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1. Preface
In 2001 Japan imported 54.1 million tons of LNG, which was slightly over half of the worlds
total LNG production of 100 million tons per year. About 60% of Japans LNG is stored in
aboveground tanks and the rest is stored in-ground tanks at LNG regasification terminals in Japan.
In-ground tanks have excellent merits; high safety, effective land utilization and not disrupting
scenery. On the other hand, in 1993, pre-stressed concrete (PC) was used for the first time in Japan
to construct a new aboveground LNG storage tank. Currently almost all aboveground tanks in Japan
are single containment, with structurally independent dikes. At present five PC tanks, with this new
design, are in operation in Japan, and some are under construction or in the planning stage. In
Europe and the United States aboveground PC tanks have been constructed since 1960s and was the
common tank design of the 1980s.
Presented here is a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of LNG aboveground tank designs
based on the past operating records of LNG regasification terminals, along with a conventional single
containment tank design. The assessment was conducted after choosing two aboveground tank
designs, among several, to study. One is the PC membrane tank without a structurally independent
dike. It has a high, calculated safety probability. This design, however, has not been constructed
anywhere in the world. The other is a Steel/PC double shell tank without a structurally independent
dike. This design has been constructed only in Japan. A Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) was also
conducted to compare both PC tank designs from the viewpoint of their global environmental impact.
Portugal, South Korea, India and other countries. There is a difference in the vapor control method
between a full containment tank and a Steel/PC double shell tank. The roof is supported by the PC
outer wall in a full containment tank (as standardized by EN 1473) and this makes it possible to control
the vapor in the case of loss of LNG containment.
In Japan, The Preliminary Draft of Recommended Practice for PC LNG Aboveground Tank
was issued as the first technical standard for Steel/PC aboveground tanks by the Center of Promotion
of Natural Gas in 1990. It was developed as the Recommended Practice for LNG Aboveground
Storage in August 2002.
2.1. PC Membrane Tank
PC Outer Wall
PC Outer Wall
SS Membrane
Inner Shell
(9% Ni Steel)
GL
GL
CS Outer shell
GL
RC Tank Body
Inner Shell
(9% Ni Steel
or Al Alloy)
Dike
SS Membrane
GL
Figure 1
2.3.
In-ground Tank
This tank design has a 2-mm thick membrane as its primary container. The tank body, which
is installed below grade, is made of reinforced concrete (RC) because large earth and water pressure
forces constantly act on side wall and bottom.
In-ground tanks have following excellent merits:
1. The possibility of spilling large quantities of LNG onto the ground is almost ruled out since
the liquefied gas is stored underground. Auxiliary equipment and sometimes piping are
above ground but these contain limited quantities of LNG relative to the storage tanks
themselves.
2. Land is effectively utilized since storage is below ground level and no protective dikes are
needed around the tanks.
3. The dome-shaped roof does not disrupt the scenery of surrounding area, giving the
onlookers a sense of safety. For the advanced-class of in-ground tank that is constructed
completely underground at Ohgishima terminal in Yokohama, Japan, the dome-shaped
roof is covered with at least one meter of soil and so it is entirely hidden from view.
Approximately 70 tanks have been constructed in Japan since the first tank was constructed in
1970. The in-ground tanks account for approximately 40% of LNG storage in Japan. They continue
to win approval from local authorities for their high safety level/record. 14 units have been constructed
in South Korea and in other countries.
2.5.
In a PC membrane tank, the inner shell membrane operates as the primary container
only. The PC outer wall withstands inner gas and liquid pressure and prevents liquid
spread in an emergency, acting as the secondary container.
In the Steel/PC double shell tank, the inner shell, made of 9% Nickel Steel, functions not
only as primary container but also it must withstand the inner gas and liquid pressure.
The PC outer wall operates as a secondary container, preventing liquid spread in an
emergency.
In a single containment tank, the inner shell operates in the same fashion as that in the
Steel/PC double shell tank. The dike functions as a secondary container.
For an in-ground tank, the inner shell membrane operates as primary container. The
outer PC wall together with earth pressure withstands the inner gas and liquid pressures
and intrinsically prevents liquid spread in an emergency by also acting as a secondary
container.
LNG Containment
PC Membrane tank
Steel/PC Double Shell Tank
Single Containment Tank
In-ground Tank
Primary Container
Primary Container
Primary Container
Primary Container
Withstanding
Prevention of Liquid Spread
LNG pressure
Secondary Container
Secondary Container
Dike (Secondary Container)
Secondary Container and Earth
40
35
34
30
28
25
25
21
20
15
12
14
PC Membrane Tank
10
20,000
40,000
60,000
Capacity m3
Figure 2
3.2.
High Safety
The membrane is not a pressure part but a part of the liquid and gas tightness system.
Defects/flaws in the membrane can not grow rapidly because they instantly release the secondary
stress that predominates on the membrane. Therefore, there is low probability of a LNG spill from a
membrane tank. Even if it were to occur, the LNG would not spread out rapidly. Moreover it would
be easy to detect the gass escape, which has good gas permeability, because the tanks PUF
insulation already fills the inter-barrier space (between membrane and PC outer wall) and therefore
inhibits the LNG from entering. The PC outer wall, operating as secondary container, could contain
any LNG spill within the tank structure. In addition, the inner shell, outer wall, foundation and roof can
be designed and constructed using proven existing technical standards and technology. The ability to
conduct a hydrostatic test enables engineers to enhance the reliability of PC outer wall.
Assessment Content
When doing a QRA, risk is synthetically evaluated from the viewpoints of probability of its
occurrence and the impact of the hazard. Then, in general, the following risk assessments are
executed by QRA for the tank designs.
(a) Impact of Vapor Leakage
Evaluation of the impacts and probabilities of damage to the roof, blow-off from one of the
safety valves and damage to the boil-off-gas (BOG) line (both from gas diffusion and
radiant heat when ignited) are conducted.
(b) Impact of Liquid Leakage
Evaluation of the impacts and probabilities from damage to the LNG receiving and feeding
lines and from overfilling of the LNG tank itself (both from gas diffusion and radiant heat
when ignited) are conducted.
(c) Impact of Tank Rupture
Evaluation of the impact and probability of tank rupture are conducted.
In this report, the object is to evaluate the safety level of the PC membrane tank design
compared to that of the Steel/PC double shell and single containment tank designs. The above two
cases, (a) and (b), do not exert a different result among these tank designs because assumed damage
is irrelevant to tank designs. On the other hand, case (c) is dependent on tank designs and so is the
focus of this paper.
4.2.
Assessment Method
Although there are several other methods such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Failure
Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) that are also used in the field of QRA, FTA is employed in this report.
FTA consists of both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Causes of the hazardous event, namely the
loss of LNG containment, are deductively inferred in the qualitative analysis. The probabilities of
these hazardous events based on the deduced qualitative analysis are then computed with failure rate
data, such as the probabilities of basic causes. Finally, a QRA of a tank system is completed both
with the calculated probability of incidence and with an analysis of the hazardous consequences.
However it is noted again that the analysis of the hazardous consequences is not addressed in this
paper adjusting the focus of the above object described in 4.1.
4.3.
OR
Shortcomings of design
and/or inspection
Natural disasters
Extra-ordinary events
P1
P2
P3
P4
Figure 3
4.4.
4.4.2.
failure of PSVs
Excessive
pressure
Underpressure
OR
P28
Liquids with
different
densities
P29
During an
maintenance
intervention
Overfilling
P37
P38
Rollover
During an
unloading
operation
AND
AND
Occurrence of
unstable
stratification
Failure of
detection
Failure of PSVs
Excessive
pressure
protection fails
Failure of
operation
P30
P31
P32
AND
P33
Failure to remove
boil-off- gas
Failure of PCV
to flare
Failure of PSVs
OR
P32
Failure of first
compressor and
take-over
P35
Figure 4
4.5.
P34
Common cause
of compressors
P36
Results
Table 2 shows the probability of LNG leakage from each tank designs. QRA by FTA finds that
a PC membrane tank design (1X10-7 times/year) has the same safety level as the Steel/PC double shell
tank design (1X10-7 times /year) and that it has higher safety level than single containment tank without
Shortcomings of Design
and/or Inspection
1X10-8
PC Membrane
Natural Disasters
3X10-8
Failure in Plant
Operation
Extra-ordinary
Events
3X10-10
7X10-8
1X10-7
7X10-8
1X10-7
7X10-8
3X10-5
7X10-8
5X10-7
Total
(unit: times/year)
Primary Container
The primary container of PC membrane tank is a 2-mm thick stainless-steel membrane, while
the Steel/PC double shell uses 9% Nickel-steel sheet that is about 30-mm thick.
5.2.2.
Secondary Container
Secondary containers of both tanks are made of prestressed concrete. In a PC membrane
tank, liquid pressure and larger thermal load constantly act on the secondary container, while they do
so only in case of an emergency (LNG leak) in the Steel/PC double shell tank design. Rebar and
prestressing tendons somewhat more extensively used in the PC membrane tank.
Primary Container
Secondary Container
Insulation
PC Membrane Tank
Stainless-steel membrane
2mm thick
Prestressed concrete
Constant liquid pressure and thermal
load
20cm thick PUF board
5.2.3. Insulation
Insulation for a PC membrane tank is made of (approximately) 20-cm thick PUF board for both
the side and bottom, while the Steel/PC double shell tank uses 1-m thick perlite for the side and PUF
for the bottom.
5.3.
t
t
m3
t
t
t
t
PC Membrane Tank
0.00
266.77
14,160.00
3,210.00
520.00
0.00
428.16
t
t
m3
t
t
t
t
5.4.1.
(1)
(2)
Stainless Steel
Computing done by JEMAI-LCA
(3)
Concrete
Recommended value by LCA subcommittee of JSCE, Japan Society of Civil Engineering used.
(4)
Rebar
Recommended value for electric furnace rebar by LCA subcommittee of JSCE used.
(5)
Prestressing Tendons
Recommended value for blast furnace hot-rolled steel by LCA subcommittee of JSCE used.
(6)
Perlite
Computing by JEMAI-LCA employing the value of limestone instead of perlite for exploiting and
import. The computed value is smaller because electricity for the grinder mill in plant was neglected.
While coal oil, for on-site combustion, is considered, electricity (for other purposes) is neglected in the
computing process.
(7)
Standard PUF
Unit emission is computed for conventional PUF foamed with HCFC-141b. It is calculated by
JEMAI-LCA such that all HCFC-141b consumed during manufacturing process is contained and
stabilized in the PUF.
(8)
9% Nickel Steel
Stainless Steel
Concrete
Rebar
Prestressing Tendon
Perlite
Standard PUF
CO2 foamed PUF
HCFC-141b in Standard PUF
Unit Emission
2.34
4.24
0.3113
0.4693
1.507
9.97
2.95
2.95
90.00
Unit
t-CO2/t
t-CO2/t
t-CO2/m3
t-CO2/t
t-CO2/t
t-CO2/t
t-CO2/t
t-CO2/t
t-CO2/t
5.5.
Bottom-line
Table 6 shows the calculation results;
Extraction/mining
through Manufacturing
9% Nickel Steel
Stainless Steel
Concrete
Rebar
Prestressing tendon
Perlite
Conventional PUF
CO2 foamed PUF
Summation [1]
t-CO2
t-CO2
t-CO2
t-CO2
t-CO2
t-CO2
t-CO2
t-CO2
t-CO2
Transporting
Summation [2]
t-CO2
t-CO2
Considering effect
of HCFC-141b
Summation [3]
Unit
t-CO2
t-CO2
Steel/PC Double
Shell Tank
5,795.95
4,320.84
1,450.24
798.71
10,431.51
106.20
22,903.45
450.71
23,354.16
23,354.16
1,131.10
4,408.01
1,506.56
783.64
1,263.07
9,092.38
PC Membrane Tank
with CO2 foamed PUF
1,131.10
4,408.01
1,506.56
783.64
1,263.07
9,092.38
319.12
9,411.50
319.12
9,411.50
PC Membrane Tank
38,534.40
47,945.90
9,411.50
6. Conclusion
The high safety level of the PC membrane tank design and Steel/PC double shell tank design
have been proven (even without a structurally independent dike) by a Quantitative Risk Assessment
using FTA, based on the past operating records of LNG regasification terminals. Also the LCA
clarifies the inherently low environmental impact of a PC membrane tank with the CO2 foamed PUF
developed by Tokyo Gas.
From now on, in the century of the environment, PC membrane tank will join the mainstream of
LNG aboveground storage tank design, both in Japan and abroad, from the viewpoints of higher safety,
higher reliability, lower cost, and their shorter construction times.
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