People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76.

February 3, 2000]
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same
class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws., this simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of
the people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to
the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance
of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.24SEP
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to
fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement
of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Osmena vs Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Congressman
Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner
asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special
Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the
President during his privilege speech entitled A Message to Garcia wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the Presidents
administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15 months for
the serious disorderly behavior.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioners words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speech and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.
HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself as stated in the provision that xxx
shall not be questioned in any other place.
2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the judiciary, because it is a matter that
depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of
power.
3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the suspension of the House Rules, which
according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.
4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, even expelled by the
votes of their colleagues.

Sergio Osmea, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then
President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to
investigate the charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be
subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea avers that the resolution violates his
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly
or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.

Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

Facts:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that
said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to
require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause
why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio Osmea, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a
Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling free things at premium
prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth, would constitute a serious assault
upon the dignity of the presidential office and would expose it to contempt and disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines
made by Osmea, Jr. It was authorized to summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to require the attendance
of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why he should
not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of the
present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmea alleged that

the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity

for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable
speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of Houseprovides that if other business has
intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to defend himself, found him guilty of
serious disorderly behavior and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty
as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of
Congress to discipline its members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session, the
Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." The provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt
from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a
member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge
his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
should be protected from the resentment of every one it may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member.

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured, committed to prison, and even expelled by the
votes of their colleagues. This was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United
States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against him, because after his speech it had taken up
other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a
suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action
which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions
that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the required
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to
abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action.
(Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was censured by the House, despite the argument that other
business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may
be disciplined, the court believed that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts . For one thing, if
this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have
assumed appellate jurisdiction,

which

the

Constitution

never

intended

to

confer

upon

coordinate branch of

the

Government. This was due to the theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this. Each department, it has been said, had
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission.)
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions.
Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or
unfair decision.
Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus
proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the
charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, due to the Constitution. Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied
power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform
its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state; That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. Given the exercise of the power committed to it, the
senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an
attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest
of comity, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions.
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by
resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of that Body. The Senator challenged
the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to
reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The

Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
votes, expel anelective member. The Jones Law empowered the Governor General to appoint Senators. Alejandrino was one.
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any
means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the
affected party.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In the
Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercisedthe power of
suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be
legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have
the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of
House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House,
and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would
seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however,
will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction.

Santiago v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001

Facts: "That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the aliens in violation of Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are
disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused."
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information.
Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending
petitioner.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her.
The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam DefensorSantiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction issuing suspension to petitioner.
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
Ratio: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
In view of suspension NOT as a penalty
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the
information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."

Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the
gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of
the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject
to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In view of multiple petitions
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended information did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019
because the official acts complained therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of
the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of
"qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in
not granting her motion to quash the information (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad,
7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1)
She was a public officer,
(2)
She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3)
Those aliens were disqualified;
(4)
She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5)
She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.'
In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks.
Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to'punish its Members for
disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that
the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."
In view of the power of the Court
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in
thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06
December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the
significant issue raised by petitioner.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members:
the former is not punitive, the latter is
FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The
Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a

Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the
information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the
Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as
well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public
officials and employees indicted before it.
Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis--vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated
duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution which provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in
thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan (2001)

356 SCRA 636 Political Law The Legislative Department Suspension of a Member of Congress Violations of RA 3019
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the
application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act
No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of
disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago.
Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned
for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the
suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for
90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title
7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The
suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House,
as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which
the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have
a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity
or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do
not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject
to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (G.R. NO. L-1123)

Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities.
The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that
some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were
already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were
they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by
the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had
been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as

already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The
SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into
the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and
the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not
say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the
president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as
follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands,
or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by
the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

Mabanag vs. Vito

Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been
elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after
the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the
same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a
consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor
was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to
the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of
said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and
the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or
citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible
of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political
function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise
of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the
judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of
ratification.

Title: ASTORGA vs VILLEGAS

GR No. 23475, April 30, 1974
Facts:In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the
owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to
the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of
RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of
the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine,
as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted.
When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred
back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently
approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for
approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and
sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as
amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew
and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of
the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted.
Decision:
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal
is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC
is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal
for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did
not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein,
the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring
about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
Astorga vs Villegas
Facts:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on third reading without amendments. But
when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of
the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing
the amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.
The printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by way of approval.
The bill became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the
bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
consequence, the Senate President invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.
Issue:
Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered to.
Held:
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments, which requires the judicial department
to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the right manner.
Petitioners argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment, required, it is
said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized by the fact that the Senate President declared his

signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill
to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, ET AL.

Facts;
House bill No. 9266, defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of Manila became a law under RA 4065 after both houses and
the President signed it. However, it was later on found out that the said law was not the same as the version approved by the Senate as it
was going thru its revision. With this finding, the Senate President and the President himself sent out a statement saying they are
withdrawing

their

signatures

from

the

House

Bill

No.

9266,

therefore,

it

should

not

be

considered

as

law.

Issue;
WON the petition for mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be granted and compel
the respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
Ruling;
The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate Presidents' signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266,
therefore it did not become a law. The temporary restraining order was also made permanent.The intent of the law making body based on its
journals prevailed over technicality of the legal process of enacting a bill.

Astorga vs. Villegas

G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled

Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing
the laws, that it was passed by Congress.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During
discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the
Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of
amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the
same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and
the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065.
However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.

ISSUES:

Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law

Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING:

Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an
official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that
has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires
the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in
other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they
are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the
validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of
the presiding officers that is essential.

When courts may turn to the journal

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal
is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked
to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal

discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which
admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Morales v Subido G.R. No. L-29658. February 27, 1969.

Facts: "In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute
measure. It is to this substitute bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.
"It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase 'who has served the police department of a city
for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,' under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both
parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course)could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative
process the phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"] was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained."
The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was
the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only
change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record."
In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the
various changes made. In what purport to be the page proofs of the bill as finally approved by both Houses of Congress.
It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or," was still part of the provision,
but according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire provision and substituted what now is Section 10 of the Police Act of
1966, which Section reads:
"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of
any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."
The petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the
Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the bill, explaining the change in Section 10, thus: "Section 10 was
recast for clarity. (with the consent of Sen. Ganzon & Congressman Montano)."
Issue: Whetherthe change an employee, as purportedty was a rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences, was in truth an alteration of
meaning.
Held: ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied.
Ratio: The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the
said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role
of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning the
immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants thereof.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive
on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree."
In view of Harwood v Wentworth
What the Justice Harlan said in Harwood v. Wentworth: How much greater is the danger of permitting the validity of a legislative
enactment to be questioned by evidence furnished by the general endorsements made by clerks upon bills previous to their final passage

and enrollment, endorsements usually so expressed as not to be intelligible to any one except those who made them, and the scope and
effect of which cannot in many cases be understood unless supplemented by the recollection of clerks as to what occurred in the hurry and
confusion often attendant upon legislative proceedings."
In view of two foreign landmark cases on enrolled bill doctrine
Both Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark and Harwood v. Wentworth involved claims similar to that made by the petitioner in this case. In both
the claims were rejected.
Thus, in Marshall Field & Co. it was contended that the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 was a nullity because "it is shown by the
congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress, and having
reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill as it finally passed, was not in the bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding
officers of the respective houses of Congress, and approved by the President."
In rejecting the contention, the United States Supreme Court held that the signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
by the President of the Senate of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses that such bill is the one that has passed
Congress. And when the bill thus attested is signed by the President and deposited in the archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
In Harwood the claim was that an act of the legislature of Arizona "contained, at the time of its final passage, provisions that were omitted
from it without authority of the council or the house, before it was presented to the governor for his approval." The Court reiterated its ruling
in Marshall Field & Co.
In view of Mabanag v Lopez-Vito & CASCO v Gimenez
It was not until 1947 that the question was presented in Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, and we there held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts." This court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution, despite the fact that the vote of three-fourths
of the members of the Congress (as required by the Constitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not actually
obtained on account of the suspension of some members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted. Whatever doubt there might have been as to the status and force of the theory in
the Philippines, in view of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag, was finally laid to rest by the unanimous decision in Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. Speaking for the Court, the then Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion said: "Furthermore, it is well settled that
the enrolled bill which uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and formaldehyde' is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez-Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961).
Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec
Facts: Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the HOR, hence, Comelec ruled that it had already
lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chatos election protest against Unico regarding canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of Unicos
proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for certiorari in the SC.
Issue: WON the court should take cognizance of Chatos election protest. If not, to who is this issue best addressed to?
WON his civil action for certiorari will prosper.
Held: The court should not take cognizance of Chatos election protest for it would amount to usurpation of the constitutionally mandated
functions of the HRET. Civil action for certiorari will not prosper. Ratio: - In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a
winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the
HRET. Reason: it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies with due regard to the peoples
mandate. - Special civil action for certiorari shall prosper if the following requisites concur: o Tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction o
There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. - In this case,
COMELEC did not commit rave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon Unicos proclamation.
It demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat regarding HRET.

Guingona vs Gonzales
Facts: As a result of national elections on May 1992, the Senate was composed by the following by parties:
LDP IS, NPC 5, Lakas 3. Applying the mathematical formula agreed by parties they are entitled to

twelve seats. On the organization of the Senate, Majority Floor Leader Romulo nominated eight senators for
Commission on Appointments. Senator Guingona objected on the nomination of Osmea.
Issue: Whether or not the Constitution requires the election and presence of 12 senators in the Commission?
Decision: Constitution does not require the election and presence of 12 Senators for the Commission to
function. Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their functions
even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constittion.

SCB PHILIPPINES VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AND CURRENCIES EN BANC
FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in
violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in
aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to
investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative

inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who
took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President
Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the
conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent
in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be
made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it
exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even
there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent
Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation,
although it may include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the
recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies
and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III
testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he
was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in
aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put,

the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President.
Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed
with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008 [Executive Privilege]
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of
the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.
RULING:

The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It pertains
to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations
and that the President believes should remain confidential. Presidential communications privilege applies
to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the
Presidents unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1)
The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
- i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence.
2)
The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President
or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the
President.
3)
The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

DECISION
(En Banc)
OZAETA, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and
Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the
governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses
summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge
the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million
proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas
corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
II.

THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of
which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the
witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing sought to
be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no
relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative
body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is
required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every
session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of
the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without
impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted
committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very
purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is
legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the
Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case.
3.

NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim
that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to
wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough
for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of selfincrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as

from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to
determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to
show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against
self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation . The witness cannot
assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a
third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is
justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might
incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.

Arnault vs Nazareno (G.R. No. L-3820)

Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid prison. Denied.
FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known
as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000
to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L.
Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de
Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money
to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress
Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary
of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October,
1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the transactions
surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important
of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and
irregularity of the Governments paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which
he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on
the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two
checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he
transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash,
which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault
resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which
brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18,
1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has
the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be

determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the
sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the
witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave
the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate
himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to
testify would be so punishable. Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal
the name of that person might incriminate him.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the
Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus,
and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and
the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of
military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the
public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the

power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777) - Digest

Facts:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate
on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of
the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend
the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all
the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.
Issue:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Ruling:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of the Legislature: The power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the
rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of
the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks
to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the department heads appearance is merely
requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department heads during question hour as it
explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislatures power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under
the rubric of executive privilege. This is the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.
This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the
failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by
the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these
officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it
expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes
that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the

executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of
office, has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied.
Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President
has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must
be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is
necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of
executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege,
Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal
means to compel his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a) are however valid.

Senate v. Ermita
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the
Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus,
and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and
the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in
a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of
military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the
public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
--------------------------------------

Senate v. Ermita
Facts:
In 2005,scandalsinvolving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita

submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due topressingmatters that needimmediateattention.
AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent asimilarletter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly
and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO
464basicallyprohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers
as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents
approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.

ISSUE:Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD:The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish
Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it mayexerciseits legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand
provides for the QuestionHour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in theapplicationof
check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in
contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while
closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section
22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere
fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest
official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is
valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of
privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455

235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere
consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate
thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the
House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but
also of reading the bill on separate days.

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the
3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own
version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and
substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text)
of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9
justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would
make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention
that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to
concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive
to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because
the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with
is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO. 209287,
July 1, 2014
In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court partially granted the consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
and declared the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular
No. 541 and related executive issuances unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with
the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the
Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations
Acts.
The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National
Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the
relevant General Appropriations Acts (GAAs).
Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any
act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials.
Remedial law; Locus standi. Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the Supreme Court ruled that the assertion of a
public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the
theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the
action complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to
protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The Court likewise cited Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., to explain that [s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Transcendental importance as a ground to waive locus standi. Each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the
outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them. In addition, considering that the issues center on the
extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not,
these cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the
determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad and wise discretion to waive the requirement
and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the Disbursement Allocation Program (DAP). Four phases
comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution;
and (4) Accountability.
The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring savings coming from the various departments and agencies
derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds;
and (3) applying the savings and unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program, activity or project] or to support other
priority PAPs.
Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy
through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the
Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1), Article VI. The President,
in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the
budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the

savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification
of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already
set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].
Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be
valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the Constitution], must be made upon a concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated
were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized.
This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.
Savings, defined. The definition of savings under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs refer to portions or balances of any
programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion
or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in
improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets.
The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger fund
available for discretionary spending. Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in
effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing appropriations under the GAAs.
The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code is to revert to the General Fund balances
of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year. The Executive could not circumvent this provision by
declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation
that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient, to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence in
this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of
needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by
augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court held that the savings pooled under the
DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs. Although the [Office of the
Solicitor General] rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the
laws (which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to
substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his
power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth
resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would
threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers.
Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional
Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices, Section 25(5) has delineated
borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or
cross-border augmentations.

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5) disallowing
cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under
Section 25(5).
No violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that the Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground
alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection
Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it,
and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of
funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the
fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The
requirement was not met here.
Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased,
ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and
circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter
of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.
The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP. To declare the implementation of the DAP
unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in
the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held
to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the
Government. Equity alleviates such burden.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that
the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow
moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the
DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the
President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some
non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the

MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec.
25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is
it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in
Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by
law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be
an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar
because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of
the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP,
even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be

declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year
and then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be
used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In
this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and
QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet
Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three
(3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and
a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System,"
presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null
and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress
1.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

2.

1.

Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congressrole must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and
monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2.

Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the
limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects was declared constitutional . IT INDICATED PURPOSE
ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY
FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines was declared unconstitutional. IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT
CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO
DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE
TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

Belgica vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa (digest)

BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208566; SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS.
HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208493); NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES. AQUINO (G.R. NO.
209251) NOVEMBER 19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district.

The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the
Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an
item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House
of Representatives.

In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became involved
in project identification.

The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.

It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support for
Local Development Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to individual
legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or hard projects but also covered
soft projects such as those which would fall under education, health and livelihood.


After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was revived
through the Mindanao Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.

In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was meant
to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.

CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies subject
to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify any
kind of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings and bridges to soft projects such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.

In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first time
when the Vice-President was given an allocation.

The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee
on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.

Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF.
Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the
Public Works Fund, among others.

The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the representative
of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.

In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food
Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the
release of funds.

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior
consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment
of funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel benefits.

In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general programs
and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.

It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.

The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual legislators.

In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds but with
the qualification that it may be allowed only once.

The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were also
allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and release of funds
were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND

The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (PSF).

The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.

The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE

In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money regularly
went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.


In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.

In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the
government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for
scores of ghost projects.

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.

Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a
dummy NGO.

ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners have legal
standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel system.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional
for violating the constitutional provisions on (a)separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative
power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy

There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system.

The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their utilization
are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.

The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or
annul the legal existence of the PDAF.

The moot and academic principle cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering
that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system
presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a
practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the
public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable

The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of
the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded
the Court to act upon.

The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.

(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue

Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.

As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.


As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases

The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case
was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring postenactment identification authority to Members of Congress.

On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.

Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering that
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be exercised by individual members of
Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.

The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management[2] does
not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and hence
no controlling doctrine was rendered.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has
been violated.

The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive department.

Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities
and the regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle.

Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.

That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law.

Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature.
They even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the
PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.

(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has

been violated

The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.

That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them determines
(a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine.
(c) Checks and balances


Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal
lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their
own discretion.

This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto.

It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation.
This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
Presidents power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable
of checking itself or its members.

The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
the implementation of the appropriation law.

The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.

The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government, because
it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.

The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.

(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.

Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.

Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy

The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds
for local development.

The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.

The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.

This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated toassist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.

Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing
local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.

For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money
and(b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.

Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a Special
Fund comprised of all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and all
sources.

It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount:
[a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less
thanP150,000,000.00.

It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines.

(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of
legislation powers.

The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section
8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used.

This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.

The law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves
the President without any guideline to construe the same.

The delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of a classification

since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.

Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990

Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990
GR 87636 -EN BANC
Facts:
December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or decreased certain
items included in the proposed budget submitted by the president
December 29, 1988 President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general
provision.
February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution decided to contest the constitutionality of the veto
of the president of SEC 55 only.
April 11, 1989 this petition was filed

 January 19, 1990 filed motion for leave to file and to admit supplemental petition same issues but included SEC 16 of
House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA 6831)
SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in the GAB thereby violation CONSTI
ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459)
SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and the reason for veto remains the same with the additional legal basis of
violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670 that authorizes the president and the heads of depts. To use
saving to augment any item of appropriations in the exec branch of government (page 460)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the line-veto power
of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as
items (Henry v. Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be
struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment appropriations
(ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.)
The provisions are inappropriate because
o They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations
o Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill
o It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation
Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the legislative the subject matter of the
provisions should be dealt with in separate and complete legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT passed
in that manner they attempt hide it in the GAB
If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SHOULD resort to their constitutionally
vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1)
DECISION: Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.

Gonzales v. Macaraig
191 SCRA 452 (1990)
Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As
passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional
provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988,
the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special Provisions and Section 55,
a General Provision, were vetoed. On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 (Authorizing and Directing the Committee on
Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of
1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes) was adopted. On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by Neptali
A. Gonzales, Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson T. Alvarez, Edgardo J. Angara, Agapito A. Aquino, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,
Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose D. Lina, Jr., John Osmea, Vicente T. Paterno, Rene A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Mamintal Abdul J.
Tamano, Wigberto E. Taada, Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando S. Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and as
substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by this case, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., Vicente Jayme, Carlos Dominguez, Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes Quisumbing, Raul Manglapus, Alfredo
Bengson, Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo Carague, Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C.
Domingo from implementing RA 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by the Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.s cause is anchored on the
following grounds: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provisions; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the itemveto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. The Solicitor General, as
counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the present case is a political question beyond the power of the Supreme Court to

determine; that Gonzales et al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a rider because it is extraneous to
the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the Presidents veto; that the power of the President to augment items in the appropriations for
the executive branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA
6670 (4 August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions or other distinct and severable parts of
an Appropriations Bill.
Issue:
whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution or differently put, has the President the
power to veto provisions of an Appropriations Bill
Held:
No. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the
general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is
referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power
given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to
approve the remaining portion of the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any
reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the Presidents veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not
changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto. The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in
the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates,
and does not relate to the entire bill. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) because they nullify the
authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the
Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When Sections 55 (FY 89)
and 16 (FY 90) prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the
interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the
Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch
concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings. More importantly, for such a special power as that of augmentation from savings, the
same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is one the primary and specific aim of which is to
make appropriation of money from the public treasury. It is a legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of
augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation
item inserted in an appropriation measure.
Issue:
whether Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are provisions, not items, in the appropriation bill
Held:
No. Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of
the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. The challenged provisions fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any
particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to
the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by the Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring

Office. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than
a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) although labeled as provisions, are actually
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.
Issue:
whether the Legislatures inclusion of qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds in the
Appropriation Bill was proper
Held:
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be spent; and that in
addition to distinct items of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or
restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an
appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. The veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of
the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should
be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or
conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again,
the test is appropriateness. It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds are appropriated.
Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a connexity with money items of appropriation that
they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of appropriateness. Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY
89) and Section 16 (FY 90) must also be held to be inappropriate conditions. While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY 90), have been
artfully drafted to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and,
therefore, separate legislation. Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The reason is that
items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on the face of the enrolled bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can only be
detected when compared with the original budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90) themselves
provide that an item shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act. Herein, there is no condition, in the budgetary sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill which was struck out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90) partake more of a curtailment on the power to
augment from savings; in other words, a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill.
Issue:
whether the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy
laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress
(1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1]). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.s argument
that the veto is ineffectual so that there is nothing to override has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld.
There need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each
exercising its respective powers with due deference to the constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate
equilibrium of governmental powers remains on even keel.
Note:
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in
the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the
executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.
Note: Executive Impoundment

Definition: This refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type.
Argument against executive impoundment: Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress has set
aside the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to implement the project
and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty
to faithfully execute the laws.
Argument for executive impoundment: Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the
President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power
drawn from the Presidents role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same provisions
invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from implementing the law if doing so would
prejudice public interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In
such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law.