valdez
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 180-181, Rollo.)
Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring
his plea for reversal on the following assigned errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL, IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT,
DISCREPANCIES IN THE AFFIDAVITS OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONIES IN COURT;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
RECANTATIONS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE

SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITY OF ACCUSED, ROLANDO
VALDEZ AS THE GUNMAN;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
MOTIVE ON THE PART OF BERNARDO CASTRO TO FIRE AT, AS
HE ACTUALLY FIRED AT THE OCCUPANTS OF MOTORIZED
TRICYCLE;
September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4: p. 291, Record), both in

Villaflor Hospital, Dagupan City where William Montano
specifically named Bernard Castro as the person who flagged
down the motorized tricycle he and the other victims were
riding. This, he claims, is inconsistent with his testimony
during the trial where he stated:
ATTY. RANCHEZ:
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE

AGAINST THE PROSECUTION ITS DELIBERATE FAILURE TO
PRESENT THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS WHO INVESTIGATED
THE INCIDENT AND IT WAS THE DEFENSE WHICH PRESENTED
SAID POLICE INVESTIGATORS;
Q.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED

ROLANDO VALDEZ DID NOT DENY THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866 BECAUSE HE DID NOT
ALLEGEDLY TOUCHED IT IN HIS MEMORANDUM.
No, sir.
(pp. 106-107, Rollo)
A.
After a painstaking review of the record and a deliberate

consideration of the arguments of accused-appellant, the
Court does not find enough basis to reverse.
When we were entering the road at Sitio Cabauangan at

around ten to fifteen meters, somebody plugged (sic) down
the tricycle, sir.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing

to consider what he says are material, substantial, important
and significant discrepancies between the affidavits of
Q.
622
622
People vs. Valdez
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies in court.
Accused-appellant points to the Statement of William
Montano, taken by SPO1 Mario Suratos on September 20,
1995 (Exhibit 1: p. 238, Record), and the Statement taken on
Now, were you able to reach Sitio Cabauangan, Nalsian,

Manaoag, Pangasinan?
A.
Q.
Why?
And what happened next after somebody plugged (sic) down

your tricycle? motorcycle, sir.
A.
Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of our
Q.
Now, what happened next, if any?
A.
The one who was standing and was lighted with the headlight
was immediately recognized by me, sir.
Q.
Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately
recognized?
A.
That one, sir.
ACTG. INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person wearing white t-shirt seated at

the bench for the accused, and when asked his name, he
gave his name as Rolando Valdez.
(pp. 11-12, tsn, June 11, 1996)
We are not persuaded.
In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and
September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4), William Montano pointed
623
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999

623
People vs. Valdez
to Bernard Castro as the person who flagged down the
motorized tricycle ridden by the victims. On November 8,
1995, William and his co-victim/survivor Randy Tibule
executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng
Demanda where they disclaimed having seen Bernard
Castro at the scene of the crime. They declared that after a
more thorough consideration of what transpired, they have
realized that the filing of the complaint against Bernard
Castro was a mistake and the result of misunderstanding or
misapprehension of what actually happened. In his testimony
in court, William, however, identified accused-appellant as
the person illuminated by the headlight of the tricycle, for

which reason William readily recognized him. We, therefore,
find nothing inconsistent between his declarations during the
investigation and his testimony in court. The lack of precision
with which he distinguished between the person who flagged
down the tricycle and the other person whom he recognized
because of the headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered
as inconsistency at all. The same holds true with claimed
discrepancies between the statements of Randy Tibule during
the investigation and his testimony in court.
Accused-appellant stubbornly insists that following the
withdrawal or retraction of the accusation of several
witnesses against Bernard Castro, these same witnesses
accusation against accused-appellant becomes doubtful.
We are not convinced.
In all the references by accused-appellant in pages 10-12 of
his brief to the sworn declarations of prosecution witnesses
made during the investigation of the case, Bernard Castro
may have indeed been identified and named as one of the
gunmen. It may readily be noted in these very same
references, however, that all these prosecution witnesses
referred to two other companions, then unidentified, of
Bernard Castro. Even in the Joint Affidavit (Exhibit 7)
referred to in page 11 of the brief, the police investigators
categorically referred to Bernard Castro y Nazareno, alias
Toti as one of the suspects or assailants involved in the
shooting incident (p. 112, Rollo). The logical conclusion that
may be drawn
624
624
People vs. Valdez
therefrom is that there is at least one other assailant in

addition to Bernard Castro, and as it developed, accusedappellant was subsequently and positively named as such.
Withal, we cannot subscribe to accused-appellants
ratiocination that if the witnesses pointed to Bernard Castro
as one of the perpetrators of the crime, then it follows that
accused-appellant cannot be one other and additional
perpetrator anymore. Accused-appellants reasoning on this
point is absolutely flawed. It is totally unacceptable.
Accused-appellant likewise seeks shelter in the mysterious
withdrawal of the victims charges against Bernard Castro. He
insinuates that such recantation should not have been given
any consideration. But, this is water under the bridge.
Anyway, even in the remotest possibility that the retraction
of the accusation against Bernard Castro may be reversed, it
does not get accused-appellant off the hook. Considering that
accused-appellant had himself been positively identified,
together with Bernard Castro, as one of the other
perpetrators of the crime, his conviction may still stand
independently and regardless of whether or not Castro is
indicted or remains unprosecuted.
Accused-appellant further argues that it is not he but Castro
who had the motive to shoot and fire at the occupants of the
motorized tricycle, mistaking one of the occupants thereof for
Isidro Capistrano, Castros former classmate and with whom
he earlier had an altercation. It is very clear in his brief,
however, that accused-appellant predicates this argument on
the mistaken premise that he was not positively identified in
the case at bar although he admits that it is established that
he was at the scene of the crime (p. 114, Rollo). This
argument will not hold simply because it is settled that
accused-appellant had been positively identified by
eyewitnesses and victims William Montano and Randy Tibule.
It is basic and fundamental rule that proof of motive is
necessary for conviction only when there is doubt as to the
identity of the accused, not when accused has been
positively identified as in the present case (People vs.
Caggauan, 94 Phil. 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA

422 [1980]; People vs.
625
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999

625
People vs. Valdez
Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it is also to be noted
that lack of motive for committing the crime does not
preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a
matter of judicial knowledge that persons have killed or
committed serious offense for no reason at all (People vs.
Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187 [1996]).
Accused-appellant further contends that the prosecutions
deliberate and intentional failure to present the investigating
police officers and their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit 7)
constitutes culpable suppression of evidence which, if duly
taken into account, will merit his acquittal.
The argument is puerile, simply because the defense itself
was able to present the police officers and Exhibit 7 (p.
116, Rollo). It is to be further noted that as earlier pointed
out, the declaration of SPO1 Suratos and SPO1 Carbonel did
not categorically rule out the possibility of convicting other
persons as co-principals of Castro. On the contrary, it is clear
from such affidavit that there was more than just one
perpetrator of the crime. It even confirms and corroborates
the eyewitness accounts of William Montano and Randy
Tibule pointing to accused-appellant as one of the other
companions of Castro.
After meticulously and carefully going through each and
every piece of evidence on record, the Court finds no reason
to depart from the trial courts accord of credence to the
eyewitness accounts of William Montano and Randy Tibule
who positively identified accused-appellant as one of the

persons who shot and fired at them and their companions
that fateful night. We agree with the trial court that the
evidence points beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant was one of those principally responsible for the
deaths of the four victims in this case and the wounding of
two others. There is also sufficient evidence that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the killings,
thus, qualifying the same to murder.
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the
offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution
of the crime which tend directly and especially to ensure its
626
626
People vs. Valdez
execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive
or retaliatory act which the victim might make (People vs.
Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that
treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden
and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it
or defend himself against such attack. What is decisive is
that the execution of the attack, without the slightest
provocation from the victim who is unarmed, made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate
(People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise
present. After reviewing the evidence, however, we do not
find any showing of evident premeditation on the part of
accused-appellant. While there may be testimonial evidence
pointing to an altercation between Bernard Castro and a
certain Capistrano, it does not sufficiently prove the
attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident

premeditation. It is not enough that evident premeditation is
suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be
evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing
determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered
an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not
merely be premeditation; it must be evident
premeditation (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the
following have to be proved: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender had clung to his determination;
and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and the execution to allow the offender to reflect on the
consequences of his act (People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA 478
[1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the
crime does not constitute sufficient ground to consider the
existence of evident premeditation. At best, it may indicate
the time when the offenders determined to commit the crime
(the first element). Their act of arming themselves with
caliber .30 carbines and thereafter waiting for their supposed
victims at ambush positions may have also indicated that
they
627
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999

627
People vs. Valdez
clung to their determination to commit the crime (the second
element). More important than these two elements is the
proof that a sufficient period of time had elapsed between
the outward act evidencing intent and actual commission of
the of-fense (the third element). There must have been
enough opportunity for the initial impulse to subside. This

element is indispensable for circumstance of evident
premeditation to aggravate the crime. In People vs. Canial,
46 SCRA 134 [1972], this Court reiterates:
In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account
only when there had been a cold and deep meditation, and a
tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal
act. There must be an opportunity to coolly and serenely
think and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences
of what they had planned to do, an interval long enough for
the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil
desire and scheme . . . . (p. 649)
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the
Court had stressed the importance of sufficient time between
the criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent, affording such opportunity for cool thought and
reflection to arrive at a calm judgment. Obviously, this
element is wanting in the case at bar. Right after the
supposed heated argument between Bernard Castro and
Capistrano, Castro and company went home to get the
firearms and not long thereafter mounted the assault. There
was no chance for the anger to subside. The culprits in the
case at bar had no opportunity for cool thought and reflection
to arrive at a calm judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial
court is that of abuse of superior strength. This contravenes
the very basic and elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction
that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is absorbed in treachery (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil.
58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs.
Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
628
628
People vs. Valdez

Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating
circumstances, if we were to uphold the trial courts premises
on the complex nature of the crime committed, the death
sentence, being the maximum penalty for murder, would still
have been the imposable penalty under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Court however, finds compelling
reasons to reduce the sentence from one death penalty (for
the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated
murder) and one reclusion perpetua (for the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions) to four counts of
reclusion perpetua (for 4 murders) and two indeterminate
sentences of prision mayor to reclusion temporal (for the 2
frustrated murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the Peoples
brief that accused-appellant should instead be convicted of
four counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder is
well taken.
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away
by the erroneous Information filed by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the complex
crime of multiple murder and double frustrated murder (p. 1,
Record: Crim. Case No. U-8747). It may be noted that in his
Resolution dated September 26, 1995, the investigating
municipal trial court judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, found a
prima facie case for four separate counts of murder (pp. 101102, Ibid.). Too, the same investigating judge in his
Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found a prima facie case
for two counts of frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was
upon reinvestigation by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder
with double frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint
Resolution dated November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.When a single act

constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty
629
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999

629
People vs. Valdez
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No.
4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances
defined above. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as falling under
the first. It is clear from the evidence on record, however,
that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a single act
but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing,
the evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman
involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of
the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a
single act of firing a single firearm. There were also several
empty bullet shells recovered from the scene of the crime.
This confirms the fact that several shots were fired.
Furthermore, considering the relative positions of the
gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding the
motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside
the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four
victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each
act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise
to the complex crime of multiple murder. We therefore rule
that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of
multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of
the four victims in this case. In the same manner, accusedappellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated
murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of
murder. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the medium
penalty is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant, being guilty of four
separate counts of murder, the proper penalty should be four
sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty
of two counts of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must
be meted out an indeterminate sentence ranging from a
mini630
630
People vs. Valdez
mum of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to a maximum of
12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal for each offense.
Now, to the matter of accused-appellants conviction for
illegal possession of unlicensed firearm under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. It was recently held in the case entitled
People vs. Molina (G.R. Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and
reiterated in People vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September
17, 1998), that there can be no separate conviction of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken
as an aggravating circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 8294, which in part, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of

unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days
after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in
the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As
in the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8294 will generally have prospective application. In
cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to
the accused, the law may be given retroactive application
(Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare
accused-appellant in the case at bar from a separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms,
Republic Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in
Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm)
subject of this present review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present
case for illegal possession of firearm should not be
misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer be any
prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. In
general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other
crimes
631
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar

cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance
in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple
Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly
raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from four
reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this
particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial
to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime,
this new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it
might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision with respect
to Criminal Case No. U-8747 is hereby MODIFIED. Accusedappellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four
counts of murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of four sentences of reclusion perpetua. He is also found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of frustrated
murder and hereby meted two indeterminate sentences,
each, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. The appealed judgment
relating to the civil liabilities of accused-appellant towards
the six victims is AFFIRMED.
Criminal Case No. U-8749 involving Presidential Decree No.
1866 is hereby dismissed.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999

631
People vs. Valdez
expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved
(murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat under Section
3).
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and GonzagaReyes, JJ.,
concur.
Mendoza and Panganiban, JJ., In the result.
632
632

Salva vs. Court of Appeals
Judgment modified.
Note.Consistent with the doctrine that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case open for review, the
appellate court may, applying the new law (Republic Act No.
8294), additionally impose a fine, which if unpaid, will subject
the convict to subsidiary imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 39 of
the Revised Penal Code. (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 277
SCRA 518 [1997]) People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611, G.R. No.
127663 March 11, 1999
[Nos. 25375, 25376. October 8, 1926]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and ap
pellee, vs. VICENTE DE LEON Y FLORA, defendant and
appellant.
1.CRIMINAL LAW; THEFT; HABITUAL DELINQUENT; PENALTY.
The accused in the instant case was convicted of the crime of
theft, having taken two game roosters belonging to different
owners, and being an habitual delinquent, in accordance with
the provisions of Act No. 3062, an additional penalty
consisting of half the penalty provided for the crime
committed must be imposed upon him. (People vs.
Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728; People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753,
promulgated December 31, 1925, not reported.)
2.ID. ; ID.The act of taking two roosters in the same place
and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes
having an independent existence of their own, because there
are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of June 13, 1894.)
3.ID. ; ID.It is not an element of the crime of theft that the
culprit know the owner of the thing stolen, the crime being
consummated provided the thing stolen belongs to another
and the same is taken with intent to gain. Neither is it
necessary for the existence of the crime of theft that it
should appear in a specific manner who is the owner of the
thing stolen, because the law does not require it, nor does it
affect the criminal liability, but only the restitution or
indemnification of damages, which are merely of a civil
nature. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 22, 1898 and October 4, 1905.)
4.ID. ; ID.The doctrine laid down in the case of United
States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260), is not applicable to the
present case, as two separate complaints have been filed
herein against the accused, but the trial court convicted him
in the two cases, considering the facts alleged in the two
complaints as constituting but one crime.

Manila. Diaz, J.
Modesto Reyes for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
438
438
People vs. De Leon
VlLLAMOR, J.:
Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon

y Flora entered the yard of Vicente Magat's house on
Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or
intimidation against persons nor force upon things, took, with
intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard, one
with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat,
and the other with white plumage and black spots, valued at
P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal
court for two crimes of theft, one the theft of Magat's rooster
and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the
accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the municipal
court in each case to suffer the penalty of three years, six
months and one day presidio correccional, to return the
stolen roosters to their respective owners and to pay the
costs in both cases. The accused appealed from this
judgment .to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being
arraigned again upon the same informations, pleaded not
guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly by agreement of
the parties approved by the court.
In view of the evidence, the trial court found the accused

guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the theft of the two
roosters constituted but one crime, and taking into
consideration the circumstance that the accused is an
habitual delinquent sentenced him in said two cases to the
penalty of three years, six months and one day presidio
correccional and to pay the costs in case R. G. No. 25375,
declaring the costs in case No. 25376, de oficio without the
obligation to indemnify, as the roosters were returned to their
respective owners. The accused appealed to this court and
his counsel alleges that the trial court erred: (a) In holding
that the guilt of the accused was proven by his own
admission; (b) in not giving him the benefit of reasonable
doubt, and (c) in sentencing instead of acquitting the
accused, with the costs de oficio.
439

439
and 1 month presidio correccional. (People vs. Aguinaldo, 47

Phil., 728; People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753 1).
We could stop right here, but the Attorney-General raises a
question in his brief which we believe it is necessary for us to
resolve now, due to the fact that it is not only important to
our jurisprudence, but also to the due prosecution of violators
of the law. The Attorney-General urges that the penalty for
two crimes of theft be imposed upon the accused for each of
the stolen roosters. The question, then, to determine is
whether or not the fact that the accused, with intent to gain,
on the same occasion and in the same place, took the two
roosters, one belonging to Vicente Magat and the other to
Ignacio Nicolas, constitutes two crimes of theft.
It will be remembered that article 517 of the Penal Code
contains three paragraphs enumerating the acts which
constitute the crime of theft The first defines theft in general;
the second declares a particular act to be theft which is not
included in the description in the first par_______________
People vs. De Leon

We have reviewed the evidence and find no grounds to
support the contention of the appellant. We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the guilt of the accused in the
present case is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The case
falls under the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 518 of the
Penal Code, amended by section 1 of Act No. 3244, in
connection with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same Code.
The penalty provided in the law is that of presidio
correccional in its full extent, and there having been present
the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the penalty must
be imposed upon the accused in its maximum degree, or four
years, two months and one day presidio correccional. The
accused being an habitual delinquent, under Act No. 3062 an
additional penalty must be imposed upon him consisting of
half the penalty provided for the crime committed, or 2 years
1 Promulgated December 31, 1925, not reported.

440
440
People vs. De Leon
agraph, and the third also considers theft a series of acts
with similar characteristics to the general type, with the
exceptions therein noted.
Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
"ART. 517. The following are guilty of theft:
"1. Any person who, with intent to gain, but without the use
of violence or intimidation against any person or the use of
force upon anything, shall take anything which is the
personal property of another without the latter's consent.
"2. Any person who, having found anything which has been
lost, shall with knowledge of its ownership appropriate the
same with intent of gain.
"3. Any person guilty of malicious damage who shall remove
or make use of the things damaged, subject to the
exceptions established by paragraphs one, two, and three of
article five hundred and ninety-two; paragraph one of article
five hundred and ninety-three; paragraph one of article five
hundred and ninety-five, and articles five hundred and
ninety-six, five hundred and ninety-eight, and six hundred
and three."
As may be seen, the act of taking another's property without
violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon
things, with intent to gain and without the consent of its
owner, is what constitutes the crime of theft, as described in
the first paragraph of article 517.
The crime of theft is an offense against personal property and
what is punished is the alarm caused in the community by
the perpetration of the act which is violative of the individual
rights guaranteed by the law, as well as the damage that
said act may occasion to the members of the community.
Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in
response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on
one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the
accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully taken
belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts
here for the accomplish441
441
People vs. De Leon
ment of different purposes, but only of one which was
consummated, and which determines the existence of only
one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place
and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes
having an independent existence of their own, because there
are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13, 1894,
said:
"The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two cows and two
calves on one night, belonging to four owners, which
livestock was found in various adjacent and open meadows,
constitutes only one crime of theft, because the fact that the
persons injured by the taking of the cattle by the accused
were several, said accused knowing that the meadows in
which this livestock was found were open and adjacent, it
being easy to pass from one to the other, does not authorize
the legal conception that the said accused committed four
thefts on said night, but only one as found by the lower court,
which did not commit an error of law by holding that the acts
were committed on a single occasion."
It is not an element of the crime of theft that the culprit know
the owner of the thing stolen, the crime being consummated
provided the thing stolen belongs to another and the same is
taken with intent to gain. (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of November 22, 1898.) Neither is it necessary for the
existence of the crime of theft that it should appear in a
specific manner who the owner is of the thing stolen,
because the law does not require it nor does it affect the
criminal liability, but only the restitution or indemnification of
damages, which are merely of a civil nature. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, October 4, 1905.) What constitutes
the crime of theft is the taking of another's property with
intent to gain, without the consent of the owner, so that after
the unlawful act of taking another's property is proven, it is

evident that all the elements mentioned in the first par442
442
People vs. De Leon
agraph of article 517 of the Penal Code exist. Therefore, we
are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a
thing belonging to another on one occasion and in the same
place, constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft;
and the fact that the things taken belong to different persons
does not produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be
punished separately.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of the
doctrine laid down in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260),
according to which, where the accused made no objection to
the information on the ground that it charged more than one
offense, the prosecution properly submitted evidence as to
the commission of each and all of the offenses charged; and
the trial court also properly entered judgment of conviction of
each and all of these offenses which were established by the
introduction of competent evidence at the trial and should,
therefore, have imposed the prescribed penalties for each
and all of the offenses of which the accused was convicted in
accordance with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal
Code. This doctrine, however, is not applicable to the present
case as two separate complaints have been filed herein
against the accused, but the trial court convicted the
accused in the two cases, considering the facts alleged in the
said complaints as constituting but one crime.
In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as in
Spanish decisions in regard to the question which is here
debated:
In Corpus Juris, vol. 36, page 799, it is said in regard to the

taking of articles belonging to two different owners at the
same time and place: "In a few jurisdictions the rule obtains
that if two or more articles belonging to different owners are
stolen at the same time and place, the theft of the property
of each owner is a separate crime and may be prosecuted as
such." (U. S. vs. Beerman, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,560; 5 Cranch
C. C., 412; State vs. Thurston 27 S. C. L., 382; Morton vs.
State, 1 Lea [Tenn.] 498.)
443

443
People vs. De Leon
In other jurisdiction it is held that such a theft may be
prosecuted, at the pleasure of the State, either as one
offense or as several distinct offenses. (Bushman vs. Com.,
138 Mass., 507; Com. vs. Sullivan, 104 Mass., 552; State vs.
Douglas, 26 Nev., 196; 65 Pac., 802; 99 Am. St, 688; State vs.
Lambert, 9 Nev., 321.) But the prevailing rule is that if
several articles, stored in the same place, are taken by a
single larcenous act, the mere fact that some of them
belonged to one person and some to another does not
dissolve the act into separate crimes. (Ala.-Clemm vs. State,
154 Ala., 12; 45 So., 212; 129 Am. St., 17; D. C.-Chanock vs.
U. S., 50 App., 54; 267 Fed., 612; Hoiles vs. U. S., 10 D. C.,
370; 36 Am. Rep., 106; Ga.-Lowe vs. State, 57 Ga., 171; Dean
vs. State, 9 Ga. A., 571; 71 South East, 932; Ill.-Peo. vs. Israel,
269 111., 284; 109 North East, 969; Ind.-Furnace vs. State,
153 Ind., 93; 54 North East, 441; Bell vs. State, 42 Ind., 335;
lowa-State vs. Sampson, 157 lowa, 257; 138 North West, 473;
42 Law. Rep. An. [N.S.], 967; State vs. Congrove, 109 lowa,
66; 80 North West, 227; State vs. Larson, 85 lowa, 659; 52
North West, 539; Ky.-Nichols vs. Com., 78 Ky., 180; Md.-State
vs. Warren, 77 Md., 121; 26 Atl. Rep., 500; 39 Am. St., 401;
Mich.-Peo. vs. Johnson, 81 Mich., 573; 45 North West, 1119;

Miss.-State vs. Quintini, 51 So., 276; Dalton vs. State, 91
Miss., 162; 44 So., 802; 124 Am. St., 637; Ward vs. State, 90
Miss., 249; 43 So., 466; Mo.-State vs. Morphin, 37 Mo., 373;
Lorton vs. State, 7 Mo., 55; 37 Am. Dec., 179; Mont.-State vs.
Mjelde, 29 Mont, 490; 75 Pac., 87; N. H.-State vs. Merrill, 44
N. H., 624; N. M.-State vs. Klasner, 19 N. M., 474; 145 Pac.,
679; Ann. Cas. 1917-D, 824; N. C.-State vs. Simons, 70 N. C.,
336; Oh.-State vs. Hennessey, 23 Oh. St., 339, 13 Am. Rep.,
253; State vs. Smith, 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint), 682; 23
CincLBul., 85; Or.-State vs. Clark, 46 Or., 140; 80 Pac., 101;
Pa.-Fulmer vs. Com., 97 Pa., 503; Com. vs. Lent, 15 Pa. Dist.,
884; S. D.-State vs. Kieffer, 17 S. D., 67; 95 North West, 289;
Tex.-Wilson vs. State, 45 Tex., 76; 23 Am. Rep., 602; Hudson
vs. State', 9 Tex. A., 151, 35 Am. Rep.,
444
444
People vs. Bretaa
732; Addison vs. State, 3 Tex. A., 40 Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23
Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.-State vs. Blay, 77 Vt., 56; 58 Atl.
Rep., 794; State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl. Rep., 432; 54
Am. St, 878; State vs. Newton, 42 Vt., 537; Va.-Alexander vs.
Com., 90 Va., 809; 20 South East, 782; Wash.-State vs. Laws,
61 Wash., 533; 112 Pac., 488; State vs. Butts, 42 Wash., 455;
85 Pac., 33; Terr. vs. Heywood, 2 Wash., 180; 2 Pac., 189;
Wyo.-Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo., 504; 54 Pac., 228; Eng.Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K, 765; 61 Eng. C. L., 765.)
For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as is
hereby, modified and the accused Vicente de Leon y Flora is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and three months
presidio mayor, with the accessories of the law, and to pay
the costs. So ordered. People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, Nos.
25375, 25376 October 8, 1926
G.R. No. 93028. July 29, 1994.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN
SIMON y SUNGA,** respondent.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; To sustain a
conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be
clearly and unmistakably established.To sustain a
conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be
clearly and unmistakably established. To sell means to give,
whether for money or any other material consideration. It
must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant
actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in
exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
_______________
* EN BANC.
** This case was initially raffled to the Second Division of the
Court but due to the novelty and importance of the issues
raised on the effects of R.A. No. 7659 in amending R.A. No.
6425, the same was referred to and accepted by the Court en
banc pursuant to Circular No. 2-89 and Bar Matter No. 209, as
amended.
556
556
People vs. Simon
Same; Same; Same; The practice of entrapping drug
traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is
susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers
through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to
mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. Nonetheless, such
causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in
the case at bar. Appellants entrapment and arrest were not
effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was
conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was
effected. No ill motive was or could be attributed to them,
aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly
performed their official duty. Such lack of dubious motive
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over
the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of
having been framed, erected as it is upon the mere shifting
sands of an alibi.
Same; Same; Same; The corpus delicti of the crime has been
fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.When the
drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service
of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
(PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn
Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, confirmed in her
Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four
tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and
had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. Thus, the
corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with
certainty and conclusiveness.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Minor error or discrepancy
neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution
evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witness honesty.
Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an
error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant,
such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter
and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the
witnesses honesty.
Same; Same; Same; No law or jurisprudence requires that an
arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a
barangay official or any other civilian or be accompanied by
the taking of pictures.Again, appellant contends that there
was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or
civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures
taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was
not reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay
official or police authorities. These are absurd disputations.
No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to
be valid,
557
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
557
People vs. Simon
be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other
civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Court finds and
declares the exhibits inadmissible in evidence.However, we
find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits
inadmissible in evidence. Appellants conformance to these
documents are declarations against interest and tacit
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in
violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that
he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in
writing and in the presence of counsel, hence whatever
incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from
him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction.Notwithstanding
the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant
cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his
criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been
sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal
sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of
the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. In the present case, and in
light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been
ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Drug-pushing when done on a small
scale belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed
at any time, and in any place.Appellant then asseverates
that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total
stranger. We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the
doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale
as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be

committed at any time and in any place. It is not contrary to
human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total
stranger, for what matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the
acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana
leaves.
Same; Same; Penalties; Court holds that in the instant case
the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 is prision correccional.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable
penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as
558
558
People vs. Simon
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to
be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant
mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
DAVIDE, JR.,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; The mere use
by a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code
can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense
punished or punishable by the Revised Penal Code.It is
thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal
Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor are found
in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law
if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the
special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the
Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not
make an offense in the special law punished by or punishable
under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It
is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a
penalty therefor, although it adopts the Codes nomenclature
of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a
penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means
make an offense thereunder an offense punished or

punishable by the Revised Penal Code. APPEAL from a
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga,
Br. 51.
Ricardo M. Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO,J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged
on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment
alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto.
Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of
marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer
in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when
subjected to laboratory
559
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
559
People vs. Simon
examination, were found positive for marijuana.1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March
2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily
detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his
right to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the merits
ensued and was duly concluded.
I
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant,
later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police
unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal
drug activities of a certain Alyas Pusa at Sto. Cristo,
Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante,
Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the
camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt.
Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt. Domingo
Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked

money from Bustamante, the team, together with their
informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had
coordinated with the police authorities and barangay officers
thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential
informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently
approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana.
Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to
buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning
shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags
and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00
as payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a prearranged signal to his companions who were stationed
around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on
them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up
team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the
team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on
board a jeep and he was placed under custodial
investigation, with Sgt.
_______________
1 Original Record, 2; Criminal Case No. G-2320, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 51, Guagua, Pampanga.
2 Ibid., 11.
3 Ibid., 23.
560
560
People vs. Simon
Pejoro as the investigator.4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez testimony, claiming that he
saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the
appellant. He also averred that he was the one who
confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from
appellant.5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he
was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest
from the rest of the other members, that is, around two
hundred meters away from his companions. He did not

actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and
appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant after
the latters arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted
the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was
apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to
counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to
counsel.6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit G, the Receipt
of Property Seized/Confiscated which appellant signed,
admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise
informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on
the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated
in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz
corrected his entry by telling him to put two, instead of
one and 40, instead of 20. He agreed to the correction
since they were the ones who were personally and directly
involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of
appellant.7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas,
examined appellant at 5:30 P.M. of the day after the latters
apprehension, and the results were practically normal except
for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not
find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant.
The next day, he again examined appellant due to the
latters complaint of gastrointestinal pain. In the course of
the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a
history of peptic ulcer, which
_________________
4 TSN, April 6, 1989, 5-32.
5 Ibid., May 5, 1989, 2.
6 Ibid., May 24, 1989, 18; May 5, 1989, 11.
7 Ibid., May 24, 1989, 21-24.
561
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
561
People vs. Simon

causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently
vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the
same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his
physical condition remained normal.8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the
attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at
around 4:30 P.M., he was watching television with the
members of his family in their house when three persons,
whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on
the assurance that they would just inquire about something
from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with
them. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but
he later noticed that they were taking a different route. While
on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted
to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When
they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some
papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach
eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to
affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents
presented to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the
dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill
came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he
vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the
hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the
NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no
longer endure the maltreatment to which he was being
subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his
uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching
the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 P.M. There, he consulted a
quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to
the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca,
Pampanga where he was confined for three days.9
Appellants brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that
appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after
undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He
likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from
peptic ulcer even before the latters arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn
Gomez-Aguas, a
_________________
8 Ibid., June 14, 1989, 3-22.
9 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 5-26.
10 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 8-16.
562
562
People vs. Simon
resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,
declared that she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause
for this ailment was appellants peptic ulcer. She did not see
any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence
presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in
favor of the Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned
judgment of the lower court, contending in his assignment of
errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of
frame-up, (2) not declaring Exhibit G (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3)
convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the Peoples real
theory and evidence is to the effect that appellant actually
sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the
other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently
from his possession,14 the latter not being in any way
connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold
and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In
view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal
is merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly
committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate

and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea
bags which separate offense is not charged herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale
must be clearly and unmistakably established.17 To sell
means to
_______________
11Ibid., August 18, 1989, 36, 41-43, 47-49.
12 Original Record, 174-175; per Judge Arsenio P. Roman.
13 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 3; Rollo, 54.
14 Exhibits F and G, Folder of Exhibits; TSN, July 10, 1989, 53.
15 Original Record, 2.
16 See People vs. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295, August 20,
1993.
17 People vs. Alilin, G.R. No. 84363, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA
772.
563
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
563
People vs. Simon
give, whether for money or any other material
consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags
of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the
poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence
adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the
illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to
prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October
22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to
Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how
the sale took place and his testimony was amply
corroborated by his teammates. As between the
straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez
and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the
former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more

entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers
through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to
mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.19 Nonetheless,
such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not
obtain in the case at bar. Appellants entrapment and arrest
were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was
conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was
effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them,
aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly
performed their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over
the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of
having been framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere
shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering
_________________
18 See People vs. Querrer, G.R. No. 97147, July 15, 1992, 211
SCRA 502.
19 People vs. Lati, G.R. No. 70393, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA
336.
20 TSN, May 5, 1989, 5.
21 Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
22 See People vs. Labra, G.R. No. 98427, November 20, 1992,
215 SCRA 822.
564
564
People vs. Simon
prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for
him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have
plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory
Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination,

P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein,23
confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the
contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were
positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of
marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been
fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the
matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from
him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing
to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the
aforementioned Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated, he
signed it as the one who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who
confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is
not an element of the offense with which appellant is
charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana
was confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even,
assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error
on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an
error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as
such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the
witnesses honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a mere
imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he
did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the
person of appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure
or confiscation
_______________
23 TSN, August 18, 1989, 3.
24 Ibid., id., 12; Exhibit M, Folder of Exhibits.
25 People vs. Celiz, et al., G.R. No. 92849, October 20, 1992,
214 SCRA 755.
26 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4-5; Rollo, 55-56.
27 People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 86495, May 13, 1992, 209
SCRA 1.
565
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
565
People vs. Simon
thereof as the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso
bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for
finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in
buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily
explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q
Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in
conducting such operation you do not anymore provide a
powder (sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark
or identity of the persons taking hold of the object?
A
We were not able to put powder on these denominations
because we are lacking that kind of material in our office
since that item can be purchased only in Manila and only few
are producing that, sir.
xxx
Q
Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime
Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A
Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot
make a request for that powder because they, themselves,
are using that in their own work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to
mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can
under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the
prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in
any of such transactions.30 The dusting of said bills with
phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for
identification pur-poses, which identification can be supplied

by other species of evidence. Again, appellant contends that
there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or
civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures
taken before, during and after his
_______________
29 TSN, May 5, 1989, 7.
30 People vs. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990, 188
SCRA 376.
566
566
People vs. Simon
arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the
custody of any barangay official or police authorities.31
These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence
requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed
by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be
accompanied by the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the
police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto,
they were not only authorized but were also under the
obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellants contention, there was an
arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his
apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report32
states, inter alia, that suspect was arrested for selling two
tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the
confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana
dried leaves. Below these remarks was affixed appellants
signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized
property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant
wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills
from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned
exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellants conformance to
these documents are declarations against interest and tacit
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in

violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel.34 Although
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that
he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in
writing and in the presence of counsel,35 hence whatever
incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from
him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in
evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and
hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
_______________
31 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6-7; Rollo, 57-58.
32 Exhibit F, Folder of Exhibits.
33 Exhibit G, ibid.
34 People vs. Mauyao, G.R. No. 84525, April 6, 1992, 207
SCRA 732.
35 TSN, May 5, 1989, 11.
36 Sec. 12(1), Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
567
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
567
People vs. Simon
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits,
appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament
since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana
has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense
of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens
the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In
the present case, and in light of the preceding discussion,
this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of
doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he
would sell marijuana to a total stranger.39 We take this
opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that
drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case,
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any

time and in any place.40 It is not contrary to human
experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger,41 for
what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer
and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the
sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.42 While there may
be instances where such sale could be improbable, taking
into consideration the diverse circumstances of person, time
and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused
supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that
those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical
and mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him
to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under
custody.43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to
how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were
supposedly obtained by
_______________
37 People vs. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991, 200
SCRA 194.
38 People vs. Sibug, G.R. No. 108520, January 24, 1994.
40 People vs. Tandoy, G.R. No. 80505, December 4, 1990,
192 SCRA 28.
41 Cf. People vs. Cina, G.R. No. 88220, October 1, 1990, 190
SCRA 199.
42 People vs. Consuelo, G.R. No. 77755, April 18, 1990, 184
SCRA 402.
43 TSN, July 10, 1989, 12-13.
568
itself such as the common experience and observation of

mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.44 The evidence on record is bereft of any
support for appellants allegation of maltreatment. Two
doctors, one for the prosecution45 and the other for the
defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or
indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the
person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his
abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been
suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even
corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a
history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at
Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging
the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp
after his arrest and during his detention there.49
Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the
authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged
malefactors despite the opportunity to do so50 and with the
legal services of counsel being available to him. Such
omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellants
story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his
allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for
the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all
costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellants arrest was only the
culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society
and it was providential that it came about after he was
caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs.
Accordingly, this opinion
___________________
568
People vs. Simon
force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence
that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in
44 People vs. Eslaban, G.R. Nos. 101211-12, February 8,

1993, 218 SCRA 534.
45 TSN, June 14, 1989, 22.
46 Ibid., August 18, 1989, 48.
47 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 15-16.
48 Ibid., October 23, 1988, 15-16.
49 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 22; October 23, 1988, 15.
50 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 26-27.

569
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
569
People vs. Simon
could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659
effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience
necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and
entails additional questions of law which we shall now
resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to
the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
SEC.13.Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx
SEC.4.Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
xxx
SEC.17.Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec.20.Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture
of the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime.The penalties
for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be
applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
following quantities:
xxx
5.750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx
_________________
52 Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides that it shall
take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation, and it was so
published in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila
Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal.
570
570
People vs. Simon
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional
to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
1.Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for
the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of
only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the
sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be
whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the
lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law,
albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the
previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it
has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code
the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and
shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by
special laws.54 The exception in said article would not apply
to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual
delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of
the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in
the present case, a corollary question would be whether this

court, at the present stage, can sua sponte apply the
provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be
imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved
in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
x x x. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal
Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as
they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be
useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under
obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective
_______________
53 Title Five, Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited
Drugs.
54 U.S. vs. Hocbo, 12 Phil. 304 (1908); U.S. vs. Parrone, 24
Phil. 29 (1913); U.S. vs. Almencion, 25 Phil. 648 (1913);
People vs. Moran, et al., 44 Phil. 387 (1923); People vs. Parel,
44 Phil. 437 (1923); People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225 (1935).
55 Article 62(5), Revised Penal Code.
571
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
571
People vs. Simon
of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would
also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime
and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the
reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has
already become final and executory or the accused is serving
sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic
considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter
being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ
of habeas corpus.56
2.Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of
imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the
drafting of the aforesaid law, thereby calling for and
necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No.

6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That
penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the
law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more
of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity
involved is less, the penalty shall range fromprision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of
its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty
where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the
minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750
grams or more. The same error has been committed with
respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided
in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in
order to give effect to the whole law,57 we hereby sold that
the penalty to be imposed
_________________
56See Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948);
Gumabon, et al. vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L30026, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420.
57Lopez and Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 100
Phil. 850 (1957).
572
572
People vs. Simon
where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from
prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion
perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule
in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a

manner favorable to the accused.
3.Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug
is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of
penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now
modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken
from said range depending upon the quantity of the drug
involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph
constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct
penalties, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and
reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides
that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them
being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most
severe as the maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which
period of such complex penalty shall be imposed on the
accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section
20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the
penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug
subject of the criminal transactions.59 Accordingly, by way of
exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the
purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the
aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a
principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the
drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not
altogether be disregarded. Since each component penalty of
the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately
as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the
modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period
of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section
20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that,
unless
________________
58 Article 77, Revised Penal Code.
59 Thisgraduated scheme of penalties is not stated with
regard and does not apply to the quantities and their
penalties provided in the first paragraph, the penalties

therein being the same regardless of whether the quantities
exceed those specified therein.
573
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
573
People vs. Simon
there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of
the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided
into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble
the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the
penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods
according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana
involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall
be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision
mayor; and 500 to 749 grams, reclusion temporal.
Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only
if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana
subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional
is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and
cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4.Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day
to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three
periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table
provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether
or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is
here to be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the
presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other
circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken
into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held
that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws,
the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under
the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A
review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws
involved provided their own specific penalties for the
offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not

taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal
Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or
maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to
consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose
main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases
that
________________
60 Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 20, R.A. No. 7659.
574
574
People vs. Simon
the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by
degrees could not be given supplementary application to
special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not
components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of
the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article
10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or
physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law
against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the
offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special
law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised
Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily,
with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the
system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this
case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be
both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this
later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable
penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken

from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
5.At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the
developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses
under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional
practice in the United States but differently from the
penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish
origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for
one year or for one to five years but without division into
periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the
special law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws
like the Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during
the American regime.
________________
61 Act No. 4103, effective on December 5, 1933.
575
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
575
People vs. Simon
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special
law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished
under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner
provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth
Act No. 30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages
with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
SEC.4.Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer
as required by section one of this Act, shall prima facie be
considered a fraud committed by such employer against his
employee or laborer by means of false pretenses similar to
those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen,
paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal
Code and shall be punished in the same manner as therein
provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses

defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties as
technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code.
These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (AntiSubversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
mayor to death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (AntiFencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor
to prision mayor; and Presi-dential Decree No. 1866 (illegal
possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the
penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion
temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is
imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and
not more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed
without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon
things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more
than 30 years, when committed with violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon
________________
62 Effective on June 9, 1938.
63 See a similar format in P.D. No. 330 which penalizes the
illegal taking of timber and forest products under Arts. 308,
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code by reference.
64 In fact, the penalty for officers or ranking leaders was
prision mayor to death, just like the penalty for treason by a
resident alien under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
576
576
People vs. Simon
things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under
the special law are different from and are without reference
or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can
be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of
penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory

provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for
felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the
legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given
example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the
penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months
is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of
reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised
Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping.
Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond
to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code,
therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539
and special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties
and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal
Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon
and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have
suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic
Act No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws,
the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those
provided for in the Revised Penal Code lucidly reveals the
statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for
felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said
special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit
proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be
to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an
integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied
legislation, which could never have been the intendment of
Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law
________________
65 G.R. No. 51368, November 6, 1981, 109 SCRA 35.
577
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
577
People vs. Simon
(Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the AntiCattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the
prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein
that
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a
special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised
Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is
in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for
penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent
seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment
of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft
of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to
applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code x x x. Article 64 of the same Code should,
likewise, be applicable, x x x. (Italics supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the
rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act
No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we
have this more recent pronouncement:
x x x. Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, this Court held that where
the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in
applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no
roomfor the application of the provisions of the Code. x x x
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No.
1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in
the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such
case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties
which distill the deep legal thought and centuries of
experience in the administration of criminal laws.
(Emphasis ours.)66
________________
66 People vs. Tsang Hin Wai, et al., G.R. No. 66389,

September 8, 1986, 144 SCRA 22. In his sponsorship speech
of Senate Bill No. 891 as Chairman of the Special Committee
on the Death Penalty, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino made this
enlightening explanation as reported in the records of the
Senate and which is pertinent to our present discussion: x x
x Article 190, referring to prohibited drugs, actually was
repealed by the enactment of a special law referring to
drugs. But since we were only amending the Revised Penal
Code in this proposed bill or
578
578
People vs. Simon
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the
Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the
technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts
of the three scales of penalties in the Code,67 with much
more reason should the provisions of said Code on the
appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying
circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the
different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for
graduating such penalties by degrees should have
supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if
they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this
aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that
mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied
only if they affect theperiods and the degrees of the penalties
within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and
consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in
accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied
to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of
the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when
there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and

no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced
by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce
the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These
provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in
toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the
aforestated second paragraph of Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have
been contemplated by the legislature.
________________
draft, we reincorporated Article 190 in an amended form. x x
x It reincorporates and amends Article 190 on the
importation, manufacture, sale, administration upon another,
or distribution of prohibited drugs, planting or cultivation of
any plant, which is a source of prohibited drugs, maintenance
of a den, dive or similar place, as defined in the Dangerous
Drugs Law (9th CRP, 1st Regular Session, Vol. 1, No. 71, 12).
67 See Articles 25, 70 and 71, Revised Penal Code.
579
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
579
People vs. Simon
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law
prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided
for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall
proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty
prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to
be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in
degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which
follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to
be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case
consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclu-sion temporal,
then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and
arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction
by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist
of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public

censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods
of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may
continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial
solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly
addressed to Congress.
6.The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us.
Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in
nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be
imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved
will exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more important
aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sen_______________
68 Section 2, Act No. 4103, as amended.
580
580
People vs. Simon
tence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised
Penal Code, states that if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an

indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. We hold that this quoted portion of the section
indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein
the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without
reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the
preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the
offense is punished under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on
indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was
necessary because of the nature of the former type of
penalties under said laws which were not included or
contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the
Code, hence there could be no minimum within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative
examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided,
this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and
last examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act
No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application
and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical
terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In
fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said
sentence, we have applied the provisions of the amended
Section 20 of said law to arrive atprision correccional and
Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium
period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law,
is now in effect punished by and under the
________________
69 Contemporaneous exposition, or construction; a
construction drawn from the time when, and the
circumstances under which, the subject-matter to be
construed, such as a custom or statute, originated (Blacks

Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 390).
581
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
581
People vs. Simon
Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid
Section 1 which directs that in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. (Italics
ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of
context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that
qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court
has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act No.
4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus,
with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from
its coverage persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment, we have held that what
is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the
penalty imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law
states is life imprisonment.
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition,
therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of
literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law
and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in
the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated
scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next

lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall
have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act
No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws,
which is the best mode of interpretation.71
________________
70 People vs. Roque, et al., 90 Phil. 142 (1951); People vs.
Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239 (1952); People vs. Moises, et al., G.R.
L-32495, August 13, 1975, 66 SCRA 151.
71Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus
interpretandi modus (Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 953).
582
582
People vs. Simon
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social
measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in
favor of the accused.72 The minimum sentence is merely a
period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not
of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the
balance of his sentence outside of his confinement.73 It does
not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he
still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set
conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convicts eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his
release on parole may readily be denied if he is found
unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on
legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar,
appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next
lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we
have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of
the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court
may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
The difference, which could thereby even involve only one
day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in

the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against
accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but
with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is,
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as the maximum
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I join Davide, Jr., J. in his concurring and
dissenting opinion.
________________
72 People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).
73 24 C.J.S., Indeterminate Sentence, Sec. 1993, 1217-1218.
583
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
583
People vs. Simon
Davide, Jr., J., Please see Concurring/Dissenting opinion.
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Quiason, J., I join Justice Davide in his dissenting opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR.,J.:
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate
cases where the penalty to be imposed would be prision
correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659,
the sentence to be meted out, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that
whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next
lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or
more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating
circumstances or of a privileged mitigating circumstance

shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the
penalty to be imposed, taking into account the quantity of
the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.
I.
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No.
7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their
technical signification and effects, then what should govern is
the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for
in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized under
the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the
latter
584
584
People vs. Simon
offenses would now be considered as punished under the
Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103,
as amended by Act No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also
provides that:
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by the same. (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should

be taken into account in the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal
Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special
laws). The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are
those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus
appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify
further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised Penal
Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is
punished by a penalty which is included in the classification
of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under
any other law (or special law) if it is not defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised
Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor are
found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a
special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found
in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the
Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not
make an offense in the special law punished by or punishable
under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It
is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a
penalty therefor, although it adopts the Codes nomenclature
of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a
penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means
make an offense thereunder an offense punished or
punishable by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659
had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be
considered aspunished under the Revised Penal Code. If that
were so, then
585
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
585
People vs. Simon
we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses

are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal
Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature
of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 4045), application of penalties to principals, accomplices, and
accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48),
and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among others. We
cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent
posture which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous
Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not
make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where
the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence
to be meted on the accused should be that whose minimum
should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the
special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
II.
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty
provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz.,
prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal,
and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code,
each should form a period, with the lightest of them being
the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe
as the maximum, yet, considering that under the said second
paragraph of Section 20 the penaltydepends on the quantity
of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way
of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to
subserve the purpose of Section 20, as amended, each of the
aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a
principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug
involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances
pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper
period of the component penalty shall then be fixed. To
illustrate, if by the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g.,
marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty

should be prision
586
586
People vs. Simon
correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating
circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should be
prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority
opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods
of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower thanprision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the sriousness of drug offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporalif it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of
the quantity of the drugs involvedby two degrees, or to
prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present
(paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a
privileged mitigating circumstance of, say, minority (Article
68, Revised Penal Code), or under circumstances covered by
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper
penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact
that a reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be
reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a
reduction beyond prision correccional. Finally, if the proper
penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at
all would be allowed. I find the justification for the rule to be
arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same
second paragraph involving the same range of penalty, we
both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5),
Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The

reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate
the seriousness of drug offenses, is unconvincing because
Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact depreciated the serious-ness of drug
offenses by providing quantity as basis for the determination
of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to cases
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair
because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE
dangerous drugssay 500 to
587
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994
587
People vs. Simon
749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be
imposed would be reclusion temporalmay only be
sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating
circum-stances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of
possession of only one (1) gram of marijuanain which case
the penalty to be imposed is prision correccionalwould not
be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the same
number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former
has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be
the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to the
reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
ART.68.Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen
years of age.When the offender is a minor under eighteen
years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the
paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
1.Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age,
who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court
having declared that he acted with discernment, a
discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by
two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the

crime which he committed.
2.Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal
Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Appealed judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.In prosecutions for illegal sale of marijuana what is
material is the proof that the selling transaction transpired
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence (People vs. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136). People vs.
Simon, 234 SCRA 555, G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000.*

ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Bouncing Checks Law; Section 2 creates a
presumption juris tantum that the second element prima
facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense
are presentB.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption
juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when
the first and third elements of the offense are present. If not
rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.
Same; Same; The gravamen of Batas Pambansa No. 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment.The
gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy
the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor.
The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended
and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why
and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in
determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding
the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.
Same; Same; Unlike in estafa, under Batas Pambansa No. 22,
one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of
an obligation, or that there was damage.Unlike in estafa,
under B.P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was
issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was
damage. The damage done is to the banking system.
_____________
* EN BANC.
498
498
Lim vs. People
Same; Same; Penalty; The penalty of fine only for violation of

BP 22 is to redeem valuable human material and to prevent
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty of the accused.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the
penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human
material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order. There, we deleted the prison
sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a
fine double the amount of the check issued.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Br. 23.
Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
PARDO,J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals affirming in toto that of the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City.2 Both courts found petitioner Rosa Lim guilty of
twice violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 223 and imposing on
her two one-year imprisonment for each of the two violations
and ordered her to pay two fines, each amounting to two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The trial court also
ordered petitioner to return to Maria Antonia Seguan, the
jewelry received or its value with interest, to pay moral
damages, attorneys fees and costs.4
We state the relevant facts.5
On August 25, 1990, petitioner called Maria Antonia Seguan
by phone. Petitioner thereafter went to Seguans store. She
bought
________________
1 In CA-G.R. CR No. 14641, promulgated on October 15,
1996, De la Rama, J., ponente, Cui and Montenegro, JJ.,
concurring.
2 In Criminal Case Nos. CBU 22127 and 22128.

3 Bouncing Checks Law, hereinafter referred to as B.P. 22.
4 Rollo, p. 94.
5 Rollo, p. 12.
499
VOL.340,SEPTEMBER18,2000
499
Lim vs. People
various kinds of jewelrySingaporean necklaces, bracelets
and rings worth P300,000.00. She wrote out a check dated
August 25, 1990, payable to cash drawn on Metrobank in
the amount of P300,000.006 and gave the check to Seguan.
On August 26, 1990, petitioner again went to Seguans store
and purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner
issued another check payable to cash dated August 16,
1990 drawn on Metro-bank in the amount of P241,668.00,7
and sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia
Nadera.
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks
were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioners account
in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the
amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did.
On June 5, 1991,8 an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 23 two
informations against petitioner. Both informations were
similarly worded, The difference is that in Criminal Case No.
22128, the bouncing check is Metro Bank Check No. CLN
094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of
P241,668.00. The informations read:9
Criminal Case No. 22127
The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses
ROSA LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22
That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check she does

not have sufficient funds in the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, with deliberate
intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then
and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check No. 1 CLN
094244391 dated August 25, 1990 in the amount of
P300,000.00 payable to Maria Antonia
_____________
6 Rollo, p. 89.
7 Ibid.
8 Rollo, p. 94.
9 Rollo, pp. 80-81.
500
500
Lim vs. People
Seguan which check was issued in payment of an obligation
of said accused, but when the said check was presented with
the bank the same was dishonored for reason Account
Closed and despite notice and demands made to redeem or
make good said check, said accused failed and refused, and
up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of said Maria Antonia Seguan in the
amount of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses
ROSA LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22,
COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, in this City of Cebu,
Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the
check she does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
present-ment, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and
of causing damage, did then and there issue, make or draw

Metro Bank Check No. CLN-094244392 dated August 26,
1990 in the amount of P241,668.00 payable to Maria Antonia
Seguan which check was issued in payment of an obligation
of said accused, but when the said check was presented with
the bank, the same was dishonored for reason Account
Closed and despite notice and demands made to redeem or
make good said check, said accused failed and refused, and
up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of said Maria Antonia Seguan in the
amount of P241,668.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cebu City, Philippines, 30 May 1991.10
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty in both
cases,
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court
rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner, to
wit:11
WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby
rendered convicting
________________
10 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 80-81.
11 Rollo, pp. 93-94.
501
501
Lim vs. People
the accused, Rosa Lim and sentencing her in Criminal Case
No. CBU-22127, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR and a fine of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS and in Criminal Case No.
CBO-22128, the same penalty of imprisonment for ONE YEAR
and fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) is
likewise imposed.
The accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant
Maria Antonia Seguan, the sum of P541,668.00 which is the
value of the jewelries bought by the accused from the latter

with interest based on the legal rate to be counted from June
5, 1991, the date of the filing of the informations, or return
the subject jewelries; and further to pay private complainant:
(a)The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages in
compensation for the latters worries with the freezing of her
business capital involved in these litigated transactions;
(b)The sum of P10,000.00 for attorneys fees, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.12
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.13
On October 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, dismissing the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.14
Hence, this appeal.15
In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew Seguan
and much more, had any transaction with her. According to
petitioner, she issued the two checks and gave them to
Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan. She gave the two checks to
Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a
security arrangement or guarantee that she would return
the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell them.16
___________________
12 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 80-94.
13 Docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14641.
14 Rollo, pp. 10-20.
15 Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 25-39.
16 Rollo, p. 13.
502
502
Lim vs. People
The appeal has no merit.
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:17
(1)The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value;
(2)The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the

time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and
(3)The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued
that the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had
no preexisting transaction. The checks were issued to Aurelia
Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to
cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment
basis.18 These defenses cannot save the day for her. The
first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present.
To escape liability, she must prove that the second element
was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did
not know that her funds in the bank account were
insufficient. She did not prove this.
B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that
the second element prima facie exists when the first and
third elements of the offense are present.19 If not rebutted, it
suffices to sustain a conviction.20
__________________
17 Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125059,
March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 447.
18 Rollo, p. 13.
19 B.P. 22, Section 2 provides, Sec. 2. Evidence of
knowledge of insufficient fundsThe making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such
bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date
of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
20 Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.

503
503
Lim vs. People
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy
the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment within five (5) banking days from notice of
dishonor.21 The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and
inimical to public welfare.22 Laws are created to achieve a
goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or
mischief.23 Why and to whom the check was issued is
irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and
conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also
irrelevant.24
Unlike in estafa,25 under B.P. No. 22, one need not prove that
the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that
there was damage. The damage done is to the banking
system.26
InUnited States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala
prohib-ita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
When dealing with acts mala prohibita27
.. . it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted
with criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory
enactment, the intention of the person who commits the
crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were
not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be
substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution.
In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which
produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid. In
those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely
the same force and result whether the intention of the person
performing the act is good or bad.
This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita.
Petitioner issued two checks. They were dishonored upon
presentment for payment due to the fact that the account

was closed. Petitioner
__________________
21 King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999, 319
SCRA 654.
22 Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.
23 Codoy v. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333, 351 (1999).
24 Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423 (1997).
25 People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999,
317 SCRA 617.
26 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 658 (1998).
27 United States v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 131 (1909).
504
504
Lim vs. People
failed to rebut the presumption that she knew her funds were
insufficient at the time of issue of the checks. And she failed
to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its
payment within five (5) banking days from receipt of notice of
dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per
quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be
exceedingly hard but so the law is written.
However, we resolve to modify the penalty imposed on
petitioner. B.P. No. 22 provides a penalty of imprisonment of
not less than thirty days but not more than one year or a fine
of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the Court.28
InVaca v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that in determining the
penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human
material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order. There, we deleted the prison
sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a

fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered
the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good
faith, that no violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed,
otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment
of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison
term.30 We do the same here. We believe such would best
serve the ends of criminal justice.
Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on
petitioner. The two fines imposed for each violation, each
amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient.
The award of moral damages and order to pay attorneys
fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
________________
28 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, Section 1.
29 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 26.
30 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 664.
505
505
Lim vs. People
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the decision of the
Court of Appeals.31 We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of
imprisonment and hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of
P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6)
months.32 We DELETE the award of moral damages and
attorneys fees. The rest of the judgment of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., In the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., On leave.

Judgment affirmed with modification. Sentence of
imprisonment set aside, moral damages and attorneys fees
deleted.
Note.What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuancethe mere act of
issuing a worthless check being malum prohibitum. (Llamado
vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423 [1997])
o0o Lim vs. People, 340 SCRA 497, G.R. No. 130038
September 18, 2000
G.R. Nos. 11895054. February 6, 1997 *

LUCRECIA GABRES, also known as MONA GABRES, accusedappellant.
Criminal Law; Labor Law; Estafa; Illegal Recruitment;
Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by means of
deceit punishable under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa
by means of deceit punishable under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. The trial courts brief ratiocination is well
taken; viz: There is no dispute that damages have been
incurred by the complainants. They parted with their money
in consideration of deployment for work in a foreign country,
but which unfortunately remains unrestituted despite the
failure in that regard of the person or persons who promised
that they will be sent off to work abroad.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
582
582
People vs. Gabres
Same; Same; Same; Same; Accused-appellant is likewise
guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.Accused-appellant
is likewise guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, an
offense under Article 38(b), in relation to Article 39, of the
Labor Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed
by the Code for the offense without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime.Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. The penalty next lower should be
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense,

without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination
of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion
of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances
are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Br. 10.
Antonio F. Angluben for accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.:
Five counts of estafa were filed against the spouses Perlito
(Lito) and Lucrecia (Mona) Gabres and, except for the names
of the private complainants and the amounts involved, the
text in each of the corresponding informations is substantially
the same in all; viz:1
________________
1 Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800.
583
583
People vs. Gabres
The undersigned accuses SPOUSES LITO and LUCRECIA
GABRES also known as MONA GABRES of the crime of Estafa,
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the months of April, 1992 up to July, 1992
and sometime subsequent thereto, at Acop, Municipality of
Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to defraud and by means of deceit
through false representations and pretenses made by them

prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
JOEL PANIDA, by then and there representing themselves as a
duly authorized or licensed recruiters for overseas
employment, when in truth and in fact they were not, thereby
inducing the said person to give to them the sum of FORTYFIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000), Philippine Currency, for
placement abroad, which amount they misappropriated for
their own use and benefit and then either fail or refuse and
continue to fail or refuse to return the same despite repeated
demands, all to the damage and prejudice of said person in
the total sum aforesaid and other consequential damages.
Contrary to Law."2
In addition, the spouses were charged with having engaged
in large scale illegal recruitment; thus:
The undersigned accuses Lito Gabres and Lucrecia Gabres
also known as Mona Gabres of Illegal Recruitment, defined
under par. 1, Art. 38 of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as The Labor Code of the Philippines, and penalized
under Art. 39(b) of the same Code, as amended by P.D. 2018,
That on or about the month of April, 1992 up to July, 1992
and sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of
Tublay, Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
recruit ORETA NISPEROS, TARCISO DACSIG, JULIUS AOAY, JOEL
PANIDA and RONALD MIRABUENO for overseas employment,
by then and there misrepresenting themselves as a duly
authorized or licensed recruiters when
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 4647.
584
584
People vs. Gabres

in truth and in fact they were not and by reason of said
misrepresentations, they were able to obtain from the said
complainants the aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P185,000.00) Philippine Currency, all
to the damage and prejudice of the above-named
complainants in the total aforesaid sum and other
consequential damages.
That such illegal recruitment having been committed by in
large scale, it constitutes economic sabotage.
Contrary to Law."3
The six cases were tried, preceded by the arraignment of the
accused, jointly.
The following version of the case is culled from the evidence
given by the prosecution.
Some time in March of 1992, Oreta Nisperos heard that the
accused couple were recruiting factory workers for abroad.
With great anticipation, Nisperos, accompanied by her son,
Ramil, and her neighbors, Joel Panida and Julius Aoay,4 went
to the residence of the Gabreses in Bauang, La Union. After
the group was introduced by Nisperos cousin, Rosario
Zapanta, the spouses confirmed their being engaged in the
recruitment of factory workers for Korea. A package deal
was reached. Each applicant was to be charged a placement
fee of P45,000.00. The parties agreed to meet again on 12
April 1992 at the Dr. Yares Clinic in Baguio City. On the
appointed date and time, Mona Gabres alone showed up to
meet with the applicants. The latter were joined, in this
meeting, by Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo
Mirabueno, who all promised to also come up with the
required placement fees.
At the respective dates stated below, the accused spouses
received the following amounts from each of the applicants;
thus:
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 47.
4 All residents of Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
585
P5,000.00
585
People vs. Gabres
DATE OF PAYMENT
NAME OF PAYOR
AMOUNT
1. April 26,1992
Oreta Nisperos
P5,000.00
(for Ramil Nisperos)

(No receipt)
4. June 7, 1992
Oreta Nisperos
P5,000.00
(Exh. B'CR No. 1800)

(No receipt)
Joel Panida
P5,000.00
Joel Panida
P5,000.00
(Exh. A'CR No. 1800)
Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.

P5,000.00
Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.

P5,000.00

2. May 1,1992
Julius Aoay
P5,000.00

3. May 5, 1992
Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.
P5,000.00
Julius Aoay
P5,000.00

5, June 10, 1992
Oreta Nisperos
P30,000.00

6. June 17, 1992
Oreta Nisperos
P5,000.00
Oreta Nisperos
(for Joan Nisperos)
(Exh. C'CR No. 1801)

7. June 18, 1992
Oreta Nisperos
P5,000.00
(for Jonard Dulay)
(Exh. D'CR No. 1801)
8, July 3, 1992
Joel Panida
. P35,000.00
(Exh. C'CR No. 1800)

Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.
P25,000.00
(Exh. D'CR No. 1803)

Julius Aoay
P30,000.00
(Exh. C'CR No. 1802)"5

_______________
5 Rollo, pp. 4445.
586
586
People vs. Gabres
On 03 July 1992, the accused spouses assured Ramil
Nisperos, Joan Nisperos, Joel Panida, Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Julius
Aoay, Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo Mirabueno that they could
expect within a few days their departure for abroad. The
promise was not fulfilled. Then, in order to appease the
applicants, the spouses explained that it was only the call of
the Korean employer, Mr. Kim, that was being awaited so as

to firm up the flight schedule. The call never came. After a
series of follow-ups, the applicants were directed by the
spouses to confer with the latters supposed associate in
Manila, one Rebecca (Vicky) Naval, who was said to be
managing the Bachs and Cochs Travel Agency. Naval initially
denied any association with the Gabreses; she later,
however, told the group that she had been engaged by the
spouses to process the travel documents, plane tickets and
flight bookings of the applicants, and that the required visas
were already being applied for.
After several more months of waiting and still getting
nowhere, the applicants finally demanded the return of their
money from the spouses. Each applicant was issued four
checks, each for P10,000.00, but which, when presented for
payment, all bounced.6
The would-be overseas workers sought the assistance of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Cordillera
Administrative Region (POEA-CAR") which certified, through
Atty. Justinian O. Lichnachan, that the accused spouses were
not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment within the City of Baguio or any part of the
region."7 Forthwith, a joint affidavit-complaint was filed with
the Benguet Provincial Prosecutors Office that became the
basis of the criminal informations, aforesaid, against the
Gabreses.8
________________
6 Apparently, though, it was Vicky Naval who issued the
checks (Julius Aoay, TSN, 15 June 1994, pp. 34).
7 Rollo, p. 46.
8 In his resolution, dated 12 August 1993, the investigating
prosecutor recommended the exoneration of Rebecca Naval
on the
587
587
People vs. Gabres
Lito Gabres managed to elude arrest, and the trial proceeded

only against his wife. Mona Gabres pleaded not guilty to
each of the accusations. She denied any involvement in her
husbands activities.
The defense sought to establish that Mona was a mere fish
vendor in Bauang, La Union, and that this work demanded
her full attention. Her husband used to be an overseas
contract worker himself and, thereafter, a liaison officer for
Caro Fran Recruitment Agency, whose job included the
processing and following-up of travel papers with the
Department of Foreign Affairs. In July, 1992, her husband
introduced her to Vicky Naval who requested Mona to
safekeep the collection of placement fees from the
applicants. She admitted having joined her husband, but only
once, in collecting the payments made by private
complainants on 03 July 1992 at Acop, Tublay, Benguet,
which was duly remitted to Naval.
In a decision, dated 14 December 1994, Judge Romeo A.
Brawner9 (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals)
rendered judgment that concluded:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, this Court finds accused
Lucrecia Mona Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to eight (8) years and ten (10) months of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM;
indeter-minate sentence of imprisonment of five 15) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to nine (9) years and ten (10) months of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM;
________________
ground that her liability was purely civil in nature. The

resolution was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor
(Records, p. 13).
9 Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet.
588
588
People vs. Gabres
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to seven (1} years of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of Prision correccional as
MINIMUM to seven (7) years of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;
Lucrecia Mona Gabres NOT GUILTY of the offense charged
due to insufficiency of evidence and hereby acquits her with
proportionate costs de oficio;
the crime charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00).
On the civil liability in the estafa cases, accused Lucrecia
Mona Gabres is hereby ordered to pay to Joel Panida, Oreta
Nisperos, Julius Aoay and Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. the amounts of
P45,000.00, P55,000.00, P40,000.00 and P40,000.00,
respectively, as actual damages.
Proportionate costs against the accused Lucrecia Mona
Gabres.
In the service of her sentence, the accused shall be credited
to the full term of her preventive imprisonment as provided
for by Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, provided the

conditions set forth therein for the enjoyment of the same
have been met.
With respect to accused Perlito Lito Gabres, let these cases
be sent to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon
as he shall have been arrested and brought to the jurisdiction
of this Court.
In order that he may not escape the clutches of the law, let
Warrants of Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Station
Commander, Bauang, La Union and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Manila. Further, the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation
589
589
People vs. Gabres
(CID), Manila is ordered to include the name of accused
Perlito Lito Gabres in its Hold Departure List.
SO ORDERED."10
Mona Gabres appealed the decision to this Court Appellant, in
main, would wish to sway the Court into thinking that the real
culprit was Lito Gabres and that the complaining witnesses
gave stress over her participation only because her husband
could not be apprehended.
The Court, regrettably, must sustain the conviction.
The testimony given by each of the private complainants
unquestionably would point to both the spouses to be the
culprits in an elaborate scheme to defraud the hopeful
applicants for overseas work. The Court quotes from the
transcript of the proceedings.
Testimony of Oreta Nisperos:
ATTY. PAOAD:
Now, Madam witness, you said a while ago that it was the
later part of March, 1992 that you and your cousin went to
see the two accused in Bauang, what transpired then?
A
They told us that they were recruiting factory workers for

Korea.
Q
What else happened?
A
They told us that if my children are interested we will see
each other in Baguio City on April 12.
Q
What was your agreement as to where shall you meet each
other and the date.
A
I suggested that we will see each other at the clinic of Dr.
Yares.
Q
Where is the clinic of Dr. Yares located?
A
It is located at Harrison Road, Baguio City.
Q
On that particular of April 12, 1992 were you able to meet
each other?
A
Yes, maam.
Q
Who were your companions?
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 5354.
590
590
People vs. Gabres
A
My companions were Julius Aoay, Joel Panida and my son
Ramil Nisperos.
Q
Who from the side of the accused came to see you on April
12,1992.
A
Mrs. Mona Gabres, maam.

Q
How about the other accused, Lito Gabres.
A
He was not there, maam.
Q
Now, what transpired on April 12,1992?
A
They told us that if we are interested we will pay an advance
payment of P5,000.00 each.
Q
For each applicant?
A
Yes, maam.
Q
What else did you talk about?
A
They told us that if we have money we will see each other on
April 26.
Q
Where will you see each other on April 26?
A
I told her that we will see at Acop, Tublay because they knew
where we are.
Q
What particular place in Acop?
A
At our residence, sir.
Atty. PAOAD:
Now, how much all in all are the two accused asking you to
pay in consideration of the same in Korea?
A
They were asking P45,000.00.
Q
Now, you said that you agreed to meet each other again on
April 26,1992, what happened on that date?
A
They came at our residence, both of them.
Q
The two accused?
A
Yes, maam.
Q
Now, when the two accused came to your residence on April
26, what happened?
A
My son paid an amount of P5,000.00.
Q
Who particularly paid for your son?
A
I paid for my son, maam.
Q
Aside from you and your son who else were present?
A
Also present were Joel Panida, Tarcisio Dacsig.
Q
How about Julius Aoay?
A
He was also present, maam.
Q
You said a while ago, Madam witness, that on April 26 you
paid P5,000.00 for your son, what is your basis in saying that
you paid P5,000.00 on that day?
A
They issued us a receipt, maam.
591
591
People vs. Gabres
Q
Who received the payment?
A
It was Mona Gabres, maam.
Q
Who issued the receipt?
A
It was Lito Gabres who was making the receipt, maam.

x x x
xxx
x x x.
Q
Now, after April 26,1992 what happened?
A
They told us that they will go back at our residence on May 1
and if the other applicants will have their money at that time
they will process their papers.
Q
Who paid on May 1,1992?
A
Julius Aoay, maam.
ATTY. PAOAD:
Who received the payment?
A
Both the two accused, maam. One will receive the amount
and the other will issue the receipt."11
Testimony of Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.:
Q
Now, to whom did you give this P5,000.00?
A
I handed it to Aunt Oreta who gave it to Mona Gabres,
Maam.
Q
Now, who issued you a receipt?
A
Mona Gabres.
Q
What about her husband Lito Gabres?
A
Aunt Oreta gave the P5,000.00 to Mona Gabres who counted
the money, after counting the money Lito Gabres gave it to
Mona Gabres.
x x x
Q
xxx
x x x.
I would like to show to you this receipt dated July 31, 1992
previously marked as Exhibit B-1' for Crim. Case No. 92-CR1803 and Exhibit I-1' in Crim. Case No. 92C R-1805, is this
the receipt you are referring to?
A
Yes, Maam.
Q
Now, who issued you this receipt?
A
Lito Gabres, Maam.
Q
Now, if this receipt was issued by Lito Gabres what was the
participation of Mona Gabres?
A
I handed this P25,000.00 to Lito Gabres, he counted it and
then handed it to Mona Gabres, Maam."12
________________
11 TSN, 05 April 1994, pp. 611.
12 TSN, 10 May 1994, pp. 56.
592
592
People vs. Gabres
Testimony of Julius Aoay:
Q
I would like to show you a receipt dated June 7, 1992 which
has been previously marked as Exhibit A' in Criminal Case
1801, as Exhibit B' in Criminal Case 1805, as Exhibit B' in
Criminal Case 1800, as Exhibit C' in Criminal Case 1803 and
as Exhibit B' in Criminal Case 1802, is this the receipt issued
to you?
A
Yes, it is.
Q
Could you tell us who wrote this receipt?
A
It was Mona Gabres, maam.
Q
How about Lito Gabres what was his participation?
A
He was the one counting the money."13
In the scheduled meeting on 12 April 1992, it was only
accused-appellant who, in fact, showed up to meet with the
applicants for overseas work. Joel Panida testified:
Q
On April 12,1992 were you present in that meeting?
A
Yes, I was also there, maam.
Q
Who else were present on that day, April 12,1992?
A
Mrs. Nisperos, Tarcisio Dacsig, Ramil Nisperos and Julius Aoay.
Q
Who from the side of the accused came to see you?
A
It was Mona Gabres only, maam.
Q
How about Lito Gabres, was he also present?
A
He was not there, maam.
Q
On April 12,1992 what transpired in that meeting?
A
She introduced herself as a recruiter for workers going to
Korea. She also asked us that if we are interested then we
will give P5,000.00 each as down payment."14
The Court finds it hard to accept the claim that private
complainants have prevaricated the evidence to implicate
Mona Gabres only because the authorities have yet to
succeed in arresting her husband. It is, of course, unfortunate
that the husband, at least momentarily, is able to ward off
the long arm of the law; nevertheless, it should, in the end,
still catch up with him.
________________
13 TSN, 23 May 1994, p. 6.
14 TSN, 26 April 1994, p. 12.

593
593
People vs. Gabres
Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by means of
deceit punishable under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.15 The trial courts brief ratiocination is well
taken; viz:
There is no dispute that damages have been incurred by the
complainants. They parted with their money in consideration
of deployment for work in a foreign country, but which
unfortunately remains unrestituted despite the failure in that
regard of the person or persons who promised that they will
be sent off to work abroad."16
Accused-appellant is likewise guilty of illegal recruitment in
large scale, an offense under Article 38(b), in relation to
Article 39, of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment.(a) Any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or nonholders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and
Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.
"(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or
________________
15 ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
"(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits.
16 Rollo, p. 49.
594
594
People us. Gabres
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the
first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
x x x
xxx
x x x.
ART. 39. Penalties.(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage
as defined herein.
Quite appropriately, the trial court has observed:
"(T)here are two elements of the crime (of illegal
recruitment), namely: (1) that the offender is a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the
offender undertakes any of the recruitment activities defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same
code. (PEOPLE vs. CORAL, G.R. Nos. 9784954, March 1,
1994, 230 SCRA 499). Without any doubt, this Court finds the
two elements of the crime present in the case at bar. That
the accused are nonlicensees or non-holders of authority to
lawfully recruit is evident in the certification issued by Atty.
Justinian Lichnacban of the POEACAR Regional Extension
Office of Baguio City (Exhibit D', 93-CR1800). Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,

utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement. The act of the
accused in holding out a placement fee of P45,000.00 per
applicant in exchange for an employment abroad; the several
collections made by them; and their promise to send off the
applicants for work in Korea were just some of the
circumstances that would qualify the acts of the accused
under the definition of recruitment and placement."17
________________
17 Rollo, p. 52.
595
595
People vs. Gabres
The Court, however, would have to reduce the award of
actual damages to Oreta Nisperos from P55,000.00 to
P50,000.00. Oreta concededly could not present any receipt
for the supposed payments she allegedly made on 26 April
1992 and on 05 May 1992, for P5,000.00 each, on behalf of
Ramil Nisperos. Joel Panida, in his testimony, attested to the
payment made on 26 April 199218 but no similar evidence
was presented to prove the payment made on 05 May 1992.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be;
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,
if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of
the following means.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term
of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the
________________
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case

exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the
matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the
full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law
accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in
favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for
the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional
minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months
while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because the
amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional
one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court thus finds some need to modify in part
of the penalties imposed by the trial court; viz:
________________
18 TSN, 26 April 1994, pp. 1213.

596
19 See Section 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
20 People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549.
21 People vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109.
22 People vs. Joya, 98 Phil. 238.
597
596
People vs. Gabres
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense.19 The penalty next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime.20 The determination of the
minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the
court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided.21 The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence.22

597
People vs. Gabres
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, the amount involved is
P45,000.00. Hence, the minimum penalty should be reduced
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
which is the maximum of the allowable minimum penalty of
the indeterminate sentence. The maximum penalty imposed
by the court a quo is within lawful range.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, the amount involved, as so

modified by this Court, is P50,000.00. The minimum penalty
should then be reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional (the maximum of the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence). The maximum penalty should at
least be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor plus a
period of two (2) years (one [1] year for each additional
P10,000.00) for a total maximum period of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802 and No, 93-CR-1803, the
amounts involved in each total P40,000.00. The minimum
penalty of the indeterminate sentence imposed by the court
a quo of two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional is within lawful range. The maximum
penalty, however, should at least be six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor plus a period of one (1) year for a total
maximum period of seven (7) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
modification only insofar as the penalties therein imposed are
concerned; thus
(1) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
from (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
MINIMUM, to eight (8) years and ten (10) months of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM.
from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM, the actual damages being reduced to
P50,000.00.
598
598
People vs. Gabres
from two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of from two (2)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
All other aspects of the dispositive portion of the decision
appealed from are AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.Illegal recruitment carries with it the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine which varies by degrees in
accordance with the enumeration made in Article 39 of the
Labor Code as amended. (People vs. Cabacang, 246 SCRA
530 [1995]) People vs. Gabres, 267 SCRA 581, G.R. Nos.
11895054 February 6, 1997
G.R. No. 138876. November 24, 1999.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EGMEDIO
LAMPAZA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Affidavits; Well-settled is the rule
that inconsistencies between an affidavit and a testimony do
not necessarily discredit the witness, for affidavits are
generally incomplete and are not considered final
repositories of truth.The
______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
113
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999
113
People vs. Lampaza
conflicts cited by appellant are largely semantical, not
factual, in character. Whether appellant forcibly made her lie
down on the floor or whether he dumped her makes no
substantial difference in appreciating the fact of the crime:
that she was down on the floor against her will. Likewise,
appellant makes too much ado about the discrepancy
between her being pressed forward and her being lifted;
the allegedly conflicting statements equally mean that he
forced her to go to the nipa hut. Moreover, the well-settled
rule is that inconsistencies between an affidavit and a
testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness, for
affidavits are generally incomplete and are not considered
final repositories of truth.
Same; Rape; The law does not impose upon a rape victim the
burden of proving resistance.Appellant further argues that
if there was any resistance [by the victim], it was couched in
general terms. The argument is bereft of merit. We must
stress that the law does not impose upon a rape victim the
burden of proving resistance. Indeed, physical resistance
need not be established when the culprit employed
intimidation, which, insofar as it was directed at the mind of
the victim, must be viewed in the light of the latters
perception and judgment at the time. In the present case, the
victim was terrified because the threat of the appellant to kill

her was substantiated by the bolo he placed beside her.
Furthermore, she could not have successfully resisted
because, according to her, he was husky and strong.
Same; Same; The fact that the victim has no visible signs of
injury does not by itself disprove rape.Neither are we
persuaded by his contention that complainant did not
undergo medical examination to show signs of physical
struggle or assault. The fact that the victim had no visible
signs of injury did not by itself disprove rape. We reiterate
that she was too intimidated to offer serious resistance to the
advances of appellant. More important, no law requires a
medical examination for the successful prosecution of rape.
Even without a medical report, the rape victims credible
testimony, standing alone, is a sufficient basis for conviction.
In the present case, we find no reason to disbelieve her
testimony. Time and time again, the Court has held that no
woman in her right mind would declare to the whole world
that she was raped and subject herself to the concomitant
strain and stigma, unless she is telling the truth. For his part,
appellant failed to adduce any evidence to show that the
victims testimony was false.
114
114
People vs. Lampaza
Same; Same; Sweetheart Theory; The sweetheart
defense cannot be given credence in the absence of
corroborative proof like love notes, mementoes, pictures or
tokenslove is not a license to rape.Other than his bare
assertions, appellant adduced no independent proof that he
was the sweetheart of the victim. His defense was neither
corroborated by any other witness nor substantiated by any
memento, love note, picture or token. Furthermore, even
assuming that the two were lovers, their relationship did not
give him a license to sexually assault her.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Indicative of an unrehearsed
testimony, slight contradictions even serve to strengthen a
witness credibility.Appellant contends that the prosecution

witnesses should not be accorded credence because their
testimonies were replete with inconsistencies and
incredibilities. In addition to the instances alluded to
earlier, appellant cites the following: the victim testified that
she shouted, although she said in her Sworn Statement that
she had not done so; she allegedly told her husband of the
rape on the evening of the fateful day, but her husband
testified that he did not return home until the afternoon of
the following day. We are not persuaded. The aforecited
inconsistencies are minor in character and, as such, do not
impugn the credibility of the complainant. Indicative of an
unrehearsed testimony, the slight contradictions even serve
to strengthen her credibility. Indeed, the Court cannot expect
a rape victim to remember every ugly detail of the sexual
assault.
Same; Same; Same; There is no code of conduct prescribing
the correct reaction of a rape victim to the sexual assault.
Complainants testimony was not weakened by her failure to
immediately narrate the incident to her nephew or to her
husband. There is no code of conduct prescribing the correct
reaction of a rape victim to the sexual assault. When placed
under a great deal of emotional stress, the workings of the
human mind are unpredictable. Some may immediately relay
the incident to authorities and close relatives, but others
need time to compose themselves before deciding on a
course of action. Although she did not immediately inform
her nephew about the incident, she told her husband about it
after he arrived from another town, when they were about to
sleep. That same night, she and her husband decided to
report the outrage to the authorities. In this light, her account
is far from incredible. Even assuming that there was a delay
in reporting the incident to the police, this fact is not
necessarily an indication of fabrication.
115
Same; Same; Penalties; The Indeterminate Sentence Law

does not apply when the offense involved is punishable with
reclusion perpetua.Under the law in effect when the crime
was committed, the penalty for simple rape was reclusion
perpetua. In imposing a lower indeterminate penalty, the trial
court erred, because the Indeterminate Sentence Law does
not apply when the offense involved is punishable with
reclusion perpetua.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

115
People vs. Lampaza
116
People vs. Lampaza

Cezar R. Tajanlangit for accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The medical examination of a victim is not a requisite for the
successful prosecution of rape. Even without a medical
report, a court may convict an accused based on the
offended partys credible testimony. The sweetheart
defense cannot be given credence in the absence of
corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures or
tokens. Love is not a license to rape.
The Case
Egmedio Lampaza appeals the March 14, 1994 Decision1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique (Branch
10)2 in Criminal Case No. 3692, finding him guilty of rape.
____________________
1 Although the Decision is dated March 14, 1994, it was
promulgated only on May 31, 1994. (See Order of the trial
court, dated May 31, 1994, Records, pp. 171-172.)
2 Assisting Judge Marvie R. Abraham Singson wrote the
assailed Decision, but it was Judge Pedro Icamina who heard
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
116
In an Information dated May 25, 1988 and at the instance of

the offended party, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Juan C.
Mission, Jr. charged appellant as follows:3
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1988, in the
Municipality of Tobias Fornier, Province of Antique, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, through
intimidation, violence and force and with the use of a deadly
weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with Teodora Wacay
without and against the consent of the offended party.
With the assistance of Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, appellant entered
a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 9, 1988.4 Trial
proceeded in due course. Thereafter, the trial court
promulgated its assailed Decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:5
WHEREFORE, in the light of the above facts, law and
jurisprudence, after the prosecution has presented thorough
and convincing evidence, the Court finds accused EGMEDIO
LAMPAZA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
RAPE and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
period of Twelve (12) Years and one (1) Day to Fourteen (14)
Years and Eight (8) Months as minimum to Seventeen (17)
Years and Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Twenty (20)
Years as maximum and to indemnify Teodora Wacay [in] the
amount of P30,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
On June 1, 1994, appellant, through Counsel Cezar C.
Tajanlangit, filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA).6 After the defense and the prosecution filed their
respec__________________
3 Records, p. 1.
4 Records, p. 25.
5 RTC Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 16-17.
6 Records, p. 173.
117

117
People vs. Lampaza
tive Briefs, the appellate court7 rendered a Decision affirming
the conviction of appellant, but modifying the penalty to
reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:8
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant EGMEDIO LAMPAZA is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay complainant Teodora Wacay the amount of P50,000.00
for moral damages.
In the light of Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court,9 the
CA recalled the entry of the above judgment, certified the
case to this Court and elevated the records.10
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,11 the Office of the Solicitor General adopted the
following facts as summarized by the trial court:12
____________________
7 Tenth Division, composed of J. Ruben T. Reyes, ponente; J.
Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. (chairman) and J. Hilarion L.
Aquino (member), both concurring.
8 CA Decision, p. 17; rollo, p. 133.
9 It provides that [w]henever the Court of Appeals should be
of the opinion that the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
higher should be imposed in a case, the Court, after
discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render
judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
higher as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the
records thereof to the Supreme Court.
10 Records, p. 140. In a Resolution dated July 19, 1999, this
Court informed appellant that he may file a SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF, if he so desires, within 30 days from notice. Because
appellant did not do so, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed by the parties

before the Court of Appeals.
11 Signed by Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M. CabotajeTang and Associate Solicitor Ma. Zorayda V. Tejones.
12 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 3-6; rollo, pp. 86-89.
118
118
People vs. Lampaza
The first witness presented was a college student who is the
nephew of the private offended party, who went to the house
of the latter on March 20, 1988, without finding her there.
Witness looked for Teodora, proceeding to the place where
farm animals are grazed, which was two hills away. (pp. 2-4,
TSN, September 27, 1989)
Witness saw [his] aunt running out [of] one of the nipa huts
in the farm. When [his] aunt reached him, she was sobbing
and very pale. She immediately asked him to accompany her
back to her house. His aunt explained to him that she ha[d]
to leave that place immediately because she was afraid of
somebody and therefore could not stay in Sitio Namontonan,
Brgy. Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique. (pp. 5-7, TSN,
Ibid.)
During cross examination, defense counsel verified the
details regarding the testimony under direct-examination of
this witness, as to the reason witness was in that sitio (p. 8,
TSN, id.), the distance between the house and the grazing
area of the farm animals, the location of the nipa hut and
other details. (p. 9, TSN, id.)
Witness repeated to the Court that [his] aunt was very afraid
when he met her running out of the nipa hut although she did
not tell him yet what happened. That [his] aunt was
trembling, very pale and looking very weak. (p. 10, TSN, id.)
The private offended party herself testified, and positively
identified accused in open court. (p. 18, TSN, id.) That in the
morning of March 20, 1988 she was in her farm lot in Sitio
Namontonan, Barangay Camandagan, Tobias Fornier,
Antique. When she was about to graze their animals, all of a
sudden accused came from behind her and twisted both her
arms. Then accused lifted her and brought her to a nipa hut
which was uninhabited. Victim struggled to set herself free,
to no avail despite kicking, shouting and struggling to be free
from the hold of the accused. (pp. 18-23, TSN, id.)
Accused dropped [the] victim to the floor of the nipa hut;
pinned both her legs including her right hand with [his] knees
[and took] off his pants. The accused ha[d] his bolo beside
him with which he threatened the victim. Victim testified that
accused raped her then, explaining in detail the commission
of the said act. (pp. 23-29, TSN, id.)
Witness informed her husband and her mother about the
rape that evening. (pp. 31-32, TSN, id.)
During cross-examination, defense counsel tried to impeach
the testimony of the witness by eliciting the information that
accused and victim were close neighbors; that during the
incident
119
119
People vs. Lampaza
private offended party passed by accused who was cutting
bamboo poles, on her way to the grazing area of the farm lot.
(pp. 3-4, TSN, November 7, 1989) She described again the
force and intimidation emanating from the accused in
committing the act complained of. Private offended party
informed the Court of the great fear she felt that she was
trembling and almost speechless when the incident
happened. (pp. 5-7; 11-22, TSN, Ibid.)
Witness was never attracted to the accused as she testified
on cross[-]examination. (p. 19, TSN, id.)
When queried by the Court as to the length of the sexual
intercourse she stated that it lasted only three minutes,
although the acts of force, intimidation and the struggle
lasted for more than ten minutes. (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.)
During the hearing of January 4, 1990, prosecution
presented another witness in the person of the husband of
the offended party (p. 32), who testified that the latter
informed him about her being raped by the accused; that

[he] wanted to kill the accused but he was prevailed upon by
his wife and decided to file a case in Court, hence the
criminal complaint (p. 34). Witness was in another town
during the incident: that he returned to his house in the
afternoon of the following day, when his wife informed him of
the incident. (pp. 32-34)
They went to the police authorities the following day and
filed their formal complaint, contained in a sworn statement.
(pp. 34-38, TSN, id.)
Version of the Defense
Insisting that appellant and complainant were sweethearts,
the defense presents the following version of the facts:13
The defenses version of the case is as follows: Accused
Egmedio Lampaza and complainant Teodora Wacay are
neighbors. They have known each other since childhood.
Accused courted complainant who later became his girlfriend.
However, they married different persons, but that
notwithstanding, they have had intimate relations.
__________________
13 Appellants Brief, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 51-52. The Brief was
signed by Atty. Cezar R. Tajanlangit.
120
120
People vs. Lampaza
In the morning of 20 March 1988, accused heard a signal
from complainant. The latter informed him that her husband
was in another town, and when he asked her what now
because your husband is not there, complainant just
laughed. Complainant told accused that she was going to
fetch her carabao, so he followed her. When he reached the
place where she was, he put his arms around her, but she
brushed them aside, apprehensive that they might be seen.
Complainant went up the nipa hut, the same place where
they had had sexual intercourse, and made love again, with
complainant taking off her clothes first, followed by accused
taking off his pants and shirt. They made love consensually.
He did not threaten complainant; neither did he use force [or]
violence in consummating the sexual act because the same
was with the consent of complainant (t.s.n., August 6, 1991).
Filomena Lampaza, the lawfully-wedded wife of the accused,
testified that complainant is the mistress of her husband, the
accused. Because of her husbands extra-marital relationship,
they were always quarreling. To avoid further trouble she
went to Iloilo to work as a housemaid for Judge Amelia K. Del
Rosario (pp. 49-50, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1991). The latter testified
that Filomena had worked for her family as a housemaid, and
during the course of her employment she had confided to her
employer that her (Filomenas) husband was maltreating her
and ha[d] a querida (t.s.n., Jan. 30, 1992).
Ruling of the RTC and the CA
Debunking the claim that the sexual intercourse was
consensual, the trial court held that appellant used force
against the victim by twisting her arm and bodily lifting her
from the farm lot to the nipa hut. He also threatened and
intimidated her by placing a bolo beside her during the actual
rape. The trial court ruled:14
Our assessment and appraisal of the facts of the case show
that there was force committed on the victim when her arms
were twisted and she was bodily lifted from the farm lot to
the nipa hut. She was intimidated or there was a threat to
intimidate her, when the bolo was placed beside her during
the rape.
___________________
14 RTC Decision, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 15-16.
121
121
People vs. Lampaza
This court finds that the incident complained of which
occurred on March 20, 1988 was x x x done without the
consent [or] approval of the victim.
We do not see any reason why Teodora Wacay related the

incident to her husband the following evening, if indeed the
rape was not committed because the husband was out of
town then. Much more, that she went to court. In People vs.
Estolano, 193 SCRA 383, the Supreme Court held that
complainant would not have made the offense subject and
endured the ordeal of testifying to all its gory detail if she had
not in fact been raped.
Affirming appellants conviction, the Court of Appeals
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua and increased the
moral damages to P50,000.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant contends that the trial court committed the
following errors:15
I
x x x [I]n holding that accused-appellant used force and
intimidation on complainant in order to consummate the
sexual act
II
x x x [I]n holding that the sexual intercourse herein
complained of was done without the consent [or] approval of
the victim
III
x x x [I]n finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape based on the inconsistencies, contradictions,
and incredibilities palpably apparent in complainants
testimony and in [the testimonies] of her witnesses
In resolving this appeal, we shall address seriatim the three
grounds raised by appellant.
___________________
15 Appellants Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 47.
122
122
People vs. Lampaza

The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Force and Intimidation
Appellant contends that rape was not proven because force
and intimidation were not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Specifically, he argues that the testimony of the victim
on this point should be rejected, because it conflicted with
her Sworn Statement given during the preliminary
investigation. First, in her statement she averred that he
pressed [her] forward towards the nipa hut; but she testified
that he lifted her. Second, she declared in her statement
that he forcibly made [her] lie down, but she testified that
he dump[ed] [her] on the floor. Third, she also stated that
appellants bolo was tucked to his side, but she testified that
it was placed beside her.16
We are not convinced. The conflicts cited by appellant are
largely semantical, not factual, in character. Whether
appellant forcibly made her lie down on the floor or whether
he dumped her makes no substantial difference in
appreciating the fact of the crime: that she was down on the
floor against her will. Likewise, appellant makes too much
ado about the discrepancy between her being pressed
forward and her being lifted; the allegedly conflicting
statements equally mean that he forced her to go to the nipa
hut. Moreover, the well-settled rule is that inconsistencies
between an affidavit and a testimony do not necessarily
discredit the witness, for affidavits are generally
incomplete17 and are not considered final repositories of
truth.18
__________________
16 Appellants Brief, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 55-56.
17 People v. Padao, 267 SCRA 64, January 28, 1997;
Sumalpong v. CA, 268 SCRA 764, February 26, 1997.
18 People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, April 18, 1997; People
v. Pontilar, 275 SCRA 338, July 11, 1997.
123

123
People vs. Lampaza
In any event, we agree with the trial court that appellant
used force and intimidation in ravaging complainant.
Although its factual findings are not absolutely binding on
this Court because it was not the ponente who heard the
prosecution witnesses,19 we believe and so hold that the
totality of the evidence presented indubitably demonstrates
that appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant
against her will. He twisted the arms of the terrified victim,
forced her to go inside the uninhabited nipa hut, placed the
bolo beside her, and threatened to kill her in order to sate his
lust. The victim testified as follows:20
Q.
Now, while you were untying the rope of your carabao, do
you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
What was that incident?
A.
All of a sudden, a person came from behind me and twisted
both my hands. (Witness demonstrated with her right hand
twisted towards the left side of her body while the left hand
was also twisted towards the right side of her body, both
hands in front).
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
Now, after the accused Egmedio Lampaza twisted your arms,
what else happened?
A.
He lifted me.
Q.
Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you
were lifted by Egmedio Lampaza?
A.
(With Julie Magbanua acting in place of the victim and the

witness in place of the accused, the accused stands behind
the victim and place[s] both arms around the victim while the
arms of the victim are twisted with the right arms towards
the left and the left arms towards the right side of her body
and from that position the accused lifts the victim upward,
raising the victim about three inches from the ground.)
_________________
19 See footnote no. 2.
20 TSN, September 27, 1989, pp. 19-26.
124
124
People vs. Lampaza
Q.
Now, Madam Witness, while you were being lifted by the
accused in the position you have just mentioned, what else
did he do?
A.
Egmedio Lampaza told me, Come, lets have sexual
intercourse.
Q.
While saying that and while lifting you, what else did
Egmedio Lampaza do, if any?
A.
He brought me to the nipa hut, Sir.
Q.
How far is that nipa hut from where you were at that time?
A.
About five arms stretch away, Sir.
Q.
Was that hut inhabited?
A.
No one lives there.
xxx
Q.
xxx
xxx
While you were being lifted by the accused and being carried
to the nipa hut, what did you do if you did anything?
A.
I struggled to set myself free.
Q.
Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you
struggled?
A.
(At this juncture, Julie Magbanua takes the place of the
accused while the witness takes the place of the victim and
from the position previously described, with the x x x arms
[of the accused] around the victim, the victim struggle[s] to
set herself free by moving her body towards the left and right
and trie[s] to push her head downward away from the arms
of the accused [who is] embracing her. The witness further
states that since her feet were off the ground, it [was] hard to
set herself free).
Q.
Now, aside from struggling hard to free yourself from the
clutches of the accused, what else did you do if any?
A.
I kicked both my legs. (Witness demonstrates a movement as
if she were pedalling an unseen bicycle).
Q.
Did you make any statement while you were trying to
struggle from the hold of the accused?
A.
I did not say anything. I only struggled.
Q.
Why did you not say anything?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A.
Because I was afraid, Sir.
125
125
People vs. Lampaza
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q.
Was the accused able to reach the nipa hut with you?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
While you were already at the nipa hut, what did the accused
do, if any?
A.
He dumped me on the floor of the nipa hut.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
After the accused dumped you on the floor of the nipa hut,
what happened to you?
A.
The accused pinned both my legs as well as my right hand,
Sir, with both of his knees.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q.
Now, Madam Witness, while in this position, what next did
the accused do?
A.
The accused took off his pants.
Q.
While the accused was doing that, was the accused saying
anything?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
What did he say?
A.
If you do not allow me to have sexual intercourse with you, I
am going to kill you.
Q.
Did you notice if there was any weapon carried by the
accused with him?
A.
Yes, Sir.
Q.
What was he carrying?
A.
He was carrying a bolo, Sir.
Q.
Where was the bolo of the accused at that time?
A.
It was beside me, Sir.
Appellant further argues that if there was any resistance [by
the victim], it was couched in general terms.21 The
argument is bereft of merit. We must stress that the law does
not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving
resistance.22 Indeed, physical resistance need not be
established when the
____________________
22 People v. Penero, 276 SCRA 564, July 31, 1997.
126
126
People vs. Lampaza
culprit employed intimidation,23 which, insofar as it was
directed at the mind of the victim, must be viewed in the
light of the latters perception and judgment at the time.24 In
the present case, the victim was terrified because the threat
of the appellant to kill her was substantiated by the bolo he
placed beside her. Furthermore, she could not have
successfully resisted because, according to her, he was husky
and strong.
Neither are we persuaded by his contention that complainant
did not undergo medical examination to show signs of
physical struggle or assault.25 The fact that the victim had
no visible signs of injury did not by itself disprove rape.26 We
reiterate that she was too intimidated to offer serious
resistance to the advances of appellant.
More important, no law requires a medical examination for

the successful prosecution of rape.27 Even without a medical
report, the rape victims credible testimony, standing alone,
is a sufficient basis for conviction.28 In the present case, we
find no reason to disbelieve her testimony. Time and time
again, the Court has held that no woman in her right mind
would declare to the whole world that she was raped and
subject herself to the concomitant strain and stigma, unless
she is
___________________
23 People v. Rabosa, 273 SCRA 142, June 9, 1997; People v.
Gaban, 262 SCRA 593, September 30, 1996.
24 People v. Oarga, 259 SCRA 90, July 17, 1996; People v.
Gumagob, 265 SCRA 84, November 28, 1996; People v.
Corea, 269 SCRA 76, March 3, 1997.
26 People v. Querida, 229 SCRA 745, February 7, 1994;
People v. Sabellina, 238 SCRA 492, December 1, 1994; People
v. Arnan, 224 SCRA 37; June 30, 1993.
27 People v. Julian, 270 SCRA 733, April 4, 1997; People v.
Manaay, 151 SCRA 31, June 18, 1987.
28 People v. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55, July 5, 1996. See also
People v. De la Cruz, 224 SCRA 506, July 6, 1993; People v.
Godines, 196 SCRA 765, May 7, 1991.
127
127
People vs. Lampaza
telling the truth.29 For his part, appellant failed to adduce
any evidence to show that the victims testimony was false.
Second Issue:
Sweetheart Theory
Appellant admits that he had sexual intercourse with the
complainant that fateful day, but argues that they were
lovers and the act was consensual.30 He adds that their
respective marriages to different persons had not prevented
them from engaging in sexual dalliances with each other.
We are not persuaded. Other than his bare assertions,

appellant adduced no independent proof that he was the
sweetheart of the victim. His defense was neither
corroborated by any other witness nor substantiated by any
memento, love note, picture or token.31 Furthermore, even
assuming that the two were lovers, their relationship did not
give him a license to sexually assault her.32
Appellants defense is further negated by the behavior of the
victim who, according to Rogelio Sumbilon, was running out
of the crime scene sobbing and very pale33 immediately
after the commission of the crime. Elaborating during crossexamination, he said that the victim was in a hurry, as if she
was afraid of something and as if somebody was running
after her.34 When they reached her house, she told him that
she was afraid and that they should hurry to her mothers
house
____________________
29 People v. Cabaluna, 264 SCRA 596, November 21, 1996;
People v. De Guzman, 265 SCRA 228, December 2, 1996.
30 Appellants Brief, pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 57-58.
31 See People v. Acabo, 259 SCRA 75, July 17, 1996.
32 People v. Buendia, G.R. Nos. 133949-51, 314 SCRA 655,
September 16, 1999; People v. Travero, 276 SCRA 301, July
28, 1997; People v. Laray, 253 SCRA 654, 662-663, February
20, 1996; People v. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82, 110, February 23,
1996.
33 TSN, September 27, 1989, p. 5.
34 Ibid., p. 10.
128
128
People vs. Lampaza
about three or four kilometers away. Her conduct clearly
belied appellants claim that the sexual act was consensual.
Third Issue:
Alleged Inconsistencies and Incredibilities
Appellant contends that the prosecution witnesses should not

be accorded credence because their testimonies were replete
with inconsistencies and incredibilities. In addition to the
instances alluded to earlier, appellant cites the following: the
victim testified that she shouted, although she said in her
Sworn Statement that she had not done so; she allegedly told
her husband of the rape on the evening of the fateful day,
but her husband testified that he did not return home until
the afternoon of the following day.35
We are not persuaded. The aforecited inconsistencies are
minor in character and, as such, do not impugn the credibility
of the complainant. Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony,
the slight contradictions even serve to strengthen her
credibility.36 Indeed, the Court cannot expect a rape victim
to remember every ugly detail of the sexual assault.37
Equally unconvincing is the alleged physical impossibility of
the victims narration that he was allegedly pinning her down
with both his hands while taking off his shirt at the same
time.38 The alleged impossibility does not imply the falsity of
her testimony; it only means that it was impossible for her to
remember the minutiae of appellants act.
Appellant also challenges the plausibility of the following
assertions of the victim: (a) she made no mention of the rape
____________________
36 People v. Letigio, 268 SCRA 227, February 13, 1997;
People v. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305, January 16, 1997; People
v. Devilleres, 269 SCRA 716, March 14, 1997; People v.
Butron, 272 SCRA 352, May 7, 1997; People v. Patawaran,
274 SCRA 130, June 19, 1997.
37 People v. Alas, 274 SCRA 310, June 19, 1997; People v.
Sagucio, 277 SCRA 183, August 11, 1997.
38 Appellants Brief, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 60a-61.
129
129
People vs. Lampaza
to her nephew when she saw him right after the incident;39
(b) she did not immediately tell her husband that she had
been raped;40 (c) she did not report the outrage to the police
or to the barangay officials.41
These arguments are puerile. Complainants testimony was
not weakened by her failure to immediately narrate the
incident to her nephew or to her husband. There is no code of
conduct prescribing the correct reaction of a rape victim to
the sexual assault. When placed under a great deal of
emotional stress, the workings of the human mind are
unpredictable.42 Some may immediately relay the incident
to authorities and close relatives, but others need time to
compose themselves before deciding on a course of
action.43 Although she did not immediately inform her
nephew about the incident, she told her husband about it
after he arrived from another town, when they were about to
sleep. That same night, she and her husband decided to
report the outrage to the authorities. In this light, her account
is far from incredible. Even assuming that there was a delay
in reporting the incident to the police, this fact is not
necessarily an indication of fabrication.44
Crime and Punishment
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is
committed when carnal knowledge of a woman is obtained
under any of the following circumstances: (1) force or
intimidation is used, (2) the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (3) the woman is under twelve
years of
_____________________
39 Ibid., p. 14; rollo, p. 60.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 17; rollo, p. 62.
42 People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713, April 4, 1997; People v.
San Juan, 270 SCRA 693, April 4, 1997; People v. Cabel, 282
SCRA 410, December 14, 1995.
43 People v. Malunes, 247 SCRA 317, August 14, 1995;
People v. Roncal, 272 SCRA 242, May 6, 1997.
44 People v. Julian, 270 SCRA 733, April 4, 1997; People v.

Quitoriano, 266 SCRA 373, 378, January 20, 1997.
130
130
People vs. Lampaza
age or is demented. Herein appellant does not deny that he
had carnal knowledge of the victim. Moreover, the totality of
the evidence presented shows that he employed force and
intimidation against her. Clearly, his conviction of rape should
be affirmed.
Under the law in effect when the crime was committed, the
penalty for simple rape was reclusion perpetua. In imposing a
lower indeterminate penalty, the trial court erred, because
the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the
offense involved is punishable with reclusion perpetua.
Likewise, appellant should be ordered to pay the victim
P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, in line with existing
jurisprudence.45 We agree with the Court of Appeals that he
should also be ordered to pay P50,000 as moral damages.
The Court has held that the fact that complainant has
suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages is
too obvious to still require the victims recital thereof at the
trial x x x.46
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the appellant shall
pay the victim P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto in addition to
the P50,000 awarded as moral damages. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Assailed decision affirmed with modification.
___________________
45 People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998;

People v. Betonio, 279 SCRA 532, September 26, 1997;
People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441, July 14, 1997.
46 People v. Ignacio, 294 SCRA 542, August 24, 1998, per
Romero, J. See also People v. Vergel, G.R. No. 128813, 316
SCRA 199, October 4, 1999.
131
131
Hold Departure Order Issued by Judge Felipe M. Abalos,
MTCC-Br. 1, Dipolog City in Crim. Cases Nos. 15521 & 15522
Notes.Love is not a license for carnal intercourse through
force or intimidation. (People vs. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82
[1996])
The absence of love notes, mementoes or pictures casts
doubt on the accuseds claim that he and the victim were
sweethearts. (People vs. Laray, 253 SCRA 654 [1996])
o0o People vs. Lampaza, 319 SCRA 112, G.R. No.
138876 November 24, 1999
G.R. Nos. 130634-35. March 12, 2001.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANOLITO
OYANIB y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Husband and Wife; Adultery; Death Under
Exceptional Circumstances; Exempting Circumstances; Words
and Phrases; An absolutory cause is present where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment there is no penalty imposed.At the outset,
accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He
invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as an
absolutory and an exempting cause. An absolutory cause is
present Svhere the act committed is a crime but for reasons
of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements; The death caused must
be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
nccused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity
the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with her
flagrant adultery.Having admitted the killing, it is
incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be
relieved of any criminal liability Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for
such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them
in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or
daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse. Accused must prove these
elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise his
defense would be untenable. The death caused must be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused
after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply
put, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with
her flagrant adultery.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law imposes very stringent
requirements before affording the offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal
Codeit must be resorted to only with great caution so much
so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the

sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.The law
imposes very stringent requirements before affording the
offended spouse the opportunity to
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
197
VOL. 354, MARCH 9, 2001
197
People vs. Oyanib
avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court
put it in People v. Wagas: The vindication of a Mans honor is
justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates;
the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to
chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as
a purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when
the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto, and it
must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that
the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Lanao del Norte, Br. 2.
Generalao Law Office for accused-appellant.
PARDO, J.:
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint
decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty2 of
six (6) months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to eight
(8) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay
P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the death of
Jesus Esquierdo, and to reclusion perpetua, to pay
P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T.
Oyanib.4
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V.
Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2)
separate
_______________
1 In Criminal Cases Nos. 11-6012 and 11-6018, Judge Maximo
B. Ratunil, presiding. Rollo, pp. 18-29.
2 Regretfully, the trial court judge did not know how to apply
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. He imposed indefinite
minimum and maximum penalties He must impose a specific
penalty in both the minimum and maximum periods (Cf.
People v. Herbias, 333 Phil. 422; 265 SCRA 571 [1996]).
3 In Criminal Case No. 11-6012.
4 In Criminal Case No. 11-6018.
198
198
People vs. Oyanib
informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
with murder and parricide, as follows:
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit:
a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill
and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby
inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised

Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances (sic) of
evident premeditation.5
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Court, the said accused, having conceived and (sic)
deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a
result of said attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code.6
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary
liberty of accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to
the police authorities7 and was immediately detained at the
Iligan City Jail.8
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 11.
6 Rollo, p. 9.
7 Criminal Case No. 11-6018, RTC Record, p. 85.
8 Ibid., p. 14.
199
VOL. 354, MARCH 9, 2001
199
People vs. Oyanib
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the informations
against him said translating them into the Visayan dialect.9
He pleaded not guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the
trial court conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and
Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on February 3,
197910 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They
lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita
separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2)
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house
of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place
where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while
Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the sala located
at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan,
Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second
floor rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise, lasted for
quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs
to check.11
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and
sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus
Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latters
stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When
Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told
Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police.
Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She
died on the way to the hospital.12
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation
Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion,
Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of
September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an
information regarding a stab_______________
9 Ibid., p. 39.
10 TSN, April 17, 1996, p. 13.
11 TSN, April 10, 1996, p. 6.
12 Ibid., pp. 7-10.
200
200
People vs. Oyanib
bing incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan,

Iligan City.13
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus
lying face up with several stab wounds in different parts of
the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the
crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr.
Uy Hospital to check on Tita; he was informed that she was
dead. Manolito was the suspect in the killing of Jesus and
Tita.14 The incident was recorded in the police blotter as
Entry No. 137138.15
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, MedicoLegal Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus and
Tita.16 Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those
inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were
fatal.17 The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and
multiple stab wound chest and abdomen.18
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal
wounds inflicted in the left chest and right side of the
abdomen. The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock and multiple stab wound.19
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of
arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately.
Manolito retained custody of their two (2) children.
Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend
Merlyns house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she
transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G.
Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.20 The
rented space consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining
room. It was arranged in a manner that if one enters the
main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and
from the sala directly to the door of the adjoining room.
_______________
13
14
15
16
17
TSN, April 17, 1996, pp. 3-4.

Ibid., pp. 5-9.
TSN, April 18, 1996, p. 3.
TSN, April 17, 1996, p. 25.
Ibid., p. 17.
18 Ibid., p. 20.
19 Criminal Case No. 11-6018, RTC Record, Exhibit E, p. 6.
20 TSN, March 6, 1997, pp. 11-18.
201
VOL. 354, MARCH 12, 2001
201
People vs. Oyanib
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and
exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito.21 In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One
time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy.
Tambacan, Iligan City.22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus
about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she
was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even
threatened to kill him.23
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his
daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius
failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting
at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning
until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to
Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his
behalf.24
Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of
romance (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the
door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and
Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and
his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek.
Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 59
in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the
assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down.
Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed
Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito,
only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit
Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting kill

him Jake, kill him Jake.25
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the
abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again.
Mean_______________
21 Ibid., p. 16.
22 Ibid., p. 49.
23 Rollo, p. 52.
24 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
25 Ibid., pp. 24-28.
202
202
People vs. Oyanib
while, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken
Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in
the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in
different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of
her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of
the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor
and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told
Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to
Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his
friends neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in
stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the
morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway
to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in
Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for
him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to
the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.26
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his
wifes place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense.
Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and
her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could
live together.27
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a

joint decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements and having carefully observed the
demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused
MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and
Parricide (Crim. Case No. II-6018) and appreciating the two
(2) mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and
voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstances
to consider, this Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
_______________
26 TSN, March 6, 1997, pp. 30-35.
27 Ibid., pp. 32, 45-46.
203
VOL. 354, MARCH 12, 2001
203
People vs. Oyanib
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS
ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6) YEARS
ONE (1) DAY TO EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify
heirs of Jesus Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and to pay the costs.
2) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No.
7659; to indemnify heirs of his wife P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and to pay the costs.
It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is
subject to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed in Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive
imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge28
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court
to the Supreme Court.29
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them
both under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to
the basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the
exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.30 He questioned the trial courts appreciation of the
facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored and
overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the
defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless
body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph
graphically showed that Jesus pants were wide open,
unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing
any underwear, lending credence
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 18-29, at p. 29.
29 Criminal Case No. II-6081, RTC Record, p. 112.
30 Rollo, pp. 56-57.
204
204
People vs. Oyanib
to his defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor
General submitted that accused-appellant failed to discharge
the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that
he killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the trial court did not err in denying him the
exempting privilege under the Article.31
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her

paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An absolutory
cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for
reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed. 32
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to
prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following
essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter;
and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.33 Accused
must prove these elements by clear and convincing
evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. The
death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in
the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of
his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery.34
There is no question that the first element is present in the
case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly
prove to the
_______________
31 Ibid., pp. 125-126.
32 People v. Talisic, 344 Phil. 51, 59; 278 SCRA 517 [1997].
33 People v. Wagas, 171 SCRA 69, 73 [1989]; People v. Talisic,
supra, Note 32, at p. 60; citing People v. Gelaver, 223 SCRA
310, 313-314 [1993].
34 People v. Wagas, supra, Note 33, at p. 73.
205
VOL. 354, MARCH 12, 2001
205
People vs. Oyanib
court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and
the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have
acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant
surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual
intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that
accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw
his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse.
Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his
wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support
of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the
police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording
the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of
Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People
v. Wagas:35
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the
scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so
severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful
spouse is caught in flagrante delicto, and it must be resorted
to only with great caution so much so that the law requires
that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal
Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4)
months of des_______________
35 People v. Wagas, supra, Note 33, at p. 74.
206
206
People vs. Oyanib
tierro.36 He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor
within a radius, of one hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan
City.37
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed.
Notes.American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes
in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. (Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA
653 [1989])
Under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, the killing of the
wife by the husband (or vice versa) is justified if the husband
kills her while engaged in sexual intercourse with another
man or immediately thereafter. (People vs. Cabalhin, 231
SCRA 486 [1994])
The kind of attitude of a husband allegedly merely standing
still and endure the illicit sexual congress between his wife
and her supposed paramour from beginning to end, and of
just going after his wifes lover when the latter is through
with his lovemaking and only after he would have put on his
clothes and started to flee, defies human naturetruly, there
is no real test of truth in the testimony of a witness except
gauge it consonantly with human knowledge, observation,
and experience. (People vs. Velasco, 351 SCRA 539 [2001])
People vs. Oyanib, 354 SCRA 196, G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March
12, 2001
[No. 38332. December 14, 1933]

appellee, vs. VALERIANO DUCOSIN, defendant and appellant.
1.INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, CONSTRUED; MAXIMUM
AND MlNIMUM PENALTIES.Under section 1 of Act No. 4103
the court must, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine
two penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act
as the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must' serve
the minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under
the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period
between the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate
in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said
Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part.
He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a
period which is not more than the "maximum" nor less than
the "minimum", as these terms are used in the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
2.ID.; ID.The maximum penalty must be determined, in any
case punishable by the Revised Penal Code, in accordance
with the rules and provisions of said Code exactly as if Act
No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had never been
passed. It was not the purpose of said Act to make
inoperative any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Neither the title nor the body of the Act indicates any
intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal or amend
any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
3.ID.; MINIMUM PENALTY.In determining the "minimum"
penalty Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of
penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had.
The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two
aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of
the extreme limits
110
110
People vs. Ducosin
of the minimum imprisonment period;, and second, the broad
question of the factors and circumstances that should guide
the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty

within the ascertained limits. We construe the expression in
section 1 "the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said
Code for the offense" to mean the penalty next lower to that
determined by the court in the case before it as the
maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by the
Revised Penal Code).
4.ID.; ID.The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103,
simply provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less than
the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower."
In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the
court to fix the minimum imprisonment anywhere within the
range of the next lower penalty without reference to the
degrees into which it may be subdivided.
5.ID.; ID.Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of "personal liberty and economic usefulness"
(Message of the GovernorGeneral, Official Gazette No. 92,
vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the
criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of
society. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a
degree not heretofore known in these Islands. Some factors
to be taken into consideration are indicated.
6.ID.; ID.Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the
minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum period of the
degree next lower to the maximum penalty.
Manila. Diaz, J.
Alejandra F. Antonio for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila convicting the appellant of the crime of frustrated
murder was referred by the first division to
111
VOL. 59, DECEMBER 14, 1933

111
People vs. Ducosin
the court in banc for the proper interpretation and application
of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature approved on
December 5, 1933, commonly known as the "Indeterminate
Sentence Law". As this is the first case which has come
before us involving the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will be
convenient to set out here some of its provisions.
Section 1 of Act No. 4103 is as follows:
"Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by acts of the Philippine Legislature, otherwise than
by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall order the accused
to be imprisoned for a minimum term, which shall not be less
than the minimum term of imprisonment provided by law f or
the offense, and f or a maximum term which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by law; and where the offense is
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto,
the court shall sentence the accused to such maximum as
may, in view of attending circumstances, be properly
imposed under the present rules of the said Code, and to a
minimum which shall not be less than the minimum
imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense. Except as provided
in section two hereof, any person who shall have been so
convicted and sentenced and shall have served the minimum
sentence imposed hereunder, may be released on parole in
accordance with the provisions of this Act."
Section 2 is as follows:
"This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or lif e imprisonment; to those
convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, sedition
or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are
habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of

imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor
112
112
People vs. Ducosin
to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of
approval of this Act, except as provided in section five
hereof."
Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates a "Board of Indeterminate
Sentence" to be composed of the Secretary of Justice as
chairman and four members to be appointed by the
Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Senate. This section describes the qualifications of
the members. Section 4 gives the board authority to adopt
rules of procedure and provides for the compensation of the
members.
Section 5 makes it the duty of the board to study the
physical, mental and moral record of the prisoners who shall
be eligible to parole and authorizes the board to determine
the proper time for the release of such prisoners. After a
prisoner has served the "minimum penalty" imposed upon on
him and the board is satisfied that such prisoner is fitted by
his training for release and that there is a reasonable
probability that he will not violate the law again and that his
release "will not be incompatible with the welfare of society",
the board may in its discretion authorize the release of such
prisoner on parole. The board may also recommend the
release on parole of other prisoners previously convicted of
any offense other than those named in section 2.
Section 6 provides for the surveillance of prisoners released
on parole for a period "equivalent to the remaining portion of
the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final
release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence." Section 7 provides that a certified copy of the
board's order of conditional or final release shall be filed with
the court and with the Chief of Constabulary.
Section 8 provides that any prisoner who violates any of the

conditions of his parole, who violates any law during the
period of surveillance for which he has been convicted, shall
be subject to re-arrest and confinement and "shall serve the
remaining unexpired portion of the maximum
113
113
People vs. Ducosin
sentence for which he was originally committed to prison"
unless the board grants a new parole.
Section 9 provides that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, shall not be construed to impair the powers
given to the Governor-General under section 64 of the
Administrative Code or the Organic Act of the Philippine
Islands.
By its terms, Act No. 4103 became law upon its approval,
that is to say, on December 5, 1933.
In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on
September 30, 1932, for the crime of frustrated murder upon
the following information:
"That on or about the 23d day of September, 1932, in the
City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent
to kill, treacherously attack, assault and wound one Rafael
Yanguas by then and there suddenly and without any
warning, stabbing the latter with a knife, thereby inflicting
upon him several wounds in different parts of the body, some
of which are necessarily mortal, thus performing all the acts
of execution which would produce the death of the said
Rafael Yanguas as a consequence, but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of said accused, that is, by the timely intervention of medical
assistance.
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to ten years and one day of prisin mayor with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs.
The penalty for the crime of murder, under article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, is reclusin temporal in its maximum
period to death. Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated
felony is the one next lower in degree to that prescribed for
the consummated felony, which in the present case is prisin
mayor in its maximum period to reclusin temporal in its
medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen
years and four months. The
114
114
People vs. Ducosin
accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating
circumstance, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, fixes the penalty within the minimum period,
that is to say, from ten years and one day to twelve years,
leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to be
served within said range, i. e., not less than ten years and
one day nor more than.twelve years. The penalty imposed by
the trial judge being within this range is correct and therefore
is the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense which this accused has committed.
As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was
enacted after this appeal was lodged in this court, we are
now required to revise the sentence imposed upon the
appellant and to bring the same into conformity with Act No.
4103.
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court
must now, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two
penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as
the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must serve the
minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the
provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between
the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the
sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act,
-be released from serving said period in whole or in part. He
must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period
which is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the
"minimum", as these terms are used in the Indeterminate

Sentence Law.
This leads up to the important question: How shall the
"maximum" and the "minimum" penalty be determined?
The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case
punishable by the Revised Penal Code, in accordance with
the rules and provisions of said Code exactly as if Act No.
4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had never been
passed. We think it is clear from a reading of Act No. 4103
that it was not its purpose to make inoperative any of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Neither the
115
115
People vs. Ducosin
title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the
part of the Legislature to repeal or amend any of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The legislative history
of the Act further shows that attention was called to the
necessity for taking care "so as not to bring the provisions of
this bill in conflict with the provisions of our penal laws,
especially with those treating with penalties." (Committee
Report, House of Representatives, H-3321, Ninth Philippine
Legislature, Third Session.)
The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to offenses
penalized by the Revised Penal Code:
"Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public
funds in the amount of P10,000. No mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances are present. Under this law the
court may impose on him a maximum sentence not
exceeding ten years and eight months but not less than nine
years, four months and one day (see art. 217, No. 3, Revised
Penal Code), and a minimum which shall not be less than four
years, two months and one day (the minimum imprisonment
period of prisin correccional in its maximum to prisin
mayor in its minimum. See article 6'1, Revised Penal Code).
The court, therefore, may sentence the accused to be
imprisoned for not less than five years nor more than ten
years or for not less than seven years nor more than ten
years and eight months, etc."
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the
"maximum" is determined in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code. In the example given reference is
made to article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that the defendant shall suffer the penalty of
prisin mayor in its medium and maximum period. The
penalty is placed in the medium degree because of the
absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to
say, anywhere between nine years, four months and one day
and ten years and eight months in the discretion of the court.
In the case on appeal here the
116
116
People vs. Ducosin
penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty
under the Revised Penal Code because of the plea of guilty,
that is to say, between ten years and one day and twelve
years in the discretion of the court. This discretion is in
nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in
conformity with the discretion conferred upon it by the
Revised Penal Code, might have assessed the penalty at, let
us say, eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act No.
4103 does not require this court to assess the said penalty at
12 years, which is the longest time of imprisonment within
the minimum degree.
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of
imprisonment conforms to the provisions and rules of the
Revised Penal Code and is therefore fixed and established as
the maximum of the sentence which shall be imposed upon
the appellant.
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment
period" referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act
provides that this "minimum which shall not be less than the
minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by said Code for the offense." We are here

upon new ground. It is in determining the "minimum" penalty
that Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of
penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had.
The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two
aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of
the extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and
second, the broad question of the factors and circumstances
that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the
minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.
We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense" to
mean the penalty next lower to that determined by the court
in the case before it as the maximum (that is to say the
correct penalty fixed by the Revised Penal Code, see our
discussion above). In the example which the Legisla117
117
People vs. Ducosin
ture had before it in the Committee Report above mentioned,
the maximum of the sentence was correctly stated to be the
medium degree of prisin mayor in its medium and
maximum period. The penalty next lower is prisin
correccional in its maximum degree to prisin mayor in its
minimum degree (article 61, paragraph 4, Revised Penal
Code), that is to say, anywhere from f our years, two months
and one day to eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Act No. 4103, simply provides that the "minimum" shall "not
be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the
penalty next lower." In other words, it is left entirely within
the discretion of the court to fix the minimum of the penalty
anywhere between four years, two months and one day and
eight years. In the example given by the committee they
stated that the court might fix the minimum penalty at five
years or seven years.
In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty to
the maximum already determined as aforesaid, is prisin
correccional in its maximum period to prisin mayor in its

medium period, that is to say, from four years, two months
and one day to ten years. As stated, it is in the discretion of
the court to fix the time of imprisonment within the said
range without reference to the technical subdivisions of
maximum degree, medium degree and minimum degree, and
in this particular the courts are vested as stated with a wider
discretion than they ever had before.
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of
the minimum penalty, namely, the considerations which
should guide the court in fixing the term or duration of the
minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic
purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General. Official
Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to
consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a
member of society. This opens up an almost limitless field of
investigation and study which it is
118
118
People vs. Ducosin
the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is
humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall
not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the
individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of
protecting the social order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors
that should be considered are: (1) His age, especially with
reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general health
and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and
personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and
mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his previous
education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and
aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor
during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime
committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the

crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note
that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes
this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum
penalties for analogous crimes).
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his
relationship, first, toward his dependents, family and
associates and their relationship with him, and second, his
relationship towards society at large and the State are
important factors. The State is concerned not only in the
imperative necessity of protecting the social organization
against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in
redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other
social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims
to individualize the administration of our criminal law to a
degree not heretofore known in these Islands. With the
foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give
full effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.
It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment
period under Act No. 4103 in the case before us on this
appeal. Unfortunately, as this defendant was convicted
before Act No. 4103 became effective, and as we know
119
119
Sy Tiangco vs. Pablo and Apao
nothing of his antecedents because his plea of guilty
rendered it unnecessary to take any testimony, we are
confined to the record before us. He plead guilty to all of the
acts which constitute the crime of murder and only the timely
intervention of medical assistance prevented the death of his
victim and the prosecution of the appellant for murder. He
was given the f ull benefit of the plea of guilty in the fixing of
the maximum of the sentence. With such light as we have
received from the record in this case, we have concluded that
a reasonable and proper minimum period of imprisonment
should be seven years, which is within the "range of the
penalty next lower in degree to the maximum, that is to say,
within the range from four years, two months and one day to
ten years of prisin correccional in its maximum period to
prisin mayor in its medium period. We repeat that Act No.
4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of
imprisonment in the minimum period of the degree next
lower to the maximum penalty.
The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent:
that the defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a
maximum penalty of ten years and one day of prisin mayor
in its maximum degree, and to a minimum imprisonment
period of seven years, and as thus modified, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed. With costs de oficio. People vs.
Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, No. 38332 December 14, 1933
[No. L-3246. November 29, 1950]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant and appellant.
1.CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCE; REQUISITES.In order that a person could
be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal
liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.A man who could feel the pangs of
jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing his
wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the
belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could
hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
3.ID. ; ID. ; FEEBLEMINDEDNESS AND ACT IN A FIT OF
JEALOUSY AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Feeblemindedness of the accused warrants the finding in his
favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either
paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code and the fact that the accused evidently killed his wife in
a fit of jealousy, he is, likewise, entitled to the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same articlethat of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion or obfuscation.
4.ID.; ID.; PENALTY.The penalty applicable for parricide
under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed only
of two indivisible penalties, to wit, reclusin perpetua to
death. Altho the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, article 63 of the said code is the
one applicable and must be applied.
5.ID.; ID.; ATTENTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE INVITED TO
THE CASE.When the court believes that the appellant is
entitled to a lighter penalty the case should be brought to the
attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may
reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusin perpetua to
death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner
he sees fit.

Camarines Sur. Palacio, J.
659
659
People vs. Formigones
Luis Contreras f or appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V.
Makasiar for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of
parricide and sentencing him to reclusin perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000,
and to pay the costs. The f ollowing f acts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo
Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan,
municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wif e, Julia
Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in
the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the
barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find
employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's
stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon,
Julia Agricola was sitting at the head of the stairs of the
house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the
house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage
resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia
toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed
by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms,
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living
room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was
found by the people who came in response to the shouts for
help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who
witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her

father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed
a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he
killed his wife. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy
because according to his statement he used to have quarrels
with his wife for the reason that he often
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660
saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he
suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations
because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to
him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice
of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as shown
by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First
Instance, the def endant entered a plea of not guilty, but did
not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two
guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to
the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that
he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would
remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his
fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and
indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refuse to take a
bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison
authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with
his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being
asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened,
he suddenly darted from Inside into the prison compound
apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant
is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability
under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with
the lower court. According to the very witness of the
defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was
his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only f rom f

eeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could
distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile
within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so
as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will
at the.time of committing the crime. The provisions of article
12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied
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661
from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal
Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are
pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara
on his Commentaries on. the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition,
pages 42 to 48
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this
exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing 'the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his
own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; 18 that
there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will For this
reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time
of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or f reedom of will, because mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability.19
"The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deafmuteness cannot be equalled to imbecility or insanity.
"The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved. without positive evidence that the defendant had
previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments
prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized

by law are always reputed to be volun-tary, and it is improper
to conclude that a person acted unconsciuosly, in order to
relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition,
unless his insanity and absence of will are proved."
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his
confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his beingfeebleminded or eccentric. or to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case
of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil., 88), we quote the
following syllabus"Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes 110
further than to indicate that the accused was moved by a
wayward or hyste
_______________
18 Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of November 21,
1891; 47 Jur. Crim., 413.
19 Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of April 20. 1911; 86
Jur. Crim., 94, 97.
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662
ical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the
effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant
acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish
the defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in
confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental
condition produced by remorse."
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the
appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence,
during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done
anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an
opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and
dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and
supported his family and even maintained in school his
children of school age, with the fruits of his work.

Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who
could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to
the extent of killing his wif e whom he suspected of being
unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was
vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an
imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of
little or no import. The f act is that he believed her f aithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of
justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and
aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a
lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition
to the observations made by appellant in his written
statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first
went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias
Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and
his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo
was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said
house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have
aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of
Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems
to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple and
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663
even f eebleminded, whose f aculties have not been f ully
developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after
she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying
her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his
feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he
thought that she had betrayed him. Al though he did not
exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to
flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him.
In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his
wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate
said written statement, thus saving the government all the
trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his

conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not
prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems
that the prosecution was not intent on proving it. At least
said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the
Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the
benefit of the doubt and we therefore decline to find the
existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other
hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the
finding in his f avor of the mitigating circumstance provided
for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is "suffering
some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
action, defense or communication with his fellow beings," or
such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power."
To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph
6 of the same article,that of having acted upon an impulse
so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of
jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without
any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first we
thought of the possible applicability of the provisions
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664
of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the
purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusin
perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article
64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three
periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed
of three different penalties, each one of which f orms a period
in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which
is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable

for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On
the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the
application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single
divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of
reclusin perpetua, to death. It is therefore clear that article
63 is the one applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal
provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs.
Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in
applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code)
which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the
present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said
the following:
"And even though this court should take into consideration
the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a qualifying
nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any
aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the
next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a
ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does
not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of
article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code).
(Decision of September 30, 1879.)
"Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict
application of which is inevitable and which, under the law,
must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional
power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal
Code; and
"Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs,
and hereby order that a proper petition be filed with the
executive
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665
branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be

deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it
by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of
the next lower."
Then, in the case of People vs. Castaeda (60 Phil. 604),
another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming the
judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusin
perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating
circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for
parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusin
perpetua, to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code
must be applied. The Court further observed:
"We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that
malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life
imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5
of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the
attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to
executive clemency after appellant has served an
appreciable amount of confinement."
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we
hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the
modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half
of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant
will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this
same court in the two cases above cited, and believing that
the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should
be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his
discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to
reclusin perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit. People vs. Formigones,
87 Phil. 658, No. L-3246 November 29, 1950
G.R. No. 108747. April 6, 1995.*

PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Probation Law; Probation should be
availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing
to be reformed and rehabilitated who manifest spontaneity,
contrition and remorse.The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can
avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on
the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appeal
that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an
escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts
affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should
be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are
willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest
spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Same; Same; Probation is a mere privilege, not a right.
Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot
extend to those not expressly included. Probation is not a
right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency
or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by
the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby
escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for
the offense of which he stands convicted. It is a special
prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons
not enjoyed by others or by all.
Same; Same; The grant of probation rests solely upon the
discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for
the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused.Accordingly, the grant of probation
rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation
Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or
its government of any of the latters prerogatives, rights or
remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the

terms of the law who
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* EN BANC.
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VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
385
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
is not clearly within them.
Same; Same; An appeal should not bar the accused from
applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce
the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express
mandate of Sec. 4 of the Probation Law.Therefore, that an
appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is
simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec. 4 of
the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negative
clause, no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Same; Same; The multiple prison terms are distinct from
each other and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out
in the Probation Law, i.e., not more than six (6) years, then
he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically
disqualified.At the outset, the penalties imposed by the
MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no need
to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against
an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision
are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the
multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should
not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms
are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more
than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he
is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses
is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken

separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9,
par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum, not
total, when it says that [t]he benefits of this Decree shall not
be extended to those x x x x sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of more than six years. Evidently, the
law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to
take each penalty separately and distinctly with the others.
Same; Same; The basis of the disqualification is principally
the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant
degree of penalty imposed.Fixing the cut-off point at a
maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is
based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher
penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of
their demonstrated capability for serious wrongdoing but
because of the gravity and serious consequences of the
offense they might further commit. The Probation Law, as
amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of
grave felonies as defined in Art.
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9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, and not
necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple
offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less
perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is
principally the gravity of the offense committed and the
concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to
a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not
generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus
may avail of probation.
Same; Same; The law considers appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies.In fine, considering that the
multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken
separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test,
petitioner should have immediately filed an application for
probation as he was already qualified after being convicted
by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready

to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit
his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the
MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For,
plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually
exclusive remedies.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion1 of the Court.
Carlo L. Cruz for petitioner.
BELLOSILLO,J.:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a
penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and
encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately
admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and
expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the
result of his appealthat when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand,
and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for
probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the
appellate courts affirmance of his conviction. Consequently,
probation should be availed of at the first opportunity
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1 Originally a dissenting view.
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VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
387
by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated,
who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within
the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D.
1990? Petitioners woes started when as President and
General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he failed to

control his outburst and blurted
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches
(sic), bullshit.Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng
puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of
multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate
Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each
Information charging him with gravely maligning them on
four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner
guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases
filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206, 105207,
105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of one
(1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional in each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s), ordered
him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria
Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie
Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for
attorneys fees, plus costs of suit.2 He was however
acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of
the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on
his innocence, petitioner elevated his case to the Regional
Trial Court.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59,
affirmed his conviction but appreciated in his favor a
mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation.
Thus
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2 Decision penned by Judge Andres B. Reyes, Jr., pp. 13-14;
Rollo, pp. 46-47.
388
388

x x x (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the
defamatory words complained of x x x x he must have been
angry and worried about some missing documents x x x as
well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising
ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million x x x x the
said defamatory words must have been uttered in the heat of
anger which is a mitigating circumstance analogous to
passion or obfuscation.3
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced in each case to a
STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment
xxxx4 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the
decision of the RTC became final. The case was then set for
execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence,
issued a warrant of arrest. But before he could be arrested
petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC
denied in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 84850, 29 June 1989,
174 SCRA 566 x x x x5
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which
on 2 July 1992 dismissed his petition on the following grounds
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to

comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 2891 of September 4, 1991. Violation of the circular is sufficient
cause for dismissal of the petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the
petition that he had asked the respondent court to reconsider
its above order; in fact, he had failed to give the court an
opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any
error on the matter. He is, however, required to move for
reconsideration of the questioned order before filing a
petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA 436). This
failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his
petition (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v.
Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 31 SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit

any capricious, arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of
power in deny_______________
3 Decision penned by Judge Lucia V. Isnani, pp. 12-13; Rollo,
pp. 59-60.
4 Ibid.
5 Order of Judge Maximo C. Contreras, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, Br. 61, Rollo, p. 67.
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VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
389
ing the petitioners application for probation x x x x
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner
out of time x x x x
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the
trial court to grant probation after conviction, upon an
application by the defendant within the period of appeal,
upon terms and conditions and period appropriate to each
case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal has
been taken x x x x6
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each
ground and seeks this Courts compassion in dispensing with
the minor technicalities which may militate against his
petition as he now argues before us that he has not yet lost
his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from
the MeTC to the RTC since [t]he reason for his appeal was
precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the
Probation Law because the original Decision of the
(Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not then be
entitled to probation.7 He contends that he appealed from
the judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of
reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to
enable him to qualify for probation.8
The central issue therefore is whether petitioner is still

qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his
conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with
regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First.Probation is a mere privilege, not a right.9 Its benefits
cannot extend to those not expressly included. Probation is
not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be
granted by the
_______________
6 Decision of the Special Eleventh Division penned by then
Associate Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. (now Presiding
Justice), concurred in by Associate Justices Jesus M. Elbinias
and Consuelo Y. Santiago.
7 Urgent Petition for Review, p. 15; Rollo, p. 16.
8 Id., p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.
9 Baclayon v. Mutia, G.R. No. 59298, 30 April 1984, 129 SCRA
149; Amandy v. People, G.R. No. 76258, 23 May 1988, 161
SCRA 436.
390
390
court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby
escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for
the offense of which he stands convicted.10 It is a special
prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons
not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which
is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.11 The Probation Law should not therefore be
permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the
latters prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention
of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no
person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which
clearly mandates that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction, nor Llamado v.
Court of Appeals12 which interprets the quoted provision,
offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application
of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of
petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not
bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit
may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this
interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence.
Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the
Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals
x x x we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal
statute. We, however, understand petitioners argument to
be really that any statutory language that appears to favor
the accused in a criminal case should be given a liberal
interpretation. Courts x x x have no authority to invoke
liberal interpretation or the spirit of the law where the
words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the
history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or
interpretation. We do not believe that the spirit of the law
may legitimately be invoked
_______________
10 34 Words and Phrases 111.
11 Bala v. Martinez, G.R. No. 67301, 29 January 1990, 181
SCRA 459.
12 G.R. No. 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566.
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VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
391
to set at naught words which have a clear and definite
meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The true
legislative intent must obviously be given effect by judges

and all others who are charged with the application and
implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear
in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent
that is to be given effect are derived from the words actually
used by the law-maker, and not from some external, mystical
or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the
words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a strict
interpretation rather than a liberal one to Section 4 of the
Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. Strict
and liberal are adjectives which too frequently impede a
disciplined and principled search for the meaning which the
law-making authority projected when it promulgated the
language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly
visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as
the nose on a mans face. The Court is simply reading Section
4 as it is in fact written. There is no need for the involved
process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage
in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects
the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of
the statute. The first duty of the judge is to take and apply a
statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise,
as this Court in Yangco v. Court of FirstInstance warned,
confusion and uncertainty will surely follow, making, we
might add, stability and continuity in the law much more
difficult to achieve:
x x x [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which
tinge words as to give them the color of a particular judicial
theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That
which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has
made it so difficult for the public to understand and know
what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in
considerable measure the unwarranted interference by
judicial tribunals with the English language as found in
statutes and contracts, cutting the words here and inserting
them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the
legislature ought to have done or what parties should have
agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and

coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their
clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until
it has been submitted to some court for its interpretation and
construction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become
sharper as our peoples grasp of English is steadily
attenuated.13
_______________
13 See Note 11, pp. 577-578.
392
392
Therefore, that an appeal should not bar the accused from
applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce
the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express
mandate of Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which
opens with a negative clause, no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. In
Bersabal v. Salvador,14 we said
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of
statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory xxxx the use of the term shall further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not
distinguish; where the law does not make exception the court
should not except.
Second.At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC
were already probationable. Hence, there was no need to
appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against
an accused found guilty of severaloffenses in one decision
are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the
multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should
not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms
are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more
than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he
is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses
is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken
separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9,
par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum, not
total, when it says that [t]he benefits of this Decree shall not
be extended to those xxxx sentenced to serve a
maximumterm of imprisonment of more than six years.
Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties
imposed but to take each penalty separately and
_______________
14 No. L-35910, 21 July 1978, 84 SCRA 176, citing McGee v.
Republic, 94 Phil. 820 (1954).
393
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
393
distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner
was supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year
and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced
to serve the prison term for each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s), and in
each of the four (4) informations, he was charged with having
defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4)
different, separate days, he was still eligible for probation, as
each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years
imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that
those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for
serious wrongdoing but because of the gravity and serious

consequences of the offense they might further commit.15
The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who
have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in
relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code,16 and not
necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple
offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less
perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is
principally the gravity of the offense committed and the
concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to
a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not
generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus
may avail of probation.
To demonstrate the point, let us take for instance one who is
convicted in a single decision of, say, thirteen (13) counts of
grave
_______________
15 Bautista, E., Statutory Concept and Objectives, Coverage
and Selection Criteria for Probation. Lecture delivered during
the 1977 Regional Seminar on Probation, Philippine
International Convention Center.
16 Art. 9 defines grave felonies as those to which the law
attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of
their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25. Art. 25
on the other hand lists death as capital punishment, and
reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual or temporary
special disqualification, and prision mayor as afflictive
penalties.
394
394
oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals
in one outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of
thirteen (13) years, and another who has been found guilty of
mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12) years and

one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum.
Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is
disqualified from availing of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that
under the MeTC Decision he could not have availed of the
benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did
not, his appeal now precludes him from applying for
probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner,
however erroneous it may be, that the penalties imposed
against him should be summed up, still he would not have
qualified under the Decision rendered by the RTC since if the
STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment
imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total
imposable penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8)
months, which is still way beyond the limit of not more than
six (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended.
To illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months;
128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and
8 months, hence, following his argument, petitioner cannot
still be eligible for probation as the total of his penalties
exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be
multiplied only four (4) times since there are only four (4)
Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for
probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to
understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be
any clearerone (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each crime
committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information(s). Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed
penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC
affirmed the judgment of conviction and merely reduced the
duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC in each case
to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment
on account of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count
or incident of grave oral defamation. There is no valid reason
therefore why the penalties imposed by the RTC should be
395
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
395
multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times,
considering that the RTC merely affirmedthe MeTC as regards
the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases
and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed
therein. Thus
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by
the trial court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C.
Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the
above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in
each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law; and to pay the costs.17
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at
that the accused was acquitted or absolved in any of the four
(4) counts under each of the four (4) Informations, or that
any part of the judgment of conviction was reversed, or that
any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed.
Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other
penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that
the judgment of conviction rendered by the MeTC was
affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the
penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not
be summed up but taken separately as the totality of all the
penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately
filed an application for probation as he was already qualified
after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt
humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of
the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing
the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right
to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and

probation mutually exclusive remedies.18
_______________
17 Decision of the RTC, p. 13; Rollo, p. 60.
18 Bernardo v. Balagot, G.R. No. 86561, 10 November 1992,
215 SCRA 526.
396
396
Third.Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even
correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his
innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner
appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of
reducing his penalties to make him eligible for probation
since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decisionbut
rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is
wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum
before the RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error
purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at his
acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been
established because of his positive identification by the
witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and
credence to the bare statements of the private complainants
despite the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c) in
not acquitting him in all the cases.19 Consequently,
petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in
relying on his positive identification considering that private
complainants could not have missed identifying him who was
their President and General Manager with whom they worked
for a good number of years. Petitioner further argued that
although the alleged defamatory words were uttered in the
presence of other persons, mostly private complainants coemployees and clients, not one of them was presented as a
witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court could
not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative
testimony of private complainants.20
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession

of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply
put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure,
the accused never manifested that he was appealing only for
the purpose of correcting a wrong penaltyto reduce it to
within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an
appeal, more so after asserting his innocence therein,
petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By
perfecting his appeal, petitioneripso facto relinquished his
alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law the
purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunism on the part of an accused who al_______________
can be validly convicted, as in the instant case, of as many

crimes charged in the Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond
the period allowed by law. This is vital and crucial. From the
records it is clear that the application for probation was filed
only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been
issued x x x (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the
Decision23 of the RTC. This is a significant fact which
militates against the instant petition. We quote with
affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed,ponencia of now
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De
Pano, Jr., on the specific issue
_______________
19 Decision of the RTC, p. 2; Rollo, p. 49.

20 Ibid.
397
21 Section 3, par. (e), Rule 117, Rules of Court, provides:

The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds: x x x that more
than one offense is charged x x x x.
22 Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court, provides: The failure
of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to alleged
the same in the said motion shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds of a motion to quash x x x x.
23 Urgent Petition for Review, p. 5; Rollo, p. 6.
398
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995

397
though already eligible does not at once apply for probation,
but doing so only after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his
conviction by the RTC to the Court of Appeals does not
necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to
reduce his penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that the Court
of Appeals would increase his penalties, which could be
worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become
final and executory because of the negligence, according to
him, of his former counsel who failed to seek possible
remedies within the period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner,
in accordance with Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court,21 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4)
Informations filed against him charged four (4) separate
crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4)
separate days. His failure to do so however may now be
deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule22 and he
398
x x x the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out
of time. The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended,
provides thus:
SEC.4. Grant of Probation.Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal x x x x
place the defendant on probation x x x x
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for

probation from one who had appealed the trial courts
judgment is allowed by law, the petitioners plea for
probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear
statement that the petitioner was up for execution of
judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D.
No. 968 says that the application for probation must be filed
within the period for perfecting an appeal; but in this case,
such period for appeal had passed, meaning to say that the
Regional Trial Courts decision had attained finality, and no
appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting
that an appeal from the appellate courts judgment is
contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment
rendered by the trial court, that appellate judgment had
become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution before
the application for probation was attempted by the petitioner.
The petitioner did not file his application for probation before
the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioners
attempt at probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on the proposition that an
application for probation may yet be granted even if it was
filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction
already set for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for
service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the
case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the
decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the
law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow
probation after an appeal has been perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats
appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and
petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although
the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his
appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise
the issue of
399
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
399
the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he
filed an application for probation outside the period for
perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for
probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384,
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
No. L-61958. April 28, 1983.*

PLUTARCO YUSI and DAISY YUSI, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE JUDGE LETICIA P. MORALES, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Probation; Appeal; Withdrawal of
application for probation by accused and instead opted to
pursue appeal from conviction, should be granted;
Withdrawal or waiver of appeal from conviction after an
application for probation of a convicted accused, not
irrevocable; Case at bar.And now, the question before us is
whether or not such a waiver or withdrawal is irrevocable. We
rule that it is not. We find the strict and unyielding
application of the waiver rule under the Probation Law
unwarranted. Under the factual circumstances of the instant
case, the respondent court in granting the application for
probation and denying the prayer to withdraw, failed to take
into account the fact that the petitioners counsel of record
was not present when the petitioners applied for probation.
True, they were represented by a counsel de oficio appointed
by the court on the spot but the counsel de oficio was not
fully acquainted with their case. He could not have
considered fully the strength of a possible appeal when he
advised them about the effects of the application for
probation. More so when we consider the thin line that
divides a criminal case for estafa and a civil case for
collection of a debt.
Same; Same; Penitent offenders, not a case, where convicted
accused improvidently filed their application for probation.
Under the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
854
854
Yusi vs. Morales
facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be considered
penitent offenders. They appeared to have improvidently
filed their application for probation and should be allowed to

withdraw it and to appeal the decision.
Same; Same; Probation Law; Philosophy of probation;
Probation Law liberally construed.The underlying
philosophy of probation is indeed one of liberality towards the
accused. It is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. Probation is a major
step taken by our Government towards the deterrence and
minimizing of crime and the humanization of criminal justice.
In line with the public policy behind probation, the right of
appeal should not be irrevocably lost from the moment a
convicted accused files an application for probation. Appeal
and probation spring from the same policy considerations of
justice, humanity, and compassion.
PETITION for certiorari and mandamus to review the orders of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Morales, J.
Antero B. Tomas for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
May persons who apply for the benefits of the Probation Law
withdraw their application during the period for filing an
appeal and ask that their appeal from the judgment of
conviction be given due course?
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for estafa in
Criminal Case No. 2260 in a decision of the respondent court
dated May 20, 1982. The court sentenced the petitioners x x
x to suffer an indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of
arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR and SIX (6)
MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum, to pay
P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan for the value of the piano,
and to pay the costs of the suit.
On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May 20, 1982 was
promulgated, the petitioners appeared in court without their
counsel of record. The respondent court appointed a cer855
VOL. 121, APRIL 28, 1983

855
Yusi vs. Morales
tain Cesar Villar who happened to be in court to act as
petitioners counsel de oficio during the promulgation. On
that occasion, the petitioners through their counsel de oficio
manifested that x x x they are going to avail of the benefits
of the Probation Law and prayed that they be released under
the same bond. (Annex B, Rollo p. 14) The court
immediately granted the petitioners prayer x x x with a
condition that the accused will submit within this day a
certification from the bonding company that it is willing to
accommodate the accused under the same bond for a period
of five (5) days beginning today.
On June 23, 1982, the petitioners filed with the respondent
court an application for probation under Presidential Decree
No. 968 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1257 (Annex
C, Rollo, p. 15).
Acting on the petitioners application for probation, the
respondent court on the same day, June 23, 1982, issued an
Order directing the probation officer of Cabanatuan City to
conduct an investigation on the application for probation and
to submit his report on the matter within sixty (60) days from
receipt in accordance with Sections 5 and 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 968 as amended. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 18).
On June 28, 1982, or seven (7) days from the date of
promulgation of the decision and within the reglementary
period to file an appeal, the petitioners filed with the
respondent court their Notice of Appeal (Annex E, Rollo, p.
19).
On July 6, 1982, the respondent court issued an Order
denying the notice of appeal on the ground that the
petitioners waived their right to appeal the decision when
they filed their application for probation (Annex F, Rollo, p.
20).
On July 16, 1982, Atty. Antero Torres filed with the court an
appearance as counsel in collaboration with the petitioners
counsel of record, and on behalf of the petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the July 6, 1982 order. On July
24, 1982, the petitioners filed a supplemental motion for

reconsideration. (Annexes G and H, Rollo, pp. 21-24).
On August 19, 1982, the respondent court issued an order
denying both the motion for reconsideration and the
supplemental motion for reconsideration (Annex J, Rollo, p.
28).
856
856
Yusi vs. Morales
Hence, this petition was filed to set aside the above orders.
In a resolution dated October 11, 1982, we considered the
People of the Philippines impleaded and required the Solicitor
General to comment on the petition.
Upon the filing of the Solicitor Generals comments, which we
treated internally as an anwer, and dispensing with the filing
of briefs or memoranda, we resolved to declare the case
submitted for decision.
The only issue is whether or not the petitioners whose
application for probation was granted after conviction of the
crime of estafa may still withdraw such application for
probation and within the reglementary period appeal the
judgment of conviction.
In not giving due course to the petitioners notice of appeal
the respondent court relied on paragraph 3, Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 968 (ESTABLISHING A PROBATION
SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES) as amended which considers an application for
probation of a convicted accused to be a waiver of his right
to appeal or an automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
And now, the question before us is whether or not such a
waiver or withdrawal is irrevocable.
We rule that it is not. We find the strict and unyielding
application of the waiver rule under the Probation Law
unwarranted.
Under the factual circumstances of the instant case, the
respondent court in granting the application for probation
and denying the prayer to withdraw, failed to take into
account the fact that the petitioners counsel of record was

not present when the petitioners applied for probation. True,
they were represented by a counsel de oficio appointed by
the court on the spot but the counsel de oficio was not fully
acquainted with their case. He could not have considered
fully the strength of a possible appeal when he advised them
about the effects of the application for probation. More so
when we consider the thin line that divides a criminal case
for estafa and a civil case for collection of a debt.
857
VOL. 121, APRIL 28, 1983
857
Yusi vs. Morales
And this fact surfaced when, on June 28, 1982 after the
petitioner discussed their case with a brother-in-law, Judge
Eladio C. Sequi of the Municipal Court of Carranglaan, Nueva
Ecija, the petitioners filed their notice of appeal upon the
Judges advice. It must be noted that the notice of appeal
was filed just seven (7) days after the promulgation of the
decision.
Considering that the application for probation is an admission
of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to
the judgment of conviction and that the application for
probation is considered a waiver upon his part to file an
appeal, it is in the best interests of justice that the court
should take the necessary steps to insure that the accused
has been fully apprised of the full import of his application
before the court acts on it.
In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily granted the
manifestation and application for probation on June 22, 1982,
the same day that the decision was promulgated and
approved the formal application the following day without
taking steps to be informed that the petitioners were aware
of the full import of their application.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which established
the Probation System was envisioned among other things, to
provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a

prison sentence (Section 2(b), Presidential Decree No. 968).
Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be
considered penitent offenders. They appeared to have
improvidently filed their application for probation and should
be allowed to withdraw it and to appeal the decision.
We agree with the Solicitor General when he observes that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
There can be no real reformation of a wrongdoer which is
the reason for probation unless there is a willingness on his
part to right the wrong he has committed. Probation is
envisioned for the accused. He may or may not avail of its
benefits. Although probation is founded on consent, waiver
and/or contract, public policy requires that interpretational
objectives set forth in Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
968 be given full effect. Probation cannot therefore be forced
or
858
858
Yusi vs. Morales
compelled on a convict. To permit this would only serve to
invite its violation. Instead, a greater emphasis should be
exerted in securing the probationers effective participation
in societys major social institution.
Since probation is an island of technicalities surrounded by
sea of discretion (Carl H. Imlay & Charles R. Galsheen, See
What Condition Your Condition Are In, Federal Probation,
XXXV (June 1971), it should, therefore, be liberally construed
in favor of the accused (herein petitioners). Having opted to
discontinue with the application for probation in its initial
stages and prior to the submission of a post sentence
investigation report and within the period interposed an
appeal from the adverse decision, petitioners should be
allowed to withdraw their application for probation and
pursue their right to appeal therefrom.
The underlying philosophy of probation is indeed one of
liberality towards the accused. It is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. Probation

is a major step taken by our Government towards the
deterrence and minimizing of crime and the humanization of
criminal justice. In line with the public policy behind
probation, the right of appeal should not be irrevocably lost
from the moment a convicted accused files an application for
probation. Appeal and probation spring from the same policy
considerations of justice, humanity, and compassion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is
hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated June 23, 1982, July 6,
1982 and August 19, 1982 of the respondent court are
nullified and set aside. The respondent court is directed to
give due course to the petitioners notice of appeal.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez
and Relova, JJ., concur.
Petition granted. Orders nullified and set aside.
Notes.The Sandiganbayan commits a grave abuse of
discretion in denying an application for probation despite
ample evidence that the applicant is entitled to the benefits
of probation. (Cabatingan vs. Sandiganbayan, 102 SCRA
187.)
859
VOL. 121, APRIL 28, 1983
859
Geronimo vs. Court of Appeals
The denial of an application for probation based merely on
probation report without any preliminary investigation may
be set aside. (Cabatingan vs. Sandiganbayan, 102 SCRA
187.)
Judges should see to it that vindictive prosecutions are
avoided even during the stage of preliminary investigation.
(Rodil vs. Garcia, 104 SCRA 362.)
It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt
is shown beyond reasonable doubt. However, after the
prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional
presumption of innocence must yield to what has been so
amply and persuasively demonstrated. (Joseph vs. Villaluz,

89 SCRA 324.)
Where the period of appeal has expired, neither a private
prosecutor nor a city fiscal can file a petition for review on
certiorari since the office of the Solicitor General itself could
not have done so. (People vs. Sonalan, 92 SCRA 607.) Yusi vs.
Morales, 121 SCRA 853, No. L-61958 April 28, 1983
G.R. No. 114343. December 28, 1995.*

ANGELO CAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FE
ALBANO MADRID, et al. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; As a rule, and unless
the trial court directs otherwise, the bail bond posted by an
accused remains in force at all stages of the case until its
final determination.With respect to the first issue, there is
no dispute that, as a rule, and unless the trial court directs
otherwise, the bail bond posted by an accused remains in
force at all stages of the case until its final determination.
Same; Same; Same; Probation; Appeals; The act of an
accused, who is immediately committed to jail after
judgment of conviction despite his being out on bail, of filing
an application for probation instead of challenging the
legality of the trial courts act of issuing such commitment
order forecloses his right to appeal.Now, in this case, since
the trial court, immediately after the promulgation of
judgment (and without waiting for the finality thereof), issued
a commitment order despite petitioners being out on bail,
petitioner should have challenged the legality of such
commitment order. However, instead of doing so, petitioner,
after having been properly advised by counsel on the effects
and consequences of probation, voluntarilyand with the
assistance of counselfiled an application for probation,
along with an affidavit of recognizance and an application for
release on recognizance of his counsel. Petitioners
actuations thus foreclosed his right to appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Section 4 of P.D.
No. 968 was amended by P.D. 1990 in order to make appeal
and probation mutually exclusive remedies.Section 4 of P.D.
No. 968, pertaining to the grant of probation, was amended
by P.D. 1990 in order to make appeal and probation mutually
exclusive remedies. Thus, Sec. 4 pro vides specifically that
(T)he filing of the application (for probation) shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An accuseds application
for probation has the effect of a final determination of his
case and the
_____________
* THIRD DIVISION.
524
524
Cal vs. Court of Appeals
cancellation of his bail bond.Thus, in this case, the
petitioners application for probation had the effect of a final
determination of his case, and the cancellation of his bail
bond. Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals could not
have done otherwise than to affirm the trial courts order of
July 15, 1992 for petitioners immediate confinement after
promulgation of judgment, in view of the subsequent
application for probation which rendered the said judgment
final and immediately executory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A trial courts order
denying an accuseds motion to withdraw his application for
probation and rejecting his notice of appeal partakes of the
nature of an order granting probation, which is not
appealable.As for the second issue, although petitioner
insists on faulting the courts a quo for denying his motion to
withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice
of appeal, his position is nonetheless untenable. The
respondent Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial
courts order of November 20, 1992, denying the petitioners
motion to withdraw his application for probation and rejecting
his notice of appeal, partook of the nature of an order
granting probation, which is not appealable.
Appeals.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Bengzon &
Jimenez for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the

respondent Court of Appeals1 dated November 11, 1993,
denying petitioners petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with prayer for restraining order, to challenge
the orders of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 21) of Santiago,
Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 0822, entitled People vs.
Angelo Cal.
_______________
1 Sixth Division, composed of J. Artemon D. Luna, ponente, JJ.
Arturo B. Buena and Alfredo J. Lagamon.
525
525
The facts of the case are as follows: After an information for
illegal recruitment was filed with the aforementioned trial
court on September 5, 1990, petitioner posted bail for his
provisional liberty. On June 8, 1992, a decision was rendered
in the aforesaid criminal case wherein the petitioner herein
was found guilty of violation of Article 36(a) of the Labor
Code as amended [illegal recruitment], and sentenced to,
among other things, suffer imprisonment of four years and
pay a fine of P20,000. The decision was promulgated on July
15, 1992, in the presence of the petitioner, after which he
was committed to jail by virtue of an order of commitment
issued the same day. The following day, July 16, petitioner,
assisted by his counsel, filed with the court a quo an
application for probation, an affidavit of recognizance, and an
application for release on recognizance. Also on the same
day, the trial court issued an order directing the petitioner to
report to the Provincial Probation and Parole Officer, and for
the latter to conduct an investigation of the applicant and
submit his report and recommendation within sixty days.
Almost two weeks later, on July 29, 1992, petitioner filed with
the trial court a Motion to Withdraw Application for Probation
and Notice of Appeal, alleging that he hastily filed his
application because of the threats employed upon him by
the authorities and that he was not able to intelligently

consult with his lawyer and reflect on the legal consequences
and effects of his application for probation under the law so
that he may not be considered to have waived his right to
appeal the decision (decision, p. 1; rollo, p. 52). On account
of the serious nature of said allegations, the lower court
conducted a full-blown hearing to verify the petitioners
allegations. However, the court denied petitioners motion to
withdraw application, etc. on November 20, 1992, when it
was determined that the accusations were baseless, and that
petitioners counsel did in fact properly advise him as to the
effects and consequences of appeal and of probation, and
that, notwithstanding such advice, in the words of the trial
court
x x x (t)he accused chose the easy way out which was to
apply for probation in order that he will not be detained
because he could not post his bailbond. But later he went to
talk to his employer Dindo Vales in Manila. He was induced to
appeal. Understandably so because in the
526
526
decision it was also found out that the recruitment activities
of Dindo Vales and his placement agency did not have any
license to recruit.
It is unfortunate that the accused in attempting to withdraw
his application for probation, would impute negligence,
misconduct, fraud and worst threats upon his lawyer and a
personnel of the Court whose only fault was to help him and
accommodate his lawyers request. The accused would feign
ignorance and stupidity in not knowing what he was doing
when in fact his mind was working in a diabolical way by
imputing fraud and wrongdoing in others. What simply
happened here was that the accused decided to apply for
probation because it was an easy way to avoid being
detained in jail, to avoid the trouble of putting up a bailbond;
to avoid further expenses of counsel and to end the case
once and for all without suffering incarceration. But after his
employer induced him to appeal, helped him to post his
bailbond and perhaps even provided him with another
counsel, the accused changed his mind. He was fully aware
and he knew what he was doing. He was properly advised by
his lawyer who told him that if he will file his application for
probation, he would lost his right to appeal although of
course he was given contrary advice by his employer in
Manila. It would be a dangerous precedent to allow the
accused to make a mockery of the Probation Law. The case of
Yusi vs. Morales2 cannot apply to him.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
the appeal is DENIED. The convict Angelo Cal is directed to
make manifest
_______________
2 No. L-61958, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 853. The sole issue
in this case was, in the light of Sec. 4 of P.D. 968 as
amended, treating the application for probation as amounting
to a waiver of the right to appeal, whether such waiver is
irrevocable, and whether persons who have applied for the
benefits of the Probation Law may still withdraw their
application during the period for filing an appeal and ask that
their appeal from the judgment of conviction be given due
course. The Supreme Court in this case ruled that such
waiver is not irrevocable, given the peculiar circumstances of
this case, particularly the fact that petitioners counsel of
record was not present when petitioners applied for
probation. Although at that point in time they were
represented by counsel de oficio appointed by the court on
the spot, nevertheless the said counsel de oficio was not fully
acquainted with their case and could not have properly
evaluated the strength of a possible appeal when he advised
them about the effects of the application for probation. After
having filed for probation, the accused subsequently changed
their minds when they were advised by a relative who
happened to be an MTC judge to appeal instead.
527

527
his desire to pursue his application for probation by reporting
to the Probation and Parole Officer, Cauayan, Isabela, within
72 hours from receipt of this order, otherwise he will be
ordered to serve his sentence.
SO ORDERED.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
from the Order dated November 20, 1992, which was denied
by the court a quo on January 4, 1993, on the ground that
petitioner had availed of the benefits of the Probation Law
and therefore cannot avail of the remedy of appeal.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the last-mentioned
order was likewise denied through an order dated June 1,
1993.
Then petitioner filed on July 9, 1993 a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for restraining order,
with the respondent Court of Appeals, which denied due
course to and dismissed the same in its Decision of
November 11, 1993. A motion for reconsideration thereof
was also denied, for having been filed out of time by 23 days.
Hence this petition before us.
Petitioner alleges that respondent Court gravely erred and
abused its discretion (a) in affirming the trial courts order of
July 15, 1992 for petitioners immediate confinement to jail
after promulgation of judgment but before same became
final and executory, i.e., prior to the lapse of the period for
filing appeal, notwithstanding that petitioner had posted bail,
and (b) in affirming the trial courts order of November 20,
1992 which denied petitioners motion to withdraw his
application for probation and which did not give due course
to his notice of appeal (petition, pp. 7, 11).
After deliberating on the petition, the public respondents
comment thereon filed by the Solicitor General, and
petitioners reply to comment, this Court is convinced that
the petition is unmeritorious.
With respect to the first issue, there is no dispute that, as a
rule, and unless the trial court directs otherwise, the bail
bond posted by an accused remains in force at all stages of

the case until its final determination. Now, in this case, since
the trial court, immediately after the promulgation of
judgment (and without waiting for the finality thereof), issued
a commitment
528
528
order despite petitioners being out on bail, petitioner should
have challenged the legality of such commitment order.
However, instead of doing so, petitioner, after having been
properly advised by counsel on the effects and consequences
of probation, voluntarilyand with the assistance of counsel
filed an application for probation, along with an affidavit of
recognizance and an application for release on recognizance
of his counsel. Petitioners actuations thus foreclosed his
right to appeal.
Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, pertaining to the grant of probation,
was amended by P.D. 1990 in order to make appeal and
probation mutually exclusive remedies.3 Thus, Sec. 4
provides specifically that (T)he filing of the application (for
probation) shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
The purpose of the amendment [of Sec. 4 of P.D. 968 by P.D.
1990] was, precisely, to prohibit an application for probation
if the accused has perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction [and vice versa].
xxx
xxx
xxx
P.D. No. 1990 [which took effect on January 15, 1986] was
issued when it was observed that even if a persons
conviction was finally affirmed after he had exhausted the
appeal process (usually up to this Court), he nevertheless
could still apply for probation and thus in effect undo such
affirmance. To prevent loss of time, money, and effort on the
part of the State in this wasteful exercise, the law was
amended to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies. (Bernardo vs. Balagot, supra.)
And that is only right since the legal positions behind appeal
and probation, respectively, are diametrically opposed. This
is because an accused applying for probation is deemed to
have accepted the judgment. In fact, x x x the application
for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction and x x x the application for probation is
considered a waiver upon his part to
_____________
3 Bernardo vs. Balagot, G.R. No. 86561, November 10, 1992,
215 SCRA 526; J. Isagani A. Cruz, ponente. See also Salgado
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89606, August 30, 1990, 189
SCRA 304.
529
529
file an appeal, x x x4
Thus, in this case, the petitioners application for probation
had the effect of a final determination of his case, and the
cancellation of his bail bond. Therefore, the respondent Court
of Appeals could not have done otherwise than to affirm the
trial courts order of July 15, 1992 for petitioners immediate
confinement after promulgation of judgment, in view of the
subsequent application for probation which rendered the said
judgment final and immediately executory.
As for the second issue, although petitioner insists on faulting
the courts a quo for denying his motion to withdraw his
application for probation and rejecting his notice of appeal,
his position is nonetheless untenable. The respondent Court
of Appeals correctly held that the trial courts order of
November 20, 1992, denying the petitioners motion to
withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice
of appeal, partook of the nature of an order granting
probation, which is not appealable.
Inasmuch as (P)robation is a mere privilege and its grant
rests upon the discretion of the court x x x (and) the grant of
probation is x x x not automatic or ministerial,5 and

considering further that (a)n order granting or denying
probation shall not be appealable,6 therefore, the appellate
Court correctly affirmed the trial courts order of November
20, 1992, and denied the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, etc.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, this Court
Resolves to DENY the instant petition, petitioner having failed
to show any reversible error committed by the respondent
appellate Court. No costs.
Romero (Acting Chairman), Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
______________
4 Yusi vs. Morales, supra.
5 Bernardo vs. Balagot, supra., pp. 532-533.
6 Last paragraph, Sec. 4, P.D. No. 968, as amended.
530
530
Municipality of Candijay, Bohol vs. Court of Appeals
Notes.Order of the court granting or denying probation is
not appealable. (Heirs of the Late Francisco Abueg vs. Court
of Appeals, 219 SCRA 78 [1993])
Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is
mandatory before an accused can be granted bail. (Santos
vs. Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56 [1995]) Cal vs. Court of Appeals,
251 SCRA 523, G.R. No. 114343 December 28, 1995
G.R. No. 84850. June 29, 1989.*

RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and LEON GAW, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probation; Under Section
4 of PD 968, trial court could grant an application for
probation at any time after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant.It will be noted that under Section 4
of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could grant an application for
probation at any time after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and certainly after an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction. Thus, the filing
of the application for probation was deemed[to constitute]
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As amended by PD No. 1257,
Section 4 now provides the period during which an
application for probation may be granted and that is after the
trial court shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
but before he begins to serve his sentence.Examination of
Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that
it had established a prolonged but definite period during
which an application for probation may be granted by the
trial court. That period was: After [the trial court] shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to
serve his sentence. Clearly, the cut-off time
commencement of service of sentencetakes place not only
after an appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction, but even after judgment has been rendered by
the appellate court and after judgment has become final.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As further amended by PD
No. 1990, the period established under Section 4 for the filing
of an application for probation is after the trial court shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant and within the
period for perfecting an appealOn 5 October 1985,
however, Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 was once
again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1990. In sharp contrast
with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its present
form, Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during
which an application for probation may be filed with the trial
court: after [the trial court] shall have convicted and

sentenced a defendant andwithin
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
567
VOL. 174, JUNE 29, 1989
567
Llamado vs. Court of Appeals
the period for perfecting an appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 4 in its
present form expressly prohibits the grant of an application
for probation if the defendant has perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction.As if to provide emphasis, a new
proviso was appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that
expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation
if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment
of conviction. It is worthy of note too that Section 4 in its
present form has dropped the phrase which said that the
filing of an application for probation means the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal. The deletion is quite logical
since an application for probation can no longer be filed once
an appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending
appeal that would have to be withdrawn.
Same; Same; Same; Appeal; The period for perfecting an
appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court
is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the
judgment appealed from.-The period for perfecting an
appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 19 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines for the Implementation of
B.P. Blg. 129 and under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, or more specifically Section 5 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Court, is fifteen (15) days from
the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from. It
is also clear from Section 3 (a) of Rule 122 that such appeal is
taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal with the
Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment appealed
from and by serving a copy thereof upon the People of the

Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado had
manifested orally and in open court his intention to appeal at
the time of promulgation of the judgment of conviction, a
manifestation at least equivalent to a written notice of appeal
and treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument that the phrase within
the period for perfecting an appeal did not really mean to
refer to the fifteen day period established by BP Blg. 129, the
Interim Rules and Guidelines Implementing BP Blg. 129 and
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure but rather to some
vague and undefined time, not persuasive.We find
ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments
of petitioners counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are
unable to persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands,
in
568
568
authorizing the trial court to grant probation upon
application by [the] defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal and in reiterating in the proviso that no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction, did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day
period established, as indicated above, by B.P. Blg. 129, the
Interim Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, but rather to some
vague and undefined time, i.e., the earliest opportunity to
withdraw the defendants appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Interpretation; Whereas clauses invoked
by petitioner did not refer to the fifteen-day period neither do
they form part of a statute.The whereas clauses invoked by
petitioner did not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day period.
There was absolutely no reason why they should have so
referred to that period for the operative words of Section 4
already do refer, in our view, to such fifteen-day period.
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly

speaking; they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the
extent they articulate the general purpose or reason
underlying a new enactment, in the present case, an
enactment which drastically but clearly changed the
substantive content of Section 4 existing before the
promulgation of P.D. No. 1990. Whereas clauses, however,
cannot control the specific terms of the statute; in the instant
case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990 do not purport to
control or modify the terms of Section 4 as amended.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probation Law is not a penal
statute; Courts have no authority to invoke liberal
interpretation or the spirit of the law where the words of the
statute themselves leave no room for doubt on
interpretation.Turning to petitioners invocation of liberal
interpretation of penal statutes, we note at the outset that
the Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however,
understand petitioners argument to be really that any
statutory language that appears to favor the accused in a
criminal case should be given a liberal interpretation.
Courts, however, have no authority to invoke liberal
interpretation or the spirit of the law where the words of
the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of
that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do
not believe that the spirit of law may legitimately be
invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and
definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law.
569
VOL. 174, JUNE 29, 1989
569
The true legislative intent must obviously be given effect
by judges and all others who are charged with the application
and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to
bear in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the
intent that is to be given effect are to be derived from the
words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some
external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and

transcending the words of the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Argument that the Court of Appeals had
no jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation and
should have remanded instead the records to the lower court,
not persuasive.Petitioner finally argues that since under
Section 4 of Probation Law as amended has vested in the trial
court the authority to grant the application for probation, the
Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the same
and should have (as he had prayed in the alternative)
remanded instead the records to the lower court. Once more,
we are not persuaded. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case when petitioner perfected his appeal. The Court of
Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand the case
except for execution of judgment. Moreover, having invoked
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at
liberty casually to attack that jurisdiction when exercised
adversely to him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the
conclusion that we have reached, that is, that petitioners
right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for
petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia
Finance Corporation. Together with Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr.,
President of the same corporation, petitioner Llamado was
prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in
Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 49. The two (2) had co-signed a postdated check
payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of
P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for lack of
sufficient funds.
570
570
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted
the petitioner alone, since jurisdiction over the person of
Pascual, who had thoughtfully fled the country, had not been
obtained. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay a fine
of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Petitioner was also required to reimburse
respondent Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of
suit.
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was
read to him, petitioner through counsel orally manifested that
he was taking an appeal. Having been so notified, the trial
court on the same day ordered the forwarding of the records
of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July 1987, petitioner
through his counsel received from the Court of Appeals a
notice to file his Appellants Brief within thirty (30) days.
Petitioner managed to secure several extensions of time
within which to file his brief, the last extension expiring on 18
November 1987.1
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellants Brief was
being finalized by his then counsel of record, sought advice
from another counselor. On 30 November 1987, petitioner,
with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in the Regional
Trial Court a Petition for Probation invoking Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not, however,
accepted by the lower court, since the records of the case
had already been forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a
Manifestation and Petition for Probation dated 16
November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition for
Probation that he had submitted to the trial court. Petitioner
asked the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation
or, in the alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial
court, together with the records of the criminal case, for
consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
At the same time, petitioner prayed that the running of the
period for the filing of his Appellants Brief be held in

abeyance until after the Court of Appeals shall have acted on
his Petition for Probation.
_______________
1 Records on Appeal, p. 21.
571
VOL. 174, JUNE 29, 1989
571
In a Manifestation and Motion dated 3 March 1988 and filed
with the Court of Appeals, petitioner formally withdrew his
appeal conditioned, however, on the approval of his Petition
for Probation.2
Complying with a Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment stating that it
had no objection to petitioner Llamados application for
probation. Private respondent-complainant, upon the other
hand, sought and obtained leave to file a Comment on
petitioner Llamados application for probation, to which
Comment, petitioner filed a Reply. Private respondent then
filed his Com-ment on the Office of the Solicitor Generals
Comment of 18 March 1988.
In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of Appeals,
through Mr. Justice Magsino, denied the Petition for Probation.
A dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while
Mr. Justice Santiago submitted a concurring opinion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which Motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals on 23 August 1988, with
another, briefer, dissenting opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.
Petitioner now asks this Court to review and reverse the
opinion of the majority in the Court of Appeals and. in effect,
to accept and adopt the dissenting opinion as its own.
The issue to be resolved here is whether or not petitioners
application for probation which was filed after a notice of
appeal had been filed with the trial court, after the records of
the case had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the
Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file Appellants
Brief, after several extensions of time to file Appellants Brief

had been sought from and granted by the Court of Appeals
but before actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D. No.
968, as amended.
P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of 1976, was
promulgated on 24 July 1976. Section 4 of this statute
provided as follows:
_______________
2 Records on Appeal, pp. 41-42.
572
572
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of
said defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the
appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable. (Italics supplied)
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial
court could grant an application for probation at any time
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
and certainly after an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction. Thus, the filing of the application for
probation was deemed[to constitute] automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal.
On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended
by P.D. No. 1257 so as to read as follows:

sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his
sentence and upon his application, suspend the execution of
said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the
court of the filing of the application for probation and he may
submit his comment on such application within ten days from
receipt of the notification.
term of imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if
an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction.
The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending
appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is filed
573
VOL. 174, JUNE 29, 1989
573
on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court,
said application shall be acted upon by the trial court on the
basis of the judgment of the appellate court. (Italics
supplied)
Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No.
1257, reveals that it had established a prolonged but definite
period during which an application for probation may be
granted by the trial court. That period was: After [the trial
court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but
before he begins to serve his sentence. Clearly, the cut-off
timecommencement of service of sentencetakes place
not only after an appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction, but even after judgment has been rendered by
the appellate court and after judgment has become final.
Indeed, in this last situation, Section 4, as amended by P.D.
No. 1257 provides that the application [for probation] shall

be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment
of the appellate court; for the appellate court might have
increased or reduced the original penalty imposed by the trial
court. It would seem beyond dispute then that had the
present case arisen while Section 4 of the statute as
amended by P.D. No. 1257 was still in effect, petitioner
Llamados application for probation would have had to be
granted. Mr. Llamados application for probation was filed
well before the cut-off time established by Section 4 as then
amended by P.D. No. 1257.
On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the Probation Law
of 1976 was once again amended. This time by P.D. No. 1990.
As so amended and in its present form, Section 4 reads as
follows:
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
conviction.
term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed
574
574
a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable. (Italics supplied)
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257,
in its present form, Section 4 establishes a much narrower
period during which an application for probation may be filed

with the trial court: after [the trial court] shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant andwithin the period
for perfecting an appeal.As if to provide emphasis, a new
proviso was appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that
expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation
if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment
of conviction. It is worthy of note too that Section 4 in its
present form has dropped the phrase which said that the
filing of an application for probation means the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal. The deletion is quite logical
since an application for probation can no longer be filed once
an appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending
appeal that would have to be withdrawn.
In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today (and at the
time petitioner Llamado was convicted by the trial court), to
the instant case, we must then inquire whether petitioner
Llamado had submitted his application for probation within
the period for perfecting an appeal. Put a little differently,
the question is whether by the time petitioner Llamados
application was filed, he had already perfected an appeal
from the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, under Section 39 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 19 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 and under
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, or more
specifically Section 5 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Court, is fifteen (15), days from the promulgation or notice of
the judgment appealed from. It is also clear from Section 3
(a) of Rule 122 that such appeal is taken or perfected by
simply filing a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court
which rendered the judgment appealed from and by serving
a copy thereof upon the
575
VOL. 174, JUNE 29, 1989
575

People of the Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado
had manifested orally and in open court his intention to
appeal at the time of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent to a written
notice of appeal and treated as such by the Regional Trial
Court.
Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase period for
perfecting an appeal and the clause if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction found
in Section 4 in its current form, should not be interpreted to
refer to Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court; and that the
whereas or preambulatory clauses of P.D. No. 1990 did not
specify a period of fifteen (15) days for perfecting an
appeal.3 It is also urged that the true legislative intent of
the amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should not apply to petitioner
who filed his Petition for probation at the earliest opportunity
then prevailing and withdrew his appeal.4
_______________
3 These clauses read:
WHEREAS, it has been the sad experience that persons who
are convicted of offenses and who may be entitled to
probation still appeal the judgment of conviction even up to
the Supreme Court, only to pursue their application for
probation when their appeal is eventually dismissed.
WHEREAS, the process of criminal investigation, prosecution,
conviction and appeal entails too much time and effort, not
to mention the huge expenses of litigation, on the part of the
State;
WHEREAS, the time, effort and expenses of the Government
in investigating and prosecuting accused persons from the
lower courts up to the Supreme Court, are often times
rendered nugatory when, after the appellate court finally
affirms the judgment of conviction, the defendant applies for
and is granted probation;
WHEREAS, the probation was not intended as an escape
hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the
administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first
opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and

rehabilitated.
WHEREAS, it becomes imperative to remedy the problems
above-mentioned confronting our probation system.
4 Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 12.
576
576
Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr.
Justice Bellosillo in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner then asks
us to have recourse to the cardinal rule in statutory
construction that penal laws [should] be liberally construed
in favor of the accused, and to avoid a too literal and strict
application of the proviso in P.D. No. 1990 which would
defeat the manifest purpose or policy for which the
[probation law] was enacted. We find ourselves unable to
accept the eloquently stated arguments of petitioners
counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are unable to
persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in
authorizing the trial court to grant probation upon
application by [the] defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal and in reiterating in the proviso that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
conviction. did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day
period established, as indicated above, by B.P. Blg. 129, the
Interim Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, but rather to some
vague and undefined time, i.e., the earliest opportunity to
withdraw the defendants appeal. The whereas clauses
invoked by petitioner did not, of course, refer to the fifteenday period. There was absolutely no reason why they should
have so referred to that period for the operative words of
Section 4 already do refer, in our view, to such fifteen-day
period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly
speaking; they are not part of the operative language of the
statute.5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the
extent they articulate the general purpose or reason

underlying a new enactment, in the present case, an
enactment which drastically but clearly changed the
substantive content of Section 4 existing before the
promulgation of P.D. No. 1990. Whereas clauses, however,
cannot control the
_______________
5 Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 US 174
(1889); 33 L Ed 302. See also Idaho Commission on Human
Rights v. Campbell, 506 P. 2d 112; 95 Id. 215 (1973).
577
VOL. 174, JUNE 29, 1989
577
specific terms of the statute; in the instant case, the whereas
clauses of P.D. No. 1990 do not purport to control or modify
the terms of Section 4 as amended. Upon the other hand, the
term period for perfecting an appeal used in Section 4 may
be seen to furnish specification for the loose language first
opportunity employed in the fourth whereas clause.
Perfection of an appeal is, of course, a term of art but it is a
term of art widely understood by lawyers and judges and
Section 4 of the Probation Law addresses itself essentially to
judges and lawyers. Perfecting an appeal has no sensible
meaning apart from the meaning given to those words in our
procedural law and so the law-making agency could only
have intended to refer to the meaning of those words in the
context of procedural law.
Turning to petitioners invocation of liberal interpretation of
penal statutes, we note at the outset that the Probation Law
is not a penal statute. We, however, understand petitioners
argument to be really that any statutory language that
appears to favor the accused in a criminal case should be
given a liberal interpretation. Courts, however, have no
authority to invoke liberal interpretation or the spirit of the
law where the words of the statute themselves, and as
illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for
doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that the spirit of

law may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words
which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by
our procedural law. The true legislative intent must
obviously be given effect by judges and all others who are
charged with the application and implementation of a
statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however,
that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given
effect are to be derived from the words actually used by the
law-maker, and not from some external, mystical or
metajuridical source independent of and transcending the
words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a strict
interpretation rather than a liberal one to Section 4 of the
Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. Strict
and liberal are adjectives which too frequently impede a
disciplined and principled search for the meaning which the
law-making authority projected when it promulgated the Ian578
578
guage which we must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in
the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose
on a mans face. The Court is simply reading Section 4 as it is
in fact written. There is no need for the involved process of
construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process
made necessary only because petitioner rejects the
conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the
statute. The first duty of a judge is to take and apply a
statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise,
as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance of Manila
warned, confusion and uncertainty in application will surely
follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the
law much more difficult to achieve:
x x x [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which
tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular
judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly
harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the

law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given
matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted
interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as
found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words here and
inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what
the legislature ought to have done or what parties should
have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and
coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their
clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until
it has been submitted to some court for its interpretation and
construction.6
The point in this warning may be expected to become
sharper as our peoples grasp of English is steadily
attenuated.
There is another and more fundamental reason why a judge
must read a statute as the legislative authority wrote it, not
as he would prefer it to have been written. The words to be
given meaning whether they be found in the Constitution or
in a statute, define and therefore limit the authority and
discretion of the judges who must apply those words. If
judges may, under
_______________
6 29 Phil. at 188 (1915); Italics supplied.
579
VOL. 174, JUNE 29, 1989
579
cover of seeking the true spirit and real intent of the law,
disregard the words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges
will effectively escape the constitutional and statutory
limitations on their authority and discretion. Once a judge
goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of the words of
the legislative authority, he is essentially on uncharted seas.
In a polity like ours which enshrines the fundamental notion
of limiting power through the separation and distribution of

powers, judges have to be particularly careful lest they
substitute their conceptions or preferences of policy for that
actually projected by the legislative agency. Where a judge
believes passionately that he knows what the legislative
agency should have said on the particular matter dealt with
by a statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the
conclusion that therefore that was what the law-making
authority was really saying or trying to say, if somewhat
ineptly. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:
Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large.
They are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial
function in its particular exercise in the field of interpretation.
They are under the constraints imposed by the judicial
function in our democratic society. As a matter of verbal
recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in
construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words
used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power
which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature.
The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren
of the need for discipline in observing the limitations. A judge
must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract
it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making
might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation
and evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation. He
must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense of
internal contradictions. x x x7
Petitioner finally argues that since under Section 4 of
Probation Law as amended has vested in the trial court the
authority
_______________
7 Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia
Law Review 527 (1947); Reprinted in 4 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction (4th ed. 1972) 409 at 416-417. Italics supplied.
580
580

to grant the application for probation, the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and should have (as
he had prayed in the alternative) remanded instead the
records to the lower court. Once more, we are not persuaded.
The trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner
perfected his appeal. The Court of Appeals was not,
therefore, in a position to remand the case except for
execution of judgment. Moreover, having invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at liberty
casually to attack that jurisdiction when exercised adversely
to him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the
conclusion that we have reached, that is, that petitioners
right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. No. 04678 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed.
Notes.The conditions which trial courts may impose in a
probation may be classified into general or mandatory and
special or discretionary. (Baclayon vs. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148.)
Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts
to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the
probationers constitutional rights are not jeopardized.
(Baclayon vs. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148.) Llamado vs. Court of
Appeals, 174 SCRA 566, G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989
No. L-59298. April 30, 1984*

FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON, petitioner, vs. HON. PACITO G.
MUTIA, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Plaridel,
Misamis Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Probation; Conditions which a court may
impose on a probationer classified into mandatory or general
and special or discretionary. The latter should be exercised
realistically and purposively to rehabilitate the probationer.
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a
probationer may be classified into general or mandatory and
special or discretionary. The mandatory conditions,
enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law, require that
the probationer should (a) present himself to the probation
officer designated to undertake his supervision at such place
as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt
of said order, and (b) report to the probation officer at least
once a month at such time and place as specified by said
officer. Special or discretionary conditions are those
additional conditions, listed in the same Section
______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
149
VOL. 129, APRIL 30, 1984
149
Baclayon vs. Mutia
10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may additionally
impose on the probationer towards his correction and
rehabilitation outside of prison. The enumeration, however, is
not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and
enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as
long as the probationers constitutional rights are not
jeopardized. There are innumerable conditions which may be
relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed
in their specific individual context. It should, however, be
borne in mind that the special or discretionary conditions of
probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to help
the probationer develop into a law-abiding and selfrespecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with
flexibility in their application and each case should be judged
on its own meritson the basis of the problems, needs and
capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the
probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to
stipulate instead unrealistic terms.
Same; Same; Court may not impose as a condition for grant
of probation that probationer should not continue her
teaching profession.Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is
the only profession she knows and as such she possesses
special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was designated as
District Guidance Coordinator and always designated as
District-in-Charge whenever the District Supervisor is out of
town. She is usually selected to represent her district in
seminars, meetings and conferences. She also excelled in her
study of Child Study and Development. It also appears that
she is an outstanding member of the Misamis Occidental Girl
Scout Council, having served as Physical Education & Girl
Scout Field Advisor of the District, Adviser of the District Girl
Scout Leaders Association, Adviser of the District Federated
Girl Scout Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource
person in District and Division Level Girl Scout encampments
and re-elected Board Member of the Misamis Occidental Girl
Scout Council. To order the petitioner to refrain from teaching
would deprive the students and the school in general the
benefits that may be derived from her training and expertise.
While it is true that probation is a mere privilege and its grant
rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Equal
regard to the demands of justice and public interest must be
observed. In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and
only calling and profession of petitioner. The law requires that
she devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation during
probation. Yet, to prohibit
150
150

Baclayon vs. Mutia
her from engaging in teaching would practically prevent her
from complying with the terms of the probation.
Same; Accessory penalties are deemed suspended once
probation application is given due course.Respondents
contend that petitioners final conviction carries with it the
accessory penalties in addition to the principal penalty of
imprisonment; and since petitioner was sentenced to arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, she must likewise suffer the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office and from the right
to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. This cannot apply
to petitioner, however, because she was granted probation.
The imposition of her sentence of imprisonment was thereby
suspended and necessarily, the imposition of the accessory
penalties was likewise thereby suspended.
Same; Judgments; Same.An order placing defendant on
probation is not a sentence but is rather in effect a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final
judgment but is rather an interlocutory judgment in the
nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant
under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be
followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of
the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of
sentence if the conditions are violated.
PETITION to review by certiorari the order of the Municipal
Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental. Mutia, J.
Morlando J. Gonzaga for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
This is a petition to review by certiorari the order dated
December 21, 1981 of respondent Pacito G. Mutia,1 then
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court (now Municipal Trial
Court) of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, which imposed as a
________________
1 He has since been appointed as and is now the incumbent
City Fiscal of Oroquieta City.
151
VOL. 129, APRIL 30, 1984
151
Baclayon vs. Mutia
condition in granting probation to petitioner Florentina L.
Baclayon that she refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of
Serious Oral Defamation by the then Municipal Court of
Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, then presided by respondent
Pacito G. Mutia for having quarrelled with and uttered
insulting and defamatory words against Remedios Estillore,
principal of the Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate
Court) and the appellate court, taking into account the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of her rank and age and the fact
that the crime was committed in the office of the
complainant in the public school building of Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties during office hours, increased the
penalty imposed by respondent judge and sentenced
petitioner to one year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional in its minimum period.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981. On
the same date petitioner applied for probation with
respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation
Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation Report favorably
recommended the granting of petitioners probation for a
period of three (3) years.
On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order
granting petitioners probation, but modified the Probation
Officers recommendation by increasing the period of
probation to five (5) years and by imposing the following

conditions:
(a) To present herself to the probation officer designated to
undertake her supervision at such place as may be specified
in the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of said
order;
(b) To report to the Probation Office or any specified place
designated by the Probation Officer at least once a month in
person;
(c) To reside at the premise approved by the Probation Officer
152
152
Baclayon vs. Mutia
and not change her residence without prior written approval;
(d) To permit the Probation Officer to visit her house and
place of work or an authorized Social Worker;
(e) To refrain from drinking intoxicating liquor to excess;
(f) To pay the cost;
(g) To satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation
of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of her liberty or
incompatible with her freedom of conscience; and
(h) To refrain from continuing her teaching profession.
Petitioners plea for deletion of the last condition was
rejected by respondent judge. Hence, the petition at bar
alleging grave abuse of discretion in the imposition of the
said condition that petitioner should refrain from continuing
her teaching profession. The petitioner submits that said
condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her rights
but is also not in accordance with the purposes, objectives
and benefits of the probation law and prays that the said
condition be deleted from the order granting her probation.
On petitioners motion, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing
the said questioned condition.
The Court finds merit in the petition.

the probationer should (a) present himself to the probation
officer designated to undertake his supervision at such place
as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt
of said order, and (b) report to the probation officer at least
once a month at such time and place as specified by said
officer. Special or discretionary conditions are those
additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the
Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on
the probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation
outside of prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive.
Probation statutes
153
VOL. 129, APRIL 30, 1984
153
Baclayon vs. Mutia
are liberal in character2 and enable courts to designate
practically any term it chooses as long as the probationers
constitutional rights are not jeopardized.3 There are
innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the
rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific
individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that
the special or discretionary conditions of probation should be
realistic, purposive and geared to help the probationer
develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual.
Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their
application and each case should be judged on its own merits
on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the
probationer.4 The very liberality of the probation should not
be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic
terms.
Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is the only profession she
knows and as such she possesses special skills and
qualifications. Thus, she was designated as District Guidance
Coordinator and always designated as District-in-Charge
whenever the District Supervisor is out of town. She is usually
selected to represent her district in seminars, meetings and
conferences. She also excelled in her study of Child Study

and Development. It also appears that she is an outstanding
member of the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council, having
served as Physical Education & Girl Scout Field Advisor of the
District, Adviser of the District Girl Scout Leaders Association,
Adviser of the District Federated Girl Scout Barangay Troop
Committee, acts as resource person in District and Division
Level Girl Scout encampments and reelected Board Member
of the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council. To order the
petitioner to refrain from teaching would deprive the
students and the school in general the benefits that may be
derived from her training and expertise. While it is true that
probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely
_______________
2 Balleta, Jr. vs. Judge Leviste, 92 SCRA 719; Santos To vs.
Pao, 120 SCRA 8; Yusi vs. Morales, 121 SCRA 853.
3 Charles Newman, Sourcebook on Probation, Parole and
Pardons, Third Edition, p. 129.
4 Sergio F. Go., The Period and Conditions of Probation, p. 43,
(1977 Probation Seminar).
154
154
Baclayon vs. Mutia
upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.5 Equal regard
to the demands of justice and public interest must be
observed.6 In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and
only calling and profession of petitioner. The law requires that
she devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation during
probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching
would practically prevent her from complying with the terms
of the probation.
Respondents contend that petitioners final conviction carries
with it the accessory penalties in addition to the principal
penalty of imprisonment; and since petitioner was sentenced
to arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision

correccional in its minimum period, she must likewise suffer
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
This cannot apply to petitioner, however, because she was
granted probation. The imposition of her sentence of
imprisonment was thereby suspended and necessarily, the
imposition of the accessory penalties was likewise thereby
suspended.
An order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather in effect a suspension of the
imposition of sentence.7 It is not a final judgment but is
rather an interlocutory judgment in the nature of a
conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the
supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by
a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the
probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of
sentence if the conditions are violated.8
In view of all the foregoing, the Court grants the petition and
hereby orders that paragraph (h) of the questioned order
______________
5 Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92.
6 Ibid.
7 Commonwealth ex rel. Paige vs. Smith, 198 A. 812, 813,
815, 130 Pa. Super. 536.
8 Ibid.
155
VOL. 129, APRIL 30, 1984
155
Baclayon vs. Mutia
granting probation which requires that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession be deleted. The
temporary restraining order is hereby made permanent. No
costs.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la
Fuente, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Notes.A preliminary investigation is necessary to determine
whether probation would serve the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public and the applicant. (Cabatingan vs.
Sandiganbayan, 102 SCRA 187).
Where the application for probation was denied below and on
petition for review in the Supreme Court, the petitioner was
granted parole, his petition for grant of probation becomes
moot and academic. (Sasi vs. People, 108 SCRA 725).
The grant or denial of application for probation does not rest
solely on offenders potentiality to reform, but also on the
observance of demands of justice and public interest.
(Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92).
Withdrawal of application for probation by accused and his
option instead to pursue his appeal from judgment of
conviction should be granted. Withdrawal or waiver of appeal
from conviction after an application for probation is not an
irrevocable matter. (Yusi vs. Morals, 121 SCRA 853).
Denial of probation to an offender for being allegedly not a
penitent offender for his protestation of innocence even after
his conviction by the trial court and the Court of Appeals is
not justified. (To vs. Cruz-Pao, 120 SCRA 8). Baclayon vs.
Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, No. L-59298 April 30, 1984
G.R. No. 67301. January 29, 1990.*

MANUEL V. BALA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO
M. MARTINEZ, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PAUL
AYANG-ANG, Probation Officer, Manila Probation Office No. 4,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Probation; Presidential Decree 1990; No
application for probation shall be granted if defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction;
Presidential Decree 1990, not to be given retroactive effect.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1990, which amends section 4 of P.D. 968, clearly states that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction. However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is
inapplicable. P.D. 1990 which went in force on January 15,
1985 can not be given retroactive effect because it would be
prejudicial to the accused.
______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
460
460
Bala vs. Martinez
Same; Criminal Procedure; Probation Law; Expiration of
proba-tion period alone does not automatically terminate
probation, a final order of discharge from the court is
required.Probation is revocable before the final discharge of
the probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioners
submission. Section 16 of PD 968 is clear on this score: Sec.
16. Termination of Probation.After the period of probation
and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of
the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge
of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms
and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is
deemed terminated. Thus the expiration of the probation
period alone does not automatically terminate proba-tion.
Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in
the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by the
court of an order of final discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such
issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed
terminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probation period may be
shortened or made longer but not to exceed the period set in
the law.The period of probation may either be shortened or
made longer, but not to exceed the period set in the law. This
is so because the period of probation, like the period of
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the
rehabilitation of the probationer. In the instant case, a review
of the records compels a revocation of the probation without
the need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after
all, would only be an exercise in futility. If we render justice
now, why should we allow the petitioner to further delay it.
Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible
society. Precisely he was granted probation in order to give
him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him
hope___hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately,
he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He
thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Revocation of Probation; An order
revoking probation or modifying the terms thereof is
unappealable.At any time during the probation, the court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for
violation of any of the conditions of proba-tion. The
probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately
be brought before the court for a hearing which may be
informal and summary, of the violation charged. x x x If the
violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his
probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the
court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence
originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of proba461
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
461
Bala vs. Martinez

tion or modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not
be appealable.
Same; Same; Same; Probation is a mere privilege and rests
on the courts sound discretion.Lastly, probation is a mere
privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or immunity conferred
by law on a person or group of persons, not enjoyed by
others or by all; special enjoyment of a good or exemption
from an evil; it is a special prerogative granted by law to
some persons. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely
upon the discretion of the court. This discretion is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. If the
probationer has proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of
the petitioner, the State is not barred from revoking such a
privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is
lessened if probation is not revoked.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is vested
in the court, not in the judges; Probationers change of
residence did not divest the RTC of Manila of jurisdiction over
the probation case.In criminal cases, venue is an element
of jurisdiction. Such being the case, the Manila RTC would not
be deprived of its jurisdiction over the probation case. To
uphold the petitioners contention would mean a depreciation
of the Manila courts power to grant probation in the first
place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioneraccused applied for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he
was a resident of Las Pias, as he is up to now, although in a
different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved
from BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision, 33 Jingco Street,
also in Las Pias. On the other hand, pursuing the petitioners
argument on this score to the limits of its logic would mean
that his probation was null and void in the first place,
because then the Manila CFI was without jurisdiction to grant
him probation as he was a resident of Las Pias. x x x It is
therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioners change of
abode compels change of venue, and necessarily, control
over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC of his
new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional
trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known

as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las Pias is one
among the municipalities included in the National Capital
Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. Needless
to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila
Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region. Accordingly, the various
branches of the regional trial courts of Makati or Manila under
the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-equal
courts, the totality of which is only one
462
462
Bala vs. Martinez
Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in
the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the
branch or judge. Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of
Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and
supervision over the probation of the petitioner.
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to review the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Br. 20, Martinez, J.
Coronel Law Office for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order seeks the reversal of the order dated April 2, 1984 of
the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court
(RTC), of Manila, Branch XX.1 The decretal portion of the
assailed order reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons above-stated, the motion to
dismiss and/or strike out motion to revoke probation, filed by
Manuel Bala, thru counsel, should be, as it is hereby DENIED,
for lack of merit.
Let the motion be set for continuation of hearing on April 25

& 27, at 8:30 oclock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and
substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen which
had been attached to her United States of America passport,
with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine
public or official document. On January 3, 1978, the trial
court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case No.
24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public
document. The dispositive portion of the judgment states:
_______________
1 Judge Antonio M. Martinez, presiding.
463
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
463
Bala vs. Martinez
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Manuel Bala y Valdellon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of falsification of a public or offical
document defined and penalized under article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he
is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less
than ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY and not exceeding
THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS & TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS
of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P1,800.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of
P8.00 for each day, and to pay the cost. He shall be credited
with the period of preventive imprisonment that he may have
undergone in accordance with law.
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of
Appeals, on April 9, 1980, affirmed in toto the lower courts
decision.
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for
execution of judgment,2 the petitioner applied for and was
granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated
August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under

probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms
and conditions enumerated therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked
his supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his
residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las
Pias, specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer
verbally granted the probationers request as he found
nothing objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioners probation, it should have
expired on August 10, 1983,3 one year after the order
granting the same was issued. But, the order of final
discharge could not be issued because the respondent
probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the
conduct of his charge.
On December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the
Philippines, through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of
Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the
petitioner before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge.4 The
motion alleged that
_______________
2 Rollo, 3.
3 Id., 8.
4 Id., 156.
464
464
Bala vs. Martinez
the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his
probation.
On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the
motion on the ground that he was no longer under
probation,5 his probation period having terminated on August
10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason
existed to revoke the same, he contended.
As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscals motion to

revoke the petitioners probation, the respondent probation
officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel
Balas probation, at the same time attaching his progress
report on supervision dated January 5, 1984.6 The same
motion, however, became the subject of a Manifestation,
dated January 30, 1984, which stated that the probation
officer was not pursuing the motion to terminate dated
January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a supplemental
report7 which recommended the revocation of probation in
the light of new facts, information, and evidences.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or
strike out the motion to revoke probation, questioning the
jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his
probation period had already expired. Moreover, his change
of residence automatically transferred the venue of the case
from the RTC of Manila to the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Makati which latter court includes under its jurisdiction the
Municipality of Las Pias, the probationers place of
residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which provides:
Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. xxx
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place
under the jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall
be transferred to the Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance of that place, and in such a case, a copy of the
probation order, the investigation report and other pertinent
records shall be furnished to said Executive Judge.
Thereafter, the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the
probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect
to him that was previously possessed by the court which
granted the proba_______________
5 Id., 156.
6 Id., 127.
7 Id., 89.
465
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
465
Bala vs. Martinez
tion.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1990, which amends section 4 of P.D. 968, clearly states that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D.
1990 which went in force on January 15, 1985 can not be
given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial to the
accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and
denied was the motion to dismiss and/or strike out the
motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the issue
of the petitioners transfer of residence. The motion did not
touch on the issue of the timeliness to revoke probation. The
respondent judge has not yet heard and received evidence,
much less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor
General submits that the present petition is premature.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the
probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioners
submission.
Section 16 of PD 9688 is clear on this score:
Sec. 16. Termination of Probation.After the period of
probation and upon consideration of the report and
recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order
the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he
has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and
thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not
automatically terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto
termination of probation found in the provisions of the
probation law. Probation is not co-terminous with its period.
There must first be issued by the court of an order of final
discharge based on the report and recommendation of the

probation offi_______________
8 P.D. 968 (1976), Section 8.
466
466
Bala vs. Martinez
cer. Only from such issuance can the case of the probationer
be deemed terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made
longer, but not to exceed the period set in the law. This is so
because the period of probation, like the period of
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the
rehabilitation of the probationer. In the instant case, a review
of the records compels a revocation of the probation without
the need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after
all, would only be an exercise in futility. If we render justice
now, why should we allow the petitioner to further delay it.
Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible
society. Precisely he was granted probation in order to give
him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him hope
hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he
has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He thus
wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release
of the probationer because he (probation officer) is in the
best position to report all information relative to the conduct
and mental and physical condition of the probationer in his
environment, and the existing institutional and community
resources that he may avail himself of when necessary.
Indeed, it is the probation officer who primarily undertakes
the supervision and reform of the probationer through a
personalized, individualized, and community-based
rehabilitation program for a specific period of time. On the
basis of his final report, the court can determine whether or
not the probationer may be released from probation.
We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer

had neglected to submit his report and recommendation. For,
as earlier discussed, without this report, the trial court could
not issue the order of final discharge of the probationer. And
it is this order of final discharge which would restore the
proba-tioners suspended civil rights. In the absence of the
order of final discharge, the probation would still subsist,
unless otherwise revoked for cause and that is precisely what
we are going to do. We are revoking his probation for cause.
The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it,
consented to be emancipated from the yoke if not stigma of a
prison
467
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
467
Bala vs. Martinez
sentence, pledging to faithfully comply with the conditions of
his probation, among which are:
xxx
4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of
society;
xxx
6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and
rehabilitation that will be prescribed by the Probation
Officer.9
These conditions, as the records show, were not complied
with. This non-compliance has defeated the very purposes of
the probation law, to wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender
by providing him with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a
prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.10
By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has
ridiculed the probation program. Instead of utilizing his
temporary liberty to rehabilitate and reintegrate himself as a
productive, law abiding, and socially responsible member of
society, he continued in his wayward waysfalsifying public

or official documents.
Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XXX,
convicted the petitioner, along with two other persons,
Lorenzo Rolo y Punzalan and Efren Faderanga y Fesalbon, for
falsification of public and/or official documents (U.S.
Passports), under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the
Revised Penal Code, in five separate informations, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 29100, 29101, 29102, 29103, and 29107. The
trial court imposed upon each of them in all five (5) cases a
prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four (4) years also of prision correccional, as
maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000, the
________________
9 Order, Crim. Case No. 24443, dated August 11, 1982, rollo,
24.
10 P.D. No. 968, sec. 2.
468
468
Bala vs. Martinez
accessory penalties thereof, and to pay the costs. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
RTC with modification by granting restitution of the amounts
they collected from the offended private parties. The
judgment has since become final. As a matter of fact, for
failure of the petitioner to appear for execution of judgment
despite notice, the trial court ordered the arrest of Manuel
Bala on July 10, 1989. A warrant of arrest against Bala was
issued on July 12, 1989 and this warrant has not yet been
implemented because Bala absconded. These facts are
evident and constitute violations of the conditions of his
probation. Thus, the revocation of his probation is compelling.
At any time during the probation, the court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of a probationer for violation of any of
the conditions of probation. The probationer, once arrested
and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court

for a hearing which may be informal and summary, of the
violation charged. x x x If the violation is established, the
court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the
conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the
probationer to serve the sentence originally imposed. An
order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms
and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.11 (Italics
supplied.)
The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the
probationer be arrested so that he can serve the sentence
originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period of
one year is of no moment, there being no order of final
discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. Neither can there be
a deduction of the one year probation period from the
penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months,
and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order
placing the defendant on probation is not a sentence, but
is in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence.12
It is not a final judgment but an interlocutory judgment in
the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the
_______________
11 Id., sec. 15.
12 Baclayon v. Mutia, G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129
SCRA 148.
469
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
469
Bala vs. Martinez
court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment
of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied
with, or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated.13
Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar
benefit or immunity conferred by law on a person or group of
persons, not enjoyed by others or by all; special enjoyment of
a good or exemption from an evil; it is a special prerogative
granted by law to some persons.14 Accordingly, the grant of

probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. This
discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.15 If the probationer has proven to be unrepentant,
as in the case of the petitioner, the State is not barred from
revoking such a privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the
offense is lessened if probation is not revoked.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner argues that his
transfer of residence automatically transferred jurisdiction
over his probation from the Manila Regional Trial Court to the
same court in his new address.
We disagree.
In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction.16 Such
being the case, the Manila RTC would not be deprived of its
jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold the
petitioners contention would mean a depreciation of the
Manila courts power to grant probation in the first place. It is
to be remembered that when the petitioner-accused applied
for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of
Las Pias, as he is up to now, although in a different
subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved from BF
Homes to Philam Life Subdivision, 33 Jingco Street, also in
Las Pias.17 On the other hand, pursuing the petitioners
argument on this score to the limits of its logic would mean
that his probation was null and void in the first place,
because then the Manila CFI was without jurisdic_______________
13 Supra, 154.
14 WORDS AND PHRASES, Vol. 33, p. 734.
15 Tolentino v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 63400, March 18, 1983, 121
SCRA 92.
16 Ragpala v. Tubod, G.R. No. 15375, 109 Phil. 373.
17 Rollo, 29.
470
470
Bala vs. Martinez

tion to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las Pias.
It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioners
change of abode compels change of venue, and necessarily,
control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC
of his new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the
regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
Las Pias is one among the municipalities included in the
National Capital Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at
Makati.18 Needless to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati,
like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region.19 Accordingly, the
various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati or
Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and
co-equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional
Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the
branch or judge.20 Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of
Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and
supervision over the probation of the petitioner.
The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained
permission to transfer residence from his probation officer.
This would not suffice; the law is very explicit in its
requirement of a prior court approval in writing. Section 10 of
PD 968 categorically decrees that the probationer must
xxx
(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to
change his residence without its prior written approval;
xxx
Further, such written approval is required by the21 probation
order of August 11, 1982 as one of the conditions of
probation, to wit:
_______________
18
19
20
21
BP 129, sections 13 and 14.

Id., section 13.
Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, October 26, 1967,
SCRA 519, 524
21 Rollo, 137.
471
VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990
471
Bala vs. Martinez
(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Pias and not to change said
address nor leave the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila
for more than twenty-four (24) hours without first securing
prior written approval of his Probation Officer.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the
expeditious administration of justice, we revoke the probation
of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his
probation, instead of remanding the case to the trial court
and having the parties start all over again in needless
protracted proceedings.22
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of
the petitioner is hereby REVOKED. Further, the trial court is
ORDERED to issue a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner
and for him to serve the sentence originally imposed without
any deduction. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Note.Grant or denial of an application for probation does
not rest solely on offenders potentiality to reform but also on
the observance of demands of justice and public interest.
(Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92.)
o0o Bala vs. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459, G.R. No. 67301
January 29, 1990
G.R. No. 89606. August 30, 1990.*

AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, (Fourteenth Division) and HON. ANTONIO SOLANO,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Quezon City
(Branch 86) and FRANCISCO LUKBAN, respondents.
Probation; Appeals; Judgment; Filing by the respondent of an
application for probation is deemed a waiver of his right to
appeal; Case at bar.There is no question that the decision
of October 16, 1986 in Criminal Case No. Q-33798 finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
serious physical injuries had become final and executory
because the filing by respondent of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of his right to appeal (See
Section 4 of P.D. 968). Likewise, the judgment finding
petitioner liable to private respondent for P126,633.50 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as consequential damages
had also become final because no appeal was taken
therefrom. Hence, it is beyond the power of the trial court to
alter or modify.
Same; Same; Same; The pronouncement in Apalisok case
that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case
should not be given a literal meaning; Penalties; Civil liability
arising from criminal offense; The offender shall continue to
be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence.
The pronouncement in Apalisok that probation affects only
the criminal aspect of the case should not be given a literal
meaning. Interpreting the phrase within the context of that
case, it means that although the execution of sentence is
suspended by the grant of probation, it does not follow that
the civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished. This
can be inferred from a reading of the text of the Apalisok
case where the issue that was involved therein was whether
a grant of probation carries with it the extinction of the civil
liability of the offender. The reason for ruling that the grant of
probation does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender
is clear, (T)he extinction or survival of civil liability are
governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the Revised Penal
Code where under Article 113 thereof provides that: x x x,
the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil

liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
305
VOL. 189,AUGUST 30, 1990
305
Salgado vs. Court of Appeals
consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not
been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty,
pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason. In
the instant case, the issue is not the survival or extinction of
the civil liability of a probationer but, whether or not the trial
court may impose as a condition of probation the manner in
which a probationer may settle his civil liability against the
offended party during the period of probation.
Same; Same; Same; Conditions that may be imposed in
probation; Limitation not to jeopardize the rights of the
accused.In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito
G. Mutia, et al., G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA
148, We ruled that the conditions listed under Section 10 of
the Probation Law are not exclusive. Courts are allowed to
impose practically any term it chooses, the only limitation
being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of
the accused. Courts may impose conditions with the end that
these conditions would help the probationer develop into a
law-abiding individual. Thus, The conditions which trial
courts may impose on a probationer may be classified into
general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The
mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the
Probation Law, require that probationer should a) present
himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his
supervision at such place as may be specified in the order
within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and b) report to
the probation officer at least once a month at such time and
place as specified by said officer. Special or discretionary
conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the same

Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may
additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction
and rehabilitation outside of prison. The enumeration,
however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in
character and enable courts to designate practically any term
it chooses as long as the probationers constitutional rights
are not jeopardized. There are innumerable conditions which
may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer when
viewed in their specific individual context. It should, however,
be borne in mind that the special or discretionary conditions
of probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to help
the probationer develop into a law-abiding and selfrespecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with
flexibility in their application, and each case should be judged
on its own meritson the basis of the problems, needs and
capacity of the probationer. x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Primary consideration in granting
probation.The primary consideration in granting probation
is the reformation of the probationer. That is why, under the
law, a post
306
306
sentence investigation, which is mandatory, has to be
conducted before a person can be granted probation to help
the court in determining whether the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be
served by the granting of the probation (Alvin Lee Koenig,
Post Sentence Investigation, Its Importance and Utility, IBP
Journal, Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 381387).
CRUZ, J., separate opinion:
Probation; Execution; Appeal; Considering that the decision
was never appealed, the trial judge had no authority to defer
the immediate enforcement of the civil award.I submit that
the trial judge had no authority to in effect defer the

immediate enforcement of the civil award of P176,633.50 by
requiring the probationer to pay it at the rate of only
P2,000.00 a month, a paltry amount, indeed, considering the
total obligation. The fact that the victim accepted the
payments did not validate the condition, which was void ab
initio as far as he was concerned. At any time he saw fit, he
could have disregarded that condition as an invalid
amendment of the decision and demanded the immediate
issuance of a writ of execution for the full amount of the civil
award.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Ernesto L. Pineda for petitioner.
Lukban, Vega, Lozada & Associates for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15493
entitled, Agustin Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano, et al.,
which affirmed the Order dated December 22, 1987 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 86) sustaining its
previous order dated November 18, 1987 directing the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability of
herein petitioner in Criminal Case No. 0-33798.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical
injuries in Criminal Case No. 0-33798 entitled, People of the
307
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990
307
Philippines v. Agustin Salgado, before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 86). After trial, judgment was
rendered on October 16, 1986 finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive

portion of the decision, states:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused AGUSTIN P.
SALGADO, JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
serious physical injuries, defined and penalized under
paragraph 3 Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, and
appreciating in his favor the following mitigating
circumstances:
1) voluntary surrender; and
2) No intention to commit so grave a wrong
hereby sentence (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment for
a period of four (4) months and twenty (20) days, with the
accessories provided for by law, and to indemnify the victim,
Francisco Lukban, Jr.,in the sum of P126,633.50 as actual or
compensatory damages,and the sum of P50,000.00 as
damages for the incapacity of Francisco Lukban to pursue
and engage in his poultry business.
SO ORDERED. (p. 19, Rollo)
On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application for
probation with the trial court. The application was granted in
an Order dated April 15, 1987. The order contained, among
others, the following condition:
x x x.
4. Indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a
monthly installment of P2,000.00 (TWO THOUSAND PESOS)
every month during the entire period of his probation. (p.
15, Rollo)
For the months of May, June, July, August, September and
October, 1987, petitioner complied with the above condition
by paying in checks the said sum of P2,000.00 monthly,
through the City Probation Officer, Perla Diaz Alonzo. Private
respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. voluntarily accepted the
checks and subsequently encashed them (p. 19, Rollo).
On September 19, 1987, private respondent Francisco
Lukban, Jr. filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution for the enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in
his favor in the criminal case. The motion was opposed by
the petitioner.
308
308
On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order
granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was
denied on December 22, 1987. After the denial of his motion
for reconsideration, the petitioner filed directly with this
Court a petition for review of the trial courts order granting
the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. We referred
the petition to the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April
13, 1988 (p. 18, Rollo).
On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming the order of the trial court granting the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but respondent Court
of Appeals denied the motion in a resolution dated August 3,
1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review
which was filed on September 26, 1989 and raised the
following assignment of errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ORDER DATED APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE
DECISION OF OCTOBER 16, 1986 AS FAR AS THE CIVIL
ASPECT IS CONCERNED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONDITION IN THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR
ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE OFFENDER IS
UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. (p. 10,
Rollo)
In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting
private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, respondent Court of Appeals advanced three (3)
reasons: 1) that the decision dated October 16, 1986 had
become final and executory and the judge who rendered the
decision cannot lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear
that the probation law provides only for the suspension of

sentence imposed on the accused; that it has absolutely no
bearing on his civil liability and that none of the conditions
listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law relates to civil
liability; and 3) that private respondent is not estopped
because he had nothing to do with
309
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990
309
the filing and the granting of the probation.
There is no question that the decision of October 16, 1986 in
Criminal Case No. Q-33798 finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries had
become final and executory because the filing by respondent
of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of his right
to appeal (See Section 4 of P.D. 968). Likewise, the judgment
finding petitioner liable to private respondent for
P126,633.50 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
consequential damages had also become final because no
appeal was taken therefrom. Hence, it is beyond the power of
the trial court to alter or modify. In the case of Samson v.
Hon. Montejo, L-18605, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 419, 422423 cited by respondent appellate court, it was held:
x x x, once a decision becomes final, even the court which
rendered it cannot lawfully alter or modify the same (Rili, et
al. v. Chunaco, et al., G.R. No. L-6630, Feb. 29, 1956),
especially, considering the fact that, as in the instant case,
the alteration or modification is material and substantial
(Ablaza v. Sycip, et al., L-12125, Nov. 23, 1960). In the case
of Behn, Meyer & Co., v. J. Mcmicking, et al., 11 Phil. 276,
(cited by respondents), it was held that where a final
judgment of an executory character had been rendered in a
suit the mission of the court is limited to the execution and
enforcement of the said final judgment in all of its parts and
in accordance with its express orders. The judgment in
question is clear, and with the amended writ of execution,
the liability of petitioner is greatly augmented, without the

benefit of proper proceeding. (Italics ours)
We do not believe, however, that the order dated April 15,
1987 granting the application for probation and imposing
some conditions therein altered or modified the decision
dated October 16, 1986. The April 15, 1987 Order of the trial
court granting the application for probation and providing as
one of the conditions therein that petitioner indemnify
private respondent P2,000.00 monthly during the period of
probation did not increase or decrease the civil liability
adjudged against petitioner but merely provided for the
manner of payment by the accused of his civil liability during
the period of probation.
It is the submission of private respondent that in the case of
Budlong v. Apalisok, No. 60151, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA
935,
310
310
We already ruled that (T)he conviction and sentence clause
of the statutory definition clearly signifies that probation
affects only the criminal aspect of the case.
The pronouncement in Apalisok that probation affects only
the criminal aspect of the case should not be given a literal
meaning. Interpreting the phrase within the context of that
case, it means that although the execution of sentence is
suspended by the grant of probation, it does not follow that
the civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished. This
can be inferred from a reading of the text of the Apalisok
case where the issue that was involved therein was whether
a grant of probation carries with it the extinction of the civil
liability of the offender. The reason for ruling that the grant of
probation does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender
is clear, (T)he extinction or survival of civil liability are
governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the Revised Penal
Code where under Article 113 thereof provides that: x x x,
the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil
liability resulting from the crime committed by him,

notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not
been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty,
pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason. In
the instant case, the issue is not the survival or extinction of
the civil liability of a probationer but, whether or not the trial
court may impose as a condition of probation the manner in
which a probationer may settle his civil liability against the
offended party during the period of probation.
Respondent appellate court ruled that Section 10 of the
Probation Law enumerates thirteen (13) conditions of
probation not one of which relates to the civil liability of the
offender (p. 22,Rollo).
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of
1976) provides:
Sec.4. Grant of Probation.Subject to the provisions of this
sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his
sentence and upon his application, suspend the execution of
said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best.
311
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990
311
In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia,
et al., G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148, We
ruled that the conditions listed under Section 10 of the
Probation Law are not exclusive. Courts are allowed to
impose practically any term it chooses, the only limitation
being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of
the accused. Courts may impose conditions with the end that
these conditions would help the probationer develop into a
law-abiding individual. Thus,

probationer should a) present himself to the probation officer
designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may
be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said
order, and b) report to the probation officer at least once a
month at such time and place as specified by said officer.
Special or discretionary conditions are those additional
conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the Probation
Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside
of prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive.
Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts
to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the
probationers constitutional rights are not jeopardized. There
are innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the
rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific
individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that
the special or discretionary conditions of probation should be
realistic, purposive and geared to help the probationer
develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual.
Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their
application, and each case should be judged on its own
meritson the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of
the probationer. x x x.
The primary consideration in granting probation is the
reformation of the probationer. That is why, under the law, a
post sentence investigation, which is mandatory, has to be
conducted before a person can be granted probation to help
the court in determining whether the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be
served by the granting of the probation (Alvin Lee Koenig,
Post Sentence Investigation, Its Importance and Utility, IBP
Journal, Special
312
312
Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 381-387). In the case of

People v. Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 26 p. 2d, 457, 458 (1933),
among those which has to be ascertained is the financial
condition and capacity of the offender to meet his
obligations:
x x x there can be no real reformation of a wrong-doer
unless there is at least a willingness on his part to right the
wrong committed, and the effect of such an act upon the
individual is of inestimable value, and to a large extent,
determines whether there has been any real reformation. To
be clearly consonant with such a purpose,the post sentence
investigation must include a financial examination of the
offenders capability in order to work out a system of
payment which can effectively accomplish reimbursement
without interfering with the defendants family and other
financial responsibilities, according to U.S. Model Penal Code
of the American Law Institute. x x x. (Sec. 301.1 Comments
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954; Also 2 U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney Generals Survey of Release Procedures 38 (1939)
cited in The Period and Conditions of Probation by Sergio F.
Go, IBP Journal Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp.
406-420). (Italics ours)
The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in
the order granting probation as it may deem best. As
already stated, it is not only limited to those listed under
Section 10 of the Probation Law. Thus, under Section 26,
paragraph (d) of the Rules on Probation Methods and
Procedures, among the conditions which may be imposed in
the order granting probation is:
Sec.26. Other conditions of Probation. The Probation Order
may also require the probationer in appropriate cases, to:
x x x
(d) comply with a program of payment of civil liability to the
victim or his heirs x x x.
However, this is not to say that the manner by which the
probationer should satisfy the payment of his civil liability in
a criminal case during the probation period may be
demanded at will by him. It is necessary that the condition
which provides for a program of payment of his civil liability
will address the offenders needs and capacity. Such need

may be ascertained from the findings and recommendations
in the post-sentence investigation report submitted by the
Probation Officer after investigation of the financial capacity
of the offender and that
313
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990
313
such condition is to the end that the interest of the state and
the reformation of the probationer is best served.
In the instant case, in the absence of any showing to the
contrary, it is presumed that when the trial court issued the
order of April 15, 1987, the condition that the petitioner has
to pay private respondent P2,000.00 a month for the
satisfaction of the civil liability adjudged against him was
recommended by the probation officer who prepared the
post-sentence investigation and that such condition is, in the
judgment of the trial court, deemed best under the
circumstances.
Counting from April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the
order granting probation which under the law is also the date
of its effectivity (Sec. 11, P.D. 968), the probation period must
have lapsed by now. Hence, the order for petitioner to
indemnify the private respondent in the amount of P2,000.00
monthly during the period of probation must have also
lapsed. If such were the case, there would therefore, be no
more obstacle for the private respondent to enforce the
execution of the balance of the civil liability of the petitioner.
However, the records are bereft of allegations to this effect.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated
March 16, 1989 of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution as well as the resolution dated August 3,
1989 of the same court are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. Salgado vs. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 304,
G.R. No. 89606 August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO
BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Actions; Death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon.Death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.
Same; Same; The claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be obligation other
than delict.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act
or omission: a)
______________
* EN BANC.
240
240
People vs. Bayotas
Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) x x x x x x x x x; e)
Quasi-delicts.
Same; Same; Where the civil liability survives, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.Where the
civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.

This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
Same; Same; Private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file the separate civil action by
prescription.Finally, the private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.
Same; Same; Death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape.Applying this set of rules to the
case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the
appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas
City, Br. 16.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC
Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape
241
241
People vs. Bayotas

and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal
of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the
National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that
the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v.
Sendaydiego1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved
for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court
on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand,
opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In
support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia2 which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in
the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue
was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein
was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect
both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a
consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
__________________
1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.

2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.
242
242
People vs. Bayotas
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment; With reference to Castillos criminal
liability, there is no question.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said
liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term final judgment. Is it
final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory
order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained
in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed
is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de
1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The code of 1870 x x x it will be observed employs the term
sentencia firme. What is sentencia firme under the old
statute? XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473,
furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de
las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y

plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
Sentencia firme really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as
Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmeden
condena determinada; or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt
of the accused becomesuna verdad legal. Prior thereto,
should the accused die, according to Viada, no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad
criminal de ninguna clase. And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, there cannot be any
243
243
People vs. Bayotas
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony
upon which the civil action might arise exists, for the simple
reason that there is no party defendant. (I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the
same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd
ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term final judgment is similarly
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term final judgment in the
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind
Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant
has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means
judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has
not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against
him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without

reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessity, cover both the criminal and the
civil aspects of the case. People vs. Yusico (November 9,
1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68
Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol.
I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as
the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and
of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability. I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillos
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be
enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we
dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil
aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation
whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a
case where the source thereofcriminal liabilitydoes not
exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et
al., CA-G.R. No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, no party can
be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit, which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding.
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case3 was
adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the
_____________
3 Supra.
244
244
People vs. Bayotas
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al.,4 People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al.5 and People of the Philippines
v. Satorre6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of
the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison

case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having
been established, and considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal
and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code;
Reyes Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v.
Castillo and Ocfemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the
case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar7 and Lamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals8 ruled differently.
In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether
the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died
before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the
extent of barring any claim therefor against his estate. It was
the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the
death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all
criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view
of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out
by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a
civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
__________________
4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.
5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.
6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.
8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.
245
245
People vs. Bayotas
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings
were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of
the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
x x x
xxx
xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its
only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before
final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Italics ours)
xxx
xxx
x x x.
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: Consequently, while the death
of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability
including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains.
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his

conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to
survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since
246
246
People vs. Bayotas
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court9 requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose
death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of
First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal,
when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this
tribunal, the name of the offended party shall be included in
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should
be substituted as defendants-appellants.
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo
to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the
civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated
on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently,
the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with
the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et
al.10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In
this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification
of public documents. Sendaydiegos death supervened
during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiegos appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it
was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent
on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import
of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon

the correctness of Sendaydiegos conviction despite dismissal
of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is
civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July
8, 1977 stating thus:
_________________
9 Section 21. Where claim does not survive.When the
action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and
the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in these rules.
10 Supra.
247
247
People vs. Bayotas
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred
after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and
ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express
waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability
is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and
Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107
Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued

on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24,
1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the
funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank
vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability
for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising
from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal
case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the
Civil Code x x x and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed
to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedents heirs or whether or not his
estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of
Court).
Succeeding cases11 raising the identical issue have
maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other
words, they
_________________
11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204
SCRA 122; Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337,
August 16,
248
248
People vs. Bayotas
were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule
that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil
liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the

entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A
reexamination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to
revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the
criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latters
extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient
to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support
to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a
grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the accuseds civil liability ex delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that
___________________
1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L51625, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 269; Rufo Mauricio
Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357,
November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No. L32507, November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa,
No. L-67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v.
Asibar, No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People
v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and
People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
249
civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be

determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the courts
_________________

249
People vs. Bayotas
which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal
would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil
liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his
conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal
action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction
is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on
this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
before final judgment;
xxx
xxx
x x x.
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the
expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil
action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed
under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been
filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the
outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and
separate one, the prosecution of which does not even
necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings.12 One would
be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering
12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:

x x x this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil
liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of
any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the
crime as such, that is without having to prove the criminal
liability of the defendant so long as his act causing damage
or prejudice to the offended party is proven by
preponderance of evidence.
250
250
People vs. Bayotas
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This
is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In such
cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from
crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action,
such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs
out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared
and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article
30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a
criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental

distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same
as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely,
it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement
to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not
apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiegos appeal will be resolved only for the purpose
of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil
liability for which his estate would be liable.13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil
liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidence adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
charged. Thus, it
________________
13 Supra, p. 134.
251
251
People vs. Bayotas
upheld Sendaydiegos conviction and pronounced the same
as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiegos civil liability, there was a reopening of the
criminal action already extinguished which served as basis
for Sendaydiegos civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977.
In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made
the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor.
Hence, the Courts conclusion:
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
x x x
xxx
x x x.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Courts judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
252
252
People vs. Bayotas
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil
procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority

nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to
civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action
upon the death of the offender. x x x.
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly
be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of
the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must
be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego
was held liable for Sendaydiegos civil liability. What are
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 86,14 are contractual money claims while the claims
involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the
restitution of personal or real property.15
_________________
14 SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed, barred; exceptions.All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counter-claims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and
if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
against the estate, as though the claim had been presented

directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this
case.
253
253
People vs. Bayotas
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what
claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money
and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part
of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal
basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the
criminal action engendered by the death of the accused
pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he
must subject to Section 1, Rule 11116 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as
__________________
16 SECTION 1. Institute of criminal and civil actions.When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes
recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of

the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others.
The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the accused. When the offended
party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual,
is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees
254
254
People vs. Bayotas
amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not
on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate
civil action is premised determines against whom the same
shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from
quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to
person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator17 of the
estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator.No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;

but actions to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala18 where we
held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code,
the same must be filed against the executor or administrator
of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the
claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims
arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money
claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations
other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also
arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed
against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86
of shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof
in court for trial.
__________________
17 Justice Regalado cited the Courts ruling in Belamala that
since the damages sought, as a result of the felony
committed amounts to injury to person or property, real or
personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be claimed
against the executor/administrator and not against the
estate.
18 Ibid.
255
255
People vs. Bayotas
the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.19
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law20
b) Contracts
_______________
19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: The civil
liability may still be pursued in a separate civil action but it
must be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict, except when by statutory provision an independent
civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the
instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil Code. Justice
Regalado stressed that:
Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and
survives the deceased offender where it also arises
simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason
of a contract, as in Torrijos; or from law, as stated in Torrijos
and in the concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in
reference to the Civil Code; or from a quasi-contract; or is
authorized by law to be pursued in an independent civil
action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these exceptions, it
would be unfair and inequitable to deprive the victim of his
property or recovery of damages therefor, as would have
been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the
provincial government in Sendaydiego.
20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil
Code; see related provisions of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 111.
256
256
People vs. Bayotas
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
xxx
xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., On leave.
_______________
21 ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when

they are filed before the court, when there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.
257
257
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
Appeal dismissed.
Note.e outcome or result of the criminal case whether an
acquittal or conviction is inconsequential and will be of no
moment in a civil action for damages based on Article 33 of
the Civil Code. (Diong Bi Chu vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA
554 [1990]) People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, G.R. No.
102007 September 2, 1994
G.R. No. 190610.April 25, 2012.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ,
accused, JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Death of the Accused; It is plain that both the
personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of
fine of Brillantes were extinguished upon his death pending
appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.It is plain that
both the personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary
penalty of fine of Brillantes were extinguished upon his death
pending appeal of his conviction
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
389
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012
389
People vs. Brillantes
by the lower courts. We recite the rules laid down in People v.
Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 (1994), to wit: 1. Death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. 2. Corollarily, the claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission: a) Law; b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts; d) . . . e)
Quasi-delicts.
Same; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002; Civil
Liability; There is no civil liability involved in violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.There is no
civil liability involved in violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. No private offended party is
involved as there is in fact no reference to civil liability in the

decision of the trial court.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; An appeal taken
by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.The
appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his
criminal liability does not have any effect on his co- accused
De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. The Rules on
Criminal Procedure on the matter states: RULE 122Appeal
Section11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.(a)
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jessie Emmanuel A. Vizcarra for accused-appellant.
390
390
RESOLUTION
PEREZ,J.:
Before the Court is an Appeal1 filed by accused-appellant
Jose Brillantes y Lopez (Brillantes) assailing the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No.
30897.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11556, 11557 and 11558
convicting accused Brillantes and Saturnino de la Cruz (De la
Cruz) for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165
entitled An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act Of 2002.3
In the Criminal Case No. 11556, De la Cruz y Valdez was

charged as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city
of Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his
possession, control and custody one (1) plastic sachet
containing shabu weighing more or less 0.1 gram including
plastic container without prescription or authority to possess
the same in violation of the aforecited law.4
On the other hand, Jose Brillantes y Lopez was charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 with illegal sale of
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 40-41.
2 Id., at pp. 2-39. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio,
Jr. with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Ricardo R.
Rosario, concurring.
3 Promulgated on June 7, 2002.
4 Rollo, p. 3.
391
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012
391
shabu and illegal possession of dangerous drug of shabu. The
two separate Informations follow:
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver to a
Public Officer, who acted as poseur buyer 0.1 gram including
plastic container of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
popularly known as shabu, a dangerous drug, without any
license or authority to do so, in violation of the aforecited
law.5
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the City

there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his
possession, control and custody two (2) big plastic sachet
containing shabu weighing more or less 2.6 grams including
plastic container without being authorized and permitted by
law to possess the same in violation of the aforecited law.6
When arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty of the
crimes charged.
The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged
the burden of proof in the cases of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, in this case
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as
shabu. The trial court relied on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty of the police officials
who conducted the buy-bust operation. The dispositive
portion reads:
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 3-4.
6 Id., at p. 4.
392
392
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [the]
accused Saturnino De la Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. 11556 for illegal
possession of shabu with a weight of 0.0619 gram and is
therefore sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1)
DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as maximum and to
pay a fine of P300,000.00.
Accused Jose Brillantes is also found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No.11557 for
illegal sale of shabu and is therefore sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P2,000,000.00. Said accused is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. 11558 for

illegal possession of shabu with an aggregate weight of
0.2351 gram and is therefore further sentenced to serve the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
The contraband subject of these cases are hereby forfeited,
the same to be disposed of as the law prescribes.7
The appellate court found no reason to depart from the ruling
of the trial court. It upheld that all the elements of the
offense of illegal sale of drugs were present and the finding
against Brillantes well established by the prosecution.
Further, it also found that all the elements constituting illegal
possession of prohibited or regulated drugs were established
beyond reasonable doubt to convict De la Cruz and Brillantes.
On all the three charges, great weight was given to the
testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team and
arresting officers SPO3 Rovimanuel Balolong and PO2 Celso
Pang-ag, who also acted as the poseur-buyer.
On 29 July 2009, a Notice of Appeal8 was filed by Brillantes
through counsel before the Supreme Court. His co-accused
De la Cruz, did not appeal his conviction.
_______________
7 CA Rollo, p. 250.
8 Rollo, pp. 40-41.
393
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012
393
While this case is pending appeal, Prisons and Security
Division Officer-in-Charge Romeo F. Fajardo9 informed the
Court that accused-appellant Brillantes died while committed
at the Bureau of Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced
by a copy of death report10 signed by New Bilibid Prison
Hospitals Medical Officer Benevito A. Fontanilla, III.
Hence, we resolve the effect of death pending appeal of his
conviction of accused-appellant Brillantes with regard to his
criminal and pecuniary liabilities.
The Revised Penal Code is instructive on the matter. It

provides in Article 89(1) that:
1.By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
before final judgment.
It is plain that both the personal penalty of imprisonment and
pecuniary penalty of fine of Brillantes were extinguished
upon his death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower
courts.
We recite the rules laid down in People v. Bayotas,11 to wit:
1.Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
_______________
9 Through a Letter dated 3 January 2012 of OIC Romeo F.
Fajardo to the Clerk of Court, Second Division of the Supreme
Court, id., at p. 88.
10 Id., at p. 89.
11 G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 255256.
394
394
2.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
a)Law
b)Contracts
c)Quasi-contracts
d). . .
e)Quasi-delicts
xxx
There is no civil liability involved in violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.12 No private
offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to
civil liability in the decision of the trial court.
The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of
his criminal liability does not have any effect on his coaccused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. The
Rules on Criminal Procedure on the matter states:
RULE 122 Appeal
Section11.Effect of appeal by any of several accused.
(a)An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
the latter; (emphasis ours)
xxx
The extinguishment of Brillantes criminal and pecuniary
liabilities is predicated on his death and not on his acquittal.
Following the provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and
subsequent extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable
to De la Cruz.
_______________
12 R.A. No. 9165.
395
VOL. 671, APRIL 25, 2012
395
WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the
appeal of accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30897 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11557
and 11558 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC,
his criminal and pecuniary liabilities having been

extinguished. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Sereno and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Appeal declared moot and academic in view of the death of
accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez.
Notes.The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where such acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases. (Bax vs. People, 532 SCRA 284 [2007])
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
the latter. (People vs. Gandia, 544 SCRA 115 [2008])
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
based solely thereon; Corollarily, the claim for civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict, in which case an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. (People vs. Ayochok, 629
SCRA 324 [2010]) People vs. Brillantes, 671 SCRA 388, G.R.
No. 190610 April 25, 2012
G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE
PATRIARCA, JR., alias KA DJANGO, CARLOS NARRA, alias
KA JESSIE and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.
Political Law; Amnesty; Amnesty commonly denotes a
general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign
grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by
some breach, the law of nations.Amnesty commonly
denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other
high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense
itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which
he is charged, that the person
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
465
465
People vs. Pariarca, Jr.
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.
Same; Same; Criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its effects.Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its effects.
Same; Same; Pardon; Distinction between pardon and
amnesty.In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference
between pardon and amnesty is given: Pardon is granted by
the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation
of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,
and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence
(Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which
he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Br. 52.
Gil S. Gojol for accused-appellant.
466
466
BUENA, J .:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of Ka
Django, Carlos Narra and Ka Jessie, appeals the decision
of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52,
in Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled People of the Philippines
versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, Carlos Narra, Ka
Jessie, and 21 John Does convicting him of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed

against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias Ka Django, Carlos Narra,
Ka Jessie, et al., charging them of murder committed as
follows:
That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00
oclock in the evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province
of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his
residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabihi, Donsol,
Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO
thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly
caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal
heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with
Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain
Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant,
assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted
considering the substantial identity of the facts and
circumstances of the case.
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30,
1987, the accused, with ten (10) armed companions,
requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted.
They had with them a person who was hogtied. Accused
Patriarca asked that the lights in Maltas house be
extinguished and Malto complied.
467
467
Around 2:00 oclock in the early morning of July 1, 1987,

Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he
saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was
hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two
gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions
to carry away the dead man.
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo
Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his place, together with
the military, on March 29, 1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the
property of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa
Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo.
She knew Patriarca, alias Ka Django, as he told her on
March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military. She,
however, replied that they were only seeking employment.
Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their farm
and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force
(CHDF) in their locality.
After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio
Alcantara that her son was abducted by the New Peoples
Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the
military and looked for him. She was informed by the
residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw
her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water,
and complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA.
After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an
NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her son
Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her
of her sons death in the hands of Ka Django. Consequently, a
Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was
able to identify them as belonging to her son by reason of the
briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used
to print his name on the waistband of his briefs so that it
would not get lost.
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and

Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is a member of
the NPA operat468
468
ing in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the
victims in the three criminal cases filed against him.
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the
accused and imposing the following penalty:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused
Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the
death of Alfredo Arevalo and hereby sentences him to suffer
an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards
Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka
Django, is hereby acquitted.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full
credit of his period of detention.
With cost de-oficio.
SO ORDERED.1
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the
following lone error allegedly committed by the trial court:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED
IN PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation
No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25,
1994, entitled Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and
All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes
Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance
of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and
Creating a National Amnesty Commission. His application

was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.
Attached to appellants brief is the Notice of Resolution of the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated November 17,
1999 which states:
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 56.
469
469
Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty
Commission dated 22 October 1998.2
RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125
of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty
Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.
Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under
the Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in
the following armed activities:
a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay
Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 14 February 1986;
b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at
Barangay Godon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay
Banwang, Gurang, Donsol, Sorsogon in 1987;
d) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer
at Barangay Boroan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in
which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 was filed
against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and
nuisance of the community, at Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09
March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No.
2665 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his
misconducts at San Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12
February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case

No. 2664 was filed against him before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former
member of the CHDF at Sitio Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol,
Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay
captain, at Barangay Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20
September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No. 2663 was
filed against him.
_______________
2 Per Notice of Correction of the NAC dated March 1, 2000
the date reflected in the Notice of Resolution of November
17, 1999 was corrected to October 22, 1999.
470
470
After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims
of the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his
activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It
thus recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his
application for amnesty.
The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22
October 1999, resolved to approve the recommendation of
the Local Amnesty Board.
WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA
PATRIARCA under Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED
for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above, provided
they were committed on or before the date he was captured
on 22 June 1988. Let a Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his
favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall
become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days
from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for
Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party

within said period. 3
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the
National Amnesty Commission, wrote the following letter to
the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca
Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting
herewith the attached copy of RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683
granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was
accused of the following cases:
1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon.
The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the
chief prosecutor of the province, the opportunity to take
whatever action you may
_______________
3 Rollo, pp. 58-59.
471
471
deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of
amnesty shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for
Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party
within said period.
Thank you for your continued support for the Peace

Process.4
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23,
2000 to the National Amnesty Commission, requested
information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration
was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken
by the NAC.5
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote,
among other things, that there has been no motion for
reconsideration filed by any party.6
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty
under Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17, 1996. It amended
Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
Section 1. Grant of Amnesty.Amnesty is hereby granted to
all persons who shall apply therefor and who have or may
have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit
of their political beliefs, whether punishable under the
Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited
to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup detat;
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or
coup detat; disloyalty of public officers or employees;
inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to
commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal
association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such
person; tumults and other disturbances of public order;
unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful
utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed in
furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes
of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59
(desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or
sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94
(various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War;
Provided, That the amnesty
_______________
4 Ibid., p. 63.
5 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
6 Ibid., p. 89.
472
472
shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for
personal ends.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for
their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations.7 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.8
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty,
which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
In the case of People vs. Casido,9 the difference between
pardon and amnesty is given:
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of
an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case

exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal
Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released
by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
_______________
Judgment reversed and set aside, accused-appellant

acquitted. Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664 ordered
dismissed.
Note.Amnesty is the proclamation of the Chief Executive
with the concurrence of Congress and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. (People vs.
Casido, 269 SCRA 360 [1997])
o0o
_______________
7 202 SCRA 844, 867 [1991].

8 Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al, 82 Phil. 642 [1949].
9 269 SCRA 360 [1997].
473
473
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon
accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is
binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the
appeal.10
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in
Griminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime of murder.
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos.
2663 and 2664, which are both filed in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,12 are ordered
DISMISSED. The release of Jose N. Patriarca who is presently
detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is likewise
ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal
cause.
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10)
days his compliance with this decision;
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
10 People vs. Crisola, 128 SCRA 1 [1984].

11 In the decision rendered by the trial court on January 20,
1998, accused-appellant had already been acquitted in
Criminal Case Nos. 2665 and 2672 for failure of the
prosecution to prove accuseds guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
12 See letter of Judge Honesto A. Villamor of the Regional
Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated May 31,
1999; Rollo, p. 28.
474
474
Amnesty and Pardon as Modes of Extinguishing Criminal
Liability Revisited
ANNOTATION
AMNESTY AND PARDON AS MODES OF EXTINGUISHING
CRIMINAL LIABILITY REVISITED
JULIANA C. AZARRAGA*
1.Definitions, p. 474
2.Amnesty distinguished from pardon, p. 475
3.Legal basis, p. 476
A.Constitution, p. 476
B.Statutes, p. 476
4.Presidential Act of clemency not subject to judicial review.
Exceptions, p. 477
5.Nature of the power of the President to grant executive

clemency, p. 478
A.Types of pardon, p. 478
B.Nature of pardon, p. 478
C.Pardon to be extended only after conviction by final
judgment, p. 478
6.A review of Philippine laws on Presidential pardons, p. 479
7.Principle behind the requirement of final conviction, p.
481
8.Essence of pardon, p. 481
9.Presidential clemency of pardon not limited to criminal
cases, p. 482
10.Effects of pardon, p. 484
_______________
1. Definitions
Amnesty is defined as an act of sovereign power granting
oblivion or pardon for a past offense, and is rarely, if ever,
exercised in favor of a single individual, and is usually
exerted in behalf of cer_______________
* Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City.
475
475
Liability Revisited
tain classes of persons, who are subject to trial but have not
yet been convicted (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S. 602).
Pardon is an act of grace proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the
individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the
law inflicts for the crime he has committed (Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code).
2. Amnesty distinguished from pardon

should take judicial notice. Pardon is one granted after
imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised
Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes
and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense (Barrioquinto vs.
Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 [1949]).
Pardon does not alter the fact that accused is a recidivist,
because it produces the extinction only of the personal
effects of the penalty (U.S. vs. Satelo, 28 Phil. 147 [1914]).
Amnesty makes an ex-convict no longer a recidivist because
it obliterates the last vestige of the crime (U.S. vs. Francisco,
10 Phil. 185 [1908]).
Both do not extinguish the civil liability of the offender (Art.
113, Revised Penal Code).
476
476
Liability Revisited
Examples of Presidential Proclamations granting amnesty are
Presidential Proclamation No. 51, dated January 28, 1948, by
Pres. Manuel Roxas, granting amnesty to those who
collaborated with the enemy during World War II (44 O.G.

408); Proclamation No. 76, dated June 21, 1948, by Pres.
Elpidio Quirino, extending amnesty to the Huks and PKM
(Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid), who committed
rebellion, sedition, illegal association, etc. (44 O.G. 1794);
and Proclamation No. 347, entitled Granting Amnesty to
Rebels, Insurgents, And All Other Persons Who Have Or May
Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes
Committed In Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations Of
The Articles of War, And Creating A National Amnesty
Commission, issued on March 25, 1994.
3. Legal basis
A. Constitution,
Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress.
B. Statutes.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
x x x
xxx
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty
and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon,
x x x
x x x.
477
477
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4. Presidential Act of clemency not subject to judicial
review. Exceptions
In the case of Taada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103
Phil. 1051 (1957), the Court said:
Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and wellestablished principle is considered that it is not within the
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of
legislative or executive action. Where therefore, discretionary
powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the
manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to
judicial review. The courts, therefore concern themselves only
with the question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and
executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases
their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public
or political policy. These considerations of public or political
policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate
constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise
authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute,
but, within these limits, they do permit the departments,
separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts
exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations,
together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not
be traversed in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution
of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).
xxx
xxx
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or
that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. x x x x x x Thus, the Legislature
may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or
submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people.
The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not
merely because they involve political question, but because
they are matters which the people have by the Constitution
delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the
powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as
he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power
conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not
primarily because they are of a political nature, but because

the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter
under his control. But every officer under a constitutional
478
478
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government must act according to law and subject him to the
restraining and controlling power of the people, acting
through the courts, as well as through the executive or the
Legislature. One department is just as representative as the
other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged
with the special duty of determining the limitations which the
law places upon all official action. x x x x x x.
5. Nature of the power of the President to grant executive
clemency
Executive clemency is a matter within the exclusive
prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should
not be unduly insulated against any tenuous importunity.
Pardon as an act of Executive clemency.
A. Types of pardon .
1. Absolute Pardon
2. Conditional Pardon.
B. Nature of pardon .
A pardon, whether absolute or conditional, is in the nature of
a deed, for the validity of which delivery is an indispensable
requisite. Until accepted, all that may have been done is a
matter of intended favor and may be cancelled. But once
accepted by the grantee, the pardon already delivered
cannot be revoked by the authority which granted it.
C. Pardon to be extended only after conviction by final
judgment .
Rule:
The conviction by final judgment limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of an appeal from his conviction by the trial
court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be

acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be
begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned
must require proof from the accused that he has not
appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his
appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification
issued by
479
479
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the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The
acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly,
those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the
pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from
confinement (People vs. Salle, Jr., 250 SCRA 581 [1995]).
Pardon extended during the pendency of an appeal or before
conviction by final judgment is void, it being in violation of
Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution (supra ).
6. A review of Philippine laws on Presidential pardons
1. Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act)
Section 21 thereof provides:
SEC. 21. That the supreme executive power shall be vested
in an executive officer, whose official title shall be The
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands . . . He is hereby
vested with the exclusive power to grant pardons and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures. . .
2. Then came the 1935 Constitution, paragraph 6, Section 10,
Article VII of which provides:
(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction, for all offenses, except in case of
impeachment, upon such condition and with such restrictions

and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall
have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress.
This provision differed from the Jones Law in some respects.
Thus, in People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), this Court held:
Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be
granted any time after the commission of the offense, either
before or after conviction (Vide, Constitution of the U.S., Art.
II, section 2; In re: Lontok [1922] 43 Phil. 293). The GovernorGeneral of the Philippines was empowered, like the President
of the United States, to pardon a person before the fact of
the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our
Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of
the State Constitutions,
480
480
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provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised
after conviction.
The requirement of after conviction operated as one of the
limitations on the pardoning power of the President, thus:
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the
exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief
Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after
conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases
of impeachment (Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 38
[1940].
3. The 1973 Constitution went further by providing that
pardon could be granted after final conviction. Section 14 of
Article IX thereof reads as follows:
The Prime Minister may, except in cases of impeachment,
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures, and, with the concurrence of the National
Assembly, grant amnesty.
4. The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution, however,

removed the limitation of final conviction, thereby bringing us
back to the aforementioned provision of the Jones Law.
Section II, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as thus
amended, reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.
But the said limitations was restored by the present
Constitution. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all Members of the Congress
(Emphasis supplied).
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of
conviction, it may be exercised at any time after conviction
even if the judgment is on appeal. It is of course entirely
different where the requirement is final conviction, as
mandated in the original pro481
481
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vision of Section 19, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution or
conviction by final judgment, as presently prescribed in
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a
case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of
conviction becomes final.
7. Principle behind the requirement of final conviction
The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the
conviction by final judgment requirement, reviving in effect
the power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon
Rama, to prevent the President from exercising executive
power in derogation of the judicial power (Record of the

Constitution Commission, Vol. 2, 395).
8. Essence of pardon
The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of
guilt and not forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon
frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless
expressly grounded on the persons innocence, it cannot
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing (Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190 [1989]).
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it
affirms his innocence and makes him a new man and as
innocent as if he had not been found guilty of the offense
charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not
truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from
all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby
restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and
unstained character prior to the finding of guilt (Garcia vs.
Chairman, Commission on Audit, 226 SCRA 356 [1993]).
a) When judgment of conviction becomes final.
(a) When no appeal is seasonably perfected; (b) when the
accused commences to serve the sentence; (c) when the
right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where
the death penalty was imposed by the trial court; and (d)
when the accused applies for probation.
482
482
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b) Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal,
and has not therefore attained finality, executive clemency
may not be granted (People vs. Salle, Jr., supra ).
9. Presidential clemency of pardon not limited to criminal
cases
In Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844, supra, the Court held:
We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why

the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support
the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases.
Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, in meritorious cases, x x x, the
President may commute or remove administrative penalties
or disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in
disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he
may impose in the interest of the service.
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a
subject of deliberations was the proposed amendment to
Article VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows: However, the
power to grant executive clemency for violation of corrupt
practices laws may be limited by legislation. The
Constitutional Commission, however, voted to remove the
amendment, since it was in derogation of the powers of the
President, x x x.
The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President
from protecting his cronies. Manifestly, however, the
Commission preferred to trust in the discretion of Presidents
and refrained from putting additional limitations on his
clemency powers (II RECORD of the Constitutional
Commission, 392, 418-419, 524-525).
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
therefore, that the Presidents executive clemency powers
may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already
provided in the Constitution, that is, no pardon, amnesty,
parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election
laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President
without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC (Art.
IX, C, Sec. 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty
criminally in
483

483
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court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty
administratively should likewise be extended the same
benefit.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to
convict an individual is beyond reasonable doubt, but the
Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the
act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts
him from punishment therefor. On the other hand, in
administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is
mere substantial evidence to support a decision, not to
mention that as to the admissibility of evidence,
administrative bodies are not bound by the technical and
rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will
therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty
administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon
or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in
the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of
the public (p. 34, Comment of Public Respondent).
Of equal importance are the following provisions of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987, Section 1, Book III of which provides:
SECTION 1. Power of Control.The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships.
Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other
laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
Administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined
as follows:
(1) Supervision and Control.Supervision and control shall
include authority to act directly whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of

plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly
provided in the specific law governing the relationship of
particular agencies the control shall encompass supervision
and control as defined in this paragraph. x x x (emphasis
supplied).
e) Limitations on Power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases .
The Court stressed, however, in the same case of Llamas vs.
Orbos, supra, that when it said the President can grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, it refers only to
all administra484
484
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tive cases in the Executive Branch, not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the government.
10. Effects of pardon
Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code provides the effects of
pardon, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.A pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.
A pardon after serving 30 years does not remove perpetual
absolute disqualification.
Suppose a pardon is granted upon a convict undergoing life
imprisonment after serving 30 years. Is the convict likewise
pardoned from the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which is an accessory to life imprisonment?
No, because Article 30 is silent as to the maximum duration
of perpetual disqualification and Article 36 expressly provides
that a pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to
hold public office or the right of suffrage unless such rights

be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. (Guevara)
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I. People vs. Pariarca,
Jr., 341 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 135457 September 29, 2000
G.R. No. 116512. March 7, 1997.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILLIAM
O. CASIDO @ MARIO, and FRANKLIN A. ALCORIN @
ARMAN, accused-appellants.
Pardon; Amnesty; Words and Phrases; Pardon and Amnesty,
Distinguished.Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and
as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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VOL. 269, MARCH 7, 1997
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People vs. Casido
as though he had committed no offense. (italics supplied)
Same; Same; The release of the accused-appellants in the
instant case justified by the amnesty that they applied under,
not by the pardon which was void for having been extended
during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by
final judgment.Accordingly, while the pardon in this case
was void for having been extended during the pendency of
the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and,
therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for
which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid.
This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of
Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June
1994. The release then of accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but
not by the pardon.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bais
City, Br. 45.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellants.
362
362
People vs. Casido
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our Resolution of 30 July 1996, we ruled that the
conditional pardons granted in this case to accusedappellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for
having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the
pendency of their instant appeal, and disposed of the
incident as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused-appellants Urgent Motion To
Withdraw Appeal is hereby DENIED and the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to effect, with the support and
assistance of the Philippine National Police, the re-arrest of
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin who
shall then, forthwith, be reconfined at the New Bilibid Prisons

in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, both within sixty (60) days from
notice hereof, and to submit a report thereon within the same
period. In the meantime, further action on the appeal is
suspended until the re-arrest of the accused-appellants.
The Court further resolves to REQUIRE the officers of the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and
Pardon to SHOW CAUSE, within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof, why they should not be held in contempt of court for
acting on and favorably recommending approval of the
applications for the pardon of the accused-appellants despite
the pendency of their appeal.
In a Comment for the members of the Presidential Committee
for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (hereinafter
Committee), dated 28 August 1996, two members of the
Committees Secretariat, namely, Nilo C. Mariano (Assistant
Chief Prosecutor) and Nestor J. Ballacillo (Solicitor in the
Office of the Solicitor General), submitted the following
explanation in compliance with the above-mentioned
resolution:
1. In line with the confidence building measures of
government, the President on August 11, 1992 constituted
the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon with the Secretary of Justice as the Chairman and
Secretary of National Defense and the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government as members with the directive
to establish guidelines for the grant of bail, re
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VOL. 269, MARCH 7, 1997
363
People vs. Casido
lease or pardon of persons detained or convicted of crimes
against national security and public order and violations of
the Articles of War. Subsequently, membership to the
Committee was expanded to include the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights and a member of the defunct
National Unification Commission who was later on replaced
by the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process.
2. On 9 December 1992, the President issued an amendment

to the guidelines incorporating therein a provision which
reads: Those charged, detained or convicted of common
crimes but who can establish by sufficient evidence that they
have actually committed any of the crimes/offenses
enumerated above may apply for possible grant of bail,
release or pardon under these guidelines.
3. Corollary to the constitution of the Committee, a
Secretariat was also constituted which was tasked to process
and evaluate the applications of those desiring to be granted
pardon or recommended for release or bail under the
aforementioned guidelines and which will recommend to the
Committee those who qualify under the guidelines.
4. The members of the Secretariat are representatives of the
Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, the Board of Pardons and
Parole, the Office of the Chief State Counsel, the Bureau of
Corrections, the Philippine National Police Legal Service, the
Judge Advocates Office-Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Office of the Solicitor General, and the Commission on
Human Rights (Legal Services).
5. In the processing and evaluation of the applications for the
grant of pardon, release or bail, it was the agreement
between the Secretariat and counsels for the applicants who
are usually the lawyers of non-government organizations
(NGOs), such as the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
(TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the KAPATID,
PAHRA, among others, that simultaneous with the processing
of the applications, motions for the withdrawal of the
applicants appeals must be filed by them with this
Honorable Court.
6. With the arrangement, the processing and evaluation of
the applications for the grant of pardon, release or bail by the
committee resulted in the grant of conditional pardon to 123
applicants and absolute pardon to eight (8) applicants as of
June 27, 1994.
7. The applications for conditional pardon of the aforenamed
prisoners were recommended by the Committee to the
President for the grant of Conditional Pardon (after the
Secretariat had evaluated that the former committed the

crimes for which they had been
364
364
People vs. Casido
charged in pursuit of their political belief) per Memorandum
dated May 25, 1995 and approved by the President on
December 29, 1995. The Conditional Pardon paper was
signed by the President on January 19, 1996 and the subject
prisoners (accused-appellants) were released by the Bureau
of Corrections on January 25, 1996.
8. Prior to their release, subject prisoners filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal which was received by the
Supreme Court on January 11, 1996. Unfortunately, the
Committee failed to verify first whether the counsel of the
accused had also withdrawn their appeal or that the NGO
lawyers had filed in their behalf a motion to Withdraw their
Appeal. It was upon the honest belief of the Secretariat that
the NGO lawyers would perform their agreed undertaking,
that the Secretariat indorsed the applications for conditional
pardon of subject prisoners for favorable action by the
Committee, and thereafter by the President.
9. There was no intention on the part of the Secretariat and
the Presidential Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII,
of the Constitution, but that what happened was a clear
misappreciation of fact.
10. The Secretariat/Committee was only prompted to act, as
they did, in their sincere and zealous effort to take part in the
governments confidence building measure geared towards
achieving peace and national reconciliation. To avoid
repetition of grant of presidential clemency under similar
circumstances, the Secre-tariat/Committee will require
applicants for any executive relief to show proof that their
appeal, if any, has been withdrawn and the withdrawal
thereof has been also approved before acting on their
applications as directed by President Fidel V. Ramos in his
handwritten instructions to the Presidential Committee, thru
the Executive Secretary, and upon recommendation of Chief

Presidential Legal Council Rene Cayetano, for the Presidential
Committee to exercise better diligence. (See Annex 1,
and its attachments).
11. The undersigned most respectfully pray for the kind
indulgence and understanding of this Honorable Court on the
matter.
On 18 September 1996, the Court required Hon. Nilo C.
Mariano and Hon. Nestor J. Ballacillo to submit to this Court a
list of the members of the Secretariat who participated in the
deliberations on the accused-appellants application for
pardon and recommended the grant thereof, together with a
certified true copy of the agreement between the Secretariat
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365
People vs. Casido
and the counsel for the applicants for pardon regarding the
filing with the appropriate courts of motions for the
withdrawal of appeals pending therein. Their Compliance,
dated 23 October 1996, stated as follows:
2. A review of the records of the Secretariat indicates that
initially or as of January, 1993, the members of the
Secretariat were:
Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra
DOJ
Assistant Chief State Nilo C. Mariano
DOJ
Executive Director Artemio C. Aspiras
DOJ
State Counsel Teresita L. de Castro
DOJ
Director Eriberto Misa, Jr.
Bureau of Pardon Corrections
Edgardo Dayao
JAGO
Pedro Abella
PNP
Samuel M. Soriano, Jr.

CHR
Imelda B. Devila
National Unification Commission
Nestor J. Ballacillo
OSG
3. On February 9-11, 1995, a Working Group was constituted
to conduct an expeditious review of the cases of prisoners in
the New Bilibid Prison who are alleged to have committed
crime in pursuit of political objectives (Resolution No. 1, of
the Secretariat Working Group).
4. For this purpose, the Working Group consisting of State
Prosecutor Alberto Vizcocho of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), Commissioner Mercedes V. Contreras of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and Andrei Bon C.
Tagum of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) convened for three days or February 9-11,
1995 to review the cases of the political prisoners.
5. Among the cases reviewed by the Working Group were
those of appellants Franklin Alcorin y Alparo and William
Casido y Balcasay.
6. After the review of the cases, the Working Group issued
Resolution No. 1, which states among others that the
prisoners [including Alcorin and Casido] be recommended to
the Secretariat of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of
Conditional Pardon in view of a determination that they were
charged or convicted of
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366
People vs. Casido
crimes that may have been committed in pursuit of political
objectives. (A copy of Resolution No. 1 is attached hereto as
Annex 1).
7. The recommendations on the political prisoners listed in
Resolution No. 1 by the Working Group as well as the
recommendations made by the Secretariat were based on
the undertaking of those representing the political prisoners,
particularly the NonGovernment Organizations (NGOs) such

as, among others, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
(TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), KAPATID and
PAHRA who promised that the corresponding withdrawals of
appeal would be filed with this Honorable Court and other
Courts concerned. This undertaking of the NGOs was
however verbal and not made in writing.
8. In recommending the grant of conditional pardon to Alcorin
and Casido, the members of the Secretariat Working Group
acted in good faith and did not disregard the Resolutions of
this Honorable Court in People vs. Hino, Jr., G.R. No. 110035,
January 31, 1995 and People vs. Salle, (250 SCRA 582,
December 4, 1995). At the time they made the
recommendations or the Working Group issued Resolution
No. 1, the members of the Secretariat and the Working Group
were not aware of the Hino and Salle rulings. Moreover, at
the time the cases were being reviewed, the members of the
Secretariat, were pressed on by members of the NGOs to act
on certain applications for pardon or provisional release with
dispatch. In turn, they made it clear to those following up the
applications that the appropriate withdrawal of appeals
should be filed so that the applications could be acted upon.
9. Believing in good faith that the promise or undertaking of
those who followed up the applications for pardon of Alcorin
and Casido would be complied with as promised, the
members of the Secretariat Working Group did not secure the
written commitment for the withdrawal of the appeal by
accused Alcorin and Casido before their applications for
pardon were reviewed.
Earlier, or on 1 October 1996, the Court received from Hon.
Manuel C. Herrera, Chairman of the National Amnesty
Commission, a letter, dated 26 September 1996 addressed to
Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., wherein the former informed
the Court that the applications for amnesty of accusedappellants Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Casido were
favorably acted upon by the National Amnesty Commission
on 22 February 1996. The body of the letter reads:
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People vs. Casido
We refer to a newspaper article found in the Philippine Daily
Inquirers August 1, 1996 issue. Please be informed that on
February 22, 1996, the National Amnesty Commission
(hereinafter the NAC) favorably acted on the applications
for amnesty of Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Casido.
The NAC was created under Proclamation No. 347 by
President Fidel V. Ramos on March 25, 1994, to receive,
process, and decide on applications for amnesty. Under
Proclamation No. 347 a grant of amnesty shall carry with it
the extinguishment of any criminal liability for acts
committed by the grantee in pursuit of his or her political
beliefs. It also carries with it the restoration of civil or political
rights that may have been suspended or lost by virtue of a
criminal conviction.
In the course of our deliberations, the NAC found that the
applicants are indeed confirmed members of the
CPP/NPA/NDF whose killing of Victoriano Mapa was
committed in pursuit of their political beliefs.
We enclose, for ready reference, copies of the following
documents:
1. Notice of Resolution for Franklin A. Alcorin and William O.
Casido.
2. Proclamation No. 347.
3. Primer on Amnesty under Proclamation Nos. 347 and 348.
In its Comment to the aforesaid letter (submitted in
compliance with our Resolution of 7 October 1996), the Office
of the Solicitor General alleged that the accused-appellants in
this case, in an effort to seek their release at the soonest
possible time, applied for pardon before the Presidential
Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP),
as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty
Commission (NAC); then contended that since amnesty,
unlike pardon, may be granted before or after the institution
of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after
conviction, as held in Barrioquinto v. Fernandez,1 the
amnesty then granted accused-appellants William Casido and

Franklin Alcorin
_______________
1 82 Phil. 642 [1949].
368
368
People vs. Casido
rendered moot and academic the question of the premature
pardon granted to them.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. In
Barrioquinto,2 we stated as follows:
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting
opinion, is predicated on a wrong contention of the nature or
character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished
from pardon.

as though he had committed no offense. (italics supplied)
Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having
been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before
conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the
first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution,
the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily
_______________
2 Supra note 1, at 646-647 (citations omitted).
369
VOL. 269, MARCH 7, 1997
369
People vs. Casido
applied under Proclamation No. 347,3 was valid. This
Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in
Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June 1994.
The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and
Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not
by the pardon.
As to the pardon, we find unsatisfactory the Explanation of
the Secretariat of the Committee. It borders on the absurd
that its members were unaware of the resolutions of this
Court in People v. Hinlo4 and People v. Salle.5 As early as
1991, this Court, in People v. Sepada,6 cited in our Resolution
of 30 July 1996 in this case, already stressed in no uncertain
terms the necessity of a final judgment before parole or
pardon could be extended. Even in their Comment of 28
August 1996, the Members of the Secretariat implied that
they were all the time aware that a pardon could only be
granted after conviction by final judgment; hence, they
required from the lawyers of the applicants the filing with this
Court of motions for the withdrawal of the applicants
appeals. Thus, they cannot plead ignorance of this condition
sine qua non to the grant of pardon. They should have
demanded from the applicants the submission of proof of
their compliance of the requirement before submitting to the
President a favorable recommendation. That alone, at the

very least, could have been the basis of a finding of good
faith. In failing to observe due care in the performance of
their duties, the Members of the Committee caused the
President serious embarrassment and thus deserve an
admonition.
_______________
3 Entitled Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All
Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes
Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance
of Political Ends, and Violations of the Articles of War, and
Creating a National Amnesty Commission, issued by the
President on 25 March 1994.
4 G.R. No. 110035, 31 January 1995.
5 G.R. No. 103567, 4 December 1995.
6 G.R. No. L-47514, 21 March 1991.
370
370
People vs. Casido
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that
the release of accused-appellants William O. Casido and
Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the
amnesty granted them and this case is dismissed with costs
de oficio.
The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of
Bail, Release or Pardon and of its Secretariat are admonished
to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of
their duty to save the President from any embarrassment in
the exercise of his power to grant pardon or parole.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Release of accused-appellants valid due to the grant of
amnesty.
Notes.Executive clemency is a matter within the exclusive
prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should
not be unduly insulated against any tenuous importunity.

(People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994])
The grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal
of the appeals of the other accused does not exempt them
from payment of the civil indemnity since a conditional
pardon does not extinguish the civil liability arising from
crime. (People vs. Nacional, 248 SCRA 122 [1995])
The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the
conviction by final judgment requirement was to prevent
the President from exercising executive power in derogation
of the judicial power. (People vs. Salle, Jr., 250 SCRA 581
[1995])
People vs. Casido, 269 SCRA 360, G.R. No. 116512 March 7,
1997
[No. L-1278. January 21, 1949]

LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and
FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents.
1.AMNESTY; PARDON AND AMNESTY DISTINGUISHED.
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;, while
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon
looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no
case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (article 36,
Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
2.ID. ; REQUISITES TO ENTITLE ONE TO INVOKE BENEFITS OF
AMNESTY ; ADMISSION OF COMMISSION OF OFFENSE NOT
REQUIRED.In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine
qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense
with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a
defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainants, or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Although the accused does not confess the

imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or
the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having
committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the
interested party, conduct sum
643
643
Barrioquinto et al vs. Fernandez et al
mary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and
the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide
whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be
regarded as a patriot or hero who have .rendered invaluable
services to the nation, or not, in accordance with the terms
of the Amnesty Proclamation.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.There is no necessity for an accused to admit
his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before
a court or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend
or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads
not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he
is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty
thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for the
prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is
generally the case in criminal proceedings, and what should
in such a case be determined is whether or not the offense
committed is of political .character. The plea of not having
committed the offense made by an accused simply means
that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because
he is not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show
that He is, because he has committed it in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political motives.
4.ID.; WITHIN JUDICIAL NOTICE.Since the Amnesty
Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the
Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of

the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits
granted therein to cases coming within their province or
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person
charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented
shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
5.ID.; RIGHT TO BENEFITS CANNOT BE WAIVED.The right to
the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence
presented, either by the complainant or prosecution, or by
the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public
interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty
Proclamation, which has the force of law, not only as
innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had
never committed any punishable offense because of the
amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punished as a
criminal.
6.CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE FOR COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE,
How ESTABLISHED.Generally the motive for the commission
of an offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on
the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the
644
644
commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express
it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may
be inf erred. The statement or testimony of a def endant at
the time of arraignment or the hearing of the case about said
motive, can not generally be considered and relied on,
specially if there is evidence to the contrary, as the true
expression of the reason or motive he had at the time of
committing the offense. Because such statement or
testimony may be an afterthought or colored by the interest
he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for which he
intends to achieve with such declaration.
7.MANDAMUS; AMNESTY COMMISSION TO ACT, DUTIES OF.
To hold that an Amnesty Commission should not proceed to
the investigation and act and decide whether the offense

with which an accused was charged comes within the
Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having
committed it, would be to defeat the purpose for which the
Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty
Commissions were established. If the courts have to proceed
to the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the
offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms
of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has
pleaded not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty
Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or
confess- having committed the offense or being responsible
therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty, as
there is no law which makes such admission or confession
not admissible as evidence against him in the courts of
justice in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the
offense does not come within the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of
submitting their case to said Commissions.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.
Roseller T. Lim for petitioners.
Antonio Belmonte for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the
petitioners against the respondents who composed the 14th
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act
and decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the
benefits of amnesty.
645
645
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were
charged with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet
been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and
after trial the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced
Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting

an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware
of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which
grants amnesty in f avor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and
committed during the period from December. 8. 1941, to the
date when each particular area of the Philippines where the
off ense was actually committed was liberated from enemy
control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit
his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by
the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Loreto
Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did
the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty
Commission, presided by the respondents, issued on January
9, 1947, an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding
whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the said
Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as
neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having
committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it
was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim, they
cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by
the President with the concurrence of Congress of the
Philippines, reads in part as follows:
WHEREAS, since the inception of the war and until the
liberation of the different areas comprising the territory of the
Philippines, volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and of other
nationalities operated as guerrillas and other patriotic
individuals and groups pursued activities in. opposition to the
forces and agents of the Japanese Empire in the invasion and
occupation of the Philippines;
646
646
Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez et al.

WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined
efforts to resist the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate
defeat, committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal
Code;
WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts
against many members of these resistance forces, for such
acts;
WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy is not a valid
defense under the laws of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded
as criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who have
rendered invaluable services to the nation; and
WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible
delay, these persons be freed from the indignity and the
jeopardy to which they are now being subjected;
Now, THEREFORE, I, Manuel Roxas, President of the
Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII,
section 10, paragraph 6, of the Constitution, do hereby
declare and proclaim an amnesty in favor of all persons who
committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code
in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed
during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when
each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated
from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall
not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed
from purely personal motives.
It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to
determine who among those against whom charges have
been filed before the courts of the Philippines or against
whom charges may be filed in the future, come within the
terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions,
simultaneously to be established, shall examine the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case and, if necessary,
conduct summary hearings of witnesses both for the
complainant and the accused. These Commissions shall
decide each case and, upon finding that it falls within the
terms of this proclamation, the Commissions shall so declare

and this amnesty shall immediately be effective as to the
accused, who .shall forthwith be released or discharged.
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting
opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or
character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished
from pardon.
private act which .must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice
647
647
Barrioquinto et al, vs. Fernandez et al.
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is
granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
-classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the institution of
the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (article 36,
Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
(Section 10 [6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs.
Blalock, 61 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47
S.E., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 Ga., 285, 296; State ex rel
AnheuserBusch Brewing Assn. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71
S.W., 52, 61; Burdick vs. United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267;
271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we- are of the opinion and so hold
that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine
qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense
with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a
defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation
of the benefits of amnesty is-in the nature of a plea of
648
648
confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not
confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by
the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the
benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested
by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the
witnesses both f or the complainants and the accused, on
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero
who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not,
in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as
well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should
take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the
benefits granted therein to cases coming within their
province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the
person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by theevidence presented, either by the complainant or
prosecution, or by the def ense, can not be waived, because
it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the
Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of a law, not only
as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had
never committed any punishable offense because of the
amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punished as a
criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person
who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not
punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty
thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person
considered by law not a criminal, but a patriot and, hero, for
having rendered invaluable services to the nation in
committing such an act.
649
649
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense
charged was not against chastity and was committed in
furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for
otherwise, it is to be naturally presumed that it has been
committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true
that though the motive as a mental impulse is a state of mind
or subjective, it need not be testified to by the defendant
himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally
the motive for the commission of an offense is established by
the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of the
offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his
motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The
statement or testimony of a defendant at the time of
arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive,
can not generally be considered and relied on, specially if
there is evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of
the reason or motive he had at the time of committing the
offense. Because such statement or testimony may be an
afterthought or colored by the interest he may have to suit

his defense or the purpose for which he intends to achieve
with such declaration. Hence it does not stand to reason and
logic to say, as the dissenting opinion avers, that unless the
defendant admits at the investigation or hearing having
committed the offense with which he is charged, and states
that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy,
and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the
court or Commission to verify the motive for the commission
of the offense, because only the accused could explain his
belief and intention or the motive of committing the offense.
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his
responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before a
court or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or
not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads
not guilty or that he has not committed the act with
650
650
which he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not
guilty thereof- Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for
the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it
is generally the case in criminal proceedings, and what
should in such a case be determined is whether or not the
offense committed is of political character. The plea of not
having committed the offense made by an accused simply
means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged
because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence
would show that he is, because he has committed it in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for
purely political motives.
According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946,
creating the Amnesty Commissions, issued by the President
of the Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First
Instance of the province in which the accused claims the
benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already decided
by said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the appellate

courts, shall be passed upon and decided by the respective
Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall be
passed upon by the Seventh Amnesty Commission. Under the
theory of the respondents and the writer of the dissenting
opinion, the Commissions should refuse to comply with the
directive of said Administrative Order, because in almost all
cases pending in the Court of First Instance, and all those
pending appeal from the sentence of said courts, the
defendants must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having
committed the offense charged, for, otherwise, they would
not or could not have appealed from the judgment of the
Courts of First Instance. To hold that an Amnesty Commission
should not proceed to the investigation and act and decide
whether the offense with which an accused was charged
comes within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit
or confess having committed it, would be to defeat the
purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and
the Amnesty
651
651
Commissions were established. If the courts have to proceed
to the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the
offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms
of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has
pleaded not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty
Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or
conf ess having committed the offense or being responsible
therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty, as
there is no law which makes such admission or confession
not admissible as evidence against him in the courts of
justice in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the off
ense does not come within the terms of .the Amnesty
Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of
submitting their case to said Commissions.
Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto

Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim was shot and
killed by Agapito Hipolito, does not necessarily bar the
respondents from finding, after the summary hearing of the
witnesses for the complainants and the accused. directed in
the said Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No.
11, that the petitioners are responsible for the killing of the
victim, either as principals by cooperation, inducement or
conspiration, or as accessories before as well as after the
fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty,
because they were members ,of the same group of
guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy.
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to
immediately proceed to hear and decide the applications for
amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the
courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and
finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 7. of September 7,
1946. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pars, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
652
652
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
An information for the crime of murder was filed against
petitioners with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga.
Because Barrioquinto was then at large, the information was
dismissed and a separate criminal case was instituted
against him. Jimenez was tried with other accused and
sentenced to life. imprisonment. Within the time for appeal,
Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, dated
September 7, 1946, granting amnesty to all persons who
have committed offenses, in furtherance of the resistance
against the Japanese, and decided to submit his case to the
14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commisison. Barrioquinto, having

been apprehended, did the same.
After the preliminary hearing had started, the Commission
issued on January 9, 1947, an order for the return of the
cases of petitioners to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are
entitled to amnesty, because Barrioquinto stated in his
testimony that it was Hipolito Tolentino who fired at and killed
the offended party. The Commission issued the order upon
the thesis that, for any person to invoke the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation, it is required that he should first
admit having committed the offensive act for which he is
prosecuted.
The text of the Amnesty Proclamation fails to support the
thesis. To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided
by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission only the following
elements are essential: First, that he is charged or may be
charged with an offense penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, except those against chastity or for purely personal
motives; second, that he committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy; and third, that it
was committed during the period from December 8,1941, to
the date when the area where the offense was committed
was actually liberated from enemy control and occupation.
653
653
If these three elements are present in a case brought before
a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, the latter cannot ref use to
hear and decide it under the proclamation. There is nothing
in the proclamation to even hint that the applicant for
amnesty must first admit having executed the acts
constituting the offense with which he is charged or may be
charged.
Upon the facts in this case, petitioners are entitled to have
their applications for amnesty heard and decided by
respondent 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission.
With the revocation of its order of January 9, 1947,

respondent 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission is ordered to
immediately proceed to hear and decide the applications for
amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I am unable to agree with the decision of the Court and shall
briefly state my reasons.
The decision proceeds on the assumption that the Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission refused to hear and decide the
application for amnesty of the present petitioners. I think this
is a mistake. There were examinations of records, hearing
and decisions.
The pleadings and annexes show that hearing was held on
the 9th of January, 1947 in which the two petitioners and
their counsel were present, and one of them, Barrioquinto,
testified, and that it was after that hearing, on the same
date, that the Commission denied their petition in a written
order and directed the clerk to return the expedientes to
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga for its final action.
It is apparent from this order that the Commission acted in
the manner contemplated by Proclamation No. 7. of the
President. The return of the papers to the court merely
follows the procedure provided in the proclamation, which
stipulates that any case now pending or which may be filed
in the future which a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission
654
654
decides as not within the terms of the amnesty shall proceed
in accordance with the usual legal procedures in the courts
without regard to this proclamation.
The proclamation does not prescribe any specific mode of
hearing. That the Commission shall examine the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case is all that is provided
for. In its discretion, the Commission may, if it deems
necessary, hear the witnesses both for the complainant and
the accused. This hearing does not have to be formal; it may

be summary, according to the proclamation. This privilege,
discretionary with the Commission, was afforded the accused
as far as the nature of their defense permitted.
I get the inference from an examination of the orders of the
Commission that the latter went over the record of each
defendants criminal case. These records are, without doubt,
the expedientes which the Commission ordered sent back
to the court. The Commission, we are to presume, read the
exhaustive and well-reasoned decision of the court against
Jimenez and the evidence for and against him on which that
decision is based, The fact that Jimenez and his witnesses
had already given his evidence at length, may well account
for the failure or refusal of the Commission to hear him and
his witnesses further- Only Barrioquinto, whose case had not
yet been tried in the Court of First Instance because he had
escaped, was heard by the Commission. The record of that
hearing consists of 33 written pages.
As to the determination of the pretended right of the
defendants to the benefits of amnesty, the two orders of the
Commission are decisions on the merits, definite and final as
far as the Commission is concerned. The fact that the
defendants denied having committed the crime imputed to
them was cited by the Commission as ground for its decision
to turn down their application. That circumstance was not
given as ground for .refusal to act. Moreover, in the second
order, a lengthy order dictated on the motion
655
655
for reconsideration by Jimenez, additional reasons are stated.
The Commission has thus amply performed the duties
required of it by the Amnesty Proclamation in both the
matters of investigating and deciding. The Commission heard
one accused and examined the evidence introduced and the
decision rendered against the other. With the reasoning by
which the Commission reached its decision, or with the result
of its decision, it is not within the province of the court to

concern itself.
The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities
acting for and in behalf of the President. They are not courts;
they are not performing judicial functions, and this Court has
no appellate jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or
decisions.
Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio
vs. Fernandez, 55 Phil., 814.) The Court can order the
Commission to act but it can not tell the Commission how to
act. How or for whom a case ,should be decided is a matter
of judgment which courts have no jurisdiction to control or
review. And so is the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence.
The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the
exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon a public officer the right and the duty to
exercise judgment. In reference to any matter in which he is
required to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and
not that of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners,
46 Phil., 190.)
In the view I take of the case, it is unneccesary to discuss the
courts premise that there is nothing in the proclamation to
even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit
having executed the acts constituting the offense with which
he is charged or may be charged. Nevertheless, I dont think
the Commission was wrong in its theory.
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an
accused says that he has not committed a crime he
656
656
cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evident that
where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions,
as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the
existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader
has to confess the allegations against him before he is
allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the
action. It is a rank inconsistency for one to justify an act, or
seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is
not responsible. It is impossible for a court or commission to
verify the presence of the essential conditions which should
entitle the applicants to exemption from punishment, when
the accused and his witnesses say that he did not commit a
crime. In the nature of things, only the accused and his
witnesses could prove that the victim collaborated with the
enemy; that the killing was perpetrated in furtherance of the
resistance movements; that no personal motive intervened in
the commission of the murder, etc., etc. These, or some of
these, are matters of belief and intention which only the
accused and his witnesses could explain.
As a matter of procedure, certiorari or mandamus, whatever
the present proceeding may be, does not lie because there is
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The
decision of the Commission has not closed the avenue for the
petitioners to invoke the provisions of the Amnesty
Proclamation before the courts. I invite attention to the
provision of the proclamation which I have quoted. In the
case of Jimenez, he could ask for a new trial, as he in effect
would have the Commission grant him; and in the case of
Barrioquinto, he could set up the proclamation in his plea
when his trial comes up.
PABLO, M.: Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez et al., 82 Phil.
642, No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
No. L-19745. January 31, 1964.

ELISEO FLORA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. VICENTE OXIMANA, ET
AL., respondents.
Labor relations; Labor unions; Disqualifications of officers;
Commission of crime; Effect of absolute pardon.An absolute
pardon restores a person to his civil and political rights, one
of which is the right to hold any office in any legitimate labor
organization. In the case at bar, the conviction in 1926 of the
crime of abusos deshonestos for which he served time in jail
until 1930, cannot after his full and absolute pardon in 1961
serve to disqualify the respondent president of a labor union
from such office under Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of Industrial Relations.
213
213
Flora vs. Oximana
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Salonga, Ordoez, Sicat & Associates for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Vicente Oximana is the president of the Benguet-Balatoc
Workers Union (BBWU), having been elected to said position
on June 20, 1960, pursuant to the provisions of the
constitution and by-laws of said union. Since 1948, when the
union was organized, Oximana has been elected continuously
as such president and has performed the duties and
functions of said office without interruption in accordance
with the provisions of said constitution and by-laws.
In 1926, Oximana was convicted of the crime of abusos
deshonestos for which he was sentenced to 3 years 6 months
and 25 days of imprisonment which he 'served until
December 4, 1930, As a consequence, a complaint was
lodged against him before the Court of Industrial Relations on
February 2, 1961 by a prosecutor of said court seeking to
disqualify him as president of the union on the strength of
the provisions of Section 17 (e) of Republic Act 875. In this

complaint, the union was made party respondent because of
complainant's desire to restrain Oximana from performing
the duties and functions of his office as president and to have
a new election held for the purpose of electing a new
qualified president.
In answer to the complaint, respondents alleged that it fails
to state a cause of action for it does not show that it bears
the sanction of at least 10% of the entire membership of the
union of which Oximana was president, and that assuming
that it does and Oximana was convicted of the offense which
involves moral turpitude, the same is not however one of the
offenses contemplated by Section 17 (e) of Republic Act 875.
In any event, respondents contend that the aforesaid legal
provision, being penal in character, does not apply to
Oximana for he has been an official of good standing long
before the effectivity of Republic Act 875.
When the case was called for or hearing, the parties
submitted a stipulation of facts wherein, among other things,
214
214
Flora vs. Oximana
it was agreed that on April 1, 1961 the President of the
Philippines granted Oximana full, absolute and plenary
pardon for the crime he had committed in 1926, thereby
restoring him to the full enjoyment of his civil and political
rights, one of which is the holding of the position now
disputed by complainants.
On November 29, 1961, Judge Amado C. Bugayong, who
heard the case, issued an order dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit. He said that were it not for the absolute pardon
granted to Oximana he would have been disqualified. But
said pardon has erased all the ill effects of his conviction and
had restored to him all his rights and privileges as a citizen
as if he had not committed the crime at all. One of such
rights is to hold an office in any labor organization as the one
now being held by respondent Oximana.
This order was affirmed by the court en banc. Hence, the

present petition for review.
Section 17 (e) of Republic Act 875 provides as follows:
"No person who has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude shall be eligible for election to any office in a
legitimate labor organization or for appointment to any
position involving the collection, custody, management,
control or disbursement of its funds, and any such person
shall be disqualified from continuing to hold any office or
such position in the organization."
If the case of respondent Oximana should be considered in
the light of what is provided for in the section abovequoted
there would be no doubt that he would be disqualified from
holding the position of president which is now being disputed
by complainants for the crime for which he was convicted in
1926 is one which involves moral turpitude because the
purpose of the law is indeed to disqualify one who, because
of gross misconduct, has rendered himself unfit to hold any
office in a legitimate labor organization. But here the
situation of respondent Oximana has changed since his
conviction. It appears that since the time of his conviction in
1926 up to the time the complaint for disqualification was
lodged against him in 1961, a long period of time has passed,
and, in the
215
215
Flora vs. Oximana
meantime, he may have reformed himself and become a new
and repentant man. In fact, when he organized the BenguetBalatoc Workers' Union in 1948, he became its president and
had been reelected as such continuously up to the present
time without any indication that through his actuation as
such official he has ever committed any misconduct or act
unbecoming his office that may disqualify him to continue
deserving the confidence of the union and its members. It is
perhaps for this reason that on April 1, 1961 the President of
the Philippines granted him full, absolute and plenary pardon
which restored to him the full enjoyment of his civil and

political rights, one of which is the right to hold any office in
any legitimate labor organization. We believe that the effect
of this pardon is as the President of the Philippines has
stated, the restoration in full of Oximana's civil and political
rights, the effect of which is to blot out any evil
consequences of the crime he has committed. Authorities
abound supporting this view.
Thus, it has been held that "A full and complete pardon,
granted after conviction, removes all penalties and legal
disabilities, and restores the defendant to all his civil rights."
Continuing, the court went on to say that "pardon completely
destroys the effect of the judgment x x x (and) 'obliterates, in
legal contemplation, the offense itself; and hence its effect is
to make the offender a new man'" (Stephens v. State of ex
rel. Goldsberry, 11 Okl. 262, 239 P. 450). In a similar vein, this
Court, thru Mr. Justice Laurel, stated that "an absolute pardon
not only blots out the crime committed but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of the
conviction" (Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441). And in an
earlier case, this Court, thru the same Justice also stated:
"x x x An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of
conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punish
216
216
Commissioner of Immigration, vs. Romero
ment which the law imposes upon those who violate its
command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and
the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences
of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon

extended .to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense
that 'he will be eligible for appointment only to positions
which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or
property responsibility,' it is absolute insofar as it 'restores
the respondent to full civil and political rights.' " (Cristobal v.
Labrador. et al., 71 Phil. 34, 38).
We are, therefore, persuaded to affirm the view expressed by
the court a quo in its order of November 29, 1961.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Flora vs. Oximana,, 10 SCRA 212, No. L-19745 January 31,
1964
[No. 48100. June 20,1941]

FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner and appellant, vs.
GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent and appellee.
1.PARDON; SCOPE AND EXTENT.The pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; an
absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that
when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
of conviction. While there may be force in the argument
which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of
absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind,
-we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the
constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily
restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after
inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to
atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory
and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.
2.ID.; ID.; EFFECT ON EIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.In the case at
bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect
committed the offense more than twenty-five years ago; that
he had already merited conditional pardon from the
Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised
the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos,
Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected
municipal president of that municipality three times in
succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the
municipality in the election for local officials in December,
1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the
purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him
to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and
the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned
hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the
Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for
defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial
interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief
Executive.

Tayabas. Pea, J.
Rodriguez & Aclaro for appellant.
Cecilio Maneja for appellee.
442
442
Pelobello vs. Palatino
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo
warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the
mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of
Marinduque. The proceedings were had pursuant to the
provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94 (a), of
the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). It was
alleged that the respondent-appellee, having been convicted
by final judgment in 1912 of atentado contra la autoridad y
sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years,
four months and one day of prisin correccional, was
disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the
contested municipal office, such disqualification not having
been removed by plenary pardon.
The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the
election and consequent proclamation of the respondentappellee for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted
that the respondent-appellee was granted by the GovernorGeneral a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been
proven (Vide Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of
ap., p. 20) that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee
absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full
civil and political rights.
The question presented is whether or not the absolute
pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification
incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (c) of section
94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted

after the election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the benign
prerogative of mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in
Cristobal vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated
December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed but
443
popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4
of the Election Code f or assuming office. We see no reason
for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial
interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief
Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action
and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concur.
444
VOL. 72, JUNE 20, 1941

443
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that
when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
of conviction. While there may be force in the argument
which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of
absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind,
we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the
constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily
restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after
inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to
atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory
and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at
bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect
committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had
already merited conditional pardon f rom the GovernorGeneral in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of
suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for
the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of
that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931) ; and
finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for
local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances,
it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon
was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the
444
HORRILLENO, M., disidente:
A modo de preliminar, y para evitar que se me entienda
equivocadamente, es preciso hacer constar que no discuto la
prerrogativa constitucional del Jefe Ejecutivo de otorgar
indultos. Tal poder est para m fuera de toda discusin.
Los hechos en este asunto son como los expone la mayora
en su decision.
Parceme errnea la aplicacin del caso de Cristbal contra
Labrador y otros (R. G. No. 47941) al presente. No existe
paridad entre uno y otro. En el primero, el recurrido principal,
Tefilo C. Santos, obtuvo indulto condicional mucho antes de
las elecciones en que se inscribi como elector y se present
como candidato a un cargo municipal. Admitiendo como
buena la opinin de la mayora en dicho asunto, Santos, al
registrarse como elector, ya haba recobrado sus derechos
civiles y polticos; ya no estaba incapacitado para votar,
segn el artculo 94 del Cdigo Electoral. En el presente,
Gregorio Palatino, el apelado, cuando se inscribi como
elector, no posea las condiciones que requiere el
mencionado cdigo. Pues est admitido que l fu convicto
del delito de atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes, en
virtud de una sentencia firme y definitiva, el ao 1912; y que,
si bien consigui indulto del entonces Gobernador General de
Filipinas el ao 1915, tal indulto fu condicional, y en l no se

le reintegraban expresamente sus derechos civiles y
polticos. Es evidente, pues, que, bajo las disposiciones del
artculo 94 del Cdigo Electoral, dicho apelado no poda
legalmente ser elector en las elecciones del 10 de diciembre
de 1940; por tanto, no estaba calificado para ser electo al
cargo de alcalde de su municipio (art. 2174, Cdigo
Administrativo. Revisado). El indulto absoluto concedido por
su Excelencia, el Presidente de Filipinas, lo fu el 25 de
diciembre de 1940, o sea, 15 das despus de las elecciones,
y despus de habrsele proclamado como el candidato electo
para alcalde de su municipio. No existe, por consiguiente,
identidad entre el caso de Cristbal contra Labrador y el que
ahora nos ocupa. ste, siguiendo el principio enunciado por
la mayora en
445
VOL. 72, JUNE 20, 1941
445
su decision, es de consecuencias ms remotas, ms
trascendentales todava, pues en l se retrotraen los efectos
del indulto a fechas anteriores a la de las elecciones mismas,
que se verificaron el 10 de diciembre de 1940; esto es, que el
apelado, por el decreto de indulto de 25 de diciembre del
repetido ao 1940, se le considera habilitado para ser elector
en las mencionadas elecciones, y, por ende, elegible al cargo
para el cual se haba presentado como candidato. Pero no es
esto todo. Dejamos dicho que el apelado no era elector
calificado en las ltimas elecciones del 10 de diciembre de
1940. Por tanto, al prestar juramento e inscribirse en el censo
electoral como elector calificado, no sindolo, cometi el
delito castigado por el artculo 179, en relacin con los
artculos 177 y 94 del Cdigo Electoral; por el cual delito
puede y debe ser acusado. Ahora bien; en el supuesto de que
lo fuera, cabra condenarle, si se le hallase culpable? Bajo el
principio enunciado por la mayora, la contestacin habra de
ser necesariamente negativa; pues el apelado, segn
aqulla, ha recobrado, en virtud del mencionado indulto,
todos sus derechos civiles y polticos, no slo desde la fecha

del indulto, sino desde que se inscribi como elector. Lo que
vale tanto como decir que, antes de ser condenado por el
delito de que se haba hecho reo, al inscribirse en el censo
electoral como elector habilitado, cuando en realidad no lo
era, ya estaba indultado. Esto, a nuestro juicio, pugna
abiertamente con el Ttulo VII, Art. 11, pr. 6, de nuestra
Constitucin, que dispone:
"El Presidente tendr la facultad de suspender sentencias y
conmutarlas, conceder indultos y condonar multas y
confiscaciones, despus de dictada sentencia condenatoria,
en toda clase de infracciones, excepto en juicios de
residencia, bajo las restricciones y limitaciones que tuviere a
bien imponer." Pero an hay ms: el principio declarado por
la mayora podra ser un incentivo fuerte para violar las
disposiciones del Cdigo Electoral, ya que un indulto
absoluto, aunque se otorgara, como en este caso, mucho
despus de haberse verificado las elecciones, tendra la
virtud de convertir en elector calificado y elegible al que no
lo era al tiempo de
446
446
las elecciones, convalidando as la eleccin, en s ilegal y
nula, de un candidato, por el solo acto del indulto. 'No puedo
aceptar tal principio con tales consecuencias.
Todo el raciocinio del apelado y que parece haberse adoptado
por la mayora, descansa en los casos de Garland Ex Parte y
de Hildreth v. Heath et al. (1 111. App., 83). Permtasenos
discutir la aplicabilidad de dichos asuntos al que nos ocupa.
En el primero, la parte del principio enunciado en el mismo,
que invoca el apelado, es aquella que se refiere a que el
perdn borra todas las incapacidades como consecuencia del
delito cometido por el indultado. No discutimos este principio.
Decimos ms todava: lo aceptamos con las limitaciones que
dijimos en el caso de Cristbal vs. Labrador. Pero este, segn
ya hemos demostrado, no es idntico al presente. No tiene ni
siquiera analoga con l. La cuestin que se plantea en el que

nos ocupa no es la de si el indulto borra o no las
incapacidades y consecuencias en que ha incurrido el
indultado al cometer el delito. El punto aqu discutido es el de
si la GRACIA otorgada tiene o no efecto retroactivo, y tal
punto no se someti ni fu discutido en el caso de Garland Ex
Parte, supra. Como dejamos dicho, a modo de preliminar en
esta disidencia, no ponemos en duda, no puede cuestionarlo
nadie, que la prerrogativa de indulto es una absoluta de que
est investido el Poder Ejecutivo en esta jurisdiccin. Ni
siquiera podemos ni queremos permitirnos, como lo hace la
mayora, hablar de los propsitos del Ejecutivo al conceder
un indulto. Creemos que no puede ni debe discutirse el fin
que se propone el Ejecutivo al ejercer la prerrogativa ms
cristiana a l otorgada por la Constitucin. Tal privilegio es
absoluto y personalsimo suyo. Lo que s discutimos,
podemos y debemos discutir, son los efectos, las
consecuencias que se quieren dar al indulto. El caso de
Garland, supra, por tanto, no dice ninguna relacin con el
que tenemos ante Nos. Es ms; la decision en dicho asunto
se public el ao 1866, con la disidencia del Magistrado Miller
a la que asintieron el "Chief Justice" y los Magistrados
Swayne y Davis. Como se sabe, el punto discutido en el
447
VOL. 72, JUNE 20, 1941
447
mencionado asunto de Garland era la constitucionalidad de
la Ley del Congreso de 24 de enero de 1865, que dispona
como condicin previa para ejercer la abogaca la de que el
candidato jurase no haber voluntariamente levantado armas
contra los Estados .Unidos desde que se haba hecho
ciudadano de dicho pas; no haber voluntariamente dado
ninguna ayuda, aprobacin, consejo o aliento a personas en
armas contra los Estados Unidos, etc. Garland, antes de la
rebelin a que se refiere el asunto contra los Estados Unidos,
ya era abogado. Durante la rebelin tom parte en ella,
hacindose miembro del Congreso de los llamados Estados
Confederados hasta que las fuerzas de stos se rindieron. El

fu indultado. Quiso volver al ejercicio de su profesin pero
hall que no poda hacerlo por las disposiciones de la Ley del
Congreso de 24 de enero de 1865 arriba mencionada.
Promovi un asunto para defender sus derechos, asunto que
se llev en apelacin al Tribunal Supremo Federal de los
Estados Unidos, el cual, con la disidencia del Magistrado
Miller y los magistrados ya referidos, declar que la Ley del
Congreso que dispona el juramento a que aludimos, era una
ley ex post facto y, por tanto, anticonstitucional. La
disidencia sostena que la expresada Ley del Congreso no era
anticonstitucional, fundndose en que la prohibicin en ella
contenida de ejercer la abogaca, a menos que el candidato
prestase el juramento que prescriba aqu-lla, no vena a ser
una pena, un nuevo castigo que se impona a Garland, sino
que era una medida dictada en consonancia con los poderes
de Policia del Estado, con el objeto de establecer mejor
garanta de los intereses pblicos contra personas cuya
conducta infunda dudas sobre su integridad y honradez,
necesarias para el ejercicio de una funcin pblica cual es la
de abogado.
En el asunto de Washington v. State, 75 Alabama 582, en el
cual las cuestiones suscitadas eran idnticas a las discutidas
en el de Garland, supra, se dijo:
"Doubtless, one who has violated the criminal law may
thereafter reform and become in fact possessed of a good
moral character. But the legislature has power in cases of this
kind to make a rule of universal application, and
448
448
no injury is permissible back of the rule to ascertain whether
the fact of which the rule is made the absolute test does or
does not exist. Illustrations of this are abundant. At common
law one convicted of crime was incompetent as a witness,
and this rule was in no manner affected by the lapse of time
since the commission of the offense and could not be set
aside by proof of a complete reformation. So in many States

a convict is debarred the privileges of an elector, and an act
so debarring was held applicable to one convicted before its
passage. (Washington v. State, 75 Alabama, 582." (Supra,
197.)
En el asunto de State of Washington v. Linda Burfield
Hazzard, 47 A. L. R., 540-541, cuya decisin se public el 12
de julio de 1926, o sea, 60 aos despus de la del asunto de
Garland, se declar:
"Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and
forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot
erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitely
fixed."
En este asunto de State of Washington v. Linda Burfield
Hazzard, supra, que versaba sobre una apelacin interpuesta
por la demandada contra la sentencia del Tribunal Superior
de Kitsap County en que se le negaba a dicha demandada el
derecho de hacer curaciones sin medicina, la decisin
apelada se confirm. La apelante alegaba, para apoyar su
pretensin, que ya haba sido indultada. Sin embargo, el
tribunal confirm la sentencia apelada y dijo:
"A pardon issued under constitutional power to limit fines and
forfeitures, to a physician convicted of manslaughter, whose
license to practice medicine was revoked because of such
conviction, does not restore the right to practice, although it
purports to restore all the rights and privileges forfeited by
the conviction."
A nuestro juicio, el principio enunciado en el caso de Garland
rie sustancialmente con el que acabamos de citar, o sea, el
asunto de Washington contra Linda Burfield Hazzard, supra.
En el primero, esto es, en el de Garland, se declar que la
Ley del Congreso de 24 de enero de 1865, era
anticonstitucional porque impona un nuevo castigo a Gar449
VOL. 72, JUNE 20, 1941
449
land no obstante haber sido indultado. En el ltimo, o sea, en

el de Washington contra Burfield, supra, se sostuvo la
sentencia apelada en que se le privaba a la apelante del
ejercicio de la medicina por haber sido convicta de un delito
no obstante haber ella obtenido el indulto. No se declar
anticonstitucional la ordenanza o ley que autorizaba la
privacin de la prctica de la medicina a la apelante. Nos
suena, pues, este principio enunciado en el asunto de
Garland, a viejo y abandonado por el establecido en el de
Washington contra Linda Burfield Hazzard, supra.
El asunto de Hildreth v. Heath, supra, tampoco es pertinente
al de autos. El apelado, al referirse a este asunto de Hildreth
v. Heath, como para destacar y atraer con ello la atencin del
Tribunal hacia dicho asunto, pone en cursivas las letras del
vocablo ineligibility, queriendo dar a entender con esto que
su ineligibilidad haba quedado borrada por el indulto. Pero,
al estudiar el caso de Hildreth, hallamos que este, antes de
ser electo como concejal de Chicago, haba sido ya indultado,
lo que no ocurre en el presente caso. En este, el apelado lo
fu mucho despus de las elecciones y de haber sido electo
alcalde de su municipio.
De ah la absoluta inaplicabilidad del asunto de Hildreth al
presente.
He ah expuestas las razones en que me fundo para disentir
de la mayora.
Judgment affirmed. Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil., 441, No.
48100 June 20, 1941
G.R. No. 125837. October 6, 2004.*

REYNALDO CANO CHUA, doing business under the name &
style PRIME MOVER CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, ANDRES PAGUIO,
PABLO CANALE, RUEL PANGAN, AURELIO PAGUIO, ROLANDO
TRINIDAD, ROMEO TAPANG and CARLOS MALIWAT,
respondents.
Labor Law; Social Security System; Petition for Review; The
Supreme Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited
to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court.Well-entrenched is the rule that the
Supreme Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited
to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court, the findings
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
122
122
Chua vs. Court of Appeals
of fact being generally conclusive on the Court and it is not
for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.
Same; Same; Employment; Employer-Employee Relationship;
Elements; The mandatory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended, is premised on the existence of an employeremployee relationship.The Social Security Act was enacted
pursuant to the policy of the government to develop,
establish gradually and perfect a social security system
which shall be suitable to the needs of the laborers
throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and
death. It provides for compulsory coverage of all employees
not over sixty years of age and their employers. Well-settled
is the rule that the mandatory coverage of Republic Act No.
1161, as amended, is premised on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, the essential elements of
which are: (a) selection and engagement of the employee;

(b) payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
power of control with regard to the means and methods by
which the work is to be accomplished, with the power of
control being the most determinative factor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Control Test; It is clear that
private respondents are employees of petitioner, the latter
having control over the results of the work done, as well as
the means and methods by which the same were
accomplished.It is clear that private respondents are
employees of petitioner, the latter having control over the
results of the work done, as well as the means and methods
by which the same were accomplished. Suffice it to say that
regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is
regular or project, private respondents are subject of the
compulsory coverage under the SSS Law, their employment
not falling under the exceptions provided by the law. This rule
is in accord with the Courts ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp.
v. SSS to the effect that all employees, regardless of tenure,
would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS, except
those classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of
the Social Security Act.
Same; Same; Same; Project Employment; In Violeta vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, this Court ruled that to
be exempted from the presumption of regularity of
employment, the agreement between a project employee
and his employer must strictly conform to the requirements
and conditions under Article 280 of the
123
123
Labor Code.In Violeta v. National Labor Relations
Commission, this Court ruled that to be exempted from the
presumption of regularity of employment, the agreement
between a project employee and his employer must strictly
conform to the requirements and conditions under Article 280
of the Labor Code. It is not enough that an employee is hired
for a specific project or phase of work. There must also be a

determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion or
termination of the project at the time the employee was
engaged if the objectives of Article 280 are to be achieved.
This second requirement was not met in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An employment ceases to be
coterminus with specific projects when the employee is
continuously rehired due to the demands of the employers
business and re-engaged for many more projects without
interruption.This Court has held that an employment
ceases to be co-terminus with specific projects when the
employee is continuously rehired due to the demands of the
employers business and re-engaged for many more projects
without interruption. The Court likewise takes note of the fact
that, as cited by the SSC, even the National Labor Relations
Commission in a labor case involving the same parties, found
that private respondents were regular employees of the
petitioner.
Same; Same; Premiums; Good Faith; Good faith or bad faith is
irrelevant for purposes of assessment and collection of the
penalty for delayed remittance of premiums.Good faith or
bad faith is irrelevant for purposes of assessment and
collection of the penalty for delayed remittance of premiums,
since the law makes no distinction between an employer who
professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of
premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal
duty imposed upon him to make such remittance.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Joselito L. Lim for petitioner.
Servillano Santillan for private respondent.
Amador M. Monteiro and Rodrigo R. Castillo for respondent
SSS.
124
124

TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38269 dated 06 March 1996, and
its Resolution dated 30 July 1996 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration,2 affirming the Order of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) dated 1 February 19953 which
held that private respondents were regular employees of the
petitioner and ordered petitioner to pay the Social Security
System (SSS) for its unpaid contributions, as well as penalty
for the delayed remittance thereof.
On 20 August 1985, private respondents Andres Paguio,
Pablo Canale, Ruel Pangan, Aurelio Paguio, Rolando Trinidad,
Romeo Tapang and Carlos Maliwat (hereinafter referred to as
respondents) filed a Petition4 with the SSC for SSS coverage
and contributions against petitioner Reynaldo Chua. owner of
Prime Mover Construction Development, claiming that they
were all regular employees of the petitioner in his
construction business.5
Private respondents claimed that they were assigned by
petitioner in his various construction projects continuously in
the following capacity, since the period indicated, and with
the corresponding basic salaries,6 to wit:
Andres Paguio
Carpenter
1977
P 42/day
Pablo Canale
Mason
1977
42/day
Ruel Pangan
Mason
1979
39/day
_______________
1 Promulgated by the Sixth Division, penned by Associate

Justice Antonio M. Martinez, with Associate Justices Pacita
CaizaresNye and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now Supreme Court
Associate Justice) concurring; Rollo, pp. 31-38.
2 Rollo, p. 39.
3 Id., at pp. 50-71.
4 Id., at pp. 40-45.
5 Id., at p. 40.
6 Id., at p. 40.
125
125
Aurelio Paguio
Fine grading
1979
42/day
Romeo Tapang
Fine grading
1979
42/day
Rolando Trinidad
Carpenter
1983 (Jan.)
39/day
Carlos Maliwat
Mason
1977
42/day
Private respondents alleged that petitioner dismissed all of
them without justifiable grounds and without notice to them
and to the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. They
further alleged that petitioner did not report them to the SSS
for compulsory coverage in flagrant violation of the Social
Security Act.7
In his Answer,8 petitioner claimed that private respondents
had no cause of action against him, and assuming there was
any, the same was barred by prescription and laches. In
addition, he claimed that private respondents were not

regular employees, but project employees whose work had
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion of which was determined at the time of their
engagement. This being the case, he concluded that said
employees were not entitled to coverage under the Social
Security Act.9
Meanwhile, the SSS filed a Petition in Intervention10 alleging
that it has an interest in the petition filed by private
respondents as it is charged with the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of the Social Security Act. The
SSS stated that it is the mandatory obligation of every
employer to report its employees to the SSS for coverage and
to remit the required contribution, including the penalty
imposed for late premium remittances.
On 01 February 1995, the SSC issued its Order11 which ruled
in favor of private respondents. The SSC, relying on
_______________
7 R.A. No. 1161, as amended; Rollo, p. 41.
8 Rollo, pp. 44-45.
9 Id., at pp. 44-45.
10 Id., at pp. 47-49.
11 Id., at pp. 50-72.
126
126
NLRC Case No. RAB-III-8-2373-85,12 declared private
respondents to be petitioners regular employees.13 It
ordered petitioner to pay the SSS the unpaid SS/EC and
Medicare contributions plus penalty for the delayed
remittance thereof, without prejudice to any other penalties
which may have accrued.14 The SSC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration15 of petitioner for lack of merit.16
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Review.17 He claimed that private respondents
were project employees, whose periods of employment were
terminated upon completion of the project. Thus, he claimed,

no employer-employee relation existed between the
parties.18 There being no employer-employee relationship,
private respondents are not entitled to coverage under the
Social Security Act.19 In addition, petitioner claimed that
private respon_______________
12 Andres Paguio v. Reynaldo Cano Chua, Decision of the
NLRC-Third Division, promulgated on 29 November 1989.
13 Rollo, pp. 69-70.
14 Id., at p. 71. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Commission finds
and so holds that petitioners were regular employees of
respondent for the periods above-stated and hereby orders
respondent Reynaldo Cano Chua to pay the SSS the amount
of FIFTY EIGHT THOUSAND, FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
PESOS AND FIVE CENTAVOS (P58,423.05) for petitioners
unpaid SS/EC and Medicare contributions plus the amount of
TWO HUNDRED SIXTY NINE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED FORTY
PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P269,640.62)
representing the 3% per month penalty for delayed
remittance thereof, computed as of November 30, 1994,
without prejudice to the collection of additional penalties that
have accrued after said date, pursuant to Section 22 (a) of
the SS Law, as amended.
15 Records, pp. 32-45.
16 Rollo, p. 75.
17 Id., at pp 77-97.
18 Id., at p. 91.
19 Id., at p. 91.
127
127
dents length of service did not change their status from
project to regular employees.20
Moreover, granting that private respondents were entitled to

coverage under the Act, petitioner claimed that the SSC erred
in imposing penalties since his failure to include private
respondents under SSS coverage was neither willful nor
deliberate, but due to the honest belief that project
employees are not regular employees.21 Likewise, he
claimed that the SSC erred in ordering payment of
contributions and penalties even for long periods between
projects when private respondents were not working.22
Petitioner also questioned the failure to apply the rules on
prescription of actions and of laches, claiming that the case,
being one for the injury to the rights of the private
respondents, should have been filed within four (4) years
from the time their cause of action accrued, or from the time
they were hired as project employees. He added that private
respondents went into a long swoon, folded their arms and
closed their eyes23 and filed their claim only in 1985, or six
(6) years or eight (8) years after they were taken in by
petitioner.24
In resolving the petition, the Court of Appeals synthesized the
issues in the petition, to wit: (1) whether private respondents
were regular employees of petitioner, and whether their
causes of action as such are barred by prescription or laches;
(2) if so, whether petitioner is now liable to pay the SSS
contributions and penalties during the period of
employment.25
The Court of Appeals, citing Article 280 of the Labor Code,26
declared that private respondents were all regular
_______________
20 Id., at p. 92.
21 Id., at p. 94.
22 Id., at p. 93.
23 Id., at p. 95.
24 Ibid.
25 Id., at p. 34.
26 Art. 280. Regular and casual employment.The provisions
of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless
128
128
employees of the petitioner in relation to certain activities
since they all worked either as masons, carpenters and fine
graders in petitioners various construction projects for at
least one year, and that their work was necessary and
desirable to petitioners business which involved the
construction of roads and bridges.27 It cited the case of
Mehitabel Furniture Company, Inc. v. NLRC,28 particularly the
ruling therein which states:
By petitioners own admission, the private respondents have
been hired to work on certain special orders that as a matter
of business policy it cannot decline. These projects are
necessary or desirable in its usual business or trade,
otherwise they would not have accepted . . . . Significantly,
such special orders are not really seasonal but more or less
regular, requiring the virtually continuous services of the
temporary workers. The NLRC also correctly observed that
if we were to accept respondents theory, it would have no
regular workers because all of its orders would be special
undertakings or projects. The petitioner could then hire all
its workers on a contract basis only and prevent them from
attaining permanent status. . . .
_______________
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except when the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph; Provided That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service,

whether such service be continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such activity exists.
27 Rollo, pp. 35-36.
28 G.R. No. 101268, 30 March 1993, 220 SCRA 602.
129
129
Furthermore, the NLRC has determined that the private
respondents have worked for more than one year in the socalled special projects of the petitioner and so fall under
the second condition specified in the above-quoted provision
(Article 280, Labor Code).29
The Court of Appeals rejected the claim of prescription,
stating that the filing of private respondents claims was well
within the twenty (20)-year period provided by the Social
Security Act.30 It found that the principle of laches could not
also apply to the instant case since delay could not be
attributed to private respondents, having filed the case
within the prescriptive period, and that there was no
evidence that petitioner lacked knowledge that private
respondents would assert their rights.31
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,32 claiming that
the Court of Appeals overlooked (1) the doctrine that length
of service of a project employee is not the controlling test of
employment tenure, and (2) petitioners failure to place
private respondents under SSS coverage was in good faith.
The motion was denied for lack of merit.33
In the present Petition for Review, petitioner again insists that
private respondents were not regular, but project, employees
and thus not subject to SSS coverage. In addition, petitioner
claims that assuming private respondents were subject to
SSS coverage, their petition was barred by prescription and
laches. Moreover, petitioner invokes the defense of
_______________
29 Id., at p. 605.
30 Rollo, p. 37, Sec. 22 (b) of the Social Security Act, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 22(b). The right to institute the necessary action against
the employer (for non-remittance of contributions) may be
commenced within 20 years from the time the delinquency is
known or the assessment is made by the SSS, as the case
may be.
31 Rollo, p. 37.
32 Id., at pp. 98-103.
33 Id., at p. 39; Resolution promulgated on 30 July 1996.
130
130
good faith, or his honest belief that project employees are
not regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Petitioners arguments are mere reiterations of his arguments
submitted before the SSC and the Court of Appeals. More
importantly, petitioner wants this Court to review factual
questions already passed upon by the SSC and the Court of
Appeals which are not cognizable by a petition for review
under Rule 45. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme
Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to
reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court, the findings of fact being generally
conclusive on the Court and it is not for the Court to weigh
evidence all over again.34
Stripped of the lengthy, if not repetitive, disquisition of the
private parties in the case, and also of the public
respondents, on the nature of private respondents
employment, the controversy boils down to one issue: the
entitlement of private respondents to compulsory SSS
coverage.
The Social Security Act was enacted pursuant to the policy of
the government to develop, establish gradually and perfect
a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs
of the laborers throughout the Philippines, and shall provide

protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age
and death.35 It provides for compulsory coverage of all
employees not over sixty years of age and their
employers.36
Well-settled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, is premised on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, the
essential elements of which are: (a) selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and (d) the
_______________
34 Omandam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January
18, 2001, 349 SCRA 483, 488, citing Bautista v. Mangaldan
Rural Bank, Inc., February 10, 1994, 230 SCRA 16.
35 Sec. 2, R.A. 1161, as amended.
36 Section 9 (a), RA 1161, as amended.
131
131
power of control with regard to the means and methods by
which the work is to be accomplished, with the power of
control being the most determinative factor.37
There is no dispute that private respondents were employees
of petitioner. Petitioner himself admitted that they worked in
his construction projects,38 although the period of their
employment was allegedly co-terminus with their phase of
work.39 Even without such admission from petitioner, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
parties can easily be determined by the application of the
control test,40 the elements of which are enumerated
above. It is clear that private respondents are employees of
petitioner, the latter having control over the results of the
work done, as well as the means and methods by which the
same were accomplished. Suffice it to say that regardless of
the nature of their employment, whether it is regular or
project, private respondents are subject of the compulsory

coverage under the SSS Law, their employment not falling
under the exceptions provided by the law.41 This rule is in
accord with
_______________
37 Social Security System v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
100388, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 1, 10-11; Section 8(d)
of R.A. 1161, as amended, reads:
(d) EmployeeAny person who performs services for an
employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts
are used and who receives compensation for such services,
where there is an employer-employee relationship; Provided,
That a self-employed professional shall be both employee
and employer at the same time. (As amended by Sec. 4, R.A.
2658 and Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1636, S-1979)
38 Rollo, p. 16.
39 Id., at p. 17.
40 Investment Planning Corp. v. Social Security System, 129
Phil. 143; 21 SCRA 924 (1967), citations omitted.
41 Section 8(j) provides for exceptions to compulsory SSS
Law coverage, to wit:
j.) Employment.Any service performed by an employee for
his employer, except
132
132
the Courts ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. SSS42 to the
effect that all employees, regardless of tenure, would qualify
_______________
1. Agricultural labor when performed by a share or leasehold
tenant or worker who is not paid any regular daily wage or
base pay and who does not work for an uninterrupted period
of at least six months in a year; (As amended by Sec. 4, R.A.
2658)
2. Domestic service in a private home;
3. Employment purely casual and not for the purposes of

occupation or business of the employer;
4. Service performed by an individual in the employ of his
son, daughter, or spouse, and service performed by a child
under the age of twenty one years in the employ of his
parents;
5. Service performed on or in connection with an alien vessel
by an employee if he is employed when such vessel is
outside the Philippines;
6. Service performed in the employ of the Philippine
Government or an instrumentality or agency thereof;
7. Service performed in the employ of a foreign government
or international organization, or their wholly-owned
instrumentality; Provided, however, That his exemption
notwithstanding, any foreign government, international
organization, or their wholly-owned instrumentality
employing workers in the Philippines or employing Filipinos
outside of the Philippines may enter into an agreement with
the Philippine Government for the inclusion of such
employees in the SSS except those already covered by their
respective civil service retirement systems: Provided, further,
That the terms of such agreement shall conform with the
provisions of this Act on coverage and amount of payment of
contributions and benefits: Provided, finally, That the
provisions of this Act shall be supplementary to any such
agreement. (As amended by Sec. 1, R.A. 3839; Sec. 3, R.A.
4857; and Sec. 5, P.D. No. 735, S-1975)
8. Such other services performed by temporary employees
who may be excluded by regulation of the Commission.
Employees of bona fide independent contractors shall not be
deemed employees of the employer engaging the services of
said contractors. (As amended by Sec. 5, P.D. No. 737, S1975).
42 122 Phil. 1110; 16 SCRA 6 (1966).
133
133
for compulsory membership in the SSS, except those classes

of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social
Security Act.43
This Court also finds no reason to deviate from the finding of
the Court of Appeals regarding the nature of employment of
private respondents. Despite the insistence of petitioner that
they were project employees, the facts show that as masons,
carpenters and fine graders in petitioners various
construction projects, they performed work which was usually
necessary and desirable to petitioners business which
involves construction of roads and bridges. In Violeta v.
NLRC,44 this Court ruled that to be exempted from the
presumption of regularity of employment, the agreement
between a project employee and his employer must strictly
conform to the requirements and conditions under Article 280
of the Labor Code. It is not enough that an employee is hired
for a specific project or phase of work. There must also be a
determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion or
termination of the project at the time the employee was
engaged if the objectives of Article 280 are to be achieved.45
This second requirement was not met in this case.
Moreover, while it may be true that private respondents were
initially hired for specific projects or undertakings, the
repeated re-hiring and continuing need for their services over
a long span of timethe shortest being two years and the
longest being eighthave undeniably made them regular
employees.46 This Court has held that an employment
ceases to be co-terminus with specific projects when the
employee is continuously rehired due to the demands of the
employers business and re-engaged for many more projects
without
_______________
43 Id., p. 1114; p. 10.
44 345 Phil. 762; 280 SCRA 520 (1997).
45 Id., p. 774.
46 Tomas Lao Construction v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 344 Phil. 268, 279; 278 SCRA 716, 726 (1997).
134
134
interruption.47 The Court likewise takes note of the fact that,
as cited by the SSC, even the National Labor Relations
Commission in a labor case involving the same parties, found
that private respondents were regular employees of the
petitioner.48
Another cogent factor militates against the allegations of the
petitioner. In the proceedings before the SSC and the Court of
Appeals, petitioner was unable to show that private
respondents were appraised of the project nature of their
employment, the specific projects themselves or any phase
thereof undertaken by petitioner and for which private
respondents were hired. He failed to show any document
such as private respondents employment contracts and
employment records that would indicate the dates of hiring
and termination in relation to the particular construction
project or phases in which they were employed.49 Moreover,
it is peculiar that petitioner did not show proof that he
submitted reports of termination after the completion of his
construction projects, considering that he alleges that private
respondents were hired and rehired for various projects or
phases of work therein.
Anent the issue of prescription, this Court rules that private
respondents right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at
the time of the filing of their petition, considering that a mere
eight (8) years had passed from the time delinquency was
discovered or the proper assessment was made. Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended, prescribes a period of twenty (20)
years, from the time the delinquency is known or assessment
is made by the SSS, within which to file a claim for nonremittance against employers.50
_______________
47 Ibid.
48 Rollo, p. 69; Decision of the NLRC-Third Division in NLRC

Case No. RAB- III-8-2373-85 promulgated on 29 November
1989.
49 Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
117983, 330 Phil. 218; 261 SCRA 505 (1996).
50 Section 22(b), R.A. 1161, as amended, in part reads:
. . . The right to institute the necessary action against the
employer may be commenced within twenty years from the
135
135
Likewise, this Court is in full accord with the findings of the
Court of Appeals that private respondents are not guilty of
laches. The principle of laches or stale demands ordains
that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.51 In the
instant case, this Court finds no proof that private
respondents had failed or neglected to assert their right,
considering that they filed their claim within the period
prescribed by law.
This Court finds no merit in petitioners protestations of good
faith. In United Christian Missionary Society v. Social Security
Commission,52 this Court ruled that good faith or bad faith is
irrelevant for purposes of assessment and collection of the
penalty for delayed remittance of premiums, since the law
makes no distinction between an employer who professes
good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and
another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed
upon him to make such remittance.53 For the same reasons,
petitioner cannot now invoke the defense of good faith.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 6 March
1996 and 30 July 1996 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Costs

against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman) and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
_______________
time the delinquency is known or the assessment is made by
the SSS, or from the time the benefit accrues, as the case
may be. (As amended by Sec. 15, P.D. No. 1636, S-1979).
51 Rovels Enterprises, Inc. v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 136821, 17
October 2002, 391 SCRA 176, 191.
52 141 Phil. 633; 30 SCRA 982 (1969).
53 Id., p. 640; p. 987.
136
136
Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals
Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., On Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
Note.An employee is regular because of the nature of the
work and the length of service, not because of the mode or
even the reason for hiring him. (Prudential Bank and Trust
Company vs. Reyes, 352 SCRA 316 [2001])
o0o Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 440 SCRA 121, G.R.
No. 125837 October 6, 2004
G.R. No. 84516. December 5, 1989.*

DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner, vs. HON. SERGIO DOROJA,
(Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and
EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
Criminal Law; Employers subsidiary liability under Art 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; Case at bar.The law involved in the
instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of
the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus: Art. 103.
Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall apply
to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged
in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties. Respondent contends that the
case of Pajarito v. Seeris cannot be applied to the present
case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual,
while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a
declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103
should be distinguished from the primary liability of
employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided
in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the
liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the
liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa aquiliana. The
present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for
culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the
* SECOND DIVISION.
2
2
Carpio vs. Doroja
Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil
action for the primary liability of the employer under Art.
2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana.
Same; Same; Requisites that must concur in order that an
employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees civil
liability in the criminal action; Case at bar.In order that an
employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employees
civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that

the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that
the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v.
Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the
employer, however, arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present,
the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
employees conviction and upon proof of the latters
insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.
Same; Same; Same; Execution; Employers subsidiary liability
may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part
of the execution proceedings against the employee.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator
has been deprived of his day in court, because the case
before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a
primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the
subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employees criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.
Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the
employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to
the criminal case. Ergo, the employers subsidiary liability
of the execution proceedings against the employee. This
Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seeris, supra,
that The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary
civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for
the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution
has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.
There is no question that the court which rendered the
judgment has a general supervisory control over its process
of execution, and this power carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgment; A judgment of
conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an
indemnity in the absence of collusion, is conclusive upon the
employer in an action for enforcement of the latters

subsidiary liability.The argument that the owner3
3
Carpio vs. Doroja
operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the
matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in
like manner, the appellate courts decision made no mention
of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already
discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the
operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary
since his liability is clear from the decision against the
accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the
question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the
appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied
from the appellate courts decision. In the recent case of Vda.
de Paman v. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the
following pronouncement: A judgment of conviction
sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the
absence of any collusion between the defendant and the
offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action
for the enforcement of the latters subsidiary liability not only
with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v.
Halili, 109 Phil. 495, that the court has no other function than
to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the
criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if
in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A
separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary
and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the
victim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Incumbent upon the court
to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution after
hearing the employer, and upon conviction of the employee
and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to employees
insolvency.Finally, the position taken by the respondent
appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of
execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has

already become final and executory cannot be sustained.
Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his
subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the
judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are
met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable,
without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the
subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where
the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of
amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court
to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only
after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the
employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to
the employees insolvency.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Br. 4. Doroja, J.
4
4
Carpio vs. Doroja
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which
denied petitioners motion for subsidiary writ of execution
against the owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the
accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin
Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and
operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a
pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which
the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in
the medicolegal certificate and sustained injuries which
required medical attention for a period of (3) three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious

Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the
Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On
January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a
lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under
an amended information punishable under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision
handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE
guilty as a principal beyond reasonable doubt of the
Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty
and appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor,
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month
and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its
minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to
indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of
P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes
lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid to the
Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the
amount of P1,500.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the cost of
this suit.
SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
5
5
Carpio vs. Doroja
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor
manifested his desire to present evidence to establish the
civil liability of either the accused driver or the owneroperator of the vehicle. Accuseds counsel moved that the
court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a
day in court, on the ground that the accused is not only
indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil
liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The
private prosecutor, however, did not move for the
appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed

by the private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch
XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of
P10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and
attorneys fees of P5,000.00. The appellate court, on January
20, 1988, modified the trial courts decision, granting the
appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10,1988 was duly
served upon the accused but was, however, returned
unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by
the sheriffs return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary
writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owneroperator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial
court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate
court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo
Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under culpaaquiliana and not culpa-contractual. A motion for
reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the
reason that complainant having failed to raise the matter of
subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court
rendered its decision which has become final and executory
and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such
decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seeris, 87
SCRA 275, which enunciates that the subsidiary liability of
the owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a
case were to be filed against said operator, the court called
upon to act thereto has no other function than to render a
decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case
without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an
error has been
6
6
Carpio vs. Doroja
committed in the decision. Petitioner maintains that the

tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary
liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in
order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that
said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot
be validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons,
namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised
on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seeris, the
injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the
so-called culpa-contractual but from culpa-aquiliana; (c)
the judgments of appellate courts may not be altered,
modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said
owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or
not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be
enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver
where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation
to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads
thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seeris
cannot be applied to the present case, the former being an
action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one
of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The
subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from
the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in
character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.
Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the
other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa
aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpacontractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action
to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100
of the Revised Penal Code. In
7
7
Carpio vs. Doroja
no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary
liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for
the employees civil liability in the criminal action, it should
be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind
of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in
the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa
Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary
liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction
of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites
present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable
upon the employees conviction and upon proof of the latters
insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator
has been deprived of his day in court, because the case
before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a
primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the
subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employees criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.
Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the
employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to
the criminal case. Ergo, the employers subsidiary liability
of the execution proceedings against the employee. This
Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra,
that The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary
civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for
the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution
has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.
There is no question that the court which rendered the

judgment has a general supervisory control over its process
of execution, and this power carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution.
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held
subsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability
was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate
courts decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability
is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a
separate complaint against the operator for recovery of
subsidiary liability is
8
8
Carpio vs. Doroja
not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision
against the accused. Such being the case, it is not
indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be
passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability
is already implied from the appellate courts decision. In the
recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, this
Court reiterated the following pronouncement: A judgment
of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an
indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the
defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the
employer in an action for the enforcement of the latters
subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability,
but also with regard to its amount. This being the case, this
Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, that the court
has no other function than to render decision based upon the
indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to
amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been
committed in the decision. A separate and independent
action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly
prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim.
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court
that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution
would in effect be to amend its decision which has already

become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling
the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary
liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment
because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need
of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary
liability can be enforced in the same case where the award
was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending
the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a
motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the
employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee
and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the
employees insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the
motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE.
The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same
proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owneroperator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private
respondent.
9
9
Perez vs. Sandiganbayan
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., On leave.
Order set aside.
Note.A prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a
writ of execution, and its issuance is a ministerial duty
compellable by mandamus. (Abbott vs. NLRC, 145 SCRA 206.)
Carpio vs. Doroja, 180 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 84516 December 5,
1989
G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000.*

LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Subsidiary Liability; Employer-Employee
Relationship; Before execution against an employer for his
subsidiary liability ensues, there must be a determination, in
a hearing set for the purpose of (1) the existence of an
employer-employee relationship; (2) that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry;(3) that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not
necessarily any offense he commits while in the discharge
of such duties); and (4) that said employee is insolvent.The
statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found
in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This liability is
enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the
award is made. However, before execution against an
employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a
hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an
employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
of such duties); and 4) that said employee is insolvent.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The drawback in the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceeding is that the alleged employer is not afforded due
process.In Vda. de Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714
(1982), the Court observed that the drawback in the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceeding is that the alleged employer is not afforded due
process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard as to
whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held: To
remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the
alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in
Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same
proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and
operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein that

the proceeding for the enforcement of the sub_________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
342
342
Basilio vs. Court of Appeals
sidiary liability may be considered as part of the proceeding
for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an
execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that
all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.
There are two instances when the existence of an employeremployee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged
vehicle owner may be determined. One, during the criminal
proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner
should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the
essence of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An alleged employer is not
denied due process where he had all the chances to
intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was
not the employer of the accused, but he chose not to
intervene at the appropriate time.Petitioner knew of the
criminal case that was filed against accused because it was
his truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it was the
insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that
provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the
stipulations in their contract. Petitioner did not intervene in
the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through
counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show
employer-employee relationship. With the convicts
application for probation, the trial courts judgment became
final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court
did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due
process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal
proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer of the
accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate

time.
Appeals.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for
petitioner.
Liberty O. Castaheda for private respondent.
343
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000
343
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court which seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 1992 and January 5, 1994, respectively. The
decision sustained the Order dated April 7, 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due
course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in Criminal
Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the petitioner
of the subsidiary indemnity arising from the offense
committed by his truck driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with double
homicide and double physical injuries.4 The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
The information against him reads:
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo
y Cruz of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Double Homicide and Double
Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the
municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,

being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck
with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of
Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and without taking the necessary care and
precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries
to persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck in a
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 21-58.
2 Id. at 63-70.
3 Id. at 60-61.
4 Records, p. 36.
344
344
careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a
result of which said dump truck being then driven by him
hit/bumped and sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a
motorized tricycle with plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto
Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00;
b) an automobile Toyota Corona with plate no. NAL-138
driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in the
amount of P2,190.50; c) a motorized tricycle with plate no.
NW-9018 driven by Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing
damage of an undetermined amount; d) an automobile
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito
Carranto thereby, causing damage of an undetermined
amount; and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate no. NFR-898
driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount; that due to the strong impact caused
by the collision, the driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3
passengers including Danilo Advincula y Poblete were hit/
bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2
passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical
injuries which required medical attendance for a period of
more than 30 days which incapacitated him from performing

his customary labor for the same period of time and
Dominador Legaspi, Jr. sustained physical injuries which
required medical attendance for a period of less than nine
days and incapacitated him from performing his customary
labor for the same period of time.
Contrary to law.
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment
dated February 4, 1991, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y
Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence
resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years of
prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs
of Danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters death,
P31,614.00, as actual and compensatory damages.
P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning capacity.
P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.5
_______________
5 Id. at 40.
345
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000
345
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so
that the above judgment became final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the
vehicular accident accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed
as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito
Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the
trial court a Special Appearance and Motion for
Reconsideration6 praying that the judgment dated February
4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected
him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil
aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack
of merit on September 16, 1991.7 Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal8 on September 25, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for
Execution of the subsidiary civil liability9 of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders.
One denied due course and dismissed Basilios appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.10 The
other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him
for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil
indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari12 under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1)
the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated
February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the
petitioner was concerned,
_______________
6 Id. at 41-47.
7 Id. at 52-53.
8 Id. at 54.
9 Id. at 55-56.
10 Id. at 561.
11 Id. at 66-68.
12 Id. at 2-21.
346
346
and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance
of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the
appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not afforded due
process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision

dated October 27, 1992, disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction is DENIED DUE COURSE and should be, as it is
hereby, DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and effect.13
A motion for reconsideration14 was filed by the petitioner on
November 24, 1992. This was denied in a Resolution15 dated
January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that
respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I. . . . IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR
PROBATION AT THE PROMULGATION.
II. . . . IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN
ACCUSED OR A PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS
NOT ENTITLED TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
III. . . . IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF
HIS DAY IN COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.
IV. . . . IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
THE AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY IN______________
13 Rollo, p. 69.
14 Records, pp. 578-593.
15 Rollo, pp. 60-61.
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VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000
347
JUNCTION BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE EMPLOYER.
IV. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT
ACT IN ABUSE OF AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.16
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals

erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner
against the trial court. To resolve it, we must, however, also
pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court
become final and executory when accused applied for
probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for
Reconsideration concerning civil liability decreed in the
judgment if he is not a party to the criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a
writ of preliminary injunction?
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be
heard by the trial court to prove the absence of an employeremployee relationship between him and accused. Nor that,
alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties
as an employee at the time of the incident. While these
assertions are not moved, we shall give them due
consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is
found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.17 This liability
is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the
______________
16 Id. at 36.
17 Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices,
or employees in the discharge of their duties.
348
348
award is made.18 However, before execution against an
employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a
hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an

employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
of such duties); and 4) that said employee is insolvent.19
In Vda. de Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the
Court observed that the drawback in the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that the
alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a
party to the case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed
the employer. Hence, we held:
To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to
the alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in
Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same
proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and
operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein that
the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has
been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.20
There are two instances when the existence of an employeremployee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged
vehicle owner may be determined. One, during the criminal
proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the exe_____________
18 Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
19 Yonaha vs. CA, 255 SCRA 397, 402 (1996).
20 Vda. de Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982).
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VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000

349
cution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should
be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of
due process.21
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against
accused because it was his truck that was involved in the
incident.22 Further, it was the insurance company, with
which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the
accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.23
Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings,
despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution
adduced evidence to show employer-employee
relationship.24 With the convicts application for probation,
the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All
told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it
found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all
his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and
prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he
chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time.
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the
proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming
that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the
motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by
the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he did on
October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was
no employer-employee relationship between him and
accused and that the latter was not discharging any function
in relation to his work at the time of the incident.25 In
addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly served
on December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a
manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for
execution.26 This was
_____________
21 National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 283 SCRA 275, 284 (1997).
22 TSN, July 8, 1992, p. 12.
23 Id. at 13.
24 Id. at 28.
25 Rollo, pp. 101-109.
26 Records, pp. 253-254.
350
350
set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for
petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in
open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was
only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a
counter-manifestation27 that belatedly attempted to contest
the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the
civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the
Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary
liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree
with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of
law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for
sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the
enforcement of the employers subsidiary liability in the
same criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty, execution against the employer must not
issue as just a matter of courseit behooves the court, as a
measure of due process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employers liability. (Yonaha
vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 [1996]) Basilio vs. Court
of Appeals, 328 SCRA 341, G.R. No. 113433 March 17, 2000
G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004.*

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Double Jeopardy;
Parties; Both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a
criminal case, but the government may do so only if the
accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy; The
offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect
to their right to civil liability.Section 1 of Rule 122 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus: Any
party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy. Clearly, both the
accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but
the government may do so only if the accused would not
thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the
prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused
should have been given a more severe penalty. On the other
hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment
with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has
the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended
parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the
judgment as is prejudicial to them.
Same; Same; Same; Well-established is the principle that the
appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss
an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail, on
the rationale that the appellant loses his standing in court
when he absconds.Well-established in our jurisdiction is the
principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu
proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused
jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: The
Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to
the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their
right to seek judicial relief. Moreover, this doctrine applies not
only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but
also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise: x x x.
When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his
arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia
proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
457
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
457
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure]. x x x
Same; Same; Same; An accused who has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities is deemed to
have abandoned his appeal rendering the judgment against
him final and executory.As to when a judgment of
conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule
120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation. In the case before us, the accusedemployee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become
final and executory.
Same; Same; Independent Civil Actions; The 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
deemed instituted in a criminal prosecutionit is only the

civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged
that is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action.At
the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution. x x x Only the civil
liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the
criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may
be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.
Same; Same; Same; The 2000 Rules deleted the requirement
of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal actionswhat is deemed
instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts.It is clear that the 2000 Rules
deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil
actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate,
distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based
on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such
revision and omission: 1. The right to bring the foregoing
actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included
therein. 2.
458
458
The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate
civil action arising from the crime charged does not
extinguish the right to bring such action. 3. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more

than once for the same act or omission. What is deemed
instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is
filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party maysubject to
the control of the prosecutorstill intervene in the criminal
action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
Same; Same; Subsidiary Civil Liability; Parties; The cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly
declare that, strictly speaking, the employers are not parties
to the criminal cases instituted against their employees;
While employers may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latters lawyers, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a
comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be
applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds
employer did not interpose an appeal. Indeed, petitioner
cannot cite any single case in which the employer appealed,
precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not
possible. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are
not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their
employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as
in the present case, the former cannot act independently on
their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An employers appeal would
violate the employees right against double jeopardy since
the judgment against the latter could become subject to
modification without his consent.An appeal from the
sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws
the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The

latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the,
appellant. This is the risk involved when the accused decides
to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts
have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of
the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it
imposed. If the present appeal is given course, the whole
case against the accused-employee becomes open to review.
It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has
already been imposed by
459
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
459
the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal
would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since
the judgment against him could become subject to
modification without his consent. We are not in a position to
second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived
his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that
petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against
double jeopardy.
Same; Same; Same; An accused, by fleeing, exhibits
contempt of the authority of the court and places himself in a
position to speculate on his chances for a reversal.By
fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the
authority of the court and placed himself in a position to
speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he
kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render
the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the
appellate court. Consequently, the judgment against an
appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the
proper authorities becomes final and executory.
Same; Same; Same; The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on subsidiary liabilityArticles 102 and 103are deemed
written into the judgments in the cases to which they are
applicable.Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,

employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters
insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary liabilityArticles 102 and 103are deemed
written into the judgments in the cases to which they are
applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the
trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.
Same; Same; Same; To allow employers to dispute the civil
liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent
court; The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case
is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount.In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In
effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction
surpasses mere civil liability. To allow employers to dispute
the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal
the final criminal conviction of their employees without the
latters consent would also result in improperly amending,
nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting
an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil
liability, but also with
460
460
regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites.Before the employers
subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be
adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the
employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former

are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was
committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties;
and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been
satisfied due to insolvency. The resolution of these issues
need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely
present. Such determination may be done in the same
criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and
civil, has been pronounced; and in a hearing set for that
precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of
the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Same; Same; Same; There is only one criminal case against
the accused-employee, and a finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspectsit is the height of absurdity for this
single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but
not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the
conviction of the former; Where the civil liability of the
accused-employee has become final and enforceable by
reason of his flight, then his employers subsidiary civil
liability has also become immediately enforceable.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates
that while the finality of conviction could be the proper
sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail,
the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioneremployer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second,
for its accused-employee. The untenability of this argument
is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and
civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case
to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to
an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of
the former. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental
to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has
become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
formers subsidiary civil liability has also become
immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing
that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on

the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process.As to the argument
that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that
what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon the employees
461
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
461
criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes
ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the
employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the
same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil
liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his
criminal negligence. It should be stressed that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It
is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy
that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of law authorizing such exercise. Hence, the legal
requirements must be strictly complied with.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; It can be said that
by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived the employer of the right to appeal.After a
judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
the case. In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the
accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before
the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was
deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal,
but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said
that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals.

Peter H. Santiago for petitioner.
Ramon M. Nisce collaborating counsel for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
Romulo Rivera and Benjamin Z. De Leon, Jr. private
prosecutors.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the
judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The
employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing
a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for
a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil
liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer are carried in one single decision
that has become final and executory.
462
462
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the
March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution
as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is
GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED.4
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y
Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced

to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as
follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of
P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for
one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for
the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of
P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00
as indemnity for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for
funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at
P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00
as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 9-28.
2 Id., pp. 30-34. Penned by Justice Mariano M. Umali and
concurred in by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Division
chair) and Edgardo P. Cruz (member).
3 Id., pp. 36-37.
4 CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34.
5 Annex G of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 115-124.
463
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
463
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral
expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and
her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and
the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as
hospital expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future
correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in

the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical
expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as
moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as
medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and
P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical
expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss
earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital
expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for
medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical
expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual
damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital
bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages,
P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral
damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of
the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual
damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the
owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual
damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the
insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of
the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large.
It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules
of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant
jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and
provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice
of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
464
464
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its
notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April
29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners]
notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8,
1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority
to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal.
The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May
31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor
filed the instant motion to dismiss.6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied
the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense.
Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the
accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as
set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to
dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal
case against the accused-employee would be to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal
filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil
liability became final and executory. Included in the civil
liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
_______________
6 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 31-33.
7 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 24,
2002, upon this Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum
signed by Assistant Solicitors General Carlos N. Ortega and

Roman G. del Rosario and Associate Solicitor Elizabeth
Victoria L. Medina. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty.
Ramon M. Nisce, was received by the Court on April 9, 2002.
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VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
465
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in
the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of
Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494)
apply to the instant case.8
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an
adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal
from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment
of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained
finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality,
notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of
that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless
the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a
criminal case, but the government may do so only if the
accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9
Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground
that the accused should have been given a more severe

penalty.10 On the other hand, the
_______________
8 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 8; Rollo, p. 200.
9 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II (2001, 9th
revised edition), p. 502.
10 Ibid.
466
466
offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect
to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to
appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties
should have the same right to appeal as much of the
judgment as is prejudicial to them.11
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the
appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss
an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal.12
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their
standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender
or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have
waived their right to seek judicial relief.13
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who
jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does so
during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly
explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his
arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia
proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment

against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy
with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x14
_______________
11 People v. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252, August 1, 1934.
12 This is substantially the same as the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
13 People v. Del Rosario, 348 SCRA 603, December 19, 2000.
14 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 540.
467
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
467
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless
they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are
otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them.15 While at large, they cannot seek
relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the
appeal.16
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is
explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped
and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is
deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the

judgment against him has become final and executory.17
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary
civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall
be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments,
in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or
some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests
lodging therein, or for
_______________
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., citing People v. Mapalao, 274 Phil. 354; 197 SCRA
79, May 14, 1991.
17 People v. Enoja, 378 Phil. 623; 321 SCRA 7, December 17,
1999.
468
468
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn;
and shall furthermore have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to
employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding

article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices,
or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now
address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
x x x
xxx
x x x
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime
charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action;
that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it
prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer under
_______________
18 Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity (2000
ed.), pp. 211-212.
469
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
469
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by
execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted
out to the employee.19
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of

reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil
actions referred to in Articles 32,20
_______________
19 Id., p. 212.
20 ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property
is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to
petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any
form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against

ones self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced
470
470
33,21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall remain
separate, distinct and independent of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil
Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since
they are not deemed included therein.
_______________
by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not
the defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence:
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a
judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
21 ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of

the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
22 ART. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police
force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person
in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall
be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action
herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice
to support such action.
23 ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
471
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
471
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate
civil action arising from the crime charged does not
extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover more than once for the same act or omission.24
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is
the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil
liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasidelicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil
action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may
subject to the control of the prosecutorstill intervene in the
criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest
therein.25
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal
Code, which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a

party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the
outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded
the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion
including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a
direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely
against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of
cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers.
Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because
in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not
interpose an appeal.27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any
single case in which the employer appealed, precisely
because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties
to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.28
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest
therein, this fact
_______________
24 Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity, supra,
p. 214.
25 Id., pp. 214-215.
26 Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
27 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 13; Rollo, p. 205.
28 Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, July
31, 1956.
472
472
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While
they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying
the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot
act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend
the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accusedemployee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the
judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent
from its Appellants Brief29 filed with the CA and from its
Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial courts
finding of guilt is not supported by competent evidence.31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a
waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the, appellant.32 This is the risk involved
when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of
conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and
to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against
the accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus
follows that a penalty higher than that which has already
been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him.
Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double
jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become
subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the
accused effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping
bail. It is
_______________
29 CA Rollo, pp. 66-108.
30 Rollo, pp. 9-28.
31 Appellants Brief, p. 14; CA Rollo, p. 84.
32 Lontoc v. People, 74 Phil. 513, December 29, 1943.
33 People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, December 9, 1999.
34 Lontoc v. People, supra; United States v. Abijan, 1 Phil. 83,
January 7, 1902. See also 11 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
473
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004

473
clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without
violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the
prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly
withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the
judgment of the court below final.35 Having been a fugitive
from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have
waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final
and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be
waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal
is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit
of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He
may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the
accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court
for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x.37
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the
authority of the court and placed himself in a position to
speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he
kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render
the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the
appellate court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who
escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities becomes final and executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to
appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee; that
by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that
the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
_______________
35 Francisco, Criminal Procedure (1996, 3rd ed.), p. 520.

36 73 Phil. 366, October 31, 1941.
37 Id., p. 369, per Abad Santos, J.
38 Francisco, Criminal Procedure, supra, p. 520.
39 Ibid.
40 People v. Enoja, supra.
474
474
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now
accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in
Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42
and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case, because
it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these
cases to take part in the criminal cases against their
employees. By participating in the defense of its employee,
herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed
rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on
subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic
tenet they have laid downthat an employers liability in a
finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are
subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their
employees in the event of the latters insolvency.44 The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability
Articles 102 and 103are deemed written into the judgments
in the cases to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accusedemployee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction
should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.46 In effect
and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses
mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a

criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat
a final judgment rendered by a competent court.48 By the
same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employ_______________
41 Supra at note 28.
42 158 SCRA 57, February 23, 1988.
43 164 SCRA 494, August 18, 1988.
44 Lagazon v. Reyes, 166 SCRA 386, October 18, 1988.
45 Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, supra.
46 Martinez v. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1, May 13, 1948.
47 Ibid.
48 Yusay v. Adil, supra; Pajarito v. Seeris, 87 SCRA 275,
December 14, 1978.
475
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
475
ees without the latters consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated
from that of the employee.49
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted,
however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that
(1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees
in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution
against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate
civil action. But the determination must be based on the
evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully
and freely present. Such determination may be done in the
same criminal action in which the employees liability,

criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing
set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer,
as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the
defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its
liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains
subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary
liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of
the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates
that while the finality of conviction could be the proper
sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail,
the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioneremployer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second,
for its accused-employee.
_______________
49 Lagazon v. Reyes, supra; Miranda P. Malate Garage &
Taxicab, Inc., supra.
50 Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula, 156 SCRA 779, December 22,
1987.
51 Ibid.
476
476
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is
only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A
finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the
height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the
accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accusedemployee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become
final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
formers subsidiary civil liability has also become

immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing
that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on
the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due
process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is
the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon
the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters
insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only
his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary
liability for his criminal negligence.52
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process.53 It is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of
law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal
requirements must be strictly complied with.55
_______________
52 Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Martinez v. Barredo,
supra.
53 Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 384 SCRA 466, July 11, 2002.
54 Oro v. Judge Diaz, 361 SCRA 108, July 11, 2001; Mercury
Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 902; 335 SCRA 567,
July 13, 2000; Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 708,
December 4, 1998.
55 Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, June 14, 1996; Del Rosario
v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 553, February 22, 1995.
477
that can be discarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules

cannot be tolerated.57 In these times when court dockets are
clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be
followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the
orderly disposition of those cases.58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has
the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then
the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case.59
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accusedemployee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC;
thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due
process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not
denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said that by
jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived
petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision
against the accused. It should be clear that only after proof of
his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be
enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an
employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has
been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The
proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26
August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a
passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by
petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in
San Juan, La Union x x x.61 Neither does petitioner dispute
that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused
while he was in the discharge of his duties.
_______________
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004

477
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the
rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial technicalities
56 Casim v. Flordeliza, 374 SCRA 386, January 23, 2002.

57 People v. Marong, 119 SCRA 430, December 27, 1982.
58 Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, supra.
59 Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265
SCRA 50, November 28, 1996.
60 Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, supra.

61 Petition for Review, p. 2; Rollo, p. 10; Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 2; Rollo, p. 194.
478
478
Litonjua vs. Fernandez
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed resolutions affirmed.
Notes.While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the
enforcement of the employers subsidiary liability in the
same criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty, execution against the employer must not
issue as just a matter of courseit behooves the court, as a
measure of due process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employers liability. (Yonaha
vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 [1996])
A final judgment rendered in a civil case absolving the
defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.
(Bordador vs. Luz, 283 SCRA 374 [1997]) Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People, 427 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 147703
April 14, 2004
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005.*

MELBA QUINTO, petitioner, vs. DANTE ANDRES and
RANDYVER PACHECO, respondents.
Actions; Criminal Procedure; When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
civil liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. With the
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action,
the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding,
with the criminal action predominating the civil.
Same; Same; The prime purpose of the criminal action is to
punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order; The sole purpose of the civil action is
the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.The
prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender
in order to deter him and others from committing the same
or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The
sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage
or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious
act of the accused. While the prosecution must prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
512
512
Quinto vs. Andres
crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of
the private complainant against the accused for damages
and/or restitution.
Same; Same; Judgments; The civil action based on delict
shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist.The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in
a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission
from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A person committing a
felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intendednatural
refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life
or events, while logical means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting
injury or damage.A person committing a felony is criminally
liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. Natural refers to an occurrence in
the ordinary course of human life or events, while logical
means that there is a rational connection between the act of
the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting
injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or

by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor.
Same; Same; Judicial Notice; It is of judicial notice that
nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes
for no reason at all.It is of judicial notice that nowadays
persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no
reason at all. However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill
the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove
that no violence was perpetrated on the person of
513
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
513
Quinto vs. Andres
the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce
proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill
the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join
them in fishing.
Appeals.
Public Attorneys Office for petitioner.
David P. Briones for respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old
Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his
playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years
old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw
respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the
mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited
Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.1
Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he
opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters
from the entrance of the drainage system.2
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with

respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system
which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high
and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.3 After a
while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out
of the drainage system and left4 without saying a word.
Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and
emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already
dead. Respondent
_______________
1 TSN, 2 May 1997, p. 23.
2 TSN, 13 January 1997, pp. 6-7.
3 Records, pp. 70-73. (Exhibits D to D-3).
4 Id., at p. 8.
514
514
Quinto vs. Andres
Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area.5
Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the
scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her
that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage
culvert while respondent Andres followed her.7
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy
thereon having been conducted. The police authorities of
Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint against the
respondents for Wilsons death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators took the sworn
statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner
Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been
to the drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres
and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already
dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding on
his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed.

Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI performed an autopsy thereon
at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report containing
the following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition,
attired with white long sleeves and dark pants and placed
inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left
forearm.
_______________
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 TSN, 6 June 1997, p. 18.
8 Records, p. 8. (Exhibit A).
515
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
515
Quinto vs. Andres
Laryngotracheal luminacongested and edematous
containing muddy particles with bloody path.
Lungshyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure;
section contains bloody froth.
Brainautolyzed and liquefied.
Stomachpartly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head
injuries, contributory.9
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against
respondents Andres and Pacheco in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for
homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the respondents with
homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13,

1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Court, the said accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco
y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a
culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto
to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr.
Dominic Aguda, who testified on direct examination that the
hematoma at the back of the victims head and the abrasion
on the latters left forearm could have been caused by a
strong force coming from a blunt instrument or object. The
injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated that the
victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also
found on the
_______________
9 Id., at p. 67.
10 Id., at p. 1.
516
516
Quinto vs. Andres
lumina of the larynx and trachea (Nakahigop ng putik). Dr.
Aguda stated that such injury could be caused when a person
is put under water by pressure or by force.11 On crossexamination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the
scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a strong force
applied to the scalp coming from a blunt instrument. He also
stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the occipital
portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma
at the back of Wilsons head could have rendered the latter
unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of water, the
boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the

doctor declared that the 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right
side of Wilsons face could have also been caused by rubbing
against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a
rough surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full
of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.12
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the
respondents had admitted the pictures showing the drainage
system including the inside portions thereof,13 the
prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial
court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, per
its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not
hold the respondents liable for damages because of the
absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for
Wilsons death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals
(CA) insofar as the civil aspect of the case was concerned. In
her brief, she averred that
_______________
11 TSN, 17 September 1997, pp. 5-7.
12 Id., at pp. 12-13.
13 Records, pp. 70-73. (Exhibits D to D-3).
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VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
517
Quinto vs. Andres
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN
RULING THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO
HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH
OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the
RTC on December 21, 2001. It ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable
doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did
not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant
to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action
ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars

the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of
acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal
acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91
Phil. 672)15
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised
the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE
EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO
HOLD RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
WILSON QUINTO.16
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere
possibilities, surmises and speculations when it held that
Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head hitting
_______________
14 CA Rollo, p. 75.
15 Rollo, p. 59.
16 Id., at p. 15.
518
518
Quinto vs. Andres
the stones in the drainage system since the culvert was
slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by a snake which
he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit
hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost
consciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The
petitioner also alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that
the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on the part of
the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that
respondent Andres even informed her of Wilsons death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the

testimony of the Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature,
location and number of the injuries sustained by the victim
which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. The
petitioner insists that the behavior of the respondents after
the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt, considering
that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent
Andres to bring out Wilsons cadaver, while respondent
Andres returned inside the drainage system only when he
saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend
Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence
on record to show that either or both the respondents caused
the death of her son and, as such, are jointly and severally
liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that
since the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove
that they committed the crime of homicide and caused the
death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for
the latters death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.17 The civil liability of such person established in
Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes
restitu_______________
519
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
519
Quinto vs. Andres
tion, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification
for consequential damages.18 When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.19 With

the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the
civil.20
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing
the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to
reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order.21 The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution,
reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for
the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual
or felonious act of the accused.22 While the prosecution
must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of
action of the private complainant against the accused for
damages and/or restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in
a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission
from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.23
_______________
19 Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
20 Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99,
December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 166.
21 Ibid.
22 Id.
23 Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
520
520
Quinto vs. Andres
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for

all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom
although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.24 Natural refers to an occurrence in the
ordinary course of human life or events, while logical
means that there is a rational connection between the act of
the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting
injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor.25
There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause
being the felonious act of the offender, the effect being the
resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The cause and
effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the
preexisting conditions, such as the pathological condition of
the victim (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the
predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del
ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la
constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or
concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the
doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the
conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus,
pulmonary infection or gangrene.26
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the
resulting injury when:
_______________
24 Article 4, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code.
25 Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 (1957).
26 Cuello Colon, Codigo Penal, 12 ed., 1968, pp. 335-336.
521
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
521
Quinto vs. Andres
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the
felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active
force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the
felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the
victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a
manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a
consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature
or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes
cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim.28 A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to
crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:
. . . Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons
guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment. . .30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
. . . The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3,
1879, said in a case similar to the present, the following:
Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his
actand in this case, the physical condition and
temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil,
the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence
of the means employed, but by the result actually produced;
_______________
27
28
29
30
Cuello Colon, Doredo Penal, Vol. 1, p. 278.

People v. Cutura, 4 SCRA 663 (1962).
People v. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1 (1934).
Id., at p. 4.
31 62 Phil. 162 (1935).

522
522
Quinto vs. Andres
and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the
deceased was the cause which determined his death, without
his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the
act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.32
In the present case, the respondents were charged with
homicide by dolo. In People v. Delim,33 the Court delineated
the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused for homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the
corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal
act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the
act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things:
first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes.
In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is
burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be
dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of
some other than the deceased and was not the result of
accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove
the felony of homicide or murder, there must be
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words,
that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter
alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and
the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies
because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.34
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the
prosecution or the private complainant is burdened to adduce
preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence.
Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger

than that presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a
_______________
32 Id., at pp. 168-169.
33 396 SCRA 386 (2003).
34 Id., at pp. 399-400.
523
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
523
Quinto vs. Andres
judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause
of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the
defendants.35
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides
how preponderance of evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider
all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of
their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately
appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.36
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court
and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant
evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the
respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of
action against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the

collective testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness,
and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the
Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased
sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as
to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was
equivocal. He
_______________
35 Francisco, Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, 1997
ed., Vol. VII, Part II, p. 431.
36 Rollo, p. 51.
524
524
Quinto vs. Andres
presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have
been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full
force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and
his head hit a hard object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q
So it is possible that the injury, that isthe hematoma,
caused on the back of the head might be due to the victims
falling on his back and his head hitting a pavement?
A
Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if
the fall is strong enough and would fall from a high place and
hit a concrete pavement, then it is possible.
Q
Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete
pavement and the head hit the pavement, the injury might
be caused by that slipping?
A
It is also possible.
Q
So when the victim was submerged under water while
unconscious, it is possible that he might have taken in some
mud or what?
A
Yes, Sir.
Q
So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still
breathing?
A
Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also
would indicate that the victim was still alive when he was
placed under water.37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side
of the victims face could have been caused by rubbing
against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q
The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face,
would it be caused by the face rubbing against a concrete
wall or pavement?
_______________
37 TSN, 17 September 1997, pp. 10-11.
525
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
525
Quinto vs. Andres
A
Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a
rough surface.
Q
Rough surface?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
Q
When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were
there no signs that the victim was strangled?
A
There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda
that the deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to
fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
Q
Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been
caused when the victim fell down and that portion of the
body or occipital portion hit a blunt object and might have
been inflicted as a result of falling down?
A
If the fall . . . if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it
is also possible.39
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the
prosecution that there were stones inside the culvert. (See
Exhibit D to D-3). The stones could have caused the
victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there
was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must
be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round.
If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will
naturally take in some amount of water and drown.40
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as
well as its conclusion based on the said findings.
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 12-13.
39 Rollo, p. 43.
40 Ibid.
526
526
Quinto vs. Andres
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule
is that the findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment
of probative weight of the evidence of the parties, and its
conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the
CA, are given conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial
court ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would change the

outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any
justification to warrant a reversal of the findings or
conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed
because even Garcia testified that the drainage culvert was
dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join
respondents Andres and Pacheco inside.41 Respondent
Andres had no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might
have caused the abrasion on the left forearm of the
deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the abrasions
on the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante
mortem or post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of
evidence that either or both the respondents hit the
deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and,
consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might have
been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the
deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or
committed serious crimes for no reason at all.42 However,
the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant
and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was
perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the
petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part
of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the
latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the
petitioner
_______________
41 TSN, 2 May 1997, p. 17.
42 People v. Delim, supra.
527
VOL. 453, MARCH 16, 2005
527
Quinto vs. Andres
testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house

and play with her son before the latters death:
Q
Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
A
Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my
son after going from her mother who is gambling, Sir.
Q
But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
A
Yes, Sir.
Q
Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is
around?
A
(Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the
courtroom.)43
When the petitioners son died inside the drainage culvert, it
was respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He
then informed the petitioner of her sons death. Even after
informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent
Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area
where the deceased was:
Q
Did not Dante Andres follow you?
A
He went with me, Sir.
Q
So when you went to the place where your son was lying,
Dante Andres was with you?
A
No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son
was there at the culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left
behind and he just followed, Sir.
Q
So when you reached the place where your son was lying
down, Dante Andres also came or arrived?
A
It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.44
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of

evidence to prove a cause of action for damages based on
the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
_______________
43 TSN, 6 June 1997, p. 8.
44 Id., at p. 18.
528
528
Quinto vs. Andres
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.Where the civil action is impliedly instituted together
with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the
offended parties are not included in the computation of the
filing feesfiling fees are to be paid only if their items of
damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if
they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment. (Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387
[2001])
There is no prejudicial question if the civil and criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
(Samson vs. Daway, 434 SCRA 612 [2004]) Quinto vs.
Andres, 453 SCRA 511, G.R. No. 155791 March 16, 2005
G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO
BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Actions; Death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon.Death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.
Same; Same; The claim for civil liability survives
be predicated on a source of survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be obligation other
than delict.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act
or omission: a)
______________
* EN BANC.
240
240
People vs. Bayotas
Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) x x x x x x x x x; e)
Quasi-delicts.
Same; Same; Where the civil liability survives, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.Where the
civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.

This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
Same; Same; Private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file the separate civil action by
prescription.Finally, the private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.
Same; Same; Death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape.Applying this set of rules to the
case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the
appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas
City, Br. 16.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC
Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape
241
241
People vs. Bayotas

and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal
of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the
National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that
the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v.
Sendaydiego1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved
for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court
on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand,
opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In
support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia2 which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in
the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue
was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein
was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect
both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a
consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
__________________
1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.

2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.
242
242
People vs. Bayotas
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
before final judgment; With reference to Castillos criminal
liability, there is no question.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said
liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term final judgment. Is it
final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory
order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained
in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed
is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de
1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The code of 1870 x x x it will be observed employs the term
sentencia firme. What is sentencia firme under the old
statute? XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473,
furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de
las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y

plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
Sentencia firme really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as
Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmeden
condena determinada; or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt
of the accused becomesuna verdad legal. Prior thereto,
should the accused die, according to Viada, no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad
criminal de ninguna clase. And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, there cannot be any
243
243
People vs. Bayotas
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony
upon which the civil action might arise exists, for the simple
reason that there is no party defendant. (I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the
same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd
ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term final judgment is similarly
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term final judgment in the
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind
Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant
has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means
judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has
not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against
him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without

reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessity, cover both the criminal and the
civil aspects of the case. People vs. Yusico (November 9,
1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68
Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol.
I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as
the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and
of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability. I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillos
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be
enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we
dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil
aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation
whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a
case where the source thereofcriminal liabilitydoes not
exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et
al., CA-G.R. No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, no party can
be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit, which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding.
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case3 was
adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the
_____________
3 Supra.
244
244
People vs. Bayotas
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al.,4 People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al.5 and People of the Philippines
v. Satorre6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of
the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison

case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having
been established, and considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal
and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code;
Reyes Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v.
Castillo and Ocfemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the
case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar7 and Lamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals8 ruled differently.
In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether
the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died
before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the
extent of barring any claim therefor against his estate. It was
the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the
death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all
criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view
of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out
by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a
civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
__________________
4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.
5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.
6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.
8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.
245
245
People vs. Bayotas
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings
were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of
the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
x x x
xxx
xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its
only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before
final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Italics ours)
xxx
xxx
x x x.
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: Consequently, while the death
of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability
including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains.
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his

conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to
survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since
246
246
People vs. Bayotas
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court9 requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose
death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of
First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal,
when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this
tribunal, the name of the offended party shall be included in
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should
be substituted as defendants-appellants.
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo
to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the
civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated
on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently,
the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with
the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et
al.10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In
this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification
of public documents. Sendaydiegos death supervened
during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiegos appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it
was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent
on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import
of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon

the correctness of Sendaydiegos conviction despite dismissal
of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is
civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July
8, 1977 stating thus:
_________________
9 Section 21. Where claim does not survive.When the
action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and
the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
manner especially provided in these rules.
10 Supra.
247
247
People vs. Bayotas
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred
after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and
ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express
waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability
is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and
Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107
Phil. 8).
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First

on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24,
1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the
funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank
vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability
for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising
from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal
case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the
Civil Code x x x and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed
to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedents heirs or whether or not his
estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of
Court).
Succeeding cases11 raising the identical issue have
maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other
words, they
_________________
11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204
SCRA 122; Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337,
August 16,
248
248
People vs. Bayotas
were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule
that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil
liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the

entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A
reexamination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to
revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the
criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latters
extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient
to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support
to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a
grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the accuseds civil liability ex delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that
___________________
1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L51625, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 269; Rufo Mauricio
Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357,
November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No. L32507, November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa,
No. L-67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v.
Asibar, No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People
v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and
People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
249
civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be

determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the courts
_________________

249
People vs. Bayotas
which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal
would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil
liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his
conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal
action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction
is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on
this matter:
before final judgment;
xxx
xxx
x x x.
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the
expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil
action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed
under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been
filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the
outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and
separate one, the prosecution of which does not even
necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings.12 One would
be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering
12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:

x x x this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil
liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of
any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the
crime as such, that is without having to prove the criminal
liability of the defendant so long as his act causing damage
or prejudice to the offended party is proven by
250
250
People vs. Bayotas
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This
is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In such
cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from
crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action,
such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs
out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared
and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article
30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a
criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental

distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same
as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely,
it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement
to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not
apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiegos appeal will be resolved only for the purpose
of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil
liability for which his estate would be liable.13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil
liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidence adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
charged. Thus, it
________________
13 Supra, p. 134.
251
251
People vs. Bayotas
upheld Sendaydiegos conviction and pronounced the same
as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiegos civil liability, there was a reopening of the
criminal action already extinguished which served as basis
for Sendaydiegos civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977.
In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made
the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor.
Hence, the Courts conclusion:
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
x x x
xxx
x x x.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Courts judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
252
252
People vs. Bayotas
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil
procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority

nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to
civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action
upon the death of the offender. x x x.
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly
be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of
the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must
be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego
was held liable for Sendaydiegos civil liability. What are
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 86,14 are contractual money claims while the claims
involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the
restitution of personal or real property.15
_________________
14 SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed, barred; exceptions.All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counter-claims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and
if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
against the estate, as though the claim had been presented

directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this
case.
253
253
People vs. Bayotas
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what
claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money
and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part
of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal
basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the
criminal action engendered by the death of the accused
pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he
must subject to Section 1, Rule 11116 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as
__________________
16 SECTION 1. Institute of criminal and civil actions.When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes
recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of

the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others.
The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the accused. When the offended
party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual,
is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees
254
254
People vs. Bayotas
amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not
on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate
civil action is premised determines against whom the same
shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from
quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to
person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator17 of the
estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator.No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;

but actions to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala18 where we
held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code,
the same must be filed against the executor or administrator
of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the
claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims
arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money
claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations
other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also
arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed
against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86
of shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof
in court for trial.
__________________
17 Justice Regalado cited the Courts ruling in Belamala that
since the damages sought, as a result of the felony
committed amounts to injury to person or property, real or
personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be claimed
against the executor/administrator and not against the
estate.
18 Ibid.
255
255
People vs. Bayotas
the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.19
a) Law20
b) Contracts
_______________
19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: The civil
liability may still be pursued in a separate civil action but it
must be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict, except when by statutory provision an independent
civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the
instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil Code. Justice
Regalado stressed that:
Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and
survives the deceased offender where it also arises
simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason
of a contract, as in Torrijos; or from law, as stated in Torrijos
and in the concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in
reference to the Civil Code; or from a quasi-contract; or is
authorized by law to be pursued in an independent civil
action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these exceptions, it
would be unfair and inequitable to deprive the victim of his
property or recovery of damages therefor, as would have
been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the
provincial government in Sendaydiego.
20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil
Code; see related provisions of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 111.
256
256
People vs. Bayotas
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
xxx
xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., On leave.
_______________
21 ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when

they are filed before the court, when there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.
257
257
Republic vs. Court of Appeals

Appeal dismissed.
Note.e outcome or result of the criminal case whether an
acquittal or conviction is inconsequential and will be of no
moment in a civil action for damages based on Article 33 of
the Civil Code. (Diong Bi Chu vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA
554 [1990])
o0o People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, G.R. No.
102007 September 2, 1994

Murder Conviction Upheld for Killing Two Neighbors with Bolo

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Murder Conviction Upheld for Killing Two Neighbors with Bolo

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Nos. L-36662-63. July 30, 1982.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

upon demand by said peace officers for him to surrender.

was hard-headed. He went home, taking his things along with

The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused,

simply cannot stand, as basis of belief. Moreover, the Court

Camano changed their declarations not only once, twice, or

(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and

The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor

More or less 12 to 15 meters.

stabbed while he was facing his assailant, as claimed by

allegedly saw the accused drinking in his house which is

But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno

People vs. Camano

[No. 34917. September 7, 1931]

In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following

"8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct

had referred to consisted of opium, that it was about to

People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng

VOL. 56, SEPTEMBER 7, 1931

VOL. 56, SEPTEMBER 7, 1931

As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish

United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88,

understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin

[No. 5728. August 11, 1910.]

VOL. 16, AUGUST 11, 1910.

stated that he desired to commit the same offense and would

[No. 39086. October 26, 1934]

7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ClRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.The corpus

codefendants were tried jointly upon said information; and,

indicating his guilt. Appellant was prosecuted on the theory

should be jointly tried and convicted, or acquitted. In other

latter did not conspire at all. In all the cases, therefore, a

indiciarias muy fuertes contra el susodicho acusado Ong

at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is

[No. 8578. November 17, 1913.]

During the pendency of the proceedings in this court the

she thought nothing of it. Upon the return of Fulgencio Seal

defendants cannot be credited. Their guilt is conclusively

United States vs. Anselmo Diris, on April 12, 1904, which

[No. 8187. January 29, 1913.]

production of a single result, each one sufficient for the

bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The following

"He is the biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied: "There

Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to

principal in the crime by direct inducement, because without

VOL. 24, JANUARY 29, 1913.

concubinage in the presence of a daughter who continually

of money together with the land involved in the donation if

thereupon to continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels

concealment gave rise to the influence which the master

court held that these facts constituted sufficient inducement

paramour, with whom she had been maintaining illicit

make the accused a principal by inducement as well as by

cused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the

[No. 42476. July 24, 1935]

themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be

receipts. The four defendants lived together in a house on

People vs. Kiichi Omine

VOL. 61, JULY 24, 1935

of frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does

all contrary supposition. When this intention is not

Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by him is