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Africa
Andy Wynne – andywynne@lineone.net
iDILMAT training solutions, Ghana
Abstract
The INTOSAI Mexico Declaration provides a summary of good practice for public sector
auditors. However, this ideal is not achieved in many Sub-Saharan African countries. This
includes both the English speaking and the French speaking countries. The picture is
complex, especially in Francophone countries where there may be more than one type of
entity which is providing some sort of audit function. The roles and relative strengths of
these different types of audit institution (Accounts Court and General State Inspectorate) need
to be clearly understood. This paper provides an introduction to their roles and relative levels
of independence. Reform programmes need to be built on the strengths of each type of entity
if they are to provide efficient development paths for the countries concerned.
Introduction
Public governance is based on the division of powers and responsibilities. Traditionally, such
a division distinguishes between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. Public
financial management is undertaken by the executive and the audit of this function is the
responsibility of either the legislature or the judiciary or a combination of the two branches.
There is also a division of responsibilities between the politicians who set government policy
and public sector officials (civil servants) who implement it. However, in many Sub-Saharan
African countries the politicians are closely involved in the implementation of their policies
and may be directly involved, for example, in the authorisation of orders and payments,
especially for larger contracts. One result of this expanded, executive, role of politicians is
that the independence of the Supreme Audit Institution in many Sub-Saharan Africa countries
is not as strong as it should be.
INTOSAI, the international body for Supreme Audit Institutions, has correctly put a lot of
emphasis on independence, but their guidance is recognised as being aspirational rather than
a statement of fact. The Mexico Declaration on Supreme Audit Institution Independence
(INTOSAI 2007) recognises eight core principles as essential requirements of proper public
sector auditing. These include requirements for “independence from the Executive”
(INTOSAI 2007: 2) for the head of the Supreme Audit Institution, but not necessarily that
this post should be appointed by parliament. They also include that “SAIs are free to publish
and disseminate their reports, once they have been formally tabled or delivered to the
appropriate authority—as required by law” (INTOSAI 2007: 3). Again, it is not specified
that these reports should be submitted direct to parliament (although elsewhere the
declaration does say that each Supreme Audit Institution should submit an annual activity
report to parliament).
A Supreme Audit Institution is defined as the member of INTOSAI in a country. It is not
dependent on any qualities of independence or other attributes. There are three main models
of Supreme Audit Institution in Sub-Saharan Africa, each with its own strengths and
weaknesses. However, in each model the head of the institution may be appointed by the
State President; they may have insufficient resources; their annual reports may be sent to the
1 Conseil Régional de Formation des Institutions Supérieures de Contrôle des Finances Publiques des
Pays Francophones d’Afrique au Sud du Sahara (African Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions –
Francophone countries)
This first annual public report from the general state inspectorate of Djibouti also notes that:
“The general state inspectorate is a concept specific to Africa, with a universal,
general and extended scope. It usually consists of elite staff recruited through
competition from amongst the highest officials of the state (magistrates, national
directors, secretaries general of ministries etc), at least in Sénégal, Burkina Faso,
Côte d'Ivoire etc” (page 24).
The independence of the General State Inspectorate in Cameroon is described in the
following terms on the website of the Presidency:
“In the field, members of the mobile audit teams enjoy total independence from
the administration and the entities subject to audit and have all powers of
investigation. During their investigations auditors should not suffer any
restriction to their freedom without the prior agreement of the President of the
Republic”
Despite this level of independence, such General State Inspectorates are often ignored or
sidelined as was suggested earlier in the case of Mali. A senior public financial management
advisor from the World Bank recently claimed that “there is a huge problem, in some African
countries, of Supreme Audit Institutions which are part of the executive, but still members of
INTOSAI, when there are other bodies in these countries which are outside the executive and
functionally more independent, but are not members of INTOSAI because of political
considerations” (personal communication). Similarly the website of the Association of
French Speaking Superior Control Institutions (AISCCUF) ignores the members of INTOSAI
2 La programmation annuelle (environ 90% des contrôles) ne dépend que de l’IGE ; le premier ministre
envoie chaque année une lettre de mission formelle à l’IGE sans instruction de contrôle précis, l’IGE élabore
son programme de travail et le transmit pour information au Premier ministre.