Design to Operations:

Integrating Safety into Hydrogen

and Fuel Cell Projects
Nick Barilo, P.E.
2014 NFPA Conference & Expo
June 10, 2014, Las Vegas, NV

PNNL-SA-102337

Overview of the Hydrogen Safety Panel (HSP)

Objectives
Provide expertise and recommendations and assist with identifying
safety-related technical data gaps, best practices and lessons
learned.

Name
Nick Barilo, Manager

Alia3on
Pacic Northwest Na3onal Laboratory

Bill Fort, Chair

Consultant

Help integrate safety planning into funded projects to ensure that all
projects address and incorporate hydrogen and related safety
practices.

David Farese

Air Products and Chemicals

Larry Fluer

Fluer, Inc.

Donald Frikken

Becht Engineering

Activities
Review safety plans for H2 facilities and projects
Participate in H2 project design reviews
Engage project teams through onsite safety reviews
Identify safety knowledge gaps
Support accident investigations

Aaron Harris

Air Liquide

Richard Kallman

City of Santa Fe Springs, CA

Miguel Maes

NASA-JSC White Sands Test Facility

Glenn Scheer

GWS Solu3ons of Tolland

Andrew J. Sherman

Mescoat Inc.

Ian Sutherland

General Motors R&D

Accomplishments
Over 395 project reviews covering vehicle fueling stations, auxiliary
power, backup power combined heat and power, industrial truck
fueling, portable power and R&D activities.
White papers with recommendations recently include:
Secondary Protection for 70MPa Fueling
Safety of Hydrogen Systems Installed in Outdoor Enclosures
Supported development/updating of safety knowledge tools:
h2incidents.org, h2bestpractices.org and Hydrogen Tools, an
iPhone/iPad app.
Conducted hydrogen safety panel meetings since 2003 engaging a
broad cross-section of the hydrogen and fuel cell community.

Steven Weiner

Pacic Northwest Na3onal Laboratory

Robert Zalosh

Firexplo

HSP Facts
Formed in 2003 to support U.S. DOE Hydrogen and Fuel
Cells Program
400 years of industrial experience, representing many H2
sectors and technical areas of expertise
Includes committee members from NFPA 2 and 55, and
technical committees of ASME, SAE and ISO
Contribute to peer-reviewed literature on hydrogen safety
Present at national & international forums

April 30, 2014

Properties of hydrogen
An understanding of the properties of
hydrogen is critical for the proper design of
a facility or workspace. A workspace can
be configured to mitigate hazards by
understanding and taking advantage of
some of the characteristics of hydrogen.
Gaseous hydrogen:
has a flammable range of 4-75% in air
will typically rise and disperse rapidly
(14x lighter than air)
diffuses through materials not normally
considered porous
requires only a small amount of energy
for ignition (0.02 mJ)
burns with a pale blue, almost invisible
flame
can embrittle some metals

April 30, 2014

Fuel Cells Overview and Benefits

Key Benefits

The Role of Fuel Cells

Very High
Eciency

Reduced CO2
Emissions

> 60% (electrical)

> 70% (electrical, hybrid fuel cell /
turbine)
> 80% (with CHP)
3550%+ reduc=ons for CHP
systems (>80% with biogas)
5590% reduc=ons for light-duty
vehicles

Reduced Oil
Use

>95% reduc=on for FCEVs (vs. todays

gasoline ICEVs)
>80% reduc=on for FCEVs (vs.
advanced PHEVs)

Reduced Air
Pollu=on

up to 90% reduc=on in criteria

pollutants for CHP systems

Fuel
Flexibility

Source: U.S. DOE

Clean fuels including

biogas, methanol, H2
Hydrogen can be produced
cleanly using sunlight or
biomass directly, or through
electrolysis, using renewable
electricity
Conventional fuels
including natural gas, propane,
diesel
April 30, 2014

Fuel Cells Where are we today?

Fuel Cells for Stationary Power,
Auxiliary Power, and Specialty
Vehicles

Fuel Cells for

Transportation

The largest markets for fuel cells today are

in sta=onary power, portable power,
auxiliary power units, and forkli^s.

The US DOE completed the worlds

largest FCEV and hydrogen
demonstra=on to date for all
purposes (with 50/50 DOE/Industry cost
share).

Projec4on of ~30,000 fuel cells shipped in

2012 (~nearly 50% increase over 2010).

Fuel cells can be a

cost-compe44ve
op4on for cri4cal-load
facili4es, backup
power, and forkliLs.

180 fuel cell vehicles

25 fueling sta4ons ($100 million

to add sta4ons to CA by 2020)

~3.6 million miles travelled

(~500,000 trips)

Several automakers have announced

commercial FCEVs in the 2015-2017
=meframe.

Production & Delivery

of Hydrogen

In the U.S., there are currently:

~9 million metric tons

of H2 produced annually

> 1200 miles of

H2 pipelines
Source: US DOE 09/2010

April 30, 2014

Diverse Fuel Cell Transportation Applications

Aircra^ APUs

Shipboard APUs

Class 8
eTruck
Refr.
Truck FC
APU

Air Cargo Loader

FC MHE

Fuel Cell
Bus

Perimeter H2
Fueling Sta=on
(Public Access)

Ba`ery-FCS NEV

eMDV

Terminal
Tractor

Source: U.S. DOE

April 30, 2014

Example Application Industrial Trucks

Forklift Equipped with Fuel Cells

Typical Hydrogen Fueling Infrastructure (Courtesy of
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.)

Forklifts are equipped with fuel cells as a replacement for traditional battery packs.
A typical project consists of a refueling system (tank, compressor, piping, etc.)
providing hydrogen to a dispenser located inside a warehouse.
Some projects use outdoor liquefied and gaseous hydrogen storage systems to
achieve a dispensing capacity up to 700 kg per day per dispenser and an onboard
pressure of 350 bar. Other projects use a steam-methane reformer system
connected to storage vessels as the source of hydrogen.

April 30, 2014

Safety planning
Safe practices in the production, storage, distribution, and use of
hydrogen are:
essential to protect people from injury or death, and
necessary to minimize damage to facilities
The goals of Safety Planning are to identify hazards, evaluate risks
by considering the likelihood and severity/consequence of an
incident associated with the hazards, and to minimize the risks
associated with a project. To achieve these goals, various hazard
analysis and risk assessment techniques are used, in conjunction
with safety reviews.
Safety planning should be an integral part of the design and
operation of a system. Safety approvals should not be after thoughts
or final hurdles to be overcome before a system can become
operational. Initial safety approvals are just that, initial. Safety can
only be assured if researchers and users are vigilant in the
maintenance of safety.

A significant incident involving a hydrogen project could negatively impact the

public's perception of hydrogen systems as viable, safe, and clean alternatives to
conventional energy systems.

April 30, 2014

Learnings from fuel cell deployment projects

Project Integration
Learning: A thorough and integrated approach to
project safety planning needs to involve all parties.
Applications aside, all of these deployment
projects involve several different types of partners:
hydrogen/fuel cell equipment suppliers
facility operators
maintenance and repair providers

One fuel cell provider noted:

The operation phase of the project turns responsibility of the system over to the
customer. This is a change from a more experienced to a less experienced user,
which opens the possibility for human error. Customer organizations must execute
safety policies and training requirements to limit human error. Lack of training and a
lack of communication are the largest sources for safety risks.
Learnings are from Deploying Fuel Cell Systems: What Have We Learned? available at h_p://www.ichs2013.com/images/
papers/115.pdf

April 30, 2014

Issues Associated With Moving From

Demonstration To Commercial Deployment
The purpose of R&D is to
develop new products, and
the approaches used there
dont necessarily translate to
safe or code compliant
configurations for commercial
deployment.
Some potential reasons why:
Manufacturers generally use design engineers rather than safety engineers to design
products. This can result in a product that performs well but may not comply with the
safety, health or environmental standards or requirements1.
Designers and authorities having jurisdiction (AHJ) may not have the experience to
recognize specific safety issues.
AHJs may be responding to installers who can cite approval at other locations as a
basis for a new installations acceptability (regardless of how safe they are).
If unsafe practices are accepted during the demonstration phase, they may become
standard practice for commercialization.
1 American

Council of Independent Laboratories, The Value of Third Party Certification, Washington, DC, April 11, 2002.

April 30, 2014

10

Design Consideration: Codes & Standards

There are many organizations working on codes, standards and guides.
The website www.fuelcellstandards.com is currently tracking the world-wide
development of over 300 hydrogen and fuel cell standards and related
documents. Lets focus on the critical infrastructure documents.
NFPA 2 Hydrogen Technologies Code
NFPA 55 Compressed Gases and Cryogenic
Fluids Code
International Fire Code (IFC) - addresses
hydrogen applications
International Building Code (IBC) - general
construction requirements
ASME B31.12 Hydrogen Pipelines and Piping
Code - hydrogen piping design

April 30, 2014

11

Important ICC 2012 Code References

IFC Section 2309 Hydrogen Motor Fuel-Dispensing
and Generation Facilities
IFC Chapter 50 Hazardous Materials - General
Provisions
IFC Chapter 53 Compressed Gases
IFC Chapter 58 Flammable Gases and Flammable
Cryogenic Fluids
IBC Chapter 4 Special Detailed Requirements Based
on Use
IBC Chapter 5 General Building Heights and Areas
IBC Chapter 7 Fire and Smoke Protection Features
IBC Chapter 9 Fire Protection Systems
International Fuel Gas Code (IFGC) Chapter 7
Gaseous Hydrogen Systems
International Mechanical Code (IMC)

April 30, 2014

12

The Need for a National Hydrogen Code

With the increased interest in hydrogen being used as a fuel source, the National
Fire Protection Association was petitioned to develop an all-encompassing
document that establishes the necessary requirements for hydrogen technologies.
Origin and development of the NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code
Technical committee formed in 2006
Focus is to address all aspects of hydrogen storage, use, and handling
Draws from existing NFPA codes and standards (extracts from NFPA 52,
55 and 853) (NFPA 52 hydrogen requirements removed and transferred to
NFPA 2)
Identifies and fills technical gaps for a complete functional set of
requirements
Developed for code users and enforcers
Structured so that it works seamlessly with building and fire codes
In the course of this presentation, any comment as to the meaning of any part of any NFPA code or standard is
only the opinion of the presenter and is NOT to be relied upon as either accurate or official. Only the NFPA may
issue a formal interpretation of its codes and standards.

April 30, 2014

13

NFPA 2 Scope
The code applies to the use of gaseous and
liquefied hydrogen in
Storage
Transfer
Production
Use
including stationary, portable and vehicular
infrastructure applications.
Fundamental requirements are provided for
Storage
Piping
Installation
Handling
Generation
The Code does not cover
Onboard vehicle or mobile equipment components or
systems
Mixtures of gaseous hydrogen and other gases with a
hydrogen concentration <95% by volume

April 30, 2014

14

Contents of NFPA 2, 2011 Edition

Fundamental
Chapters

Use Specific
Chapters

Document Title, Hydrogen Technologies Code

Chapter 1, Administra4on
Chapter 2, Referenced Publica4ons
Chapter 3, Deni4ons
Chapter 4, General Fire Safety Requirements
Chapter 5, Performance-Based Op4on
Chapter 6, General Hydrogen Requirements
Chapter 7, Gaseous Hydrogen
Chapter 8, Liqueed Hydrogen
Chapter 9, Explosion ProtecKon
Chapter 10, GH2 Vehicle Fueling Facili4es
Chapter 11, LH2 Fueling Facili4es
Chapter 12, Hydrogen Fuel Cell Power Systems
Chapter 13, Hydrogen Genera4on Systems
Chapter 14, Combus4on Applica4ons
Chapter 15, Special Atmosphere Applica4ons
Chapter 16, Laboratory Opera4ons
Chapter 17, Parking Garages
Chapter 18, Road Tunnels
Chapter 19, Repair Garages

Reserved

Reserved

Chapter 20, Fuel Blends

Annex A
Annexes B-L

April 30, 2014

15

Fueling Requirements Moved to NFPA 2

The following chapters
have been removed from
NFPA 52 in the 2013
edition:
Chapter 7 Service and
Maintenance of GH2
Engine Fuel Systems
Chapter 9 GH2
Compression, Gas
Processing, Storage, and
Dispensing Systems
Chapter 14 LH2 Fueling
Facilities

These requirements are already currently covered by NFPA 2-2011. The

extract references will be dropped in the 2015 edition.

April 30, 2014

16

Codes and Standards Summary

There has been much work done to address the need for codes and
standards for hydrogen and fuel cell technologies.
NFPA 2 is a comprehensive hydrogen technologies code. The first
edition was issued in 2011, and an update is scheduled for 2015.
The International Fire Code (IFC) and the NFPA 1 Fire Code are the
two primary fire codes used in the United States.
References to NFPA 2 Hydrogen Technologies Code in these Fire
Codes will make NFPA 2 effectively the national hydrogen code for
the United States. The benefits of this are:
A national hydrogen code will create a greater level of standardization in
hydrogen requirements
This increased standardization will make it easier for project developers to
write permit applications and code officials to review these applications

April 30, 2014

17

Design Consideration: Identifying safety vulnerabilities

What is it?
The identification of safety vulnerabilities is an organized effort to identify and analyze the
significance of hazards associated with a process or activity (i.e., a hazard analysis). Doing a hazard
analysis will help you:
see any unacceptable risks you might face when working with hydrogen, and
determine your options for managing or eliminating those risks.
Why is it important?
Hazard analysis can shine a spotlight on facility design problems and unsafe hydrogen operations
that could cause property damage, injuries, or even death. Once the problems are brought to light,
risk management strategies can be developed to address them. Done correctly, hazard analysis
helps a project team identify potential safety issues, discover ways to lower the probability of an
occurrence, and minimize the associated consequences. A hazard analysis is also required by some
codes and standards (e.g., NFPA 2 requires one for every hydrogen fueling system installation).
Who should be involved?
The hazard analysis team should have sufficient expertise in all aspects of the work being analyzed.
At least one team member should have experience and knowledge specific to the hydrogen project,
process, equipment, and/or facility being evaluated, and at least one team member should be skilled
in the hazard analysis method being used.
It is also important to include someone with knowledge of hydrogen properties (e.g., flammability
and ease of ignition) and someone who is aware of the codes and standards pertinent to the project
and facility.

April 30, 2014

18

Tips for a successful hazards analysis

Allow ample time over multiple sessions.
Dont rush through it.
Bring easily accessible data on equipment
design and operation, expected range of
operating parameters, startup and
shutdown procedures, and required
maintenance operations.
Dont get bogged down by one difficult
event or failure mode. Postpone completion
of that event or failure mode until additional
pertinent resources and information (and
possibly another participant) become
available.
Bring plenty of coffee and other
refreshments to each session.
Maintain a spirit of congeniality and interject
healthy doses of good humor.

A hazard analysis typically consists of the five

major steps

April 30, 2014

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Hazard analysis methods

FMEA - (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis): A systematic method for examining the effects of component failures on system
performance and surroundings. FMEA determines which initiating events (component failures, operating conditions, external
events, etc.) will lead to significant adverse consequences that can compromise safety.
What If Analysis: A speculative process where questions of the form What if ... (hardware, software, instrumentation, or
operators) (fail, breach, break, lose functionality, reverse, etc.)...? are formulated and answered in a way that can identify
potentially unacceptable risks.
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Analysis): A method developed to identify both hazards and operability problems at chemical
process plants. It systematically evaluates the impacts of deviations in process parameters (e.g., pressure, temperature, flow
rate) using guide words (e.g., higher, lower, no) to uncover potential hazards/risks associated with changes from normal
operating conditions.
Checklist Analysis: A method to evaluate the project against existing guidelines using a series of checklists.
It is most often used to evaluate a specific design, piece of equipment, or process for which an organization has significant
experience, and for which written guidelines or standards are available.
Fault Tree Analysis: A deductive (top-down) method used to identify and analyze conditions and factors that can cause a
failure or undesirable event. This method addresses the possibility of various combinations of failures, contributing events, and
conditions.
Event Tree Analysis: An inductive approach used to identify the spectrum and severity of possible outcomes and determine
their likelihoods. The analysis starts with
an initiating event or initial condition and includes the identification of a set of success and failure events that are combined to
produce various outcomes.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment: An organized process for answering and often quantifying the following three questions: what
can go wrong, how likely is it to happen, and what are the consequences? PRA is usually the most demanding hazard analysis
technique in terms of staffing and resources, but it often produces the most complete and thoroughly documented analysis.

April 30, 2014

20

Learnings from fuel cell deployment projects

Hazards Analysis
Learning: Safety vulnerability analysis needs to comprehensively consider all
potential incident scenarios introduced by hydrogen/fuel cell deployment and
equipment operations and exposures.
A thorough hazards analysis
is critical for ensuring safety
deployment of hydrogen
and fuel cell technologies.
Many projects did not
comprehensively address
the potential safety
vulnerabilities of all
operations regardless of the
fuel cell application.
Hazard analysis was cited
the most frequently and also
had most no actions.

Recommendations and actions from HSP safety review

(development and deployment projects)

April 30, 2014

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General Design Considerations

Hydrogen cylinders and storage tanks should be stored outside at a safe distance from structures,
ventilation intakes, and vehicle routes. This applies even while in use. Best practices call for compressed
hydrogen bottles supplying a manifold to be located outside, with welded lines to connect to indoor
equipment. If a hydrogen cylinder is used inside, additional safety considerations must be addressed,
including (but not limited to):
limiting total hydrogen volume based on workspace size
maintaining minimum spacing between cylinders of hydrogen and oxidants
securing of cylinders properly
Additional recommendations for cylinder storage inside a shed or other enclosure include:
Buildings (e.g., sheds) used for storing hydrogen cylinders should be constructed of noncombustible
materials.
Detached storage facilities should have normal and emergency ventilation system with inlets low to
the ground and exhausts at the highest point of the room in the exterior wall or roof. The inlets and
exhausts should be oriented in the same direction (for wind tolerance).
Hydrogen sensors should be installed at the exhaust within the enclosure to detect any leaks.
The storage facility should have an automatic shutoff that activates if a leak is detected or a problem
occurs in the facility that is being supplied with hydrogen.
Ignition sources (e.g., open flames, electrical equipment, or heating equipment) should not be
allowed within the storage facility.
The gaseous hydrogen system should be electrically bonded and grounded.
Hydrogen storage facilities should be equipped with venting systems for both normal operating
requirements and emergency situations.
April 30, 2014

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Design Consideration: Selection of Materials

Materials of construction, including materials
used in piping, valves and seals, must be
carefully selected to account for their
deterioration when exposed to hydrogen at the
intended operating conditions.
The mechanical properties of metals, including
steels, aluminum and aluminum alloys, titanium
and titanium alloys, and nickel and nickel alloys
are detrimentally affected by hydrogen.
Exposure of metals to hydrogen can lead to
embrittlement, cracking and/or significant
losses in tensile strength, ductility, and
fracture toughness. This can result in
premature failure in load-carrying
components.
Additionally, hydrogen diffuses through many
materials, particularly nonmetals, due to its
small molecular size.

Preferred
Generally acceptable
materials include austenitic
stainless steels, aluminum
alloys, copper, and copper
alloys.
Avoid
Nickel and most nickel alloys
should not be used since they
are subject to severe
hydrogen embrittlement.
Gray, ductile, and malleable
cast irons should not be used
for hydrogen service.
See http://www.ca.sandia.gov/matlsTechRef/
for additional guidance.

April 30, 2014

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A Lesson Learned on Material Selection

A pressure relief device (PRD) valve failed on a high-pressure storage tube at a hydrogen
fueling station, causing the release of approximately 300 kilograms of hydrogen gas. The
gas ignited at the exit of the vent pipe and burned for 2-1/2 hours until technicians were
permitted by the local fire department to enter the station and stop the flow of gas.
The root cause of the incident
was a failed pressure relief
valve
An extensive metallurgical
analysis of the failed valve
concluded that improper
material selection and
deviations from valve
production processes led
to the valve failure.
The good news There were no injuries and very little property damage. The corrugated
roof on an adjacent canopy over a fueling dispenser was slightly singed by the escaping
hydrogen flame, causing less than $300 in damage.
Source: h2incidents.org

April 30, 2014

24

Design Consideration: Piping Layout and Design

Hydrogen piping systems must be carefully designed and
installed to minimize the potential for leaks and allow for
their easy detection. Piping systems should be designed in
accordance with the applicable codes and standards and
to:
Minimize leaks through the use of welded joints where
possible.
Ensure that personnel will be able to easily reach joints and
fittings (to check for leaks).
Prevent or reduce the chance of personal injury (i.e., contact
with cold surfaces, head impact, tripping hazards, etc.).
Minimize stresses (structural and thermal) in piping
components and connected equipment.
Determine proper sizes and settings of pressure relief devices.
Include properly labeled shutoff valves at safe locations.

Flow restrictors, such as orifice meters, in the supply line

are an effective means of limiting the supply flow rate and
controlling leakage rate.
Piping should be labeled to indicate content, flow direction,
and design and test pressures.

Key Resources:
ASME B31.3
ASME B31.12
CGA G5.5
Vent Lines
Vent lines for hydrogen (including pressure
relief lines and boil-off from cryogenic
systems) should be vented to a safe
outside location. The vent should be
designed to prevent moisture or ice from
accumulating in the line. The vent system
should:
be leak tight
avoid air intrusion or be designed to
handle the possibility of an explosion
inside the piping
be unobstructed and protected from
the weather
safely release the unused hydrogen
above the facility roof or at a remote
location
be designed to carry the excess flow
of the venting gas or liquid

April 30, 2014

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Design Consideration: Ventilation

Proper ventilation can reduce the likelihood of a
flammable mixture of hydrogen forming in an enclosure
following a release or leak.
o At a minimum, ventilation rates should be sufficient to dilute
a potential hydrogen leak to 25% of the lower flammability
limit (LFL) for all operations and credible accident
scenarios.

Passive ventilation features such as roof or eave vents

can prevent the buildup of hydrogen in the event of a
leak or discharge, but passive ventilation works best for
outdoor installations.
o In designing passive ventilation, ceiling and roof
configurations should be thoroughly evaluated to ensure
that a hydrogen leak will be able to dissipate safely. Inlet
openings should be located at floor level in exterior walls,
and outlet openings should be located at the highest point
of the room in exterior walls or the roof.

Is there a problem here?

April 30, 2014

26

Active Ventilation
If passive ventilation is insufficient, active (mechanical, forced) ventilation can be
used to prevent the accumulation of flammable mixtures.
Equipment used in active ventilation systems (e.g., fan motors, actuators for
vents and valves) should have the applicable electrical classification and be
approved for hydrogen use.
If active ventilation systems are relied upon to mitigate gas accumulation
hazards, procedures and operational practices should ensure that the system is
operational at all times when hydrogen is present or could be accidentally
released.
Hydrogen equipment and systems should be shut down if there is an outage or
loss of the ventilation system if LFL quantities of hydrogen could accumulate
due to the loss of ventilation. If the hazard is substantial, an automatic
shutdown feature may be appropriate.
Ventilation (passive or active) should be at a rate not less than1 scf/min/ft2 (0.3048
Nm3/min/m2) of floor area over the area of storage or use.
Be aware that no practical indoor ventilation features can quickly disperse
hydrogen from a massive release by a pressurized vessel, pipe rupture, or
blowdown.

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Design Consideration: Leak Detection

Hydrogen leak detection systems may be required by the AHJ
or may be installed as a means for enhancing safety of the
operation. Leak detection can be achieved by:
Providing hydrogen (or flammable gas) detectors in a room or
enclosure, or
By monitoring the internal piping pressures and/or flow rates for
changes that would suggest a leak is present in the system.
Other methods include providing detectors in close proximity to the
exterior piping or locating hydrogen piping within another pipe and
monitoring the annulus for leaks.

Regardless of the method used, leak detection systems should,

at a minimum, incorporate automatic shutoff of the hydrogen
source (and startup of a properly-configured active ventilation
system, if present) when hydrogen is detected. For systems
designed to monitor hydrogen concentrations in rooms or
areas, the leak detection system should also warn personnel
with visual and audible warnings when the environment is
becoming unsafe. Remote notification should also be
considered.

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Leak Detection Design and Performance

Goals for an area hydrogen leak detection system include:
Detection sensitivity of +/-0.25% by volume of hydrogen in air
Response time of 1 second at a concentration of 1% by volume
The design of a leak detection system must ensure that any leaking hydrogen would pass by the
detector.
The sensitivity of the detector to other gases and vapors should be considered in the selection of the
detector and should be explained to personnel. Additionally, caution should be exercised when
selecting and using detectors that may themselves be ignition sources.
A good practice is to set the detectors to alarm at 1% hydrogen by volume in air, which is 25% of the
lower flammability limit (LFL). If automatic shutdown is incorporated into the system, manual reset
should be required to restart the system.
Portable gas detectors are valuable for local leak detection. Portable detectors should be used for
entry or re-entry into rooms in which an alarm has occurred to ensure that the hydrogen has
dissipated.
Maintenance and recalibration of leak detectors should be performed every 3-6 months and
recorded in facility records or manufacturer's instructions.
Provide for automatic shut-off and isolation of hydrogen sources
Shut down process equipment to a safe mode
Control active ventilation
Activate audible and visual alarms

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Design Consideration: Flame Detection

Hydrogen flames are almost invisible to humans, so thermal and optical sensors are used
to detect burning hydrogen.
To cover a large area or volume, many thermal detectors are needed and should be
located at or near the site of a potential fire.
Optical sensors for detecting hydrogen flames can operate in the ultraviolet or infrared
spectral region. Closed-circuit infrared and ultraviolet remote-viewing systems equipped
with appropriate filters have been used successfully.
Flame detectors should be installed in certain applications
(e.g., NFPA 2 requires them near hydrogen dispensers in
hydrogen fueling stations). Detectors should provide a
rapid and reliable indication of the existence, location,
and size of a hydrogen flame. The system should also:
Provide for automatic shut-off and isolation of hydrogen
sources
Photo courtesy of Hammer
Shut down the system to a safe mode
Control active ventilation
Trigger audible and visual alarms
Control access to areas with high concentrations of hydrogen or active fires

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Design Consideration: Electrical Equipment

Depending on the amount of hydrogen that is expected to
exist in a workspace, the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70)
requires certain types of electrical equipment to be used.
NFPA 70 classifications relevant to hydrogen include:
Class I: Locations in which flammable gases or vapors are or
may be present in the air in quantities sufficient to produce explosive
or ignitable mixtures (see Article 500)
Division 1: flammable or explosive mixtures may exist under normal operating
conditions, or during maintenance (leaks), or because of system breakdown/faulty
operation of equipment
Division 2: flammable or explosive mixtures are only present under abnormal conditions
(i.e., accidental rupture or breakdown of the containment vessel), or systems where
ignitable concentrations are prevented by positive mechanical (active) ventilation, or
systems adjacent to Class I/Div 1 locations where vapors might migrate.
Hydrogen is classified as a Group B gas.
The autoignition temperature for hydrogen is 585C (1085F).

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Electrical Equipment
Electrical equipment must conform to the applicable electrical classification and must be suitable for
hydrogen service. Fans for active ventilation systems should be provided with a rotating element of
nonferrous or spark-resistant construction, or be constructed of, or lined with, such material.
Other equipment or devices should be constructed in a similar manner and designed for use in
hydrogen service.
Motors and their controls not approved for hydrogen service should be located outside the location
where hydrogen is generated or conveyed.
The gaseous hydrogen system should be electrically bonded and grounded.
Other equipment not conforming to the National Electrical Code requirements must be located
outside the area classified as hazardous.

Figure from NFPA 497

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Design Consideration: Outdoor Separation Distances

Hydrogen cylinders and storage tanks should be
stored outside at a safe distance from structures,
ventilation intakes, and vehicle routes. This applies
even while in use. Best practices call for compressed
hydrogen bottles supplying a manifold to be located
outside, with welded lines to connect to indoor
equipment. When it is necessary to locate storage
inside, the provisions in NFPA 2 should be followed.
NFPA 2/55 define hydrogen systems as an assembly
of equipment designed to contain, distribute, or
transport compressed gases.
A bulk hydrogen compressed gas system is an
assembly of equipment that consists of, but is not
limited to, storage containers, pressure regulators,
pressure relief devices, compressors, manifolds, and
piping, with a storage capacity of more than 5,000 scf
(141.6 Nm3) of compressed hydrogen gas and that
terminates at the source valve.

Photo: H2bestpractices.org

April 30, 2014

33

Outdoor Separation Distances to Hydrogen

Storage (Cylinders) or Non-bulk Systems*
Volume (^3)

0-4,225

4,226-21,225

21,126-50,700

50,701-84,500

84,501-200,000

Minimum Distance
Between Storage
Areas

5 d

10 d

10 d

10 d

10 d

Min. Distance to Lot

Lines of Property That
Can Be Built Upon

5 d

10 d

15 d

20 d

25 d

Min. Distance to
Public Streets/Alleys/
Ways

5 d

10 d

15 d

20 d

25 d

Min. Distance to
Buildings on Same
Property (< 2 Hr.
Construc3on

5 d

10 d

20 d

20 d

20 d

Same w/2 Hr.

Construc3on

0 d

5 d

5 d

5 d

5 d

Same w/4 Hr.

Construc3on

0 d

0 d

0 d

0 d

0 d

Air Intakes

50 d

50 d

50 d

50 d

50 d

Building Openings

25 d

25 d

25 d

25 d

25 d

* <5,000 d3

Source: NFPA 2, 2011 Edi3on

April 30, 2014

34

Outdoor Separation Distances for Bulk Hydrogen Systems

Pressure (psig)

Pipe Internal Diameter (in.)

> 15 to
250
2.07

> 250 to
3000
0.75

> 3000 to
7500
0.29

> 7500 to
15000
0.28

40 d

46 d

29 d

34 d

20 d

24 d

13 d

16 d

17 d

19 d

12 d

14 d

Exposure Group 1
a)
b)
c)
d)

Lot lines
Air intakes (HVAC, compressors, Other)
Operable openings in buildings and Structures
Igni3on sources such as open ames and welding

Exposure Group 2

a) Exposed persons other than those servicing the system

b) parked cars

Exposure Group 3
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Buildings of non-combus3ble non-re-rated construc3on

Buildings of combus3ble construc3on
Flammable gas storage systems above or below ground
Hazardous materials storage systems above or below ground
Heavy 3mber, coal, or other slow-burning combus3ble solids
Ordinary combus3bles, including fast-burning solids such as
ordinary lumber, excelsior, paper, or combus3ble waste and
vegeta3on other than that found in maintained landscaped
areas
g) Unopenable openings in building and structures
h) U3li3es overhead including electric power, building services or
hazardous materials piping systems

Source: NFPA 55, 2013 Edi3on

April 30, 2014

35

Calculations for Outdoor Bulk Hydrogen System

Separation Distances
Pressure (psig)

Pipe Internal Diameter (d) (in.)

> 15 to
250
2.07

> 250 to
3000
0.75

> 3000 to
7500
0.29

> 7500 to
15000
0.28

0.231d

0.738d

1.105d

1.448d

0.12584d
0.47126

0.43616d
0.91791

0.68311d
1.3123

0.92909d
1.6813

0.096d

0.307d

0.459d

0.602d

Exposure Group 1
a)
b)
c)
d)

Lot lines
Air intakes (HVAC, compressors, Other)
Operable openings in buildings and Structures
Igni3on sources such as open ames and welding

Exposure Group 2

a) Exposed persons other than those servicing the system

b) parked cars

Exposure Group 3
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Buildings of non-combus3ble non-re-rated construc3on

Buildings of combus3ble construc3on
Flammable gas storage systems above or below ground
Hazardous materials storage systems above or below ground
Heavy 3mber, coal, or other slow-burning combus3ble solids
Ordinary combus3bles, including fast-burning solids such as
ordinary lumber, excelsior, paper, or combus3ble waste and
vegeta3on other than that found in maintained landscaped
areas
g) Unopenable openings in building and structures
h) U3li3es overhead including electric power, building services or
hazardous materials piping systems

(D) Distance
(d) diameter

Source: NFPA 55, 2013 Edi3on

April 30, 2014

36

Learnings from fuel cell deployment projects

Hydrogen Equipment Enclosures
Are these buildings,
or equipment
enclosures? The
answer could impact
what requirements
are applied.

Safety issues associated with the modular design approach for fueling equipment
need to be better understood by both manufacturers and code developers for safe
and economical deployments.

April 30, 2014

37

Safety of Hydrogen Equipment Enclosures

There is currently no consistent set of requirements that can be applied by designers
or regulators that govern the:

construction of the enclosures,

ventilation systems,
leak or fire detection systems,
electrical classification, and
separation distances between the enclosure and other structures.

Without clear requirements for the different types of enclosures, designers have little
guidance on how to design safe systems and code officials have a difficult time
determining which code requirements may apply to which enclosures.
A sound technical basis is needed to provide a basis for prescriptive (and performancebased) requirements for the range of enclosures used for hydrogen systems.
Public comments were submitted on NFPA 2 to bring additional focus on this
issue. It is anticipated that the 2016 version of the code will provide
additional prescriptive requirements for enclosures.

April 30, 2014

38

Learnings from fuel cell deployment projects

Third party certification
Learning: The role and scope of third-party certification of hydrogen and fuel cell
systems need to be clarified to facilitate their commercialization.
Certification presents significant challenges. The issues include:
Confusion with terminology used in the various codes and standards
Difficulties applying certification standards or even the absence of such
standards, as well as a lack of certification organizations
Significant costs since the technology and products are still rapidly
changing and each new iteration would require recertification
Lack of clarity on what a certification covers relative to a particular piece
of equipment, system or facility
Few systems or facilities that are listed, labeled or certified

April 30, 2014

39

Learnings from fuel cell deployment projects

Third party certification
Why the issues are a problem
" Facility owners/operators:
" Have no internal or hired expertise on hydrogen safety issues
" Believe they are buying a commercial product where all the safety issues have
been handled and as such rely on the equipment suppliers to ensure the safety
is addressed

" Regulators:
" May be assuming that a companys cerftication implies that all code and
safety issues are addressed
" May not have expertise to evaluate equipment that is not certified (codes and
standards require unlisted equipment to be approved by the AHJ)
When certified (i.e., listed) equipment is not available, codes and standards typically
require approval of this equipment by the AHJ. This places a significant responsibility
on AHJs, who may not be familiar with the technology, lack the resources to support a
thorough review, or may be unaware that their review and approval covers unlisted
equipment.

April 30, 2014

40

Operational Consideration: Employee Training

Management should insure that workers have access to proper training to do their jobs
safely. After identifying possible hazards associated with a particular job, an appropriate
training plan should be developed. Periodic retraining is required as is additional training
whenever new equipment and new information become available.
All staff who will be working with or around hydrogen should be adequately trained on
hydrogen safety procedures and should understand:
Hydrogen properties and behavior
Safety requirements for working with or
around high-pressure hydrogen gas
(if applicable)
Safety requirements for working with or
around cryogenic liquid hydrogen (if applicable)
Hydrogen equipment inspection, operation,
and maintenance
First aid procedures
Emergency notification and evacuation/response policies and procedures

April 30, 2014

41

Operational Consideration: Procedures

Formalized procedures provide the necessary instructions to develop safe work practices
and to accomplish work safely, in addition to providing safety information and emergency
procedures. Formalized procedures should include:
q Operating procedures that describe the operating and emergency shutdown steps
for the system, apparatus, and equipment in a facility.
q Safe work practices used to control hazards during operations such as lockout;
confined space entry; opening equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a
facility by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel.
q Management of change procedures that describe the method that will be used to
review proposed changes to materials, technology, equipment, procedures,
personnel and facility operation for their effect on safety vulnerabilities.
q Stop work procedures establish the authority and responsibility, without reprisal, for
workers to stop work when they discover that employees are exposed to conditions
of imminent danger or to other hazards (e.g., leaking valves in a hydrogen system).
q Clear decision and communication chains for reacting to safety concerns/
incidents, including formal approval to resume operations after issue has been
addressed.
q Emergency response procedures for onsite personnel to ensure employee safety
during an emergency situation at the facility.

April 30, 2014

42

Operational Consideration: Maintenance

The maintenance strategy for each piece of equipment should be
documented and communicated to the workers who will be
performing the maintenance. Although it is difficult to do, facility
managers should balance the risk of equipment failure with the
cost of maintenance. If the failure consequence of a component is
minimal, inspections need not be as frequent as those for a
component whose failure could lead to a fatality.
Written guidelines clearly outlining procedures to be done should
be provided to the maintenance personnel.
Vague instructions such as "check" or "inspect" should not be the
only descriptions of inspections in a preventive maintenance
program. Instructions should provide clear guidance and state
performance requirements. For example, "Check relief valve" is a
bad instruction. Better instructions are "Verify proper set point" or
"Verify that relief valve operates within tolerance of set pressure".
Preventive maintenance should be arranged on a time-based
schedule that makes sense for the particular organization.

NFPA Maintenance and Inspec=on

Requirements for Bulk H2 Systems
Maintenance shall be performed
annually by a qualied representa3ve
of the equipment owner.
The maintenance shall include
inspec3on for physical damage, leak
3ghtness, ground system integrity,
vent system opera3on, equipment
iden3ca3on, warning signs, operator
in- forma3on and training records,
scheduled maintenance and re- test
records, alarm opera3on, and other
safety-related features.
Scheduled maintenance and retest
ac3vi3es shall be formally
documented, and records shall be
maintained a minimum of 3 years.

Maintenance results should be tracked (written) and stewarded,

including documentation and monitoring of follow-up actions and
who is responsible.

April 30, 2014

43

Operational Consideration: Loss Prevention

Flammable hydrogen mixtures are easily
ignited by static electricity, electrical sparks,
and open flames.
The most effective way to extinguish a
hydrogen fire is to shut off the flow of
hydrogen. A central shutoff valve is typically
required and an automatic shut-off system
should be considered. If it is not possible or
safe to turn off the hydrogen flow, the usual
fire-fighting procedure is to prevent the fire
from spreading, protect adjacent equipment
and let the fire burn until the hydrogen is
consumed.

Stationary fuel cell at a cell tower site

If a hydrogen fire is extinguished without

stopping the hydrogen flow, an explosive
mixture may form, creating a more serious
hazard.

April 30, 2014

44

Operational Consideration: Checking for Leaks

Hydrogen is colorless and odorless, so human senses can't detect it. Personnel should use extreme
caution when approaching an area where there is the potential for a hydrogen leak. Best practices
include the following:

Listen for the sound of high-pressure gas escaping.

Listen and watch for alarms.
Use a portable hydrogen detector.
Hydrogen burns with a pale blue flame that is nearly invisible
in daylight. The flame may appear yellow if there are
impurities in the air (e.g., dust, sodium from the ocean spray).
A pure hydrogen flame will not produce any smoke.
Hydrogen flames also emit low radiant heat, so a person may
not feel heat until they are very close to the flame. Best
practices include the following:
A portable flame detector (e.g., thermal imaging camera)
should be used if possible.
Otherwise, listen for venting hydrogen and watch for thermal
Hydrogen and Propane Flames in Daylight
waves that signal the presence of a flame.
(Photo courtesy of HAMMER)
Use a combustible probe (e.g., broom)
Always allow enough time for troubleshooting/debugging a monitoring system before it's used.
Where multiple gases are co-located, always respond in a manner to investigate/ mitigate the most
hazardous gas.

April 30, 2014

45

A Lesson Learned on Hydrogen Leaks

Hydrogen Explosion and Iron Dust Flash Fires in Powdered Metals Plant
Operators in a powdered metals production facility heard a hissing noise near one of the plant furnaces and
determined that it was a gas leak in the trench below the furnaces. The trench carried hydrogen, nitrogen,
and cooling water runoff pipes as well as a vent pipe for the furnaces.
Maintenance personnel presumed that the leak was nonflammable nitrogen because there had
recently been a nitrogen piping leak elsewhere in the plant. Using the plant's overhead crane, they
removed some of the heavy trench covers. They determined that the leak was in an area that the crane
could not reach, so they brought in a forklift with a chain to remove the trench covers in that area.
Eyewitnesses stated that as the first trench cover was wrenched from its position by the forklift, friction
created sparks followed immediately by a powerful explosion. Several days after the explosion, Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) investigators observed a large hole (~3x7 inches) in a corroded section of hydrogen
vent piping inside the trench.
As the hydrogen-air mixture in the partially open trench exploded, the resulting overpressure dispersed
large quantities of iron dust from the rafters and other surfaces in the plant, and some of this dust
subsequently ignited. Eyewitnesses reported that embers were raining down and igniting iron dust flash fires
in the area. Visibility was so poor due to dust and smoke that even with a flashlight, it was impossible to see
more than 3 or 4 feet. Three plant employees eventually died from burn injuries despite wearing supposedly
flash-fire-resistant garments. Two others suffered smoke-inhalation injuries. Due to the extensive nature of
the injuries, and the abundance of both hydrogen and combustible dust present at the time of the incident, it
is difficult to specifically determine which fuel, if not both, caused the fatal injuries to the victims.
source: h2incidents.org

April 30, 2014

46

Operational Consideration: Lessons Learned

When incidents or near-misses occur, an institution should share any lessons learned
so that future incidents or near misses can be prevented.
Incident investigation should include determination of the root causes and the
development of lessons learned. Subject matter experts, safety professionals, peers,
and managers should be involved in this "no-blame" process.
A mitigation plan should be developed to address the root cause(s) in order to prevent
future accidents. Maintenance frequencies may need to be increased to identify
potential incidents before they occur.
Incident reports should be widely disseminated to foster and maximize organizational
learning.
Hydrogen safety incidents and near misses should be reported in Hydrogen Safety
Incident Reporting Database at H2Incidents.org. Please share your incidents and near
misses with others who are working with hydrogen so they can benefit from your
experiences. All incident reports will be "sanitized" to ensure that individuals and
organizations are not identified.

April 30, 2014

47

Implementing a Lessons Learned Process

It is very important to keep your
organization focused on hydrogen safety
by constantly communicating its
importance. In particular, communicating
lessons learned from hydrogen incidents
and near-misses in other facilities is the
most effective strategy for preventing
such incidents and near-misses from
occurring in your own facility.
Lessons Learned bulletins can be an
excellent resource for promoting safety.
Relevant bulletins can improve personnel
safety performance, help workers
understand how to prevent mistakes from
recurring, and mitigate facility safety
risks.

When incidents or near-misses occur, an institution

should share any lessons learned so that future
incidents or near misses can be prevented.
Incident investigation should include
determination of the root causes and the
development of lessons learned.
A mitigation plan should be developed to address
the root cause(s) in order to prevent future
accidents. Maintenance frequencies may need to
be increased to identify potential incidents before
they occur.
Incident reports should be widely disseminated to
foster and maximize organizational learning.

Please share your incidents and near misses with

others who are working with hydrogen so they
can benefit from your experiences by reporting it
to the Hydrogen Safety Incident Reporting
Database at H2Incidents.org. All incident reports
will be "sanitized" to ensure that individuals and
organizations are not identified.

April 30, 2014

48

Operational Consideration: Working with First Responders

Preplanning
Project and facility owners should work with
local first responders to assist in their
preplanning activities. This should include
a tour of the hydrogen facilities with
focused attention on safety features and
emergency shutoffs.
Training
Training of emergency response personnel
should be a high priority to ensure that
these personnel understand how to
properly respond to a hydrogen incident.
A variety of resources are available to
assist with this training (see the resource
lists at the end of this presentation).
Equipment
A hydrogen fire is often difficult to detect
without a thermal imaging camera or flame
detector. Ensure that the local first
responders have one available for their
use.

Responding to an Incident
The facility owner/operator should provide the
fire fighters with detailed information regarding
the incident, hazardous material (including
hydrogen) inventories and locations, facility
safety equipment and instrumentation, and any
actions taken so far.

Fire department assistance in an emergency

must be under the direction of the senior fire
fighter officer (i.e., incident commander). The
facility owner/operator should relinquish incident
command to the fire department when they
arrive and cooperate fully with them.

Fire fighters who respond to a spill, fire, or

vehicle collision must be familiar with the hazard
information cards recommended by DOT or
other safety documents.

They should also know the recommended

exclusion areas to protect the public if a spill or
fire occurs.

An additional factor for increased safety is

awareness of fragment evacuation distance
criteria. Guidance should be provided to limit
danger from fragments and reduce the
probability of injuries or fatalities in explosions.

April 30, 2014

49

Design/Operational Consideration: Liquid Hydrogen

This presentation was primarily focused gaseous hydrogen systems and
equipment. Designers of cryogenic liquid hydrogen storage and supply systems should
be familiar with all the hazards of gaseous hydrogen as well as those of liquid hydrogen.
General safety considerations for the use of cryogenic liquid are listed below.
Due to its extremely low boiling point, liquid hydrogen
can cause serious frostbite and hypothermia.
Ice formation on vents and valves could cause them
to malfunction.
Condensed air could result in oxygen enrichment and
explosive conditions near a liquid hydrogen storage
system.
Accidental air leakage into a liquid hydrogen storage
vessel (e.g., from inadequate purging) will result in
the introduction of moisture. The water will form ice,
which may plug lines or cause instruments to
malfunction.
A liquid hydrogen release will look similar
Continuous evaporation generates gaseous hydrogen and an
to this liquid nitrogen release.
(Photo courtesy of Scott Stookey)
increase in pressure inside a liquid hydrogen storage vessel if
not properly released.
If a liquid hydrogen leak or spill occurs, a hydrogen cloud could flow horizontally for some distance
or even downward, depending on the terrain and weather conditions.

April 30, 2014

50

Concluding thoughts
Safe practices in the production, storage, distribution and use of hydrogen are
essential for deployment of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies.
Because hydrogens use as a fuel is still a relatively new endeavor, the proper
methods of handling, storage, transport and use are often not well understood
across the various communities either participating in or impacted by its
demonstration and deployment.
Project proponents and AHJs are encouraged to work together to ensure that
deployment activities are conducted safely and in a manner that warrants
public confidence.
The Hydrogen Safety Panel will continue to identify initiatives to bring focused
attention, action and outreach on key safety issues for deployment of
hydrogen and fuel cell systems.

April 30, 2014

51

Thank You for Your Attention!

The author wishes to thank the U.S. Department of Energys Fuel Cell
Technologies Oce (Sunita Satyapal, Director and Charles James, Safety, Codes
and Standards Lead) for their support of this work. The contributions of
Hydrogen Safety Panel members Bill Fort, Don Frikken, Richard Kallman, Glenn
Scheer, Ed Skolnik, Steven Weiner and Bob Zalosh are gratefully
acknowledged.
My Contact Information:
Nick Barilo, P.E.
Hydrogen Safety Program Manager
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
P.O. Box 999, MSIN K7-76
Richland, WA 99352 USA
Tel: 509-371-7894
nick.barilo@pnnl.gov

April 30, 2014

52

Resources and Helpful Tools

April 30, 2014

53

Safety Planning Guidance

Scope of Work
Organizational Safety Information
Organizational Policies & Procedures
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Experience
Project Safety
Identification of Safety Vulnerabilities
Risk Reduction Plan
Management of Change Procedures
Project Safety Documentation
Communications Plan
Employee Training
Safety Events and Lessons Learned
Emergency Response
Safety Plan Approval

h_ps://www1.eere.energy.gov/
hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/
safety_guidance.pdf

April 30, 2014

54

Safety Knowledge Tools

learning from incidents, applying best practices
Collect information and
share lessons learned from
hydrogen incidents and
near-misses, with a goal of
preventing similar safety
events from occurring in the
future.
Capture vast and growing
knowledge base of hydrogen
experience and make it
publicly available to the
hydrogen community and
stakeholders.
http://H2incidents.org
http://H2bestpractices.org

April 30, 2014

55

H2incidents.org
capturing the event, focusing on lessons learned
Each safety event record contains
Description
Severity (Was hydrogen released?
Was there ignition?)
Setting
Equipment
Characteristics (High pressure? Low
temperature?)
Damage and Injuries
Probable Cause(s)
Contributing Factors
Lessons Learned/Suggestions for
Avoidance/Mitigation Steps Taken
Tube Trailer Rollover

April 30, 2014

56

H2bestpractices.org
sharing experience, applying best practices
Introduction to Hydrogen
So you want to know something about
hydrogen?

Hydrogen Properties
Hydrogen compared with other fuels

Safety Practices

Safety culture
Safety planning
Incident procedures
Communications

Design and Operations

Facility design considerations

Storage and piping
Operating procedures
Equipment maintenance
Laboratory safety
Indoor refueling of forklifts

Safety events from H2incidents.org

illustrate what can go wrong if best
practices are not followed.

April 30, 2014

57

Hydrogen Safety Checklist

outdoor storage, indoor dispensing and use
Hydrogen safety, much like all flammable gas
safety, relies on 5 key considerations:
1. Recognize hazards and define mitigation
measures [PLAN]
2. Ensure system integrity [KEEP H2 IN THE
SYSTEM]
3. Provide proper ventilation to prevent
accumulation [MANAGE DISCHARGES]
4. Ensure that leaks are detected and isolated
[DETECT AND MITIGATE]
5. Train personnel and ensure that hazards and
mitigations are understood and that
established work instructions are followed
[MANAGE OPERATIONS]

Hydrogen
Supply
System

Hydrogen
User
Enclosed Space

h_p://h2bestprac3ces.org/docs/HydrogenSafetyChecklist.pdf

April 30, 2014

58

Introduction to Hydrogen Safety for First

Responders
Provides an awareness-level overview of hydrogen for fire, law enforcement,
emergency medical personnel, or individuals who may witness or discover a
hydrogen release and must initiate an action
Course Content
Hydrogen Basics
Transport and Storage
Hydrogen Vehicles
Hydrogen Dispensing
Stationary Facilities
Codes and Standards
Emergency Response
The course is registered on the TRAIN*
website for broader dissemination to first
responders

h_p://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/rstresponders.html

*TrainingFinder Realtime Affiliate Integrated Network (TRAIN) is a central repository for public health training
courses. Almost 30,000 TRAIN users are emergency responders.

April 30, 2014

59

Introduction to Hydrogen for Code Officials

Provides an overview of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, discusses
how these technologies are used in real-world applications and
discusses the codes and standards required for permitting them.

Hydrogen and fuel cell basics

Hydrogen and fuel cell
applications
Hydrogen fueling stations
Fuel cell facilities

h_p://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/training/code_ocial_training

April 30, 2014

60

Technical Reference for

Hydrogen Compatibility of Materials
Consists of material specific chapters (as individual PDF files)
summarizing mechanical-property data from journal publications and
technical reports

Plain Carbon Ferritic Steels

Low-Alloy Ferritic Steels
High-Alloy Ferritic Steels
Austenitic Steels
Aluminum Alloys
Copper Alloys
Nickel Alloys
Nonmetals
h_p://www.sandia.gov/matlsTechRef/

April 30, 2014

61

Portable Safety Planning Tools

Hydrogen Tools iPhone and iPad
Apps
Integrates H2incidents.org and
H2bestpractices.org into a single,
searchable, iPad and iPhone
application
Features include safety planning
guidance and checklists, an NFPA
separation distance calculator, link
to material compatibility resources
and other helpful tools
All tools (except H2incidents.org)
are available without a data
connection

April 30, 2014

62

Links to Hydrogen Safety Resources

DATABASES/WEBSITES (including REGULATIONS, Codes & Standards)
Hydrogen Incident Reporting and Lessons Learned Database - http://www.h2incidents.org/
Hydrogen Safety Bibliographic Database -http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/biblio_database.html
Hydrogen/Fuel Cell Codes and Standards - http://www.fuelcellstandards.com/
29 CFR 1910.103 Occupational Safety and Health Standards (Hydrogen)
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9749
Storage and Handling of Gaseous and Liquefied Hydrogen http://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-35299_42271_4115_4237-193832--,00.html
NFPA 2: Hydrogen Technologies Code - http://www.nfpa.org/2
NFPA 853: Standard for the Installation of Stationary Fuel Cell Power Systems - http://www.nfpa.org/853
MANUALS
Hydrogen Safety Best Practices - http://h2bestpractices.org/
Technical Reference for Hydrogen Compatibility of Materials - http://www.sandia.gov/matlsTechRef/
ANSI/AIAA G-095 - Guide to Safety of Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems http://www.aiaa.org/StandardsDetail.aspx?id=3864 [US$100.95]
ISO/TR 15916 - Basic considerations for the safety of hydrogen systems http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=29145 [CHF 172,00]
FM Global Property Loss prevention Data Sheets http://www.fmglobal.com/FMGlobalRegistration/Vshared/FMDS0791.pdf

April 30, 2014

63

Links to Hydrogen Safety Resources

FLIERS, POSTERS, NEWSLETTERS, REPORTS, APPS, OTHER LITERATURE
Hydrogen ToolsiPhone/iPad app - https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/hydrogen-tools/id692196514?mt=8
H2 Safety Snapshot - http://www1.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/codes/snapshot.html
Hydrogen Safety Tips for First Responders http://www.dhses.ny.gov/ofpc/publications/documents/HydrogenPoster_v15.pdf
Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Safety Report (FCHEA) - http://www.hydrogenandfuelcellsafety.info/
Fact Sheet on Hydrogen Safety (FCHEA) http://fchea.org/core/import/PDFs/factsheets/Hydrogen%20Safety_NEW.pdf
Hydrogen Safety Fact Sheet (NHA) - http://www.arhab.org/pdfs/h2_safety_fsheet.pdf
National Template: Hydrogen Vehicle and Infrastructure Codes and Standards http://www.afdc.energy.gov/pdfs/48609.pdf
Hydrogen Vehicle and Infrastructure Codes and Standards Citations - http://www.afdc.energy.gov/pdfs/48608.pdf
Regulations, Codes, and Standards Template for California Hydrogen Dispensing Stations http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/56223.pdf
Reaching the U.S. Fire Service with Hydrogen Safety Information: A Roadmap http://www.nfpa.org/~/media/Files/Research/Research%20Foundation/Research%20Foundation%20reports/For
%20emergency%20responders/report%20final%20h2fs.pdf
Safetygrams http://www.airproducts.com/company/Sustainability/environment-health-and-safety/product-safetysafetygrams.aspx
Materials Safety Data Sheets (GH2) - https://apdirect.airproducts.com/msds/DisplayPDF.aspx?docid=63578
Materials Safety Data Sheets (LH2) - http://www.hydrogenandfuelcellsafety.info/resources/mdss/Praxair-LH2.pdf

April 30, 2014

64

Links to Hydrogen Safety Resources

TRAINING

Introduction to Hydrogen Safety for First Responders - http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/firstresponders.html

Introduction to Hydrogen for Code Officials - http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/training/code_official_training/
Hydrogen Safety Training for Researchers - http://www.h2labsafety.org/
Permitting Hydrogen Facilities - http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/permitting/
Regulators Guide to Permitting Hydrogen Technologies http://www1.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/codes/permitting_guides.html
Identification, Preparation and Dissemination of Hydrogen Safety Facts to Regulators and Public Safety Officials
(HyFACTS) - http://www.hyfacts.eu/
IAFF HazMat/WMD Training - http://www.iaff.org/et/HW/index.htm
PROPERTIES, CALCULATORS
Hydrogen Analysis Resource Center (HARC): Basic Hydrogen Properties http://hydrogen.pnl.gov/cocoon/morf/hydrogen/article/701
HARC: Hydrogen Conversions Calculator http://hydrogen.pnl.gov/cocoon/morf/hydrogen/site_specific/hydrogen_calculator?canprint=false.

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Thank You
CEUs:

To receive CEUs for this session, scan your badge at

the back of the room before leaving

Evaluation:

Complete the session evaluation on the mobile app

(to download, search your app store for NFPA 2014
C&E)

Handouts:

Handouts will be available via the mobile app or at

nfpa.org/conference

Recordings: Audio recordings will be available. To order, see

Fleetwood Media Productions (at Breakers Registration
desk) or visit nfpa.org/conference

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